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Wang Wen: Putin, Xi & Trump Meet – Shenzhen World Order? — Transcript

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  1. 0:00Welcome back everyone. We are joined
  2. 0:02today by Professor Wang Wei, dean at
  3. 0:04Chongyang Institute for Financial
  4. 0:06Studies, also the deputy dean of the
  5. 0:10Silk Road School at Renmin University of
  6. 0:12China.
  7. 0:14Furthermore, he's also the executive
  8. 0:16director of China-US People-to-People
  9. 0:18Exchange Research Center and the
  10. 0:20secretary general of the Green Finance
  11. 0:23Committee of China. I'm sure I'm
  12. 0:25forgetting some titles, but
  13. 0:28there's too many of them. So thank you
  14. 0:29for coming on the program.
  15. 0:32>> Okay, thank you. Thank you, Professor
  16. 0:34Dingsheng. Every time
  17. 0:35when I you have opportunity to
  18. 0:37conversation with you, I learn a lot
  19. 0:39from you.
  20. 0:41>> Thank you.
  21. 0:43Well, what I wanted to talk to you about
  22. 0:44today was this
  23. 0:47yeah, well, what looks like it will be
  24. 0:49meeting between Xi Jinping, Vladimir
  25. 0:52Putin, and Donald Trump
  26. 0:55at the APEC leaders' summit in Shenzhen
  27. 0:59in China.
  28. 1:00And
  29. 1:01I yeah, I guess
  30. 1:02how do you
  31. 1:04see the purpose of this meeting? Because
  32. 1:06for me, this is quite fascinating. This
  33. 1:07is
  34. 1:08again, the leaders of the three great
  35. 1:11powers meeting, which seems like a
  36. 1:14good idea that is to get the great
  37. 1:16powers to organize relations between
  38. 1:19them and then, you know, then it's
  39. 1:21easier to work out the smaller pieces
  40. 1:23thereafter.
  41. 1:25But of course, in Europe, you know, they
  42. 1:27have their own concern that this will be
  43. 1:28another Yalta.
  44. 1:30However, my first question is though
  45. 1:32that these three leaders, they all seem
  46. 1:34to have very different incentives and
  47. 1:36priorities for such a meeting. So I was
  48. 1:38wondering
  49. 1:39what what is on the agenda for this
  50. 1:41meeting?
  51. 1:43>> Uh
  52. 1:44well,
  53. 1:45as you may know,
  54. 1:46at the early of this year, I predict
  55. 1:49the trilateral meeting when I got an
  56. 1:52interview with the BBC.
  57. 1:54And after
  58. 1:57the President Trump visiting to this
  59. 2:00May.
  60. 2:01I got a
  61. 2:02uh uh interview
  62. 2:04of BBC two.
  63. 2:05I predict again I said that's uh
  64. 2:09a higher uh possibility
  65. 2:12to uh have such a trilateral meeting
  66. 2:16among US
  67. 2:18Russia and China leaders.
  68. 2:20Uh so now I think that the coming uh
  69. 2:23uh we have a couple of days
  70. 2:26uh for the coming APEC meeting. So now
  71. 2:29more and more media predict
  72. 2:32maybe it will be 100% for the trilateral
  73. 2:37meeting.
  74. 2:38So I think firstly I must be clarified
  75. 2:42that the goal of such a trilateral
  76. 2:44meeting is not to forge a military
  77. 2:47alliance
  78. 2:48sign grand peace treaty or uh
  79. 2:52collude to cut up the world.
  80. 2:56Rather
  81. 2:57its core objective is to manage the
  82. 3:01risks of conflict among major power
  83. 3:05and establish predictable framework for
  84. 3:09their coexistence.
  85. 3:10So I think uh
  86. 3:12now some media report or predict
  87. 3:16the trilateral meeting as a G3.
  88. 3:19I disagree with it.
  89. 3:21Let me analyze nowadays the world
  90. 3:25crisis. I think that the world today
  91. 3:27is beset by numerous crisis as we all
  92. 3:30know
  93. 3:31largely stems from an increased risks of
  94. 3:36miscalculation
  95. 3:37among major powers and lack of channel
  96. 3:40for uh
  97. 3:42miscommunication or less communication.
  98. 3:45So now we must acknowledge that the
  99. 3:49three big power have distinct interest
  100. 3:53and demands
  101. 3:54as you asked.
  102. 3:56Uh I think the United States
  103. 3:58the US is uh pre
  104. 4:01uh primarily
  105. 4:02concerned with avoiding direct conflict
  106. 4:06with both China and Russia
  107. 4:08simultaneously,
  108. 4:09managing nuclear proliferation
  109. 4:12and the spillover
  110. 4:15of the regional conflicts
  111. 4:18including
  112. 4:20Iran
  113. 4:21crisis and preserving its existing
  114. 4:26global influence.
