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از حذف رزم‌آرا تا ملی شدن نفت | قسمت دوم گفتگوی شهرام اتفاق و کوروش احمدی — Transcript

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0:01An atmosphere had been created in
0:03society in 1949—and even before that
0:05—a climate of fear and terror, such
0:08that those who wanted to negotiate with
0:10foreign parties were afraid. Hazhir was
0:13assassinated for this very reason, as
0:16he had gone to help draft the
0:17Gass-Golshayan Agreement. Razmara was
0:19assassinated for this very reason, as
0:21he had reached an agreement on that
0:2350/50 contract. Why did Razmara keep
0:25this hidden? It was kept hidden for
0:29fear of his life, and the British
0:31Embassy in Iran understood perfectly
0:33well that the assassination of Razmara
0:35had absolutely no effect on the
0:37nationalization of oil. Iran's
0:39representative, Mr. Abbas-Qoli
0:41Golshayan, was negotiating with Mr.
0:43Gass, the company's representative.
0:45Could there have been any negotiation
0:47easier or clearer than that at the time
0:49? For example, this Mr. Hazhir, who
0:52they said was assassinated by Emami (
0:55this Emami was the person who
0:57assassinated the late Kasravi); Mr.
0:59Hazhir tried very hard to say that
1:01Kasravi was deserving of death, that
1:03his killing was necessary, he had to be
1:06killed, and Emami should be released.
1:09This same Mr. Hazhir released Emami
1:12from prison. Do you see what kind of
1:14situation we were facing back then?
1:19Hello Mr. Ettefaq, hello Mr. Ahmadi,
1:22thank you for giving us your time again
1:24. In our last session, we discussed the
1:32various events related to oil contracts
1:46and the motives that led to the concern
1:48for nationalizing the oil industry in
1:50Iran; we talked about different
1:52contracts, what policy should have been
1:54pursued, and what results the policies
1:56that were pursued yielded, so it would
1:58be good to revisit two of its topics,
2:00which I will list by title. In this
2:12session, we will also cover the story
2:16of Razmara's assassination, the
2:23nationalization of the oil industry,
2:26Dr. Mossadegh's premiership, up to
2:28August 19th [28 Mordad], with the goal
2:31of having a clear answer to the
2:33question of whether, on August 19, 1953
2:36, a coup took place against Mossadegh
2:43or not? If not, what was the story?
2:48Those two questions from the previous
2:50session, or the topics that are worth
2:59reviewing again and were the focus of
3:01part of the discussion: one was the
3:03matter of whether the subsidiaries of
3:05the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company existed
3:07in the contract that was revised by
3:09Reza Shah or not? Meaning, did that 20%
3:18share that Iran had include these
3:21subsidiaries or not? And secondly, is
3:26there any documentation regarding the
3:28making or receiving of the 50/50
3:30proposal by Razmara from England or not
3:38? Mr. Ahmadi, if we want to start with
3:45you, and in this first part, check
3:47these one or two points with you and
3:49Mr. Ettefaq; regarding the contract,
3:52the second contract, exactly what share
3:59or consideration was intended for Iran?
4:03And did this include the subsidiaries
4:05as well—meaning, aside from the
4:07profits taken from Iranian oil, was any
4:09benefit mentioned for Iran or not?
4:15Yes, hello to you and to Mr. Ettefaq; I
4:17am happy to be at your service once
4:19again. I would like to address the two
4:24issues you mentioned that remained from
4:26our last session. Well, in the previous
4:34session, I spoke and gave my opinion,
4:36explaining that in the definitions
4:38section of the 1933 contract and in
4:40Article 10, the contract is...The text
4:52is drafted in such a way that the 20
4:54percent does not include the
4:55subsidiaries of the National Iranian
4:57Oil Company; excuse me, the...It does
5:05not include the Anglo-Iranian Oil
5:06Company. In what way? Well, this is the
5:09contract text; here is the English
5:11version. Of course, look, in this text,
5:15"the Company" is defined, and the "
5:17Anglo-Iranian Oil Company" is also
5:19defined. The term "the Company" is
5:28defined as meaning the Anglo-Iranian
5:29Oil Company plus all its subsidiary
5:31companies.
5:37This is the definition given for "the
5:39Company."
5:40Aha, in...
5:43Meaning the definition of "the Company"
5:45is the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and a
5:48series of other firms, plus its
5:50subsidiaries.
5:53Subsidiaries of the company, meaning
5:55its subordinates; aha, Iran and Britain
5:57plus the companies underneath.
6:06Aha, yes. "The Company"; the company is
6:16defined this way, whereas in the next
6:18clause, the "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company"
6:20is defined, stating it is the
6:22Anglo-Iranian Oil Company or any other
6:24company that, with the consent of the
6:26government—meaning the Iranian
6:27government according to Article 26—
6:29this concession can be transferred to.
6:40Now look, these side points are not
6:42important; what is important is that "
6:44its subsidiary companies" is not here.
6:49Meaning it has defined the
6:51Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, what kind of
6:53company it is, and so on.
6:56And...
6:57Well, where that 20 percent is defined
6:59...
7:01Well, then we go to Article 10; in
7:03Article 10 it says that...Subsection B
7:12of Article 10—the subtitle of clause
7:14B—says that the payment of 20 percent
7:16...It talks about the payment of 20
7:24percent of the ordinary shares of the
7:26Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, it does not
7:28say 20 percent of the shares of "the
7:30Company."
7:33Uh...
7:34Here it says that the payment...A sum
7:40equivalent to 20 percent that is
7:42payable to the holders of ordinary
7:43shares...
7:47Uh......of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
7:50Company.
7:52Aha.
7:53Then, up above, it had defined this
7:55Anglo-Iranian Oil Company excluding the
7:57"subsidiary companies"...
8:00It had defined it; the "subsidiary
8:02companies" were included for "the
8:04Company."
8:07That is why here, this 20 percent does
8:09not apply to "the Company" in a way
8:11that would also include those "
8:13subsidiary companies."
8:16Yes, may I ask two questions here, if
8:19your explanations are complete?
8:21Well, of course, there is more to it,
8:23but in any case, you can ask about this
8:25part; one is when it says ordinary
8:27shares...Which company? I mean, did we
8:33have two companies that had gone public
8:35on the London Stock Exchange? No,
8:38holders of ordinary shares.
8:41Holders of ordinary shares of the
8:43Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
8:45Aha.
8:47No, not two companies, not several
8:49companies; it says 20 percent, meaning
8:51an amount equivalent to 20 percent of
8:53the distributable shares to the
8:55ordinary shareholders of the
8:57Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
8:59Right.
9:00Meaning Iran’s share is 20 percent of
9:02distributable shares.
9:04Yes.
9:06To the ordinary shareholders of the
9:08Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
9:11Yeah, but the issue is that if those
9:13companies—look, every company has
9:16shareholders; naturally, in that
9:18shareholding system, ownership of
9:20subsidiaries is also taken into account
9:22. Meaning that anyone who holds shares
9:25anywhere, they proportionally own
9:27shares in all the assets. If those
9:30subsidiary companies were actual assets
9:32of the Iran-Anglo company. The
9:35Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and it’s
9:37mentioned here that it's equal to 20
9:39percent of the ordinary shares, so
9:41naturally, it should include the
9:42subsidiaries too.
9:44No, look, it says that we have a
9:46company defined in this way, okay?
9:50Whether that is logical or not is a
9:52different discussion, but the way it's
9:55defined here, it says we have a company
9:57whose costs of its subsidiaries become
9:59the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Yes.
10:15Meaning.
10:15Then how did it define Anglo-Persian?
10:18Then, in what it brings afterwards. In
10:22the so-called next clause, it says that
10:24. Company D. Any other corporate. B.
10:48That with consent or any or any other
10:50company.
10:58Yes.
10:59This means the discussion about...
11:03It’s a technical discussion about the
11:05legal status of this company, in terms
11:07of who owns the concession now with the
11:09Iranian government's consent, and in
11:11the future, it might belong to someone
11:13else, meaning it's transferable. It
11:19wanted to introduce transferability
11:21here, but it didn't talk about '
11:23subsidiary companies' in relation to
11:24the definition of the Anglo-Persian Oil
11:26Company Limited.
11:29It didn't.
11:30It wasn't done.
11:33Yes, then in this clause, in Article 10
11:36, section 1 (b), it says "distributable
11:38shares," 20 percent of distributable
11:40shares to—look, all these words used
11:43here have a reason, a meaning, and have
11:45effects and consequences.
11:50Meaning.
11:52What do the benefits that reached Iran
11:54after this contract show us?
11:55Well, that’s another discussion;
11:57that’s a completely different story.
11:59As for the numbers and figures Iran
12:01received, whether it matches that,
12:02that’s a whole different story. Look,
12:10here it says paying a figure equivalent
12:13to 20 percent of distributable shares
12:15to the ordinary shares of the
12:17Anglo-Persian Oil Company, now they
12:19also subtract 671,250 pounds from it;
12:21they calculate the surplus over this.
12:29Then in clause 'c' it says, Excuse me,
12:43No. It defined 'b' above, Meaning it
13:08says that the amount paid by the
13:09company to the Iranian government
13:11during the year must not be less than
13:13750,000 pounds.
13:16Look, in clause 'b' it used the
13:18Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and in the
13:20clause where it says The total money
13:25that with its other companies
13:30It means, look, the "Company" here,
13:32along with its subsidiaries, it says
13:34the total money the company provides—
13:36defined as the company and its
13:38subsidiaries—to Iran should not be
13:40less than one thousand pounds.
13:45This itself is also another
13:50It has another story as to why this
13:52ceiling was used here; consequently,
13:54this 20 only includes the so-called
13:56dividends of this Anglo-Persian Oil
13:58Company.
14:02And nothing else; and then it says 20
14:04percent of distributable shares. I
14:08think I explained last session that
14:10distributable shares also have their
14:12own story, because they can be subject
14:13to two limits, two restrictions.
14:18Meaning distributable shares are shares
14:19that the British government, the
14:21company, the board of directors, and
14:23the general assembly of the company
14:24have permitted to be distributed among
14:26ordinary shareholders.
14:31For example, I mentioned that during
14:33the Second World War, a year or two
14:34before the war and perhaps many years
14:36after the war, 80 percent They wouldn't
14:41allow the shares; the British
14:42government wouldn't allow them to be
14:44distributed.
14:44It wouldn't allow dividend distribution
14:46.
14:50It wouldn't allow dividend distribution
14:52, and at that time, the company itself,
14:54the board of directors, and the general
14:56assembly would approve setting aside a
14:58portion of this profit as a reserve for
15:00investment or other purposes, and then
15:02none of these would be distributable
15:03shares.
15:08Will not
15:10It does not include ordinary shares,
15:12meaning that is a figure that, after
15:14these are deducted, the shares
15:15distributable to ordinary shareholders
15:20Are then determined as to how much they
15:22are. I think you did the right thing by
15:32emphasizing this topic because over the
15:34past years, many people have just
15:35looked at this 20, saying it was 16 in
15:37the D'Arcy Concession and then it
15:39became 20 here, whereas the D'Arcy
15:41Concession says: 16 percent of the
15:43annual net profits of the company and
15:45the companies that it will establish
15:46hereafter.
15:55Shall belong to the Sublime Government,
15:57meaning its status is completely clear.
16:00See, then what are ordinary shares?
16:02Ordinary shares mean minus the 51
16:03percent shares given to the British
16:05government, and that's just the
16:06beginning.
