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The Truth and The Lies of The Challenger Disaster with Whistle Blower Allan McDonald. — Transcript

by Club Paranormal (Truth Be Told) · 7,813 words · 1,088 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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0:08[Music]
0:17all right this is truth be told I'm Tony
0:19sweet with the one and only long-haired
0:21himself captain Ron no he's not
0:23sasquatch it's actually him in studio
0:25thank you we have a great show for you
0:27guys today
0:28our guest in 1986 stood at the launch
0:31control center to see one of the most
0:34devastating disasters of the NASA
0:37program the space shuttle program he was
0:40the director of space shuttle solid
0:42rocket motor project at the time of the
0:44accident and he wrote a book called true
0:47the truth lies and or ings inside the
0:50space shuttle Challenger disaster please
0:52welcome to our show we have the one and
0:55only Alan McDonald hey sir how you doing
0:59[Music]
1:05we appreciate you we appreciate you
1:07joining us today lots to talk about can
1:12you hear us
1:12oh yeah perfect it's just like the
1:16Houston thing where you're just
1:17reenacting like after wait 12 seconds
1:22well let's see if we can fix that there
1:25we go there we go yeah you don't want to
1:27look at captain Ron too long it's one of
1:29those that you know gorillas don't stare
1:30them in the eye
1:31but what we're gonna do is we're gonna
1:33get started captain Ron had a couple
1:34questions to get us going and people in
1:36a chat room on our YouTube channel
1:37please ask ask away yeah I think there's
1:40I've learned a lot about this and I'd
1:42like to know why he takes back to that
1:43fateful night before the the launch and
1:47how that thing went down because that
1:48that's it's actually horrifying the way
1:51this whole thing unfolded it's very
1:52interesting you want to take our
1:53audience there and kind of take us back
1:55to that moment we had disrupt the launch
2:01that prior Sunday and rather Monday
2:07because they had a problem in removing
2:09the handle from the crew cabin and as a
2:14result of having that problem they used
2:16up most of the launch window and some
2:19very heavy winds came in that scrub the
2:22launch
2:22and I went back to my friend's house in
2:26Titusville and I wasn't there for about
2:28an hour when I got a phone call from my
2:31fellow the work for me by the name of
2:33Bob babbling saying that they were just
2:35informed that a meteorologist in Orlando
2:38was saying that these strong winds we
2:41saw today are followed by a real cold
2:43front moving in and it might be as cold
2:46as 18 degrees Fahrenheit by the opening
2:49of the launch window tomorrow morning
2:50and I said good grief I'm really worried
2:53about the o-rings and those feel joints
2:56for they operate properly at those kind
2:58of temperatures and he said well you
3:00know our engineering people are too and
3:02the reason they called you is that we
3:05need to find out if NASA can give us an
3:07hour-by-hour forecast at the launch site
3:10not in Orlando so we can calculate what
3:13the actual temperatures will be on the
3:15hardware at the opening our launch
3:17window I
3:18fine I'll get that information for you
3:21but when you get it here's what I want
3:23you to do once you can be in engineering
3:25and have them make an assessment of what
3:29the impact these cold temperatures can
3:31be on any part of the hardware primarily
3:33feel joints and the end result of it
3:36that I want you to have the
3:38vice-president engineering make a
3:40recommendation what is the lowest
3:43temperature that is safe to launch and
3:46I'll set up a teleconference this
3:47evening well I you folks back in Utah in
3:51as well as the engineering people at the
3:54NASA Marshall Space Flight Center in
3:56Huntsville Alabama and you need to fax
4:00charts of what you're gonna present to
4:02each of those places so we can discuss
4:05this issue and I did that and they did
4:09exactly what I asked fact the charts
4:12were presented by the engineers that not
4:15only made them but for the most part
4:16were handwritten they didn't have time
4:18to type them and they went through the
4:22areas they had of concern what they knew
4:24and didn't know and at the end of that
4:27the Vice presentation earring came on
4:30just as I had requested and he said
4:32based on the information presented here
4:35by his engineering staff he would not
4:38recommend that we launch at any
4:41temperature below 53 degrees Fahrenheit
4:43and based on the information I saw them
4:48present I thought that was a right
4:50suggestion and recommendation because it
4:53was primarily based on the fact that
4:56exactly one year earlier
4:58January 1985 we'd brought some of these
5:01boosters we pulled out of the ocean back
5:03to reload the propellant when we pulled
5:06the segment's apart we noticed a huge
5:09amount of black soot
5:10trapped between two of these row rings
5:13in the joint this this joint is so
5:16important and sealing is so important
5:18that there is a requirement for
5:20redundancy so there's actually two
5:22o-rings to seal off these joints and
5:25what that indicated was that a little
5:28bit of that yes got past the first one