  115. 4:28That's US concern.
  116. 4:30And Russia's concern, I think Russia
  117. 4:32core concern centered on securely
  118. 4:36recognition as a true global power
  119. 4:40reshaping the European security
  120. 4:42architecture
  121. 4:43and managing the crisis in Ukraine.
  122. 4:47And how about China?
  123. 4:49In my
  124. 4:51thinking,
  125. 4:53my opinion, the China's
  126. 4:55focus lie in defending its core
  127. 4:59interests, opposing block-based
  128. 5:01confrontation,
  129. 5:03preventing
  130. 5:04fragmentation of the world, and
  131. 5:06maintaining the stability of a global
  132. 5:08supply chain and the economic and
  133. 5:11trading environment.
  134. 5:12So based these divergent interests,
  135. 5:17I think if
  136. 5:19on November 18th
  137. 5:22the leaders of these three major power
  138. 5:25meet
  139. 5:26in Shenzhen,
  140. 5:27the agenda will likely fall into three
  141. 5:30main
  142. 5:32category.
  143. 5:33The first category, I think concerns
  144. 5:36crisis management.
  145. 5:38The era where region
  146. 5:41minimal consensus its most feasible such
  147. 5:45as managing nuclear risks, preventing
  148. 5:48the escalation of conflicts
  149. 5:51and crucially
  150. 5:54establishing a red line to avoid direct
  151. 5:57crash between
  152. 5:59major power.
  153. 6:00Second category involved the global
  154. 6:03public
  155. 6:05Uh, identifying error for cooperation
  156. 6:08where interest intersect, such as
  157. 6:11climate change, food of security,
  158. 6:14uh, energy crisis, public health, global
  159. 6:17governance of AI, counter terrorism, and
  160. 6:20the non-proliferation.
  161. 6:22So these issues provide a foundation for
  162. 6:25collaboration.
  163. 6:26And the third category I guess,
  164. 6:29the third category
  165. 6:31entails principle dialogue on the rules
  166. 6:34of engagement among major power,
  167. 6:38uh, candidly communicating their respect
  168. 6:41the red line regarding core interest,
  169. 6:44defining the boundaries of competition,
  170. 6:47and distinguishing between competition,
  171. 6:50confrontation, and war.
  172. 6:53So naturally,
  173. 6:54my
  174. 6:56conclusion is that I think that now many
  175. 7:01truly
  176. 7:02bilateral disputes will not be resolved
  177. 7:05within a trilateral framework, and we
  178. 7:08will continue to be addressed through
  179. 7:10bilateral channel.
  180. 7:12So the value
  181. 7:14of trilateral meeting this time
  182. 7:18lies not in resolving every conflict,
  183. 7:21but in preventing bilateral disputes
  184. 7:25from
  185. 7:26spiraling into global
  186. 7:29catastrophe.
  187. 7:30So that's my opinion.
  188. 7:34>> Yeah, well, I guess that's the kind of
  189. 7:35the two ways of looking at when the
  190. 7:37great powers meet,
  191. 7:39that is, all the great powers, that is,
  192. 7:41you know, I think the Arabs have this
  193. 7:43great expression. It's something along
  194. 7:44the lines that, you know, when elephants
  195. 7:46fight, grass get trampled, but,
  196. 7:49you know, when elephants make love, the
  197. 7:51grass also gets trampled. So it's always
  198. 7:53a concern by the smaller powers that
  199. 7:55when the great powers come together that
  200. 7:57they will somehow step on the interests
  201. 7:59and the security of the smaller powers.
  202. 8:01And
  203. 8:02um, but on the other hand,
  204. 8:04you do need to find a settlement between
  205. 8:06the great powers, otherwise the smaller
  206. 8:08will be used in a
  207. 8:10in a competition between them. So,
  208. 8:13but but nonetheless,
  209. 8:14especially if you follow the European
  210. 8:16coverage,
  211. 8:17this has been portrayed as another Yalta
  212. 8:20settlement.
  213. 8:21The Yalta, of course, this
  214. 8:22institutionalized great power rivalry
  215. 8:25with competing blocks and spheres of
  216. 8:27exclusive influence.
  217. 8:30And
  218. 8:31you know, in the unipolar moment,
  219. 8:33it it didn't only
  220. 8:35try to cement a global
  221. 8:39dominance and make the entire US
  222. 8:42the entire world the US sphere of
  223. 8:43influence.
  224. 8:45So, you know, this was seen
  225. 8:47by many, at least in Europe, as a way of
  226. 8:49moving away from the old Yalta system.
  227. 8:52But but of course, for the Chinese, the
  228. 8:55Russians and others, they don't want to
  229. 8:56go back to the unipolar moment either.
