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Unethical Decisions - The Causes of the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster Roger Boisjoly — Transcript

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0:45I'm eating I don't know whether this is
0:49because professor black shares lunches
0:52are you a little longer than usual this
0:53quarter but we'll be starting from 335
0:57from now on the questions related to
1:03ethics are being raised in a number of
1:06arenas today in education we see this in
1:09the proposal for the liberal education
1:13of the University of Minnesota where
1:15there are strong recommendations for
1:17courses and ethics we see this in the
1:19requirements of the Accreditation Board
1:21for Engineering and Technology where is
1:24a strong push for engineering ethics
1:28courses for engineers and it's fine to
1:32do this in what we sometimes call an
1:34academic manner in terms of reading
1:36about ethical problems and ethical
1:38issues and and decisions made on ethics
1:41and either from a textbook or from a
1:43faculty member but today we'll have a
1:45living example of an issue in
1:48engineering ethics and the person that
1:50played a key role in in in a very
1:53important manner it's been said that the
1:56engineering advances often as a result
1:59of failures that we learn from the
2:02analysis of failures of systems what one
2:05might do in the future and what one must
2:08do in the future and that's fine and and
2:11there's a certain more than grain of
2:13truth to that perhaps but one thing is
2:15to learn from failures that one could
2:17not predict before the failure occurred
2:19it's another thing when people were
2:21predicting a particular failure and then
2:23it occurs and and that latter issue is
2:25the one which we'll hear about today and
2:27it's truly a an ethical issue which will
2:30go down in the history of engineering in
2:32the history of the u.s. the failure that
2:35led to the disaster of the of the space
2:39shuttle Challenger is one that was well
2:40known to everybody here today it's an
2:44issue that raised problems related to
2:47engineering decisions versus what were
2:49called some extent management decisions
2:51brings rise to questions of the need for
2:54having technical leadership at
2:57proper levels and industry and that
2:59technical leadership making decisions on
3:01technical grounds as well the speaker
3:04today is one who has been called with
3:07the good reason a whistleblower and has
3:12suffered all of the the bad as well as
3:15some of the good that occurs to
3:17whistleblowers as you'll hear about
3:19today I think it's a rare opportunity
3:21for us to hear the firsthand about the
3:24key issues related not only to what has
3:28become a very tragic incident but also
3:30key issues related to what engineers
3:32must do and consider when practicing in
3:36industry Roger Beaujolais is a graduate
3:39of what is now the University of Lowell
3:42he received an engineering degree there
3:43in 1960 he worked for a number of
3:47companies generally related to aerospace
3:51industry from July 1980 he started to
3:56work for Morton Thiokol in Utah he
3:59worked there through of course the
4:00incident on the Challenger which was in
4:02January 86 and left the company later on
4:06in 1986 he's been giving lectures at
4:09some other educational institutions I
4:12heard him a few years ago speak at the
4:14American Society of Mechanical Engineers
4:15meeting I'm sure you'll all be impressed
4:18with the knowledge he'll in part today
4:21and the sincerity in which he'll deliver
4:23mr. Poli
4:38oh I can come on lightboxes off there we
4:52go okay good afternoon what I'm going to
4:57do is define to you the circumstances
5:00leading to the challenge of disaster and
5:02give you a factual chronology of what
5:05happened that led to the decision-making
5:08process before I start I'd like to give
5:11you somewhat of a familiar familiar
5:14ization process here well looking at
5:16here is that what we call the stack on
5:17the shuttle the solid rocket boosters
5:19the external tank and the orbiter itself
5:21and I'm going to be primarily focusing
5:26on the solid rocket booster phase the
5:30booster is actually made up of four
5:32segments that are transported to Cape
5:34Canaveral and assembled ready for launch
5:36we're looking at the forward section
5:39forward Center the App Center in the aft
5:43section containing the nozzle itself the
5:45reason I show you this is because I want
5:47to point out a full booster and show you
5:48this is the joint that failed and this
5:51is the configuration of that particular
5:53joint I have a full-size set of pictures
5:56of that in the moment another joint that
5:58I will be discussing is part of the
6:00escalation of the problem is this nozzle
6:02joint that looks like so and again I
6:04have a full-size graph of that that I
6:06want to show you what really started
6:12with like what the concerns was the fact
6:16that when we assemble this this filled
6:19joint you can see we have vacuum putty
6:23located between the two interfaces on
6:26either side of this joint the joint is
6:28configured with a clevis and a tang the
6:32tank fits into the clevis with two
6:33o-rings we refer to the first o-ring
6:36that the hot gas had the potential of
6:38reaching through this path right here as
6:40their primary or ring seal and then the
6:43redundant secondary seal behind it was
6:46the flight rate man rating of this
6:50basically this was our backup seals
6:52should anything ever occur in hot gas
6:54get past this primary seal now the gas
6:57that this system was to protect against
6:59was approximately 5700 degrees
7:01Fahrenheit and it was never intended to
7:03have any holes in this party it was
7:05never intended for this gas to ever come
7:07down and penetrate and even reach a seal
7:09but unfortunately the mechanism of
7:12assembly caused and trapped air to occur
7:14and occasionally and quite frequently in
7:17fact we'd get bore holes in this putty
7:19which would then provide a path during
7:22ignition for the hot gas to come down
7:23and attack the o-ring seals just to show
7:27you well I guess not on a more vivid
7:29detail I had a full scale model here but
7:31I think I will forego that the joints
7:34were actually put together like I said
7:36Tang in clevis and pinned in a hundred
7:39and seventy seven locations these pens
7:41one inch diameter actually carried the
7:43structural load as the internal pressure
7:45was generated as you can see here this
7:48is a propellant outline and there's
7:50actually a hole down the centerline of
7:52the motor so large in fact that you
7:54could actually stoop down and walk down
7:55the full length of this motor these
7:57components were twelve foot in diameter
7:59and contained 1.1 million pounds of
8:03propellant when they were fully
8:04assembled ready for flight at the Cape
8:06the problem really started to escalate
8:09in January of 1985 in January of 1985 I
8:13was at the Cape and when the boosters
8:16were recovered for reuse and
8:18refurbishment and disassembled at the
8:21Cape I inspected them and I found two
8:23failed joints of the character that I
8:25just showed you had massive leaks in
8:27them we had compromised the primary seal
8:30and two filled joints in fact they were
8:32compromised so bad that in one joint
8:34we actually had eighty degrees of
8:37blackened grease between these two seals
8:39which indicated the products of
8:40combustion had actually blown by this
8:42first primary seal and fortunately were
8:45actually stopped by the secondary seal
8:47one joint had 80 degrees arc length and
8:49the other joint had 110 degrees arc
8:51length was postulated after this launch
8:53that these seals had a temperature of 53
8:55degrees Fahrenheit well in by March
8:58early late March late February early
9:02March of 1985
9:03I had brought this information back and
9:06one of my colleagues former supervisor
9:08in fact had devised what we referred to
9:09as a resiliency test to actually test
9:12the capability of these seals to perform
9:14in an environment that we had not
9:17previously tested for namely alloy the
9:19normal launch temperature we found out
9:22for these pulmonary Orange resiliency
9:24tests that we were in severe problem
9:28area at 50 degrees Fahrenheit the seals
9:31had a distinct problem with them at that
9:33temperature we presented this
9:35information to engineering management if
9:37I call but they felt it was just too
9:39sensitive to release to anybody and so
9:41they just kept it secret the only people
9:44that really know about it was the
9:45individuals who had actually worked and
9:47knew about the tests and and were privy
9:49to the results well and I will I will
9:53give you this data later on in the
9:55presentation so you know precisely what
9:57the data encompassed in June of 1985 the
10:01problem escalated once again we opened
10:05up a a nozzle joint this time and the
10:09nozzle joint is made up of a joint that
10:11looks like so this is what we call the
10:14nozzle fixed housing and a nozzle cone
10:17actually lays across the exit like so
10:19and so what we have here is a piece of
10:23metal that supports the gimballed nozzle
10:26that actually is attached to the F
10:27closure dome and the metal parts are
10:30heavily insulated because of the
10:32turbulence of the gas in this area and
10:34again we find a gap between the
10:36insulation which was filled with vacuum
10:37putty again the primary seal would be in
10:40this location the first seal designated
10:42as the primary is that is the seal that
10:44would first be attacked by hot gas
10:46should it ever occur now in this joint
10:48we have a different characteristic in
10:50that we have a very very safe secondary
10:52seal which is a face seal around the
10:55corner it's actually squeezed between
10:56two massive pieces of metal this
10:58represents almost the full-scale
11:00cross-section of what we're looking at
11:01we have a hundred one in an eighth inch
11:03diameter bolts that actually clamp this
11:05face together
11:06now what I'm about to show you when we
11:09is what we found when we opened up this
11:11joint in June of 1985 from an actual
11:15flight that occurred in April
11:17this particular segment was actually
11:18sent back to psych all in Utah with the
11:21nozzle intact on this particular
11:23assembly and we just assembled it at
11:25Utah cause it was much easier to do it
11:27that way back at our plant now what I'm
11:29about to show you is the condition of
11:31the seal that actually came out of that
11:34joint and I'd like to point out to
11:36people this is not a cartoon this is an
11:39actual photographic cross-sections of
11:42the seal that will remove from that
11:43joint and as you can see the seal had
11:46three heat-affected notches in it from
11:48the hot gas each of these cross-section
11:51refers to a notch as shown in the plan
11:54view now what we're looking at side view
11:56what we're looking at here is this
11:58highlighted the dark highlighted outline
12:00is the amount of seal material that
12:02remained as opposed to the round
12:05circular cross-section that should have
12:06been there and if you look at this worse
12:08cross-section I would estimate that
12:11somewhere between 75 and 80 percent of
12:12the cross section has been vaporized by
12:14the hot gas we postulated that this
12:17cross section in this seal had never
12:20sealed for the full two minutes of
12:22booster flight and so we really had a
12:25brand-new ballgame here because if
12:27whatever happened to this joint and we
12:30come up with several postulations as to
12:32what it might have been but after all we
12:34don't have crystal balls but whatever