16:09See how much it restricts this,
16:10subtracts this from it, then 25 percent
16:13belongs to the Burmah Oil Company,
16:14meaning 24 percent of these shares are
16:16ordinary shares that are distributable
16:18to ordinary shareholders, and even then
16:21, that Relates only to the
16:26Anglo-Persian Oil Company, minus the
16:28subsidiaries.
16:30Very well.
16:31And another issue here, the other issue
16:33you mentioned, is how much was actually
16:35given in practice.
16:49See, the lawyers for the company
16:51brought this in for a rainy day;
16:52meaning if one day things ended up in
16:54arbitration, or court, or a tribunal,
16:56they would have this to say that
16:58subsidiary companies were not included
17:00and we shouldn’t have paid Iran money
17:02for the revenue of those subsidiaries,
17:04based on...However, in practice, Iran
17:06had absolutely no access to the books,
17:08the company ledgers, and Iran, as a
17:10partner, was never granted any
17:11permission to audit or examine the
17:13company's books, and this was always
17:15one of Iran's problems, a very serious
17:17one. And why was it serious? Because
17:32for many reasons, one being that they
17:34were selling Iran's oil to the British
17:36Navy at a massive discount. They were
17:42selling it at a massive discount to the
17:43British airline, and the secret
17:45agreement signed between the company
17:46and the British government was never
17:48made public. It never ceased to be
17:52confidential. But, well, back then and
17:54afterward, there were estimates, so to
17:56speak. The estimate was that it was
18:02sold at around 25 percent of the global
18:04price to the British Navy, and well,
18:06all this came out of Iran's pocket.
18:14It came out of Iran's pocket, but since
18:16Iran didn't have access to the ledgers
18:18and couldn't audit them, it was just "
18:20what you see is what you get"; they
18:22would give Iran a lump sum and say, for
18:24example, "this is your million pounds
18:26or 500 share," and Iran couldn't
18:27question it in any way.
18:34Very well, Jamian, your observations
18:36regarding the contract, as well as the
18:38question left over from the last
18:40session: what documentation exists for
18:42receiving the 5-percent proposal? From
18:50the company, that is? I would like to
18:54extend my greetings to you and your
18:55respected colleagues.
18:59Dear Mr. Kourosh Ahmadi, and all the
19:01viewers who are going to watch this
19:03program, This image, which is a slide
19:09here, I request that your colleagues
19:11show this slide. This slide is actually
19:15the D'Arcy Oil Concession; it is a part
19:17of the D'Arcy Oil Concession. One of
19:22the chapters related to this part is
19:25its ninth chapter, which we see here;
19:27ten is over here.
19:29Tenth, maybe, perhaps.
19:31Here is the tenth.
19:32Yes, chapter nine; that one is just an
19:35example.
19:35As an example, in fact.
19:40Its ninth chapter states: "The Imperial
19:41Government of Iran permits the
19:43Concessionaire to establish one or more
19:45companies to benefit from said
19:46concession." And then he can go and,
19:51based on the decisions he makes,
19:53organize the bylaws of those subsidiary
19:55companies himself. And in its tenth
20:03chapter, it is stipulated that between
20:05the concessionaire on one side and the
20:07company it forms on the other, an
20:09agreement will be made that one month
20:11after the official date of the
20:12company's establishment, the
20:13concessionaire is obligated to pay
20:1520,000 British pounds in cash and
20:1720,000 pounds in paid-up shares to the
20:19government. In addition to that, the
20:28company and all companies that will be
20:30established shall be obligated to pay
20:3210/16 of their annual net profits to
20:34the government year by year. Therefore,
20:41with such a background, the 1933 or
20:431312 contract is concluded by Reza Shah
20:46. Reza Shah and his colleagues actually
20:50conclude this contract. I request that
20:54your esteemed colleagues show slide
20:56number [number]. This is actually the
20:59image of the same contract that Mr.
21:01Ahmadi was just talking about. This I
21:07have broken down the contract in slide
21:09three. Slide three is also the
21:12discussion that Mr. Ahmadi was bringing
21:14up. See, in the definitions, an
21:18important point we have is that in the
21:20definitions section, the company is
21:22defined, the firm is defined, and
21:24subsidiaries are defined. Subsidiaries
21:35are companies where the parent company
21:36has the right to appoint more than half
21:38of the directors directly or indirectly
21:40, or holds over 50 percent of the
21:42shares; therefore, our definition of a
21:44subsidiary in this contract is that the
21:46company must either hold more than 50
21:47percent of the shares or be able to
21:49appoint more than 50 percent of the
21:51directors there.
21:59Yes.
22:01Could you please show slide four? Slide
22:06three, that same clause, please show
22:09slide three if possible.
22:13This.
22:13No, the next one, the next one, yes,
22:16this is it; it says that an amount
22:18equivalent to 20 percent in addition to
22:20what......is actually paid to the
22:25ordinary shareholders of the
22:26Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 20 percent
22:28must be paid as profit to the ordinary
22:31shareholders. Mr. Ahmadi's definition
22:37of ordinary and non-ordinary shares is
22:39different from the definition I have.
22:43Ordinary shares are in contrast to
22:44preferred shares. I mean, no one there
22:47has said that in ordinary shares, you
22:50cannot benefit from that 51 percent
22:52which belongs to, for example, the
22:54government, the oil belongs to the
22:56British government, or not? Ordinary
23:00shareholders have a difference with
23:02preferred shareholders. Preferred
23:07shares allocate a guaranteed profit to
23:09the shareholders, and they enjoy a
23:11privilege that ordinary shareholders do
23:13not. An ordinary shareholder benefits
23:23from all the profits and assets of the
23:25company, and the notion that we assume
23:27that they do not benefit from the
23:29assets is not correct; that is, for
23:31instance, for someone to say that an
23:33ordinary shareholder does not benefit
23:35from the 51 percent belonging to the
23:37British government, I beg you...
23:43Excuse me, the point that exists
23:45exactly here is this. Now, it is stated
23:49here that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
23:51, in the definitions section of the
23:54contract, defines the "Company" once,
23:56defines the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
23:58once, and......and also, in fact,
24:02defines the subsidiaries, defines the
24:05subsidiaries, saying that subsidiaries
24:07are those who are...
24:08Yes, above 50 percent management-wise,
24:11but whatever they are, they belong to
24:13the "Company."
24:14It makes no difference at all; this has
24:16no effect on the discussion. I would
24:18ask you to show the next slide. See,
24:21the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had 59
24:24subsidiaries, and these are a part of
24:26them. A few examples of them. The
24:30Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had 59
24:33subsidiaries and a series of assets.
24:36Yes.
24:37And regarding the assets, there is no
24:39doubt. Meaning it had 300 ocean-going
24:43oil tankers. It had several refineries;
24:46these are part of its assets, meaning
24:48that without a doubt, as a regular
24:50shareholder......we were entitled to 20
24:53percent of the profits from all of
24:55these operations.
24:55Well, that is not in the contract; to
24:57say it like that, how are you going to
24:59resolve this dispute now?
25:01I will explain it now.
25:02Yes.
25:03I will resolve the issue now.
25:06Therefore, all the company's assets,
25:09including those 300 ocean-going tankers
25:11, the oil refinery in France, the oil
25:14refinery in Australia, the oil refinery
25:16in Britain—all the profits from these
25:19, 20 percent of it, should have gone to
25:21us; this is without doubt.
25:24That is not in the contract, that is a
25:26different interpretation; this
25:27difference in interpretation is clear,
25:29I have read it, now let's talk about it
25:31.
25:34The companies here, which are the
25:36subsidiaries—those in which the
25:37Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has over 50
25:39percent of shares or over 50 percent of
25:41board membership—have been included
25:43in the contract, and those not covered
25:45by this contract have been excluded
25:47from our profits. Meaning we did not
25:53receive 20 percent from the companies
25:55where the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has
25:57less than 50 percent [shares] or less
25:59than 50 percent board membership,
26:00according to the agreement made there.
26:07So this is one point; another point
26:09that was raised in the previous session
26:11—which is often brought up—is that
26:13they say the taxes the Anglo-Iranian
26:15Oil Company paid to the British
26:17government were more than the oil money
26:19it paid to us. The reason is that the
26:24Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was paying
26:26the taxes of the 59 subsidiaries and
26:28those assets to the British government,
26:30and this is not taken into account in
26:33the calculations. Meaning that, in fact
26:38, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was
26:40paying the British government taxes on
26:42the sum of all the activities it was
26:44conducting worldwide.
26:48But our 20 percent share was not small
26:50either; meaning that a portion of those
26:5359 subsidiaries and all the assets of
26:55the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company could
26:57have belonged to us. Am I the only one
27:01making this interpretation? No,
27:05credible experts in the country have,
27:07in fact, had this interpretation. Three
27:14credible oil experts had this
27:16interpretation regarding this 20
27:18percent. The first one is Manouchehr
27:22Farmanfarmaian; he has written that the
27:24British, for a long time—that is,
27:26from the 1920s onwards—were extremely
27:29interested in separating the
27:30subsidiaries from us. And this was
27:34realized under Mosaddegh's
27:35administration, because only by
27:37nationalizing the oil could these
27:39companies be definitively and certainly
27:41separated from us. Mosaddegh proceeded
27:45to nationalize oil without study or
27:47foresight, and even our historians who,
27:49after Mosaddegh, spilled so much ink on
27:52paper and in books about oil, did not
27:54want to assess from a financial and
27:56political standpoint what benefits the
27:58nationalization of oil had for the
28:00Iranian nation. If it was a point of
28:04pride, it is unclear what that pride
28:06consists of, and if the intention was
28:08profit, then Iran gained nothing from
28:10it but major losses and the like. This
28:14is from the book "Tehran to Caracas,
28:16Oil and Politics in Iran," page 350, by
28:19Manouchehr Farmanfarmaian. Elsewhere,
28:24he says that as a result of Mosaddegh's
28:27ignorance, Iran forever lost its rights
28:29to 20 percent of the profits of all the
28:31subsidiary companies of the
28:33Anglo-Persian Oil Company worldwide.
28:38The next figure who has commented on
28:40this field is Dr. Parviz Mina, one of
28:42the former directors of the National
28:44Iranian Oil Company. He says he is
28:47asked, "Well, why wasn't this raised in
28:49those discussions and disputes after
28:51the oil nationalization?""Why wasn't it
28:54raised before?""Why wasn't it raised
28:56after?" He says, "I believe that
29:00perhaps the issue was considered, but
29:02the intention was to include Iran's
29:04list of claims regarding lost profits
29:06in subsidiary companies in the final
29:08stages, when the issue of compensation
29:10is raised and each party presents their
29:13claims." Uh.
29:22Dr. Fuad Rouhani, whom you introduced
29:24as a credible expert in the previous
29:26session, also believes that during Dr.
29:27Mosaddegh's time, there was always talk
29:29of addressing all of Iran's claims
29:31alongside the company's claims, and
29:33Iran always considered its share in the
29:35profits of the subsidiary companies as
29:37part of its contractual rights and
29:39claims. These are three oil experts who
29:46have a similar interpretation. The
29:52dispute, meaning the point that exists
29:53in the contract, is that what is being
29:55said in the contract is that the
29:57subsidiary companies are only those
29:59companies in which the Anglo-Persian
30:00Oil Company holds over 50 percent.
30:05Meaning, so they don't come claiming
30:07tomorrow...
