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Who to trust? Forming policy beliefs in a polarised world — Transcript

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0:00Scientists, it's a great pleasure to
0:01welcome you here today for
0:03the inaugural lecture of Sudatta Baner
0:06Padje.
0:07Sid is an internationally recognized
0:10economist in the field of political
0:11economy and public policy with a
0:13particular interest in the economic
0:15evaluation of public policy and the
0:17economics of crime.
0:19His research has dealt with questions in
0:20political economy around electoral
0:22systems and coalition formation as well
0:25as around the rise of extremism during
0:27periods of political pessimism. And I
0:30have to say we're experiencing one of
0:32those periods right now, so this
0:33couldn't be more
0:35opportune.
0:36He also researches in public policy
0:38looking in particular at crime policy
0:40and how it gets mediated through the
0:42political process.
0:44Sid's work has been published in top
0:46academic journals, but also is highly
0:48impactful beyond academia. His paper on
0:51the electoral incentives of prosecutors
0:53with Brian McAnam was awarded the Duncan
0:55Black Prize for the best paper by the
0:57prestigious public choice society in
1:002015.
1:02This paper is an example of his dual
1:04interest in political economy and the
1:06working of the criminal justice system.
1:09He's also director of the
1:10multi-disciplinary center for crime,
1:12justice, and policing at the university
1:15and leads the 21st century transnational
1:17crime theme for the Institute of Global
1:19Innovation.
1:21These are vehicles for his genuinely
1:23innovative and deep relationships with
1:25practitioners.
1:26For example,
1:28he's worked closely with a number of
1:29police forces to promote a culture of
1:32evidence-based policing.
1:34This work is transforming police
1:35investigation and forms the core of one
1:38of the business school's impact case
1:40studies for the next ref and indeed has
1:42also been shortlisted recently for a
1:44cost impact prize.
1:47Sid is truly also an interdisciplinary
1:49scholar.
1:51In addition to regularly publishing in
1:52economics journals, he's also published
1:55in highly ranked journals in political
1:56science, law, criminology, and medicine.
2:00Over the last few years, he's worked
2:01closely with Professor Jessica Woodhams
2:03in the School of Psychology and a number
2:06of other scholars
2:07in psychology, law, public health, and
2:10nursing on funded projects on policing
2:12and criminal justice interventions.
2:15His most recent funded project was
2:17confirmed just 2 weeks ago and I
2:19understand from Sid that it's already
2:20started
2:22um with another 650,000
2:25pounds from the College of Policing.
2:27And outside of his work, I'm told that
2:29Sid likes to keep fit by playing tennis,
2:32belongs to a book club, and enjoys
2:35exploring the culinary delights of
2:36Birmingham. Now, I believe that uh those
2:40of you in the audience may represent
2:41some of those constituencies of Sid's
2:44work, um
2:45his research collaborators, his
2:47students, maybe also his tennis
2:48partners. And I would also like to
2:50extend a particular welcome to Sid's
2:52parents who flown all the way from
2:54Calcutta to be here tonight. So, we're
2:56very pleased indeed to have you with us.
3:04SO, TONIGHT SID WILL LOOK AT THE CAUSES
3:06AND effects of polarization
3:08and the rise of electoral success of
3:10politicians with extremist views. He
3:12will explore whether this is correlated
3:15with the availability of multiple
3:17channels, including social media
3:19outlets, through which citizens can get
3:21information, and whether this
3:23contributes to the rise of echo
3:25chambers.
3:26And with that, can I just say that
3:28tonight we are live streaming on
3:30Facebook, one of those social media
3:31channels, and we would encourage you to
3:33tweet throughout the lecture uh with the
3:36hashtag um
3:38cosinorg.
3:40Uh and with no further ado, I will pass
3:43you over to to Sid.
3:57So, thank you Richard for your kind
3:58introduction and uh
4:00good evening everybody. So, uh
4:03pleasure to talk to you about something
4:05which I've been thinking of for a very
4:06long time.
4:08Uh
4:11and this thinking has made me realize
4:13that
4:14what we term as polarization about
4:17policy positions, say, do you support
4:20Brexit or do you support electing Trump
4:24and so on and so forth,
4:26are really
4:27emanate from differences in policy
4:30beliefs about the state of the world.
4:33And you know, hopefully
4:35uh by the time I end, you'll have a
4:36better understanding of what I mean by
4:38differences in policy beliefs across
4:40states of the world.
4:42This was driven home to me
4:45uh on my recent visit to India at
4:47Christmas. I talked to a left-liberal
4:50lawyer friend of mine
4:53and she told me that things are really
4:55bad. Why? Because the present government
4:58is basically overturning the secular
5:01constitutional structure of India
5:05and and and sort of undoing all the
5:06years which has made India the diverse
5:09country that it is.
5:11Right.
5:12That's that's one viewpoint. The next
5:14day as it happened, I was talking to a
5:16right-wing nationalist cousin of mine
5:19and he told me that after years of
5:22left-wing propaganda,
5:24finally people were seeing an alternate
5:26viewpoint and finally
5:29addition to economic progress,
5:32India was
5:34reliving and rediscovering its past
5:36glory.
5:38Now,
5:39I have to say that
5:42I don't even want to get into where the
5:43truth lies,
5:45but it what I was wondering, A, where do
5:48these beliefs come from? These extremely
5:50polar beliefs. And B,
5:54what would happen if these two people
5:56talked to each other?
5:58Okay? So,
6:00that in a sense gives you a flavor of
6:04the type of things that I'm going to
6:05talk about today.
6:08But before even get into that, and and
6:10and I have to say, uh that's one of the
6:13sort of advantages of
6:14giving this kind of an inaugural lecture
6:17is I can I can I can now make a lot of
6:18conjectures about things that I don't
6:20necessarily have to prove rigorously.
6:23And
6:24yeah, it's a one-time opportunity, and
6:26I'm going to use that. But I'll start
6:29with a couple of things that we already
6:31know, including some recent work that
6:33I've done before I move into the realm
6:36of speculation.
6:38So, let me just just go back a bit
6:41and talk about
6:44uh
6:46Right, there should be a clicker. Ah,
6:48yes.
6:49And talk about voting theory 101.
6:54Voting theory 101 has the celebrated
6:57median voter theorem, which says that
7:01politicians, and therefore policies,
7:04gravitate towards the
7:06middle because they want to sort of be
7:09concerned with
7:11the preferences of the median voter, and
7:13that's a winning strategy. It's
7:14particularly true when there are two
7:16parties, as you have in the UK or the US
7:19and in a number of other countries.