12:36happened to this joint if it should
12:37happen to a filled joint then all bets
12:39are off because the filled joint might
12:41fail because both of those seals bore
12:43seals on the same surface and it's not
12:46difficult to predict that whatever
12:48happened to one could happen to the next
12:50one in line now at the same time this
12:52was going on in this joint
12:53the secondary seal around the corner
12:55that very safe seal that I spoke to you
12:57about was also eroded 30 mm of an inch
13:01and so we really had a new problem on
13:05our hands and another miss Ann Ennis
13:08well this was so serious that for the
13:11next flight right in this review we had
13:14to go down and present a complete status
13:19of all the booster seals on the shuttle
13:21program to NASA at the Marshall Space
13:22Flight Center so we did this and because
13:25of the seriousness of this what we just
13:27found on this seal it was decided
13:30engineering management that they would
13:31now release the information that they
13:33had been keeping secret up to this time
13:34and they presented that information to
13:37NASA now everybody on the program knew
13:39about the seriousness of these seals and
13:42they're serious functional capabilities
13:45at 53 degrees Fahrenheit actually at 50
13:47because that was the whole limit we
13:49tested well as you can imagine I waited
13:52for some action to take place and I
13:53waited two four weeks and virtually
13:56nothing was done they had formed an
13:58unofficial task force team but virtually
14:00nothing was being done after two weeks
14:03of frustration with this activity I
14:05wrote a memo on a 31st of July 1985 to
14:10the vice president of engineering at
14:11Morton Thiokol and I'd like to give you
14:13a sense of that memo in quote one
14:16paragraph the memo ended by saying quote
14:19it is my honest and very real fear that
14:21if we do not take immediate action to
14:24dedicate a team to solve the problem
14:26with the field joints having a
14:27number-one priority then we stand in
14:29jeopardy of losing a flight along with
14:32all the launchpad facilities I also
14:34mentioned in that memo that we were
14:37going to experience a failure the
14:38highest order loss of human life on
14:41August 15th a seal task force team was
14:44officially formed I believe is the
14:46direct result of that memo although no
14:48one ever talked to me about that memo
14:51the Vice President engineering never
14:53wrote me a memo back or never talked to
14:55me about the contents of that memo but
14:57he published a memo officially forming
14:59this team which had five of us
15:02designated as full-time members out of
15:05approximately 2,500 people working on
15:06the program not all of whom were
15:08engineers of course unfortunately for us
15:10they were assigned to this team we
15:12received virtually no management support
15:14whatsoever the major production program
15:17dominated all available resources as we
15:20struggle to get changes tested and
15:25implemented in the program itself well
15:28on August 19th NASA headquarters was
15:30getting a little antsy so they asked for
15:31presentation from Morton Thiokol again
15:33on the status of the booster seals on
15:35the shuttle program and that's the
15:38management was assured by thiokol senior
15:40people that it was safe to continue fine
15:43well January 27th was the concluding
15:45major event that was in front of us
15:49prior to the challenge of disaster on
15:51that day we got a rather benign
15:52telephone call asking if we were
15:55concerned about the predicted overnight
15:56temperature low of 18 degrees Fahrenheit
15:59and of course being the only technical
16:02person that had seen the joints
16:03disassembled via before I bought went
16:05into orbit without any booster assist at
16:07all and very very concerned along with
16:09my colleagues we mustered up a group of
16:12engineers that were extremely concerned
16:13with what we were faced with we
16:16convinced thiokol engineering management
16:18and also the business side of the house
16:19on my dad that day that it was not safe
16:22to launch under these conditions based
16:24on our previous years experience and the
16:26experience during the year in the
16:28escalation of the problem we were asked
16:30by and we transmitted this informally to
16:33the Marshall Space Flight Center NASA
16:34Massa Marshall Space Flight Center we
16:36were asked to give a formal presentation
16:38that evening to express our concerns so
16:40a formal talk on was convened and we
16:43were at Morton Thiokol in Utah where we
16:46were gathered there were 14 of us there
16:49were a group at the Kennedy Space Center
16:50and then there was a group at the
16:52Marshall Space Flight Center which was a
16:54technical branch that had oversight for
16:55the shuttle solid rocket boosters
16:57we started our presentation and what I'd
17:00like to show you is a sampling or the
17:03view graphs that we presented that night
17:04and I'd like to point out to people that
17:07we had precisely about 45 minutes to
17:09present prepare this formal presentation
17:12and we as individuals went to our own
17:14offices and prepared prepared these view
17:16graphs and none of us knew what the
17:19other people were presenting except we
17:21saw it in real time but I hope that you
17:24understand after you see them that what
17:25we presented was enough information from
17:27an engineering standpoint to stop the
17:29flight what this was was a sheet in a
17:32cartoon that I had torn right out of an
17:34October 85 presentation to SAE that I
17:37gave to 130 technical experts in this
17:39nation concerning the sales in this
17:41joint in how they operate as I solicited
17:43help from their expert opinions so I had
17:47this at my fingertips so I included this
17:49I thought this would be another neat way
17:51to drive the point home once again what
17:53the problem was
17:54if you look at this top view with this
17:56centerline of the segment being here
17:58relative to this piece here you'll find
18:00that everything is as it should be when
18:03it's assembled you see how the o-rings
18:04are touching both sides of the surfaces
18:06that's how or ings are really supposed
18:08to work but you'll find in in the
18:11pressurized view down below with the
18:14same criteria this is the centerline
18:15relative to this view that as pressure
18:18is applied to this cylinder in the walls
18:20actually bulge out radially the joint
18:23doesn't deflect quite as far because it
18:25has a largest stiffness well the effect
18:27of that differential deflection is to
18:29cause this inboard clevis leg to deflect
18:32in towards the centerline of the motor
18:33at the same time that the Tang is
18:35deflecting outboard with the resulting
18:37effect that this gap opens tremendously
18:39on the order of 42 to 60 thousandths of
18:43an inch the 42 thousandths of an inch is
18:45a measured maximum number conducted in
18:4712 tests with hydraulic oil as we had
18:50measured over the period of time this is
18:52my best estimate of 60,000 switch may be
18:55a practical upper limit since we had
18:57only run 12 tests and I wasn't about to
18:59stand up and say that we had screened
19:01out the maximum at that point in time
19:02and so this was my best estimate now
19:05when I presented this to seal experts in
19:07San Diego at sae nobody said a word and
19:11I know why they didn't say a word
19:12because these are more than an order of
19:13magnitude beyond the accepted industrial
19:16standards for the uses of o-ring design
19:18these should be on the order of a
19:20thousand so it's two thousandths of an
19:22inch
19:23and we're talking 42 to 60 thousandths
19:25of an inch in a pressurized condition
19:27with an o-ring of that size now the
19:29problem is exacerbated even further
19:32because you'll see that the secondary
19:34o-ring has lifted off its seal see
19:37that's the problem with this joint when
19:40the joint opens that much this small
19:42diameter seal with with the 20,000th
19:44minimum squeeze on it does not have the
19:47margin to allow it to stay seated on its
19:50mating surface and so this is a
19:52misapplication of o-ring technology and
19:55if you want to look at what happened to
19:56challenge it just picture both o-ring
19:58seals looking like the secondary seal
20:01position both o-rings will lift it off
20:03in hot gas won't roaring by eating the
20:05seals that will lift
20:06off alive as it went out the case
20:08continued a slow leak until it reached
20:10about 50 seconds then it started to flow
20:12more rapidly and the trace on the
20:14pressure transducer at the head end
20:16showed the the the pressure drop falling
20:18at the same time the hole was growing at
20:2073 seconds the hole is analytically
20:23predicted to be about 25 inches in
20:25diameter when they found the pieces it
20:27was about 25 inches in diameter I had
20:32also taken this right out of the August
20:3519th presentation though
20:36NASA headquarters I had prepared this
20:38chart for that presentation although I
20:40didn't present it at that time you can
20:42see way back in August my primary
20:45concern was at the field units that had
20:47the highest concern the erosion
20:49penetration of the primary si requires a
20:51reliable secondary seal for pressure
20:53integrity and I've broken it down into
20:55two conditions ignition transient and
20:58steady-state in a 0 to 600 millisecond
21:01region is the time it takes to go from
21:03zero pressure to a thousand for PS I
21:07broke that down into three regimes 0 to
21:09170 milliseconds we have a high
21:12probability of having a secondary co in
21:16other words the secondary seal will be
21:17contacting like the primary seal because
21:19we have really not experienced any joint
21:22rotation yet because nothing is really
21:24happening it's just starting to be
21:26pressurized in the 170 to 330
21:29millisecond region we have somewhat a
21:31reduced probability because now motion
21:33is is starting and then 330 to 600 we
21:36have a high probability that we might
21:38not have secondary seal capability now
21:41how did we know this well we had done
21:44bench testing that actually showed us
21:45this and bench testing also showed us
21:47that the initial phase of 100 and 0 to
21:50170 milliseconds was safe and if we
21:53should ever penetrate the seal primary
21:56seal after the initial ignition
21:58transient we had a high probability that
22:01we would have no secondary seal
22:02capability because it would be lifted
22:04off and so what we were talking about
22:06here is timing function if you'll find
22:09this referred to later on as timing
22:11function and
22:15this was nothing new they had seen this
22:18before but this was just kind of
22:19reinforce what we had already presented
22:22to them what this chart was was a chart
22:26made up and you see it's hand printed we
22:28didn't have the time to get it typed up
22:29I just hand printed this so you have to
22:31excuse some of the the words and you can
22:33see I just stuck things in as
22:36appropriate I did this specifically for
22:39Challenger that other chart had nothing
22:41to do a challenger that was a general
22:42chart and the program itself and you'll
22:45notice that I had no mention of
22:46temperature in the other chart I was
22:47afraid of these joints even at room
22:49temperature in the middle of summer
22:50because that joint was simply a lousy
22:53design a temperature lower than the
22:56current database results in changing the
22:57primary no ring sealing timing function
23:00those are the three zones that I
23:01described previously that was my fear
23:03that we'd slide from that first safe
23:05zone to one of those two other zones and