30:08But even this still had to be evaluated
30:10. Meaning that for instance, in 1934 or
30:201936, the composition of these
30:21subsidiary companies whose shares were
30:23over 50 percent or less than 50 percent
30:25naturally differed, and those who
30:27wanted to handle this case had to
30:29calculate year by year the subsidiary
30:31companies that were over 50 percent,
30:33and where the number of Anglo-Persian
30:35Oil Company board members in those
30:36companies was over 50 percent. They
30:46would effectively extract the list of
30:48those subject to this plan and
30:50calculate our 20 percent based on that.
30:52Yes. Excuse me, may I ask two questions
30:55here, similar to the two questions I
30:57asked Mr. Ahmadi? Look, three
31:00definitions have been provided in the
31:02definitions section. At least three of
31:05them that I have seen now. You stated
31:13that regarding "The Company" itself,
31:15Iran's interests are limited in your
31:17view to subsidiaries where the company
31:19is involved in over 50%of the
31:21management or shareholding. Now the
31:30question is, when the definitions
31:32section explicitly defines these three
31:34layers—The Company, the Anglo-Iranian
31:37Oil Company, and the subsidiaries—and
31:39then in the article that wants to
31:41specify Iran's share of interest
31:48refers to the second definition,
31:49doesn't this signify something?
31:53Meaning it excludes it? Yes, doesn't
31:57this show that it is specifically
31:58pointing to the second layer out of
32:00these three, or should it be
32:02interpreted differently? Hello friends,
32:07I am Mehdi Ahmadi, manager of the Azad
32:09collective. Those who have known us for
32:13a long time know that Azad's finances
32:15work by covering all expenses, except
32:17for studio rent, through YouTube
32:19revenue, and we would share the
32:20specific case of studio rent with our
32:22audience every year. With your monthly
32:27foreign currency and rial support, you
32:29helped us cover this and continue
32:31Azad's activities. For the new contract
32:33, we did not announce this. The reason
32:35was that we were required to have the
32:37new contract in the form of a mortgage.
32:39Some audience members helped us. We
32:44secured it through loans and credit
32:46facilities, and the reason I am sharing
32:48this with you again is that we now need
32:50you to stand by us again to repay those
32:52facilities. For monthly foreign
32:56currency support, you can use the
32:58Patreon platform, and for monthly rial
33:00support, use the Hami-bash platform.
33:02Links to both platforms are available
33:04in the description. Let me add one
33:06point as well. Your support helps us
33:09focus more on more important
33:11conversations that require both longer
33:13negotiations and detailed research,
33:15giving us the leisure to do so. Thank
33:19you. You can watch the continuation of
33:21the conversation.
33:24I request that if possible, your
33:25colleagues put up the previous slide.
33:28No, the one before that; yes.
33:30Look, in those definitions, we have a
33:32place where it says "Company operations
33:35in Iran."
33:36Yes.
33:38Meaning all industrial, commercial, and
33:40technical oil operations that the
33:42company carries out exclusively to
33:44execute this concession; if their
33:46intention was to deprive us of those
33:48privileges, instead of all this
33:50complexity, they could have just said
33:52in the same clause related to the 20
33:54percent that
34:00Iran's profit from this project is
34:02related to oil operations only
34:04performed in Iran, point to "Company
34:05operations in Iran," and state there
34:07that this profit only relates to that
34:09—meaning very simply, instead of this
34:11much goodwill, otherwise, it’s a
34:13legal trick.
34:17It might even be a legal trick; that's
34:20perfectly fine, I...I do not reject
34:22this claim by dear Mr. Ahmadi. It is
34:25possible that they created such
34:27complexity in the contract so that they
34:29could renege in the future; this is
34:31probable. But I have a big question,
34:37and that is why did none of the
34:38supporters of oil nationalization,
34:40whether before the agreement or after,
34:42after the nationalization of oil during
34:45the disputes with the Anglo-Iranian Oil
34:47Company, raise this issue? Look, right
34:53now tomorrow morning...
34:54Look, it wasn't even a topic.
34:57Suppose Mr. Ahmadi and I are
34:58representatives of the Iranian
35:00government, and we get up and go to
35:02England to argue over this issue.
35:06Despite the fact that we have two
35:08different opinions, when we go to
35:09negotiate, we negotiate with the other
35:11side under the assumption that this is
35:13our right.
35:15Yes.
35:18It's true that we have this difference
35:20of opinion within our own internal
35:21debates, but when we want to go and
35:23negotiate there, our natural assumption
35:25is that it works this way; so who told
35:26them not to raise this issue? It was
35:31worth raising. One of the points Mr.
35:34Movahed raises in his book right here
35:36is exactly this. I have the third
35:42volume of Mr. Movahed's book, pages
35:44908-909, as a reference, and he is
35:46stating exactly this: that this issue
35:48was not raised at all in the meetings
35:50they had there, or in the negotiations
35:52they had for resolving the dispute
35:54after nationalization.
35:59Two points were raised there; here are
36:01the discussions they brought up.
36:02Well, naturally, they went into the
36:04negotiations with that very approach;
36:06they said, even if there is ambiguity,
36:07let's go for the maximum.
36:09They didn't do it, they didn't state
36:11the maximum; that is the criticism
36:13directed at them now.
36:14The criticism is that...
36:16Suppose you are in doubt whether this
36:1920%belongs to the Iranian nation or not
36:21; you have your doubts, right?
36:23Yes.
36:25The logical thing to do, in fact, is to
36:28go into the meeting with this
36:30assumption and state your maximum
36:32demand, saying, well, it is certain
36:34that we must benefit from the 20%
36:36contract. Why didn't they do that?
36:39Excuse me, let me ask my second
36:41question. Can the benefits Iran
36:45received after this agreement show us
36:47whether it was only from operations in
36:49Iran or if it included the subsidiary?
36:54It can't show that at all, because
36:55those calculations were never done, and
36:57that is my criticism. My point is, look
37:01, the main activities taking place
37:03during that period were political
37:05demonstrations, strikes, "Death to
37:07America,""Death to the Shah," and such,
37:09and no one was pursuing these arguments
37:11at all. Well no, at the time of oil
37:15nationalization, this issue was raised
37:17very seriously. Now let's move forward,
37:20I will tell the rest of the story; no,
37:22after the nationalization of oil.
37:25Meaning there, the amounts we were
37:27receiving were the same four shillings
37:28for every [], plus the amounts that
37:30were listed there and such. They had
37:34left those calculations for later,
37:36because different people were
37:37responsible, and they thought, well,
37:39one day we'll sit down and do the math.
37:43And the big problem is that many didn't
37:45even grasp the sheer volume, the actual
37:47volume of the wealth that was there;
37:49look.
37:51My entire point in this discussion is
37:53this.
37:57What we should have done—and I say we
37:59should have maintained that contract—
38:02was that instead of separating from the
38:04Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which later
38:06became BP or British Petroleum—the
38:08equivalent of Mercedes in the auto
38:10industry—we should have gone and
38:12acquired shares in it. Because...could
38:17you please put up the next poster?
38:22Excuse me, look; no, right here, see,
38:24here the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had
38:27shares in the Kuwait Oil Company, in
38:29the Iraq Petroleum Company, in the
38:31Qatar Petroleum Company, and we could
38:33have been a player in those commercial
38:35sectors, and the profit, the economic
38:37profit that would have resulted from
38:39this was far greater than the
38:41accounting profit of this endeavor.
38:45It was greater, and if you could also
38:47tell us what the documentation for that
38:4950-50 clause was.
38:51Yes, let me tell you that. I would like
39:01to ask your esteemed colleagues to be
39:02kind enough to put up the next slide.
39:10This one.
39:11Look, yes, see, on December 30, 1950. I
39:17haven't reached that slide yet; on
39:20December 30, 1950. Saudi Arabia reached
39:25an agreement with the American side,
39:27signed it, and finalized it, so that a
39:2950-50 contract was formed.
39:31When is that in the solar calendar?
39:33December 30th is Dey 9, 1329.
39:37The 9th.
39:38The 9th of Dey, two months before
39:40nationalization.
39:41Two months before nationalization; of
39:43course, this discussion had been raised
39:45in Saudi Arabia for several months, and
39:48as soon as it was raised there.
39:49News of it reached Iran.
39:51News of it had reached Iran as well,
39:53but what was agreed upon and signed on
39:56paper is Dey 9, 1329. Therefore, to say
40:02that the 50-50 contract wasn't realized
40:04, meaning it was too late, that’s not
40:07the case at all; because when Reza Shah
40:09signed the second contract in 1933,
40:12there was no other example in the
40:14Middle East at all; meaning we were the
40:16first oil nation in the Middle East in
40:181900. And 50-50, meaning 1329, Dey 9,
40:251329, this contract between Saudi
40:28Arabia and...
40:29America signed it.
40:31It is finalized with America.
40:32Venezuela was also before that.
40:34Venezuela had done this several years
40:36earlier. The structure of oil in
40:41Venezuela, the structure of oil in the
40:43United States, the level of access, and
40:45their conditions were completely
40:47different from Iran, from the Middle
40:48East, and that was not the benchmark
40:50for the company, for the Iranians;
40:52meaning that wasn't their issue. The
41:00date is January 23, 1951, Equivalent to
41:04Bahman 3, 1329, A meeting is held in
41:09the office of Sir William Strang, the
41:11Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
41:12Affairs of the UK; this meeting...
41:14'51 would be 1329.
41:18'51 would be 1330, I think.
41:2350, this house is 50, it probably
41:26should be 50.
41:28The second of Esfand 1329, maybe that
41:30part was written incorrectly.
41:32Yes, yes.
41:33No, it’s February, right? Am I
41:37mistaken?
41:38Yes, now we...
41:39No, February 21st which is likely
41:41around Esfand, but 51 would be [year]
41:4330, [year] 30.
41:44Yes.
41:45This needs to be checked, yes.
41:50To inform you, equivalent to Bahman 3,
41:531329, a meeting is held there based on
41:55that session. A 50-50 agreement is
42:01reached.
42:01Between whom and whom?
42:05Between the British Foreign Office,
42:07Treasury officials, and the
42:09Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This is
42:15communicated to the British Embassy in
42:17Iran. Mr. Shepherd references the
42:22minutes with the number I wrote up
42:26there, F371/91522, and writes a letter
42:29to Razmara with the lower reference
42:33number, F371/91523.
42:37Ah.
42:38Well, and...This letter indicates that
42:45the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has
42:47agreed to accept this 50-50 [split] and
42:50has made other agreements as well.
42:54What were those other agreements? Those
42:56other agreements were that...The book I
43:06am holding is by one of the supporters,
43:08no, one of the devotees of Mr.
43:10Mossadegh; by Colonel Gholamreza Nejati
43:12. It is a two-volume book, this is the
43:16first volume, I am...Reading page 233
43:22of the book. In this book, it is
43:24written that...In a letter, Shepherd
43:33informed Razmara that arrangements have
43:35been made for the Oil Company to pay
43:37Iran 28.5 million pounds in royalties
43:39in 1951, and to deposit another 10
43:41million pounds to Iran's account for
43:43this purpose during the same year. Also
43:52, to sign a contract with Iran based on
43:54the 50-50 principle. Shepherd, hoping
44:01that Razmara would be able to get what
44:03he prepares approved by Parliament,
44:05explains the profit-sharing plan after
44:07consulting with the Treasury, the
44:09Ministry of Fuel and Power, and the
44:10company, and makes a request to Razmara
44:12. He says this concession we are giving
44:20you, meaning 28...Meaning we give you [
44:22X] million pounds in royalties; we give
44:25you this plus that 50-50 on the
44:26condition that you end the discussion
44:28of oil nationalization. Meaning, accept
44:33that we are no longer going to
44:34nationalize the oil; we will do this on
44:36these conditions. The reference numbers
44:40I provided are also there, yes. Oil
44:43nationalization actually happened in
44:461951, right? This is correct, these
44:49dates, so the Saudi contract which was
44:51in the year 50, would be the year 1328.
