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Trump : Quel 1er bilan géopolitique ? — Transcript

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0:17A geopolitical assessment for Trump?
0:20With Donald Trump now a year into his second term,
0:24this inquiry is both unavoidable and essential.
0:29Why unavoidable?
0:30Because US initiatives are multiplying in variety and
0:34complexity, necessitating renewed scrutiny.
0:36This assessment is vital to distinguish the Trump administration’s
0:41underlying strategy and structural objectives.
0:45Ultimately, it enables us to understand the specific geopolitical influences
0:49this action exerts on the world.
0:53Fabrice Ravel, hello.
0:54Hello, Olivier. Hello everyone.
0:57I misspoke.
0:58I said ‘this action’, not ‘these actions’; and there have been countless actions
1:02since the beginning of Trump's mandate.
1:05That's the least we can say.
1:07I will take this a step further and outline the primary developments.
1:13It will become evident that there has been
1:18a significant flurry of activity from the
1:21Trump administration between 20 January 2025
1:27and January 2026, and he has only been in
1:33office since he was sworn in on 20 January 2025.
1:36Indeed, I have identified nine key events to report,
1:41which I will summarise briefly so we can be in a better position
1:48to respond to the question regarding an initial assessment.
1:53However, we must first establish a clear record of the specific actions taken.
1:56To begin with, both chronologically and in terms of
2:00importance for Trump, we had a re-engagement
2:04with Vladimir Putin and Russian diplomacy.
2:08This has become a common thread.
2:12We could even refine that by describing it as a recurrent theme
2:15throughout the year—playing out almost like a serialised drama or soap opera—
2:22marked by a relentless cycle of encounters,
2:27break-ups or ruptures, and then the inevitable
2:31comebacks.
2:34In the wake of those initial overtures, Donald Trump used
2:39a huge chart in early April 2025 to delineate what he characterised as a landscape
2:44of global trade imbalances and excessive foreign customs duties foreign
2:50customs duties that left the USA on the losing side of the global ledger.
2:55Six days later, Donald Trump granted a 90-day moratorium.
2:59By August, however, these duties were formally imposed on several countries,
3:03while the moratorium was extended for others.
3:05This sequence demonstrates a dynamic, proactive approach that
3:11necessitates careful interpretation of
3:13subsequent developments.
3:15Trump would later use his social media platform
3:20on 10 May 2025 to claim a pivotal role in brokering a ceasefire
3:26between India and Pakistan.
3:27This long-standing bilateral tension was a subject
3:32we previously examined, specifically regarding whether the crisis
3:35would escalate into open conflict or subside.
3:39Subsequently, on the night of 21 June 2025, several Iranian nuclear facilities
3:45were targeted and bombed by B-2 stealth bombers.
3:50That was already number four which brings us to
3:52the fifth major intervention: the facilitated peace process between Rwanda and
3:57the Democratic Republic of Congo.
4:00An initial treaty was signed in late June, which was subsequently formalised and
4:05extended by the Washington Agreements of 5 December, drawn up to seek
4:09long-term diplomatic continuity.
4:12In late September 2025, the Gaza Strip Treaty—also known as
4:17the Trump Plan— was reportedly signed.
4:22While this highlights a series of apparent peace initiatives,
4:26it is significant that on 20 December 2025,
4:29Trump ordered US military strikes on Islamic State bases
4:34in Syria. This was followed up by the launch
4:40on Christmas Day (25 December) of twelve Tomahawk missiles
4:43targeting Islamic State bases in north-western Nigeria.
4:48Finally, on 3 January 2026, the Venezuelan president was captured.
4:56Another common thread is Trump’s interest in
5:01Greenland, evinced through Donald Trump Jr's visit in January 2025 before
5:08his father’s inauguration.
5:10We can see a persistent demand, if not direct pressure—the audience may
5:15choose the term they find most appropriate—
5:18exerted on both Canada and Greenland.
5:22We can clearly see a sort of frenzy that requires
5:24careful interpretation, because we’re looking at multifaceted actions
5:29involving multiple actors spanning different global regions.
5:33The scope of these actions encompasses virtually every continent. Moreover,
5:37a strategic oscillation is evident between diplomatic attempts to
5:43broker peace and overt military operations seeking
5:46decisive victory through armed conflict or war.
5:50This is where I think we would need interpretation to
5:57accurately evaluate these actions.