23:08heaven forbid the last zone nearing 330
23:12milliseconds this is the January 85
23:15launch designated as the 15th white
23:17where we had 80 and 110 degrees of arc
23:19length of black and grease luring
23:22squeeze would result in would be at the
23:25result of lower temperature I'd actually
23:26run a calculation that day which showed
23:28the cross section of the O ring to
23:29shrink by one thousandth of an inch not
23:31very much but we didn't have very much
23:33to spare and it's in a wrong direction
23:34higher o range short hardness that
23:37material gets just like a brick when it
23:40freezes we were just slightly above the
23:42glass transition temperature which is
23:44defined as the temperature of an
23:46elastomer at which all the way the
23:47spaces disappear and it is now like a
23:49piece of metal thicker grease viscosity
23:53not the best wording in the world but
23:54what I'm referring to is the
23:56slipperiness or the quality of the
23:57grease to allow the o-ring to slide into
23:59position it would impede that someone
24:02higher or ring pressure actuation time
24:04is a result of lower temperature than we
24:07had experienced previously now the
24:09bottom two bullets sum up the whole
24:12discussion that evening in the whole
24:15fear if the actuation time increases the
24:17threshold of secondary seal
24:19pressurization capability is approached
24:21that was what we were really afraid of
24:23if the threshold is reached then it's
24:26really a jump ball
24:27we might not be able to seal these
24:29joints we were not talking about these
24:31joints sealing once the seals are
24:33sealing and working and being attacked
24:35by hot gas we were talking that night
24:37about them even functioning as being
24:40able to function as seals before the hot
24:41gas ate them alive this is the infamous
24:45data that we obtained in the February
24:46March timeframe in 1985 and as you can
24:48see by the data when we ran these tests
24:51now let me first explain what we
24:53actually did we actually took an o-ring
24:55between two steel plates and and we
24:59squeezed down to two steel plates to
25:02actually represent this action right
25:05here on the on the actual joint and what
25:10we were doing is squeezing it down
25:12squeezing an o-ring down let me just
25:15actually make it perfectly clear by
25:17putting an o-ring seal in there we
25:18actually squeezing the o-ring down 40
25:20thousands of an inch and then removing
25:2330 thousandths of that squeeze so we
25:26should have had a residual squeeze of
25:27ten thousandths of an inch and measuring
25:30and you know by optical means and white
25:32means whether or not the o-ring still
25:35maintained contact with both metal parts
25:37well we did that at a hundred degrees
25:39Fahrenheit and we found that at a
25:42hundred degrees the o-ring maintained
25:45contact with the metal parts we did it
25:48in 75 degrees Fahrenheit and we found
25:50that it separated for 2.4 seconds and at
25:5350 degrees the same tests produced the
25:56results of separation for an excess of
25:5810 minutes we start measuring after 10
26:00minutes because it was ridiculous to to
26:02proceed with with further measurement
26:04because 10 minutes and 2.4 seconds
26:07compared to 200 milliseconds actually I
26:10designated it as a hundred and 70
26:11milliseconds now that 170 milliseconds
26:14was my best estimate post-disaster
26:16testing was literally thousands of tests
26:18pointed to real number being 200
26:21milliseconds so I missed it by a few
26:23ticks if you can see that this also was
26:27a unconservative test but we had fixed
26:30machine settings at the time and this
26:32was only preliminary set of data we
26:34actually separated to inches a minute in
26:36the flight rate was 3.2 inch inches per
26:38minute so this was slightly
26:39unconservative
26:40but I I point to this and tell everybody
26:44that's in engineering I only need one
26:46piece of negative data to shut something
26:47down I can't necessarily say the same
26:50thing to go forward with a project but I
26:52only need one negative piece of data to
26:54shut something down that was a very bad
26:56piece of data to continue going forward
27:00with this program and yet and this is
27:03the data we presented and had in our
27:04possession that evening and I was asked
27:06during of course a telephone
27:07conversation to produce other data and
27:09how to share frustration from being
27:11badgered I basically blurted it out that
27:14I'm sorry I don't have anything other
27:15than what I presented because I've been
27:17trying to get other data since last
27:19October and in the system just would not
27:21allow me to get it and when I said that
27:23the general manager Bob Plant just about
27:25come out of his chair the conclusions
27:28and the next chart the recommendations
27:30chart were actually written and
27:31presented by the vice president
27:32engineering at Mullen cycle based on our
27:34input up to up to the meeting time the
27:38temperature of the o-ring is not the
27:39only parameter controlling buh-bye well
27:41absolutely that's a given statement
27:42because we had blow-by at various
27:44temperatures but the characteristic of
27:46the Bulova is the important thing to
27:47understand the January flight had blow
27:51by with an o-ring temperature about 53
27:53degrees we had for development motors
27:55with no blow by in the range of 47 to 52
27:58degrees but there's a caveat to that
27:59right away the development mortis had
28:02party packing which resulted in better
28:03performance now let me explain that to
28:05you there tested in a horizontal
28:06position and it's a very difficult
28:08assembly and so when they were assembled
28:10and they walked down the joint after
28:12assembling looked at the putty in the
28:13character of the joint from the inside
28:15they found that they were like little
28:16fall kennels volcanoes in the putty
28:18holes and they attributed that to the
28:21very difficult in severe assembly in the
28:23horizontal position and so they just
28:25slammed them shut with the handle of a
28:28broom for instance or shove some more
28:30putty in and tapped it shut so they
28:32didn't really represent what they had in
28:34flight but they and it was okay the
28:37rationale was okay up to that point but
28:39they should have investigated the flip
28:40side of that coin which was does it do
28:42the same thing when we assemble it
28:43vertically because they're assembled
28:46vertically at the Cape now when they
28:50finally got around to doing that it was
28:52in the middle
28:53part of 1985 middle to latter part in
28:561985 what do you think they found they
28:58found that when they assembled it
28:59vertically it also blew holes and putty
29:01so by not doing those tests early on in
29:04the program they essentially voided the
29:05development qualification testing
29:07relative to oring erosion due to heart
29:09gas impingement so we really couldn't
29:12use that data that night even though it
29:13was stated at about 50 degrees
29:15Fahrenheit we expect blow by the current
29:17it's a reasonable assumption we headed
29:19at 53 the year before well with
29:21inexperienced base we expect the
29:24temperature to be 29 degrees at 9:00
29:26a.m. and 38 degrees at 2 o'clock in the
29:29afternoon for lunchtime those were
29:31options that we were concerning that
29:33night we have no data other than
29:36temperature that would make these joints
29:39any different than anything else we have
29:41ever flown in fact from a geometry
29:42standpoint we presented that that
29:44evening but to keep it somewhat in hand
29:46here
29:46I don't present it anymore we add
29:48geometry joints that had better
29:50overhangs squeeze on them then most of
29:52the joints we had previously flown so we
29:54have a better set of joints from a
29:55geometry standpoint recommendations
29:58basically state don't fly it and if you
30:00have to fly it for heaven's sakes back
30:03out the conditions of ambient
30:04temperature and wind to produce a sealed
30:07temperature of no more than 53 degrees
30:10Fahrenheit and that basically was the
30:12end of our presentation it lasted about
30:14an hour as questions were batted back
30:17and forth and in discussion at times got
30:20very heated so we sat down and now it
30:24was management's turn our manager was
30:27asked by the project manager at the
30:30Kennedy Space Center who was actually a
30:31Marshall Space Flight Center in type for
30:34his launch decision and our project
30:38manager responded that he did not
30:40recommend launching based on the
30:42engineering presentation just made now
30:44pay attention that's the first no vote
30:46many of you probably don't even know
30:47that the original decision was made not
30:49to launch but it was and so that dispels
30:52all this garbage about we were too
30:56technical in our presentation and the
30:58managers didn't understand they
30:59understand fully they understood fully
31:01the original decision was made not to
31:03launch then Larry Malloy who was the man
31:05asking the questions asked his
31:06essentially his chief engineer at the
31:08Marshall Space Flight Center for his
31:09launch decision hey George Hardy
31:12responded that he did not he was
31:14appalled at the high calls
31:15recommendation but he would not
31:17recommend launching over the contractors
31:19objection that's the second no vote then
31:22Larry Malloy who was the man asking the
31:24questions went into a summary mode and
31:26that's when he made some of his famous
31:28comments about when do you want me to
31:31launch thiokol next April and this
31:34remember this was January and they had a
31:36very aggressive launch schedule that was
31:39George Hardy statement about being apart
31:41was the start of the pressure I know it
31:43because I felt that George Hardy was a
31:45highly respected individual in the
31:47program and worked for NASA for many
31:49many years and when George Hardy says
31:50he's appalled I'll tell you he damn well
31:52gets the attention or everybody
31:53listening and I felt the pressure and I
31:56felt the pressure about the comments
31:57from Irene Molloy and I was very very
32:00nervous about it he concluded with a
32:04statement that he was his opinion that
32:06the data we presented was inconclusive
32:07now think about that statement for a
32:09moment we're at this meeting Flight
32:11Readiness review meeting to prove that
32:12it's safe to launch his statement about
32:15our data being inconclusive actually
32:17violates
32:18NASA's long-standing conditions of
32:21forcing contractors and themselves to
32:22prove that it's safe to launch his
32:25statement about the data being
32:26inconclusive is actually an automatic
32:27default or no launch condition if you
32:29think about it so that's three no votes
32:31including man asking questions as soon
32:35as he gets finished speaking our program
32:37manager asked for five-minute offline
32:40carcass to reevaluate the data now it's
32:45the caucus that actually constitutes the
32:46unethical decision-making for him in my
32:48opinion because if they had done nothing
32:51except hang up the phone they'd have
32:53been great shape they claims the
32:55Presidential Commission I manages claim
32:57that they felt no pressure at all but I
32:58submit to you if they didn't feel any
33:00pressure why they asked for the caucus
33:01the decision had already been made not
33:03to launch so I know they felt the
33:05pressure because I felt the pressure and
33:06I was there they started to have a
33:09meeting amongst themselves because the
33:11first word spoken when the mute button
33:12button was pushed on mute was spoken by
33:15a general manager
