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What Really Happened at Three Mile Island? American Nuclear Society interviews Lake Barrett — Transcript

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0:01hello
0:02and welcome to a special ans event on
0:06what really happened at three mile
0:08island i'm craig piercy i'm the
0:10executive director and ceo of ans and
0:14i'll be serving as today's moderator
0:16i'll be interviewing lake barrett who
0:19led the nrc's cleanup efforts at three
0:21mile island before we begin a few
0:24program notes we'll be taking a few
0:26questions toward the end of today's
0:28program
0:29please use the q a function to submit
0:31them we'll get to as many as we can in
0:34the time allotted
0:36note that the event is being recorded
0:37and a link to the video will be emailed
0:40to you later today
0:42certificates of attendance are available
0:44by request please see the chat for
0:47contact information
0:49and finally we ask that all participants
0:51adhere to the ans code of ethics and
0:54respectful behavior policy which can be
0:56found at ans.org
0:59okay let's get into it
1:03unit two of the three mile island
1:05nuclear power plant near middletown
1:07pennsylvania experienced a partial
1:09meltdown of its core on march 28 1979
1:14though its small radioactive releases
1:17had no discernible effects on plant
1:20personnel or the public
1:22it was the most serious accident in u.s
1:25commercial operating history
1:27the accident led to major reforms in the
1:30operation and regulation of u.s nuclear
1:32plants
1:33which helped make nuclear today one of
1:35the safest forms of energy available to
1:37humankind
1:40last month netflix released a four-part
1:43docu-drama entitled meltdown three-mile
1:46island
1:47in it the showrunners blend a mix of
1:50honestly great arcable footage of the
1:52event and its aftermath
1:54into a dark risky
1:57a dark narrative of risky cleanup
1:59maneuvers that put the quote survival of
2:02the east coast in the balance
2:05in may 2022
2:07the show spent one week on the top of
2:09u.s netflix top 10 list
2:12two weeks on the canada top ten
2:14and one each for slovakia and new
2:16zealand before the ratings fell off
2:19yet in our algorithm-driven world
2:22one that increasingly blurs the
2:24distinction between journalism and
2:26entertainment
2:28shows like the meltdown
2:30live on in the netflix recommendation
2:32engine
2:33and can exert a hidden pull on our
2:35collective perception of history
2:38that's why we at ans thought it was
2:40important to ensure that the historical
2:42record is there for anyone looking to
2:45answer the question
2:47what really happened at tmi
2:50now i'd like to introduce our guest lake
2:52barrett
2:53lake is an independent consultant in the
2:55energy field serving both government and
2:58commercial capacities in the nuclear
3:00energy and nuclear materials management
3:02areas for over five decades he currently
3:05supports the recovery of the fukushima
3:08nuclear reactor accident as a senior
3:10advisor to the japanese government and
3:12the tokyo electric power company
3:15at the nuclear regulatory commission
3:18he served at multiple senior technical
3:21and executive positions including his
3:23time as the on-site director and senior
3:26federal official for the cleanup of the
3:29three-mile island reactor accident
3:31for additional information on lake
3:34please see below or on the chat
3:36and so with that
3:38lake welcome thank you for joining us
3:41um
3:42glad you're here
3:44thank you craig pleasure to be here
3:46so let's start at the beginning
3:48how did lake barrett get into nuclear
3:52well um i graduated uh with a bs degree
3:55in mechanical engineering from
3:57university to connecticut in 1967
4:00my father had recently died and my
4:02mother was widow so i needed to stay
4:04close to home so i went to work at
4:06electric boat division of general
4:07dynamics in groton connecticut
4:10and worked as a first a s5w reactor test
4:14engineer uh training and then in design
4:17and construction operation uh i served
4:20as a
4:21radiological engineer for the last
4:24refueling of the uss nautilus
4:26also as a decommissioning engineer for
4:29the us triton our only two reactors so i
4:32got a lot of experience uh there at
4:34electric boat
4:35as adam rick over a contractor i was
4:38extremely indoctrinated in the admiral
4:40rickover nuclear culture management
4:42world which came to serve me very well
4:44later on in life
4:47so now
4:48on the day of the accident you obviously
4:51weren't there
4:52tell me a little bit about what you were
4:54doing in those first days when you were
4:56with the nrc
4:58okay i was with the nrc in the division
5:00of operating reactors in bethesda
5:02maryland on that day uh we'd heard that
5:05morning at 10 a.m
5:08that there had been a declared emergency
5:09at three mile island the nrc emergency
5:12operations center was activated in
5:14another adjacent building um and i
5:17reported there with many other people
5:19but there was a complete lack of
5:21information other than it was declared
5:24uh it was said there were high radiation
5:26levels in the uh containment building um
5:30we asked how why was that and the answer
5:33was that there was a uh transient uh due
5:36to the trip or the of the reactor and
5:39the cobalt 60 might be you know in the
5:41primary coolant system but the numbers
5:43were too high and we were very skeptical
5:46and wanted more information but there
5:48was no more information to be obtained
5:51from the control room because the
5:52operators themselves at that time uh
5:54were were confused as to exactly you
5:57know what had happened
6:01so uh now there's been some discussion
6:04about whether or not there was actually
6:06a hydrogen explosion that occurred on
6:09that on that first day and dan i think
6:12we
6:13we may have some pictures uh that we can
6:16put up that that that show some of the
6:18things that happened inside the reactor
6:20so i think we want to go on to
6:22go on beyond that and then beyond that
6:25one so uh you know like talk us you know
6:28talk us through some of these pictures
6:29was was there an explosion
6:32no there was not a detonation or an
6:35explosion of the hydrogen you know in
6:37the uh containment uh what happened was
6:40as the core was damaged and we already
6:41said the core was severely damaged in
6:43here for the first several years because
6:45we didn't know if there was any actually
6:47any melting of the core or not
6:49melting is a very difficult word insofar
6:52as is it a jane fonda meltdown or is it
6:54just the physical you know melting of
6:56you know of the fuel inside the reactor
6:58vessel
6:59but anyway what happened was a lot of
7:01hydrogen was released into the
7:03containment building uh around 1 pm on
7:06the 28th there was a
7:09deflagration a burning of it now
7:11basically it's something like if you
7:12turn your gas grill on and don't put a
7:15match in or a lighter in right away and
7:17then you do a little bit later you get a
7:18big woof and and a flame front goes
7:21through uh when we got into the
7:23containment building a year later we
7:25could see evidence of what happened as
7:28you can see in this picture here uh you
7:30can see the pressure spike of around two
7:32atmospheres um you know did collapse the
7:34drum uh the pressure wave threw a steel