7:22And and and you see that, right, in in
7:24the rise of New Labour, which came to
7:25the center and then after years of being
7:27out of power came into power. And you
7:30see that all over the world.
7:32At the same time, completely contrary to
7:35the median voter theorem,
7:37you see the recent electoral success of
7:39politicians who've espoused extreme, and
7:43by extreme I mean away from the median
7:45policies. And in countries as diverse as
7:48India, US, and Brazil. So, none of these
7:51leaders who were elected are known for
7:53their centrist or moderate policies.
7:57Now, why is that? Now, one explanation
7:59of course could be that look, society's
8:02polarized, so there's a vanishing middle
8:05or median. Instead, there are sort of
8:07bunches of
8:08uh voters who matter at the two extremes
8:11and politicians are simply latching on
8:13to one or the other. And you actually
8:15see that. I mean, labor has now again
8:17moved to the left, so even politicians
8:19who don't win are kind of moving away
8:21from the center.
8:22So, that could be one possible
8:24explanation which might explain the sort
8:27of supposed
8:29lack of influence now of the median
8:32voter.
8:34Possible?
8:36Now, that of course begs the question of
8:39why is society so polarized? I mean,
8:42have things changed over time in some
8:44ways which has caused society to become
8:47more polarized?
8:49Now, a popular explanation, and though
8:51I'll kind of mostly run with this
8:53explanation, I'll point out that there
8:54are competing
8:56uh viewpoints on this,
8:58is that the rise of media, so rise of I
9:01would say a choice of media outlets
9:04including social media,
9:07allows the perpetuation of echo
9:09chambers. So, if you only had like two
9:12or three national dailies
9:14from which you get your news and they're
9:17kind of more or less centrist, then
9:19whether you like it or not, you're
9:20exposed to different viewpoints. So,
9:22even if you're left liberal, you might
9:24hear news which do not necessarily
9:26conform to your beliefs and so on and so
9:28forth. But today, you don't need to. You
9:30don't need to read any, you know,
9:32central national daily.
9:34You pick an outlet that sort of is
9:37consonant with your beliefs. And by the
9:40way, this affects both the choice of
9:41news. So, you pick an outlet if you want
9:44to if you're left liberal and you want
9:46to learn about, you know, the sort of
9:48catastrophe of global warming, not only
9:51do you pick news media that covers that,
9:54but you also pick a news media where the
9:55slant is towards
9:57an ideology or which which conforms to
10:00your existing view.
10:03And and the fact that we have countless
10:04sources is therefore ironically, even
10:06though we could become information rich
10:08if you could use these countless
10:10sources, actually makes us information
10:12poor because we only pick those things
10:16which I'm not saying we necessarily do,
10:18but we could end up choosing those
10:20things which conform to our existing
10:22bias.
10:24And why is it ironic? Because
10:26potentially there are these countless
10:28news sources, and you could, through a
10:30careful reading, actually verify and
10:34find out the truth about competing
10:36claims. But as they say, to find one
10:38must seek. Do we seek?
10:42Uh here's an example. Now,
10:45I imagine most of you don't have this
10:48odd hobby that I do of following the US
10:51Supreme Court and its judgments and so
10:53on and so forth. So, you might not
10:55recognize this,
10:56but this is the late Antonin Scalia,
10:59a conservative stalwart who died
11:01suddenly in Obama's last year in office.
11:04And and it's a different issue that
11:06there was this bitter fight where the
11:07Republicans wouldn't let him his
11:09successor be confirmed and so on and so
11:10forth.
11:11That's for another day.
11:14But here's an interview with just the
11:16late Justice Scalia.
11:18He says, "What's your media diet? Where
11:20do you get your news?" He said, "Well,
11:21we get newspapers in the morning." What
11:23a surprise.
11:25We, meaning the justices, "No, no,
11:26Maureen, Maureen." Maureen is Antonin
11:28Scalia's wife. "Maureen and I I usually
11:31skim them. We just get the Wall Street
11:32Journal,
11:34uh which is sort of uh center right,
11:36Washington Times about the same a bit
11:38more right perhaps. We used to get the
11:40Washington Post, which is a left liberal
11:43uh newspaper, but it just went too far
11:46for me. I couldn't handle it anymore.
11:48What tipped you over the edge? Why did
11:50he not read the Washington Times
11:52anymore? The treatment of almost any
11:54conservative issue.
11:56It was slanted and often nasty.
11:58And this is important. Why should I wake
12:01up and get upset every morning by
12:03reading news which makes me angry?
12:06Absolutely no need to do that. And
12:09therefore, I just stopped reading such
12:10news and instead read things in which
12:13sort of, you know, most news agrees with
12:16my sort of
12:17prior beliefs.
12:19Now, this is from Justice Scalia, an
12:21erudite scholar and a judge who you
12:23think would welcome independent thinking
12:26and so on and so forth.
12:28But
12:29is it any wonder that a lot of ordinary
12:33citizens also follow Justice Scalia and
12:36only consume news that conforms to their
12:38bias and therefore their media
12:40consumption could confirm bias as we
12:43only read what we want.
12:46Now, many people of course think that
12:47this is sort of a recent phenomenon with
12:50the rise of competing channels and
12:52social media and so on and so forth.
12:55But
12:56to be fair, uh you were warned about
12:59this to an extent by two researchers in
13:01as early as 1996
13:04uh from MIT, which says that individuals
13:08empowered to screen out
13:10material that does not conform to their
13:12existing preferences may form virtual
13:15cliques, insulate themselves from
13:17opposing points of view, reinforce their
13:20bias. Internet users can seek out
13:22interactions with like-minded
13:24individuals who have similar values and
13:27thus become less likely to trust
13:29important decisions to people whose
13:31values differ from their own.
13:35Now,
13:36I have to say this is not a viewpoint
13:39which is universally shared. I think
13:42it's a reasonably likely explanation for
13:45some of the polarization that we see,
13:47but it's not universally shared. And in
13:49fact, some argue that social media in
13:52fact widens exposure and even if it is a
13:55sort of accidental exposure in a way,
13:57you know, you kind of
13:58it it does sometimes bring you in
14:00contact with views other than your own,
14:02which may actually help worsen bias. So,
14:04I'm perfectly aware that there's also a
14:07sort of alternative minority viewpoint
14:10on this, which is important that
14:11sometimes actually social media can make
14:13you find the truth. If
14:16you have the sort of interest in
14:19learning about
14:21various
14:22viewpoints.
