Vali 65 nghìn đô la và bàn tay CIA trong cái chết của Ngô Đình Diệm — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:05[Music]
- 0:10Hello everyone. Welcome to the Asian Chronicles program. In 1963,
- 0:16South Vietnam was in the midst of one of the most tense years of the
- 0:20Cold War. President Ngo Dinh Diem, once considered by Washington as the symbol
- 0:25of communism in Southeast Asia, was now facing a
- 0:29serious political crisis right in the heart of Saigon. And behind the scenes
- 0:33, a few individuals, both American and Vietnamese, were quietly deciding
- 0:39how much longer the regime could survive. Today's story doesn't begin
- 0:44at Independence Hall, nor at any high-level meeting. It begins
- 0:48in a small and incredibly unexpected place: a modest dental clinic
- 0:54in the heart of Saigon. Imagine this scene: A large man,
- 1:00the physique of a retired boxer, sits huddled in a cramped dental chair
- 1:05. A small tissue is draped around his neck, his mouth agape as if waiting for
- 1:11the dentist to examine his teeth. The screeching sound of a drill echoed somewhere in the next room
- 1:15. Everything seemed so ordinary it was boring. Like hundreds of
- 1:20other dental clinics in operation. At that same time in Saigon that midday, the
- 1:24men sitting in those chairs weren't experiencing any toothaches. He was a
- 1:28CIA officer. And in a few minutes, one of the most powerful generals of the
- 1:33South Vietnamese army would quietly enter through the back door to discuss something
- 1:38far greater than the room's capacity. It was the fate
- 1:42of an entire regime. The more cramped and ordinary the space,
- 1:46the more it reveals a thought-provoking truth: sometimes
- 1:51the history of an entire nation isn't written in grand rooms,
- 1:55but whispered in the most ordinary corners of everyday life
- 2:00. The man sitting in the dentist's chair that day was Lucian Conen, and
- 2:06his journey from an orphan in Paris to a figure present on that
- 2:11fateful night of the First Republic of Vietnam is the story we will
- 2:15explore
- 2:18in today's program.
- 2:22To understand why Lucian Conen was present at one of the most decisive moments
- 2:26in modern Vietnamese history, we need to go back as far as
- 2:31Paris in 1919, where he was born. His father died when
- 2:36he was young, and his mother sent him to live with his aunt in Kansas
- 2:42City, USA, when he was only five years old. Although he acquired American citizenship from then on, his French roots
- 2:47shaped his entire later life when World War II
- 2:51broke out. He joined the US Army. And thanks to his fluent French and understanding of
- 2:56French culture, he was recruited into the OSS, the predecessor of the C. In 1944,
- 3:04Conen jumped to occupied France, joining the
- 3:09Jetber Joint Special Forces to support the French resistance movement. It was there that he began
- 3:14a close relationship with the Cicon Brotherhood, an underground network of Cicons
- 3:19in France. They gave him the nickname Luigi. Nearly 20 years later, upon returning to Vietnam
- 3:24as a CIA liaison officer in 1962
- 3:30and 1963, he adopted a new codename, Black
- 3:35Luigi. According to his personal file, which is preserved in declassified documents
- 3:39related to the assassination of President Kennedy, Conen was physically
- 3:44large, had a deep voice, and a very distinctive feature: the
- 3:50missing joints of his right index and middle fingers. This is where
- 3:55Conen's true personality was most clearly revealed. According to an official CIA article published
- 4:00in the Internal Intelligence Research journal in 2019, Conen often hinted that
- 4:06his [musical] deformed hands were the remnants of some bloody mission
- 4:10in the past. But the truth, according to the same document, is
- 4:15far less romantic. He lost two fingers while repairing a car engine.
- 4:19This seemingly insignificant detail reveals something crucial about
- 4:24Kin's character: he always knew how to let others weave their own myths around
- 4:29him and how to use ambiguity as a weapon. Such a person, when
- 4:35stepping into the role of a secret liaison between Washington and the Saigon generals, would
- 4:39bring many things to this story that are not always clear.
- 4:43What few people know is that Kin arrived in Vietnam very early, as early as 1945.
- 4:51When he parachuted into North Vietnam to support the anti-Japanese [music] forces, which at the time
- 4:55included the Viet Minh. Nearly 20 years later, the same man who had fought alongside
- 5:00Ho Chi Minh's forces against the Japanese became a supporter
- 5:04of President Ngo Dinh Diem's power consolidation in the 1950s.