6:00Yes, since the sheer volume and geographical diversity of interventions
6:04—coupled with their varying modalities—make it difficult
6:07to discern any coherence.
6:09To gain clarity, specific analytical criteria should be applied.
6:13I suggest a first step entailing an examination of the tangible
6:17results of these American initiatives.
6:19And then, perhaps, a second step to link these actions to the objectives
6:24set out by the Trump administration.
6:26Let’s thus begin with the results.
6:27We should first seek to objectively assess what the results of
6:33the actions taken might be.
6:36From a methodological perspective, we should maintain a rather natural,
6:40yet essential distinction.
6:43Yet how can we assess these short- and long-term results?
6:48As we shall see, diplomatically and militarily,
6:52our assessment must
6:55be nuanced according to the timeframe, particularly when examining results from
7:03a short-term or a long-term perspective.
7:06Beginning with the short-term results,
7:10the immediate impression is that —I’ll insist on this—we can
7:15objectively point to the sentiment of multiple victories on many fronts.
7:20First, diplomatically; since we can conclude that
7:24the Trump administration endeavoured to secure, if not
7:29peace, at least a ceasefire and end to hostilities
7:33in three pivotal geopolitical theatres, namely the
7:36India-Pakistan conflict, the dispute
7:39between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and then the
7:43Middle East, following the implementation of
7:47a peace plan for the Gaza Strip.
7:49On the military front, the successes
7:54were equally substantial.
7:56These operations can be categorised by their
8:00increasing operational complexity.
8:07The missile strikes conducted in Nigeria were undoubtedly effective;
8:14however, the air campaigns in Syria and
8:18the sophisticated strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure
8:22represent a higher echelon of coordination.
8:26The latter, in particular, demonstrated precise coordination between
8:30bombers and tactical air forces.
8:32Finally, if one focuses strictly on the operational dimensions of
8:38the recent intervention in Venezuela, it is clear that
8:42we are observing a successful joint military engagement.
8:45This required a seamless integration of aerial strikes,
8:50the tactical deployment of ground troops—which is,
8:54after all, a wholly different undertaking—
8:56and a capacity for the projection and withdrawal of supporting naval forces.
9:01From that vantage point, it was clearly successful.
9:04However, if we examine these events from a longer-term perspective,
9:11we can legitimately question the results that have been achieved.
9:19I must also point out that shifting from the short term to the long term is,
9:24ultimately, a shift from the tactical to the strategic dimension.
9:29This point warrants elaboration, as it necessitates a reassessment
9:33of the apparent initial impact of
9:37these actions.
9:38We will inevitably encounter a pendulum swing, as
9:44both diplomatic and military consequences require
9:48a longer horizon to fully appreciate the
9:53scope of these actions.
9:55Firstly, from a diplomatic viewpoint,
9:57it must be observed that while the aforementioned events
10:02include ceasefires and truces, fundamental geopolitical tensions remain
10:06unresolved.
10:07The long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan
10:14remains at an impasse.
10:16We might add that with regard to Rwanda and
10:21the Democratic Republic of Congo, it took exhaustive American diplomatic
10:24pressure to get the Washington agreements signed on 5 December, and they faced
10:31multiple delays because the fighting had not really stopped.
10:36Moreover, fighting between Rwanda and the DRC
10:39has not only persisted but has seemingly intensified
10:42since the signing.
10:44We may thus get the impression that we’re sadly continuing in the same vein as all the
10:50regional peace deals that had failed previously.
10:53As for the situation in the Middle East, while an initial phase was clearly signed
10:58on 9 October in Egypt between Israel and several Palestinian authorities, we remain
11:03a long way from a definitive peace. Tensions remain
11:07critically high.
11:09Even at this stage, we must be cautious; militarily,
11:12the current results may represent temporary tactical successes,
11:15but they have failed to resolve
11:19the underlying structural issues.
11:24I haven’t even delved into the sporadic strikes mentioned in Syria or Nigeria.
11:31However, I would like to emphasise what happened in Iran, since we did record
11:36a session earlier on Iran addressing whether
11:40air power would be enough to secure victory.
11:45If you recall, Olivier, we emphasised that it was not about securing victory, rather
11:49it concerned the ability to buy time and delay Iran's research into or
11:57acquisition of nuclear weapons.