  230. 9:00However, if you compare it to Yalta
  231. 9:02though, how how do you conceptualize
  232. 9:04this
  233. 9:05I guess this new model for a multipolar
  234. 9:07system? Because you referred to it as
  235. 9:10the Shenzhen international system.
  236. 9:13And I guess how can such a system be
  237. 9:15organized and how would it differ from
  238. 9:18Yalta?
  239. 9:19>> Well,
  240. 9:20yes, I think there are a lot of a
  241. 9:22difference
  242. 9:23difference between Yalta system and the
  243. 9:25Shenzhen international system, if we can
  244. 9:27call it.
  245. 9:29Last month I write an
  246. 9:32article about the Shenzhen international
  247. 9:34system.
  248. 9:36Let me explain to you. I think the Yalta
  249. 9:38system
  250. 9:39was a framework
  251. 9:41through which the
  252. 9:43victorious powers of the post world
  253. 9:47second era
  254. 9:49delineated their perspective spheres of
  255. 9:53influence.
  256. 9:54Its underlying logic was predicated on
  257. 9:59the
  258. 10:00partitioning of influence and the
  259. 10:02formation of opposing blocks. And the
  260. 10:06notion that security is determined by
  261. 10:09great powers
  262. 10:11Within the later building there are
  263. 10:13surrounding region as buffer zones.
  264. 10:16While small nation were largely treated
  265. 10:19as a bargaining chips in the power games
  266. 10:22of major states.
  267. 10:25And and after the
  268. 10:28the the Cold War,
  269. 10:29I think the the unipolar moment
  270. 10:33established
  271. 10:35followed the Cold War
  272. 10:37pushing the its larger to it its extreme
  273. 10:41attempting to have
  274. 10:43single nation define the global order
  275. 10:46and
  276. 10:47utilizing the institution
  277. 10:50network of alliance and section to
  278. 10:54constrain other major power.
  279. 10:57So this is
  280. 10:59inception of Yalta international system.
  281. 11:02But how about the Shenzhen international
  282. 11:04system? I think the Shenzhen
  283. 11:06international system as I term it
  284. 11:08is neither a new post-war treaty
  285. 11:12nor an attempt to dismantle the United
  286. 11:16State United Nation in favor of
  287. 11:19replacement. Rather it is an involving
  288. 11:24paradigm for interaction among great
  289. 11:27powers. One that is currently being
  290. 11:30practiced and developed grounding in the
  291. 11:34objective reality that a multipolar
  292. 11:37world has already arrived.
  293. 11:40So I think there are three fundamental
  294. 11:41differences between the two.
  295. 11:45First
  296. 11:47they differ in their logical starting
  297. 11:51points.
  298. 11:52The Yalta system was rooted in the
  299. 11:56delineation of interest and a sphere of
  300. 11:59influence.
  301. 12:00The Shenzhen paradigm
  302. 12:01by contrast beginning by acknowledging
  303. 12:04the core interest of all nations while
  304. 12:07explicitly rejecting the logic of sphere
  305. 12:11of influence.
  306. 12:13While major power may
  307. 12:16safeguard their own security, they do
  308. 12:19not treat other sovereignty states as
  309. 12:22buffer zone or vessel.
  310. 12:24None do they permit the violation of
  311. 12:30another nation sovereignty under the
  312. 12:32guise of security. That's the first
  313. 12:34difference. Second difference, I think
  314. 12:36they differ in their operation model.
  315. 12:40The Yalta system was defined by
  316. 12:42block-based confrontation where one was
  317. 12:46either
  318. 12:47a friend or enemy.
  319. 12:49The Shenzhen paradigm
  320. 12:51accepts
  321. 12:53that competition may exist, but the
  322. 12:55confrontation is not inevitable.
  323. 12:58While intense
  324. 13:00rivalry may occur between major power,
  325. 13:03it does not compel other nation to take
  326. 13:06sides. Nor does it involve the creation
  327. 13:10of exclusive military blocks.
  328. 13:12Competition must have boundaries and
  329. 13:16conflict must be
  330. 13:19equip
  331. 13:20with breaking mechanism.
  332. 13:22That's the second
  333. 13:24differences. The third difference that I
  334. 13:26think they differed in their relation
  335. 13:29with the global South
  336. 13:31because under the Yalta and the unipolar
  337. 13:33system, small nations and the different
  338. 13:36developing country
  339. 13:38were largely perceptive recipients of
  340. 13:42arrangement made by the great powers.
  341. 13:44In Shenzhen paradigm, I think
  342. 13:46coordination among major power cannot
  343. 13:50bypass
  344. 13:51small or media size states.
  345. 13:54Dual stock between a great power cannot
  346. 13:58take procedures over the sovereignty and
  347. 14:02aspiration of the broad developing
  348. 14:04world.
  349. 14:05Communi- communication between the major
  350. 14:08powers is intended to reduce the great
  351. 14:12reduce the global risks of
  352. 14:15uh not to facilitate uh private carving
  353. 14:19up of the world among them.