14:25However,
14:26while certainly
14:29a good explanation is that polarized
14:31voters give rise to polarized
14:33politicians and therefore polarized
14:35policies,
14:37is it necessary
14:39that voting groups have to be polarized
14:42in order for policies to be extreme? And
14:45again, by extreme, let me
14:46once again clarify, I mean away from the
14:49median.
14:53The answer as turns out, and this is not
14:55speculation. This is this is one part
14:57where where we've actually based on the
14:59work that I've done, which is not pure
15:01speculation.
15:03The answer is no.
15:05Uh
15:05in recent work that I've done with Colan
15:08Chatterjee at Penn State and Joydeep Roy
15:09at the University of Bath,
15:11we show that extreme policies and their
15:15and politicians who espouse extreme
15:16policies can
15:20be electorally successful
15:23even in a completely homogeneous
15:26society. I mean, to take an extreme
15:28example in our model, we take a one
15:30voter economy with with with which has,
15:33you know, so that so that or a bunch of
15:35identical voters and suppose they're at
15:37some policy position, you'd think the
15:40natural
15:41answer is that if there's only one
15:42voter, then shouldn't every politician
15:45who wants to win be at that voter's
15:47ideal policy? And the answer is no.
15:50And the reason is because voters care
15:52not just for policy on which there are
15:55policy differences, but they care for
15:57other things like character of a
15:58politician,
16:00uh honesty, and so on and so forth.
16:04And strangely enough,
16:07uh
16:08this extremism
16:10uh in in the policy space
16:13signals to the voters something about
16:16the competence or the honesty of a
16:18politician. So, the basic idea is that,
16:21look,
16:23only a politician
16:26who is sort of honest in you know, is
16:28just not pandering to the voter would
16:31ever want to take a policy with which
16:33voters don't agree, right? I mean, you
16:35know, a
16:37So, why why would if he only want to win
16:39and therefore
16:40in a
16:41regime of political pessimism, that is
16:44when you're basically
16:45fed up with the political class, which
16:47is sort of a phase that we're going
16:49through now,
16:52a voter would consider voting for this
16:54challenger
16:56who has taken an extreme policy. But at
16:59the same time, this voter wants to be
17:00sure that actually the challenger is in
17:03fact competent, honest, and so on and so
17:05forth, and therefore would try to seek
17:07out news or demand news from media.
17:11And the media would respond by providing
17:14more news and and mind you, some of the
17:16news could be true, some of the news
17:18could be false.
17:19Uh
17:20If you're really really interested, uh
17:22we'd be more than happy to send you a
17:23link to the paper. Uh
17:26and and therefore the demand for news
17:27would increase in sort of extremism up
17:29to a point. I mean,
17:31if the politician takes a totally crazy
17:33policy, well, yeah,
17:34fine. You you won't uh vote for her, but
17:37up to a point, you actually want to vote
17:39for this bold politician who does not
17:41pander to your ideal policy.
17:45And therefore, and
17:47you end up sometimes voting for a
17:49politician because you think he's
17:51otherwise competent and honest.
17:53And this as I pointed out,
17:55uh occurs during the times of political
17:57pessimism,
17:59which is often uh correlated with an
18:02economy in recession.
18:04Right, so that's that's if you like an
18:05empirically testable hypothesis that
18:08comes out of our model.
18:10And as a result, you have you suffer
18:12extreme policies, which are the price of
18:14selecting, if you like, uh leaders with
18:17competence and so on and so forth.
18:21Now,
18:22I could point out that in in in
18:25environments less drastic than ours,
18:28that is, one in which there's a
18:29homogeneous society and so on and so
18:31forth,
18:32it's still true that you could get uh
18:34extreme policies uh which could help
18:37select uh competent leaders.
18:41The cost of that is it drives policy
18:43away from the median voter,
18:45but it also has a dynamic effect. It it
18:49it dynamically it favors
18:52especially, I mean, in times of conflict
18:55and so on, uh politicians who are
18:57inherently hawkish in a way, in other
18:59words, those who are sort of aggressive
19:03in in in in in negotiations and so on
19:05and so forth, uh who who might go to war
19:08more easily than others. So so there is
19:10a
19:11uh
19:12dynamics of the selection of extreme
19:14leaders which can last beyond a single
19:17period and bias uh the process in favor
19:21of politicians with certain types of
19:23ideology.
19:25And therefore, it can lead to certain
19:27bad outcomes like the perpetuation of
19:29conflict, particularly land disputes
19:31between neighboring countries, and so on
19:33and so forth.
19:35Right. So,
19:37two things to take away from here. One
19:39is you don't need a polarized electorate
19:42to elect politicians with extreme
19:44policies.
19:45Second, if you do, there's a cost of
19:48this kind of selection. You suffer
19:50extreme policies and in certain types of
19:52issues with the extreme policies, say,
19:54negotiation over land and so on and so
19:57forth. This can lead to the perpetuation
19:59of conflict, which has social costs.
20:04Now, as you know, typically, economists
20:06like to express everything in very
20:09elegant equations. And I'm sure you
20:11would have wanted to know what this
20:13would have looked like.
20:16So, this is when we when we translate
20:17all our
20:19uh work which I've kind of told you in
20:20the words to equations, this is what it
20:23looks like.
20:24I'm sure this is absolutely fascinating,
20:25no?
20:28Okay.
20:29Slightly more accessible.
20:31Here's a picture. And believe me, you'll
20:33know it. You generally get exactly what
20:35I'm talking about.
20:38So, what we're trying to so
20:40Remember, we said that um
20:42during a time of political pessimism
20:44when you're fed up with the incumbent
20:46political class, you want to uh consider
20:48voting for a competent uh challenger who
20:51might have an extreme policy. Okay?
20:54So, we want to see so we want to
20:57understand the
21:00hypothesized
21:02uh
21:03quality of a challenger if if it turns
21:07out to be of high quality. Okay, so some
21:09expectation about Yeah, the challenger
21:10might be actually quite competent.
21:13So, here's on a vertical axis, you have
21:16the probability that your challenger is
21:19competent, high quality, that is better
21:21than the incumbent.
21:23Yeah, and this
21:26tells me the ratio of how much better
21:29a challenger is compared to the
21:30incumbent.