7:37door open and and uh you know
7:39bent the door uh some of the other
7:41pictures please dan you had passed um
7:45there was a melted phone you can see
7:46from narration but but there was no
7:48shock wave there was no uh explosion per
7:51se because the phone still was sitting
7:53on the edge of the edge of the table um
7:55one of the other ones you can see uh the
7:59this is inside one of the cabinets you
8:00can see on the right hand side the paint
8:03was was peeled off the cover of the
8:06metal cabinet but inside were were
8:08plastics that were untouched and the one
8:11before that you can see
8:13um plastic that was wrapping on wooden
8:16scaffolding that is
8:17was charred
8:19but the scaffolding was not uh moved
8:22anywhere so there was no explosion
8:23inside there was a there was a rapid
8:25burn
8:28so you were
8:29you were at tmi twice right once
8:33immediately after the the events of
8:36march 28th and then obviously a longer
8:39term of duty uh as the the the senior
8:43nrc official on site uh maybe you know
8:46talk about both of those uh you know
8:49what did you do immediately after and
8:51then and then you know we can we can get
8:54into that longer um you know that longer
8:57tenure during the cleanup
8:59okay well initially when we were the
9:01first days uh i was in bethesda uh for
9:04the first week uh and and that evolved
9:07into the chaotic times of the lack of
9:10communication from the control room uh
9:13information kind of slowly drifted into
9:16us uh it was you know
9:18early thursday we started to realize
9:21that there was significant core damage
9:23was confirmed when the sample was taken
9:26um you know it was very highly
9:27radioactive
9:28we so we knew there was severe core
9:30damage nothing we didn't know for sure
9:32yet but it didn't really matter because
9:34we knew the core had probably collapsed
9:36and we also learned about the pressure
9:39excursion the burn inside the
9:40containment building so we knew we had a
9:42severe situation
9:44and we started getting into mitigation
9:46efforts to support
9:48how to mitigate this and also to try to
9:50improve the communications but it was
9:52very difficult to extract information
9:55out of the out of the site because we
9:57didn't know they didn't know themselves
10:00i don't believe there was any
10:01intentional withholding of the
10:03information by any of the people who
10:05were there
10:06there were nrc people in the control
10:07room along with the gpu med ed people at
10:10the time uh so but we were gathering the
10:13information uh then there was known as
10:15black friday uh when we had the you know
10:18evacuation situation um we were looking
10:20at the situation of of degassing the
10:24primary coolant system which was heavy
10:26in hydrogen um and uh
10:28we were filling the um through the waste
10:32gas compressors the tanks and we did
10:34some advanced calculations about
10:36potentially um you know how significant
10:38that might be from a public health and
10:40safety point of view
10:42we've done some quick calculations based
10:44on the first sampling and we thought if
10:46if the relief valves had lifted in those
10:48in those tanks that would be about a
10:501200 mr per hour at the site boundary um
10:54i was in the process of briefing the
10:56executive committee and harold denton
10:58dixtello
11:01at that time friday morning and then a
11:04report came in from the from the site
11:06that there was 1200 milligram per hour
11:09reading now it was
11:10assumed by us erroneously
11:13that that was a site boundary reading
11:14where it was a helicopter hovering over
11:16the exhaust vent um but that kicked in a
11:20a dialogue by the senior folks there
11:23about what should be done and there was
11:24just so much frustration due to the lack
11:26of you know information um that we had
11:30from the site so uh
11:32ended up with the governor having a
11:34precautionary evacuation
11:36basically due to the uncertainty that we
11:38had but reality was
11:40on wednesday night when the main coolant
11:42pump was was restarted the plant was
11:45thermodynamically stable you know at
11:47that point but we were degassing uh down
11:50through the letdown system and there was
11:52iodine in the
11:54air in the auxiliary building very high
11:56radiation levels due to the you know the
11:58fission products that were in the let
12:00down primary cooling system um so that
12:02that continued on uh that week uh and
12:06then we sort of had a shift turnover and
12:07then i went
12:09the following week i was to relieve the
12:11first set of nrc people with harold
12:13denton at the site so i spent three
12:15weeks at the site basically mitigating
12:17iodine that was being released from the
12:20um
12:21auxiliary building very low levels but
12:23nonetheless measures you know we could
12:24measure it um so it was changing the
12:27charcoal and
12:28in the filters and that sort of thing is
12:30what we were doing and ben rushi um
12:34was was my boss there uh you know at
12:36that at that time
12:39so uh and just just really quickly so
12:41you were measuring 1200 milligram and
12:43that that does get referenced in the
12:45series but that was from the exhaust
12:47stack that was ins that was not at the
12:49boundary that was in the plant itself so
12:52so
12:53you can reasonably assume that those
12:55read you know the the elevated readings
12:57that occurred
12:59around the plant kind of came from that
13:01concentrated source
13:03basically it was the exhaust valley
13:06out of the stack at that point but they
13:08were relatively low um that was a spike
13:10of noble gases that was a noble gas
13:14xenon 133 primarily at that time
13:17which has very low biological
13:19significance and decays away very
13:21rapidly so although the gamma level was
13:23fairly high but it was a local right
13:25over it was not at the site boundary the
13:27site the maximum site boundary doses you
13:29know for the entire period if people had
13:31even stayed there which they didn't
13:33there wasn't anybody there uh would have
13:35been you know nominally 100 milligram
13:37total if they'd stayed there the entire
13:39week which that was not the case and we
13:41have tld systems all around um the the
13:45site that we we can back calculate what
13:47those were um so we we had that data and
13:50that's in the ans uh wire uh article
13:54that
13:55published
13:56so 100 milligram just just for just for
13:59comparison would be
14:00the additional radiation you might get
14:03in certain high altitude parts of living
14:05in certain high altitude parts of
14:07colorado for a year um or
14:09actually 85 milligram working or living
14:12in the us capital for a year because of
14:14the radioactive uh
14:16uh
14:17marble
14:18so uh so
14:20your your second tour of duty you're
14:22there you're the you know essentially
14:25the lead nrc official in charge of the
14:27cleanup this is you know after the
14:29site's been been stabilized and and
14:32so i want to go into a little bit about
14:36the balance that you had to strike
14:39to on the one hand be
14:41expeditious and getting the site cleaned
14:44up but also being deliberate about the
14:47actions that you took to ensure there
14:49weren't any unintended consequences of
14:52it can you talk a little bit about that
14:54you know that balance and how you