33:16he said in a soft voice we have to make
33:18a management decision and I emphasize
33:20soft voice because he wasn't speaking to
33:22me he wasn't speaking of my colleagues
33:24on the other end of the table I was less
33:26than five feet away from them so I heard
33:28I heard every word spoken he was
33:30speaking to his other three senior
33:32executives who were all vice presidents
33:33three of which were gathered right
33:35around the table one of which was
33:36sitting up against the wall
33:38never did but the man against wall never
33:40did participate in anything except shook
33:42its head yesterday's gonna launch in the
33:44ultimate decision anyways they were
33:46trying and struggling trying to make a
33:49list on a piece of paper that would
33:51justify a decision to launch when my
33:53colleague Ani Thompson came from way
33:54down the other end of the table up place
33:56the pad of paper down and once again
33:58sketched out the joint with the
34:00explanation verbally why we should not
34:02attempt the launch under such adverse
34:04conditions Arnie was summarily ignored
34:06got the vilest looks you can ever ever
34:08ever imagine he went back to his place
34:11because he had no way of getting them
34:15engaged in conversation with him when he
34:18gave up and went back to his seat I
34:19grabbed eight-by-ten colour glossy
34:21photographs that showed the 1985 launch
34:26and the heart gasps buh-bye in the
34:28blackened condition between the seals I
34:31also had a comparative photograph of a
34:34room-temperature launch which showed the
34:36same type of blow-by but with a totally
34:38different characteristic it was gray
34:40sort of modelling splotchy in
34:42characteristic and it was like night and
34:44day between the two all you had to do to
34:46say to anybody a person on the street
34:48was that the color black is bad and
34:51tells you that you're in worse shape
34:52now which pick pick one that's in worse
34:54shape and a hundred times out of a
34:56hundred times they could pick the right
34:57photograph when I made that pitch to our
35:00managers they just did not want to hear
35:03it
35:03they didn't want to look at the
35:04photographs they didn't want me to talk
35:05to them they just Summerlee ignored me
35:07also I was told by my colleagues after
35:09the meeting that I was literally
35:11screaming at the managers to look at the
35:13photographs and not ignore what they
35:15were telling him namely that more hot
35:16gas blow-by occurred at a lower
35:18temperature but they didn't want to hear
35:19that and so I got the same works as
35:21Arnie and I went back to my seat also as
35:24they continue their discussion just
35:26before they took the vote poll Dave I
35:28sprint the vice-president senior vice
35:29president and general
35:30manager turn third vice president of
35:32engineering and said it said to him take
35:34off your engineering hat and put on your
35:36management hat
35:37real subtle threat huh well
35:40vice-president engineering capitulated
35:42unfortunately they took the vote poll
35:44shortly thereafter it was four votes to
35:47launch Presidential Commission asked
35:49them why they didn't pull us and the
35:52general manager said we already knew the
35:54position of the engineers and it was
35:56fruitless to pull them because we knew
35:58we would not be unanimous now see that's
36:00what they're supposed to do and if
36:02anybody is not unanimous that's a
36:04default when no launch but yet we
36:06weren't given the opportunity they were
36:08back on the telephone conversation told
36:11NASA that and they read from this list
36:13that they had generated told NASA that
36:14they wanted the launch but this was the
36:16new decision there was very little
36:18questioning no probing discussion NASA
36:20promptly accepted the decision telephone
36:23telecon was basically terminated now I
36:27was very angry when I left that room
36:28believe you if I had had a box of
36:30grenades that evening cycle would have
36:32been leveled this is the decision-making
36:36chart that they actually based their
36:39decision on now you ask yourself as I go
36:41down these statements one of the time if
36:43these are actual statements that support
36:46a decision to launch the calculations
36:49show that SRM 25 o-rings will be 20
36:51degrees colder than SRM 15 this is the
36:54Challenger Challenger will be 25 degrees
36:5620 degrees colder excuse me than the
36:58January 85 o-rings remember the name is
37:02temperature data not conclusive there's
37:05that word again
37:05not conclusive on predicting primary
37:08o-ring bull by the engineering
37:11assessment is that that is a why an
37:15outright bull face lie there was no
37:18engineering assessment that carcass the
37:20only two engineers who spoke were myself
37:22in Arnie Thompson and we were not
37:23allowed to be engaged in discussion and
37:25so that that is a absolute falsehood
37:29colder ol rings will have increased
37:31effective durometer in other words
37:33they'll be harder do you remember that
37:34on my chart is a reason for changing the
37:37timing function in the fear of launching
37:39harder o rings will take longer to see
37:41that's another way of saying timing
37:44function but this look makes it look
37:45like it's a positive attribute instead
37:47of a negative attribute more gas may
37:50pass the primary o-ring before the
37:52primary seal seats
37:53that's the magic wand trick you had 24
37:57successful voice and you just declare
37:58it's going to work it's going to see you
38:01can't do that people you we don't know
38:03what's going on inside those joints in
38:05real time the demonstrated sealing
38:07threshold is three times greater than a
38:0938 thousands of Rochin experience on a
38:11january flight that is a true statement
38:14but it does not apply
38:16we were not discussing oring erosion
38:19that night we were discussing if the
38:22seals would function first as seals
38:24before the hot gas ate him alive and
38:27then we had a comfortable three factor
38:31of safety of three on margin we had
38:32tested many subscale tests and that was
38:35a real number but it didn't apply that
38:37night we were afraid that the seals
38:39weren't even function as seals first if
38:42the primary seal does not seat the
38:44secondary will the magic wand trick
38:46again I don't know how you can do that
38:48pressure will get that a secondary seal
38:51before the metal parts rotate I don't
38:53know how they knew that I'd it was the
38:56closest person and Ronny was the second
38:58closest person all those joints and we
38:59certainly didn't know that there had
39:01never been never been one test dynamic
39:05test run on pressure temperature or
39:07deflection running these motors why
39:09because in order to run those tests you
39:11have to drill holes in a case and drill
39:13hole in a joint you void 1 million
39:16dollars worth of hardware for flight
39:18that's why I didn't run tests but I'll
39:20show you after the Challenger disaster
39:22they drilled holes like you can't
39:25believe in a joint they took flight
39:27hardware out of the stream like it was
39:29popcorn but yet before the disaster we
39:33could never get that information the
39:35o-ring pressure leak check places the
39:37secondary seal in the output position
39:39which minimizes sealing time that
39:41doesn't say anything it's just filler
39:43that's a fact of physics if I put
39:45pressure on one side of an o-ring it
39:47will move to the opposite side of the
39:48groove and it will do it a thousand
39:49times out of a thousand times ragazza
39:51what the temperature is unless it's
39:52frozen solid to the deck it doesn't say
39:55anything it's like pushing a cable with
39:56casters it's going
39:57move as opposed to being grounded its
40:00just filler morton-thiokol recommends at
40:03the launch proceeded on the 28th now
40:05does anybody in the audience see
40:07anything after that statement I sure
40:09don't see the CEO Morton Thiokol was
40:12late as the spring of 1988 said in an
40:14interview with Businessweek magazine as
40:16he was still trying to protect his
40:18corporate hind side that Morton Thiokol
40:20never agreed to launch at the
40:22temperature at the time of launch and I
40:24maintain to you oh yes they did right
40:26there it doesn't there's no caveat
40:30there's no exceptions there's nothing on
40:32that that says they can't launch and
40:33quite frankly if it had dropped to 20
40:35below zero NASA what this chart has the
40:38authority to launch the last poet
40:41actually contradicts the first bullet
40:43the Challenger will not be significantly
40:46different from the January 85 launch it
40:48just said it'd be 20 degrees colder and
40:50we had met I thought we had made a
40:52pretty good case for the increments from
40:54a hundred down to 75 down to 50 degrees
40:57Fahrenheit the severity and how they
40:59overran responded and that it was very
41:01very important in those increments that
41:04at the law we got the more serious
41:05difficulty we were going to have well
41:08when this was this chart was finished
41:10NASA asked for a signed copy of this
41:12chart as you can see Joakim insta who's
41:15the guy our program manager signed it
41:17and it was faxed down this is the
41:19ultimate cya piece of paper in the
41:20program because NASA knew that they
41:24needed this signed to protect themselves
41:26I have to tell you ladies and gentlemen
41:28that the only temperature that anybody
41:29knew about in that program including me
41:31that night and up to that night and
41:33since that night was 40 degrees
41:36Fahrenheit period 40 degrees Fahrenheit
41:39I wasn't willing to launch neither when
41:43my colleagues at 40 degrees Fahrenheit
41:44but that is the lowest temperature that
41:46any of us on a program even knew about
41:48and so they did violate launched with
41:52criteria al McDonald told Larry Malloy
41:54at the Kennedy Space Center he would
41:56hate to be the one that had to stand up
41:58in front of a board of inquiry and
41:59explain why he launched below the
42:01specification temperature of 40 degrees
42:03Fahrenheit but he was ignored at that
42:05point in time also well I had made up my
42:07mind not to watch the launch next day
42:09because I was very very
42:11afraid that what we were predicting was
42:13going to occur but one of the colleagues
42:16that was in the room that night had a
42:18daughter that I call that day who had
42:20never seen the launch and he had another
42:21daughter that worked at that call and I
42:23knew them as family friends and so I sat
42:25in with him as he coaxed me to come in
42:27and watch well as the vehicle ignited
42:30and cleared the lunch tower I whispered
42:32to Bob that we just dodged a bullet
42:35because we were told by the ballas
42:37ditions the people the engineers who are
42:39experts on how propellants burn and how
42:41they work and from past experience that
42:43they had they told us if we had so much
42:45as a tiny pinhole in the case it would
42:47blow up on the pad right at ignition
42:49well when that didn't happen of course I
42:51felt wow we're home free at 60 seconds
42:55in the launch he would speed back to me
42:57that he had just completed a prayer of
42:58thanks for a successful launch thirteen
43:01seconds later we both saw the horror of
43:03destruction along with our colleagues in
43:04a room as the vehicle exploded and there
43:07was no mistake in our minds that it had
43:09exploded because it was way premature in
43:12the separation it should have gone 120
43:14seconds and as typical engineers we all
43:17got acronym and it's out every time
43:18there's the launch and we time it was a
43:19stopwatch I always do that
