Warum Putin nicht aufhören wird — Transcript
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- 0:00How much longer can Ukraine hold out? It
- 0:02is soon to be the fifth winter of their
- 0:04defensive fight against Russia.
- 0:06The answer to that question also depends
- 0:08on how much longer Vladimir Putin can
- 0:10continue this war.
- 0:12Or will someone force him to seriously
- 0:15consider peace now? I spoke about this
- 0:18with Markus Keupp, a military economist
- 0:20and lecturer at ETH Zurich.
- 0:23Mr. Keupp, it is quite staggering how
- 0:25openly we have seen Donald Trump side
- 0:27with Russia over the past few weeks.
- 0:30He is easing existing sanctions against
- 0:32Moscow. He has decided he wants to
- 0:34import Russian diesel to the US, and he
- 0:36is now in very open conflict with
- 0:38President Zelenskyy’s Ukraine. How
- 0:41surprising is all of this to you?
- 0:44>> Not very.
- 0:45Um, we actually saw this pattern in 2025
- 0:48, where Trump suddenly makes these, uh,
- 0:52these U-turns and seemingly teams up
- 0:54with Putin.
- 0:56One simply has to understand that
- 0:58Trump’s personal interests, especially
- 1:00those regarding his own self-enrichment
- 1:02, are not necessarily identical to those
- 1:04of the US.
- 1:06And that is actually the big problem—
- 1:08that Trump is acting out of
- 1:09self-interest and his own delusion and
- 1:12intellectual ignorance, which plays into
- 1:14Putin’s hands, but is not in the
- 1:16slightest in the US's military or
- 1:18geopolitical interest. So it really is a
- 1:20person-related problem, and I think that
- 1:23will be corrected very strongly after
- 1:25the midterms.
- 1:26>> Um, Trump actually needs a success in
- 1:28the midterms.
- 1:30Some observers think that is why he is
- 1:32trying this—to see if fuel prices drop
- 1:34so he can claim a short-term win.
- 1:36Do you see it that way too?
- 1:39>> Well, I do think that in his mind,
- 1:41something like that could work. Um, but
- 1:43unfortunately, he is showing that he
- 1:45simply doesn't understand how price
- 1:47formation in the oil market or the
- 1:49markets for oil products works. So I
- 1:51think he just hoped that the sentiment
- 1:54would shift. Yes, and that the world
- 1:56would now think, oh, uh, the US is
- 1:57getting diesel from Russia. Incredible.
- 1:59Yes, well, the greatest irony of it all
- 2:01is that the US is actually a diesel
- 2:03exporter itself. Yes, the last thing the
- 2:05US needs for its economy is diesel from
- 2:07Russia. So, these are all just small PR
- 2:09maneuvers, I think, with which he is
- 2:11trying, uh, to score a few points
- 2:13shortly before the midterms.
- 2:16And Putin, as a shrewd Chekist, uh, can
- 2:18naturally exploit that very well for his
- 2:21own agenda, but that won't bring
- 2:23anything to the USA as a state, um, nor
- 2:26to Ukraine.
- 2:27And I just think that with his reckless
- 2:29nature, um, he will damage himself far
- 2:31more than he realizes, because the
- 2:33American people will not forgive you if
- 2:36you have an affordability crisis and if
- 2:38you have high inflation, high fuel
- 2:40prices, and you as president just stand
- 2:42there and do nothing about it, or even
- 2:44give the impression that you are
- 2:46collaborating with the country's enemies
- 2:48.
- 2:48>> We will know more on the 4th. November,
- 2:50when the midterm results slowly come in
- 2:52. I took another look at this diesel
- 2:54deal again today.
- 2:56The price of diesel in the USA has
- 2:58actually risen slightly since the
- 2:59announcement that Trump wants to import
- 3:01from Russia, by about four cents, uh,
- 3:03per liter.
- 3:05But there are still critics in Europe
- 3:06who fear that one consequence of all
- 3:08this will be that Putin emerges from
- 3:10this matter economically strengthened,
- 3:12even if it doesn't have the desired
- 3:14effect from Trump's perspective in the
- 3:16USA.
- 3:16Mm.
- 3:18>> I don't see it that way, and you can
- 3:20easily realize that for yourself if you
- 3:21look at the quantities, and what kind of
- 3:23peanuts we are actually talking about
- 3:24here. Yes, so the USA consumes about
- 3:28600,000 tons of diesel per day. I will
- 3:31repeat the number again: 600,000 tons.