14:56maintain that balance
14:58uh yes um in
15:00the fall of 80 but a year later is when
15:03i was asked to go and be the site
15:05director by harold denton and and john
15:07hearn who was the chairman of the nrc at
15:09that time uh so i went there and the job
15:12was to be sure the public health and
15:14safety is protected and to get the
15:16cleanup done as quickly as we safely can
15:19do
15:20because there was an unknown risk of
15:22what the core conditions were we didn't
15:24know we know it's severely damaged
15:26but we didn't know if it was melted or
15:28not we didn't know how the reactor
15:29vessel was on the base so there was many
15:31uncertainties and we wanted to get it
15:34into an engineered design condition as
15:37opposed to an undesigned condition that
15:39we were in so timeliness had a risk
15:42factor to it as well but safety was
15:44first and uh to reduce the the the
15:47uncertainty risk uh was the second part
15:51of it so this was a balance that we had
15:54um to do and as i said
15:56everybody in america pitched together to
15:58solve this problem now the situation
16:01when i arrived there was was very
16:03difficult for everyone
16:05america we had no one had ever estab uh
16:08you know faced the situation of you know
16:11a severely damaged core it comes out
16:13partially melted core um high very high
16:16radiation readings throughout the plant
16:19uh we had you know many r per hour you
16:22know inside the containment building and
16:24some places the auxiliary building um we
16:27had
16:28three meters nine feet of water in the
16:30containment building highly radioactive
16:32cesium strontium this had to be dealt
16:34with we'd never dealt with that type of
16:36thing before in america now to to to
16:39deal with this
16:40a whole team had to be created under
16:42under basically gpu nuclear took over
16:45from metropolitan edison who was you
16:47know the original owner of it and we had
16:50to put together basically four different
16:51cultures into a team and some of this
16:54resulted in some of the procedural
16:56issues we're going to talk about in a
16:58moment but basically to to be successful
17:01with the challenge of the cleanup of
17:04severely damaged reactor like this first
17:06you had to have the utility owner that
17:08was gpu nuclear
17:10they owned it they had the operators who
17:12knew the plant were there we had to
17:14bring in new technologies past what
17:17operating reactor people do because the
17:19cesium and strontium was out of the fuel
17:21it was in the water it was in the air in
17:23places so we had to bring in
17:25technologies from the doe nuclear
17:27laboratory systems who had dealt with
17:29that and reprocessing in the defense
17:31industry so the hanford the oak ridge
17:33savannah river technologies needed to be
17:36brought in we needed to bring in
17:38substantial engineering and construction
17:40refurbishment work like to rebuild the
17:42polar crane so gpu
17:45hired bechtel national to be part of
17:47that team their preeminent you know
17:49architect engineering company so they
17:51were part of the team and we had a new
17:53management structure brought in uh which
17:56basically was the naval nuclear
17:58management safety culture conduct of
18:01operations
18:02manager so we had a lot of that
18:04management culture infused now putting
18:07these four different cultures together
18:10into an effective team was a managerial
18:14challenge and communications and
18:15understanding and learning uh what was a
18:18major was a major part of it but this
18:21was the situation we had uh moving
18:24forward to do
18:25very complex
18:26um tasks for example we had to build a
18:29whole new system to process the nine
18:31feet of water in the basement to to
18:33reduce the gamma radiation levels the
18:35polar crane which was on the top of the
18:38reactor building had to be refurbished
18:40because we had to remove the 40-ton
18:43missile shields
18:44to eventually remove the head and the
18:46inner plenum to get access down into the
18:49damaged fuel uh we we had to do the what
18:53was the quick look was to get data on
18:55what was inside so we could decide was
18:58this was this going to have to be
18:59totally robotics or could we put humans
19:01in there uh so we did a lot of
19:03decontamination the quick look where we
19:06then discovered that the top you know
19:08five feet of the core had collapsed down
19:10underneath um so we we learned all of
19:13these things to to move forward and and
19:16part of this was the the the the tmi
19:20team i will say which is gpu because
19:22needed to work to refurbish the polar
19:24crane uh and that was uh one of the
19:27example of one of the
19:29major tasks we had to do besides water
19:31and all the other tasks we had
19:34so uh
19:36so complicated relationship between the
19:38partners but
19:40um a a defined uh a defined set of
19:43objectives now in the show
19:46there's discussion about
19:48um the pressure to move to move fast um
19:52did you feel that pressure
19:55no i mean
19:57expediency prompt safe cleanup was
19:59important so prompt yes that was
20:02important because we wanted to get the
20:03core out okay we wanted to get it into
20:06engineer design configuration not an
20:08unknown configuration sitting in the
20:10bottom we wanted to get the cesium and
20:12strontium that was in the water uh and
20:15air and other waste we wanted to get
20:16those into a designed for waste
20:18management controlled system in place so
20:21we we constantly were working on these
20:24with the integrated cleanup team and
20:26what was done gpu put together the
20:29bechtel people in with the gpu people
20:32and they had a unified tmi2 procedural
20:35system
20:36where they basically adapted the best
20:39procedures from each of these
20:41organizations to do specific tasks
20:44and this is where the differences of
20:46opinion
20:47amongst individuals is to which
20:49procedures you should use for what tasks
20:54in the case of the poll ukraine evolved
20:59from this procedural differences of
21:01opinion
21:02and
21:04as it related to the polar crane
21:06there were
21:08this was considered by gpu to be a major
21:10refurbishment now the polar crane was a
21:13major construction refurbishment job
21:16uh all the wiring had to be replaced
21:18because it was all damaged by by the
21:20heat and radiation
21:22the brakes had to be replaced structural
21:25integrity had to be checked very
21:27carefully i was a 500 ton capacity crane
21:30um and it was needed to remove first the
21:3340 ton
21:35missile shields which there were four of
21:36them over the reactor head uh and then
21:39uh needed to be tested and then to then
21:42to lift the
21:43ton head itself the head assembly had to
21:46be taken off and then the smaller plenum
21:49had to be pulled out to get access to
21:51the core so we knew this had to be done
21:54uh and given that this was a lot of
21:57vector work to do the refurbishment
22:00they chose a procedure known as a work
22:02package
22:03okay and a lot of the differences of
22:05opinion between mr parks and bechtel and
22:08gpu
22:09had to do with which type of procedure
22:12was to be used
22:14the
22:15work packages that construction
22:17companies normally did could adapt all
22:20the quality assurance requirements
22:23but the focus was primarily from a