  354. 14:21So I think uh how such a system might be
  355. 14:27uh constructed.
  356. 14:28It it is not something uh that can be
  357. 14:31achieved overnight through a single
  358. 14:33conference.
  359. 14:35I have some
  360. 14:37imagination. First, it is essential to
  361. 14:41establish the functional mechanism for
  362. 14:44crisis management among the major
  363. 14:45powers.
  364. 14:47Second, more importantly,
  365. 14:49uh to uh accumulate
  366. 14:52practical experience in cooperation on
  367. 14:55global public issues.
  368. 14:57Most
  369. 14:58importantly uh
  370. 15:00I think these uh
  371. 15:03must remain open to the entire world. It
  372. 15:07cannot become an exclusively closed
  373. 15:10circle, and it must be uh
  374. 15:13compatible with and complementary to the
  375. 15:17existing international system centered
  376. 15:19on the UN's rather than seeking to
  377. 15:22increase it.
  378. 15:26>> What do you describe though? It's often
  379. 15:28what what security architecture is
  380. 15:30supposed to look like? That is
  381. 15:33ideally you find that
  382. 15:35the main powers or all the powers are in
  383. 15:37the position to harmonize interests,
  384. 15:38that is to pursue these win-win
  385. 15:40solutions, but when it's possible of
  386. 15:42course, but when it's not possible
  387. 15:44to harmonize interests then at least how
  388. 15:47to manage competition, set the rules so
  389. 15:50there's
  390. 15:51restraint. And
  391. 15:53I think a challenge during the unipolar
  392. 15:54moment was that it was the hegemonic era
  393. 15:57was based on
  394. 15:59US alliance systems, but then
  395. 16:02diplomacy essentially meant that you sit
  396. 16:03in the room with people you already
  397. 16:05agree with, that is people from your own
  398. 16:06block and you put max pressure as a
  399. 16:10collective hegemony to pressure others
  400. 16:12to fall in line. So I think diplomacy
  401. 16:14died to some extent, at least it took on
  402. 16:16a different format. Was more about
  403. 16:20yeah, ultimatums and threats, I would
  404. 16:22say.
  405. 16:23However, now that we're moving away from
  406. 16:25it, it looks like the decision making
  407. 16:27will no longer be made between the US
  408. 16:29and its allies, but instead the US and
  409. 16:32the other rising great powers, so China
  410. 16:35and Russia.
  411. 16:37Again, the
  412. 16:40the main concern now is coming from
  413. 16:42countries in Europe and Japan.
  414. 16:47Did you think it
  415. 16:48could create risks of a new, you know,
  416. 16:50great power arrangement
  417. 16:52in which smaller countries have their
  418. 16:55security ignored because
  419. 16:57you know, often people point out that
  420. 16:58it's that will be in no one's interest
  421. 17:01because if countries like
  422. 17:02Japan feel very insecure, they might do
  423. 17:04something foolish that is beginning to
  424. 17:06militarize, pursue nuclear weapons. So
  425. 17:08there's a there's a
  426. 17:10common interest among the great powers
  427. 17:12that also
  428. 17:13even though decision making should shift
  429. 17:15a little bit, how diplomacy is done, one
  430. 17:18also has to take into account the
  431. 17:19smaller countries.
  432. 17:21>> Yeah, I think
  433. 17:23this concern is totally
  434. 17:26understood and understood. And also this
  435. 17:29concern is highly realistic.
  436. 17:32But I have to explain is that
  437. 17:35we must distinguish between the two
  438. 17:38entirely different scenarios.
  439. 17:41One involved
  440. 17:43great power making
  441. 17:45backroom deals
  442. 17:47privately deciding the fate of other
  443. 17:50nation and sacrificing the interest of a
  444. 17:53smaller state as you mentioned to reach
  445. 17:57compromises among themselves.
  446. 17:59So this is old style of power politics.
  447. 18:02We concerned about we worry about it.
  448. 18:06Also the Europe, Japan or the other
  449. 18:09nations of global sums, they concerned.
  450. 18:13But the problem is that
  451. 18:15the
  452. 18:16international system
  453. 18:18seek to discard such a older style
  454. 18:21politics power politics.
  455. 18:24And
  456. 18:25the other scenario I want to share with
  457. 18:28you is that
  458. 18:29it involves the greater power
  459. 18:31establishing a dialogue for risk
  460. 18:33management and control
  461. 18:35aimed at preventing war between them and
  462. 18:38ensuring that conflict does not spread
  463. 18:40globally
  464. 18:42without however making any decision or
  465. 18:44behavior of other countries.
  466. 18:46If these dialogue mechanism can
  467. 18:49established
  468. 18:50I think
  469. 18:51how to judge
  470. 18:53whether
  471. 18:54such a dialogue
  472. 18:56mechanism serve
  473. 18:58I think
  474. 19:01we can judge it
  475. 19:04by a few
  476. 19:06by a through a very important
  477. 19:09criteria.
