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Ukraine-Russie. Où en est-on ? — Transcript

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0:18Russia-Ukraine: Where do things stand?
0:21As the war grinds on, the initial blaze of global interest has
0:25flickered into a dull ember compared to its initial peak.
0:28There are many sources of distraction: conflicts in the Near and Middle East,
0:33areas of tension, whether in Greenland or American
0:37interventions in Venezuela.
0:39There are many sources of conflict and war.
0:42However, Ukraine and Russia are and will remain
0:46pivotal in global geopolitical developments.
0:49That is why we are going to revisit this issue today with Fabrice Ravel.
0:53Hello, Fabrice. Hello, Olivier.
0:56Hello, everyone.
0:58I’ve just hinted that the conflict seems to be commonplace.
1:00It’s been going on for a long time.
1:02We are already entering a fifth year.
1:03Can we ask ourselves today where things stand with this conflict?
1:06I have deliberately highlighted this expression
1:09to emphasise that the conflict has not only become
1:15a routine fixture of the landscape but is also
1:18being perceived as less significant. Such a decline
1:23in urgency would have been considered unthinkable or even
1:28impossible in 2024, only two years into the
1:32hostilities, when global attention was
1:36entirely and appropriately absorbed by the crisis.
1:39I believe there are two primary factors behind this shift.
1:43Firstly, 2025 was an exceptionally dense year. Specifically,
1:47we must consider the intensifying conflicts and frictions in the Middle East,
1:52escalating tensions over Greenland,
1:55and Washington’s recent interventions in Venezuela.
1:58It is evident that the initiatives led by Donald Trump
2:02—as explored in our previous session, ‘Trump:
2:06an initial assessment’— have consistently captivated
2:11both the media and high-level decision-makers.
2:15That’s the first explanation.
2:18Yet this is also reinforced by a secondary factor
2:21that we must also consider. What’s that?
2:24It’s a pervasive, almost unsettling perception that the conflict has
2:31reached a standstill, despite the ongoing reality of
2:35profound human loss and physical devastation.
2:39The word ‘frozen’ stands out to us because it feels as if the entire
2:45situation has stopped moving.
2:47Moreover, to elaborate on this term,
2:51I should point out that it is the same one I used in late February 2024.
2:57As we are recording this in February 2026, we should be
3:04clear on that consistency.
3:07So, two years ago, after two years of conflict,
3:09the front line had already become frozen.
3:11This suggests that as we add another two years (24 months) to the ledger,
3:16shifting our gaze to the long term, we get the impression that
3:20the clock has stopped.
3:22How can we avoid the parallel to the German novelist Erich Maria Remarque
3:30and his 1929 work, All Quiet on the Western Front?
3:33If we transpose that sentiment to Eastern Europe today, could we also ask
3:37whether it has truly become all quiet on the Eastern front?
3:42There is an impression of a gnawing on a map, with a few scraps of land
3:47nibbled away here and there.
3:50We might recall a caricature from a French satirical newspaper
3:54during the First World War, depicting an French officer rejoicing
3:59as he claims to be
4:00‘nibbling away’ at the German officers.
4:03The caption in this satirical newspaper is:
4:06Yes, like a mouse attacking a safe.
4:08To put it bluntly, if this is really the case, then we are
4:12facing a situation that looks set to continue
4:16for a very long time.
4:18However, I think our inquiry is still very important.
4:24Firstly, because we have had four years of war
4:30with significant events, destruction, and
4:32staggering losses —but also because
4:36we cannot fail to notice the developing challenges and
4:39consequences that, beyond the the conflict per se,
4:42have global and geopolitical repercussions.
4:45That is why this question cannot be ignored.
4:47Yet even if it appears frozen, a closer look reveals that the situation
4:51was shifting during this fourth year of conflict.
4:54Perhaps we should take stock of this year.
4:57Yes, perhaps starting with the most positive aspects,
5:01if you don't mind, especially since they are the most
5:05recent at the time of preparing this session.
5:08I think our audience senses the weight of this milestone: four years of conflict since
5:1324 February 2022, and we unfortunately find ourselves stepping into
5:19the shadow of a fifth year of war.
5:21What is this first positive event?
5:23We are observing a shift towards more frequent and
5:29seemingly more serious negotiations.
5:32First, towards the end of 2025, there were several meetings in Moscow.