11:59That matter needed to be completely nuanced.
12:03I think two additional points should also be added.
12:07Firstly, if we consider all the measures
12:12taken on customs agreements or customs tariffs,
12:15it is important to note that the effects of such measures can only be
12:19assessed over a much longer period of time.
12:22While we are sure to unpack this further in some future RDVG session,
12:25it is worth noting a shift in relations
12:30with China; specifically, since after meeting
12:33Xi Jinping, Donald Trump has substantially walked back
12:38the scale of the customs duties
12:43he had originally proposed.
12:45This observation carries even more weight when we acknowledge that
12:48China was the specific target of these measures.
12:51It is clear, however, that the initial expectations may not
12:55yield results as substantive as we might have
13:00first assumed.
13:01I’ll round off our analysis and return to
13:06the final item on our initial list by suggesting that
13:12if there is one area where the situation remains notably static, it’s
13:17the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia.
13:20Ultimately, a clear assessment here may be a complex
13:24challenge. To maintain an objective perspective on these results, we may need to
13:29look toward different methodological lenses to fully understand
13:34the current landscape.
13:35Perhaps, to put these results into proper perspective, we should pivot our analysis
13:41towards the administration's own stated goals: what was Donald Trump
13:45seeking to achieve?
13:47There are three key elements to consider, since the
13:50outcomes of these policies acquire deeper meaning when viewed through
13:56the lens of the original goals sought by
14:00Trump and his administration.
14:01What are these three elements?
14:03We can start with JD Vance's speech at the Munich
14:09Security Conference on 14 February 2025.
14:14Then there is a particularly important document
14:16finalised in November 2025 and published on 5 December 2025.
14:22Which document?
14:24This document, which outlines Washington’s National Security Strategy, is of
14:28clear and significant importance. While we will return to
14:31its specifics later, it is worth noting
14:33that several pages comprehensively define these goals.
14:37There is a third element which aligns with this: a development from 8 December 2025.
14:42It could serve as a live commentary for those who may have overlooked the original
14:48document: I’m talking about a special session of the Politico programme
14:53known as "The Conversation”, during which
14:57a journalist interviewed Donald Trump
15:02for over forty minutes.
15:05Of these three elements, the document on strategic analysis is our
15:09primary interest. We will be placing this text at the forefront of our discussion, since
15:15it contains a range of aspects that will very quickly
15:19clarify the broader trajectory.
15:22So let’s dive right into this document, shall we?
15:27When examining the regional breakdown, the
15:30Western Hemisphere emerges as the first major area of concern, as it is
15:33highlighted over 4 full pages.
15:35We must consider what the Western Hemisphere actually
15:40encompasses and implies within these pages.
15:44As you’ll notice, the Western Hemisphere
15:47is largely Latin America.
15:49It is significant to observe that within the periodic
15:54framework of the US National Security Strategy, this edition marks
16:00the first time Latin America has been
16:03accorded such high strategic priority.
16:05That is something definitely worth highlighting.
16:08The second region is Asia, but more specifically, Asia-Pacific, which receives
16:13about four pages of attention.
16:18Predictably, the document maintains strategic continuity by
16:23designating China as a systemic competitor; and also outlines
16:31a roll-back policy that relies heavily on
16:36integrated alliances such as the Quad and AUKUS.
16:41We covered these alliances in a previous session of RDVG.
16:47The third region addressed is Europe, a section
16:54characterised by a certain strategic ambivalence;
17:01while Washington affirms the
17:06region’s importance, it simultaneously insists that
17:14European partners must assume
17:21a greater share of the collective defence burden.
17:25Significantly, Russia is situated within this European context on page 25, framing
17:31the security imperative for the continent.
17:35Russia is denied a specific regional status, portrayed instead
17:39as a weakened actor whose primary role
17:42in US diplomacy is to catalyse
17:48a more self-sufficient Europe, capable of dealing
17:54with Russia, and thus managing its own risks and major dichotomies. This approach
18:00aims to insulate American assets from continental risks, ensuring that
18:05focus remains fixed on the systemic rivalry with China.
18:10I think that's very important.
18:12We can now clearly how the document’s regional sequencing
18:15illustrates the strategic shift we are currently examining.