22:24construction work type of thing
22:27the utility people who were
22:29used they were used to not doing a lot
22:31of heavy construction but construction
22:32mods at a plant used engineering chain
22:35notice known as type procedures and they
22:37were somewhat different but both of them
22:39will achieve the nuclear quality
22:41assurance requirements of the nuclear
22:43regulatory commission and we had we
22:46checked that over and we checked the
22:48safety of it
22:49i had as the director i had
22:51responsibility to sign off on every
22:54gpu operating procedure involving
22:56substantial amounts of radioactivity i
22:59signed about a thousand procedures a
23:00year and i had a staff of 18 to 20
23:03people and we reviewed them and we
23:05worked closely knowing technically what
23:07was going on at the plant
23:09now we knew that we were moving in the
23:11let me say the the
23:13february of 1983 moving toward the polar
23:17crane
23:18we were we at nrc knew that gpu was
23:22using the bechtel um work package type
23:26procedures which was okay with us
23:28because it met the uh engineering
23:30quality assurance requirements if they
23:32had chosen to use the ecn type that
23:34would have been okay too okay but we it
23:37was an administrative issue
23:39mr can i can i can i stop you there for
23:42a second like because i want to just i
23:44want to make sure
23:46i understand this because it is it is a
23:48significant part of the show so so what
23:51you're suggesting is that what the
23:54netflix show presents as as sort of a
23:56major safety risk
23:58was
23:59actually a disagreement over what the
24:02the flavor of paperwork that would be
24:04required to document the improvements
24:06needed to to um get the polar crane
24:10running and and get the missile shields
24:12and the reactor head off is that
24:14a fair way of describing it
24:16yes yes it was
24:19it was it was an issue of the procedural
24:21paperwork
24:22um when uh
24:24mr parks didn't like the way that it was
24:27being done he wanted to use the ecn type
24:30approach
24:31and he basically came to us at the nrc
24:34confidentially and we recognized his
24:36confidentiality saying that gpu was
24:38doing this the wrong way and we said
24:41well
24:41tell us what from a safety point of view
24:43is wrong
24:44and he couldn't say that other than i
24:46don't like their procedure
24:48uh and he says i'm not sure that they
24:49did calculations like they should
24:52so i think it was february 18 1983 he
24:55came to me okay and i said we will look
24:59into this uh and and see
25:01you know the merits of of the case um we
25:04looked that we did a surprise inspection
25:06that week at bechtel gaithersburg office
25:08uh and the calculations were there and
25:10they were following the procedures uh
25:12the following friday i had a meeting
25:14with him and and we told him again we
25:17didn't see anything from a safety point
25:19of view wrong okay
25:21is there any safety issue that you have
25:23that you think is not being corrected
25:25besides the administrative procedure
25:27they're using and there was he said no
25:30and if you look in the uh
25:327 57 page affidavit that he filed with
25:35the nrc uh later objecting to my
25:39decision
25:41there was no safety issue other than the
25:43procedural one so it was it was
25:45administrative uh there was always in
25:48the show there was this thing about it
25:50upcoming lift uh there was nothing
25:52scheduled uh for the next two months
25:55i had not gotten the procedures yet for
25:57operations um when we first procedures
26:00came to me
26:02on march 10th i think it was i i
26:04disapproved them because they had not
26:07done the
26:08proper rigging for uh certifications for
26:12the for the slings for the for the lift
26:15um
26:16but uh and then and then after that mr
26:19parks uh complained to my superiors i
26:21told him he had the right to do it if
26:22you didn't agree with me he could go to
26:24the commission and he did
26:26and the commission asked for a a
26:28investigation of it which is fine and
26:31they did and then it became more of a
26:33public
26:34public issue
26:36so with that uh difference of opinion on
26:39the procedures um we know we we moved
26:42forward um there was testing there was
26:44always going to be testing of the crane
26:46uh the show had an impression that there
26:48was a commission meeting and a
26:50last-minute thing there was no such
26:52commission meeting that day that's
26:53totally fictitious uh what they have uh
26:56in the show but it makes good television
26:58i guess um and um you know
27:02one of the things i know i had a meeting
27:03with governor thornberg he asked what is
27:05all this about i explained to him what
27:06it was
27:08and i said we're going to be doubly sure
27:09any lifts in that containment will be
27:11done safely
27:12and i said that i personally would be in
27:14there on the first heavy lift
27:16so the reviews were done the gpu made
27:19the necessary you know improvements that
27:21we'd you know requested to do um and the
27:25crane went forward and and did
27:26successful lifts um you know later so i
27:29think it's february of 84 that was was
27:31the time um you know where's the lift i
27:34think dan has a picture uh yeah dan dan
27:37put up the picture uh of lake because
27:40again you committed to the governor that
27:41you were gonna be there at the time
27:43right so you you suited up and went in
27:45yeah that was me getting ready to go in
27:47if you notice i have a camera there i
27:48was for a lot of reasons you're just not
27:50going to stand in there and watch so i
27:52was the photographer um you know for the
27:54for the lifting of the first heavy lifts
27:57and the next picture uh i think was the
28:00lifting of the go back one there we go
28:03that was the first heavy lift this is
28:05the 40 ton
28:06missile shield that was lifted we took
28:08the 440 ton uh
28:11reactor head shields which you see one
28:13here
28:14with the pressurizer shield to give a
28:17test rig to actually do a 170 ton test
28:20lift
28:21to test and prove that the crane uh
28:24would be capable of lifting the uh
28:27the head
28:28the show has a whole lot of comments
28:30about how an accident would have caused
28:33a disaster in central pennsylvania
28:36supercriticality
28:38melting of the core
28:39none of that is technically feasible
28:42the decay heat of the core at the time
28:44uh in 1983 was 24 kilowatts that's about
28:48uh 18 to 20 home hair dryers uh not
28:51enough heat that was going to to melt
28:53anything at all but um you know none of
28:56that was none of that was mentioned
28:58well and let me just i do want to go to
29:00one thing here and dan i think you can
29:02take the you can you can take the screen
29:05share off so
29:06so like i want to i want to zero in on
29:08that point so
29:10at the time at which you were doing the
29:13the reactor head lift
29:16the the energy in the core was you know
29:18let's call it 18 let's call it 18 hair
29:21dryers um
29:24did richard did richard parks know that
29:26when when he made that when he made his
29:28claims could he have known that
29:31he he should have known it i mean he
29:32wasn't a degreed engineer but he had
29:34been a nuclear trained you know operator
29:36so i mean uh
29:39in my discussions that i had with him