21:32So, you can see that's only when the
21:34challenger is
21:36not too much better than the incumbent
21:39than the incumbent, even if she was of
21:41high quality, that extremism no longer
21:43prevails and instead you have more
21:46centrist policies winning. In every
21:48other situation,
21:50uh
21:51you have the
21:53possibility of
21:56political uh scenario where even with a
22:00completely homogeneous society, you have
22:02extreme policies.
22:04So, this, if you like, is our kind of
22:06benchmark situation and and and it seems
22:09to correlate with the fact that, you
22:11know, we have elected extreme leaders at
22:13a time of political pessimism.
22:16How do things change? So, back to our
22:18polarization and now I'm going to get,
22:20as I said, in the realm of conjectures.
22:23Interesting conjectures, I hope, but
22:24nonetheless things that I haven't
22:26proved, but I either hope to prove or I
22:27hope that other people will prove.
22:31So, is it the case that when you
22:34actually have a polarized electorate,
22:36these things get worse? So, you get even
22:38more extreme policies and
22:40and so on and so forth. Or are there
22:42some forces which actually bring us more
22:44towards centrism in in a polarized
22:46electorate?
22:48Now, to do
22:49an analysis of this, there are a few
22:51conceptual issues and that's mostly what
22:53I'm going to talk about
22:55uh for the rest of the lecture. Some
22:57conceptual issues that you need to
22:58understand.
23:00First of all, what do we mean
23:02polarization?
23:04Well, of course, you could talk about
23:05ideological polarization.
23:07Right? So, you know, you might believe
23:10uh in a more equal society versus you
23:13might believe in that society should
23:15give incentives to the person who works
23:17hard and therefore equality per se is
23:19not desirable.
23:21If anything, inequality makes society
23:23grow. So, those are
23:24um ideological uh polarization. You may
23:27believe that uh in general the
23:30government should not interfere in in in
23:32in personal choices versus you might
23:35think that the state has a role in
23:37promoting, say, family values and so on
23:39and so forth. So, these are So, this is
23:41a kind of ideological polarization. So,
23:43if your beliefs are very far apart in
23:45this dimension, you have ideological
23:47polarization.
23:49I think conceptually we should
23:50distinguish between this and
23:52polarization in beliefs.
23:55And I would argue that ideological
23:57polarization often arises because of a
23:59polarization in beliefs. That your
24:01belief about the state of the world
24:04is different. So, you might believe that
24:08uh
24:08an unequal society is better because you
24:11believe on some evidence that you have,
24:13which is partial,
24:15that
24:18unequal societies are what incentivizes
24:21people to work hard.
24:23You might believe that an equal society
24:25doesn't leave much incentives for people
24:27who work hard and are productive.
24:29Now, how
24:30far that a belief is true
24:33is is a different issue. But, the reason
24:35why one person may believe that actually
24:38societal inequality is quite okay and we
24:40shouldn't really worry about it versus
24:42others who think it's actually not okay.
24:44If anything, it leads to concentration
24:46of wealth and perpetuation of
24:48oligarchies and so on, comes because the
24:51sort of information, partially revealing
24:53information that comes to you from
24:54different sources, varies leading to
24:57huge divergences in beliefs, right? So,
25:00my claim is that it's these divergences
25:02in beliefs that
25:05perpetrates divergence in ideology.
25:08Okay?
25:10And and and and and such polarization if
25:12with such polarization in beliefs,
25:14there's no clear way that your beliefs
25:17are going to convert even though I'm
25:18going to talk about one or two
25:19mechanisms which could cause these
25:20beliefs to converge
25:23even when that actually is quite clearly
25:25a true state of the world.
25:28To give you a very very
25:31absurd example,
25:33if you believe that the earth is flat,
25:35right? And you only read media outlets
25:38and by the way, there is a flat earth
25:40group and they have they're doing a lot
25:41of fundraising if you want to help.
25:44Right? Okay.
25:45So,
25:46if you believe that the earth is flat
25:48and and you only end up in talking to
25:50people who believe that the earth is
25:52flat, then even when it's very clearly
25:55that the truth exists and the earth is
25:57not flat, your beliefs will never
25:59converge to that.
26:01Okay?
26:05Why? Because as I said, to converge
26:07meaningful information exchange needs to
26:09take place, but there's a chance it will
26:11not.
26:12Well, why? Well, of course, you could be
26:13like the late Justice Scalia and many
26:15others, you only read newspaper outlets
26:18that sort of confirm to your beliefs.
26:21And as
26:23as I've mentioned before and want to
26:24emphasize this point, that mobility, not
26:27just physical mobility that you can move
26:29and you know,
26:31to a place which is sort of more in
26:33consonance with your values, but today
26:37online mobility, in other words, you can
26:40create your virtual society,
26:43right? Where most of them have the
26:45belief in the kind of things that that
26:47you do, whether it's the flat earth
26:48theory or something less absurd.
26:51And this, ironically,
26:54uh
26:55has been helped by globalization and and
26:59and immigration waves in many countries.
27:01Why? Because this allows us to consort
27:05with people of our kind. If you can't
27:07find somebody in our community, well, we
27:10we find somebody else online or because
27:12of globalization and the internet and so
27:14on. Or
27:16if you have mass immigration waves,
27:19often people
27:20people There is no meaningful exchange
27:22between the two populations, the
27:23immigrants who come in and those who
27:25don't, because you know, what's the
27:27point? I've got I've got lots of fellow
27:29immigrants to talk to and so on and so
27:31forth. And therefore, this sort of
27:33perpetuation of beliefs can actually be
27:38increased because of changes that are
27:40occurring in the world today.
27:45Now,
27:47one very simple solution people always
27:50talk about is
27:52communication. If we only talked to each
27:54other, things would be okay.
27:57So, the question that I want to ask is,
27:58does communication help?
28:06Well, of course, it can. I mean, you
28:07know,
28:08uh
28:09there are papers, I mean, in in many
28:11areas, including economics, which talk
28:13about talk and cheap talk and so on and
28:15so forth, showing that costless
28:16communication can help.
28:18But it doesn't necessarily help if the
28:20initial priors about the state of the
28:23world or the initial beliefs are very
28:25far apart.
28:28Sometimes, and and and and and you know,
28:30there is a body of research showing that
28:33sometimes third-party mediation can
28:35help. So, you have a third person who
28:37kind of mediates on your behalf and
28:38tries to get people to think through uh
28:42and and and reach some kind of
28:43consensus. That sometimes can help.
28:46But if anything, that is also work
28:48showing that third-party mediation can
28:51sometimes worsen polarization and lead
28:54to conflict.