- 3:34Putin promised him 300,000 tons in total
- 3:37, so that's half a day's worth.
- 3:40And these 300,000 tons are coming on
- 3:42seven ships that are currently departing
- 3:44.
- 3:45They will arrive, uh, on approximately
- 3:46the 7th. November in the USA. Four of
- 3:49these ships are sanctioned. That means,
- 3:52therefore, that American companies or
- 3:53ports shouldn't actually be accepting
- 3:55this diesel at all. That's the first
- 3:57point.
- 3:58Now there is, for example, Senator
- 4:00Blumenthal, co-author of the, um, of the
- 4:02Grain-Blumenthal Act, which wants to
- 4:04enforce actions against the Russian oil
- 4:06industry and is currently temporarily
- 4:08suspended, who says that if this oil
- 4:10arrives, the Port Authority of New York
- 4:12should actually seize the ship
- 4:14immediately for violating sanctions.
- 4:17Yes, so there we see this pattern that
- 4:19we have already seen frequently.
- 4:21In PR, yes, in the, in the press, in the
- 4:23, in the media impact, it gets overhyped
- 4:25and it works exactly according to
- 4:27Russian calculation.
- 4:29Everyone writes about it, everyone says
- 4:31: "Oh dear, Ukraine is falling, Russia
- 4:33is being strengthened."
- 4:34But the more you look, the more you
- 4:36examine the facts, the more these small
- 4:38deals crumble until, in the end, nothing
- 4:41of them remains. And we've seen this
- 4:43pattern several times now in '25, even
- 4:44already this year. Yes, well, a big fuss
- 4:47is made about it, but in the end,
- 4:49nothing comes of it. And what about the
- 4:51negotiations running in parallel to that
- 4:53?
- 4:54The US and Moscow are also in contact
- 4:56regarding the lifting of other sanctions
- 4:59packages, for example.
- 5:01Isn't there a risk that a greater effect
- 5:03might eventually occur?
- 5:05>> No, I don't see it that way, because
- 5:07these aren't negotiations, but Russian
- 5:08influence operations.
- 5:10It's not about negotiating any kind of
- 5:12peace deal, or at least not what Russia
- 5:14understands by peace.
- 5:16In other words, enforcing the
- 5:18dismantling of Ukraine or its status as
- 5:20a satellite state, a Russian satellite
- 5:22state.
- 5:23It's about something completely
- 5:24different. It's also about Trump's
- 5:25personal enrichment here.
- 5:28If you look at these two diplomat-actors
- 5:30, Witkoff and Kushner, who are neither
- 5:32trained diplomats nor have any knowledge
- 5:35about Russia or Eastern Europe, they're
- 5:37simply trying to push through deals,
- 5:39essentially from private interest to
- 5:42private interest, right?
- 5:45So businessman Trump is negotiating with
- 5:47businessman Putin with the goal that
- 5:49both enrich themselves.
- 5:52But this has nothing to do with peace or
- 5:54a post-war order.
- 5:56And Putin is doing this very
- 5:58deliberately because he knows this lever
- 6:00of self-enrichment is how he can reach
- 6:02Trump, right?
- 6:04And that's why it's portrayed that way
- 6:06by Russian state propaganda—as if these
- 6:09were peace negotiations—but in principle
- 6:11, these are two very corrupt businessmen
- 6:13negotiating opportunities for
- 6:15self-enrichment.
- 6:18>> I want to discuss which paths exist for
- 6:19actual peace negotiations with you, but
- 6:21a quick question first about the state
- 6:23of the Russian economy, because it
- 6:25depends on which expert you talk to.
- 6:27You arrive at different assessments
- 6:29there. There are some who say these 21
- 6:31sanctions packages from the European
- 6:33Union against Moscow have only had a
- 6:35limited effect so far. Putin can just
- 6:38carry on as before.
- 6:40And then there are others who say it's
- 6:42starting to get tight, also because
- 6:43Ukraine is specifically targeting oil
- 6:45refineries and having success with it.
- 6:48How is Russia's economy doing?
- 6:50>> Mhm.
- 6:51The narrative that the sanctions
- 6:53allegedly aren't working is something
- 6:54you hear primarily from the right-wing
- 6:56populist corner, and above all from
- 6:58those who have an interest in resuming
- 6:59business with Russia, those who want the
- 7:01pre-war status back.
- 7:02So, the pre-war status is not coming
- 7:05back.