  478. 19:10The first criteria is that regarding the
  479. 19:12agenda
  480. 19:14any major issue directly affecting the
  481. 19:17fate of nations in Europe, Japan or the
  482. 19:20other region cannot be centered behind
  483. 19:23the closed door by the United States,
  484. 19:25China or Russia alone.
  485. 19:27These parties concerned must have a
  486. 19:30fully right to participate and the
  487. 19:33meaningful meaningful voice.
  488. 19:36Because while while great power may
  489. 19:38exchange views and manage the fuel of of
  490. 19:42risks
  491. 19:43they have no men mandate mandate to
  492. 19:49over spam
  493. 19:50they are bound and dictate a political
  494. 19:53arrangement for other region.
  495. 19:56And the second point I want to say is
  496. 19:59that regarding the nature of mechanism
  497. 20:02it must remain functional dialogue
  498. 20:06folks on quiet communication and risk
  499. 20:09management. It cannot involved into an
  500. 20:12exclusive council that makes decision on
  501. 20:15global affairs. Furthermore the outcome
  502. 20:18of such a dialogue cannot be imposed
  503. 20:20upon third party. So this is a two very
  504. 20:24important bottom line. If we can uphold
  505. 20:27these two
  506. 20:28bottom lines, I think the regularized
  507. 20:32the dialogue among great power could
  508. 20:35serve as a
  509. 20:37stabilizer for a multipolar world.
  510. 20:41Conversely,
  511. 20:42should it devolve into background gear
  512. 20:46making, it would effectively revive the
  513. 20:49power politics of bygone era
  514. 20:53a development
  515. 20:54inevitable phase existence from small
  516. 20:57and medium sized nation worldwide.
  517. 21:00So,
  518. 21:01I think in the future
  519. 21:03how the Shenzhen international system
  520. 21:06maintain
  521. 21:07consequently
  522. 21:09such a mechanism must
  523. 21:12be subjective
  524. 21:14to the oversize of the international
  525. 21:17community. So, let just wait and see be
  526. 21:19a patience to observe how implement of
  527. 21:24Shenzhen international system.
  528. 21:27>> Well,
  529. 21:28it would then consist of
  530. 21:30all these main power great powers. We
  531. 21:32can say there's three great powers.
  532. 21:34Again, what the how are the great power
  533. 21:36can be
  534. 21:37defined differs, but
  535. 21:39but of those three powers the main the
  536. 21:42two largest powers would be China and
  537. 21:44United States and
  538. 21:47the the competition between the two.
  539. 21:49It's the underlying competition appears
  540. 21:51to be over technology, military power
  541. 21:55and global influence and again you can
  542. 21:58argue that it's so far been in the
  543. 21:59economic sphere, but it always threatens
  544. 22:01to spill into the military sphere. That
  545. 22:03is by trying to push for secession of
  546. 22:06Taiwan or even you see the rhetoric
  547. 22:08around
  548. 22:10about you know knocking out Iran or
  549. 22:12Russia that this could be used to weaken
  550. 22:14the Chinese. So, you know the the the
  551. 22:16competition is there, the military
  552. 22:18potential as well.
  553. 22:21I mean the do you think
  554. 22:24what we're now seeing this talks between
  555. 22:26the Chinese and Americans, does it have
  556. 22:28a potential for a
  557. 22:30new era which essentially breaks with
  558. 22:32this
  559. 22:33Cold War mentality of the past, or is
  560. 22:35this what we're seeing now, a temporary
  561. 22:37truce that is
  562. 22:39while, I guess each side regroups?
  563. 22:42>> Well, in my assessment, this is not
  564. 22:45merely a truce, as you mentioned. Nor
  565. 22:48does it
  566. 22:49signify that the underlying tension have
  567. 22:53been resolved.
  568. 22:55Cuz I think now the US-China
  569. 22:58relationship have entered a prolonged
  570. 23:02era characterized by limited competition
  571. 23:05and managed conflict.
  572. 23:08So you mentioned the truce, I think the
  573. 23:11term truce rooted in a context of war
  574. 23:16implies a path to gather strength for a
  575. 23:20next round of confrontation.
  576. 23:22Yet I think the current US-China rivalry
  577. 23:25involved two
  578. 23:27powers coexisting with a single
  579. 23:29integrated global system.
  580. 23:32The competition is a struggle,
  581. 23:35is a structural. The competition is
  582. 23:37structural, I think. The contest over
  583. 23:40the technology and
  584. 23:43strategy will not simply varnish, nor
  585. 23:48can they be a fully eliminated through a
  586. 23:51signal meeting.
  587. 23:53But the problem is that now both major
  588. 23:56power are increasingly recognizing a
  589. 23:58stark reality.
