Wang Wen: Putin, Xi & Trump Meet – Shenzhen World Order? — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:00Welcome back everyone. We are joined
- 0:02today by Professor Wang Wei, dean at
- 0:04Chongyang Institute for Financial
- 0:06Studies, also the deputy dean of the
- 0:10Silk Road School at Renmin University of
- 0:12China.
- 0:14Furthermore, he's also the executive
- 0:16director of China-US People-to-People
- 0:18Exchange Research Center and the
- 0:20secretary general of the Green Finance
- 0:23Committee of China. I'm sure I'm
- 0:25forgetting some titles, but
- 0:28there's too many of them. So thank you
- 0:29for coming on the program.
- 0:32>> Okay, thank you. Thank you, Professor
- 0:34Dingsheng. Every time
- 0:35when I you have opportunity to
- 0:37conversation with you, I learn a lot
- 0:39from you.
- 0:41>> Thank you.
- 0:43Well, what I wanted to talk to you about
- 0:44today was this
- 0:47yeah, well, what looks like it will be
- 0:49meeting between Xi Jinping, Vladimir
- 0:52Putin, and Donald Trump
- 0:55at the APEC leaders' summit in Shenzhen
- 0:59in China.
- 1:00And
- 1:01I yeah, I guess
- 1:02how do you
- 1:04see the purpose of this meeting? Because
- 1:06for me, this is quite fascinating. This
- 1:07is
- 1:08again, the leaders of the three great
- 1:11powers meeting, which seems like a
- 1:14good idea that is to get the great
- 1:16powers to organize relations between
- 1:19them and then, you know, then it's
- 1:21easier to work out the smaller pieces
- 1:23thereafter.
- 1:25But of course, in Europe, you know, they
- 1:27have their own concern that this will be
- 1:28another Yalta.
- 1:30However, my first question is though
- 1:32that these three leaders, they all seem
- 1:34to have very different incentives and
- 1:36priorities for such a meeting. So I was
- 1:38wondering
- 1:39what what is on the agenda for this
- 1:41meeting?
- 1:43>> Uh
- 1:44well,
- 1:45as you may know,
- 1:46at the early of this year, I predict
- 1:49the trilateral meeting when I got an
- 1:52interview with the BBC.
- 1:54And after
- 1:57the President Trump visiting to this
- 2:00May.
- 2:01I got a
- 2:02uh uh interview
- 2:04of BBC two.
- 2:05I predict again I said that's uh
- 2:09a higher uh possibility
- 2:12to uh have such a trilateral meeting
- 2:16among US
- 2:18Russia and China leaders.
- 2:20Uh so now I think that the coming uh
- 2:23uh we have a couple of days
- 2:26uh for the coming APEC meeting. So now
- 2:29more and more media predict
- 2:32maybe it will be 100% for the trilateral
- 2:37meeting.
- 2:38So I think firstly I must be clarified
- 2:42that the goal of such a trilateral
- 2:44meeting is not to forge a military
- 2:47alliance
- 2:48sign grand peace treaty or uh
- 2:52collude to cut up the world.
- 2:56Rather
- 2:57its core objective is to manage the
- 3:01risks of conflict among major power
- 3:05and establish predictable framework for
- 3:09their coexistence.
- 3:10So I think uh
- 3:12now some media report or predict
- 3:16the trilateral meeting as a G3.
- 3:19I disagree with it.
- 3:21Let me analyze nowadays the world
- 3:25crisis. I think that the world today
- 3:27is beset by numerous crisis as we all
- 3:30know
- 3:31largely stems from an increased risks of
- 3:36miscalculation
- 3:37among major powers and lack of channel
- 3:40for uh
- 3:42miscommunication or less communication.
- 3:45So now we must acknowledge that the
- 3:49three big power have distinct interest
- 3:53and demands
- 3:54as you asked.
- 3:56Uh I think the United States
- 3:58the US is uh pre
- 4:01uh primarily
- 4:02concerned with avoiding direct conflict
- 4:06with both China and Russia
- 4:08simultaneously,
- 4:09managing nuclear proliferation
- 4:12and the spillover
- 4:15of the regional conflicts
- 4:18including
- 4:20Iran
- 4:21crisis and preserving its existing
- 4:26global influence.