- 5:08And in 1963, he was involved in the very event that overthrew
- 5:13the president he had helped to establish. A lifetime spanning almost the entire
- 5:19lifespan of a political regime, playing different roles in each period. It's as if history
- 5:24sometimes borrows the same person to write completely opposite chapters
- 5:28. At this time, she should be a US Army lieutenant colonel and a
- 5:35CIA liaison officer in Saigon. He had known General Tran Van Don for 18 years
- 5:40, and it was this long-standing personal relationship, not any
- 5:45cold administrative directive, that would become the most important link between Washington and
- 5:50the South Vietnamese generals in the final months of
- 5:53Ngo Dinh Diem's regime. But before delving into her role, we
- 5:57need to understand why things came to this point, and it began with a
- 6:02religious crisis that erupted in the summer of 1963.
- 6:13On May 8, 1963, in Hue, an event banning the display of Buddhist flags
- 6:20on Buddha's birthday led to protests and bloodshed, resulting in
- 6:25fatalities. The direct cause of these deaths
- 6:29remains controversial among sources, with the Diem regime
- 6:33at the time claiming it was the result of a grenade attack by communist forces
- 6:38. While the Buddhist side and much of the Western press claimed that government forces
- 6:42directly opened fire and used armored vehicles to suppress the crowd
- 6:46, Professor Edward Miller, whom we will refer to later in this program,
- 6:52also noted in his research that the full truth of this event
- 6:57is difficult to establish absolutely solely from surviving documents. Whatever
- 7:02the cause, this event became the starting point for a crisis
- 7:05that lasted throughout the summer, seriously undermining the legitimacy of the
- 7:10Ngo Dinh Diem regime in the eyes of American diplomats and international public opinion. By
- 7:15the 21st of [the month], special forces under advisor Ngo Dinh Nhu
- 7:19imposed martial law and attacked temples throughout the country, including
- 7:24the Xa Loi Pagoda in Saigon. It was in this context of extreme tension that one of
- 7:29the most controversial documents of this entire period was born. On May 24,
- 7:341963, while many high-ranking officials in
- 7:39Washington were on their summer weekend, three State Department officials—Roger
- 7:45Hillsman, Harryman, and Michael Forestel—drafted
- 7:50a telegram to the new U.S. ambassador to Saigon, Henry Cabber Lodge.
- 7:56This telegram, later known as Cable 243, essentially stated that
- 8:02Washington would not oppose the overthrow of the Diem regime unless Ngo
- 8:06Dinh Nhu was removed from power. According to an analysis by the
- 8:10research project "The Divided House," published in May 2025 by the National Security Archive at
- 8:15George Washington University, this telegram
- 8:21was not the result of a carefully considered decision by the entire
- 8:25Kennedy administration. Researchers Arturo Uro Jimenez, Bakadi, and Luca
- 8:30Trenta argue that this was almost certainly an act of exploiting a leadership vacuum
- 8:35on a weekend when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and
- 8:41CIA Director John Mc were absent to offer direct counterarguments. By the 29th, General
- 8:48Maxwell Taylor began to express doubts about this course of action. But in Saigon, Ambassador
- 8:53L had already begun implementing steps that were difficult to reverse. There is something worth
- 8:58pondering here. A decision of such magnitude, one that could change the fate
- 9:02of an entire nation, was hastily drafted on a Saturday afternoon
- 9:07by a small group of officials taking advantage of the absence of those who could challenge
- 9:11them. Could this be evidence that even the machinery of a superpower
- 9:15doesn't always operate according to the cold, calculated
- 9:19, and perfect strategy many imagine, but sometimes contains the same fragility
- 9:24and randomness as any other human-run organization
- 9:27? And what is even more noteworthy is that this [musical] event itself reveals a
- 9:32What many overlooked was that the US government at the time was not united
- 9:37in its view of Vietnam. This division would become increasingly apparent
- 9:41in the following weeks, especially within the
- 9:45Central Intelligence Agency.
- 9:51Early on the morning of October 0, 1963, the top CIA leadership gathered
- 9:57in Director John McCon's office to discuss the escalating crisis
- 10:02in Saigon. According to declassified documents released by the
- 10:06National Security Archive, McCon issued a very clear directive to his associates
- 10:11. The exact wording of this directive, recorded in the meeting minutes, stated that
- 10:16under no circumstances should the agency become involved in the assassination
- 10:20or other extremely sensitive matters concerning the US ambassador in Saigon. This directive revealed
- 10:25the CIA director's deep concern about the behavior of Ambassador Henry
- 10:30Cber Lodge, whom he considered imprudent in maintaining secrecy.