44:54No, it would be 1329, but the
44:57difference between...
44:58The difference between December and
45:00Azar, between Decem...Decem...
45:03The difference between December,
45:04because you put me under pressure.
45:09December 30, 195 [0], a few months
45:11earlier, equivalent to Dey 9, 1329, is
45:14a few months earlier, yes, a few days
45:17earlier than, in fact, this date;
45:20therefore, the decision-making is in...
45:23actually between the decision-makers in
45:26Britain, [on the] 21st. It is done on
45:35January 23rd, the letter that is, um,
45:37at the embassy in Iran, let me tell you
45:40, it is numbered...
45:44February 21st, which is the 2nd of
45:47Esfand, the day after that, February
45:4922nd, 1951, or the 3rd of Esfand 1329,
45:52they hand the letter to Razmara.
45:55Uh.
45:56Now, there is a point that is sometimes
45:58raised, let me tell you this as well.
46:03And that is that others didn't know
46:05about this issue; they ask why Razmara
46:07hid it. I have a great deal of
46:13documentation that this matter was kept
46:16hidden by Razmara. Now, I will explain
46:23later why it was kept hidden out of
46:25fear for his life, but everyone at the
46:27British Embassy in Iran knew about it.
46:33For instance, Manouchehr Farmanfarmaian
46:35in his own book. In the book "Blood and
46:42Oil," on page 306, he writes that I had
46:44a dinner, for instance, on one of those
46:46nights at the embassy, and they told me
46:49there that this agreement had been
46:51reached and such.
46:55And again, for example, Mr. Mohammad
46:57Movahhed himself writes in the second
46:59volume of his book, page 139, that
47:01everyone had actually been informed and
47:03the matter had spread.
47:05Therefore, the summary of these remarks
47:07is this. Britain had reached the 50-50
47:09agreement with Iran. Because, as he
47:11says, a big claim is being raised. They
47:15argue that the reason for the
47:16nationalization of oil was that the
47:1850-50 agreement was not reached.
47:21Yes.
47:22And Mossadegh said that if the 50-50
47:24agreement had been reached, we wouldn't
47:26have nationalized oil. While all
47:30members of the National Front,
47:31Mossadegh's associates, and other
47:33experts in this field were aware that
47:35this agreement had indeed been reached.
47:40Now, why did Mr. Razmara try not to
47:42explicitly raise this in the meetings?
47:47In those few remaining days, look, not
47:49much time passed between when this
47:50agreement was made and when Razmara was
47:52assassinated. In those few days, out of
47:56fear for his life—which I will
47:57explain later what the situation was
47:59about.
47:59Mr. Ahmadi, you [addressing these]
48:02points.
48:02Look, regarding that 20 percent, the
48:05text of the contract is clear.
48:06Let's consider that as the conclusion
48:08of the audience's negotiations.
48:10The text of the contract is clear,
48:12meaning based on this contract, Iran
48:14could never claim...It couldn't extend
48:20the so-called profit—the 20 percent
48:22—to the subsidiary companies. This is
48:27completely clear, it's evident, and as
48:29I said, Iran fundamentally had no
48:31possibility of auditing, never had it,
48:33and even "William Fraser" had told
48:35Abolhassan Ebtehaj—he had raised this
48:37with him in London regarding the
48:39auditing. He had said: "The Iranians '
48:45big issue is that whatever you give
48:46them, they have to accept, and they
48:48want you to allow them access to the
48:50accounts." He had said: "Over my dead
48:52body." This is in the memoirs of
48:55Abolhassan Ebtehaj. Anyway, that's that
48:58. Regarding the book, the book by Dr.
49:04Mohammad Ali Movahhed, from which I
49:06read three quotes.
49:12The fact that Mr. Movahhed brought
49:13these quotes was to answer them and
49:15refute them. Of course, the argument
49:28that Mina and Fouad Rouhani brought up
49:30versus the argument that Manouchehr
49:31Farmanfarmaian brought up, which
49:33Mo'uhed finally rejects quite sharply
49:35—if they can even read that final
49:37conclusion—Manouchehr
49:38Farmanfarmaian’s views had their own
49:40specific characteristics; for example,
49:42he says, I don't know, about the
49:44celebration that took place, and in
49:45this same book "Blood and Oil"—such
49:47is the title of his book—he says that
49:49the British were extremely happy about
49:51the nationalization of the oil industry
49:53by Mossadegh and had held parties and
49:55celebrations, and he would say things
49:57of this nature, meaning his book is
49:59truly worthless. Now, I can bring up a
50:11series of examples from this book again
50:13after this session. Mr. Mo'uhed
50:19included this quote from Farmanfarmaian
50:21to refute it, not to confirm it, as
50:23well as the two quotes he included from
50:25Mina and Rouhani.
50:30Parviz
50:34Parviz Mina brought it up, and Fouad
50:36Rouhani brought it up; in this book of
50:38Mr. Mo'uhed, it is about the fact that,
50:40well, it was called that this profit—
50:42whether it belongs to the subsidiary,
50:44or to the subsidiary companies, or only
50:47to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company itself
50:49—was in excess of those 4 shillings
50:51per ton, which was Iran's share. Now,
50:58our discussion is not about the
50:59disagreement over whether this 20
51:01percent of the profits of the
51:02Anglo-Persian Oil Company reached Iran;
51:04the discussion is about the subsidiary
51:06companies. These subsidiary companies
51:10—and let me open a parenthesis here
51:12that for the subsidiary companies, it
51:14doesn't matter if it’s above 50 or
51:16below 50; in any case, whatever their
51:18title is, its definition is provided
51:20here and whatever it is, it is that—
51:22what is important is whether Article 10
51:24references (that is, refers) to these
51:26subsidiary companies or not? The
51:30argument that Mr. Parviz Mina and the
51:32late Fouad Rouhani brought up is about
51:34the fact that so to speak, with the
51:40nationalization of oil, this issue was
51:42raised: with the nationalization of oil
51:44, what happens to our 20 percent? Uh
51:48That they said the people were only
51:50chanting slogans and weren't paying
51:51attention to these issues and weren't
51:53thinking about these things and such.
51:55They were exactly thinking about these
51:56things. Meaning all the negotiations
52:01that Iran had with the company or with
52:03the British government, its issue was
52:05the discussion of determining
52:06compensation and past accounts and past
52:08claims.
52:12Well, in those accounts, the subsidiary
52:15companies, this text seemed as if I
52:18Iran's claim was that yes, the
52:20subsidiary companies are included, but
52:22the British had excluded this. In any
52:27case, our position was that in the
52:28contract, in the D'Arcy concession,
52:30Iran was explicitly a partner in the
52:33subsidiary companies; but in the
52:34subsequent contract (the 1933 contract)
52:41they had excluded this. However, Iran
52:46with this negotiation position...I mean
52:48, it didn't even lead to negotiations,
52:51it led to a dispute over compensation,
52:53and then Iran would always add: "and
52:55arrears, and past claims, and Iran's
52:57claims, and the full settlement of
52:59claims." And there was a list for these
53:04, and it exists, it is everywhere, this
53:06list of past claims, which is this 20,
53:08and then Iran claiming that the
53:10subsidiary companies should also be
53:12included in this. These were things
53:16that had been set aside so that during
53:18negotiations and during arbitration—
53:20since Iran accepted the ICJ arbitration
53:22, the arbitration of the International
53:24Court of Justice—it was said that all
53:26of these were to be addressed in the
53:28arbitration. Iran had never abandoned
53:32these. Let me say that regarding
53:34Regarding the 50-50 [split] as well
53:37Regarding the 50 What was strange to me
53:44was what was read from Mr. Nejati from
53:46the declassified British documents in
53:48later years. That the British had
53:55negotiated among themselves that we can
53:57no longer not give 50 to Iran. After it
54:03happened in Saudi Arabia, this issue
54:05occurred; it had also happened in
54:06Venezuela, and Iran is a dynamic
54:08society and we are witnessing such a
54:10movement; we can no longer deny it to
54:12Iran and we are forced to do something,
54:14but with conditions and stipulations.
54:19This reference they make, and the
54:21document they mention, the document
54:22presented and the one in Mr. Nejati's
54:24book, these are about the internal
54:26discussions of the British themselves.
54:29Razmara, what about this...and his
54:32letter Apparently, they had also
54:38written to Razmara, and the rumor, just
54:40as it was correctly said, the rumor was
54:42also in Tehran at that time that
54:44Britain is examining, is discussing,
54:46and has talked to Razmara about this,
54:48but they were setting conditions.
54:53Britain was setting very difficult
54:55conditions for this matter so that, in
54:57the event that Iran accepts these
54:58conditions, uh...
55:00We are ready for the 50-50
55:02What were the conditions?
55:03For example, regarding that very
55:05explicit discussion of subsidiary
55:07companies, one was that.
55:08Where had they stated these conditions?
55:10What conditions? There were none.
55:12No, look, why, where is your document?
55:17Look, the document, for example, of
55:19Shepherd's negotiations with Hossein
55:21Ala, where Hossein Ala hears for the
55:24first time, at least officially from
55:26Shepherd, on, in the year, in, it seems
55:28the 26th or 27th of Esfand, where
55:30Shepherd says: "Under conditions, we
55:32are willing to negotiate this 50-50
55:34with you." Negotiate with you? Hossein
55:40Ala tells him: "Oh, too late!" He says:
55:43"It's too late now, it's all over." Now
55:48, under the conditions...in any case,
55:50they had brought this up, and it is in
55:52this English text as well that they
55:54were willing to grant this concession
55:56to Iran under certain conditions.
55:58That is not what is written here. Let
56:00me read it once. It states that
56:02Shepherd, in a letter to Razmara,
56:04informed him that arrangements had been
56:06made for the Oil Company to pay 28. 5
56:09million pounds for royalties in the
56:12year 135 [1950]. It also states that
56:15another 10 million pounds should be
56:17deposited into Iran's account within
56:19the same year for this purpose. Also,
56:22to sign a contract with Iran based on a
56:2450-50 principle. So, there is a 28.5
56:29million pounds, and a 10 million.
56:3410 million pounds plus 50-50. Razmara;
56:38and what condition does it have?
56:42Shepherd was instructed to tell Razmara
56:44that with this proposal, any resolution
56:46that mentions nationalization is
56:48considered unacceptable by the British
56:50government. There was no condition
56:54regarding the company at all. I should
56:58also add that it is written that
57:00Razmara, having the profit-sharing plan
57:02in hand, appeared at the Oil Commission
57:05on March 5 (Esfand 14, 1329); this was
57:07within his power.
57:10Yes, but he never officially announced
57:12it.
57:13Well, everyone knew it anyway, the
57:15point is why didn't he do it, the
57:17embassy had announced it to everyone
57:19and...
57:20Razmara did not announce it because of
57:22his position.
57:24The government does not operate based
57:26on rumors; everyone knows many things,
57:28but a government doesn't run on rumors.
57:33The Prime Minister of the country,
57:35after receiving such a request from
57:36England, should have referred this
57:38proposal to the Oil Commission via a
57:39letter. Because the discussion was
57:43ongoing in the Oil Commission, and
57:45Razmara did not do this.
57:46They didn't let him, they assassinated
57:48him.
57:49You wrote, if I may say, that this
57:51letter reached Razmara on Esfand 2. Am
57:53I correct? Yes.
