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Why Do Arabs Always LOSE To Israel? — Transcript

by Hikma History · 1,720 words · 293 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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  1. 0:00Why did Arab states always lose to
  2. 0:02Israel? Four wars, 1948, [music]
  3. 0:04'56, '67, and 1973.
  4. 0:08Multiple Arab states with a population
  5. 0:11that would have dwarfed Israel's, home
  6. 0:13advantage in most cases, and yet the
  7. 0:16same result almost every single time.
  8. 0:18Not close defeats either. Some of them
  9. 0:21were catastrophic. 1967 was over in 6
  10. 0:24days. So, what went wrong? As usual, the
  11. 0:28answer isn't simple. There are many
  12. 0:30different reasons. And once we
  13. 0:32understand them, we'll realize that
  14. 0:34these wars were almost certainly lost
  15. 0:36before they began. Let's get into it.
  16. 0:52Before we get into the video, please
  17. 0:54make sure you like, comment, and
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  20. 1:00will help me with YouTube's algorithm a
  21. 1:02lot. I appreciate you guys.
  22. 1:05Let's start with the armies themselves.
  23. 1:07Some of the key Arab militaries across
  24. 1:09this period, such as Syria and Egypt,
  25. 1:12they adopted a Soviet-style military
  26. 1:14doctrine. On paper, Soviet doctrine was
  27. 1:17great. But in practice, however, it had
  28. 1:20flaws. Soviet military doctrine was
  29. 1:23quite rigid and it had a centralized
  30. 1:25command structure, whereby orders would
  31. 1:27be given and would flow top-down. Now, I
  32. 1:31know that sounds like a normal army
  33. 1:32functioning, but the problem with that
  34. 1:34is
  35. 1:35when you're in the midst of a battle and
  36. 1:37a junior officer has to exercise
  37. 1:39independent judgment, they will most
  38. 1:41likely just wait for their chain of
  39. 1:43command to give them the order. This has
  40. 1:46been studied by people like Kenneth
  41. 1:47When battlefield conditions
  42. 1:50change unexpectedly, say for example,
  43. 1:53Israeli forces make a breakthrough in a
  44. 1:55direction that was unanticipated,
  45. 1:58or when communication break down, Arab
  46. 2:01junior officers tended to freeze. They
  47. 2:04waited for authorization from above
  48. 2:07rather than adapting on the fly. By the
  49. 2:09time the orders came down the chain, the
  50. 2:11moment had passed. Israel had moved on.
  51. 2:14Israeli military doctrine, on the other
  52. 2:16hand, was the complete opposite. It was
  53. 2:19built around the concept of mission
  54. 2:20command, which means giving junior
  55. 2:23officers a clear objective and then
  56. 2:25trusting them to figure out how to
  57. 2:27achieve it. The Israeli Defense Forces
  58. 2:29emphasized initiative, improvisation,
  59. 2:32and aggressive problem-solving at every
  60. 2:35level of the chain of command. An
  61. 2:37Israeli lieutenant whose orders became
  62. 2:39irrelevant due to changing circumstances
  63. 2:42was expected to make new decisions
  64. 2:44immediately. His Arab counterpart might
  65. 2:46have to wait. That difference,
  66. 2:49compounded across thousands of
  67. 2:50individual battlefield moments, is damn
  68. 2:53near enough to tell you the full story.
  69. 2:55But we're not done, because there was
  70. 2:56also a consistent coordination problem.
  71. 3:00You see, the Arab states never fought as
  72. 3:02a unified military force. They were
  73. 3:04separate armies with separate chains of
  74. 3:07command and even separate operational
  75. 3:09objectives. There was no unified Arab
  76. 3:12command that could direct resources
  77. 3:14where they were needed, shift forces
  78. 3:17between fronts, or impose a coherent
  79. 3:20operational plan across multiple
  80. 3:23national armies. Israel fought as one
  81. 3:26army. The Arabs fought as several
  82. 3:29simultaneously and poorly. Equipment
  83. 3:32also mattered. For much of this period,
  84. 3:35Arab armies relied primarily on Soviet
  85. 3:37hardware, T-54 and T-55 tanks, MiG
  86. 3:41fighter jets, Soviet artillery systems.
  87. 3:45Soviet equipment was capable, but it
  88. 3:47came with the aforementioned rigid
  89. 3:49Soviet military doctrine as well. Israel
  90. 3:52increasingly sourced its equipment from
  91. 3:54the West, French Mirage jets, American
  92. 3:57Patton tanks, etc. In 1967, the Israeli
  93. 4:02Air Force flew French Mirage IIIs and
  94. 4:04destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the
  95. 4:06ground in the space of 3 hours. The
  96. 4:09technological edge was real, but it was
  97. 4:12the combination of superior equipment
  98. 4:14with superior training and doctrine that
  99. 4:17made it lethal. Arab pilots flying MiGs
  100. 4:20were not trained to the same standard as
  101. 4:22Israeli pilots flying Mirages. The gap
  102. 4:25in equipment and the gap in human
  103. 4:27capital reinforced each other.