- 7:06If you look at how the Russian economy
- 7:08has changed, um, not just due to the
- 7:09sanctions but generally because of the
- 7:11war, we are actually seeing the total
- 7:13decay of an economy that was at least an
- 7:15emerging economy and relatively well
- 7:16integrated into the Western economy in
- 7:18terms of its foreign trade, turning into
- 7:20essentially a Chinese satellite.
- 7:23You can look at whatever you want:
- 7:25consumer goods, cars, or equipment
- 7:27investments for industry.
- 7:29Everything now comes either directly
- 7:31from China or is imported via China,
- 7:33thus circumventing the sanctions.
- 7:36And I always ask, if the sanctions
- 7:38supposedly don't work, why is Putin
- 7:40pushing so persistently to have them
- 7:42lifted?
- 7:44So why is the lifting of sanctions
- 7:45always part of the so-called
- 7:47negotiations if Russia is supposedly
- 7:49able to just carry on as normal, right?
- 7:51That would be the first point.
- 7:52The second is that Russia has, of course
- 7:54, completely transformed into a war
- 7:56economy by now.
- 7:57This means that it is an economy in
- 7:59which normal economic indicators, such
- 8:01as GDP or inflation rates, firstly have
- 8:03no meaning anymore, and secondly, the
- 8:05data is, of course, either completely
- 8:07suppressed or at least falsified by the
- 8:09Russian state. Yes, that is a culture
- 8:11you already know from the Soviet Union,
- 8:13which naturally also exists in modern
- 8:15Russia.
- 8:16And so one must not make the mistake of
- 8:19using the published data that Russia
- 8:23puts out as, um, as real indicators.
- 8:27What is actually happening in this
- 8:29economy is that they are increasingly
- 8:31living off their reserves.
- 8:34Yes, this means that Russia is basically
- 8:36depleting the reserves it accumulated in
- 8:38the past to finance this war economy.
- 8:40But one must clearly say, it is a
- 8:42deficit economy. Russia has had a budget
- 8:45deficit of more than 3%for at least
- 8:47three years, and the more resources they
- 8:49pour into the war economy, the larger
- 8:51this state budget gap naturally becomes
- 8:53. Yes, and Russia has meanwhile also
- 8:55switched to monetary state financing.
- 8:57This means the banks, which are
- 8:59essentially under the control of the
- 9:01Kremlin itself or the oligarchs, are now
- 9:03being forced to buy government bonds,
- 9:05which allows the state to refinance
- 9:07itself.
- 9:08So, one must not make the mistake of
- 9:10confusing the surface of this economy
- 9:12with the hollowing out of the economy
- 9:14that is currently happening.
- 9:16Yes, for example, the effect that there
- 9:19has been an explosion of wages in Russia
- 9:21over the last two years.
- 9:23Many Western media outlets interpreted
- 9:25this as Russia booming and supposedly
- 9:27nothing bad happening to the economy.
- 9:29But the reason is quite different.
- 9:31Wages are exploding because there are
- 9:32too few people left.
- 9:34Yes, the people have either emigrated,
- 9:36or over a million of them are no longer
- 9:38alive because they were killed at the
- 9:40front.
- 9:41And you can imagine, if you have jobs to
- 9:43fill but no people, then wages go up.
- 9:45Yes, that is also an effect of a war
- 9:47economy that you simply don't see. And
- 9:50in that respect, you have to be careful
- 9:52.
- 9:53Yes, there is still this mental image of
- 9:55Russia as some kind of mysterious power
- 9:58where different laws apply, where the
- 10:01normal laws of economics or even physics
- 10:03don't apply, and that is of course
- 10:06nonsense.
- 10:08Yes, this is an economy living off its
- 10:09reserves, and it can do that until those
- 10:11reserves are completely exhausted, and
- 10:13then it will simply collapse.
- 10:14The longer the war lasts, the more we
- 10:16move into this scenario, both
- 10:18economically and militarily.
- 10:19>> I'd like to follow up on that
- 10:20immediately, because the question is, of
- 10:22course, when will the point come where
- 10:24Russia can no longer continue like this
- 10:25? The European Union's goal was to
- 10:27ensure with these sanctions that, at
- 10:29some point, their military capability
- 10:31would no longer exist simply because the
- 10:34money is missing.
- 10:36>> Yes, so militarily, their effectiveness
- 10:38is declining, and you can see that quite
- 10:39clearly when you look at the map.