57:55It reached Razmara on Esfand 3. Is that
57:57correct? Well, from Esfand 3 to Esfand
58:0016, he had 13 days, right? During these
58:0313 days, he might have been very busy,
58:05but he could have found a few minutes
58:07to tell his secretary to write this
58:08letter to the Oil Commission; it wasn't
58:10that they killed him and it couldn't be
58:12done. Well, allow me not to fully
58:18accept that; the issue is that this
58:2050-50 proposal was a rumor in the media
58:22.
58:27Why did Razmara...and in the media of
58:29that time it was rumored, but it had
58:31not been officially conveyed to anyone.
58:36Even Hossein hears for the first time
58:37from Shepherd that England is willing
58:39to do such a thing.
58:41Why did Razmara hide it?
58:43Look, he hid it for this reason. This
58:45is also found in the documents of that
58:47period, in the media of that time, and
58:48in the memoirs of that era. Razmara;
58:56the reason people talk about Razmara is
58:58that he had become inclined to accept
59:00the nationalization of the oil industry
59:02, but he thought it was still too early
59:04, for instance, that in 5 or 10 years
59:06it would be the right time, and he was
59:08examining that. And his thought, or the
59:18reason why some believe—no one knows
59:19if this analysis is correct—that he
59:21did not officially inform the
59:22parliament, is because he thought that
59:24if this issue were raised, if the 50/50
59:35issue were raised officially, it would
59:37undermine his own apparent plan to
59:39state that he agreed with oil
59:40nationalization but for the future, and
59:42that is why he was worried. This is one
59:54analysis; I am not necessarily a
59:56proponent of this or any other analysis
59:57, but the fact of the matter is that
59:59within the British government, within
1:00:01the oil company, they were finally
1:00:03forced to accept 50/50 after a very
1:00:05long delay, but they were talking about
1:00:06getting concessions from Iran under
1:00:08certain conditions and then granting
1:00:10this to Razmara; they announced that
1:00:12they were ready for this. Razmara did
1:00:19not publicly inform the parliament for
1:00:21whatever reason; if he had informed the
1:00:22parliament, it might have caused a
1:00:24development or a change in the work of
1:00:26the Oil Commission, which did not
1:00:27happen. If we summarize this section,
1:00:31with you You said that in the summer of
1:00:361951, Mosaddegh says that if England
1:00:38had accepted the 50/50...
1:00:42Yes, it wouldn't have come to this;
1:00:44apparently, that proposal was made in
1:00:46the spring as well.
1:00:49No, in Esfand, late Esfand of 1950.
1:00:52It was proposed in late Esfand.
1:00:54When he was prime minister.
1:00:55Well, why wasn't this proposal raised
1:00:57again by England at the beginning of
1:00:59Mosaddegh's term, or did Mosaddegh not
1:01:01want to accept it? Look, that argument
1:01:07Mosaddegh makes in the 16th parliament
1:01:09in Shahrivar says that if in the 15th
1:01:12parliament, meaning under the
1:01:13conditions where Gass and Golshayan
1:01:15were negotiating over the claim that
1:01:17Iran had submitted, that the Hajir
1:01:19government had submitted
1:01:25Ah
1:01:26The 25 articles that I explained last
1:01:28session, that was the basis; they were
1:01:30negotiating about that. Well, there
1:01:34were many arguments. At that time, the
1:01:3650/50 discussion, the action taken in
1:01:38Venezuela, was being raised in Iran.
1:01:41England did not accept it. Mosaddegh is
1:01:43referring to that; he says in that
1:01:45period, in that government, in the 15th
1:01:47parliament—which would be the years
1:01:491947, 1948, 1949—if England had
1:01:51accepted this 50/50 in that period, it
1:01:54would have been feasible. Another point
1:02:00can be inferred from Mosaddegh's words,
1:02:02which is in the parliamentary records;
1:02:04another thing that is inferred is that
1:02:06after our situation with the British
1:02:08reached this point and this movement
1:02:10had taken shape among the people and
1:02:12the general public, the possibility of
1:02:14returning to, say, the 50-50 offer—
1:02:16whether it was a rumor or true, it
1:02:18hadn't even been officially proposed—
1:02:20even if it had been officially proposed
1:02:22, Hossein Ala is not Mosaddegh; Hossein
1:02:24Ala was not part of those extremist
1:02:26movements, with all the "death to this"
1:02:28and "long live that" slogans. When the
1:02:34ambassador tells Hossein Ala, "Sir, we
1:02:37are ready for 50-50," Hossein Ala tells
1:02:39him, "It's too late now"; meaning it
1:02:41was already too late at that juncture.
1:02:45All right, let's take a short break so
1:02:47the guys can fix the power, and then we
1:02:49will continue with the discussion. Well
1:02:56, why didn't Razmara make that proposal
1:02:59public if it existed?
1:03:02Let me explain, there was an atmosphere
1:03:05from 1949 onwards......which of course
1:03:09had been created in society even before
1:03:11that, a climate of fear and terror,
1:03:13where those who wanted to negotiate
1:03:15with......foreign parties were afraid;
1:03:20meaning, a...
1:03:21Why? What was the reason for that?
1:03:23I am explaining that, in fact, one of
1:03:25the constant points of discussion is
1:03:27that we assume the foreign side
1:03:29wouldn't come to talk, while in reality
1:03:31, the domestic sides were also
1:03:32terrified of talking to them. One of
1:03:35the events that occurred in 1949 was
1:03:38that when the draft of the
1:03:40Gass-Golshayan Agreement on July 17,
1:03:421949......was compiled, and was
1:03:48actually ready for a decision to be
1:03:51made, shortly after, Mr. Hajir......was
1:03:57assassinated on November 4, 1949, by
1:04:00Seyyed Hossein Emami. Seyyed Hossein
1:04:06Emami was one of the members of the
1:04:08Fadayan-e Islam organization; he was
1:04:10assassinated by the Fadayan-e Islam
1:04:12group, and the Fadayan-e Islam
1:04:14explained the reason for this action,
1:04:16both then and even today, by saying
1:04:18that those who tried to make such a
1:04:20disgraceful agreement with the
1:04:22Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and with
1:04:24Britain had to face their punishment.
1:04:29Before Hajir was assassinated, Hajir
1:04:31had previously been the Prime Minister.
1:04:36Then the supporters of the Tudeh Party
1:04:38and the National Front protested,
1:04:40exerted pressure, and they were forced
1:04:42to replace Hajir. The Shah appointed
1:04:52him as the Minister of Court, but he
1:04:54was in charge of guiding the agreement
1:04:56and leading the talks; the
1:04:58Gass-Golshayan Agreement is a contract
1:05:00that was signed between Sir Neville
1:05:02Gass, one of the figures of the
1:05:03Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the
1:05:05British government, and Abbas-Gholi
1:05:07Golshayan; it is a draft agreement that
1:05:09would have fulfilled some of the
1:05:11Iranians' demands......and brought them
1:05:19to a result. But the pressure at that
1:05:25time was so great that it caused many
1:05:27to be afraid of negotiating, and this
1:05:29issue intensified significantly after
1:05:31the murder of Hajir. Esfand of 1329, if
1:05:40I may say so. Meaning the same time
1:05:47that...Shortly after oil is
1:05:51nationalized. A secret meeting is held
1:05:56between the members of the National
1:05:58Front and, if I may say so, the
1:06:00Fadayan-e Islam. Ezzatollah Sahabi
1:06:05writes about this meeting in his
1:06:07memoirs. A notable point was that
1:06:12during that period, meaning the time of
1:06:14Razmara's assassination, the Fadayan-e
1:06:17Islam were in close contact with the
1:06:19National Front. The proposal to
1:06:24assassinate Razmara was also discussed
1:06:26in a meeting attended by the late
1:06:28Navvab Safavi, the late Dr. Fatemi, Dr.
1:06:31Baghai, Makki, Dr. Shayegan, and other
1:06:33National Front leaders, though notably
1:06:35without the presence of Dr. Mossadegh
1:06:38and Ayatollah Kashani.
1:06:40Without these two.
1:06:41Without these two individuals. It was
1:06:45raised in that meeting that the leaders
1:06:47of the National Front presented an
1:06:49analysis of the country's political
1:06:50situation, the general conclusion of
1:06:52which was that the main danger of the
1:06:54day was Razmara himself, and that it
1:06:56was Razmara who intended to sell Iran
1:06:58to England. They were of the opinion
1:07:02that the Shah was not dangerous for the
1:07:04time being, and that everything was
1:07:05Razmara's doing. In response to the
1:07:10leaders 'analysis, Navvab stated: "Let
1:07:13us assume that Razmara falls today."
1:07:20And at this moment, he turns his teacup
1:07:23upside down onto his saucer and says: "
1:07:25Now Razmara has fallen, what then? Do
1:07:30you promise to implement Islamic laws
1:07:32after his fall?" To which they give a
1:07:35positive response. For the younger ones
1:07:38who don't know who Ezzatollah Sahabi,
1:07:40who wrote these memoirs, is. Ezzatollah
1:07:45Sahabi's father, Mr. Yadollah Sahabi,
1:07:47was one of the founders of the Freedom
1:07:50Movement of Iran and had two sons. One
1:07:53of his sons is, in fact, Ezzatollah
1:07:55Sahabi. Another son of his is Fereydoun
1:07:58Sahabi. They are a respectable family.
1:08:00Even though I have differences of
1:08:02opinion with them, they were and are a
1:08:04respectable family and honorable people
1:08:06, and...Ezzatollah Sahabi is the one
1:08:10recounting these memories. Fereydoun
1:08:13Sahabi is the one who became the head
1:08:16of the Atomic Energy Organization in
1:08:181979 and terminated the contract for
1:08:20building a nuclear power plant between
1:08:22Iran and Germany. Meaning, before the
1:08:27revolution, we had a contract for the
1:08:29construction of a nuclear power plant
1:08:31for Iran. The Germans protested, saying
1:08:35that this contract termination is
1:08:37detrimental to you; we have started the
1:08:39project, we are supposed to build the
1:08:42nuclear power plant soon, and Mr.
1:08:44Fereydoun Sahabi's response was that "
1:08:46When we have oil, we don't need nuclear
1:08:48energy." Therefore, I want to say that
1:08:52the person making these statements,
1:08:54Ezzatollah Sahabi, is the brother of
1:08:57Mr. Fereydoun Sahabi, the son of
1:08:59Yadollah Sahabi, and a credible person
1:09:01for what he is saying.
1:09:04Now, what is the story behind the
1:09:06Fadayan-e Islam saying that you must
1:09:08implement Islamic laws in Iran? The
1:09:12story is that in Aban of 1329, the
1:09:14Fadayan-e Islam had published a
1:09:16pamphlet. In that pamphlet, they had
1:09:21certain demands and definitions of an
1:09:23Islamic government, saying the country
1:09:25should be administered accordingly. All
1:09:30women must wear the hijab. Alcohol
1:09:34sellers must be dealt with. It should
1:09:37neither be produced nor, in fact, sold.
1:09:42In textbooks, for instance, if it says
1:09:44"Reza plays the tar well," this must be
1:09:47removed. It’s ugly; playing the tar
1:09:50is, for example, an un-Islamic act.