5:30and it burned the first one a little bit
5:32as well and stop by the second one and
5:35it was significant from the standpoint
5:38that it was a heavy black set in it
5:40penetrated almost all the way around
5:42this joint which is 12 feet in diameter
5:45and we couldn't understand why that had
5:49happened because we'd never had seen
5:51this happen in any of the joints before
5:53like this these feel joints and we
5:56concluded that why that happened was
5:58that was the coldest launch at that time
6:01in the shuttle program 53 degrees
6:04Fahrenheit and now they're asking us to
6:09launch it high teens or low 20s long
6:12ways away from 53 right Halon let me ask
6:15you something right in here real quick
6:16it's interesting that this came up
6:17because you guys saw the temperature
6:19dropping down to 18 degrees the day
6:21before the launch isn't somebody
6:23checking this you know eight months
6:24before the launch that well what if it
6:26gets cold that day you know they had
6:32seven delays on the prior launch it was
6:35supposed to launch and just before
6:38Christmas December of 85 and it didn't
6:40get launched about the 12th of January I
6:42believe but so that they have a hard
6:46time projecting out burned far exactly
6:49what they would be and as you well know
6:52these temperatures can change in a
6:55matter of 24 hours very quickly right oh
6:58yeah and it was happen to be a set of
7:02delays there I called it Murphy there in
7:05spades because we missed actually two
7:07perfectly good days to launch challenger
7:11before that the first one that was
7:13actually scheduled to was on Sunday it
7:15was Super Bowl Sunday in fact and that
7:18one was close foam because the fellow
7:21from Patrick Air Force Base that gave
7:23the weather briefing the day before said
7:25though in his opinion there was a high
7:27probability of rain showers being in the
7:30area during the launch window and as a
7:32result they decided not to even bother
7:34tanking they scrubbed it well it turned
7:37out that weather forecast was horrible
7:39too because that never really happened
7:42too late in the afternoon and that was
7:43the morning scheduled launch they were
7:45just perfect
7:46they're nice that morning it's the
7:49Sunday date because of a bad weather
7:51forecast they missed the Monday day
7:53because they couldn't get a door handle
7:55off within several hours because add you
7:59know cold back some bad battery using
8:01some of their tools and also is a
8:04cascading effect of mistakes that push
8:08them into a day where the weather really
8:11became an issue hmm Alan I want to I
8:15want to ask you this because the people
8:19that actually do the checking how much
8:23do they have to do I mean when it comes
8:26to checking and then going up to the
8:28next level next to that level next level
8:30to actually make the decision to
8:31continue because it doesn't sound like
8:34that the top guys are not going to be
8:35going in and looking at this it's the
8:38you know the the engineers themselves or
8:40the crew or whoever how many levels does
8:44it have to go through to get up to make
8:45that decision to actually launch because
8:48do they lose a lot in translation or is
8:51it just they just ignored it up to that
8:54point they really do have to go up about
8:57four levels that's the bottom level is
9:01basically the contractor and his staff
9:03and engineers and then they have to
9:06raise whatever issues they may have
9:08whoever is the program manager at NASA
9:11on that particular item and it so
9:14happens that all the propulsion items
9:16were at the Marshall Space Flight Center
9:18in Huntsville Alabama they have to
9:21report it to that then they have to
9:23report it to the what they call level
9:25two which was the Johnson Space Center
9:28which had the overall responsibility for
9:32the shuttle it was assigned to them and
9:33then they have to break the assistant
9:37minister ater of NASA as level one so it
9:40has to go through each of those levels
9:42to get the very top now the mission
9:46management team at the cake consists of
9:49the administrator so she administrator
9:52from NASA in Washington consists of the
9:56folks from the Johnson Space Center and
9:59also the launch director at the Kennedy
10:03Space Center and in his some of his
10:05staff and it also includes a
10:09representative from the Marshall Space
10:13Center Space Flight Center which has
10:15responsibility for the external tank the
10:18Space Shuttle main engines and the solid
10:20rocket boosters and somebody from the
10:23Johnson Space Center that has
10:24responsibility for the orbiter and those
10:28people are all set on the mission
10:31management team it so happened that in
10:33this case the representative on the
10:36mission management team for the Marshall
10:39Space Flight Center was in that meeting
10:41the night before fellow my name is Stan
10:43writers he represented Marshall for the
10:47solid rocket boosters the external tank
10:49and the Space Shuttle main engines the
10:52fellow that was ahead of the solid
10:54rocket boosters the fellow by the name
10:55of Larry Malloy reported to Stan
10:58Reinhardt's and he was the one that kind
11:00of responded and I thought in the manner
11:03that I was shocked that he thought our