28:56I'm going to talk a little bit about
28:57conflict
28:58towards the end, but uh
29:02So, it's not clear from what we know
29:04that while communi- whether
29:05communication helps and when does
29:07communication help. And in particular,
29:10the what we know from the literature on
29:14uh strategic interaction suggests that
29:16communication can only help if your
29:19initial priors are not too far apart.
29:23Okay. So,
29:26now, let's see if this works or not.
29:29Here's an example of communication.
29:39Right.
29:40Let's try this.
29:42Any idea?
29:44I always knew that I was technologically
29:45challenged, but
29:47um
29:59What is Swami's situation? Swami's
30:00situation is I asked him one question.
30:03And very often, has he not
30:04Step to this.
30:05been done written on issues to Rajapaksa
30:07in the past? Has he not met Mr.
30:09Rajapaksa in the past at an individual
30:12level? At each time that he has met Mr.
30:14Rajapaksa to lobby on different issues,
30:16has he done so on behalf of the
30:17government of India? No, he has used his
30:20own good offices to do so. Now, the
30:21lives of five fishermen is at stake. My
30:25question to Subramanian Swamy is, does
30:28he believe, and he has the choice of
30:30ducking this.
30:31But, I'd repeat the question a thousand
30:33times for his benefit. Does he believe
30:34the Sri Lankan government is lying?
30:37Does he believe the Sri Lankan
30:38government is lying? Does he believe the
30:40Sri Lankan Does he believe the Sri
30:42Lankan government is lying?
30:44Let me answer that question.
30:59Okay.
31:00I I I I you know, this goes on for about
31:03another 18 minutes, but I think
31:05Okay, but I I I I think you get the
31:08general picture. There's an
31:10This is communication. People are
31:12talking, trying to find out supposedly
31:14the truth. Is he lying? But do you think
31:16much information is getting transmitted?
31:18So, one one reason could be again that
31:21we are trying to trying to
31:24have dialogue on an issue that we
31:26totally are sort of at loggerheads with.
31:29Now, can we do better? So, one
31:31possibility is, yes, find a common
31:34dimension.
31:36So, many people talk about things
31:37around, you know,
31:39uh golf diplomacy, cricket diplomacy.
31:43Uh oh.
31:46Right.
31:47It's obviously gone to the
31:50The check They must have changed. Never
31:52mind. I I I'll tell you what it is. It's
31:55uh
31:56Yeah. It's taking to the Ah, yes, here
31:59we are.
32:00That that's cool, yeah.
32:02Okay. So, at at at the height of a lot
32:04of tensions between India and Pakistan,
32:07uh
32:08India and Pakistan reached the
32:10semi-finals of a cricket match, and then
32:13India's then Prime Minister Manmohan
32:14Singh invited the Pakistani Prime
32:17Minister and the Pakistani President to
32:19watch the India-Pakistan match in
32:21Mohali.
32:22Uh
32:24This was a good example of
32:28starting some kind of dialogue
32:31on an
32:32issue that
32:33people kind of agree with. I mean, I'm
32:35sure the Indian Prime Minister and the
32:36Pakistani Prime Minister did not agree
32:38on who they would like to win the match,
32:41but this Yeah? But they certainly agreed
32:44that
32:46cricket is one thing that they both
32:47love. Now, does this work? I mean, does
32:50this kind of cricket diplomacy work? And
32:52does it lead to meaningful dialogue on
32:55other dimensions?
32:57Uh
32:59we don't know,
33:00but one reason why this may work is that
33:04once communication starts on this common
33:06dimension, information on other
33:08dimensions may get updated. It could be
33:11that the two Prime Ministers talking to
33:12each other find that actually there is
33:15much that is common between the two
33:17countries. It's not that they didn't
33:18know it, but it comes to the forefront.
33:20And actually there are there are things
33:21about each other that they trust. And it
33:24might be to their advantage, including
33:26sometimes their political advantage, to
33:28make peace.
33:29I mean, you know, it's it's a it's an
33:30idea that politicians increase conflict
33:33and I argue sometimes that they do,
33:35but sometimes it is to their electoral
33:37advantage to say that they brought home
33:40the peace.
33:41And and and so therefore starting where
33:43dialogue on a non-controversial
33:45dimension may allow communication to
33:47continue as new issues come up that are
33:49perhaps not even so polarizing within
33:52the countries.
33:53Now,
33:54this is a conjecture. I think it would
33:56be really nice and given we have so many
33:58brilliant experimentalists in the
34:00audience, wouldn't it be great to test
34:02this experimentally? So,
34:05pick subjects and subjects who differ
34:08from each other, you know, on on on the
34:11policy scale, and then
34:14uh
34:15you first have them talking about a
34:17dimension that they agree with,
34:19say cricket or golf or something, and
34:21then having a dialogue about the
34:22dimension that they have very different
34:25priors with.
34:27versus
34:28same subjects of experiments
34:31uh
34:31talking only on the dimension of
34:33conflict and see in which cases you
34:36reach resolution if you do.
34:38Uh I hypothesize that you would in the
34:40case where you have a communication on
34:42the dimension that you agree with, but
34:44again, that's that that's something
34:46uh for us to test.
34:51Right.
34:52Now,
34:53here's an example of um if you like
34:56bipartisan agreement in a time of uh
34:59great
35:01polarization. Now, the US uh Republicans
35:04and Democrats
35:06are
35:07highly polarized. I mean, they don't
35:08seem to agree on anything, including the
35:10fact that they need to get a budget
35:12done, right? But, in spite of that, they
35:15managed to pass a criminal justice
35:17reform on a bipartisan basis a
35:20couple of months ago.
35:22And it occurred through
35:24influence groups on the left and the
35:26right. So, such this you know, the Koch
35:28brothers who opposed everything that
35:30Obama did, they funded
35:33a movement to
35:35prevent this overcrowding of prisons and
35:38prevent this
35:40uh to sort of reduce these disparities
35:43in sentencing in the US with
35:45left-liberal organizations like the
35:47American Civil Liberties Organization.
35:50Now, why did this happen? It happened
35:52because in spite of a lot of
35:55prior
35:57polarization in beliefs, so you know,
35:59the the Koch brothers believe that in
36:02general government is a force for evil
36:04and looked for limited government versus
36:06the left-liberals who push for
36:07ever-expanding government,
36:09they all agreed
36:11that
36:13the amount of money spent on prisons is
36:16not being put is not a good use of the
36:18government budget.