29:41now this is my memory from 40 years ago
29:44uh and in all the documentation at the
29:46time he never brought up a specific uh
29:49issue other than the procedures weren't
29:51being done as he thought they ought to
29:53be done so i don't know honestly what he
29:56did or didn't know we never had a
29:58technical discussion when i asked him
30:00what is your safety concern other than
30:03procedures
30:04um there wasn't any at that time so what
30:07he had in the show was what he had in
30:09the show
30:10right so but again i think that the you
30:13know the show kind of
30:16lays out the scenario where the head
30:18drops and it damages the fuel and and
30:20you know east coast the east coast is is
30:23you know is um
30:26at least some part of it is rendered
30:28uninhabitable at least that's you know
30:30the suggestion of it
30:31so you know
30:33moving on a little bit now to the um
30:36the restart of operations for unit one
30:40um you know this the show i think
30:42touches on it a bit but um
30:45you know obviously there there were
30:48you know there was some controversy
30:49around that locally
30:51um
30:52but
30:52was there you know was there anything in
30:54the decision to restart unit one that
30:57that that gave you pause at the time or
30:59gives you pause now how do you how do
31:02you view that that
31:03that decision
31:05well
31:06the the three-mile accident you know in
31:0879 and 80
31:10everybody did uh the reassessment and
31:12and the whole industry changed because
31:14we realized that we had a this was a
31:16serious thing and we could not continue
31:18like we were
31:19as an industry and as a government we
31:21were complacent and all kinds of things
31:23we learned so
31:25mass change came across the whole
31:27country um and so
31:30gpu the owner of tmi tmi1 and tmi2 split
31:35the organizations into unit 1 restart
31:38and unit 2 unit 2 cleanup and they
31:40brought in all new people all new
31:42managers and the unit 1 was was the
31:45restart was totally changed so it was
31:47all new managers navy nuclear you know
31:49captains and admirals were brought in uh
31:52all the operators were retrained new
31:54operators are brought in it was a
31:55totally different corporation the name
31:57had changed the old metropolitan edison
31:59was gone i mean all the people who were
32:02who were really there before were pretty
32:03much gone uh certainly all the
32:05leadership was so the nrc went through
32:08basically a six-year process of of
32:10recertifying their operations uh you
32:14know would be safe training was checked
32:16and rechecked uh and all the lessons
32:18learned impo
32:20admiral rickover was asked to do a
32:22special review adam rickover was getting
32:24old at the time but adam rickov was
32:26still very very knowledgeable but he had
32:28his he had his own group of navy
32:30captains which were highly trained who
32:32went through the gpu plans uh with a
32:35fine-tooth comb as did the nrc so it was
32:38a totally different corporation uh
32:40totally different people totally
32:42different lessons learned and i think
32:44the proof of it is it was restarted it
32:46went on and operated very successfully
32:48for 32 years until 2019 when it went
32:52down due to economics
32:54of cheap natural gas maybe now people in
32:56pennsylvania might want to wish a little
32:58differently but nonetheless that's
32:59that's kind of what happened um but it
33:01worked very the plant worked very well
33:04but the accident in 1979 traumatized the
33:08people of central pennsylvania i mean
33:10that was the true
33:12sadness of what we the nuclear
33:15establishment did to the people now you
33:18may have excuses it wasn't our fault and
33:20you know but but it was we it happened
33:23uh so
33:24when tmi1
33:26wanted to be restarted in the early 80s
33:28there was a lot of people in central
33:30pennsylvania said never again i mean we
33:32were traumatized before we were
33:34threatened our children were threatened
33:36threatened
33:37and a lot of people were very vehement
33:39about it against it there were also
33:41people who were very supportive of it i
33:43think after it was running
33:45i think people calmed down most did a
33:47few people were still highly impacted by
33:50this as you could see from the show and
33:53still are
33:54they they
33:57were true victims of what the industry
34:00did to them and the press did to them
34:02and and in my view
34:04shows like the netflix are still doing
34:06to people okay of scaring scaring them i
34:09think inappropriately
34:11well so i was i was a i was a teenager
34:14at the time living i don't know maybe 90
34:16you know 90 to 100 miles south i can i
34:19can remember the eerie feeling in the
34:21days that followed and i think one of
34:23the the
34:24one of the things that one of the
34:26services that the show actually does
34:29is
34:30you know they go back through this rich
34:32detailed archival footage and they pull
34:34up the press conferences and you realize
34:36how colossal the communications failure
34:39was in the first few days i mean anybody
34:41who would you know you can't blame
34:43anybody for being worried about it
34:44because it just seemed as though
34:47uh you know nobody was in charge i mean
34:49is that you know
34:51did did you feel that eerie you know did
34:53you feel that eeriness too i mean what
34:55you know how did you perceive it
34:58you're perceiving it from an engineering
35:00standpoint but you know when you were
35:02there on site how did you you know
35:05give me some examples of of how you
35:07could sort of viscerally feel that your
35:09family was there right
35:11yeah i mean
35:12we moved there i mean originally when i
35:14was asked to go up there you know in
35:161980 they said well you can you can
35:18still live in maryland rather than
35:20suburban maryland outside of washington
35:22and and i said no i said if i could take
35:24this job i have to live there in the
35:26community i have to have a house my
35:28children my two young children then
35:30needed to go to local school and i
35:32needed to see the cooling towers from my
35:34house and they said well you could go do
35:36it so i did and i lived there and my
35:39wife was a childbirth
35:41nurse at the harrisburg hospital and and
35:43so i'm you know we were members in our
35:45church and knew all about uh how the
35:48people felt and they were truly all good
35:51people including the people who were on
35:53that on that netflix show the ladies who
35:55i knew quite well um you know these were
35:57all really good people but they were
36:01impacted severely psychologically by
36:04what
36:05the industry did to them uh so it was
36:08real
36:08and uh you know i
36:11and they would ask a lot of questions
36:13well if you lived here would you have
36:14left and i said if all the only news i
36:16had was what i was getting uh on the on
36:19the television i probably would have
36:20told my wife and kids to go uh you know
36:23but reality there's just two the reality
36:25people act like they believe and what
36:28you perceive and and when you get
36:30information that says
36:31it it's it's it's significant you react
36:34that way uh so uh it doesn't matter what
36:36reality is or isn't it's what you
36:38believe it is and and we
36:40that trauma was was significant uh what
36:44we did to the people of central