11:05recommendation really was not supported
11:08for any real test data no real hard
11:12engineering analysis as primarily based
11:14on a concern we had of a quote
11:16qualitative observation a year earlier
11:20and that he thought the data was a was
11:25not consistent because the only time
11:28we'd ever seen this kind of gas get past
11:32the first o-ring was this terrible time
11:35year earlier but we saw it again in
11:38October of 85 at a temperature about 70
11:42degrees or so he's any fire and he said
11:45you can't make that conclusion then that
11:47fellow the presenter that says no you
11:49need to look at the photographs the one
11:52that was cold had a huge amount of black
11:54soot you know it's jet black almost all
11:57the way around the circumference the one
12:00and it also burned the primary Orion the
12:02one that was warm didn't affect the
12:05primary o-ring at all and it was very
12:07light gray you had to look at the photo
12:09very carefully to see it and it hardly
12:12penetrated
12:13all around the joint and he said my
12:15opinion is what we're seeing here is the
12:17effect of temperature that with the huge
12:20stack up tolerances and these 12-foot
12:22diameter joints we have in all these
12:24parts that that influence of temperature
12:27is in these two photographs and he was
12:31very adamant about that and I fully
12:34agreed with him and he says well you
12:36know Larry Malloy since when the hell
12:39you want me lunch I call next April and
12:43said you know that even the launch was a
12:45hell of a time to be changing the launch
12:47commit criteria we've been living with
12:49the one we have up today the way it is
12:52and and I was really surprised because
12:56in all the past Flight Readiness reviews
12:58I've been in and I've given every one of
13:00them for my company in the prior two
13:02years I always had to prove beyond a
13:05shadow of a doubt that it was safe to
13:07fly and data that was inconsistent or
13:12whatnot was never considered adequate
13:14for recommendations at to fly and here
13:18they challenged the data because it
13:22didn't have any hard test data behind it
13:24or some hard analysis and so they asked
13:28the director assistant director of
13:31science and engineering at Marshall what
13:33his position was and he said he was
13:36appalled that we could make that often
13:39make such a recommendation based on the
13:40data they presented that evening but he
13:43wouldn't go against the contractors
13:45recommendation so then mr. Reinhart
13:49asked my boss who was the vice president
13:51of space booster programs and program
13:54management what his position was and he
13:58said he couldn't go against the
14:00engineering recommendation but that he
14:04would like to go off line and make sure
14:07that we've included all the data that's
14:09available and reassess it and come back
14:12on to either support our position or
14:15find another temperature maybe that that
14:18we might be more comfortable with it
14:21would still be safe so he took that time
14:24off which meant that
14:26it was on mute so we couldn't hear him
14:28people of Marshall couldn't hear him and
14:30and it took about a half hour later
14:33before they finally came back on not the
14:36five minutes and when they came back on
14:39it wasn't the vice president nearing
14:43that made the original recommendation
14:45not to launch below 53 it was my boss
14:49who was in program management the vice
14:52president of space programs and he said
14:55that based on their reassessment all the
14:58data they feel it's okay to proceed on
15:01with the launch as planned
15:03no specific temperature restriction and
15:07I was really taken aback by that because
15:09I didn't see him present any data that
15:12wasn't supportive of the original
15:14recommendation basically they said we
15:17shouldn't launch below 53 so nobody
15:22challenged the basis for changing the
15:25recommendation from people at Marshall
15:28hey doctor was this just accepted like
15:31oh okay or was it like intense when
15:33these guys were going back and forth
15:34about it could you feel tension between
15:36them it was tense going back and forth
15:40before they went offline about because
15:43the engineers were very supportive and
15:46adamant about the data they presented
15:48shows there's a concern and it would go
15:51we know the cold temperature is going to
15:52make it worse we know there may be
15:55there's a cliff out there somewhere we
15:57don't know where it is and the
16:00temperature of tomorrow's launches a
16:02long ways away from the area that we saw
16:05some concern and and and I fully agreed
16:09the bad and I was real surprised that
16:12NASA challenged that assessment that
16:14much because they'd always been in my
16:17opinion rightfully so error on the
16:20Senate side of safety you had to prove
16:23that it really was not only safe to
16:26launch but that the safety factors that
16:29were supposed to be there for those
16:32conditions were still in place because
16:35if they weren't you had to either do
16:40something about it to put get the safety
16:42factor back or they were forced to write
16:44a waiver of flying the system below what
16:48it is supposed to be flying within a
16:50safety factor and here they put the