5:37Crucially, the summit set for late February 2026 in
5:43Abu Dhabi is particularly compelling, as it marks the first instance of
5:48a trilateral engagement since 2022, this time between
5:53the Ukrainians, the Russians, and the United States.
5:57It will be the first time that all three will be meeting at the same time.
6:02Of particular interest within the Russian delegation is General Igor Kostyukov;
6:07as the head of Russian military intelligence for the army, his presence brings the full weight
6:14of the GRU to these proceedings.
6:18The presence of such a heavyweight Russian figure signals
6:21that the players may finally be putting
6:26their cards on the table, raising the stakes and—optimistically—
6:34the chances of a breakthrough.
6:36On the other hand, there are clearly a number of sticking points.
6:40Reflecting on 2025, the first thought that arises is
6:45the likelihood of severe stumbling blocks
6:50regarding territory, especially as Russia continues to claim
6:53the Donbas in its entirety.
6:56I think that we should explain the situation to our audience, clarifying that
7:01the Donbas was an integral part of Ukraine prior to
7:05the 24 February 2022 invasion. Currently, Ukrainian
7:08forces maintain control of 20% of the region;
7:13by fortifying the cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk into significant
7:17military bastions, they have created a defensive line
7:22that the Russian military
7:24has thus far been unable to breach.
7:27While this stumbling block is clearly a significant hurdle,
7:30it also necessitates a shift in our analytical focus.
7:35This transition will allow us to shift our perspectives to
7:40other issues that we will also examine
7:43during this session.
7:45In this regard, I should make a brief summary of what happened.
7:49Overall, between late February 2025 and February 2026,
7:53the Ukrainians are convinced that the Russians cannot sustain
8:00their current pace and that the situation is becoming untenable for the Russians.
8:04Kyiv anchors its confidence in a series of indicators that
8:09support this perspective.
8:11First, to answer your question: throughout the summer
8:14of 2025, Ukraine notably ramped up
8:20its long-range strikes.
8:22It is estimated that between July and late September/early October 2025,
8:27the Ukrainians carried out no fewer than 58 attacks
8:31on Russian territory.
8:33These strikes comprised drones and missiles that pierced
8:37the Russian heartland at ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometres.
8:42Crucially—and I will expand on this later— Ukraine also relies on
8:45the scale of Russian losses to support this view.
8:51Despite the immense difficulties
8:54in gathering information, data suggests
9:00a staggering toll: in 2025 alone,
9:03the Russian military machine appears to have bled out the equivalent
9:09of 350,000 men through death, injury, or missing in action.
9:15This means, Olivier, that in 2025—just one year of the
9:23four-year conflict—Russia incurred nearly a third of all its casualties
9:26since the war began.
9:27That’s the second point.
9:29The Ukrainians believe the war will become unsustainable for Russia because
9:32the rate of casualties they are inflicting
9:35cannot be maintained in the long term.
9:38What I find interesting as a third point is
9:42the Ukrainian goal of making the war a tangible reality
9:47for the Russian people.
9:50There are two key elements to consider in this regard, and
9:54both are central to what we should keep in mind for 2025.
10:00First, three senior officers were killed in attacks in Russia in 2025.
10:05I should add that the Ukrainians still refuse to admit
10:11they were behind these attacks.
10:14Ultimately, the air remains thick with an almost unbearable suspense
10:18over who is truly responsible for the attacks.
10:21Another notable operation is Spiderweb,
10:25which the Ukrainians launched on 1 June 2025.
10:29Operation Spiderweb involved drone attacks on
10:34multiple sites, though the drones were first transported in lorries
10:39to bring them closer to their targets.
10:42This impressive,
10:44highly coordinated operation struck multiple targets simultaneously.
10:48Using missiles or drones, it targeted Russian strategic bombers.
10:54Ukraine claims 40 were destroyed,
10:57though Western observers estimate the number at 20.
11:01It is clear the aim was to convey the message that Ukraine is still there,
11:07capable of striking deeper into Russian territory
11:10—including strategic targets— to make the cost of the war
11:14more tangible for the Russian people.
11:20These are the three factors underpinning the
11:23Ukrainian calculation that a form of ultimate victory
11:29remains achievable.
11:31Yet this clearly hinders the negotiations mentioned at the outset.
11:34I must interrupt, Fabrice, because these points suggest
11:37Ukraine is in a strong position to attain victory.
11:41I'm sure that Russian perception of the same situation is completely different.
11:45You're absolutely right.