- 10:42If you simply calculate how much
- 10:45territory Russia has occupied or been
- 10:47able to acquire in '24, in '25, and now
- 10:50in '26, we are currently at the lowest
- 10:53number of square kilometers ever
- 10:55measured, and there are now even small
- 10:58Ukrainian counter-advances.
- 11:01Yes, so you notice that Russia is no
- 11:03longer getting through at the front.
- 11:05That is particularly the case on the
- 11:08northeastern and central Donbas front,
- 11:10and the reason for that is simply that
- 11:13Ukraine has now built up such deep
- 11:15echelons of defensive positions in the
- 11:18hinterland—trenches and systems where
- 11:21drones monitor this no-man's-land and
- 11:23take them out immediately if they move
- 11:26into it.
- 11:28That the Russians can no longer get
- 11:29through at all. Yes, even though they
- 11:31now have between 1,000 and 1,500
- 11:33casualties per day—more than in the
- 11:35Crimean War—they are not breaking
- 11:37through anymore.
- 11:39And that is an interesting effect,
- 11:41because until now, observers mostly said
- 11:43that this is a war of attrition that
- 11:45will work out in Russia's favor.
- 11:47According to the motto: it might take
- 11:49longer, but in the end, they will win.
- 11:51The data and the maps show the exact
- 11:53opposite, that is, Russia has to
- 11:56sacrifice more and more resources for
- 11:58less and less operational gain.
- 12:01And in military terms, that naturally
- 12:02includes the war economy.
- 12:04You might say, sure, the economic
- 12:06sanctions from the EU aren't supported
- 12:09by the whole world and can be partially
- 12:11circumvented, but what Ukraine is doing
- 12:13is applying "real" sanctions.
- 12:17Meaning, they are deliberately targeting
- 12:20and hitting production capacities of the
- 12:24war economy, specifically the oil and
- 12:27gas industry, and all industrial sectors
- 12:31producing war goods, such as missile
- 12:34factories or facilities handling
- 12:37dual-use goods.
- 12:39That is why, for example, they shelled
- 12:41the oil refineries.
- 12:43And if you put that all together, they
- 12:45can really damage this war economy quite
- 12:47severely. That is, of course, an effect
- 12:49you don't see immediately, but it is an
- 12:51effect of continuous erosion.
- 12:53Yes, meaning this economy will
- 12:55continuously slow down and become less
- 12:57and less productive.
- 12:59>> This doesn't mean there will be some
- 13:01grand collapse, but there will reach a
- 13:03point where Russia simply cannot
- 13:04continue like this.
- 13:06>> When will that point be reached?
- 13:07>> Exactly.
- 13:09I don't think there will be a grand
- 13:11collapse because that would be quite
- 13:13atypical for Russian history.
- 13:16I know some observers expect that,
- 13:19following the idea that the oligarchs
- 13:22will eventually turn against Putin and
- 13:24trigger a big revolution.
- 13:27I don't believe that.
- 13:29I think this system will simply erode
- 13:31slowly until Putin realizes, "Okay, I
- 13:33just can't get through anymore, no
- 13:35matter how much I sacrifice."
- 13:39And then, I think he will be given
- 13:42signals that his position is starting to
- 13:46wobble.
- 13:48And since he is a highly trained power
- 13:50politician, I don't believe he will be
- 13:52irrational enough to sacrifice himself
- 13:54as well.
- 13:55So, in other words, once he realizes he
- 13:57cannot get through, he will most likely
- 13:59seriously consider for the first time
- 14:01what he is actually doing. I simply
- 14:03think Putin is not truly informed about
- 14:06the actual state of the war. That is to
- 14:08say, the maps he is shown or the reports
- 14:10from the front are likely embellished
- 14:12and exaggerated. Because I can't imagine
- 14:15it any other way, that he is still
- 14:16spreading his pseudo-historical
- 14:18narratives, uh, and still believes he
- 14:20could win the whole thing, uh, when the
- 14:22, when the entire data basis really
- 14:24speaks against it.
- 14:25Yes, and that's what I meant earlier by
- 14:27, um, what I notice with many
- 14:29commentators is that they don't argue in
- 14:31a data-driven way; they don't look at
- 14:33economic performance or the map, but
- 14:35rather at their own mental images.
- 14:37Yes, so they argue, uh, Russia is a
- 14:38magical empire, it's unusual, and
- 14:40different laws apply there, and that's
- 14:42why it has to turn out that way. Yes,
- 14:44and we should urgently move away from
- 14:46this emotional way, uh, of arguing.