36:45pennsylvania and never again and i don't
36:48think it ever will be again because we
36:50changed so much in the in the ability to
36:53not only do a better technical job to
36:55vent any event like this but also if
36:58events happen how we communicate uh
37:01accurate information gets to the press
37:03um at the time
37:05you know the the press touchstone was
37:08the jane fonda china syndrome movie i
37:10mean that's what they could understand
37:12and that was the reference case that
37:14people used
37:15and people
37:16words like the word meltdown uh is a
37:19very difficult word for for me i would
37:21say as an engineer because what is that
37:23is that you know molten core going to
37:26china and and the area is devastated uh
37:28for 100 miles or is it what happened to
37:31tmi yes some fuel melted in it and it
37:34flowed inside you know inside the vessel
37:36here or there
37:37but not the consequences uh minimal
37:40minimal consequences from a biological
37:43radiological point of view now that the
37:46plant was ruined of course it's a
37:47billion dollar plant was destroyed so it
37:50was certainly a huge industrial accident
37:52but from a public health and safety
37:54point of view it was fairly minor
37:58and didn't really i mean ultimately
38:02i feel like the netflix show runners
38:05kind of buried the lead of the story
38:07right there's been so much advancement
38:09in nuclear safety since three mile
38:11island and because of three mile island
38:13and and obviously they were going for
38:16sort of a certain dramatic narrative
38:18here but you know do you think they
38:19missed an opportunity to set the record
38:21straight on the safety improvements
38:24oh absolutely i mean there there's so
38:26much that that the industry did and the
38:28government did as well uh post three
38:31mile island i mean it was actually it
38:33was a huge wake-up call for us all i
38:35mean we as overall we as a nation we
38:38were complacent about it those operators
38:40you know we're not appropriately trained
38:43to operate a bmw reactor but they were
38:46good people they were good operators uh
38:48but they were they were lost that day
38:50okay i mean when they were turning off
38:52the the uh safety injection pumps that
38:55our 1975 computer was turning on okay
38:59they turned it off i mean we never
39:02expected an operator to be a problem we
39:05always thought whatever uh happened in a
39:07reactor and of a design point of view
39:09the operators would be there to help you
39:11and to assist you uh in the situation
39:13your your engineering uh automation etc
39:16we never thought that they would
39:18actually turn pumps off because they
39:20misunderstood um you know the
39:22instruments that they they were seeing
39:24in their training so we learned all of
39:26this
39:28and you know the
39:29key thing i think was the adoption of
39:32the naval nuclear management culture uh
39:35the institute uh nuclear power
39:38operations you know you the industry uh
39:41uh you know they're harder on themselves
39:43than the nrc should be and that's a good
39:45thing so we the communications if
39:48something goes wrong a whole reporting
39:50system even very minor items unusual
39:53events are now reported there's
39:55communications between the state level
39:58and the local level and and the utility
40:00sites themselves so so much has changed
40:04that we learned and i think
40:06i was an early thing that was good for
40:09america okay in that uh the backup
40:12systems did work the containment work uh
40:15there was no um you know appreciable you
40:18know impact radiologically speaking on
40:21on the community
40:22economically speaking and the investment
40:24side it was pretty severe i mean
40:27metropolitan edison gpu nuclear they no
40:30longer exist those companies no longer
40:32exist uh through this whole thing so we
40:34learned a lot and we made america
40:36stronger we made us more protective
40:39productive and we made us safer so i
40:42think we learned our lessons uh and we
40:45moved on and i think the last you know
40:4740 years has shown
40:49the value and i'm hoping the next 40
40:51years will even be better
40:54so i'm going to kind of dip into the
40:56into the q a here because the questions
40:58of uh the questions have come in and
41:01there's one related to this part of the
41:02conversation so
41:04uh it goes like this i watch the
41:06miniseries how could how would the tmi
41:09accident
41:10be handled if it happened in 2022 how
41:13would you handle it from the nrc side if
41:16you were in charge of the event again or
41:18how you know what what procedures do any
41:20nrc have in place that weren't in place
41:22then maybe you can give us some of the
41:24just uh you know
41:27a contrast of what that would be like
41:30yeah i mean in the post tmi you know
41:32lessons learned both the industry and
41:34and the nrc uh communications and safety
41:38data are are key things we all we had
41:41was a phone line okay to the control
41:43room and would ask questions and you
41:45would never you know the people were
41:47busy trying to figure out what was going
41:49on so you could not get any information
41:52there was a whole data center the nrc
41:54changed its um you know incident
41:57response center completely to not just
41:59depending on a phone line or two
42:01they'd get actually data of safety
42:03parameters you'd get temperatures and
42:05pressures um
42:06all of that data that we just didn't
42:08have at that at that time so so the
42:11information flow is is tremendously
42:13different the operator training is
42:16completely different i mean there were
42:17very few simulators then as far as the
42:20training
42:21of the operators and the fundamentals of
42:24of understanding you know superheat
42:26steam and and things that were
42:29fundamental that the operators really
42:31didn't understand thermal response uh
42:33transients so it
42:36we're probably never going to get to
42:37there okay but if we did if we had some
42:40of it uh we have the data and the flow
42:43and their exercise their training and
42:46and doing doing uh
42:48responses and drills
42:50we're in a much better situation to be
42:52able to communicate externally
42:54the utility met ed at the time i had no
42:57ability to go into a press conference on
43:00what was happening the press people were
43:03monitoring the radio communications from
43:06the gpu
43:08monitors who were out taking samples so
43:10they would have real-time data as to
43:13what a radiation level might be whereas
43:15the
43:16jack irvine who was the vice president
43:18would go into a press conference he was
43:20maybe a half hour out of date but they
43:22would have it within a minute and they
43:23would say we just had a report the level
43:25went up or the level went down the level
43:27went sideways he couldn't respond
43:30because he didn't know and if he said
43:32something he was then quote lying so
43:34even though he was more right then he
43:37was wrong
43:38his credibility was zero okay
43:41uh and uh things like we did in nrc on
43:45the hydrogen bubble uh situation which
43:48happened you know later on um you know
43:51chairman henry would ask a what if
43:53question well what if the the hydrogen
43:56was explosive right
43:57a simple question but it got out of
44:00control and said well nrc is doing