11:46On the other side of the board, the Russians are
11:49entirely convinced that the war has become unsustainable for Ukraine.
11:53That leads me to elaborate on the primary points
11:57of the Russian focus.
12:00We should note that this diametric opposition in assessing
12:04the same situation, while predictable,
12:08significantly hampers negotiations.
12:14What are the three main points on which the Russians base their
12:18belief that the war is becoming unsustainable for the Ukrainians?
12:22I hasten to add that I am deliberately using these
12:27parallel descriptions to highlight that both belligerents remain
12:31convinced of their capacity for victory.
12:34This poses a problem when trying to find a way out of this war.
12:38The first point is the evident failure of
12:42the Russian military to achieve the announced objectives
12:47it had set for itself leading into 2025.
12:50Admittedly, they sustained very heavy losses.
12:53Granted, the scale of captured territory is relatively small;
12:58however, an examination of two particular instances
13:01provides necessary nuance.
13:03By October 2025, the Russian advance took 65 km² of
13:10Ukrainian territory, and the second week of November 2025
13:16saw a sudden surge to 134 km² of Ukrainian territory,
13:22which easily doubled the first week.
13:24One could argue that, given the areas involved, this is still very modest.
13:30Yet two nuances may nevertheless need to be put into perspective here.
13:35First, Moscow has clearly changed its tactics.
13:38We must move beyond the prevailing Western trope that
13:42Russia continues to employ the Soviet-era
13:47doctrine of suicidal infantry charges to secure
13:51marginal tactical objectives, as it did during the
13:54Second World War.
13:55Because ultimately, after a while, they would still manage
13:58to take a few square kilometres.
14:00Today, the Russian army no longer operates in the same way.
14:03Russian troops now operate by infiltrating small groups to avoid
14:09excessive losses and the great danger posed by drones, which we discussed
14:14in previous sessions on this war.
14:17This is exactly why the map shows only incremental shifts,
14:22though the actual pressure on the line is unrelenting.
14:27Following this initial remark, it is clear that while
14:32the gnawing is gradual, it remains constant and—crucially—
14:35always in the same direction.
14:37Consequently, we are left with the distinct impression that the Russian military is
14:43intensifying its pressure on the Ukrainian forces.
14:45That seems relatively objective to highlight.
14:49There is also a second compelling point: demographics.
14:55Yet this point on demographics goes beyond a tally of losses.
14:59What do we see when we put this demographic point into perspective?
15:04By comparison, the Russian population is approximately around 143 million.
15:13Yet we don’t know the Ukrainian population.
15:18And that's key.
15:20I imagine some in our audience want to ask: What do you mean, we don't know?
15:24Well, nobody knows.
15:25I assure you that I’ve checked multiple sources.
15:28Basically, current estimates place Ukraine’s population
15:31between 28 and 38 million.
15:33When you get such wide range,
15:36it means that nobody knows.
15:37When the margin of error reaches 10 million on a base of 28 to 38 million,
15:43it signals a major instability in the data.
15:46Some sources even place the figure below 28.
15:51To grasp where things stand in these terms,
15:54we should note that in 2022, before the invasion,
15:59Ukraine’s population—including both Ukrainians and foreign nationals—
16:04stood at an estimated 41 million.
16:09That’s clearly a huge loss.
16:12This leads to an inescapable question: how can we account for such
16:17a massive decline —one that clearly extends far beyond
16:21the tally of battlefield casualties— and what explains
16:24the staggering gap between 28 and 38.
16:27Here, we arrive at a critical juncture: we must understand why
16:32this argument—one increasingly weighed by
16:37the Russians—is so pivotal; specifically, certain sources estimate
16:40that 10 million Ukrainians have fled the country.
16:44While the numbers remain contentious, we can look to
16:47the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an organisation
16:52of renowned professional rigour whose impartiality in
16:57this conflict is widely respected. This UN agency cites a figure
17:01of 5,100,000 Ukrainian refugees on European soil.
17:06This figure rises to 5,600,000 when considering all Ukrainian refugees in
17:10all countries around the world.
17:13That’s is more than a considerable number.
17:16What would the Russians be interested in this figure?
17:19From their perspective, this indicates a profound weariness on the Ukrainian side,
17:23suggesting that morale is flagging and
17:27the will to fight is eroding.
17:31Another point the Russians may utilise—
17:35—following our discussion concerning the major events
17:40that happened in 2025— is the fact that on
17:4426 August 2025, the Ukrainian government began allowing
17:49young men aged 18 to 22 to travel internationally once more.