16:52engineering people in a position of
16:54proving that it would fail and they
16:57couldn't they couldn't bring a little
16:59fail that's a different question right
17:03stuff so then didn't they bring a
17:06document and they wanted you to sign it
17:08this was the moment that that just seems
17:12brutal to me that you were faced with
17:13whether or not to sign this to sign off
17:15that it would be okay to fly yeah well
17:18that was the the ultimate end of this
17:21discussion after my boss recommended do
17:25we proceed on as I believe George Hardy
17:29at the Marshall Space Flight Center and
17:31he was the deputy director for science
17:33and engineering said that well we really
17:37need to have that recommendation to
17:40launch put in writing and signed by a
17:43responsible thiokol official and faxed
17:46to both the Marshall Space Flight Center
17:48and to the Kennedy Space Center and I
17:51knew who that responsible cycle official
17:54was that was me that's why I was at the
17:58Cape I was a director space shuttle
18:00solid rocket motor project that was my
18:02responsibility and I did the smartest
18:05thing I ever did in my life and that was
18:07I refused to sign it
18:09that's must be so hard knowing that
18:11they're expecting you to sign it
18:13certainly your boss wants you to sign it
18:15they put you in a really tough position
18:17well that year that was the
18:18responsibility and reason they always
18:21required that each major contractor have
18:25a official high enough from their
18:28company that had the responsibility if
18:31anything came up in the last minute that
18:33they could resolve the issue and they
18:35were the ones that made the decision
18:37whether to go for lunch or not and
18:39that's why they were there and that's
18:42why I was there and because I refused to
18:45sign it my boss had to sign it back in
18:48Utah and fax it down to me that was a
18:52brilliant move I mean I
18:53I don't know how you did it cuz that
18:54would have been hard to not yeah I feel
18:57like I'm risking my job by not signing
18:59this document I felt exactly that way at
19:03the time too but I just felt that yeah
19:06there is a temperature out there where
19:08this thing will fail at the fails will
19:10be catastrophic and it also was such a
19:12big gap just wait a day right right and
19:16it was 18 degrees not it was gonna be 49
19:19and it's so close to 53 that's I mean 30
19:2218 oh boy that's a red flag
19:24right yeah that's human I really thought
19:27that the reason they went offline is
19:29that because Stan Rhine arts may ask the
19:33question which I frankly agreed with and
19:35that was he said that the recommendation
19:38we made at 53 certainly isn't consistent
19:41with his understanding of what the
19:43specification for the rocket motor is as
19:47my understanding those motors supposed
19:49to be qualified from 40 degrees
19:51Fahrenheit to 90 and the 53 certainly
19:54isn't consistent with that and I agreed
19:56with that and I really thought the
19:58reason they went offline is to go back
20:01and relook at that because I knew that
20:04that someone had run in an analysis way
20:07back in the early development said they
20:09were good before I knew they never
20:11tested one down that long but I figured
20:14they would come back and say it's good
20:1640 which I thought was okay and kind of
20:18a moot point because it wasn't gonna get
20:20to 40 tomorrow either so you had this
20:23very trying moment in your life when you
20:26decide I'm not gonna sign this and you
20:28risk your job basically to have your
20:30boss sign off on it
20:31then you go into the next day now the
20:34launch how did that go well you know I
20:39was very nervous obviously about all
20:42that and when I first went the launch
20:43site it was I think was 22 degrees and I
20:47had my headset briefcase and I put my
20:49headset on cuz I sent it down the
20:51console because they have two areas in
20:54the launch control center once for the
20:56mission management team which was a
20:59hundred at that time Harper sent NASA
21:00people and then there's a big wall and a
21:04guy with an m16 at the door and then
21:07there's
21:07support contractors room which I was
21:11involved in and we all have consoles
21:13that monitor real-time all the data on
21:16the systems were responsible for it also
21:19has a lot of cameras you can access the
21:22first thing I did was access cameras and
21:24looked at the vehicle on a lunch bag and
21:26I was shocked to see all these icicles
21:29hanging on the fixed service structure
21:32and also on the shuttle the orbiter the
21:35solid rocket boosters huge amount of ice
21:38in most of that occurred because they
21:41don't have a very good freeze protection
21:44program down there and they have a lot
21:46of areas they have to access and use
21:50water on the fixed service structure at
21:53various levels and in order to keep the
21:56pipes from breaking they left the
21:58spigots open so the water was dripping
22:01all night long and with some slight
22:03breeze and the cold weather got in there
22:06they formed these big icicles wherever
22:08the water dripped and off of these
22:10things now that well they're not gonna
22:12launch this thing anyway so they stopped