43:21and it was 73 seconds when it let go but
43:24strangely enough right after the
43:25explosion occurred and I was very angry
43:29even even knowing this our boost is
43:31actually flew out of the explosion still
43:33thrusting so it wasn't us but I was
43:36still mad in hell because that they had
43:38just listened and not launched that
43:39sequence of events would not have
43:41occurred whatever the cause at that
43:43point in time well one of the managers
43:46was in that room actually the man that
43:48said nothing that night except shook his
43:50head yes to vote to launch he went out
43:53of that room like he was shot out of a
43:54cannon because I think he realized what
43:58serious trouble the program was in at
44:00that point in time because of what had
44:02transpired the evening before well any
44:04Johnny Thompson and myself were actually
44:07placed on a fairly investigation team in
44:09prompt order and sent to the Marshall
44:11Space Flight Center in Alabama and what
44:14I saw there shocked me and actually made
44:17me very very angry and disgusted NASA
44:20management at the center was diligently
44:22attempting to find a condition other
44:23than
44:24that caused a disaster I think they knew
44:27the seriousness of what they had done
44:29and they were trying to actually pin
44:32this disaster in something else they had
44:34actually closed out photographs of the
44:36assembly and and they claimed that there
44:39was a twisted o-ring and I swore up and
44:41down to them that I just tried a piece
44:42of o-ring and twisted it actually put it
44:45on put it on a desk you know had about a
44:48yard length of it was secretary of white
44:50out tape and twisted it full 360 degrees
44:54three times and I left it on my desk in
44:57it unfold and the white out tape was in
44:59a line which says that the stored energy
45:02and o-ring was sufficient to avoid a
45:04twist in it now it was just on a desktop
45:07imagine how I would act and greased on a
45:09greased surface would even be dipped
45:10more difficult I did with him and argued
45:13with him and argued with him that that
45:14couldn't possibly happen and what they
45:15were seeing was a track that somebody
45:18had caused by just wiping inadvertently
45:20wiping the surface with a glove or hand
45:22they actually sent a team of experts out
45:25to if I call in spent two weeks trying
45:27to take a photograph over twisted o-ring
45:29in a joint of course they couldn't do it
45:31after two weeks they came back and said
45:33wow I guess you were right
45:34well even more important than that we're
45:39on a fairly investigation team we never
45:41showed this information for a week to
45:45ten days later they had actually known
45:48within 24 hours of launch what actually
45:50caused a disaster but those on a fairly
45:52investigation team whenever made privy
45:54to it they had 16 millimeter film of it
45:56you see this arrow right here that
45:59points that is black smoke this is the F
46:02joint right here see the black smoke
46:04coming out of the F joint this is right
46:05at the ignition this is at point six
46:08eight seconds this is a slight delay
46:11because there was postulated there may
46:13have been some frozen water in the joint
46:14and it delayed it slightly but that's
46:16pretty close to at the beginning
46:18ignition if you'd taken that the white
46:20time they knew that and they had never
46:23told us so we're on a fairly
46:24investigation team as they chased us
46:25down blind alley after blind alley after
46:27blind alley well
46:32after al McDonald had made the
46:35presidential commission aware that the
46:36telecon took place they scheduled a the
46:38presidential commission scheduled a
46:40closed-door hearing at the Kennedy Space
46:41Center on the 14th of February 1986 we
46:46were instructed by the company attorneys
46:47to go that meeting and answer all
46:49questions yes to know and volunteer
46:51nothing can you imagine how much
46:54information they would have really found
46:55out if we had done that well I I wasn't
46:57willing to do that and I bared all I was
46:59pardon me the first to testify Arnie was
47:02second and he basically verified
47:04everything I said and add a few words
47:05himself then now McDonnell gave his
47:07version as he was at the Kennedy Space
47:09Center that night what the Commission
47:11members heard was so shocking to them
47:13that they asked us to all leave close
47:14the door
47:15placed a call directly to President
47:17Reagan and informed him of what had
47:19happened they were so afraid that
47:21because of what they just heard would
47:22never ever last to the end of the day
47:24before the press got it that they didn't
47:27want the president broadsided and so
47:28they made the call one of the aides to
47:30the Commission told us this well five
47:32days later I was being interviewed by
47:34another Commission member and I handed a
47:36packet of my activity reports and memos
47:40to him as in answer to one of his
47:42questions and a company attorney present
47:44literally almost fell off his chair I
47:47realized at that point in time that I
47:49had truly not endeared myself with
47:50company management
47:52because my memos actually stopped their
47:57testimony cold in its tracks and clearly
48:00proved that this problem had been around
48:02way before that telecon meeting and I
48:05had the documented evidence that I had
48:07handed over to him to prove it and so
48:09from that point on management had a very
48:12very difficult time in testifying with a
48:14series of half-truths and from that
48:17point on the focus of the investigation
48:19was not only on the technical failure of
48:24the joint but on a management managerial
48:26failure of the organization on February
48:2825th we got to tell our story in public
48:31and I fell into further disfavor by
48:34directly rebutting our general managers
48:36testimony just before me where he
48:37claimed that the engineering position at
48:39the talk on meeting that evening was not
48:41unanimous and that was simply not true
48:43every body in the room that evening was
48:46there for the sole and specific purpose
48:47of stopping the launch even the general
48:49manager believe it or not he anticipated
48:52that it would be a highly politicized or
48:54potentially criticized problem but he
48:58knew what we were striving for before
49:01the meeting even started so if he didn't
49:03support it he sure as hell didn't in
49:05voice voice his opinion against anything
49:07and so the default is that everybody
49:09that was in that room they remained
49:11silent was there for the sole purpose of
49:13supporting the launch that's why they
49:14were there in all actuality well after
49:18my testimony I was off the failure
49:20investigation team immediately sent back
49:21to Utah and at while I was being told in
49:24March that I was a major participant in
49:26the redesign I was felt very strange
49:28because I was it seemed like I was being
49:30isolated from the program I was given
49:32technical input but never invited to
49:34meetings never knew when they occurred
49:35never knew who attended I was told by
49:37the grapevine that my technical input
49:39was changed from time to time and I had
49:42no input essentially I was essentially
49:44being isolated it took me about six
49:45weeks in real time to really understand
49:47that this was happening well in May al
49:52McDonnell and I would call back to the
49:53Presidential Commission we were asked
49:55point-blank about our job assignments
49:56and when I answered the question with
49:59the fact that I was being isolated from
50:00the program and that al and said that he
50:03had 30 people that were reporting to him
50:05originally now
50:07we're not reporting him anymore and he
50:08was now reporting to one of them
50:10Presidential Commission got very very
50:12angry because they said we were being
50:14punished for honesty and our testimony
50:16well the company took out a lot of flack
50:20about this because the Presidential
50:22Commission actually at least the
50:23closed-door hearings and made it public
50:25and thiokol got beat up very severely in
50:27the press by the press the Presidential
50:30Commission and the Congress of the
50:31United States it got so bad that our
50:34colleagues at the plant were now blaming
50:37us for all of that cause problems
50:40we started referred to ourselves at the
50:42five lepers there were five of us that
50:44testified in one degree or another and
50:45we were being ostracized by our
50:47colleagues we tried to cause a
50:51mitigation of the internal strife by
50:52asking for a meeting with the CEO the
50:55president of the aerospace division and
50:57the person heading a shuttle program at
50:58that time because the program was
51:01actually coming down around their ears
51:02and it was out of control because the
51:03original people who were controlling the
51:05program made the decision to launch was
51:07still controlling the program if you can
51:09believe that it was still in their
51:10position the meeting unfortunately was
51:13one-sided totally one-sided we bared our
51:16souls to try and help the program in the
51:18company and we were basically ostracized
51:20and the CEO made it sound like that if
51:23everything worked out okay all would be
51:25forgiven and that was basically the tone
51:29of the meeting that took place that
51:30night well in June we were all called
51:33back once again and this time to testify
51:34in front of the presidential not
51:39presidential but the house cyant House
51:41Committee on science and technology when
51:44we went back there it was really an a
51:47bad experience for me extremely bad
51:49experience for me during two days of
51:51intensive preparations with attorneys
51:53and PR people I and we in general but I
51:57specifically were the victims of an
51:59attempted PR people brainwashing as they
52:02told us that the Congress the United
52:04States the people on this committee we
52:06were only interested in press coverage
52:07and they really didn't give a damn about
52:08Challenger how do you think you know
52:11that made somebody like me feel it was
52:15very distressing because they try to
52:17influence my testimony directly but they
52:19failed once again
52:20and I answered all the questions the
52:22best of my ability but it took its toll
52:25on me when I'm back to cycle I could no
52:27longer endure the hostile day-to-day
52:29environment and so by July I went to a
52:33company executive explain situation he
52:35said you better take some time off and
52:37get you head cleared when I did that I
52:39went out on medical leave got some
52:43professional help
52:44got a diagnosis well not diagnosed at
52:46that time but I got some professional
52:48help to the degree and the point where I
52:50knew that the source of my problem was
52:52the company and I called him up in
52:57September and told him I would never
52:58return to work for them they taught me
53:01that continue on leave that I had to go
53:03and get diagnosed by a psychiatrist
53:06which I did I was officially diagnosed
53:08by one psychiatrist one psychiatrist and
53:11three psychologists is having
53:13post-traumatic stress disorder I
53:16received long-term disabilities from a
53:19medical program which started in January
53:21of 87 the day I qualified was the day I
53:25got my final noticed that I was
53:27terminated I was received my final check
53:30and they asked me to send my badges in I
53:33did that I received 60% of my former
53:35salary for two years and then everything
53:39was down to zero now what this really
53:43leads to is everyone's Professional
53:45Responsibility and I believe it is best
53:48explained in this timeless piece by mr.