17:54Kyiv was reluctant to take this step, even though
17:56the minimum age for conscription in the Ukrainian military is 25.
18:00Quite clearly, the goal was to stem a large-scale
18:06exodus of citizens who
18:08—to put it bluntly— wished to dodge the draft
18:10and reality of war.
18:11Multiple reports point to the same conclusion:
18:14100,000 Ukrainians have left the country
18:18and remain abroad.
18:19Thus, for the Russians, this is an indication
18:23—and I say this purely analytically— that there is
18:29a sense of terminal fatigue among the Ukrainian population,
18:35who are consequently nearing a breaking point.
18:38This accounts for the third point on which
18:41the Russian are relying, namely the heavy bombardment
18:45of Ukrainian urban centres like Kyiv, with a particular focus
18:49on power stations and the wider energy grid.
18:52At this point, the objective is quite obvious,
18:57particularly as these strikes escalated in January 2026—three days in particular.
19:03I am specifically thinking of January 9th and 24th.
19:07It is quite clear that the intent is to plunge a city of 4 million inhabitants—Kyiv—into
19:11darkness, but more crucially into the cold.
19:14Bear in mind, the temperature in Kyiv right now is -20º.
19:18One can almost feel the distress at the tightening vice of
19:23these combined pressures.
19:25They are doing so all the more because, current evidence suggests
19:30Russian production of drones,
19:34glide bombs and missiles is accelerating, whereas
19:38Ukrainian air defences are becoming less effective at repelling
19:42such sustained attacks.
19:45We are looking at a situation where each side,
19:48based on a number of arguments,
19:51hopes that the other will crack first.
19:55The picture is more nuanced than it appears, as each side views the situation
19:59very differently.
20:00If we take all this as our compass, what scenarios could we
20:05actually envision concerning Russia and Ukraine in 2026?
20:08There are three.
20:10Considering the groundwork we’ve just laid, I think these points won’t be
20:13particularly difficult to grasp.
20:15The first scenario would be that of a Russian implosion—
20:22the disintegration of the army and the continued implosion of Russian society.
20:27This scenario relies more on arguments like the ones
20:30put forward by the Ukrainians.
20:32But why is this scenario not so ridiculous to envision?
20:36Quite simply because it mirrors the Russian army in 1917. If we put
20:40it into perspective, we should recall that
20:45General Brusilov’s 1916 offensive —while tactically successful
20:51against Austro-Hungarian forces— incurred such
20:55staggering losses that it became a Pyrrhic victory.
20:59The gains were insignificant compared to the consequences, which ultimately
21:04shattered the morale and confidence the Russians had placed in the Tsar.
21:11This perspective suggests the brink of revolution.
21:14This event is clearly highlighted in Alexandre Jevakhoff's La Guerre Civile Russe
21:18(The Russian Civil War: 1917-1922) and that is exactly
21:23what is happening at this moment.
21:25On the other hand, of course, the second scenario
21:29is the collapse of the Ukrainian army.
21:32We must avoid dismissing this scenario entirely, notwithstanding the
21:37apparent hesitation of Western media
21:40and analysts to contemplate this scenario.
21:46I think it’s appropriate to underscore this ‘hesitation to contemplate’,
21:51but in light of how things are perceived in Russia, this is not entirely improbable.
21:56Then there is a third scenario which, nonetheless, appears the
22:01most probable: a situation where no clear victor
22:06emerges, leading to a potential
22:11armistice followed by a peace settlement
22:19involving various concessions.
22:21However, for this to happen, both sides must be willing to make
22:26concessions that are at least tolerable to their opponent.
22:31This scenario is all the more likely to succeed because there is another player with
22:36some interest: the United States of America.
22:40We should remember—and our session will increasingly
22:45demonstrate this—that this conflict
22:48did not emerge ex nihilo; rather, it is inextricably linked
22:53to a broader set of external parameters.
22:57We must avoid the trap of analysing conflicts
23:00in total isolation from their context.
23:02We must ground this analysis in a set of specific,
23:05rational frameworks.
23:07Why would Washington be so interested in the prospects
23:10of an armistice?
23:11Because from the US point of view, it is essential to
23:18break up the burgeoning partnership between Russia and China.
23:25Why would that be essential for the Americans?