- 14:48>> Yes, looking at it from the other side,
- 14:50one could also say that Ukraine is doing
- 14:52anything but well.
- 14:54We recently had this on our broadcast
- 14:56too, that evacuations are taking place
- 14:57in eastern towns, like Sloviansk,
- 14:59Kramatorsk; people have to leave there
- 15:01because these areas can no longer be
- 15:02protected.
- 15:04You see more and more often that Russia
- 15:06manages to, um, hit targets in Kyiv as
- 15:08well.
- 15:09I believe just today there was a report
- 15:10of a train station with at least 14
- 15:12deaths at the time we are both speaking
- 15:14.
- 15:15Then also the outages of Starlink, uh,
- 15:17where Ukraine struggled with its air
- 15:19defense.
- 15:21So the question of whether Kyiv can even
- 15:23make it through this fifth winter of the
- 15:25war is certainly in the room.
- 15:27Yes.
- 15:28>> Mhm.
- 15:29Well, that Ukraine is naturally
- 15:30suffering heavy damage from the war,
- 15:32that goes without saying and that
- 15:33doesn't really need to be discussed.
- 15:35Parenthesis open, war crimes,
- 15:37parenthesis close. Yes, so Russia is
- 15:39deliberately shelling civilians at
- 15:41civilian train stations, deliberately
- 15:43shelling civilian cities, and shelling
- 15:45civilian energy infrastructure. Yes, all
- 15:47of these are war crimes; they are not
- 15:50permitted under the Geneva Protocols nor
- 15:52under the Hague Convention. So, they are
- 15:54not allowed to deliberately shell the
- 15:56civilian population or the foundations
- 15:57of life. Fewer and fewer people are
- 15:59talking about that, but I mention it
- 16:01regularly that this is a criminal war,
- 16:03not just one that violates international
- 16:05law. Yes.
- 16:06Um, on the other hand, it must be said
- 16:08that much of what is regularly dragged
- 16:10out in the Western press, along the
- 16:11lines of "Ukraine cannot defend itself
- 16:13and is on the verge of collapse," simply
- 16:15does not correspond to the technical and
- 16:17military facts.
- 16:19So yes, it is true that Elon Musk messed
- 16:21around with Starlink for 5 days, but
- 16:23Starlink is now restored and functions
- 16:25just like it did before that episode,
- 16:27also at the old speed.
- 16:29Yes, Ukraine suffers damage to its
- 16:31energy infrastructure every war winter
- 16:33because Russia shells it, but they also
- 16:35repair it continuously.
- 16:38Yes, Ukrainian cities are being
- 16:40constantly shelled, and yes, the
- 16:41Ukrainian air defense is unable to
- 16:43engage everything with the same
- 16:45intensity.
- 16:47Meaning, um, to hit the Russian aircraft
- 16:50, um, and the positions from which this
- 16:52is happening, but that doesn't mean
- 16:54Ukraine is giving up.
- 16:57Yes, and one must also see, um, that it
- 17:00is only so difficult for the Ukrainians
- 17:02to organize this defense because they
- 17:05are still being supported quite
- 17:07hesitantly by the West.
- 17:10Yes, I mean, if we had a different US
- 17:12president and different European
- 17:14politicians, um, we could do much more
- 17:16if there were an understanding that
- 17:18Ukraine is actually the forward front
- 17:20for what we call Europe.
- 17:22>> I promised you we would talk briefly
- 17:23about peace negotiations, so perhaps a
- 17:25word on that.
- 17:27It has been noticeable in recent weeks
- 17:29that, um, individual heads of government
- 17:31in Europe have tried to make contact
- 17:33with Putin.
- 17:34There were phone calls from, uh, Finland
- 17:37, for example, and, um, that did not
- 17:40exactly meet with approval.
- 17:42Denmark, for instance, asked why Finland
- 17:44—and then it was also Norway—why these
- 17:47two countries should seek direct contact
- 17:49with Putin and try as individual states
- 17:51to push for peace efforts.
- 17:55And in fact, it is the case that even
- 17:56the Kremlin repeatedly says that Europe
- 17:59should agree on one negotiator to speak
- 18:01for the bloc.
- 18:02But that is precisely where the European
- 18:04Union has been failing for months. Why?
- 18:09>> Well, I would say generally, they should
- 18:11not let their agenda be dictated by the
- 18:13Kremlin, and certainly not fall for the
- 18:15motive of so-called peace negotiations.