18:20The Near and Middle East occupy only a marginal fourth-place
18:25position over two pages, while Africa is only cited in
18:303 paragraphs on the final page. Crucially, the policy
18:34regarding Africa has pivoted from development and
18:39liberal reform to the targeted
18:43investment in —and I quote—
18:47“Africa’s tremendous natural resources”.
18:51We can thus sense a number of major trends
18:57coming to light, which we may be able to perceive better
19:03if we try to synthesise them in a global geostrategic framework.
19:08The logic being applied here is quite clear,
19:10but can we discern an underlying philosophy behind
19:14Trump and his administration?
19:15Certainly. A cohesive philosophy emerges and becomes apparent
19:21when we consider two specific references
19:30that are also highlighted in the document mentioned earlier.
19:35What do these references entail?
19:37The first is clearly the Monroe Doctrine.
19:40It is analytically significant to revisit a speech given by the 5th US President, James
19:45Monroe, on 2 December 1823
19:49We must exercise caution here, as there is a frequent tendency to caricature it
19:54or reduce it to isolationism.
19:56That represents only one facet of the policy.
20:00From a different perspective, we can see the implementation of the phrase
20:06America for the Americans. Properly interpreted, it envisions
20:10the American continent as a whole, with the United States of North America as the only
20:19power entitled to exercise legitimate and natural hegemony.
20:26What's more—and this is clearly articulated in the document—
20:30the United States now denies
20:32any other power the opportunity to exert influence
20:37within this hemisphere.
20:39Should they do so, the US would be compelled to intervene.
20:42This point bears significant consequences.
20:44Indeed, the text clarifies that Donald Trump is implementing this doctrine,
20:50which is termed the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
20:54There is clearly a return to the strategic pursuit
21:00of a privileged sphere of influence.
21:03Some geopolitical experts seem to dispute this logic. I would
21:09invite them to reread the document.
21:10Again, we should read the documents.
21:12It is clear that the United States is asserting
21:14a distinct logic of influence.
21:17As we conclude our session, we shouldn’t forget to point out
21:20that this will inevitably have geopolitical consequences,
21:24more broadly, on the rest of the world.
21:26That wraps up the first reference,
21:27which objectively brings us to a second reference: Ronald Reagan.
21:34Ronald Reagan's approach is defined by the maxim: ‘Peace through
21:39strength’, a hallmark of Ronald Reagan.
21:41When we consider his first term (1980–1984) and, subsequently,
21:46again during his second term (1985–1988), there was a considerable increase
21:52in the American military budget. He embarked on an arms race with the
21:57specific intent of significantly slowing down Soviet
22:01production and compelling them to negotiate, thereby achieving
22:06peace through strength.
22:08I think it is essential to remember a third
22:12US president, who is perhaps less prominently featured in the document.
22:17He is not necessarily cited as often as
22:21the first two by Donald Trump himself, and many observers tend to
22:26forget him. Yet I believe it is essential to recall
22:29him in the context of our discussion.
22:31I’m talking about US President Theodore Roosevelt, known for his
22:35Big Stick theory.
22:37It is worth remembering that Theodore Roosevelt oversaw
22:43a pivotal shift from the end of the 19th century into the beginning
22:48of the 20th. His idea was essentially:
22:52If I’m looking to achieve an international goal,
22:56I show up with a big stick.
22:58This is the famous Big Stick theory, which is applied with even greater emphasis
23:03when talking with allies.
23:04I think this is an interesting point to highlight.
23:09To advance our analysis, I believe we must consider
23:16three conceptual references, keeping three analyses in mind.
23:23I believe that they will allow us
23:27to definitively interpret the US administration's
23:32current objectives. This will enable a more nuanced appreciation of
23:35the outcomes.
23:37Primarily, if we refer to Emmanuel Todd’s After
23:43the Empire, we can discern
23:47the logic of the Delian League at play. In After the Empire,
23:51we see a comparison between Athens and the United States of America.
23:56We can clearly see a power asserting its supremacy and hegemony first and
24:03foremost over its allies, where it is the allies who must pay for their security.
24:10That’s the Delian League.
24:11Contributions were made to the treasury deposited
24:14at Delos to build up the Athenian fleet and military power; in return,
24:20Athens provided security through its fleet and army.
24:25It is clear that this was Emmanuel Todd’s central thesis,
24:29evoking a specific image of the world as viewed by Trump
24:34and NATO officials who argue that European contributions to the collective
24:40budget—to the NATO budget— are inadequate.