23:28They are banking on the fact that a ceasefire would open the door
23:32to rebuilding a relationship with Russia, with trade deals serving
23:38as the initial bridge.
23:41Washington’s real play here is to flip Russia into an ally to help
23:45contain China on issues in the Pacific and, particularly, Taiwan.
23:50We can base these comments on two aspects:
23:54First, you may recall a session we recorded on
23:5924 February 2022, the day the war broke out,
24:02and I remember the date well because it shocked both of us.
24:07In that session, we examined whether the rapprochement between Russia and
24:12China was a one-off, merely tactical approach, or whether it would become
24:16a strategic rapprochement.
24:17It was incredible to do that session on that day, wasn't it?
24:20Why would I recall that session?
24:23I made the point that, if you scratch the surface, the actual points of convergence
24:28between Moscow and Beijing are rather thin.
24:30They even had a number of points of divergence that made this alliance not
24:35necessarily automatic in the long term or from a strategic point of view.
24:39This is exactly the lever the Americans are pulling. They are applying
24:44the Kissinger Theorem, which posits
24:48a landscape dominated by three major powers
24:51—and we should admit that there are mainly three major powers, namely
24:55China, the USA, and Russia.
24:58As Kissinger once quipped, you should never be the one who stands alone.
25:01Let’s not forget what Kissinger means: I am going to separate China, which
25:06was communist in 1972, from the USSR, which was also communist in 1972.
25:11Ideology played no role.
25:12This is very important to point out today.
25:15We tend to forget that in geopolitics, alliances disregard ideologies.
25:20It is all about interests. These are not questions of ideology.
25:22This is very important to grasp in geopolitics.
25:25Kissinger noted that while
25:26both the Chinese and the Soviets were communists, they
25:29seemed to have a number of animosities.
25:33That fits in with what we were saying earlier.
25:35The goal was to widen the antagonism and bring China to the US side.
25:40Before he died, Henry Kissinger said that the US should
25:44get closer to the Russians.
25:45At the time, he was criticised and some wondered if he had changed his mind.
25:48No, he changed a player.
25:51He argued that China represented the primary threat to US interests, which
25:55called for a strategic pivot towards Moscow.
25:58This is a crucial point. We can clearly see that US interest in an armistice
26:03is a genuine strategic objective, rather than the mere
26:08presidential whim it is so often portrayed to be.
26:12That's very important to keep in mind.
26:15This last scenario of an armistice seems quite desirable.
26:19The warring sides would find common ground, thus serving Washington’s
26:23strategic interests and ending the loss of life on the ground.
26:27Why is it so complicated to implement?
26:30Perhaps because Vladimir Putin is not interested.
26:33That’s especially striking in the comments.
26:36The question is raised often.
26:38Very well, let’s try to put ourselves in the shoes of the Russians and Vladimir Putin
26:42as a way to understand how they might see things.
26:47Let’s start by briefly looking at a point that is entirely consistent with
26:50what we examined previously, and this may even sound
26:54a bit of a repetition.
26:56Given the arguments they have presented,
26:59the Russians may reasonably believe that despite the slight nibbling at the front line,
27:04they are not losing; instead, they remain capable of
27:09of exerting significant pressure on their adversary.
27:14Why, therefore, should they rush to end the war
27:18when they believe they hold a small but
27:22definite advantage?
27:24Their argument is at least plausible.
27:26I may not agree, but I understand.
27:29The second point is arguably more significant and compelling.
27:32It also deserves a much brighter spotlight.
27:36Indeed, this point was addressed during a session that sought to
27:39answer the question of whether Russia has a strategic culture.
27:43Because we need to understand the mindset of the Russians.
27:50We must remember that history and geography
27:56inevitably shape strategic culture.
28:00When we reflect on this, we first encounter Russia’s
28:04frustration stemming from limited access to the seas.
28:08Russia is driven by an obsession with
28:10reaching warm seas. It is a profound
28:13geopolitical paradox that although the country covers
28:1717 million square kilometres and is the world’s largest landmass,
28:19it lacks the maritime access necessary to dominate a world
28:24that is 70% water. Because its own coasts are largely frozen,
28:28Russia remains focused on securing the warm-water ports
28:30it needs—hence its logical obsession
28:33with the warm seas.
28:35A second point we examined in that session is an arguably legitimate fear.
28:38I am referring to the pervasive Russian apprehension regarding Western
28:44aggression; a historical concern grounded in successive invasions, including
28:49those by the Teutonic Knights, Charles XII of Sweden,
28:53Napoleon, and the combatants of both world wars.