1:09:53Islamic examples should be used instead
1:09:55. Mosques should be established across
1:09:59the country to hold congregational
1:10:01prayers and Friday prayers. All country
1:10:05officials must participate in these
1:10:07prayers. At prayer times, the call to
1:10:10prayer must be broadcast from
1:10:11loudspeakers; a set of these rulings
1:10:14was, in fact, the agreement. The
1:10:18agreement made in that meeting was that
1:10:21the National Front members, who held
1:10:23power in parliament and the country,
1:10:24promised Navvab Safavi that if Razmara
1:10:27were removed, they would implement
1:10:28Islamic law in the country. The point
1:10:33being made here is this.
1:10:34This is it. Yes. Well, so I gather this
1:10:37from your remarks, and if you agree,
1:10:39let me ask Mr. Ahmadi......to ask for
1:10:43his opinion on it. This, to me, serves
1:10:54as strong evidence in favor of the
1:10:56nationalization of the oil industry
1:10:58being a political project; meaning the
1:11:00nationalists in Iran likely aligned
1:11:02with the Navvab faction. Despite the
1:11:13fact that, as explained in the previous
1:11:15section, they knew about the agreements
1:11:17being reached with the British
1:11:19government, they decided to remove
1:11:21Razmara and push the matter forward
1:11:23this way. This, in my view, is more
1:11:27significant than the event itself, as
1:11:29it plays a role in framing Mr.
1:11:31Ettefagh's perspective.
1:11:33Let me add that the date this
1:11:34discussion is being raised......is
1:11:38after the National Front realized that
1:11:40the 50-50 agreement had been reached,
1:11:42even though Razmara, fearing for his
1:11:44life, would not bring this issue up; it
1:11:46was the date...
1:11:48The embassy.
1:11:50What was the date of the meeting?
1:11:51What was the date of this meeting you
1:11:53mentioned?
1:11:54It was before the 16th, meaning in
1:11:56Esfand, two or three days before the
1:11:5816th of Esfand when Razmara was
1:12:01assassinated. That is, the 50-50
1:12:04agreement is reached; Razmara hides it,
1:12:06but the embassy, not knowing the
1:12:08situation, tells everyone, and everyone
1:12:11finds out; the news leaks through the
1:12:13embassy. Many who were experts in this
1:12:19field and political figures learn that
1:12:22Razmara had made a 50-50 agreement, and
1:12:24then this meeting is held; 16th, 3 days
1:12:27after this meeting, the 16th of Esfand.
1:12:32The meeting was on the 13th of Esfand.
1:12:35Yes, your points.
1:12:37Well, look, before I address the
1:12:39discussion regarding the assassination
1:12:41of Razmara, let me state a point. Mr.
1:12:44Ettefagh mentioned several points;
1:12:46preliminarily, I must say that I truly
1:12:48know my intention, his intention in
1:12:50this discussion, and certainly yours,
1:12:52is for a series of dark points to be
1:12:54clarified.
1:12:56Intention.
1:13:01This so-called election debate is
1:13:02certainly not about knocking the other
1:13:04out of the race; neither he nor I have
1:13:06that intention, and your goal has also
1:13:08been to clarify the issues. Therefore,
1:13:14we should ensure that it proceeds in
1:13:16this same spirit. Well, for instance,
1:13:22the details he added to the discussion
1:13:24about Razmara’s assassination, which
1:13:26they had supposedly heard about—
1:13:27meaning the points mentioned in the
1:13:29late Sahabi's book—these details were
1:13:31added to suggest they already knew that
1:13:33a 50-50 agreement had been reached. The
1:13:38fact that a 50-50 agreement was reached
1:13:40is not even up for debate. Even
1:13:42Shepherd and those people were saying,
1:13:43"We are willing to negotiate with you
1:13:45regarding this." As for how it was
1:13:47agreed upon, or whether it was because
1:13:49they realized a 50-50 split was
1:13:51happening and decided to kill Razmara
1:13:53so they couldn't move forward, that is
1:13:55the question. Well, I think we should
1:13:58proceed a bit more with facts and such.
1:14:02Look, they said everyone back then was
1:14:04afraid of negotiating with foreign
1:14:06parties; well, were the foreign parties
1:14:08afraid? Who was afraid, exactly? The
1:14:11Iranian representative, Mr. Abbas-Gholi
1:14:13Golshayan, was negotiating with Mr.
1:14:15Gass, the company representative. Could
1:14:17a negotiation be any simpler or clearer
1:14:19than that? They even reached an
1:14:20agreement. As for the claim that Iran's
1:14:23interests were secured in that, it
1:14:24simply wasn't the case. The only
1:14:26concession, as I mentioned in the last
1:14:28session, was increasing the royalty
1:14:30from four shillings per ton, the four
1:14:32shillings per ton from the 1933
1:14:33agreement, In this Gass-Golshayan
1:14:38agreement, it was decided to make it
1:14:40six shillings per ton; meanwhile, the
1:14:42price of oil had increased at least
1:14:44fivefold in that interval. It was
1:14:49extremely unjust for Iran to accept the
1:14:51same contract with the only concession
1:14:53being an increase from four shillings
1:14:55to six. I don't believe "fear of
1:15:00negotiating with foreign parties" is an
1:15:02accurate description for that era; it
1:15:04might be for the current era. I don't
1:15:14mean Mr. Ettefagh; certainly, some
1:15:16people over the past few years have
1:15:18tried to create a kind of equivalence
1:15:20between the conditions we've had in
1:15:21these recent decades and the conditions
1:15:23of that time, claiming that the
1:15:25extremists today who oppose
1:15:26negotiations were the same as those
1:15:28back then who also opposed them. And
1:15:40the codes they provide are somewhat in
1:15:42that context, but I genuinely enjoyed
1:15:44the discussion with Mr. Ettefagh—I
1:15:46don't mean him—but this equivalence
1:15:48some people propose, for example,
1:15:50saying nuclear populism is like oil
1:15:52populism, and many other things of that
1:15:54nature, is done with an eye toward...
1:15:59That’s also considering that, in any
1:16:01case, a group now—well, people are
1:16:03dissatisfied—wants to tell the people
1:16:05: "Sir, exactly what exists today and
1:16:07you are dissatisfied with, it was the
1:16:09same back then; therefore, you should
1:16:11be dissatisfied with them too." Now,
1:16:13regarding the discussion about the
1:16:15assassination of Hajir by Emami, it was
1:16:17said that it was because of the oil
1:16:19issue because Hajir was reaching an
1:16:21agreement; that was absolutely not the
1:16:23case. Hajir, who was assassinated on
1:16:28November 4th, was involved in the
1:16:30elections and the theft of ballot boxes
1:16:32by the military from Sepahsalar Mosque,
1:16:34and the uproar that was caused in
1:16:35connection with that—a few days
1:16:37earlier, of course—and then Hajir,
1:16:39who comes on that date, it was in
1:16:40connection with this, meaning...1949.
1:16:50We had not yet entered the litigation
1:16:52stages regarding oil; the Golshayan
1:16:54agreement was being negotiated, or it
1:16:56was in parliament. The assassination of
1:17:01Hajir had nothing to do with the oil
1:17:03issue; or, for example, the pressure
1:17:05from the Tudeh party members and the
1:17:07National Front for the removal of Hajir
1:17:10—well, this Hajir, the National Front
1:17:12was established in November 1949. The
1:17:17Tudeh Party was declared illegal on
1:17:20February 4, 1949, but of course, it was
1:17:22still active and was a close ally of
1:17:24Razmara. The Tudeh members, the Tudeh
1:17:33Party, because of the relations Razmara
1:17:35wanted to have with the Soviets, the
1:17:37escape of 15 Tudeh Party leaders from
1:17:38Qasr Prison and such—this is why I
1:17:40think that we should perhaps raise
1:17:42these with a little more caution, maybe
1:17:44it would be appropriate. But regarding
1:17:51the connection to Razmara...Ah, another
1:17:53thing I mentioned about the late Sahabi
1:17:55, who said; look, in Sahabi's book, he
1:17:57does not say, "I was there myself and
1:17:59heard these things." This appears in
1:18:02the late Sahabi's book, but the late
1:18:05Sahabi does not say that in the year
1:18:071948 or, I don't know, 1950. It seems
1:18:12that when this happened, the late
1:18:14Sahabi was eight or so years old at the
1:18:15time; he was not in a position to be
1:18:17present at these meetings. Where did
1:18:20this come from? Its root is from the
1:18:23statements of the late Martyr Araqi.
1:18:30The late Martyr Araqi, in the autumn of
1:18:321978, when he goes to Paris to meet
1:18:34with Ayatollah Khomeini, speaks on the
1:18:36sidelines with a group of members of
1:18:38the Islamic Association in France and
1:18:39raises this topic with them. Then some
1:18:49people collect those oral statements in
1:18:51the book "Martyr Araqi"(I think
1:18:52that’s its name), and then the late
1:18:54Sahabi takes it from that book and
1:18:56quotes it, as if someone with this name
1:18:58, with these specifications, and having
1:19:00passed through several hands, has
1:19:01stated this.
1:19:08To use this as evidence that the
1:19:10National Front intended to kill Razmara
1:19:12, and therefore the National Front are
1:19:14terrorists and murderers, I think that
1:19:16is a bit of an exaggeration; at the
1:19:18very least, it is an exaggeration in
1:19:20the debate. But, there is an issue that
1:19:26, unfortunately, political
1:19:28assassination did exist back then. For
1:19:33instance, take Mr. Hazhir, who they
1:19:35said was assassinated by Emami. This
1:19:40Emami was the person who assassinated
1:19:42the late Kasravi, I believe in 1945,
1:19:45and he had an assistant; since he was a
1:19:47lawyer, he had an assistant in the
1:19:49judiciary. This Emami and his
1:19:53accomplice killed Kasravi with a knife.
1:19:59This Mr. Hazhir, after serving in
1:20:01Qavam's government and after becoming
1:20:03Prime Minister, was very active. He
1:20:07made intense efforts and obtained a
1:20:09fatwa from the authorities to declare
1:20:11that Kasravi was an apostate, his
1:20:13killing was obligatory, he had to be
1:20:15killed, and Emami should be released.
1:20:19This very Mr. Hazhir freed Emami from
1:20:21prison. Just look! What kind of
1:20:24situation were we facing back then? And
1:20:29when issues are presented incompletely,
1:20:31what kind of effect can it have on the
1:20:33mind? Meaning, it can lead the reader
1:20:38or listener into error, whether
1:20:40regarding the late Sahabi's discussion
1:20:42or the Hazhir discussion. Whether it's
1:20:46about Hazhir, or if the National Front
1:20:48was into assassination; Hazhir, well,
1:20:51perhaps wasn't into assassination. Even
1:20:53if the discussion of releasing Khalil
1:20:55Tahmasbi and such later enters the
1:20:58equation (which Mr. Ettefaq probably
1:21:00wants to raise), their status is also
1:21:02clear. So, we must raise all aspects of
1:21:08the discussion; but regarding Razmara's
1:21:10assassination and its impact on oil,
1:21:12there is no doubt that Razmara's
1:21:14assassination had absolutely no impact
1:21:17on the nationalization of oil.
1:21:21Razmara's assassination happened on
1:21:23Esfand 16th (March 7th). The so-called
1:21:27nationalization of oil in the Oil
1:21:28Commission was...
1:21:29On Esfand 17th (March 8th).
1:21:31It was carried out on the 17th.
1:21:33The day after Razmara's assassination.