- 10:34Another figure within the CIA apparatus also held a cautious stance: William
- 10:39Colby, then head of the agency's Far East bureau. According to Colby's memoir, *
- 10:44Men of Honor*, published in 1978,
- 10:51he opposed overthrowing the Diem regime for fear that it would disrupt
- 10:56the strategic hamlet system and the rural pacification network being built to
- 11:00counter communist forces. On the opposing side, Ambassador Henry Cavet Lodge and a group of
- 11:06State Department officials who supported the coup believed that the Ngo family's leadership
- 11:11had become an insurmountable political obstacle. Particularly in the eyes of
- 11:14Western media and some commentators, including the research group of the Dividing House project
- 11:19, Lodge acted somewhat independently of
- 11:24official directives from Washington, sometimes withholding or filtering information sent to the Central Committee
- 11:29to advance his own agenda. It is important to emphasize here
- 11:33that this was not a conflict between the United States and Vietnam, but a profound conflict
- 11:37between American individuals themselves, between Mon and Kobe on one side
- 11:42and Lodge and the Hillsman group on the other, President Kennedy. [music]
- 11:47Throughout this period, the constant oscillation between these two viewpoints led to an
- 11:52inconsistent policy; it could be said that for many weeks of
- 11:57that fall, the fate of South Vietnam did not rest in the hands of a
- 12:01single strategist in Washington, but was tossed back and forth between several individuals with
- 12:06nearly equal power but pursuing different goals. And it was
- 12:10in this gap of inconsistency that Lin Cornin became the one
- 12:14directly conveying conflicting messages to the Vietnamese side. Sometimes
- 12:19even he himself was not entirely sure which message truly
- 12:23reflected Washington's ultimate will.
- 12:32Returning to the opening scene of today's program, in late October 1963,
- 12:39to avoid being monitored, General Tran Van Don and Lucien Conin chose
- 12:44that very dental clinic as their regular meeting place. According to Conin's own account, in an
- 12:49interview with American public television in 1981,
- 12:54the procedure was as follows: General Don would arrive first, then she would sit in
- 13:00the dentist's chair, draped a scarf around her neck, and open her mouth so that if anything happened, he could
- 13:05say he was just having dental treatment. When the conversation ended,
- 13:09General Don would quietly leave through the back door. Try to imagine the feeling of
- 13:14those two men. One sitting motionless with dental instruments dangling in front of him.
- 13:18The other standing pressed against the wall, whispering together about whether
- 13:23or not to overthrow a president. While the sound of the dental drill continued its steady whirring in
- 13:27the next room, like a detached background music for a decision that would
- 13:31change an entire country, General Tran Van Don, in the same series of interviews
- 13:35, confirmed this detail and added something that made the story
- 13:40much more complicated. He recounted that while she repeatedly hinted
- 13:44that the US agreed to the change of government, just a few days earlier,
- 13:49on the evening of October 22nd, General Paul Harkins, commander of
- 13:55US military forces in Vietnam, had told him at a dinner that he completely opposed
- 14:00a coup and saw no reason to remove President Diem.
- 14:05Don admitted that, caught between two conflicting streams of information from two
- 14:08different Americans, he and his colleagues were confused about
- 14:13Washington's true position. And perhaps that was precisely the most difficult position
- 14:18any ally of a superpower has ever faced: trying
- 14:22to guess which of the many voices emanating from the same government
- 14:27was the final one. Declassified CIA telegrams,
- 14:31stored in the US foreign relations archives from 1961
- 14:37to 1963, show that the contacts between Coen and the group of generals were very cautious
- 14:44and tightly controlled by the embassy, not
- 14:49spontaneous actions on her own. A meeting at Tan Son Nhat airport
- 14:53on October 1st and another meeting in Nha Trang shortly afterward were both recorded.
- 14:59Details in the telegrams sent to Washington show that every step was
- 15:04reported and approved. Finally, at that very dental clinic, she confirmed
- 15:09to the general what the group of generals were waiting for: that the
- 15:13US military would not provide aid to help the Diem regime suppress a coup, and
- 15:17that US aid would continue if a new government came to power. With
- 15:22this confirmation, the plan was effectively approved, but for a coup
- 15:27to run smoothly, another very practical element was needed:
- 15:32money.