36:20They all agreed that sentences are
36:22disproportionately long for
36:25and and and that something needs to be
36:27done. It could be that the right-wing
36:29people were more concerned about the
36:31overreach of government and budgetary
36:33issues and the Sorry, the right were
36:35more concerned about that and the left
36:36were more concerned about issues around
36:38disparities in sentencing between racial
36:39groups, but nonetheless they found this
36:42uh
36:43extreme problem on which they had a
36:45common agreement and came to a solution.
36:49That's also the hope that you might
36:50ultimately find a solution because
36:52whether you believe in Brexit or you
36:53don't believe in Brexit, you might not
36:55believe in no-deal Brexit and therefore
36:57you might at the last minute come
36:58together and come come to uh a common
37:01ground.
37:02So, I think we need to start find Well,
37:04maybe too optimistic, but anyway, we
37:06need to start finding common ground and
37:08evidence on problems we agree that needs
37:11to be solved to avoid bad outcomes.
37:17Common values. Now, the fact that we
37:19need to find a common dimension
37:22uh need to find a common dimension
37:25uh
37:26would make me wonder, well, should we
37:28therefore try to search for or inculcate
37:32a sense a set of common values?
37:36Would that help in reducing polarization
37:39or should we instead
37:42face more exposure to divergent
37:44viewpoints? I mean, what is going to
37:46reduce uh
37:48polarization? And this has policy
37:51implications.
37:52Because if you believe that it's about
37:55inculcating common values, then you
37:57might be more interested in you know,
38:00thinking about uh
38:02mandated courses in uh
38:05uh sort of civics and what, you know, I
38:07don't know, living in a Western liberal
38:09society is. You might be more interested
38:11in perhaps nationalism lectures. I
38:13remember a French politician's blank was
38:15that every child must be made to sing
38:18the national anthem and so on and so
38:19forth. That's your common values.
38:22On the other hand, if you think, well,
38:23no, it's actually exposure to divergent
38:26viewpoints, which is what helps people
38:29uh
38:30engage in meaningful dialogue, then you
38:32might be more interested in uh
38:34lessons in multiculturalism and so on
38:36and so forth.
38:38Which is essentially a reframing of the
38:41question,
38:42what sort of society
38:44do we want? And And depending on what
38:47your objective function is, of course,
38:48but what sort of society do you think at
38:51least has lower polarization or is more
38:54progressive in whatever dimension you
38:56believe in? I mean, is it is it uh a
38:59melting pot where different cultures and
39:01ideologies mix? So, you know, all
39:04that which is sort of the American idea
39:06that uh
39:07you come with different cultures and so
39:08on and so forth, you melt and you become
39:10American. Or is it a salad bowl where
39:14you have different cultures and you and
39:16you and you form a kind of uh
39:18mosaic, if you like, or you know, where
39:20everybody retains their individual
39:22culture.
39:23What sort of society
39:25should one aspire for? And what are
39:30Put another way,
39:31what do these two different societies
39:33have in regards to
39:36how polarized they are?
39:40Now,
39:42we don't While we don't know the answer,
39:44I mean, people have thought about this,
39:46there are a couple of interesting points
39:48to note.
39:49We know that forced exposure doesn't
39:51help.
39:52Right? So, we said, you know, talking in
39:55different divergent viewpoints and so
39:57on, but if you force people to listen to
39:59things that they don't necessarily want
40:00to listen to,
40:02that's not going to help. There's a lot
40:03of evidence that right-wing people get
40:06more right-wing after listening to
40:07left-wing news and and vice versa.
40:10Yeah?
40:12So, so clearly it has to occur by things
40:15other than just mandating, let's do
40:17this, let's do that.
40:18And it leaves us with empirical
40:21challenges which are quite complicated.
40:23I mean, is is a society that is diverse
40:27in some sense more polarized? We don't
40:31know. Does the degree of diversity
40:33matter?
40:34I mean, you know, it's not very clear
40:36what what diversity is. Is it like maybe
40:38having three big groups which are very
40:40diverse versus lots of small groups
40:42across the political spectrum? What
40:44leads to more polarization?
40:46And there are issues of what economists
40:48call reverse causality, something our
40:51students always grapple with, which is
40:53cause and effect. Suppose we find that
40:55diverse societies are less polarized.
40:59Uh is it happening because the society
41:02is less uh polarized simply because it's
41:04more diverse and people are left in
41:06peace? Or are diverse societies more
41:08correlated with societies which are
41:10liberal in other dimensions and that is
41:12what is driving the
41:14lack of polarization? You know,
41:16complicated empirical challenges and
41:18therefore it complicates uh
41:21the issue of whether we should aim for a
41:23melting pot or a salad bowl.
41:26Conflict versus polarization and now
41:29it's getting even more speculative. Uh
41:32what sort of structure actually
41:34incentivizes progress? And now, you can
41:37define progress as you want. If your
41:38progress is high GDP,
41:40that's progress. If your progress is an
41:42equal society, that's progress. Whatever
41:44is your
41:46metric of progress,
41:48what kind of societal structure or what
41:51kind of societal diversity versus
41:53homogeneity incentivizes progress? And
41:57even if we know that a certain societal
41:59structure does, are these consistent
42:01with individual incentives? In other
42:03words, would the political class
42:05encourage uh such a society?
42:08Because after all, you know, there's
42:09work showing that leaders may sometimes
42:11thrive on polarization they're
42:12electorally successful. Why would they
42:14ever want to reduce that?
42:17Can we progress in spite of
42:18polarization?
42:20Because there's a worry that
42:21polarization leads to a lot of conflict
42:24across classes, which has societal
42:26costs.
42:29Now, for what it is worth, and I'm
42:31making a few conjectures, I think the
42:33type of conflict matters. Because
42:35whatever
42:36we think, I don't think uniformity of
42:38ideas or uniformity of beliefs is in any
42:41way progress.
42:43In fact, I think progress occurs through
42:45the conflict of ideas. And so, like
42:47everything else, you know, there's
42:48probably an optimal degree of conflict.
42:52So, while conflict of ideas therefore
42:54advances society, only when there is a
42:56dialogue between these conflict of
42:58ideas, and you know, sort of the better
43:00idea comes out through this dialogue.
43:02What polarization of prior beliefs does
43:05is actually it impedes this conflict of
43:08ideas. If you start by believing that
43:10I'm right and this person is, you know,
43:12sort of the devil incarnate, and then
43:14you try to have this a sort of
43:16discussion about ideas, you don't have a
43:18true conflict of ideas with a better
43:20idea winning.