- 18:17I think there is a certain residual
- 18:19naivety among some European politicians
- 18:22along the lines of, um, but surely Putin
- 18:24must have a rational interest in ending
- 18:27this war.
- 18:28Funnily enough, no, he doesn't have to.
- 18:30Putin sees this war from a primarily
- 18:33Soviet perspective, and I don't mean the
- 18:35party, but rather as a Chekist. Yes,
- 18:38from the perspective of the Soviet
- 18:39secret services, and that is primarily
- 18:41an imperial perspective. For him, no
- 18:43Ukrainian nation exists, nor does a
- 18:45Ukrainian people. For him, this is
- 18:47Novorossiya.
- 18:49For him, these are territories he once
- 18:51held and where it is his historical,
- 18:53world-historical mission to take them
- 18:55back.
- 18:57This imperial thinking is completely
- 18:59incompatible, not only with
- 19:01international law but also with the
- 19:02Westphalian principle, that is to say,
- 19:05the principle that states sovereignly
- 19:07decide on their foreign policy, their
- 19:09alliances, and that states simply have a
- 19:11right to exist.
- 19:13Yes, meaning that some other state
- 19:14cannot just come along and conquer them
- 19:16. That was the order we had established
- 19:18in the world before the Brilliant Keller
- 19:19, and you know what kind of world that
- 19:20was.
- 19:21With this imperial worldview, no
- 19:23understanding is possible. And I believe
- 19:26that is what these politicians fail to
- 19:27see. They just fall for it and let
- 19:29themselves be paraded by the Kremlin
- 19:31with the term "so-called peace
- 19:32negotiations." But if you consider, what
- 19:34actually happened in this phone call?
- 19:36Russia, well, Putin gave them both a
- 19:38lecture of about 90 minutes on his view
- 19:40of how the history of the Slavic peoples
- 19:43should be understood.
- 19:45Yes, well, it is starting to take on
- 19:46traits like Adolf Hitler. Yes, that one
- 19:49holds hours-long monologues late at
- 19:52night, for months on end, about how he
- 19:55sees world history. Yes, but that has
- 19:59very, very little to do with real
- 20:00geopolitics.
- 20:02We have seen this since '22; the French
- 20:04president already traveled to Moscow, as
- 20:07did the German Chancellor at the time,
- 20:09and the Austrian one too. Yes, they all
- 20:11show up at Putin's door like schoolboys
- 20:13. Yes, and think, "Oh please, please
- 20:15stop the war." And for me, that is not
- 20:17so much a sign of Putin's strength. For
- 20:18me, it is primarily a sign of European
- 20:20weakness. Yes, and I believe one should
- 20:23urgently move away from this weakness
- 20:25and urgently grow a backbone.
- 20:28>> What chances does diplomacy even have if
- 20:30one listens to you?
- 20:32So, is it this idea of a three-way
- 20:34summit that Donald Trump is now
- 20:36announcing, whether Putin, Zelenskyy,
- 20:38and himself, or Putin, Xi Jinping, and
- 20:41himself?
- 20:43Yes, I would say that would be the
- 20:44ultimate caricature of Yalta or Potsdam
- 20:47.
- 20:48Yes, behind that lies—there you see
- 20:50again this Putinist notion that Russia
- 20:52is virtually a superpower and equal to
- 20:54the USA.
- 20:55So, five—what I keep saying—the Soviet
- 20:58Union was a superpower. Modern Russia is
- 21:00not. Modern Russia has the gross
- 21:02domestic product of Italy.
- 21:04Yes, it has a population of 130 million
- 21:06if you only count ethnic Russians.
- 21:09Um, about 145 million if you count all
- 21:12the others who are not ethnic Russians.
- 21:15But still, that is a third of the
- 21:16European population. Yes, Russia doesn't
- 21:18have nearly the power of innovation,
- 21:20doesn't have nearly the standard of
- 21:21living. Um, the only thing they have is
- 21:23nuclear weapons. Yes, okay. But Pakistan
- 21:26, India, and probably Israel have those
- 21:28too.
- 21:29Um, yes, these are all just mental
- 21:30images, but they do have an effect on
- 21:32Trump.
- 21:34Yes, and um, and then give Putin the
- 21:36idea that we could, so to speak, um,
- 21:38hold a, a, a three-way meeting of the
- 21:40authoritarians, uh.