- 15:40On the morning of November 1, 1963, the coup officially broke out. Lucien Conin
- 15:48was present at the headquarters of the General Staff of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces carrying a
- 15:53.357 Magnum revolver, a private radio communication device to report directly
- 15:58to the embassy, and a significant amount of cash. This is one of the
- 16:03most controversial details of the entire event and where we need to be
- 16:07particularly cautious when presenting the figures. According to a CIA Inspector General report
- 16:11completed on May 31, 1967, and fully declassified in
- 16:192024, she gave General Tran Van Don approximately $65,000 in
- 16:27two installments: one on May 11 and another on the day of the coup,
- 16:31with the aim of persuading hesitant military units to side with the
- 16:35coup. However, the exact figure is not entirely consistent among sources.
- 16:40Lucien C, testifying before a US Senate committee in 1975
- 16:47, gave a different figure of nearly $70,000, equivalent to 3 million
- 16:53South Vietnamese Dong at the time. Other sources, based on the official exchange rate at
- 16:57the time, gave a lower figure of only about $42,000. The discrepancies
- 17:04in the figures, even within the testimonies of those involved, reveal
- 17:08an interesting fact: even a top-tier intelligence agency
- 17:13like the CIA cannot maintain absolute consistency when
- 17:18accounting for its own secret transactions. Another
- 17:23noteworthy document is a memorandum drafted by General Tran Van Don in
- 17:291971. In it, he attempts to clarify the distribution
- 17:32of this 3 million dong. According to the memorandum, approximately 1,500,000 dong
- 17:37was distributed with receipts to specific commanding units. The remaining 1,500,000 dong
- 17:43was distributed without receipts, with the stated reason being to purchase food for
- 17:48soldiers and provide death benefits for the families of soldiers killed in the coup
- 17:52. This presents a paradox worth considering.
- 17:58Generals preparing to overthrow a government facing the death penalty if
- 18:02they failed still meticulously recorded receipts for every expenditure. Does
- 18:06this show that even in the most audacious and dangerous moments of a
- 18:11coup, accounting and bookkeeping never disappear? A coup,
- 18:17after all, is perhaps not only driven by political ideals or
- 18:22loyalty, but also by a machine requiring vast sums of money to maintain, where every
- 18:26penny must be allocated to buy the loyalty of subordinates and to provide for
- 18:30the funerals of soldiers who will never return. To this day,
- 18:35some observers still question whether all that unrecorded money
- 18:40was actually used for its intended purpose. But this is
- 18:45a question that the existing documentation cannot definitively answer. And they
- 18:49I leave this question open to you. Militarily, the coup unfolded
- 18:55quite rapidly. Forces still loyal to President Diem were quickly
- 18:59neutralized or forced to surrender. But what was not
- 19:04explicitly stated in any prior planning document was the specific fate awaiting President
- 19:09Diem and his brother, advisor Ngo Dinh Nhu.
- 19:16On November 0, 1963, after declaring their surrender, President
- 19:18Ngo
- 19:26Dinh Diem and advisor Ngo Dinh Nhu were assassinated in the armored prisoner transport vehicle
- 19:30while being escorted to the General Staff headquarters. To this day, no
- 19:36official record has been published clearly confirming who
- 19:39directly ordered their assassination. A 1967 CIA Inspector General report
- 19:46stated that an unnamed regimental-level officer of the South Vietnamese Army
- 19:50provided the CIA with images
- 19:55of the two brothers' bodies and said that most generals had leaned toward execution
- 19:59rather than sparing their lives. Meanwhile, General Tran Van Don, in
- 20:04his memoirs, denied any formal vote among the generals
- 20:08to decide the fate of the Ngo brothers, blaming it on
- 20:13the group's general indecisiveness. This information gap itself raises a question
- 20:18that many political upheavals around the world have also encountered: why
- 20:23do the most crucial life-or-death decisions often leave no clear written record
- 20:27, and where is the line between legitimate caution on the part of those involved
- 20:30? With part of the truth
- 20:35about the historical significance and responsibility of this entire event potentially never fully known ,
- 20:40international academics still hold differing viewpoints, which we present in turn
- 20:44for your consideration. Professor Edward Miller of Dartmouth University, author
- 20:51of the book *The Wrong Alliance* published by Harvard University Press in
- 20:562013, argues that the popular image of Diem as a puppet completely
- 21:01controlled by the US is inaccurate. According to Miller, Diem possessed a
- 21:05distinct vision for nation-building, and the collapse of the First Republic was the result
- 21:10of a tragedy where two partners in the same alliance could not reconcile
- 21:14their strategic visions. From a different perspective, Dr. Mark Moya of
- 21:20the U.S. Marine Corps University, author of *The Lost Victory*, argues
- 21:24that the Kennedy administration made a grave strategic mistake
- 21:28. Relying on pressure from the media and a group of liberal officials
- 21:32at the State Department led to the removal of a
- 21:36highly effective anti-communist ally and plunged South Vietnam into years of political instability.