1:21:37It was carried out the next day, but we
1:21:38were at the expiration of the two-month
1:21:40deadline set by the Parliament for the
1:21:42Oil Commission to decide; it had to
1:21:44make its decision around those days, a
1:21:46day or two before or after, and it had
1:21:47already reached that decision. If you
1:21:55look at Fouad Rouhani's book, if I
1:21:56don't forget, I can take a picture of
1:21:58that page and put it in the group or on
1:22:00my Telegram channel; Rouhani, Fouad
1:22:08Rouhani, with the explanation he gives
1:22:10regarding the workflow of the Oil
1:22:12Commission, says that the events that
1:22:14occurred, the Gass-Golshayan agreement
1:22:16which was not ratified, the other
1:22:18proposals that existed, the British did
1:22:20not accept them, and other proposals
1:22:22were not agreed upon, so there was no
1:22:24way left but to nationalize the oil
1:22:26industry, and on Esfand 12th (March 3rd
1:22:28), the decision to nationalize the oil
1:22:30industry was made. Due to logistical
1:22:36and procedural tasks, it took a bit
1:22:38longer until the 17th. Now, perhaps I
1:22:47don’t fully recall the exact quote—
1:22:49I am paraphrasing—but the content is
1:22:51certainly that Fuad Rouhani, who is a
1:22:53very well-informed person, says the oil
1:22:55issue had been decided and concluded by
1:22:58Esfand 12, and the assassination of
1:22:59Razmara did not have any decisive
1:23:01influence on the decision of the Oil
1:23:03Commission.
1:23:14Let me ask you a very brief question;
1:23:16you mentioned that one theory regarding
1:23:18Razmara’s refusal to announce this
1:23:20new negotiation framework and proposals
1:23:23was that he hoped to create a plan
1:23:25where, perhaps, nationalization would
1:23:27happen a few years later, and maybe it
1:23:29could be credited to him. If we
1:23:40consider the period from approximately
1:23:42Esfand 3 to Esfand 16, and if the path
1:23:44to nationalization was naturally
1:23:46progressing inevitably, and nothing
1:23:49could stop it, and naturally Razmara
1:23:51was also aware of this matter.
1:23:59Naturally, he should have announced it
1:24:01to prevent this event from occurring,
1:24:03and given this picture of his removal.
1:24:09Meaning his failure to announce it and
1:24:11his removal fit together quite well.
1:24:15What reason could there be for not
1:24:17announcing this matter? His fear for
1:24:19his life because of this.
1:24:20Well, look, no, that’s not it at all.
1:24:26Look, someone who stood against [the
1:24:28opposition], someone who tried to get
1:24:30the Gass-Golshayan agreement approved,
1:24:32made a serious effort to pass the
1:24:34Gass-Golshayan agreement which was
1:24:36extremely unpopular; it was unpopular
1:24:38across all spectrums in the country.
1:24:45Someone who said a nation that cannot
1:24:47even make a water pitcher, what does it
1:24:49have to do with nationalizing the oil
1:24:51industry, and made such harsh remarks
1:24:53—would he think that by coming out
1:24:54and saying the British have accepted a
1:24:5650-50 split, he would be assassinated?
1:25:01It is unlikely that he would be
1:25:02assassinated for such things; there
1:25:04were worse things he had done to be
1:25:05assassinated for.
1:25:08Meaning there were worse reasons,
1:25:09better or worse reasons for him to be
1:25:11assassinated. It wasn't necessary for
1:25:15him to be assassinated just for
1:25:17revealing this 50-50 deal; in fact, it
1:25:19was a positive step forward, 50-50 was
1:25:21a positive step forward. Now, whether
1:25:24there was truly a reason, we are just
1:25:26speculating; it is one of those
1:25:27historical debates that we cannot
1:25:29settle. One analysis is that he himself
1:25:34—look, another argument regarding
1:25:36Razmara is that even Asadollah Alam
1:25:38implies that the assassin of Razmara
1:25:40was the court. These issues are clearly
1:25:45addressed in the book "The Secrets of
1:25:47Razmara's Assassination." Was the
1:25:50weapon that fired the shot—the one
1:25:52that proved fatal—the same one fired
1:25:54by Khalil Tahmasebi, or was it an army
1:25:56sergeant’s? These discussions have
1:25:58been had many times; I don't have a
1:26:00particular opinion on this. But you
1:26:04know it is clear in Asadollah Alam's
1:26:06book that the Shah was extremely
1:26:08worried about Razmara; this is a fact
1:26:10—that Alam goes to get Razmara, who
1:26:12had apparently forgotten to go to the
1:26:14mosque for the memorial service of a
1:26:15cleric who had passed away. Alam goes
1:26:22to his office, reminds him, takes him,
1:26:24and they go to the mosque together, and
1:26:26then this incident happens. Well, these
1:26:29things, and many other things.
1:26:33For instance, consider the condolences
1:26:35sent to the Shah regarding the
1:26:37assassination of Razmara; the Shah
1:26:38wouldn’t respond to any of them, and
1:26:40in a few instances, when people would
1:26:42ask Hossein [Ala], he would say: "Don't
1:26:44you know what is going on? Don't you
1:26:49know that he had intended to harm His
1:26:51Majesty?" Asadollah Alam says that The
1:26:55Shah was protected, meaning, for
1:26:57example, that Hazrat Abbas was watching
1:26:59over him. He brings up several reasons;
1:27:01one of them is that Razmara couldn't do
1:27:03anything to him; he was killed before
1:27:05he could do anything. These are in the
1:27:08memoirs.
1:27:08So the situation was much worse than
1:27:10these words imply.
1:27:11It is much worse than these words imply
1:27:13, meaning we cannot say anything with
1:27:15certainty or decisiveness.
1:27:16Yes, regarding the fact that Razmara
1:27:18was Chief of Staff of the Army and
1:27:20still had presence, influence, and
1:27:22power in the Army General Staff, and
1:27:24the Shah was suspicious of everyone—
1:27:26for example, Mosaddegh strongly opposed
1:27:28Razmara; the National Front and
1:27:30Mosaddegh and others were saying a
1:27:32military man cannot become Prime
1:27:34Minister.
1:27:35And the Shah offers the premiership to
1:27:37Mosaddegh in that same year of 1949,
1:27:39saying you come and be Prime Minister,
1:27:40in competition with Razmara, he says
1:27:42you come and be Prime Minister.
1:27:44Mosaddegh says, God willing, may He
1:27:46grant it elsewhere another day. See,
1:27:49with such an atmosphere there, we
1:27:51cannot just take everything and say the
1:27:53National Front wanted to kill Razmara
1:27:56so that oil would be nationalized, and
1:27:58that when he was killed, oil was
1:28:00nationalized; the issue is much more
1:28:02complex than these words. Very well, If
1:28:06there are any points to make, please
1:28:07share them. I don't want us to stay in
1:28:11this phase for too long; because
1:28:13further ahead, issues become very
1:28:15complex, especially the story of Dr.
1:28:17Mosaddegh's relationship with Mohammad
1:28:20Reza Shah, which becomes more complex
1:28:22and leads to numerous cases. I want us
1:28:26to talk about those too; these
1:28:28triangular and quadrilateral
1:28:30relationships, the assassinations...yes
1:28:32, it could drag on for a long time. For
1:28:35this reason, if there is a very small
1:28:37point, please state it so we can take a
1:28:39step forward.
1:28:40Yes, if you allow me, I would like to
1:28:41continue the discussion. I will just
1:28:45add a few points; I have an interview
1:28:47on my mobile phone right now: "The
1:28:49Fadayan-e Islam Society, Abdolhossein
1:28:51Hazhir; The Why and How of a
1:28:52Confrontation." This interview is with
1:28:57Mr. Mohammad Ali Abd-e-Khodaei,
1:28:59Secretary-General of the Fadayan-e
1:29:01Islam Society, in the year On 1401/1/7
1:29:06(that is, 2 years ago). They explain
1:29:14eloquently and beautifully here that
1:29:16the affair we had with Hajir was due to
1:29:18this contract, because of the position
1:29:19they had in supporting—let me put it
1:29:21this way—supporting the Gas-Golshayan
1:29:23contract. This is firsthand and fresh;
1:29:30but let’s move past this discussion,
1:29:32let’s leave it...
1:29:33No, right now I can tell you 10
1:29:35documents that say it was about the
1:29:37elections.
1:29:38Well, in any case.
1:29:39People of that era, in that era, say it
1:29:41was about the elections; this is what
1:29:43you see here.
1:29:44Well, we are supposed to tell the
1:29:46narratives; we don't want to convince
1:29:48each other anymore, we want several
1:29:50different narratives []. The narrative
1:29:52I am presenting is that oil
1:29:54nationalization did not have an
1:29:55economic goal, it had a political goal;
1:29:58because if it had an economic goal, we
1:30:00should have first clung to that 20
1:30:02percent where we had interests. In
1:30:05short, after this meeting with Mr...the
1:30:08meeting of the National Front members
1:30:10with the Fadayan-e Islam is held,
1:30:12Razmara is assassinated on Esfand 16th.
1:30:18Immediately the next morning, Esfand
1:30:2117th, they take this...they take the
1:30:23oil nationalization bill to, if I may
1:30:26say, the Parliament; and 4 days after
1:30:29this event, on Esfand 20th, 1329, the
1:30:32Bakhtar-e Emrouz newspaper, edited by
1:30:34Fatemi, In support of the Fadayan-e
1:30:41Islam's action, writes: "The brave
1:30:43people of the capital showed on two
1:30:45occasions how much they care about the
1:30:47freedom of their votes and opinions."
1:30:52It means that one time they got rid of
1:30:54Hajir, and one time this Razmara; and
1:30:57the bullet that flew from the muzzle of
1:30:59Emami's revolver, the martyr Emami's
1:31:01revolver, into Hajir's heart, proved
1:31:03and demonstrated that no treason will
1:31:05remain unanswered and unquestioned.
1:31:10Meaning, in fact, they are saying that
1:31:12we have actually shown twice that
1:31:14anyone who wants to commit treason, the
1:31:16nation has shown they will get rid of
1:31:18them. Of course, we have no evidence of
1:31:22coordination between the Fadayan-e
1:31:24Islam and the National Front regarding
1:31:26Hajir, but regarding...regarding, let
1:31:29me say...
1:31:30Other than the meeting that Sahabi
1:31:32describes, or rather Mr. Araqi
1:31:33describes, do you have any other
1:31:35evidence regarding Razmara?
1:31:37Just this, just the praise and
1:31:38commendation of this newspaper, which,
1:31:40well, everyone was praising and
1:31:42commending; I, in this way, I put these
1:31:45together and draw a conclusion from
1:31:47them. On Esfand 29th, the story of oil
1:31:50nationalization takes place. One year
1:31:56later, Hossein Fatemi is assassinated
1:31:59because of the broken promise he made
1:32:01in that meeting with Navvab Safavi, and
1:32:03they also announce that the reason we
1:32:05assassinated him is that he had broken
1:32:07this promise. What does breaking a
1:32:11promise mean? It means Mr. Government
1:32:15Fatemi had said that if you do that, we
1:32:17will establish an Islamic government
1:32:19here. Well, they couldn't implement
1:32:23that narrative, the conditions Navvab
1:32:25Safavi wanted to enforce in the country
1:32:27; mandatory hijab, I don't know,
1:32:34Establishing things, establishing
1:32:35congregational prayers, they couldn't
1:32:37implement these in the country. They
1:32:40had actually made an agreement so that
1:32:42their work would get done. And I would
1:32:47like to ask your respected colleagues
1:32:49to put up the seventh slide.
1:32:53This is it.