28:55What’s so important about these historical facts?
28:57Because they ended up conceiving not only the necessity, but the obsession
29:06with establishing a glacis.
29:09A glacis, in geopolitical terms, is a type of intermediate buffer territory
29:14intended to absorb any aggressive advance. This
29:19was the role of the Warsaw Pact countries, such as East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria,
29:23the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania, where the
29:25Soviet army maintained a heavy presence.
29:29Now; why would I bring that up?
29:32The presence of Western troops as guarantors of Ukrainian security
29:38—a proposal often discussed— remains an unthinkable
29:41condition for the Russians in any armistice agreement.
29:44Such a deployment would be tantamount to saying that the Russians—who claim they
29:49began the war precisely to remove Ukraine from the NATO
29:54or European Union sphere of influence— would now accept a situation
29:57where NATO and Europe's presence would be stronger than it was in 2022,
30:02despite the territorial gains the Russians have had.
30:07It is thus essential to consider this factor,
30:10as it underscores a strategic perception that is not exclusive to
30:13Vladimir Putin, but is shared by
30:15the entire Russian political and military leadership.
30:18This view appears to be deeply rooted in the Russian national psyche.
30:22Whether we regret it or disagree with it, this reality seems
30:27to me to be entirely unavoidable.
30:31Crucially, an armistice would
30:35end the war and could ultimately lead to peace.
30:40However, does an authoritarian power truly benefit from ending the war?
30:45Unfortunately, in a time of war, the entire society
30:48of such a power is focused on the conflict,
30:54inevitably influenced by the prevailing propaganda.
30:59The risk its leader faces in ending this conflict is that
31:02the population may no longer be mobilised by
31:05the struggle; instead, they may suddenly find the opportunity to question
31:11both the true reasons for the conflict and
31:15what was actually achieved.
31:17They could also ask whether the current government legitimately
31:23and adequately conduct the war.
31:25Ultimately, it becomes apparent that ending this war could prompt
31:28the Russian populace to scrutinise the legitimacy
31:32of Vladimir Putin’s power.
31:34I am not entirely sure that Russian leaders would be
31:37very inclined to take that risk.
31:39Thus, within the framework of an armistice, there may be
31:42an incentive to redirect focus towards external theatres
31:47to forestall such domestic scrutiny.
31:49One theatre may be the Baltic states.
31:52Let's take the question from another angle.
31:53Are there any factors that could persuade Vladimir Putin to consider
31:57the possibility of an armistice?
32:00Yes. What makes this especially interesting is that there are actually
32:03three distinct factors that could lead Vladimir
32:10Putin to reconsider this prospect and question whether
32:15an armistice is truly advisable.
32:17I suggest we examine these three factors one by one.
32:19What are they?
32:20Let’s begin with a factor that we have not yet highlighted
32:26in this session.
32:28This factor is linked to macroeconomics.
32:30There are legitimate grounds to question what the real situation of
32:37the Russian economy is today.
32:40This question is both crucial and problematic because
32:45we are finding that the experts do not agree at all.
32:48Many of them believe that after four years,
32:51the economic sanctions imposed by Washington and Europe
32:55—while taking much longer than expected—
33:01are finally beginning to bear fruit.
33:03There are also a growing number of experts who sense that the Russian economy is
33:08teetering on the edge of an abyss, which is a haunting prospect to the Russian
33:13authorities, especially with the ghost of 1917
33:16still looming in the background.
33:19But regardless of where things stand
33:23exactly from a macroeconomic perspective, if I may, Olivier,
33:26I believe there are other questions we need to ask
33:32—questions that I feel are not being sufficiently addressed in the Western media.
33:36Because that is a fact.
33:38The first: is this fact being reported objectively?
33:42Is it being reported to Vladimir Putin? First question.
33:46Now the second: does Vladimir Putin want to hear it?
33:50That's the second question.
33:52To my point: does any particular adviser
33:54currently have Putin’s ear? Is there a wizard in
33:57the Kremlin? I draw that image
33:59from Giuliano da Empoli’s novel The Wizard of the Kremlin (2022).
34:04Is there a wizard in the Kremlin with the authority and power to
34:09pull back the curtain and speak the truth about the Russian economy?
34:13That, once again, is a point that I feel is not being raised often enough.
34:16There’s a gap between objective facts and what can be reported.