53:52Adolph J Ackerman he wrote in the AAAS
53:56he wrote in the I Triple E publication
54:00that in 1967 that engineers have a
54:05responsibility that goes far beyond the
54:07building of machines and systems we
54:09cannot leave it to the technical
54:11illiterate sorry Ventoux literate and
54:12overloaded technical administrators to
54:15decide what is safe and for the public
54:17good we must tell what we know first or
54:20normal administrative channels but when
54:22these fails through whatever evidence we
54:23can find many claim that it is disloyal
54:26to protests sometimes the penalty
54:29disapproval loss of status even
54:32vilification can be so
54:33there today we need more critical
54:36pronouncements and public declarations
54:38by engineering engineers and high
54:40professional responsibilities in some
54:42instances such criticism must be severe
54:44if we ought to properly serve mankind
54:46and preserve our freedom hence it is of
54:49the utmost importance that we maintain
54:51our freedom of communication in the
54:53engineering profession and to the public
54:55the decades ahead are bound to be a
54:58critical and difficult period and there
55:00will be occasions for sharp dissent and
55:02strong words if we are to meet our
55:05responsibilities
55:06close quote I simply recommend
55:09practicing the golden rule do unto
55:11others as you would have them do unto
55:12you
55:13unfortunately business in this country
55:15especially is has perverted their golden
55:17rule and it's called doing to others
55:19before they do unto you now don't be
55:23expected to protect be protected if you
55:25are not willing to protect others from
55:26surety professionalism speaking out may
55:29or may not extract a price for doing so
55:30but I can assure you one thing you will
55:33have a clear conscience and a peaceful
55:35sleep at night for doing the right thing
55:37academia research on whistleblowers
55:39provides us some insight actually the
55:42industrial government complex strongly
55:43discourages whistleblowing
55:45if a whistleblower goes outside his
55:47organizational culture he is usually
55:49severely punished for doing so to send a
55:51strong message for others in the
55:52organization not to do the same or else
55:55they will receive the same end result
55:56the industry and government has
55:58succeeded very cleverly in deceiving the
56:01public about the character and motives
56:02of whistle blows the general perception
56:04is that whistleblowers are troublemakers
56:06and snitches and try to make trouble for
56:09their employer while exactly the
56:11opposite is the truth extensive research
56:13shows that doles has stepped forward
56:16with bad news do so to protect the
56:18health safety and welfare of the public
56:20and their companies but whistleblowers
56:24are most often long-term dedicated
56:27employees whose only concern is to right
56:28or wrong within an organization to
56:30prevent somebody from a high-probability
56:32injury or death it's really that simple
56:35but industry and government has
56:36distorted the truth so well that winning
56:38vindication for whistleblower is all but
56:41impossible I'd like to just quickly
56:44summarize just so you have a feel for
56:46what
56:47happens to people the methods used to a
56:49neutralized it whistleblower make the
56:51whistleblower instead of the message the
56:53issue isolate the whistleblower
56:55set the whistleblower up for fall
56:57display maximum toughness in selecting
57:00charges against the whistleblower you
57:02eliminate the whistleblowers job
57:04destabilize the whistleblower support
57:06base the following some of the methods
57:08to neutralize the dissent itself
57:10overwhelm the whistleblower by making
57:12him or her a struggle for self
57:14preservation of career family bank
57:17account and even sanity until the point
57:19of dissent is put behind waiting way to
57:21your survival priorities separate
57:24expertise from Authority keep the
57:26employees ignorant about what's going on
57:28substitute democracy for scientific
57:31methods for decision making and last but
57:34I believe one of the most important ones
57:35is to prevent a written record when a
57:38policy is indefensible the goal is to
57:40restrict debate to an oral dialogue
57:41since it is difficult to accuse somebody
57:44of revising an oral dialogue and
57:47accountability will be diffused in the
57:49event of a tragedy I have to tell you
57:51each of the foregoing categories were
57:53used against me and my colleagues at
57:54various points in times all accept
57:57dismissal the conversation I today
57:59--tz-- and media made it virtually
58:00impossible but I call the dismisses but
58:04they did make our lives absolutely
58:05miserable on a day-to-day basis now the
58:09bottom line in this whole thing and why
58:11it's so important is accountability and
58:14there's been no accountability to date
58:17even today no accountability and more
58:19than 500 employees unfortunately will be
58:21the ones that have accountability
58:23extracted from them at this point in
58:25time there have been over 1,000
58:27employees laid off at the facility at
58:29Morton Thiokol out of about 8,000 people
58:31and that's very very severe in northern
58:34Utah there are no other jobs to go to
58:36and so some of these people are
58:38unfortunately actually have to walk away
58:39from their homes the lack of
58:41accountability has actually produced an
58:43incredibly browsing nozzle joint
58:46redesign that they're flying today the
58:48joint actually begs failure by Murphy's
58:50Laura once again just as the original
58:52joint that I showed you I have some
58:54suggested solutions eirick I suggest
58:57that we require the passage of the EIT
58:59exam as a
59:00requisite for obtaining an engineering
59:02degree now don't all moan and groan I'm
59:05not asking you to do anything I haven't
59:06already done on the I did it the hard
59:07way
59:08I took the EIT being out of school over
59:1230 years so it can be done and then take
59:16the the P exam and pass it and get
59:19licensed now the reason I am I
59:21suggesting is the code of ethics as a
59:24very effective club when a manager comes
59:26up to you and asked you to do something
59:28unethical you can simply refer him to
59:30the code of ethics and ask him is he
59:33asking you to violate this code of
59:34ethics you see the effectiveness that
59:36this potentially could have I believe it
59:38would really work and put the
59:40decision-making process back in the
59:41hands of the engineering and the
59:43technical people and it would also avoid
59:45the current shameful paradox that it
59:47exists in this country at the present
59:48time really the only people that need to
59:50be licensed as civil engineers who build
59:52our roads bridges and buildings most of
59:54the others of us have a huge industrial
59:56exemption and not need to be licensed
59:58but consider the paradox
1:00:00what does more harm to you as an
1:00:02individual the roadbed that you drive a
1:00:05car over or the car that you're riding
1:00:06in did you ever think about the
1:00:08airplanes you fly in I did the stress
1:00:10analysis and some of that stuff I'm not
1:00:12licensed wasn't licensed at the time
1:00:14does that give you a warm feeling it
1:00:17doesn't give me a very warm feeling and
1:00:19it's a terrible paradox when you really
1:00:20look at it as to what it represents the
1:00:23huge industrial exemption actually
1:00:25provides a huge resource pool of a
1:00:28renewable resource of Engineers and
1:00:30that's why it's done and it's a way to
1:00:32promote cheap labor
1:00:33in an overturning business community
1:00:37well I hope is that attorneys can make
1:00:41inroads into the into the law and cause
1:00:43the transfer of the engineering code of
1:00:45ethics to management and restore the
1:00:47technical decision-making to the
1:00:48technical people but if this fails I
1:00:50feel that the long term solution really
1:00:52rests with university university
1:00:54education and it rests with them to
1:00:57teach students the benefits of combining
1:00:59science technology and society issues
1:01:01towards the upgrading of ethical
1:01:02decision making within industry and
1:01:04government in conclusion I will never
1:01:07forget and I hope this nation will never
1:01:10forget especially the engineering
1:01:11community
1:01:12the supreme sacrifice that the seven
1:01:14challenge astronauts made for forfeiting
1:01:16their lives for such an irresponsible
1:01:17launch decision
1:01:19maybe we always remember astronauts Kobe
1:01:22Smith McNair Onizuka Resnick Jarvis and
1:01:30McAuliffe for the dedication and courage
1:01:33to this nation's space program
1:01:35I implore all of you not to dwell on any
1:01:39of the negative aspects that you've just
1:01:40heard but use those conditions that
1:01:45you've heard as a positive lesson on how
1:01:48to recognize and act upon
1:01:51confrontational situations that you may
1:01:54encounter in your careers and I assure
1:01:56you you will encounter them albeit in a
1:01:59much lesser visible environment I hope
1:02:02we can all learn together from past
1:02:04organizational misconduct and bring
1:02:07about change toward practicing the
1:02:08golden rule in business and government
1:02:10to significantly reduce unethical
1:02:13decision making practices thank you very
1:02:15much
1:02:22oh yes yes sir that was a marvelous
1:02:31presentation but I want to ask you why
1:02:33you think that universities are the
1:02:35proper place to teach ethics we think
1:02:37that the ethical standards of
1:02:39universities are it sufficiently high or
1:02:42different from the general community if
1:02:44I want to be whistle blown off stand up
1:02:46at that desk
1:02:47what I can say about universities would
1:02:49be just about the same is what you have
1:02:51said so I don't believe that the ambient