- 4:28That's US concern.
- 4:30And Russia's concern, I think Russia
- 4:32core concern centered on securely
- 4:36recognition as a true global power
- 4:40reshaping the European security
- 4:42architecture
- 4:43and managing the crisis in Ukraine.
- 4:47And how about China?
- 4:49In my
- 4:51thinking,
- 4:53my opinion, the China's
- 4:55focus lie in defending its core
- 4:59interests, opposing block-based
- 5:01confrontation,
- 5:03preventing
- 5:04fragmentation of the world, and
- 5:06maintaining the stability of a global
- 5:08supply chain and the economic and
- 5:11trading environment.
- 5:12So based these divergent interests,
- 5:17I think if
- 5:19on November 18th
- 5:22the leaders of these three major power
- 5:25meet
- 5:26in Shenzhen,
- 5:27the agenda will likely fall into three
- 5:30main
- 5:32category.
- 5:33The first category, I think concerns
- 5:36crisis management.
- 5:38The era where region
- 5:41minimal consensus its most feasible such
- 5:45as managing nuclear risks, preventing
- 5:48the escalation of conflicts
- 5:51and crucially
- 5:54establishing a red line to avoid direct
- 5:57crash between
- 5:59major power.
- 6:00Second category involved the global
- 6:03public
- 6:05Uh, identifying error for cooperation
- 6:08where interest intersect, such as
- 6:11climate change, food of security,
- 6:14uh, energy crisis, public health, global
- 6:17governance of AI, counter terrorism, and
- 6:20the non-proliferation.
- 6:22So these issues provide a foundation for
- 6:25collaboration.
- 6:26And the third category I guess,
- 6:29the third category
- 6:31entails principle dialogue on the rules
- 6:34of engagement among major power,
- 6:38uh, candidly communicating their respect
- 6:41the red line regarding core interest,
- 6:44defining the boundaries of competition,
- 6:47and distinguishing between competition,
- 6:50confrontation, and war.
- 6:53So naturally,
- 6:54my
- 6:56conclusion is that I think that now many
- 7:01truly
- 7:02bilateral disputes will not be resolved
- 7:05within a trilateral framework, and we
- 7:08will continue to be addressed through
- 7:10bilateral channel.
- 7:12So the value
- 7:14of trilateral meeting this time
- 7:18lies not in resolving every conflict,
- 7:21but in preventing bilateral disputes
- 7:25from
- 7:26spiraling into global
- 7:29catastrophe.
- 7:30So that's my opinion.
- 7:34>> Yeah, well, I guess that's the kind of
- 7:35the two ways of looking at when the
- 7:37great powers meet,
- 7:39that is, all the great powers, that is,
- 7:41you know, I think the Arabs have this
- 7:43great expression. It's something along
- 7:44the lines that, you know, when elephants
- 7:46fight, grass get trampled, but,
- 7:49you know, when elephants make love, the
- 7:51grass also gets trampled. So it's always
- 7:53a concern by the smaller powers that
- 7:55when the great powers come together that
- 7:57they will somehow step on the interests
- 7:59and the security of the smaller powers.
- 8:01And
- 8:02um, but on the other hand,
- 8:04you do need to find a settlement between
- 8:06the great powers, otherwise the smaller
- 8:08will be used in a
- 8:10in a competition between them. So,
- 8:13but but nonetheless,
- 8:14especially if you follow the European
- 8:16coverage,
- 8:17this has been portrayed as another Yalta
- 8:20settlement.
- 8:21The Yalta, of course, this
- 8:22institutionalized great power rivalry
- 8:25with competing blocks and spheres of
- 8:27exclusive influence.
- 8:30And
- 8:31you know, in the unipolar moment,
- 8:33it it didn't only
- 8:35try to cement a global
- 8:39dominance and make the entire US
- 8:42the entire world the US sphere of
- 8:43influence.
- 8:45So, you know, this was seen
- 8:47by many, at least in Europe, as a way of
- 8:49moving away from the old Yalta system.
- 8:52But but of course, for the Chinese, the
- 8:55Russians and others, they don't want to
- 8:56go back to the unipolar moment either.