34:20This assumes an affirmative answer to those macroeconomic
34:27questions, potentially
34:31indicating an initial slowdown.
34:34Yet, a secondary effect exists which Emmanuel Todd, in
34:39The Defeat of the West (Le défaite de l’Occident), uniquely identifies and
34:44elucidates with such precision.
34:47The fact is that we have only addressed two aspects of demographics.
34:52I’ll explain:
34:53conflict-related loss on the one hand; actual demographic ratio of
34:58the population on the other.
35:00I didn’t specify that earlier, but the overall ratio is
35:041 for the Ukrainians and about 4.3 for the Russians.
35:08In terms of losses? In terms of population.
35:12OK; in terms of population.
35:13In terms of population.
35:14Let’s stick with these two aspects.
35:16But it's important that you asked me to clarify because it allows us to see,
35:19in terms of reserves, what each country's respective reserves
35:24would be, which could explain why the Russians think they have
35:27the long-term advantage.
35:29This ultimately takes us back,
35:30with your clarification, Olivier, to the point
35:34that Emmanuel Todd raised in his book.
35:37So far we haven't mentioned fertility rates and birth rates.
35:40However, if we look at the fertility and birth rates
35:44in Russia since the collapse of
35:49the Soviet Union in 1989 —focusing
35:51strictly on Russian territories to ensure
35:55a fair comparison— we see
35:58that the population isn't growing.
36:02Even in peacetime, Russia struggled
36:07to maintain its fertility and birth rates, which are exceptionally
36:12low and cannot maintain the Russian population at the same level.
36:17What that means is that these losses are incredibly detrimental.
36:21Since the Russian population was already struggling to
36:27maintain its numbers in peacetime, the long-term impact
36:33on fertility and birth rates might lead Vladimir Putin
36:36to reconsider the wisdom of
36:40a prolonged conflict, which we can clearly see
36:44has a very significant impact on Russian demographics, once again
36:49in terms of fertility and birth rates.
36:50We’ve now shone a light on the demographic landscape from 3 different vantage
36:55points, which is crucial.
36:56One last point: the war is still going on.
37:02What does this statement mean?
37:06This brings us back to our sessions on Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, where we
37:11showed that both strategists believe that if you are
37:14forced to go to war, you’ve already lost.
37:17So now, you've been at war for four years.
37:19And the idea is: even if you win, who have you won?
37:25Clausewitz, as we know, defined war as the continuation of politics
37:29by other means; therefore, looking at his work alongside
37:32Sun Tzu’s, the goal is to achieve your aim and find an exit as fast as possible.
37:36In this regard, now with the image of these two strategists
37:40displayed on each side of the screen, they may be asking:
37:44after four years of war, have you considered the scale of the destruction,
37:51the staggering losses, the economic fallout,
37:54and the diplomatic strain you are mired in?
37:58We’ll inevitably reach a juncture where we must put an end to it,
38:02particularly as a final point emerges: paradoxically,
38:07continuation may no longer align with Chinese interests,
38:12thus incentivising Vladimir Putin’s withdrawal.
38:16We must never forget that when you are allied with someone, it is
38:19usually due to geopolitical necessity and dependence rather than friendship.
38:24However, the problem with the current alliance is that
38:29the longer the war lasts, the more Russia becomes dependent
38:33on China for its economy, trade
38:37and equipment. Conversely, the Chinese have
38:41realised that as long as the Americans are preoccupied
38:46with this conflict, they have less capacity
38:49to monitor developments in the Pacific.
38:51Consequently, there are several factors that could lead
38:57the Russians to reconsider their position, despite the
39:03initial outlook discussed earlier.
39:05With the conflict now entrenched, and an elusive end not entirely in sight,
39:09the real question is: what will happen if, and when, the fighting finally stops?
39:13That, ultimately, is the major question.
39:16That’s what I wanted to convey as part of our title: Where do things stand?
39:22After four years of being bogged down
39:26in a conflict that seems destined for trench warfare
39:32—a war of position— there is a sense that
39:36we must simply accept its presence and turn our attention elsewhere.
39:41We are thus facing many perspectives and questions.
39:45First, how will the conflict end?
39:49How will things stand with the military balance and
39:53political decisions?
39:55Following on from my question, what position and status will
40:00these unavoidable decisions eventually give to Ukraine?
40:06A position of more or less neutrality?
40:08Entry into the European Union or into the fold of NATO?