43:21Yeah? So, there is an optimal degree of
43:24conflict, which is good, and I think the
43:26prior polarization in society has
43:28something to do with whether the
43:30conflict of ideas is good or bad for
43:31society. It's a bit like what Lipset
43:34said in 1959, that inherent in all
43:37democratic system is a constant threat
43:39that group conflicts, which our
43:41democracies like floods, that's the
43:42conflict of ideas, if you like, may
43:44solidify to the point where they
43:46threaten to disintegrate uh society.
43:50Okay, so now,
43:53are we in that age? Can we do anything
43:55about it? Am I optimistic? Well, I'm
43:57kind of optimistic be- because I sort of
43:59believe what was said in The Ascent of
44:01Man,
44:03that there are many gifts that are
44:04unique in man, but then the center of
44:07them all, the root from which all
44:08knowledge grows, lies the ability to
44:10draw conclusions from what we see
44:13to what we do not see, to move our minds
44:16through space and time, and to recognize
44:18ourselves in the past on the steps of
44:20the present. Now,
44:22it it might sometimes seem hidden in
44:24this kind of polarized society that we
44:26think we lived live in, but I'm sure
44:29there are triggers which would enable us
44:31to,
44:32you know, revive our rational hats on
44:34and reason. And that's why I'm kind of
44:36uh
44:37optimistic.
44:39And what we actually think about sort of
44:41conflict and so on and so forth.
44:44I'm going to end here. And it also gives
44:45me a chance to quote from Man and
44:47Superman. Uh I like George Bernard Shaw,
44:49not because I agree with him, but I
44:51think he writes beautifully.
44:53And also some of these quotes sort of
44:54show how dated I am. Never mind.
44:58Right.
44:59So, it's The reasonable man adapts
45:01himself to the world. The unreasonable
45:04one persists in trying to adapt the
45:07world to himself. Therefore,
45:10all progress depends on the unreasonable
45:13man.
45:14So, I would say, let's all activate our
45:17unreasonable selves. Thank you.
45:32Sid, thank you for that. Um I was um at
45:34the beginning you said that you were
45:35going to make a lot of conjectures and
45:37you don't have to prove things, but you
45:39forgot that you've got questions, Sid.
45:41I'll make some further conjectures then.
45:44So, colleagues, in this the spirit of
45:47being invited to be unreasonable, who
45:49would like to go first with the first
45:51question to Sid?
45:54Yes.
45:55Over here.
45:57Um Hi, Sid. Thanks for an exciting talk.
46:01Uh my question pertains uh to the echo
46:04chamber and polarization point that you
46:06mentioned,
46:08which has received a lot of limelight
46:09recently. And these Facebook
46:13the social media giants like Facebook
46:14and Twitter have received a lot of flak
46:16for it. And your presentation focused on
46:20us as consumers to inform us of the
46:23various forces at play here.
46:25But do you think in this entire
46:26discourse we are forgetting a very
46:29important third party which is the
46:31government. Do you think there is a
46:34potential contribution there or should
46:36the state be left out of this entire
46:39business of preventing echo chambers or
46:42nudging consumers towards a lesser
46:43polarized state. So what is your take on
46:45that?
46:47Uh
46:48I mean really good question. I mean
46:50first of all I agree that I I kind of
46:51look at this mainly from the point of
46:54view of consumers. But I I think
46:57governments are important, right? I mean
46:58that's why I had this example of a
47:00dialogue between the Indian Prime
47:01Minister and the Pakistani Prime
47:03Minister. And I think governments
47:06have have a duty to
47:08reduce some of this. And
47:11now how do they do that? Because you you
47:13know you're you're kind of trading off
47:15other things which are really important
47:16like privacy and so on and so forth if
47:19you try to regulate. I would rather that
47:22governments nudge.
47:24So you know, let's all encourage people
47:27to be civil and watch India-Pakistan
47:30cricket matches without becoming a
47:32shouting match about the morals of the
47:34of the two countries and so on and so
47:36forth.
47:37So governments again can
47:39encourage civil discourse by example.
47:42The debates in parliament don't always
47:45seem to point to the government as a
47:46great leader in encouraging civil
47:49discourse. And and I and I think and
47:51that's where I I'm sort of
47:53torn. I'm not sure
47:55what the government should be
47:56encouraging. And that's partly you know,
47:58why I said there are all these
47:59speculations and conjectures because
48:02we are not sure what sort of society we
48:03aspire to be which will actually reduce
48:06echo chambers. I mean, and and how it
48:08links with diversity. That's an open
48:10question, and maybe something that the
48:11PICT student you can tackle.
48:15Okay, other questions, colleagues?
48:19Yes, here.
48:26So, firstly, congratulations, Sid. Um
48:28it's a pleasure to be here. So, um my
48:30question comes, as you know me uh as a
48:32political scientist. So, you started off
48:34by talking about um the kind of Downsean
48:37approach, one-dimensional.
48:38Yeah.
48:39Um and in a sense, one could argue that
48:41polarization is a good example of
48:44uh if I can use the language of
48:45political science, an example of
48:47cumulative cleavages. So, it's where
48:49divisions in society of essentially a
48:51series of them accumulate to kind of
48:53encourage polarization. So, political
48:56scientist might say, "Well, the real
48:57response is actually to think about the
49:00cross-cutting cleavages." So, the way to
49:02deal with polarization is to actually
49:04maybe um focus on those issues which cut
49:07across.
49:09And I could perhaps be challenging and
49:10say you've picked India, you've picked
49:12the United States, you picked Brazil,
49:14you picked the UK. Part of that is the
49:17structure of those institutional
49:19frameworks that they have.
49:21So, if you have a different kind of
49:23electoral system, a different
49:24institutional framework, and a kind of
49:25light party in sense, it could deal with
49:27it. Um but also it's about maybe
49:29encouraging those issues which cross-cut
49:32rather than cumulative. So, is part of
49:34the solution to maybe find the issues,
49:37maybe not just cricket, but other kinds
49:39of issues which can cut across rather
49:42than be cumulative cleavages?
49:45Yeah.
49:46Uh you know,
49:47that that's really an excellent idea.