  104. 4:30The military failures did not happen in
  105. 4:31isolation. They were produced by a
  106. 4:34broader political environment that made
  107. 4:36effective military organization
  108. 4:39impossible. Arab states across this
  109. 4:41period were politically unstable in a
  110. 4:44way that had direct military
  111. 4:46consequences. Egypt experienced a
  112. 4:49military coup in 1952. Syria had so many
  113. 4:53coups between 1949 and 1970 that it's
  114. 4:56honestly difficult to keep track of
  115. 4:58them. They had three in 1949 alone. Iraq
  116. 5:02saw the monarchy overthrown in 1958 and
  117. 5:05then a succession of violent transfers
  118. 5:07of power throughout the 1960s.
  119. 5:10This chronic political instability meant
  120. 5:13that military leadership was constantly
  121. 5:15being purged, reshuffled, and replaced
  122. 5:18not on the basis of competence, but on
  123. 5:21the basis of which party was in charge
  124. 5:23of the government. I hope we can all
  125. 5:26agree that building a professional
  126. 5:27military requires continuity.
  127. 5:30Doctrine has to be developed. Officers
  128. 5:33need time to train, exercise, and hone
  129. 5:36their skills. When the senior officer
  130. 5:38corps is replaced every time a new
  131. 5:40government takes power
  132. 5:42or whenever a general becomes too
  133. 5:44popular and therefore too dangerous to
  134. 5:46the ruler, that continuity is broken.
  135. 5:49Arab armies going into these wars were
  136. 5:52often led by officers who had been in
  137. 5:54the post for months rather than years.
  138. 5:57They might have even owed their
  139. 5:59positions to political connection rather
  140. 6:01than military experience. They might
  141. 6:04have even understood that showing too
  142. 6:06much initiative or competence might
  143. 6:09actually make them a target. If there is
  144. 6:11one institution where meritocracy has to
  145. 6:14be non-negotiable, it's the military.
  146. 6:17Your life is on the line.
  147. 6:19In contrast, even though Israel was
  148. 6:22younger than most Arab states, it
  149. 6:24actually had more institutional
  150. 6:26continuity.
  151. 6:27The IDF was built by the Haganah, a
  152. 6:30military organization with decades of
  153. 6:33experience, developed during the British
  154. 6:35Mandate period. There is also the
  155. 6:37problem of what the armies were actually
  156. 6:40for. Arab leaders during this period
  157. 6:43often used their armies in order to
  158. 6:45protect themselves from their own
  159. 6:46people. The best equipped, most reliable
  160. 6:49units during this period were kept in
  161. 6:52the capital in order to protect the
  162. 6:54regime. Egypt's Republican Guard existed
  163. 6:57to protect President Nasser. When these
  164. 6:59units were committed to the war front,
  165. 7:02they would be used for a purpose that
  166. 7:03they had not been built for or trained
  167. 7:06for.
  168. 7:07This is the part where I get
  169. 7:08philosophical, because another key
  170. 7:10reason is the issue of motivation.
  171. 7:13Israel was built by a population that
  172. 7:15had survived the traumatic experiences
  173. 7:18of 1930s Europe and [music] the events
  174. 7:20of World War II. Due to algorithmic
  175. 7:23consequences, I can't expand beyond
  176. 7:25that. So, they were a population for who
  177. 7:28defeat was not just another political
  178. 7:30setback, but it potentially meant
  179. 7:32annihilation.
  180. 7:33That existential reality helped to
  181. 7:35produce a culture of absolute commitment
  182. 7:38to the Zionist cause.
  183. 7:40It produced innovation under pressure,
  184. 7:42resilience when things go wrong, and a
  185. 7:45refusal to accept defeat as an option.
  186. 7:48That's really difficult to fight
  187. 7:49against. Now, compare the Zionist level
  188. 7:52of unity in purpose with that of the
  189. 7:54Arab states. Arab leaders at the time
  190. 7:57would often loudly declare that their
  191. 7:59purpose was the liberation of Palestine,
  192. 8:02and it would often galvanize the masses,
  193. 8:04but in truth, those leaders often used
  194. 8:07the Palestine issue for their own
  195. 8:09political goals.