- 9:00However, if you compare it to Yalta
- 9:02though, how how do you conceptualize
- 9:04this
- 9:05I guess this new model for a multipolar
- 9:07system? Because you referred to it as
- 9:10the Shenzhen international system.
- 9:13And I guess how can such a system be
- 9:15organized and how would it differ from
- 9:18Yalta?
- 9:19>> Well,
- 9:20yes, I think there are a lot of a
- 9:22difference
- 9:23difference between Yalta system and the
- 9:25Shenzhen international system, if we can
- 9:27call it.
- 9:29Last month I write an
- 9:32article about the Shenzhen international
- 9:34system.
- 9:36Let me explain to you. I think the Yalta
- 9:38system
- 9:39was a framework
- 9:41through which the
- 9:43victorious powers of the post world
- 9:47second era
- 9:49delineated their perspective spheres of
- 9:53influence.
- 9:54Its underlying logic was predicated on
- 9:59the
- 10:00partitioning of influence and the
- 10:02formation of opposing blocks. And the
- 10:06notion that security is determined by
- 10:09great powers
- 10:11Within the later building there are
- 10:13surrounding region as buffer zones.
- 10:16While small nation were largely treated
- 10:19as a bargaining chips in the power games
- 10:22of major states.
- 10:25And and after the
- 10:28the the Cold War,
- 10:29I think the the unipolar moment
- 10:33established
- 10:35followed the Cold War
- 10:37pushing the its larger to it its extreme
- 10:41attempting to have
- 10:43single nation define the global order
- 10:46and
- 10:47utilizing the institution
- 10:50network of alliance and section to
- 10:54constrain other major power.
- 10:57So this is
- 10:59inception of Yalta international system.
- 11:02But how about the Shenzhen international
- 11:04system? I think the Shenzhen
- 11:06international system as I term it
- 11:08is neither a new post-war treaty
- 11:12nor an attempt to dismantle the United
- 11:16State United Nation in favor of
- 11:19replacement. Rather it is an involving
- 11:24paradigm for interaction among great
- 11:27powers. One that is currently being
- 11:30practiced and developed grounding in the
- 11:34objective reality that a multipolar
- 11:37world has already arrived.
- 11:40So I think there are three fundamental
- 11:41differences between the two.
- 11:45First
- 11:47they differ in their logical starting
- 11:51points.
- 11:52The Yalta system was rooted in the
- 11:56delineation of interest and a sphere of
- 11:59influence.
- 12:00The Shenzhen paradigm
- 12:01by contrast beginning by acknowledging
- 12:04the core interest of all nations while
- 12:07explicitly rejecting the logic of sphere
- 12:11of influence.
- 12:13While major power may
- 12:16safeguard their own security, they do
- 12:19not treat other sovereignty states as
- 12:22buffer zone or vessel.
- 12:24None do they permit the violation of
- 12:30another nation sovereignty under the
- 12:32guise of security. That's the first
- 12:34difference. Second difference, I think
- 12:36they differ in their operation model.
- 12:40The Yalta system was defined by
- 12:42block-based confrontation where one was
- 12:46either
- 12:47a friend or enemy.
- 12:49The Shenzhen paradigm
- 12:51accepts
- 12:53that competition may exist, but the
- 12:55confrontation is not inevitable.
- 12:58While intense
- 13:00rivalry may occur between major power,
- 13:03it does not compel other nation to take
- 13:06sides. Nor does it involve the creation
- 13:10of exclusive military blocks.
- 13:12Competition must have boundaries and
- 13:16conflict must be
- 13:19equip
- 13:20with breaking mechanism.
- 13:22That's the second
- 13:24differences. The third difference that I
- 13:26think they differed in their relation
- 13:29with the global South
- 13:31because under the Yalta and the unipolar
- 13:33system, small nations and the different
- 13:36developing country
- 13:38were largely perceptive recipients of
- 13:42arrangement made by the great powers.
- 13:44In Shenzhen paradigm, I think
- 13:46coordination among major power cannot
- 13:50bypass
- 13:51small or media size states.
- 13:54Dual stock between a great power cannot
- 13:58take procedures over the sovereignty and
- 14:02aspiration of the broad developing
- 14:04world.
- 14:05Communi- communication between the major
- 14:08powers is intended to reduce the great
- 14:12reduce the global risks of
- 14:15uh not to facilitate uh private carving
- 14:19up of the world among them.