1:02:54at the university is very ethical it's
1:02:56just hidden no but you have to
1:02:58understand that that the real effect of
1:03:02an engineering education is to become
1:03:04socially inept we are technically sharp
1:03:07but socially inept as hell and if you
1:03:09don't give people the rudimentary basics
1:03:11on what to expect
1:03:12then you're expecting them to respond to
1:03:14situations that they've never been
1:03:15schooled or even have an inkling of a
1:03:18being thrown into the Lions Den and I
1:03:21believe that through a case study such
1:03:24as that I presented here that there are
1:03:25many fruitful areas of discussion not
1:03:28that you will make everybody an ethical
1:03:29person but you will give them the basic
1:03:31tools to make an informed decision but
1:03:34now you expect people who are no more
1:03:38ethical than others to lead ethical
1:03:41discussions I you teach things all the
1:03:44time in addition all about engineering
1:03:47as well well you use this Epic's how do
1:03:51we know Epic's we are the teachers and
1:03:54we don't know it are you telling me that
1:03:56you can't take what I just gave you
1:03:58today and use it as a video tape
1:04:00presentation as a segment of your class
1:04:02and actually motivate people towards a
1:04:05understanding of what they need to
1:04:07expect when they get into industry
1:04:08whether you're unethical or not if you
1:04:10can't do that then you don't have a very
1:04:13good rapport with your students I don't
1:04:15think that's what have a very good
1:04:16rapport with their students we have some
1:04:18students here and they can tell us how
1:04:20good or up the horrors they have with
1:04:21their professors well well I'll tell you
1:04:24I've been at many of the major
1:04:25universities around this country and the
1:04:27student bodies are the ones that are
1:04:29actually asking for these courses to be
1:04:31taught so that they do not go out with
1:04:33blinders on and if the universities
1:04:36respond to that then we are in a sad
1:04:38state of affairs in this country a point
1:04:46I wanted to clear out when you said that
1:04:48the engineering group on this meeting
1:04:53the night before before the management
1:04:55reversed itself the engineering
1:04:59participants were unanimous and
1:05:01recommending that the launch not take
1:05:03place and that this information not this
1:05:07recommendation not to launch had been
1:05:09transmitted to decision makers within
1:05:12NASA is that right that's correct so
1:05:14they were clearly appraised of the fact
1:05:17that the technical people had
1:05:19recommended not to launch that's right
1:05:23the other recommendation knew that it
1:05:30was not based on the same technical it
1:05:35was not repetition but was simply a
1:05:39management appraisal of the gamble no no
1:05:43you missed the sequence of events what
1:05:45we did that day was we as engineers
1:05:48convinced our own in-house people not to
1:05:50launch and we had the technical
1:05:51rationale to support that when we were
1:05:54finished convincing our own in-house
1:05:55people about that we had informal
1:05:57discussions with NASA Marshall Space
1:05:59Flight Center we had no view graphs but
1:06:01we had informal discussions and
1:06:02expressed in verbalized our concerns and
1:06:05when they heard our concerns verbalized
1:06:07they became very antsy about what we
1:06:10were talking about and they asked us to
1:06:12formalize our concerns in a formal
1:06:14presentation on a telecon that evening
1:06:16which we did with a formal hookup
1:06:17between three two centers and us at the
1:06:20plant we actually gave our engineering
1:06:22presentation and the expectation had
1:06:25never wavered from the fact that we were
1:06:27there for the sole purpose of stopping
1:06:28the launch as was the initial result
1:06:31what happened at night is we ran into a
1:06:33buzzsaw with a customer namely NASA who
1:06:36actually reversed their posture in in
1:06:38instead of forcing us to prove that it
1:06:40was safe to launch which was the normal
1:06:42occurrence they were actually put us in
1:06:45a posture to prove that it was not safe
1:06:46to launch and of course we couldn't do
1:06:48that
1:06:48all I could speak in is terms of
1:06:51probabilities of failure and no numbers
1:06:53mind you because I had no numbers but I
1:06:56have two eyes and I 20 years at 27 years
1:06:59experience and a good feel for what
1:07:02these little babies do and everybody
1:07:05else knew about it for an engineering
1:07:08standpoint too and they listened you see
1:07:10we were successful what we what we
1:07:12actually ran into that night was a
1:07:14totally unexpected customer reaction
1:07:18that seems to me to exonerate thiokol
1:07:21that if that they have made possible the
1:07:25vehicle for communicating the concern of
1:07:28the technical people your voice had had
1:07:31a hearing and your colleagues had had a
1:07:33hearing and your customers chose to
1:07:37ignore the technical information and
1:07:39recommendations they were receiving from
1:07:41the technical people and it seems to me
1:07:44that that your company people should
1:07:48have been thoroughly protected by no not
1:07:51at all because they actually ultimately
1:07:53capitulated as manages and gave
1:07:56permission to launch
1:07:57oh yes it does because what it did was
1:08:04it what it did was it showed that the
1:08:06people who ran the company were now
1:08:08coming up and saying you remember that
1:08:11chart I showed you it implied it implied
1:08:14that there was a engineering review that
1:08:16took place see the implication was that
1:08:19the engineering assessment is that it
1:08:21implied that the engineers participated
1:08:24in that caucus when in fact that was not
1:08:26true and so they actually had deceived
1:08:31NASA on the receiving end of this
1:08:33information as to what happened see we
1:08:35were on mute
1:08:36they couldn't hear us and we couldn't
1:08:38hear them this was a closed hearing a
1:08:39closed meeting and so they did and they
1:08:43do deserve as as matter of fact the
1:08:46signers and manufacturers and producers
1:08:47of this booster I assigned 75% of the
1:08:50blame for the launch on fire call people
1:08:52on a human that you may think that
1:08:54that's harsh but dammit it's their
1:08:56hardware and they have a fiduciary
1:08:58responsibility to justify that the
1:09:01that to give the information that their
1:09:04hardware is ready for launch and when
1:09:06they say that their hardware is ready
1:09:07for launch by gosh it should be ready
1:09:09for launch without any crap shoot or
1:09:12gamble in pressing that button and so
1:09:14they should be held and put their feet
1:09:16to the fire about 75% of the blame now
1:09:19if you internalize that same type of
1:09:21percentage within Morton Thiokol I say
1:09:23that the general manager of our plant
1:09:25should be accorded 75% of the blame
1:09:27because he's the one that created the
1:09:29ultimate internal pressure in that
1:09:30caucus when he and it finalized that
1:09:33with his direction to the vice
1:09:35presidential era to play ball and so I
1:09:38apportion 75% of the blame for that
1:09:40launch decision on the general manager
1:09:42and in that plant now you can agree or
1:09:45disagree with that but the fact is they
1:09:46cannot dodge the responsibility for
1:09:49making this decision I thought at that
1:09:51night and I still think it today at this
1:09:53point in time that the reason they did
1:09:55what they did is that we were in
1:09:57negotiations for fall on sole source
1:10:00contract without any competition that
1:10:03would keep them making boosters into the
1:10:04late 1990s without any competition
1:10:06whatsoever yeah but don't you think the
1:10:08NASA representatives knew that pressure
1:10:10that was on them and that they they had
1:10:12a very clear idea of what the technical
1:10:14problems were and they used this
1:10:18reversal position of your Thiokol
1:10:21managers simply to do what they wanted
1:10:24to do in the first place well I think
1:10:25that's correct and now I think that
1:10:26actually is underlined by the fact that
1:10:28they didn't ask any deeper probing
1:10:29questions during during the receipt of
1:10:31that answer and I actually had a
1:10:33presidential commission member who will
1:10:35remain nameless tell me there Roger it
1:10:37didn't make any difference what you guys
1:10:38did that night NASA was going to launch
1:10:40anyways period and so our guys would
1:10:43have come out way ahead if they just
1:10:45hung up the telephone conversation I
1:10:51know that but I can make just and I
1:10:54agree this great circumstantial evidence
1:10:56for that for that position but there's
1:10:58just as strong and evidence on the other
1:11:00side of that coin for NASA creating
1:11:01their own pressure this was NASA's
1:11:03premier PR opportunity since landing a
1:11:06man on the moon think about that
1:11:08now after that disaster now seven
1:11:11through a major reorganization
1:11:14and change our management do you think
1:11:17any of this would be prevented by the
1:11:20change of Management Center Styles they
1:11:22don't know well the floor the floor in
1:11:24that statement is major they did not go
1:11:26through a major reorganization they went
1:11:28through a cosmetic reorganization which
1:11:31means absolutely nothing
1:11:32the the motivation for Carson's schedule
1:11:35is alive and well people it's alive and
1:11:38well in and you don't have to take my
1:11:40word for it
1:11:41just go back and read the newspapers
1:11:43since they returned the flight NASA
1:11:46rolled out the return to flight vehicle
1:11:48on the 4th of July
1:11:50rah-rah-rah they no sooner got it out to
1:11:53the pad when they developed major fuel
1:11:56leaks which they acknowledged an