24:43I think this is the first thing we must bear in mind.
24:46It leads us directly to Paul Kennedy’s book, The Rise and Fall
24:51of the Great Powers. His argument seeks to determine whether, timelessly
24:57and across civilisations, a universal logic governs how
25:02a state rises to power, reaches its zenith,
25:07and then falls into decline.
25:10Why would I bring up his book in this context?
25:12Because Paul Kennedy emphasises and demonstrates that
25:18when a power shifts from macroeconomic strength and
25:25political power to excessive military power, it becomes exhausted.
25:32Moreover, following on from Paul Kennedy's
25:35reasoning, I feel there is one point rarely emphasised that
25:40warrants our attention.
25:42While most observers focus on the specific percentages
25:49of customs duties and their impact on the different trade
25:56relations, the true
25:58interest lies elsewhere. In this logic of customs duties, we
26:01can see a tremendous admission.
26:04Let’s consider it this way: could this need or urgent rush
26:08to impose customs duties actually reveal
26:13what may be an impression of perceived difficulty or
26:19economic weakness?
26:21If we compare this with American history,
26:25I think it would that we would easily see
26:29that the United States of the 1950s or 1960s
26:35never feared economic competition or felt the need to set up customs barriers
26:38to protect itself against economic powers that seemed
26:42to threaten its growth.
26:44On the contrary, we should remember that after 1945,
26:49Washington actually encouraged French and British
26:53decolonisation to open up markets that had been closed by colonial
26:57tariffs. Back then, the United States was confident in
27:01its ability to dominate any open market.
27:04This focus on customs barriers suggests
27:07something quite interesting.
27:10In Paul Kennedy's view, this expansive display of
27:15power functions as a paradox; rather than signalling
27:20absolute strength, it underscores a profound
27:23anxiety regarding national decline.
27:28This distinction is vital for our reflection.
27:33Finally, as a third element,
27:36we should note that by doing so,
27:39the United States adopted a global role it had never held since its
27:44birth on 4 July 1776.
27:48In fact, a closer look reveals that the United States
27:50has always played—or at least asserted—
27:53a singular role in the international order,
27:57driven by various, shifting reasons.
28:00Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin underscore this in
28:04America is Back: Les Nouveaux Césars du Pentagone (in French).
28:08I’m thinking of page 99 in particular; the title of chapter four.
28:13Translated literally, it’s Woodrow Wilson's catechism.
28:16The term catechism is quite interesting, because we can clearly see that
28:19there was a claim to have brought a unique message,
28:24to be a unique player, rightly or wrongly,
28:27a claim to be the defender of democracy and freedom, and therefore to be
28:33a very special player in international relations.
28:35Yet there is nothing of the sort in the document we are discussing.
28:39It contains no intent to convey a political message.
28:43We are thus witnessing the banalisation of the United States.
28:50We’re looking at an actor that suddenly eschews the mantle of classic player in
28:55international relations, and is now defending its interests and exerting
29:00influence like the various powers of the past, or indeed,
29:04its contemporary rivals in this third decade of the 21st century.
29:08This may not be the least of the paradoxes we could examine,
29:12but there is another, perhaps more vital and unexpected,
29:18that warrants our attention.
29:22You identified another, albeit still unexplained paradox that could
29:26potentially affect the Trump administration’s record by the second term’s end.
29:32What exactly is this paradox?
29:34Donald Trump, through the actions we have examined,
29:37seems to be perfectly in tune with
29:42this world of geopolitical power relations.
29:46But there’s a “but”.
29:48Upon closer examination, Donald Trump's actions appear to be based
29:52almost exclusively on a macroeconomic logic.
29:55We could revisit the events previously mentioned—and particularly his speeches
30:00and verbal explanations— to find that
30:04his focus remains nearly entirely confined to
30:10this specific line of reasoning.
30:12I will provide a few examples to further
30:15illustrate this point.
30:17It was quite striking, in the aftermath of the strike
30:21on Iran, to hear the U.S. President explain to journalists aboard Air Force One
30:26that Iran should abandon
30:30its nuclear ambitions since the country would be
30:35far better served by focusing on commercial operations.
30:37Furthermore, the Iranians are remarkable business people with a potential for
30:41extraordinary development on commercial logic.