- 14:21So I think uh how such a system might be
- 14:27uh constructed.
- 14:28It it is not something uh that can be
- 14:31achieved overnight through a single
- 14:33conference.
- 14:35I have some
- 14:37imagination. First, it is essential to
- 14:41establish the functional mechanism for
- 14:44crisis management among the major
- 14:45powers.
- 14:47Second, more importantly,
- 14:49uh to uh accumulate
- 14:52practical experience in cooperation on
- 14:55global public issues.
- 14:57Most
- 14:58importantly uh
- 15:00I think these uh
- 15:03must remain open to the entire world. It
- 15:07cannot become an exclusively closed
- 15:10circle, and it must be uh
- 15:13compatible with and complementary to the
- 15:17existing international system centered
- 15:19on the UN's rather than seeking to
- 15:22increase it.
- 15:26>> What do you describe though? It's often
- 15:28what what security architecture is
- 15:30supposed to look like? That is
- 15:33ideally you find that
- 15:35the main powers or all the powers are in
- 15:37the position to harmonize interests,
- 15:38that is to pursue these win-win
- 15:40solutions, but when it's possible of
- 15:42course, but when it's not possible
- 15:44to harmonize interests then at least how
- 15:47to manage competition, set the rules so
- 15:50there's
- 15:51restraint. And
- 15:53I think a challenge during the unipolar
- 15:54moment was that it was the hegemonic era
- 15:57was based on
- 15:59US alliance systems, but then
- 16:02diplomacy essentially meant that you sit
- 16:03in the room with people you already
- 16:05agree with, that is people from your own
- 16:06block and you put max pressure as a
- 16:10collective hegemony to pressure others
- 16:12to fall in line. So I think diplomacy
- 16:14died to some extent, at least it took on
- 16:16a different format. Was more about
- 16:20yeah, ultimatums and threats, I would
- 16:22say.
- 16:23However, now that we're moving away from
- 16:25it, it looks like the decision making
- 16:27will no longer be made between the US
- 16:29and its allies, but instead the US and
- 16:32the other rising great powers, so China
- 16:35and Russia.
- 16:37Again, the
- 16:40the main concern now is coming from
- 16:42countries in Europe and Japan.
- 16:47Did you think it
- 16:48could create risks of a new, you know,
- 16:50great power arrangement
- 16:52in which smaller countries have their
- 16:55security ignored because
- 16:57you know, often people point out that
- 16:58it's that will be in no one's interest
- 17:01because if countries like
- 17:02Japan feel very insecure, they might do
- 17:04something foolish that is beginning to
- 17:06militarize, pursue nuclear weapons. So
- 17:08there's a there's a
- 17:10common interest among the great powers
- 17:12that also
- 17:13even though decision making should shift
- 17:15a little bit, how diplomacy is done, one
- 17:18also has to take into account the
- 17:19smaller countries.
- 17:21>> Yeah, I think
- 17:23this concern is totally
- 17:26understood and understood. And also this
- 17:29concern is highly realistic.
- 17:32But I have to explain is that
- 17:35we must distinguish between the two
- 17:38entirely different scenarios.
- 17:41One involved
- 17:43great power making
- 17:45backroom deals
- 17:47privately deciding the fate of other
- 17:50nation and sacrificing the interest of a
- 17:53smaller state as you mentioned to reach
- 17:57compromises among themselves.
- 17:59So this is old style of power politics.
- 18:02We concerned about we worry about it.
- 18:06Also the Europe, Japan or the other
- 18:09nations of global sums, they concerned.
- 18:13But the problem is that
- 18:15the
- 18:16international system
- 18:18seek to discard such a older style
- 18:21politics power politics.
- 18:24And
- 18:25the other scenario I want to share with
- 18:28you is that
- 18:29it involves the greater power
- 18:31establishing a dialogue for risk
- 18:33management and control
- 18:35aimed at preventing war between them and
- 18:38ensuring that conflict does not spread
- 18:40globally
- 18:42without however making any decision or
- 18:44behavior of other countries.
- 18:46If these dialogue mechanism can
- 18:49established
- 18:50I think
- 18:51how to judge
- 18:53whether
- 18:54such a dialogue
- 18:56mechanism serve
- 18:58I think
- 19:01we can judge it
- 19:04by a few
- 19:06by a through a very important
- 19:09criteria.