1:11:58oppression in a press release that they
1:12:00never ever have fixed on a pad they
1:12:02always roll back into the Vehicle
1:12:04Assembly Building and then proceeded to
1:12:06fix it on the pad there there are
1:12:09literally hundreds of examples since the
1:12:12return to flight like this that will
1:12:13absolutely conclusively prove to you
1:12:16that the organization is still badly
1:12:18broken over 10 scientific astronauts
1:12:22have resigned from the program why I ask
1:12:25you would scientific astronauts all PhDs
1:12:29all very talented individuals all who
1:12:32worked their fingers to the bone to get
1:12:34into the astronaut corps program why
1:12:36would they give up the premier technical
1:12:38opportunity this century if there still
1:12:40wasn't something really bad in the
1:12:42program and they would see seeing
1:12:44themselves you as the sacrificial lambs
1:12:46once again why would Sally Ride quit
1:12:48shortly after she issued a report
1:12:50doesn't make sense doesn't make sense at
1:12:54all unless the system is still screwed
1:12:56up
1:12:56I had numerous phone calls both with
1:12:59inside of NASA and with inside Morton
1:13:01Thiokol and the message was loud and
1:13:03clear
1:13:03Roger it is business as usual NASA set
1:13:07up a a snitch program an internal snitch
1:13:10program that would read that people
1:13:13would remain anonymous and it goes
1:13:14through the Columbus NASA facility the
1:13:17first person that reported a very severe
1:13:20problem and it had to do with the
1:13:22o-rings somebody had actually slipped
1:13:24the o-rings I guess with a razor blade
1:13:26and they were hoping to draw attention
1:13:28to two problems in a manufacturer the
1:13:30o-ring seal that was a hell of a way to
1:13:32do it but but that's what they did do
1:13:34you know that the first test case
1:13:36through this supposedly anonymous system
1:13:38they identified the individual what do
1:13:40you think that did to the system
1:13:42it totally diffused the system as being
1:13:44operative do you think that things have
1:13:47changed at NASA I just came from the
1:13:49nest it's guarded Space Center last week
1:13:51I got the ultimate invite to talk to my
1:13:53colleagues at NASA at a different center
1:13:55of course but the fact that Matt is
1:13:57there scared to death about this
1:13:59upcoming launch after I talk to them
1:14:00about this this incredibly lousy joint
1:14:03redesigned you know let me show you you
1:14:08want you want to see you want ammunition
1:14:10I'll give you an addition this is the
1:14:12redesigned joint that I have no problem
1:14:15with technically I don't like it as the
1:14:17best design but I have no problem safety
1:14:19wise you can recognize the original
1:14:21configuration of the joint in here see
1:14:23the crosshatch section that's the new
1:14:24additional piece that's now machined as
1:14:27part of the tang and this purpose is a
1:14:29capture feature to keep this leg from
1:14:30lifting off this is now an interference
1:14:33fit right here okay these parts is
1:14:36supposed to reuse nineteen times you you
1:14:39really think they're going to get
1:14:40nineteen uses out of these things
1:14:41after this interference fit is gold and
1:14:44chewed up every time they assemble this
1:14:45thing I don't think so
1:14:47but as far as it's or rings occur in
1:14:49their level rings they add another
1:14:50o-ring it's a vital ring and but this
1:14:54seal will always remain compressed and
1:14:57always get more compression as the
1:14:59vehicle is pressurized so from that
1:15:00standpoint it's not bad when all these
1:15:06go out this tries to go in but it can't
1:15:09anymore because this won't let it
1:15:11and as this mutual interface moves it
1:15:14just causes this comparing to stay
1:15:16compressed now see I had recommended a
1:15:18wire mesh elastomeric impregnated seal
1:15:23for this position that is used in the
1:15:26oil industry it can withstand thirty
1:15:28five thousand psi in two thousand
1:15:30degrees Fahrenheit for a long period of
1:15:33time way in excess of two minutes and
1:15:35they put a Viton o-ring seal in there
1:15:37you know I'm really ashamed to admit
1:15:40that I told them how to make this joint
1:15:42they they had this coming down
1:15:45originally right here and they could not
1:15:47figure out how to get a machining quill
1:15:49and they had a machine the slot and like
1:15:51a stupid jerk I told them to just had to
1:15:53relieve this and it could have machined
1:15:54it or else they would had to come up
1:15:55with a different design but I have no
1:15:57problem with this from a safety
1:15:58standpoint no problem at all it's a belt
1:16:01and suspenders
1:16:02they also have heaters on the joint to
1:16:04keep them nice and toasty warm okay this
1:16:07is the joint I really have a problem
1:16:08with this is a joint that I believe that
1:16:12none of you is engineering students or
1:16:14engineering professors would even design
1:16:16in your home workshop this is an
1:16:17abortion what we have here and you
1:16:21recognize the joint the nozzle fixed
1:16:23housing this is the F dome they've got a
1:16:25little bit different character of
1:16:27insulation they have what they call
1:16:29split flap which it allows the stress to
1:16:31be taken off this this opening they have
1:16:33and he's have been here and they have
1:16:35another ol ring is the level rings again
1:16:37right there but this is not used as a
1:16:39seal I'll explain that in a minute
1:16:41there's the original primary seal the
1:16:43original secondary seal and now they've
1:16:46drilled 100 radio holes between the
1:16:50original primary and secondary seal
1:16:52installed 100 bolts and underneath the
1:16:55head of these bolts they put the magic
1:16:56seals called stato seals they are washes
1:17:00and you guessed it o rings on the ID
1:17:04it's a blind assembly people by its very
1:17:07name stat means statics that o seal this
1:17:11piece relative to this piece moves in
1:17:14the axial direction roughly 8 to 10
1:17:16thousandths of an inch
1:17:17this piece moves relative to this piece
1:17:20some amount unknown in a circumferential
1:17:23plane because when these assembled
1:17:25they're not round I assure you they are
1:17:27round when they're pressurized to a
1:17:29thousand psi and so you have relative
1:17:32motion this joint is designed to have a
1:17:34gap it's designed to have a gap who in
1:17:38their right mind would actually clamp
1:17:41against an airspace against the gap that
1:17:45was designed a piece of equipment it was
1:17:48designed have a gap in it what
1:17:49means is that at a hundreds of street
1:17:51points you have metal metal contact and
1:17:52in between 100 discrete points you have
1:17:54a daisy effect with a gap in between the
1:17:57bolts it will act very similar not in
1:18:00magnitude but very similar in technique
1:18:02of deflection as the previous joint now
1:18:05remember we had already gotten past a
1:18:07primary ring sale in April 1985 flight
1:18:10this is not a test it was a real flight
1:18:12we ever get past the primary seal again
1:18:14we now present 101 potentially pets
1:18:18instead of one that we had originally I
1:18:20had also proposed a metal seal here
1:18:23which would have not only taken the
1:18:24temperature but would have been
1:18:26impervious to erosion should we ever get
1:18:28past my recommendation for this joint
1:18:31was to simply take these F domes put
1:18:33them up in a vertical turret lathe cut a
1:18:35cylindrical true service extend this
1:18:38they had to make all these new pieces
1:18:39anyways here extend this out import a
1:18:42register that would actually keep this
1:18:45piece from moving in and out like it had
1:18:47done before it would minimize it okay
1:18:49now get back to the adhesive I could I
1:18:51submit to you that if you had gone
1:18:52around and taking a poll with that call
1:18:54and asked is anybody ever concerned with
1:18:58hockey ass getting past this adhesive
1:18:59the answer including me would have been
1:19:01not on your life it'll never get past it
1:19:04he Civ Clark guys can never even get to
1:19:06this first sale this is considered a
1:19:08wiper seal and the purpose of this is to
1:19:10keep this adhesive from following the
1:19:13real seal during assembly
1:19:14now let me ask you a question if the
1:19:16purpose of this seal is to keep that
1:19:17adhesive from following that seal during
1:19:19assembly does not it follow that that
1:19:22adhesive will follow this seal during
1:19:24assembly guess what happened the first
1:19:27two development tests of this joint a
1:19:29hot gas test and a coal gas test they
1:19:32got gas right through here
1:19:35passed adhesive one gentleman told me
1:19:37that it stopped here and the other
1:19:38gentleman told me I went all the way up
1:19:40to the primary sale two out of two test
1:19:43failures in the redesign of this joint
1:19:45and this joint still went forward and is
1:19:47flying today now do you think something
1:19:50has changed at the agency I sure as hell
1:19:52don't think something's changed at the
1:19:53agency this is the type of crap that
1:19:56they still put out this is a Murphy of
1:19:59our type joint this is the joint
1:20:01why this disjoint is why I don't watch
1:20:04launches anymore
1:20:05I am absolutely afraid to watch the
1:20:09launch because of the fear of failure in
1:20:11real time again I could probably see a
1:20:13videotape but not in real time that was
1:20:15too much to go through that one time and
1:20:17I won't do it again but this is what
1:20:18we're faced in a program today thank you
1:20:22thank you very much the opportunity to
1:20:25talk to mr. Beaujolais again and the
1:20:27refreshments and old W building and I
1:20:29thank you again I think we all
1:20:31appreciated your presentation
1:20:33[Applause]

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