  196. 8:11As I've mentioned many times before,
  197. 8:13many Arab countries were artificial
  198. 8:15constructs produced by colonial
  199. 8:17cartography.
  200. 8:19They had populations with no deep
  201. 8:21identification with the nation whose
  202. 8:23uniform that they were wearing.
  203. 8:25Imagine a Syrian soldier in the Golan
  204. 8:28being expected to fight for a Ba'athist
  205. 8:30regime that had taken power in a coup
  206. 8:32only 2 years before.
  207. 8:34The motivational gap between a
  208. 8:36population fighting for its very
  209. 8:38survival and soldiers fighting for a
  210. 8:40political project that they may or may
  211. 8:42not have agreed with was enormous and it
  212. 8:46showed.
  213. 8:47None of this analysis is complete
  214. 8:49without acknowledging a factor that
  215. 8:50became more and more important as the
  216. 8:53period progressed. And that's American
  217. 8:55support for Israel.
  218. 8:57In 1948, American support was primarily
  219. 9:00diplomatic. Uh President Truman's
  220. 9:02recognition of Israel over the
  221. 9:04objections of his own State Department
  222. 9:06was significant but not militarily
  223. 9:09decisive. By 1967, the relationship was
  224. 9:12deeper. By 1973, it was explicit and
  225. 9:16critical as Egypt and Syria launched
  226. 9:19their surprise attack on the Jewish
  227. 9:21holiday Yom Kippur. The Israelis were
  228. 9:23genuinely caught off guard suffering
  229. 9:25real losses in the first days of
  230. 9:27fighting. Then Uncle Sam stepped in as
  231. 9:30it initiated Operation Nickel Grass, an
  232. 9:33emergency airlift that delivered over
  233. 9:3522,000 tons of military equipment to
  234. 9:39Israel within weeks. Tanks, artillery,
  235. 9:42ammunition, and aircraft. The airlift
  236. 9:45allowed Israel to replace its losses,
  237. 9:47stabilize its lines, and eventually help
  238. 9:50it turn the war around.
  239. 9:52The implications of American support are
  240. 9:55grave. Israel has a guarantor of last
  241. 9:58resort, meaning whatever losses it
  242. 10:01sustains, however badly a war is going,
  243. 10:04the United States will ensure that it is
  244. 10:07not destroyed. No Arab state has ever
  245. 10:09had an equivalent guarantee. Saudi
  246. 10:12Arabia thought they had it in the
  247. 10:13present war with Iran, but that's proven
  248. 10:16to be a mirage. This asymmetry means
  249. 10:19Israel fights every war knowing that
  250. 10:21catastrophic defeat is ultimately
  251. 10:24impossible. Arab states fight knowing
  252. 10:26that catastrophic defeat is not only
  253. 10:28possible, but considering everything
  254. 10:30else on this list that I've mentioned,
  255. 10:32it's probably likely.
  256. 10:34In conclusion, the Arab states lost
  257. 10:36these wars for cascading reasons. Their
  258. 10:40armies were built on rigid doctrine that
  259. 10:42punished initiative. Their armies did
  260. 10:44not prioritize meritocracy. Arab
  261. 10:46coalitions would always break down
  262. 10:48because they were fragmented and
  263. 10:50dysfunctional. Their political systems
  264. 10:52produced chronic instability that
  265. 10:54undermined their militaries.
  266. 10:56Their soldiers were fighting for states
  267. 10:58with shallow roots and ambiguous
  268. 11:01legitimacy. And behind Israel stood the
  269. 11:04most powerful military guarantor in
  270. 11:07human history. If I had to dilute my
  271. 11:10analysis to only one reason, I would say
  272. 11:12it's because Israel wanted to win more.
  273. 11:15They had way more motivation to win than
  274. 11:18their Arab counterparts.
  275. 11:19Of course, this logic does not extend to
  276. 11:21the various Palestinian groups that were
  277. 11:23fighting for their homeland.
  278. 11:25And considering many Israelis hold dual
  279. 11:28citizenship with wealthy Western
  280. 11:30countries, don't be surprised if in the
  281. 11:32future that motivational pendulum swings
  282. 11:35towards [music] the Palestinians favor.
  283. 11:38What do you think is the reason that
  284. 11:39Arab states have performed so badly on
  285. 11:41the battlefield against Israel? Leave
  286. 11:44your thoughts in the comment below. As
  287. 11:46usual, I want to thank my patrons for
  288. 11:48their generous support. If you want to
  289. 11:50support the channel, there's a link to
  290. 11:52my Patreon in the description to this
  291. 11:54video. Don't forget to like, comment,
  292. 11:56and subscribe if you guys enjoyed this
  293. 11:58video. Until next time, peace.

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