- 21:42Yes, and then they say where things are
- 21:43headed in the world. That is exactly
- 21:45what I mean by that is the opposing
- 21:46principle to the Westphalian world. Yes
- 21:48, in other words, there is then what the
- 21:50, what the legal scholar, uh, Carl
- 21:52Schmitt, who was a mastermind of
- 21:54National Socialism, also already said,
- 21:56there is then a world of the hegemonic
- 21:58powers, right?
- 22:00So every hegemonic power then has its
- 22:02personal space where it tells its
- 22:04vassals what to do and, um, others have
- 22:06to keep out of this space.
- 22:08So, the world is divided into spheres of
- 22:10influence. Yes, there are also certain,
- 22:12uh, people in Europe who call themselves
- 22:14scientists who are parroting that again
- 22:16today. There you notice how, right, this
- 22:19legacy of authoritarian thinking with
- 22:21links to fascism, um, that is actually
- 22:24what is behind it.
- 22:26Yes, and I think, um, one should
- 22:28urgently, uh, become aware that one
- 22:30should not simply parrot this in the
- 22:32media, but that one is, that one is
- 22:34advocating for an, an authoritarian, uh
- 22:36, um, person here, yes, and their
- 22:38projects, instead of decisively taking
- 22:40defensive measures against it.
- 22:43I would like to follow up on that again
- 22:45, because somehow it is something that
- 22:47many people are simply, where they are
- 22:48wringing their hands and looking for
- 22:50such a way to be satisfied.
- 22:53So, if you say diplomacy is not working
- 22:55because of the way Putin thinks and
- 22:57behaves, it is not possible with these
- 22:58classic means.
- 23:01>> Will it then be decided on the
- 23:02battlefield or how does one find an end
- 23:05to this conflict?
- 23:07Well, serious negotiations will only
- 23:09come about when Putin is truly convinced
- 23:12himself that he is not getting anywhere
- 23:14.
- 23:15In other words, that he is not making
- 23:17military progress and that he is slowly
- 23:18getting too many problems economically.
- 23:21So, in other words, very high inflation
- 23:23, as already exists in Russia now. You
- 23:25have to look at the explosion of food
- 23:26prices in Russia again. Butter has
- 23:28meanwhile become a luxury good, yes, as
- 23:30expensive as in Switzerland.
- 23:31Um, if you think about that, we are
- 23:33still a long way from that. Yes, so as
- 23:36long as Putin is convinced there, I just
- 23:38have to sacrifice even more, just throw
- 23:39more people in, more material, it's
- 23:41exactly like in Afghanistan, right?
- 23:43Afghanistan back in the '79 invasion,
- 23:45people also said, yes, that actually
- 23:47can't work and they actually have to
- 23:49stop now. They stayed for a total of 10
- 23:52years. Yes.
- 23:53Um, well, in my view, we really need to
- 23:56move away from these misguided hopes.
- 24:00Um, I don't believe that negotiations
- 24:02are a way to end this war, because if
- 24:04Putin gets away with even a partial
- 24:06victory, it will embolden his way of
- 24:08thinking, and his successors 'as well,
- 24:10by the way.
- 24:12I just have to keep up the pressure long
- 24:14enough, and then these decadent Western
- 24:17politicians and peoples will eventually
- 24:19cave in.
- 24:20Yes, and I know that in many European
- 24:22countries there is this mindset where
- 24:24people say, oh, can't they just cede a
- 24:26few territories so we can finally have
- 24:28peace again?
- 24:30Yes, that kind of thinking.
- 24:31And that's when I always ask, would you
- 24:34allow in your own country what you so
- 24:36casually demand of Ukraine?
- 24:40For example, Austria just gives up
- 24:42Burgenland, or Tyrol, for that matter.
- 24:46Yes, and then it's quiet again, or
- 24:48Germany is partially occupied and just
- 24:50says, well, places like Saxony or
- 24:52Bavaria, we don't really need those,
- 24:54let's just give them up.
- 24:57Or France, for example, during the
- 24:59Hundred Years' War, could have said, oh
- 25:01, those English can have Aquitaine, we
- 25:03don't really need it anyway. Strange,
- 25:05isn't it? In your own country, there
- 25:07would be a huge outcry, you'd be
- 25:08screaming treason, you would never allow
- 25:10it.
- 25:11Yes, but um, in Ukraine, people say—
- 25:14over the heads of the Ukrainian people—
- 25:17just make peace already. And here, too,
- 25:20you find this authoritarian mindset. Yes
- 25:22, it reflects older patterns in European
- 25:25history.
- 25:26For instance, the idea that Germany and
- 25:28Russia, in particular, are the, so to
- 25:29speak, "ordering powers" on the European
- 25:31continent.