30:43In a similar vein, when the Washington Accords were signed
30:47on 5 December 2025, it was equally startling to
30:51observe Donald Trump— offering hearty pats on the back
30:56to the representatives of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic
31:01of Congo—declaring:
31:03You'll see, we're all going to make a lot of money.
31:06It's true that this is quite out of step with the outlook.
31:10However, I think another example will take us even further,
31:14because when, at the end of June, he welcomed NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte
31:19in his office and discussed relations between Israel and Iran in a rather
31:24condescending manner on the one hand, but above all in a rather offbeat manner on
31:29the other, he compared Iran and Israel to schoolchildren fighting in
31:35playground who need to be separated.
31:37But what we are saying here is much more important than it might seem.
31:41This reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of
31:48geopolitical logic, which is here
31:51reduced strictly to a macroeconomic dimension and
31:54the pursuit of profit.
31:57While the administration may grasp the balance of power,
32:01it fails to recognise that ideological principles and national interests often transcend
32:07macroeconomic concerns when dealing with geopolitics.
32:10This oversight frequently leads Trump and
32:14his advisors to misjudge the evolution of certain situations.
32:17I am thinking specifically of the war between Ukraine and Russia—a conflict
32:22that in the eyes of Vladimir Putin and the Russian leadership, clearly cannot
32:28be reduced to a simple macroeconomic perspective.
32:32This distinction is vital; while the Trump administration may appear
32:40synchronised with the geopolitical reality, it
32:47lacks the substantive political framework or interpretation mentioned in America is Back:
32:54Les Nouveaux Césars du Pentagone (The New Caesars of the Pentagon).
33:00It is entirely possible that the future of the USA will necessitate a reintroduction
33:04of this political framework.
33:08There will therefore be a return to a Wilsonian perspective,
33:13or confirmation of a radically different perspective,
33:19such as that espoused by Vice-President J D Vance.
33:23However, there have already been major consequences at
33:26the global geopolitical level.
33:28Even before future events unfold, we are witnessing consequences that
33:32affect the Trump administration, the USA, and its broader sphere of influence,
33:36reaching across the globe.
33:38First, yes, and this last word is significant,
33:43as it emphasises that we’re still in the realm of hypothesis rather than certainty.
33:48If the West still exists, what does it entail?
33:53That is a real question.
33:55Earlier, we examined how geography per se represents
34:00a significant issue in the mind of the American administration.
34:05However, we can also see that this question arises even more acutely within the specific
34:10relationship between the USA and Europe.
34:13We might further extend this inquiry by asking if the future
34:16belongs to the American ambition to
34:22change European policy—aligning it with their own vision of
34:28what allies should be— or if the Europeans will
34:31successfully wait for new US elections to restore the previous nature
34:37of the relationship.
34:38This dynamic reveals a primary consequence of significant weight.
34:44Yet there is also a secondary one.
34:46This is the final nail in the coffin.
34:50It’s the final nail in the coffin for international law.
34:53We are now faced with the question of how to leverage law to oppose
34:58Russia and deny Moscow the possibility of expanding their territory?
35:04Similarly, we must ask how we can expect to hold China to
35:08international law regarding its ambitions in Taiwan,
35:13especially given Washington’s actions over the last twelve months—
35:17most notably in Venezuela.
35:20We are clearly in a period of immense upheaval, which many interpret as
35:28a return to realpolitik.
35:31I don’t believe it.
35:33Realpolitik has always been present.
35:36And so, in fact, it is a wake-up call for Westerners, and particularly
35:42for Europeans, who have so often clung to this dream of eternal peace,
35:48not to say perpetual peace. Europeans will
35:53have to relearn how to live alone. But to
35:56live alone in geopolitics, they must relearn how to see themselves as a power.
36:03To be a power or not to be.
36:07To paraphrase Shakespeare in Scene 1 of Act 3 of Hamlet:
36:12Prince of Denmark, which turns the matter back to Greenland.
36:18This is the response Europeans must now formulate.
36:22But can they manage to ask themselves the question?
36:26Regardless, Fabrice, thank you for guiding us towards this reflection on the connection
36:29between solitude and power, which I find particularly fruitful.
36:33And I hope you all can join us again very soon for another session of
36:36Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique. Thanks
36:38Thank you.
36:39Thank you all for following this new session of
36:42Rendez-vous de la Géopolitique. See you soon!

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