44:03analyses of what might happen if it
44:04explodes and then people say what do you
44:06mean it could explode it couldn't
44:08explode okay because there was a
44:09hydrogen over pressure no oxygen but a
44:12simple question asked by you know a very
44:14good man and chairman henry was a very
44:16good man a very good engineer and
44:17scientist uh you know
44:19got out of control okay so i think today
44:23you know everybody is more sensitive we
44:25have all learned from this um just like
44:28we've learned from fukushima and all
44:30this so the nrc and the industry in
44:32america you know
44:34does watch its operating world much
44:36closer today and we had not before three
44:39mile island i mean there's especially
44:41there's a whole lot of things we should
44:43have known but we didn't know so the
44:46fundamentals were changed
44:49so i got another question um so
44:53like this it goes like this mr barrett
44:56looks irritated after some questions by
44:59the netflix interviewer
45:01did he know the purpose of the
45:03documentary beforehand or did he
45:05discover the tone of the interview
45:07during the interview
45:10the latter i mean i i'm
45:12i'm a complete novice when it comes to
45:15hollywood okay i don't know anything
45:17about it i'm kind of trusting uh i was a
45:20real eye-opener to me um netflix said
45:23they want to become more of a news
45:24organization and they wanted to know and
45:26i said okay i'll talk to you so i had
45:29several interviews with them you know
45:30off camera and none of this parks and
45:33none of this was ever mentioned um and
45:36they wanted to know about the accident
45:37and and so we started off i agreed to do
45:41uh i i checked with some other friends
45:43who that interviewed in pennsylvania and
45:46they said it was pretty straightforward
45:47and so i trusted them so i went and did
45:50this interview for the it was a three
45:52hour long interview for the first 45
45:54minutes it was pretty straightforward
45:56and then all of a sudden
45:59it went into
46:00you know when did you stop beating your
46:01spouse kind of questions
46:03so i knew this was not going to be good
46:06this was a setup
46:08and i had a choice you know fight or
46:10flight
46:10if i walked off the set they would say
46:12see the government refuses to answer
46:14questions uh or you fight and you try to
46:17you know go through it and try to say to
46:18say the whole story so it was another
46:21three hours of
46:22what terrible things did you do
46:25so they did a lot of editing of course
46:27and they would toward the i guess it was
46:29two and a half hours i was getting a
46:31little frustrated uh you know and bent
46:33it a little bit which i should not have
46:35done
46:36um you know they tried to get me to say
46:39things about the the ladies that were on
46:41the show
46:42uh did i know them i said yes i did i
46:44hadn't talked to them in decades of
46:46course um and you know to say something
46:49negative about them which i would not do
46:51these were these are good people they
46:53still are good people uh traumatized
46:55absolutely
46:56okay uh but nonetheless uh so they were
46:59trying to jazz it up so yeah i was
47:01ambushed um but you know that goes with
47:04life life isn't here all the time
47:07right
47:08well
47:09uh you know
47:11i think everyone in the nuclear
47:12professional community
47:14is grateful that you that you chose to
47:16fight instead of
47:18choose flight so um
47:20now i've got one back on a question
47:23related to the event itself you may or
47:25may not know the answer to it but uh
47:28it's i thought tmi management said to
47:32turn off the safety injection pumps
47:35shortly after o 800 not the operators
47:38the operators kept the pumps running
47:39does that uh you know
47:41do you recall that
47:44no i mean i don't think that's correct
47:46now i guess i'm not sure what the person
47:47means by management um the the shift
47:50supervisor and the main on the three
47:52operators in the control room made those
47:55decisions okay uh these were um navy
47:59operators uh they came out of the u.s
48:01navy and part of i think the problem was
48:04was a cultural one and uh let me explain
48:06a little bit
48:07the
48:08these folks
48:09um were trained for the bmw reactor but
48:12it wasn't the in-depth training that
48:14they really needed but they but their
48:16most of their experience was with a
48:18naval reactor which is a recirculating
48:20steam generator okay now a naval reactor
48:23uh as a as the recirculation has a lot
48:26of thermal inertia to it you know
48:27actually the analysis would be like
48:29you're driving a cadillac you turn the
48:31wheel and it kind of turns slowly this
48:33is a 1980s cadillac not a new one uh and
48:36um but the bmw reactor is a very
48:38responsive super heat you know not a lot
48:41of volume in the steam generator uh and
48:43and it behaves quite differently nice
48:45little like a ferrari you turn away a
48:47little bit that thing can be in a ditch
48:49and it can go very fast these operators
48:52were trained in something that navy
48:54operators remember never lose the bubble
48:56okay now this was the pressurizer you
48:59never lose the pressurizer bubble which
49:01controls the pressure in a pressurized
49:03water reactor which the navy ones all
49:05are you never lose the bubble if you
49:07were a trainee or an operator and you
49:09lost the bubble your career was ruined
49:11and you were laughed at by everybody in
49:13every bar for the rest of your life so
49:15you never ever lose the bubble
49:17these operators when they really foul
49:19was open
49:20they thought they lost the bubble and it
49:22was like the end of the world to lose
49:24the bubble okay so when the injection
49:27pumps went on they turned them off right
49:29there there was no
49:31vice president or senior manager or gary
49:34miller who was the site manager telling
49:36them now when the george clooner the
49:38first you know
49:40the green engineer
49:42tech guy came in you know that that had
49:44passed you know he asked so many sad
49:47things happened for example when one of
49:49when one of the engineers asked was is
49:52the black valve closed the answer was
49:54yes the black valve is closed what the
49:56operator didn't tell him was i just shut
49:58it five minutes ago
50:00but it it opened all for the last three
50:03hours right when they you know they
50:04basically
50:06so they had no idea what what they
50:08really did but there's no
50:10uh there was no cover-up as the thing
50:13implies at the end people told them well
50:15don't we knew that it melted um yeah i
50:18talked with those operators you know
50:20privately after and they were
50:21interrogated by the rogue oven you know
50:24investigation the chemin the president's
50:26chemistry commission which were in-depth
50:29reviews i didn't today the show implied
50:33these were white washes those were not
50:35white washes at all you can read those
50:37reports those were strong independent
50:39reports both of them but no there's no
50:42basis to that that i know of
50:43right right so so another another
50:46question so how much has your experience
50:49with tmi been applicable to the work
50:52that you've been doing at fukushima i
50:54mean i would assume to a certain extent
50:55it's the same are there any differences