- 19:10The first criteria is that regarding the
- 19:12agenda
- 19:14any major issue directly affecting the
- 19:17fate of nations in Europe, Japan or the
- 19:20other region cannot be centered behind
- 19:23the closed door by the United States,
- 19:25China or Russia alone.
- 19:27These parties concerned must have a
- 19:30fully right to participate and the
- 19:33meaningful meaningful voice.
- 19:36Because while while great power may
- 19:38exchange views and manage the fuel of of
- 19:42risks
- 19:43they have no men mandate mandate to
- 19:49over spam
- 19:50they are bound and dictate a political
- 19:53arrangement for other region.
- 19:56And the second point I want to say is
- 19:59that regarding the nature of mechanism
- 20:02it must remain functional dialogue
- 20:06folks on quiet communication and risk
- 20:09management. It cannot involved into an
- 20:12exclusive council that makes decision on
- 20:15global affairs. Furthermore the outcome
- 20:18of such a dialogue cannot be imposed
- 20:20upon third party. So this is a two very
- 20:24important bottom line. If we can uphold
- 20:27these two
- 20:28bottom lines, I think the regularized
- 20:32the dialogue among great power could
- 20:35serve as a
- 20:37stabilizer for a multipolar world.
- 20:41Conversely,
- 20:42should it devolve into background gear
- 20:46making, it would effectively revive the
- 20:49power politics of bygone era
- 20:53a development
- 20:54inevitable phase existence from small
- 20:57and medium sized nation worldwide.
- 21:00So,
- 21:01I think in the future
- 21:03how the Shenzhen international system
- 21:06maintain
- 21:07consequently
- 21:09such a mechanism must
- 21:12be subjective
- 21:14to the oversize of the international
- 21:17community. So, let just wait and see be
- 21:19a patience to observe how implement of
- 21:24Shenzhen international system.
- 21:27>> Well,
- 21:28it would then consist of
- 21:30all these main power great powers. We
- 21:32can say there's three great powers.
- 21:34Again, what the how are the great power
- 21:36can be
- 21:37defined differs, but
- 21:39but of those three powers the main the
- 21:42two largest powers would be China and
- 21:44United States and
- 21:47the the competition between the two.
- 21:49It's the underlying competition appears
- 21:51to be over technology, military power
- 21:55and global influence and again you can
- 21:58argue that it's so far been in the
- 21:59economic sphere, but it always threatens
- 22:01to spill into the military sphere. That
- 22:03is by trying to push for secession of
- 22:06Taiwan or even you see the rhetoric
- 22:08around
- 22:10about you know knocking out Iran or
- 22:12Russia that this could be used to weaken
- 22:14the Chinese. So, you know the the the
- 22:16competition is there, the military
- 22:18potential as well.
- 22:21I mean the do you think
- 22:24what we're now seeing this talks between
- 22:26the Chinese and Americans, does it have
- 22:28a potential for a
- 22:30new era which essentially breaks with
- 22:32this
- 22:33Cold War mentality of the past, or is
- 22:35this what we're seeing now, a temporary
- 22:37truce that is
- 22:39while, I guess each side regroups?
- 22:42>> Well, in my assessment, this is not
- 22:45merely a truce, as you mentioned. Nor
- 22:48does it
- 22:49signify that the underlying tension have
- 22:53been resolved.
- 22:55Cuz I think now the US-China
- 22:58relationship have entered a prolonged
- 23:02era characterized by limited competition
- 23:05and managed conflict.
- 23:08So you mentioned the truce, I think the
- 23:11term truce rooted in a context of war
- 23:16implies a path to gather strength for a
- 23:20next round of confrontation.
- 23:22Yet I think the current US-China rivalry
- 23:25involved two
- 23:27powers coexisting with a single
- 23:29integrated global system.
- 23:32The competition is a struggle,
- 23:35is a structural. The competition is
- 23:37structural, I think. The contest over
- 23:40the technology and
- 23:43strategy will not simply varnish, nor
- 23:48can they be a fully eliminated through a
- 23:51signal meeting.