49:49And I guess it's sort of the issue that
49:51you're trying to solve, right? I mean,
49:53if if you're trying to solve
49:55uh tensions between India and Pakistan,
49:57you might be looking for things which
49:58are common to those countries. If you're
50:01trying to solve a global conflict, you'd
50:04be looking more at the kind of issues,
50:05cross-cutting issues that you are. So,
50:08I'd like to take a sort of
50:09micro approach to this saying that
50:12really depends on the type of issue and
50:14the type of polarization that you're
50:16trying to solve.
50:18Uh
50:18yeah, I I mean, I'll keep it
50:20I mean, we we we could really discuss
50:21this for a long time because it's an
50:22excellent question.
50:24Okay. Thank you. Other questions,
50:26colleagues?
50:28Yes, at the back over here, and then
50:30we'll go over here for the next one.
50:39Thank you. Thank you for the for the for
50:41the presentation, the lecture.
50:42Uh do you think that the nature of
50:45legitimacy of political systems has
50:47changed that in the in the environment
50:50now there is less acceptance of
50:52uh the the right of state to act to act
50:56on behalf of others?
51:00I I I'm not
51:02sure that there's a good yes and no
51:04answer to it. I think it depends on who
51:06you ask, and I think there is just as
51:08anything else, there is a polarization
51:10of beliefs about how much the state can
51:12or cannot act on behalf of the citizens.
51:15On the one hand, I might be inclined to
51:17say yes because, you know,
51:19uh a lot of people would say the state
51:21has
51:21loses legitimacy in in in many
51:24instances, which has actually led to the
51:25rise of extremist politicians. On the
51:28other hand, you see these very ambitious
51:29proposals from the
51:31uh coming from the new left, which
51:34implicitly
51:36trust the state with a lot more than we
51:38would ever do. So, it's, you know, so
51:41that I think it again depends on who you
51:43ask. It depends on sort of the initial
51:46beliefs because, you know, in some of
51:48these new green deals and so on and so
51:50forth,
51:51we're actually asking the state to
51:52intervene in almost every aspect of our
51:55lives. Now,
51:57it could be that the left believe that
51:58it's truly what what we need and it but
52:01it sort of assumes some legitimacy of
52:03the state to be able to deliver some of
52:05these issues.
52:09Uh we had our colleague here. There's a
52:11microphone here.
52:17Uh thank you. I just wanted to go back
52:19to your your point about uniformity of
52:22ideas
52:23toward the middle of your your talk.
52:26Uh and it made me think about corporate
52:29media in this country and how you could
52:31argue that there's a sort of lack of
52:33uh meaningful or or there's a kind of
52:37a rather narrow spectrum of opinion,
52:39sorry, narrow spectrum of opinion.
52:42Uh
52:42and there's a sort of lack of
52:43meaningful, therefore, lack of
52:45meaningful analysis of
52:48uh other viewpoints.
52:50Um
52:52So, an example of that is and and uh
52:54perhaps that could lead to extremism.
52:56So,
52:57uh for example, you hear the terms hard
52:59left and also hard right sort of banded
53:02around a lot but without any real
53:04analysis of what those terms
53:07mean.
53:09Yeah. So, does this create a sort of
53:11extreme environment where basically cuz
53:13people's opinions are not are untested?
53:17Yeah.
53:19I think that's that's generally a
53:21problem with labels.
53:23The moment you label somebody hard left
53:26or hard right,
53:28you close your mind to the actual idea
53:30espoused by that person you call hard
53:33left and hard right. It becomes, "Oh,
53:36this guy, no, we don't want to hear."
53:38And and and and unless you also happen
53:41to be sympathetic to the hard left or
53:43the hard right. You become totally
53:45closed to that idea and therefore you
53:47just reject it out of hand.
53:50Now, where do these labels come from?
53:52And I I think it's not an accident. I
53:54think I think part of these labels are a
53:59sort of way of
54:01creating conflict and polarization in
54:03society.
54:05I would like to kind of know more about,
54:08you know, how did we develop some of
54:10these labels and how did we develop some
54:12of these kind of
54:13uh
54:15ways of shutting out the actual
54:18viewpoints being espoused.
54:20Uh that that's itself an interesting
54:23agenda for research, but but that partly
54:25answer your question.
54:27Um
54:28Yeah. Yeah.
54:29Yeah, okay.
54:30Okay. We've got time for one last quick
54:32question and you were first.
54:36But there will be time after it's over,
54:37John. So, you were first, yeah. Uh the
54:40microphone's over here. Okay.
54:46This is just clearing up a question,
54:48really. First of all, uh
54:49congratulations, Sid, um on your uh
54:52becoming a professor. Uh we are the the
54:55the tennis people, very proud of you.
54:58Well done.
55:00Um well done, yes. Excellent.
55:05So, um I just needed the echo chamber
55:08bit cleared up. If you could just uh
55:10enlighten us on what that meant, I'd be
55:12really pleased.
55:14So, echo chamber is is is basically So,
55:16so the idea is that uh if you can choose
55:20sort of to consort with people of your
55:22kind,
55:24then you're hearing opinions which
55:27reflects or echoes your initial beliefs.
55:32And you know, and and and there are a
55:34lot of lot lot uh
55:36reasons why people tend to do that. I
55:38mean, we have lot of people who do
55:39behavioral daily economics who would
55:41talk about conformity bias and so on and
55:43so forth. Basically, it's the idea that
55:45I don't want to wake up in the morning
55:46and get angry and therefore I kind of
55:48listen to things which I kind of mostly
55:50agree with and yeah, maybe occasional
55:52divergences. So, an echo chamber is
55:54basically
55:56uh if you like a group or a collection
55:58where you're hearing echoes of the same
55:59viewpoint.
56:03Um it's time to come to an end now and I
56:05want to thank everybody for coming.
56:06We've got a great audience Sid and it's
56:08great to see people from different parts
56:10of your life. You've obviously got lots
56:12of hidden talents there.
56:14That we can discover more about. And
56:16people will have a chance to talk with
56:17Sid and also to each other as soon as
56:20we've finished because there's drinks
56:21and nibbles and stuff outside. But, can
56:24I um conclude? Thank you. Those um our
56:26colleagues in Cass have organized this
56:27event. But, particularly Sid, thank you.
56:30You've gave us a very stimulating talk.
56:32There was lots of wonderful concepts in
56:34there about common values. And I think
56:36for me, I really like the way that you
56:38finished it all by being an optimist.
56:41So, on behalf of us all, THANK YOU AND
56:43CONGRATULATIONS.
56:57COLLEAGUES, PLEASE JOIN US OUTSIDE.

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