50:57how has it helped you
51:00uh
51:01well i mean i i guess it helps but i
51:04don't understand the
51:06the
51:07public situation uh responding to the
51:10public and interfacing with the public
51:12in fukushima over the water and
51:13everything else is exactly the same as
51:15three mile island we had nine thousand
51:18tons of accident slightly tritiated
51:20water at three mile island we could not
51:22discharge into the susquehanna river
51:24technically you could but
51:26psychologically and social politically
51:28you could not so it was evaporated into
51:30the environment in the air so we had the
51:33same uh dealing with the social
51:35political aspects of it as they do in
51:39japan um the technical challenge in
51:42japan far exceeds that of three mile
51:45island i mean the buildings are shambled
51:47three melted cores the core is on the
51:49floor it's it's eaten down into the
51:52concrete um you know concrete through
51:54superheated steam has been you know
51:56blasted away with only rebar on the
51:58pedestal so it is the technologically it
52:01is a huge much bigger job to do we have
52:05to do it robotically we can't send
52:06people in we could put people in three
52:08mile island but and and so that's the
52:11difference
52:12the management challenges are almost the
52:14same um you know tepco like metropolitan
52:17edison was an operating utility they
52:19made electricity that's what they did um
52:22and you know this is a cleanup job this
52:24is like you know hanford tanks it's it's
52:27a different type of business
52:29so they have to work through getting
52:31their traditional you know reactor
52:34suppliers the sheep toshibas to apaches
52:39mitsubishis to work together into a
52:41cleanup team so the culture of of having
52:46nuclear safety culture a la naval
52:48reactors is is new to them uh so they
52:51are going through the same management
52:54transitions let me say to to change to
52:59a cleanup so that's the same so i think
53:02there's there's great similarities
53:04between tmi and fukushima uh and there's
53:07completely
53:08dissimilar things as far as certainly
53:10from technically uh fukushima is a much
53:12greater much bigger task um it's orders
53:16of magnitude
53:18so so we get back and you mentioned
53:20again in the context of the previous
53:22question but it's it's the
53:24socio-political challenges right those
53:26in many ways you know there's
53:28clearly a lot of similarities where the
53:30the
53:31you know when you look at the facts it's
53:34not as serious as how people would
53:36perceive what happened
53:38and and that's always a challenge with
53:39nuclear if there's one thing that
53:42you could you know help everyone
53:45understand about
53:46whether it's radiation or the operation
53:49of plants like as if there's
53:51one little bit of information that we
53:53truthful information that we could put
53:54in everyone's brain that would make it
53:56better what would it what would it be
53:58like
53:59all right so that's a that's a hard one
54:01um i mean i think we have to recognize
54:04we in the nuclear industry we have a a
54:07negative stigma of the nuclear bomb and
54:09we saw it in the pictures constantly of
54:11the that's kind of was our
54:14sad origin okay a weapon a weapon uh
54:17whereas we really are concentrated
54:20energy that's that's clean and the most
54:22concentrated form that we have uh to go
54:25forward and we have to recognize that uh
54:28we have to work in a democracy anyway
54:30which we are you know the people vote on
54:33what they believe uh and
54:35and that matters you know you know
54:37elections matter so we have to as we go
54:39through as a country has to make choices
54:41or it's energy for clean energy we have
54:44to
54:44address the safety and stigma issue uh
54:47as to how we are prepared for this uh i
54:50mean many times when i've spoken to
54:53in
54:53students university types uh you know i
54:56said no when cavemen uh discovered fire
54:59it was a great thing on our evolution uh
55:01as far as their cooking meet and keeping
55:03our our huts warm but it also could burn
55:05your hut down and it and it can and it
55:07hurts you so you have to respect it and
55:09you respect nuclear energy uh we need to
55:12have the appropriate systems for it um
55:15but recognize that people don't
55:16necessarily see it like we do and if you
55:19just do just the pure technical thing
55:21well don't worry about it that's
55:22perfectly low risk that's that's that's
55:24it and
55:26sort of
55:27dismiss it
55:28uh we're doing a disservice because the
55:31perception is critical i used i some
55:35when i was younger i used to think
55:36perception doesn't matter reality is all
55:38that matters the older i get you know
55:40perception matters sometimes almost as
55:43much as reality and if you look at uh
55:46you know what my grandkids will do with
55:47these internet things okay some of them
55:50almost live in an unrealistic world but
55:53some people can survive a long time in
55:55in virtual reality which is kind of sad
55:58but nonetheless that's our society
56:00somewhat so we need to be conscious of
56:03that
56:04going forward and and be more attentive
56:07and
56:08responsive to people's fundamental
56:11information needs
56:13as we
56:15promote as we should promote
56:17nuclear energy as a safe clean future uh
56:21as long as we don't get complacent about
56:23it and we're not
56:24in my view
56:25for our future for our great grandkids
56:28well i think like that that this
56:30conversation today has has
56:33has made a contribution to that effort
56:35as i as i mentioned in the beginning you
56:38know very much similar to your point um
56:40we live in an algorithm-driven world
56:43right netflix
56:44chooses the content that they provide
56:47based on
56:48a level of individual information about
56:51people's viewing habits
56:53that
56:54you know we didn't have even 10 or 15
56:56years ago and so uh you know there's in
56:59many ways a greater power to to scare
57:03people that want to be scared but
57:05there's also an opportunity thankfully
57:07through the internet to be able to
57:09always
57:11provide that additional information out
57:13there to let people make up their own
57:15minds and really lay it out for the for
57:18the historical record for anybody that's
57:20interested in in diving deeper in this
57:22topic so
57:24um with that i'm gonna uh thank you for
57:26participating today thank you for your
57:28service to the nuclear community over
57:30five decades
57:32and um and
57:34we you know look forward to having more
57:36conversations like this with you
57:38and and your colleagues down the line
57:41but in the meantime i want to thank
57:43everyone for joining us today uh we will
57:46make a recording of this available to
57:48members later on today and i think we
57:52will probably make this available to the
57:54public at a point at which we can get it
57:56into a form and put it on youtube so i
57:59would say for those that will be
58:00watching on youtube i'm going to do what
58:03everybody else does and say click the
58:05link below for more information but in
58:08the meantime thank you lake have a good
58:10rest of the week thank you everyone for
58:12joining us and we'll see you again soon
58:14thank you greg
58:16thank you

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