  590. 24:00The cost of the contemporary great power
  591. 24:02competition are prohibitively high,
  592. 24:05higher.
  593. 24:06Whether
  594. 24:08through a military conflict, total
  595. 24:11decoupling, or a complete technology
  596. 24:13blockade, there are no truly winners. So
  597. 24:17consequently, practical necessity
  598. 24:21combine a both side to contain their
  599. 24:24competition within a divided boundary,
  600. 24:28allowing, that is allowing rivalry to
  601. 24:31persist
  602. 24:33while establishing the red line to
  603. 24:35prevent slide into a direct conflict.
  604. 24:40So in short I think now the competition
  605. 24:43between the US and China has become an
  606. 24:46the new normal
  607. 24:48while conflict between the United States
  608. 24:51and China must be
  609. 24:55deeply managed. So this is not fleeting
  610. 25:00truth as you mentioned the truth but
  611. 25:02rather
  612. 25:03a new long-term model of coexistence
  613. 25:08that these
  614. 25:09major powers are compelled to adopt. So
  615. 25:14that's my new observation.
  616. 25:17>> Um
  617. 25:18we see that
  618. 25:19in this talks between Beijing and
  619. 25:21Washington that Beijing becomes more
  620. 25:25confident it seems. It's unclear whether
  621. 25:27or not this is a power growing or if
  622. 25:29it's just becoming
  623. 25:31you know in terms of being a better
  624. 25:33position to shape the relations with
  625. 25:35Washington or has it essentially been a
  626. 25:38learning curve that is
  627. 25:40how to handle Trump because
  628. 25:42Trump is
  629. 25:44well let's say well I guess an unusual
  630. 25:46style of leadership.
  631. 25:49Is this been
  632. 25:50has this been a big issue in Beijing how
  633. 25:53to handle Trump?
  634. 25:55>> Well
  635. 25:57I don't believe that any single side
  636. 25:59currently holds an absolute advantage
  637. 26:03that would allow it to
  638. 26:06unilaterally shape US and China
  639. 26:09relations.
  640. 26:10The trajectory of these bilateral
  641. 26:13relations is always the result of a
  642. 26:17two-way interaction. It is not something
  643. 26:19that one party can dictate and high on
  644. 26:22its own.
  645. 26:24Of course I agree you mentioned China is
  646. 26:26more proactively pragmatic stance today
  647. 26:30stance from uh its growing national
  648. 26:32strength
  649. 26:33as well as clear more sober
  650. 26:36understanding of the outside world.
  651. 26:39At the same time the US continues to
  652. 26:41possess this formidable military
  653. 26:44technological and alliance system
  654. 26:46providing it with a wider
  655. 26:48uh aerial of a tool of engagement.
  656. 26:52But I think the now the advantage are
  657. 26:56relative not absolute.
  658. 26:59In this bilateral relationship
  659. 27:01both sides hold their own
  660. 27:04backing
  661. 27:06ships while also facing their own
  662. 27:09respective constraints.
  663. 27:11Therefore it could be uh it it cannot be
  664. 27:15said that the China occupies
  665. 27:18uh unilaterally more favorable position.
  666. 27:22Uh as far you mentioned that how to deal
  667. 27:25with Donald Trump
  668. 27:26uh there's no a single universal
  669. 27:29formula that works once and for all.
  670. 27:34The Trump administration foreign policy
  671. 27:37is characterized by a high degree of
  672. 27:40pragmatism and a strong trans
  673. 27:43transactional nature.
  674. 27:45So for us I mean for China China
  675. 27:49approach
  676. 27:50uh folks on two key points.
  677. 27:53First
  678. 27:54to clearly and firmly uphold a China
  679. 27:56core interest maintaining a strict red
  680. 27:59line and refusing to make any
  681. 28:03concession on matter of principle
  682. 28:06regarding sovereignty and security. And
  683. 28:09second to engage in pragmatic
  684. 28:12communication in areas where interest
  685. 28:15converse isolating aspects that allow
  686. 28:18for cooperation or negotiation. So now
  687. 28:22we
  688. 28:23I think a master
  689. 28:25also be fully aware
  690. 28:28because
  691. 28:29we all know the the the the Milton
  692. 28:32election.
  693. 28:33So now the US diplomatic
  694. 28:37no, the US domestic politics deeply
  695. 28:41polarized. Even if an agreement is
  696. 28:44reached with the United States executive
  697. 28:46branch, it may still be constrained by
  698. 28:49the Congress or public opinion. So
  699. 28:52consequently, I think when dealing with
  700. 28:55the United States, one cannot focus
  701. 28:58solely on any single leaders. We must be
  702. 29:02prepared to navigate the both short-term
  703. 29:05in caption and long-term strategic
  704. 29:08games.