40:12With the presence of European forces or not?
40:16And following that thread, we arrive at a question currently left in the shadows:
40:21what kind of hand will Europe extend to a Russia that has finally laid down its arms?
40:26What geopolitical structure is being proposed?
40:31It is imperative to remind those observers who tend to categorise nations as
40:35permanent belligerents that geographical reality
40:42is a decisive factor; Russia remains the terrestrial extension of Europe,
40:47and eventually, a strategy must be formulated for
40:50a state that will perpetually exist on the European frontier.
40:54We are thus confronted with a series of enquiries that will inextricably
40:58influence not only the future of relations between Europe and the USA,
41:02but also the trajectory of European integration itself.
41:05However, we must also consider a real second player.
41:09I’m thinking of one specific country: China.
41:14I’d also like to address this factor through questions.
41:19Because ultimately, over the last five or six weeks,
41:23three very important questions have emerged.
41:27I believe we should keep them in mind.
41:29First, what do these repeated and increasingly significant
41:37reshuffles of the Chinese high command over
41:41the past few weeks and months actually signify?
41:45I should point out that these personnel changes
41:50have expanded in scope, now encompassing
41:54the most senior tiers of the Chinese military command structure.
41:59These are therefore very significant reshuffles.
42:02Secondly, what is the significance of Xi Jinping's
42:06address that began on New Year's Eve, thus on 31 December but ended about
42:16ten minutes into 2026? It was clearly aimed at Westerners, given the use of the
42:19Western calendar, and we cannot fail to notice that images
42:23of the Chinese army were highlighted
42:28and Taiwan was reminded that it remains a target for China.
42:32In the same vein, how can we not also question
42:35the significance of the hour-and-a-half-long
42:38Chinese parade on 3 September 2025? It was
42:42a display of power that was, to say the least,
42:46obvious.
42:48But then, perhaps we should turn these questions on their head to see how
42:54they mirror the very issue we are examining today.
42:57Perhaps our audience is asking another question:
43:00where is heading with all this?
43:04We can certainly ask:
43:07if the massive changes in the Chinese high command,
43:12alongside this blatant desire to show off their power—and the word ‘desire’ is key—
43:18actually points to a real weakness—the very paradox we
43:21touched on before. In this regard, I’ll cite
43:23Allison’s Destined for War: Can America and China
43:27Escape Thucydides' Trap?
43:29We cannot really say that the title is uninspiring, can we?
43:32Certainly, Graham Allison wanted this title
43:35to tell us: there is a risk of war because the established power is
43:37always afraid of being overtaken by the challenging power.
43:41But here, we could point out that suddenly, there is an impression that Beijing
43:44seems to be doubting its power and is wondering whether they are
43:48really looking at real window of opportunity to be seized now, particularly
43:52concerning Taiwan, before it's too late.
43:56There is clearly a risk in this regard.
44:00Should this be true, there is a risk of being confronted
44:03with two simultaneous crises: an intractable
44:06conflict between Ukraine and Russia,
44:10and an increasingly imminent threat of warfare
44:13in Taiwan.
44:16Consequently, we run the risk of conflicts that are
44:20no longer isolated from one another, but rather interconnected,
44:24precipitating a state of war that I would categorise
44:28as global rather than worldwide.
44:30That, in fact, is the real risk we are currently facing.
44:35If I wanted to hammer this point home, I would also have to
44:39mention that on Wednesday, 4 February 2026,
44:45official media in both countries reported a communication
44:49between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.
44:54In this exchange, Xi Jinping himself stressed the importance of strengthening
44:59bilateral cooperation, which confirms
45:02—for anyone still in doubt— that the prospect
45:04of strategic cooperation between Russia and China
45:11is very much alive.
45:13All of these signals, to my mind, sharpen the point of the question
45:18we’ve asked today and the need for a swift reckoning:
45:21Where exactly do things stand?
45:24This is necessary to prevent the conflict from dragging on too long and ultimately
45:29yield deleterious consequences for the rest of the world.
45:33Fabrice, it is common to open geopolitical meetings with a
45:35question: where do things stand?
45:37While it is less common to finish on so many questions, they have succeeded
45:40in opening up a range of deep and complex insight for further thought.
45:43I think we will see the value of continuing along these lines
45:47in a future session. Thank you, Fabrice.
45:49Thank you.
45:50That wraps up this session of Rendez-vous de la Géopolitique.
45:52Thank you all for following us.

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