- 23:53But the problem is that now both major
- 23:56power are increasingly recognizing a
- 23:58stark reality.
- 24:00The cost of the contemporary great power
- 24:02competition are prohibitively high,
- 24:05higher.
- 24:06Whether
- 24:08through a military conflict, total
- 24:11decoupling, or a complete technology
- 24:13blockade, there are no truly winners. So
- 24:17consequently, practical necessity
- 24:21combine a both side to contain their
- 24:24competition within a divided boundary,
- 24:28allowing, that is allowing rivalry to
- 24:31persist
- 24:33while establishing the red line to
- 24:35prevent slide into a direct conflict.
- 24:40So in short I think now the competition
- 24:43between the US and China has become an
- 24:46the new normal
- 24:48while conflict between the United States
- 24:51and China must be
- 24:55deeply managed. So this is not fleeting
- 25:00truth as you mentioned the truth but
- 25:02rather
- 25:03a new long-term model of coexistence
- 25:08that these
- 25:09major powers are compelled to adopt. So
- 25:14that's my new observation.
- 25:17>> Um
- 25:18we see that
- 25:19in this talks between Beijing and
- 25:21Washington that Beijing becomes more
- 25:25confident it seems. It's unclear whether
- 25:27or not this is a power growing or if
- 25:29it's just becoming
- 25:31you know in terms of being a better
- 25:33position to shape the relations with
- 25:35Washington or has it essentially been a
- 25:38learning curve that is
- 25:40how to handle Trump because
- 25:42Trump is
- 25:44well let's say well I guess an unusual
- 25:46style of leadership.
- 25:49Is this been
- 25:50has this been a big issue in Beijing how
- 25:53to handle Trump?
- 25:55>> Well
- 25:57I don't believe that any single side
- 25:59currently holds an absolute advantage
- 26:03that would allow it to
- 26:06unilaterally shape US and China
- 26:09relations.
- 26:10The trajectory of these bilateral
- 26:13relations is always the result of a
- 26:17two-way interaction. It is not something
- 26:19that one party can dictate and high on
- 26:22its own.
- 26:24Of course I agree you mentioned China is
- 26:26more proactively pragmatic stance today
- 26:30stance from uh its growing national
- 26:32strength
- 26:33as well as clear more sober
- 26:36understanding of the outside world.
- 26:39At the same time the US continues to
- 26:41possess this formidable military
- 26:44technological and alliance system
- 26:46providing it with a wider
- 26:48uh aerial of a tool of engagement.
- 26:52But I think the now the advantage are
- 26:56relative not absolute.
- 26:59In this bilateral relationship
- 27:01both sides hold their own
- 27:04backing
- 27:06ships while also facing their own
- 27:09respective constraints.
- 27:11Therefore it could be uh it it cannot be
- 27:15said that the China occupies
- 27:18uh unilaterally more favorable position.
- 27:22Uh as far you mentioned that how to deal
- 27:25with Donald Trump
- 27:26uh there's no a single universal
- 27:29formula that works once and for all.
- 27:34The Trump administration foreign policy
- 27:37is characterized by a high degree of
- 27:40pragmatism and a strong trans
- 27:43transactional nature.
- 27:45So for us I mean for China China
- 27:49approach
- 27:50uh folks on two key points.
- 27:53First
- 27:54to clearly and firmly uphold a China
- 27:56core interest maintaining a strict red
- 27:59line and refusing to make any
- 28:03concession on matter of principle
- 28:06regarding sovereignty and security. And
- 28:09second to engage in pragmatic
- 28:12communication in areas where interest
- 28:15converse isolating aspects that allow
- 28:18for cooperation or negotiation. So now
- 28:22we
- 28:23I think a master
- 28:25also be fully aware
- 28:28because
- 28:29we all know the the the the Milton
- 28:32election.
- 28:33So now the US diplomatic
- 28:37no, the US domestic politics deeply
- 28:41polarized. Even if an agreement is
- 28:44reached with the United States executive
- 28:46branch, it may still be constrained by
- 28:49the Congress or public opinion. So
- 28:52consequently, I think when dealing with
- 28:55the United States, one cannot focus
- 28:58solely on any single leaders. We must be
- 29:02prepared to navigate the both short-term
- 29:05in caption and long-term strategic
- 29:08games.