- 25:32They sort of settle things between
- 25:34themselves and carve up Eastern Europe a
- 25:35bit among themselves. Even today, there
- 25:38are many, many people in Europe who
- 25:40parrot this again.
- 25:42Yes, and this way of thinking is
- 25:44extremely dangerous because, in my view
- 25:46, it leads to a chaotic nuclearization
- 25:48of the world.
- 25:50If you consider the setting: Ukraine
- 25:51voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons
- 25:53—that is, its Soviet ones—through the
- 25:55Budapest Memorandum. Russia, however,
- 25:57kept theirs, and you know that the
- 25:59nuclear threat is always a constant
- 26:01companion in Russian propaganda
- 26:03maneuvers.
- 26:05If the world sees this and says, "Okay,
- 26:07in the end they prevail because the
- 26:09others are too weak and let them get
- 26:11away with it," then it means the only
- 26:13real security is having nuclear weapons
- 26:15, and then every state will arm itself
- 26:17nuclearly—especially Taiwan, yes,
- 26:19especially Saudi Arabia, perhaps even
- 26:21Poland.
- 26:23And then we will face a chaotic
- 26:24renuclearization of the world, and that
- 26:26will not make the world safer, but on
- 26:27the contrary, more insecure. Yes, and
- 26:29that is actually the whole
- 26:30world-historical dimension at stake here
- 26:33in Ukraine, which many, in their
- 26:34comfortable affluent pacifism, fail to
- 26:36see; but they are now being punished for
- 26:3930 years of world-historical negligence
- 26:41. Yes, they are sitting there grilling
- 26:42in their suburban homes, and now they
- 26:44realize the impacts are getting closer,
- 26:46the war is getting closer. Yes, their
- 26:47illusion of peace is being brutally
- 26:49shattered, but it was just an illusion,
- 26:51after all. Yes, we should have had a
- 26:53rethink in Europe at the latest by 2014
- 26:55, when Crimea was occupied, but we
- 26:56didn't, and now we are paying the price
- 26:58for it.
- 26:59And the last thing one should do now is
- 27:01to continue on this path of weakness.
- 27:04Yes, the best thing one can do is simply
- 27:06to draw the painful lesson from this and
- 27:08organize the defense. And that defense,
- 27:09as it happens, is in Ukraine.
- 27:11Yes, the last thing they need is for
- 27:13this front to come home to them, because
- 27:15he naturally will not stop.
- 27:17Yes, even if he only achieves partial
- 27:19success in Ukraine, it will continue.
- 27:21And that would not just be a short-term
- 27:23pain; they would then have a bleeding
- 27:25eastern border for decades, where there
- 27:28is never any peace.
- 27:29And that is the last thing Europe needs
- 27:31right now.
- 27:32>> Mr. Käup, I always ask every guest the
- 27:34same final question in this format. Um,
- 27:37you are free to choose how you answer;
- 27:39perhaps something comes to mind that
- 27:40fits the topic, but I always ask when
- 27:42you last changed your mind, on what
- 27:44subject, and for what reason.
- 27:46>> Mhm.
- 27:48I last changed my mind.
- 27:51In 2023, um, when I said the war is
- 27:54strategically lost for Russia. And I
- 27:56have stuck to that opinion, but I
- 27:58changed something else.
- 28:01Back then, I actually still thought that
- 28:04Putin was rational enough, or at least
- 28:06so well-informed by his generals, that
- 28:09he would see this coming attrition, this
- 28:12total decay of Russia, and that he would
- 28:15realize, um, that Russia was moving
- 28:17along a path from which there is no
- 28:20turning back.
- 28:22That is why I titled my book, in which I
- 28:24write about all of this, "Spurwechsel"(
- 28:26Changing Lanes). And this change of
- 28:28lanes is irreversible.
- 28:29So, until the summer of '23, I still
- 28:32thought, okay, he will realize he went
- 28:35in there, he burned his fingers, and he
- 28:38will probably then seek a face-saving
- 28:41exit.
- 28:43I still thought that in the summer of
- 28:45'23, but then I changed my mind and
- 28:47realized he wouldn't stop, he would keep
- 28:49going, and things would get much worse
- 28:51before they got better.
- 28:53>> It would have been nice if changing my
- 28:55opinion hadn't been necessary in this
- 28:57case, but that's just how it is. Yes,
- 28:59>> I want to say thank you for the
- 29:00conversation and for your time.
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