  705. 29:11>> Uh
  706. 29:13but
  707. 29:14we are again the the the key reason why
  708. 29:17they will be meeting though is because
  709. 29:18the
  710. 29:20the former hegemonic system is of course
  711. 29:22gone. The western dominated structures
  712. 29:24are all becoming well outdated and
  713. 29:27you kind of see similar debates having
  714. 29:30well is at least being intensified by by
  715. 29:33recent events that is in the Middle East
  716. 29:34we see the Gulf States now thinking how
  717. 29:37how the security architecture has to be
  718. 29:39reshaped because the US won't be there
  719. 29:41much in the future. We see in Europe
  720. 29:44they kind of recognizing well something
  721. 29:46similar but a bit reluctantly. Of course
  722. 29:48the similar talks in East Asia. I know
  723. 29:50the South Koreans were especially
  724. 29:52worried when the US started to pull out
  725. 29:54all of their air defenses. So
  726. 29:56um
  727. 29:57but
  728. 29:59in in in so the hegemony is gone.
  729. 30:02But many countries
  730. 30:04including in the global south there's
  731. 30:06many who are worried that if you replace
  732. 30:10one dominant power that is the United
  733. 30:11States with another one that you'll end
  734. 30:13up in a similar situation. Indeed you
  735. 30:16often see this comment from the
  736. 30:18Americans themselves that is
  737. 30:20the the concern that China will act as
  738. 30:24as another America, one that is aspiring
  739. 30:26for global primacy.
  740. 30:28How do you think that the Chinese how
  741. 30:30how do you think the Chinese could
  742. 30:32demonstrate
  743. 30:33that their vision of a multipolar world
  744. 30:36um
  745. 30:37is genuine as opposed to merely you
  746. 30:40know, deception to increase Beijing's
  747. 30:42power.
  748. 30:44>> Well, I think
  749. 30:45I don't know whether
  750. 30:47you remember
  751. 30:4950 years ago
  752. 30:51when Mr. Deng Xiaoping delivered a
  753. 30:54lecture in UN.
  754. 30:56I think the early of the 1970s
  755. 31:00he said China never to seek for a new
  756. 31:03hegemony.
  757. 31:04If China
  758. 31:06do that
  759. 31:07all the nation can
  760. 31:10oppose or reject
  761. 31:13China.
  762. 31:14So I think that's very obvious in the
  763. 31:16past half century China always continue
  764. 31:20the the rules, the principles
  765. 31:23that is reject
  766. 31:25the
  767. 31:26new hegemony.
  768. 31:28And also China never
  769. 31:31want to seek to replace American
  770. 31:33hegemony with a Chinese hegemony. So
  771. 31:36that's a very obvious and also
  772. 31:40no single nation
  773. 31:42in the future can act as the new
  774. 31:45hegemony.
  775. 31:46So that's very obvious. And second
  776. 31:48things I want to say is that
  777. 31:53in in the conduct of international
  778. 31:56affairs China
  779. 31:58will ensure
  780. 32:00that
  781. 32:01its own interest never placed
  782. 32:04above those of
  783. 32:06the other developing nations.
  784. 32:08And it must not pressure country within
  785. 32:11the global south to
  786. 32:13take sides between China and the United
  787. 32:16States.
  788. 32:17And the third point
  789. 32:18we have to admit that regardless reform
  790. 32:20of global governance
  791. 32:22China take concrete steps to shape
  792. 32:26governance authority and institutional
  793. 32:28power towards a broader community of
  794. 32:31developing nation. It includes reforming
  795. 32:35voting rights within IMF and World Bank
  796. 32:38advising the expansion of BRICS and
  797. 32:42ensuring that the developing country
  798. 32:44gained the greater say in the creation
  799. 32:46of international rules.
  800. 32:48So it's very obvious. Of course, I know
  801. 32:52it is it's revolt revolt by
  802. 32:56how say it's still
  803. 33:00the long and ongoing process to
  804. 33:03demonstration
  805. 33:05of kind of long-term strategy.
  806. 33:07But China always do that. So please
  807. 33:10trust China. In the past
  808. 33:12half century, China do the same
  809. 33:16strategy. So I I think in the coming
  810. 33:19half century, China will continue.
  811. 33:24>> But
  812. 33:25what is interesting is that there's
  813. 33:27three great powers. I mean, if
  814. 33:30India had
  815. 33:32you know, a different posture, you know,
  816. 33:34it could also of course enter these
  817. 33:35ranks. But if we identify three great
  818. 33:38powers, it is interesting that
  819. 33:40you know, the US has always had
  820. 33:42you know, the divide and rule strategy
  821. 33:44behind its hegemonic posture, which is,
  822. 33:46you know, turned the Chinese and the
  823. 33:48Soviets against each other back in the
  824. 33:50'70s and now of course try to
  825. 33:53create some wedge between the the
  826. 33:55Chinese and the Russians. And I was
  827. 33:57wondering, how do you see this? That is
  828. 33:59if
  829. 34:01if if the tensions now continue to grow
  830. 34:03between the Americans and the Russians,
  831. 34:05that is if Washington and Moscow have
  832. 34:08interest that continues to diverge.