- 29:11>> Uh
- 29:13but
- 29:14we are again the the the key reason why
- 29:17they will be meeting though is because
- 29:18the
- 29:20the former hegemonic system is of course
- 29:22gone. The western dominated structures
- 29:24are all becoming well outdated and
- 29:27you kind of see similar debates having
- 29:30well is at least being intensified by by
- 29:33recent events that is in the Middle East
- 29:34we see the Gulf States now thinking how
- 29:37how the security architecture has to be
- 29:39reshaped because the US won't be there
- 29:41much in the future. We see in Europe
- 29:44they kind of recognizing well something
- 29:46similar but a bit reluctantly. Of course
- 29:48the similar talks in East Asia. I know
- 29:50the South Koreans were especially
- 29:52worried when the US started to pull out
- 29:54all of their air defenses. So
- 29:56um
- 29:57but
- 29:59in in in so the hegemony is gone.
- 30:02But many countries
- 30:04including in the global south there's
- 30:06many who are worried that if you replace
- 30:10one dominant power that is the United
- 30:11States with another one that you'll end
- 30:13up in a similar situation. Indeed you
- 30:16often see this comment from the
- 30:18Americans themselves that is
- 30:20the the concern that China will act as
- 30:24as another America, one that is aspiring
- 30:26for global primacy.
- 30:28How do you think that the Chinese how
- 30:30how do you think the Chinese could
- 30:32demonstrate
- 30:33that their vision of a multipolar world
- 30:36um
- 30:37is genuine as opposed to merely you
- 30:40know, deception to increase Beijing's
- 30:42power.
- 30:44>> Well, I think
- 30:45I don't know whether
- 30:47you remember
- 30:4950 years ago
- 30:51when Mr. Deng Xiaoping delivered a
- 30:54lecture in UN.
- 30:56I think the early of the 1970s
- 31:00he said China never to seek for a new
- 31:03hegemony.
- 31:04If China
- 31:06do that
- 31:07all the nation can
- 31:10oppose or reject
- 31:13China.
- 31:14So I think that's very obvious in the
- 31:16past half century China always continue
- 31:20the the rules, the principles
- 31:23that is reject
- 31:25the
- 31:26new hegemony.
- 31:28And also China never
- 31:31want to seek to replace American
- 31:33hegemony with a Chinese hegemony. So
- 31:36that's a very obvious and also
- 31:40no single nation
- 31:42in the future can act as the new
- 31:45hegemony.
- 31:46So that's very obvious. And second
- 31:48things I want to say is that
- 31:53in in the conduct of international
- 31:56affairs China
- 31:58will ensure
- 32:00that
- 32:01its own interest never placed
- 32:04above those of
- 32:06the other developing nations.
- 32:08And it must not pressure country within
- 32:11the global south to
- 32:13take sides between China and the United
- 32:16States.
- 32:17And the third point
- 32:18we have to admit that regardless reform
- 32:20of global governance
- 32:22China take concrete steps to shape
- 32:26governance authority and institutional
- 32:28power towards a broader community of
- 32:31developing nation. It includes reforming
- 32:35voting rights within IMF and World Bank
- 32:38advising the expansion of BRICS and
- 32:42ensuring that the developing country
- 32:44gained the greater say in the creation
- 32:46of international rules.
- 32:48So it's very obvious. Of course, I know
- 32:52it is it's revolt revolt by
- 32:56how say it's still
- 33:00the long and ongoing process to
- 33:03demonstration
- 33:05of kind of long-term strategy.
- 33:07But China always do that. So please
- 33:10trust China. In the past
- 33:12half century, China do the same
- 33:16strategy. So I I think in the coming
- 33:19half century, China will continue.
- 33:24>> But
- 33:25what is interesting is that there's
- 33:27three great powers. I mean, if
- 33:30India had
- 33:32you know, a different posture, you know,
- 33:34it could also of course enter these
- 33:35ranks. But if we identify three great
- 33:38powers, it is interesting that
- 33:40you know, the US has always had
- 33:42you know, the divide and rule strategy
- 33:44behind its hegemonic posture, which is,
- 33:46you know, turned the Chinese and the
- 33:48Soviets against each other back in the
- 33:50'70s and now of course try to
- 33:53create some wedge between the the
- 33:55Chinese and the Russians. And I was
- 33:57wondering, how do you see this? That is
- 33:59if
- 34:01if if the tensions now continue to grow
- 34:03between the Americans and the Russians,
- 34:05that is if Washington and Moscow have
- 34:08interest that continues to diverge.