- 21:42Twenty days later, on November 22, 1963,
- 21:50President John Kennedy himself was assassinated in Dallas, Texas,
- 21:56closing a tumultuous chapter in history and leaving behind
- 22:00many unanswered questions. And viewed
- 22:04within the broader context of the Cold War, the 1963 Saigon events
- 22:11carried another significant meaning. Beyond the fate of South Vietnam itself, it showed
- 22:15other US allies around the world the stark reality
- 22:20that even a regime once considered a close partner could be dismantled
- 22:26in weeks if Washington's strategic trajectory shifted. This is not
- 22:30a definitive conclusion based solely on existing documents, but it
- 22:35is a question that many international relations researchers continue
- 22:38to ask when looking back at this period.
- 22:47Following the 1963 events,
- 22:51Luen Conen was awarded the CIA Intelligence Medal for
- 22:56his role as a liaison. However, according to his own accounts in later interviews,
- 23:00his presence on that fateful night became something he rarely
- 23:04spoke about. In an interview with NBC News
- 23:08in 1971, Conen recounted that when the generals hesitated
- 23:14in their actions, he urged them on with a phrase
- 23:20often quoted later: once you've started, you must continue. If you hesitate
- 23:26, you will die. She herself should have always described her role as such afterwards.
- 23:33I, merely a messenger of diplomatic directives, had no right
- 23:37to interfere more deeply in the life-or-death decisions of the Vietnamese side. That is
- 23:42perhaps also how many people who have stood in a neutral position
- 23:46in history perceive themselves. Like neutral tools of a
- 23:50larger machine, even though in reality, it is their hands that
- 23:55transform abstract, distant decisions into concrete, irreversible ones. In
- 24:011968, she should have left the CEA. By 1973,
- 24:08he was appointed to head a special operations branch of the US Drug Enforcement Agency
- 24:12before retiring in 1984.
- 24:17He died in 1998 in Maryland, USA, and was buried
- 24:24at Arlington National Cemetery. If there's one image that lingers after all
- 24:29the declassified documents, inconsistent figures, and
- 24:33conflicting academic viewpoints we've just gone through, it's probably that of a man
- 24:37sitting silently in a dentist's chair, mouth agape, pretending nothing
- 24:42is happening. Meanwhile, outside the door, an entire nation is quietly drifting
- 24:47toward an irreversible turning point. Lucien Conen lived a
- 24:51long life, from an orphan boy in Paris to a paratrooper in occupied France,
- 24:56to a soldier who shook hands with the very people he would later
- 25:00confront, and finally to a man in the room where
- 25:05the fates of two people and a part of a nation were decided.
- 25:10He carried the codename Black Luigi throughout those years. But perhaps the name
- 25:14truly associated with him in the memories of Vietnamese people who lived through
- 25:17that period is not an intelligence codename, but the image of a foreigner
- 25:21who was present almost by chance, at the very moment when Vietnamese history
- 25:26took a different turn. Sixty years have passed, and those who sat in
- 25:31that small dental clinic and those who stood in the General Staff Headquarters
- 25:36on the morning of October 1st of that year are now all gone. They carry
- 25:42with them answers that perhaps no declassified document can replace
- 25:46. Answers to the question of whether, at that decisive moment, they acted for
- 25:51what they believed was best for their country: because of pressure from a stronger ally, or
- 25:56simply because they had no other choice in the swift current of the times
- 26:00. Those who arrived later were left with only yellowed files,
- 26:05faded tapes of room recordings, and an unanswered question
- 26:09: when the fate of a nation can be whispered in
- 26:13such a small, insignificant room, where does the real boundary lie between the
- 26:17destiny of a people and the petty, human calculations of individuals
- 26:22who happen to be in the right place at the right time? See you again in the
- 26:26next broadcast of Asia Chronicle. [music]
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