1:32:54August 15, 1952, Members of the
1:33:01National Front present an emergency
1:33:03motion to the parliament and pass it,
1:33:05stating that because the treason of Haj
1:33:07Ali Razmara against the Iranian nation
1:33:09has been proven; you know that the
1:33:10person who assassinated Razmara was
1:33:12Khalil Tahmasebi; they called him
1:33:14Master Khalil Tahmasebi. Now, why
1:33:18Master? Master, he was probably a
1:33:20master of assassination. They state: "
1:33:25Single Article; because the treason of
1:33:28Haj Ali Razmara has been proven to the
1:33:30Iranian nation, if his killer is Master
1:33:32Khalil Tahmasebi, he is granted amnesty
1:33:34by this law and shall be released."
1:33:43Note: The government is obligated to
1:33:44secure the livelihood and sustenance of
1:33:47Mr. Khalil Tahmasebi in every respect
1:33:49and provide for his welfare and comfort
1:33:51for life. Look, someone went and
1:33:56committed an assassination. Well, Then,
1:34:06members of the National Front, in a
1:34:07parliament that is supposed to be the
1:34:09guardian and protector of the law, that
1:34:11is supposed to defend the establishment
1:34:13of law, the rule of law, and
1:34:14constitutionalism, collectively vote in
1:34:16this parliament to release this killer
1:34:18and give him a lifetime reward for the
1:34:20effort he made! But look, you cannot
1:34:28not connect these things; look, we can
1:34:30keep making up reasons for each of
1:34:32these events that happen; saying this
1:34:34was one way, that was another way. Look
1:34:41, Hazhir was assassinated for the very
1:34:43reason that he had gone and was...with
1:34:45the help of Golshayan, they were
1:34:47reaching an agreement and were drafting
1:34:49the Golshayan contract. Razmara was
1:34:56assassinated for the same reason that
1:34:58he had reached an agreement on the
1:35:0050/50 contract; he was receiving 38
1:35:01million pounds from the foreign side...
1:35:0628 and a half and 10 million, two
1:35:08figures, a total of 38 and a half
1:35:11million dollars, no, pounds, he was
1:35:13receiving.
1:35:15Those were the usual annual concessions
1:35:17, meaning they didn't do that, sir.
1:35:21Anyway, they had reached an agreement,
1:35:23well, and I must say that afterwards
1:35:25they assassinated Razmara. August 15,
1:35:291952, this is the official gazette of
1:35:31the Imperial State of Iran, the text of
1:35:34the proceedings. Members of the
1:35:36National Front present an emergency
1:35:38motion. Look, they blame the murder of,
1:35:41well, the murder of Razmara on the Shah
1:35:44, saying the Shah had a dispute with
1:35:46Razmara. Members of the National Front
1:35:48present an emergency motion that,
1:35:50firstly, release this man. Second, the
1:35:53National Front
1:35:55Yes, yes, it's actually written there,
1:35:57those who presented the emergency
1:35:59motion are there, and then, may I say,
1:36:01until we have something, a Provide for
1:36:08their life until the end, that is what
1:36:10you are sitting here reading now, right
1:36:12?
1:36:13Yes, they are members of the Jari and
1:36:15Makki.
1:36:17Well, my conclusion is that those who
1:36:19sought an agreement with the company
1:36:21were assassinated. They ask, why wasn't
1:36:23an agreement reached with the British?
1:36:26One side is like this; attempts at an
1:36:28agreement are made, it is claimed that
1:36:30the company is not willing to reach an
1:36:32agreement, and all these stories I
1:36:34mentioned. Now, do you want me to
1:36:37continue my discussion? No, since we
1:36:39are still in the assassination section,
1:36:42Mr. Ahmadi, please state if you have
1:36:44any observations. But also, a
1:36:49clarification regarding the
1:36:51negotiations that took place during Dr.
1:36:53Mossadegh's term, which actually, with
1:36:56the entry of the Americans, the World
1:36:58Bank, and other factors, why did this
1:37:01not lead to a result by 1952?
1:37:05What? I didn't understand, what?
1:37:07The negotiations that took place during
1:37:09Mossadegh's own term.
1:37:10Why did those not reach a result? The
1:37:12proposals that...
1:37:16Negotiation with the company after,
1:37:19after the nationalization, yes, that we
1:37:21go ahead and see why this matter was
1:37:24not settled during this 28-month period
1:37:26, and at least reach July 21, 1952.
1:37:31Yes, look; regarding the assassination
1:37:33of Razmara, the assassination of Hajir,
1:37:35the assassination of Kasravi, and other
1:37:37assassinations that were carried out
1:37:38during that period, and the
1:37:40assassination of...Dr. Fatemi, well,
1:37:46there is a general discussion that
1:37:47exists, and as I mentioned, those
1:37:49assassinations were deplorable and
1:37:51condemned; but unfortunately, our
1:37:53atmosphere, look, we should not look at
1:37:55the issue anachronistically. We should
1:38:02not project today's atmosphere onto the
1:38:04atmosphere of that time. And even in
1:38:09the so-called years immediately before
1:38:11the revolution, we had assassinations
1:38:13in the country; we had guerrilla groups
1:38:15in the country that were carrying out
1:38:16assassinations, and we had them all
1:38:18over the world; the way we look at
1:38:20terrorism today is different from how
1:38:21the political society of that time
1:38:23looked at it. Of course, this is a
1:38:28secondary discussion, but my point is
1:38:31that this issue must be kept in mind;
1:38:33why? And this was not specific to
1:38:35anyone in particular. I said Mr. Hajir
1:38:40pulled strings to get Emami released
1:38:42from prison, to get his pardon; the
1:38:43same Emami who came and killed him.
1:38:50Meaning the issue was not that the
1:38:52National Front, for example, had
1:38:53supported or praised or glorified an
1:38:55assassination; Hajir himself had done
1:38:57the same thing when he was a member of
1:38:59Qavam's cabinet and after he became
1:39:01Prime Minister; these examples are used
1:39:03to show the atmosphere of that period.
1:39:10But regarding what he put on this board
1:39:12, this event happened on August 7, not
1:39:14August 15; August 15 is the date of
1:39:16this official gazette of the Imperial
1:39:18State of Iran that was published,
1:39:20another thing happened on August 7, and
1:39:22Ayatollah Kashani became Speaker of the
1:39:25Parliament in that session, 16 days
1:39:27after the July 21 uprising, we are now
1:39:29...
1:39:32Uh.
1:39:35Consider the context of that time; this
1:39:37event happened in that manner. Mr.
1:39:42Kashani, who became speaker of the
1:39:44parliament after the voting ended, and
1:39:46Mr. Shams Qanatabadi were the
1:39:48initiators of this move and this plan.
1:39:52Who was he?
1:40:00Shams Qanatabadi was a very close
1:40:02associate of Ayatollah Kashani, the
1:40:04leader of the Mojahedin-e Islam or
1:40:06something, some group called Mojahed or
1:40:08Mojahedin-e Islam, an anti-Mossadegh
1:40:10person; meaning from that point on,
1:40:12from that moment, they clearly
1:40:13separated their path from the National
1:40:16Front along with Kashani, Baghai, and
1:40:18those whose names are mentioned here,
1:40:20Haerizadeh and others. These were the
1:40:31same people who declared Qavam as "
1:40:33Mahdur-al-Dam"(one whose blood may be
1:40:35shed); meaning after Qavam al-Saltaneh,
1:40:37Baghai was the center of this action,
1:40:39claiming that Qavam al-Saltaneh had
1:40:41committed crimes, submitted a
1:40:42single-article bill to the parliament,
1:40:44and declared that he was Mahdur-al-Dam
1:40:46and his assets should be confiscated,
1:40:48which the National Front and Mossadegh
1:40:50opposed.
1:40:52What date is this from?
1:40:54It’s from mid-Mordad.
1:40:55Yes, maybe 10 or 12 days after the 30th
1:40:58of Tir uprising. Mossadegh said, "This
1:41:01parliament’s job is not to put people
1:41:03on trial, it is not a court." Even
1:41:07though he always had problems with
1:41:09Qavam al-Saltaneh, he said he would not
1:41:11...The Shah signed this order, this
1:41:12single-article bill; although with a
1:41:14delay, he did it. He did it. However,
1:41:19Mossadegh said, "I will not implement
1:41:21this because the parliament is not a
1:41:23court; Qavam al-Saltaneh must have the
1:41:25right to defend himself." And he didn't
1:41:28allow it and provided, so to speak,
1:41:30serious bodyguards and protection for
1:41:32Qavam al-Saltaneh. We are living in
1:41:37such a period, in such an atmosphere,
1:41:39and this Mr. Shams Qanatabadi was at
1:41:41the center of this agenda. It is clear
1:41:45that Mr. Ayatollah Kashani was issuing
1:41:47a series of fatwas—fatwas for the
1:41:49Fada'iyan-e Islam—in connection with
1:41:52these events that were taking place. 27
1:41:58people signed this plan; 10 or 11 of
1:42:00them were from the National Front,
1:42:02meaning 17 of them, 17 or 16, were not
1:42:04from the National Front when they did
1:42:06this, when they passed this
1:42:08single-article bill. However, even
1:42:12those 10 or 11 who were from the
1:42:14National Front included people who had
1:42:16already separated their path from
1:42:18Mossadegh, such as Haerizadeh, Baghai,
1:42:20and a few others. Regardless, their
1:42:23action was not right; after all, the
1:42:25parliament is not a court; this should
1:42:27have followed its own natural course.
1:42:33Another issue that existed was the one
1:42:35I mentioned regarding the assassination
1:42:37of Razmara; in the book "The Secrets of
1:42:39Razmara's Murder," it is documented
1:42:41that Khalil Tahmasebi’s shot could
1:42:43not have been the effective one. Two
1:42:48weapons were involved in this case. The
1:42:52Belgian Colt handgun was that
1:42:53sergeant's, which proved effective, and
1:42:55in this single-article bill it also
1:42:56mentions that assuming...It is right
1:43:01here. It says, assuming that his killer
1:43:06is Ostad Khalil Tahmasbi. Assuming that
1:43:09his killer is Ostad Khalil Tahmasbi.
1:43:14They don't say he was the killer and
1:43:15should be released; they say assuming
1:43:17the killer is Tahmasbi, in the eyes of
1:43:19the nation he is considered innocent
1:43:21and exonerated. See, it's still not
1:43:25quite like that, because the transcript
1:43:27of the negotiations—what they
1:43:29ratified—we don't have it here right
1:43:30now; what they ratified is something
1:43:32else.
1:43:34Then someone there suggests that you
1:43:36should write the text this way.
1:43:37In any case, this text was ratified. I
1:43:42can look up the details now, but this
1:43:44very text that was ratified, which you
1:43:46yourself put on this screen, says: "
1:43:48Assuming that this Ostad Khalil
1:43:49Tahmasbi—he was a carpenter, that's
1:43:51why they called him Ostad—is the
1:43:53killer, in the eyes of the Iranian
1:43:55nation, he is innocent." Look, this is
1:43:59what I want to say. I mean to say that
1:44:02issues of that period must be viewed
1:44:04within the atmosphere of that time,
1:44:06with the conditions of that time, and
1:44:07seen with the complexities and details
1:44:09of the matter. We cannot easily bring
1:44:15this up and say the National Front was
1:44:17a murderer and a terrorist and was even
1:44:19a breeder of terrorists, etc. Making
1:44:21such conclusions gets us nowhere. It
1:44:26makes our work today more difficult.

About this transcript

This page contains the full transcript of از حذف رزم‌آرا تا ملی شدن نفت | قسمت دوم گفتگوی شهرام اتفاق و کوروش احمدی by Azad, generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 13,944 words across 2,312 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.

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