- 34:11You also see this in the economic
- 34:12sphere. They don't have that many
- 34:13overlapping economic interests.
- 34:16But if they continue to diverge, how do
- 34:18you see
- 34:19Beijing possibly facing any difficult
- 34:21choices? I mean,
- 34:24so far the Russians and the Chinese have
- 34:26formed a very tight strategic
- 34:28partnership. But where where do you see
- 34:30the limits
- 34:31on this partnership?
- 34:33>> Well, I think now
- 34:36the reality of the great power rivalry
- 34:38does not mean that China must take
- 34:41sides.
- 34:42Uh now as we all know the China Russia
- 34:45comprehensive strategic partnership of
- 34:47coordination for a new era
- 34:51is fundamentally defined by the
- 34:53principle of non alignment, non
- 34:56confrontation and non targeting of three
- 34:58parties.
- 34:59So this principle established its
- 35:01essential
- 35:03boundaries.
- 35:04First,
- 35:05it is no
- 35:06China and Russia relationship
- 35:09is not a military alliance.
- 35:12We
- 35:13we will not enter into a military treaty
- 35:17with Russia.
- 35:18None will we commit to direct
- 35:21participation in any confrontation
- 35:24between major powers.
- 35:26While
- 35:27Russia
- 35:29China cooperation is rooted in
- 35:32shared interest, it does not entail an
- 35:35alignment of position on every
- 35:38international issue. We maintain an
- 35:40independent judgment on many matters.
- 35:44Second point I want to share is that
- 35:46China Russia partnership will not
- 35:48involve into a military block designed
- 35:51to confront the United States.
- 35:54China develops its strategic
- 35:57coordination with Russia while
- 35:59simultaneously maintaining channel for
- 36:02communication and dialogue with the
- 36:04United States.
- 36:05The two are not mutually exclusive.
- 36:09The objective of Chinese diplomacy is
- 36:12not to join forces with one side to
- 36:15defeat another.
- 36:17And more important I think we we we have
- 36:20to admit
- 36:22that nowadays
- 36:24the intensifying confront conflict
- 36:27the intensifying conflict
- 36:30between United States and Russia
- 36:32objectively
- 36:34complicates China external environment
- 36:37and create a pressure.
- 36:39However, this does not necessitate
- 36:43an either all choice.
- 36:45China's diplomatic logic involved
- 36:48addressing various bilateral
- 36:51relationship separately.
- 36:53Our relationship with Russia serves the
- 36:56interest of both China and Russia.
- 37:00While
- 37:01our relationship with the United States
- 37:03focus on the issues specifically to the
- 37:06China US
- 37:09relations. So I think that's a two
- 37:11separate issues we deal with one by one,
- 37:14right?
- 37:15So crucially I think there is an
- 37:18absolute bottle lies.
- 37:20All of China external cooperation must
- 37:24serve its own national sovereignty,
- 37:27security and development interest.
- 37:30No partnership
- 37:32with any country may compromise
- 37:36China's core interest.
- 37:39This serves as ultimate boundary for all
- 37:43of China foreign relations. So this I I
- 37:47I want to explain to everyone that is
- 37:51we need to
- 37:54use a new logic, new theoretical logic
- 37:58to observe
- 38:00the complicated trilateral relationship
- 38:04among China, US and Russia. [snorts]
- 38:09>> Yeah and all the I remember
- 38:11in
- 38:12well at least about 70 years ago there
- 38:14was a lot of literature
- 38:16in the West as well about more critical
- 38:18literature about the dangers of military
- 38:21blocks that is
- 38:22it necessitates counter reaction. So I
- 38:24think perhaps yeah this aversion towards
- 38:28military alliances has been a yeah
- 38:30positive aspect of China's foreign
- 38:32policy.
- 38:33Anyways
- 38:34Professor Wang thank you so much for
- 38:36your time. I appreciate it.
- 38:37>> Thank you. Thank you so much.
- 38:44>> Hello.
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