  833. 34:11You also see this in the economic
  834. 34:12sphere. They don't have that many
  835. 34:13overlapping economic interests.
  836. 34:16But if they continue to diverge, how do
  837. 34:18you see
  838. 34:19Beijing possibly facing any difficult
  839. 34:21choices? I mean,
  840. 34:24so far the Russians and the Chinese have
  841. 34:26formed a very tight strategic
  842. 34:28partnership. But where where do you see
  843. 34:30the limits
  844. 34:31on this partnership?
  845. 34:33>> Well, I think now
  846. 34:36the reality of the great power rivalry
  847. 34:38does not mean that China must take
  848. 34:41sides.
  849. 34:42Uh now as we all know the China Russia
  850. 34:45comprehensive strategic partnership of
  851. 34:47coordination for a new era
  852. 34:51is fundamentally defined by the
  853. 34:53principle of non alignment, non
  854. 34:56confrontation and non targeting of three
  855. 34:58parties.
  856. 34:59So this principle established its
  857. 35:01essential
  858. 35:03boundaries.
  859. 35:04First,
  860. 35:05it is no
  861. 35:06China and Russia relationship
  862. 35:09is not a military alliance.
  863. 35:12We
  864. 35:13we will not enter into a military treaty
  865. 35:17with Russia.
  866. 35:18None will we commit to direct
  867. 35:21participation in any confrontation
  868. 35:24between major powers.
  869. 35:26While
  870. 35:27Russia
  871. 35:29China cooperation is rooted in
  872. 35:32shared interest, it does not entail an
  873. 35:35alignment of position on every
  874. 35:38international issue. We maintain an
  875. 35:40independent judgment on many matters.
  876. 35:44Second point I want to share is that
  877. 35:46China Russia partnership will not
  878. 35:48involve into a military block designed
  879. 35:51to confront the United States.
  880. 35:54China develops its strategic
  881. 35:57coordination with Russia while
  882. 35:59simultaneously maintaining channel for
  883. 36:02communication and dialogue with the
  884. 36:04United States.
  885. 36:05The two are not mutually exclusive.
  886. 36:09The objective of Chinese diplomacy is
  887. 36:12not to join forces with one side to
  888. 36:15defeat another.
  889. 36:17And more important I think we we we have
  890. 36:20to admit
  891. 36:22that nowadays
  892. 36:24the intensifying confront conflict
  893. 36:27the intensifying conflict
  894. 36:30between United States and Russia
  895. 36:32objectively
  896. 36:34complicates China external environment
  897. 36:37and create a pressure.
  898. 36:39However, this does not necessitate
  899. 36:43an either all choice.
  900. 36:45China's diplomatic logic involved
  901. 36:48addressing various bilateral
  902. 36:51relationship separately.
  903. 36:53Our relationship with Russia serves the
  904. 36:56interest of both China and Russia.
  905. 37:00While
  906. 37:01our relationship with the United States
  907. 37:03focus on the issues specifically to the
  908. 37:06China US
  909. 37:09relations. So I think that's a two
  910. 37:11separate issues we deal with one by one,
  911. 37:14right?
  912. 37:15So crucially I think there is an
  913. 37:18absolute bottle lies.
  914. 37:20All of China external cooperation must
  915. 37:24serve its own national sovereignty,
  916. 37:27security and development interest.
  917. 37:30No partnership
  918. 37:32with any country may compromise
  919. 37:36China's core interest.
  920. 37:39This serves as ultimate boundary for all
  921. 37:43of China foreign relations. So this I I
  922. 37:47I want to explain to everyone that is
  923. 37:51we need to
  924. 37:54use a new logic, new theoretical logic
  925. 37:58to observe
  926. 38:00the complicated trilateral relationship
  927. 38:04among China, US and Russia. [snorts]
  928. 38:09>> Yeah and all the I remember
  929. 38:11in
  930. 38:12well at least about 70 years ago there
  931. 38:14was a lot of literature
  932. 38:16in the West as well about more critical
  933. 38:18literature about the dangers of military
  934. 38:21blocks that is
  935. 38:22it necessitates counter reaction. So I
  936. 38:24think perhaps yeah this aversion towards
  937. 38:28military alliances has been a yeah
  938. 38:30positive aspect of China's foreign
  939. 38:32policy.
  940. 38:33Anyways
  941. 38:34Professor Wang thank you so much for
  942. 38:36your time. I appreciate it.
  943. 38:37>> Thank you. Thank you so much.
  944. 38:44>> Hello.

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