22:15the count and sent a nice team out with
22:18instructions to not only a set assess
22:20the problem but to knock all the ice
22:22that was possible off at any area and
22:25clean it up off on the mobile launch
22:27platform because Rockwell had raised the
22:30issue that he thought that was an added
22:32debris issue and they couldn't say it
22:35was safe to launch under that kind of a
22:36condition that's fascinating that you
22:38said before the launch
22:40you felt well they're not gonna launch
22:41anyway no Wow well when you first when
22:45you first refused to sign what was the
22:47initial reaction I couldn't even imagine
22:49they even allowed you to be there at the
22:52launch pad if you refused well they knew
22:56they had more influence with my boss
22:59than me and that he's a vice president
23:03he's high on the totem pole so that's
23:05more important and that they when he
23:10said that he would sign it and fax it
23:13down to me huh
23:14I was worried at the time he was going
23:17to tell me he was going to fax it down
23:19blank and tell me to sign it
23:21and or pink slip right once on this
23:25printer you know the basis for making
23:27the recommendation Tran he didn't say
23:30that he said he would sign it and fax it
23:33down so that got me out of having to
23:36deny it twice and that would have been a
23:38lot tougher turned so he said he would
23:41so I waited for and while I was waiting
23:45for I was very nervous about that change
23:48and I told the NASA folks that I don't
23:50know who and he'll made the
23:51recommendation but you guys can't even
23:54accept it as to what do you mean I said
23:56because you're asking us to fly those
23:59solid rocket motors outside of an
24:02environment they're ever qualified to
24:04fly it you can't do that see this is a
24:06pivotal point right here that even
24:08though your boss signed off on this you
24:11still told them you shouldn't do it
24:13because it's outside the parameters
24:14that's correct
24:15wow what a stand-up guy huh we need
24:20people like I didn't gain response from
24:22that I was a launch director at
24:28cancellous launch for three reasons not
24:31just one one being that concerns a yo
24:33range we just discussed for over an hour
24:35but I said I talked to my vice president
24:38it was communication with our retrieval
24:41ships out in the ocean and they told him
24:43that they were in 30-foot seas with
24:45winds at 50 knots gusting to 70 and that
24:50they were heading in short four or five
24:52knots and they won't even be in the
24:53recovery area in the morning I said
24:56we're so we're putting all that hardware
24:57at risk the other reason we ought to
25:00cancel it is I heard about the concern
25:04there raised about the ice tomorrow
25:06because of not having good freeze
25:08protection and I said if those things
25:10are all dripping and and all they're
25:12fought the ice all over that place they
25:14not only big debris issue problem may
25:18change the acoustics or something I said
25:21I'm recommending not launching not based
25:23on what I know but what I do not know
25:26and you're in the same position and they
25:28said out these aren't your concerns but
25:31we'll pass them on in advisory capacity
25:34so then I said well let me tell you
25:37something I hope nothing happens
25:39tomorrow but if it does I'm not gonna be
25:42the person to stand before a board of
25:44inquiry my next why I gave you my
25:46permission to launch my rocket clusters
25:49environment I knew they were never
25:51qualified to fly it oh good for him and
25:53that's that's so stand up well I'm gonna
25:55if you don't mind I want to ask a couple
25:57questions from the chat room there
25:59people are just blowing up in a chat
26:00room the first question is why and you
26:04know there there are a few people
26:05wanting to get a little more conspiracy
26:07theory but why do you think they did not
26:12cancel or postpone the the launch a day
26:17or two or even just until the weather
26:19got better I mean was it just money it
26:21was a political was it
26:23I'll loot somebody some people will lose
26:25the jobs if they didn't launch it what
26:28why do you think they did not launch
26:30that day or what they did launch that
26:32day and not postpone it I think that it
26:35was primarily because of the schedule
26:38pressure and the pressure of the media
26:39to fly to him what people didn't realize
26:43that the prior launch which by the way
26:45carried congressman bill Nelson was a
26:49senator he got beat as a in Florida on
26:51the prior launch was the most delayed
26:54launch in history seven times and NASA
26:57had just announced a few months earlier
27:00than that that they were going to be
27:02launching 24 flights a year two a month
27:05one every other week starting in a
27:08couple of years and the press was
27:11merciless I remember reading the Orlando
27:13Sentinel saying hey NASA claims they're
27:15gonna start launching through these a
27:16month and it took them almost a month to
27:21launch just one after it was declared
27:23ready to go which was true so that was a
27:27huge pressure thing they already said
27:31they were the launch 15 of these in 86
27:34which was double more than double what
27:36they'd never done and and then they were
27:39going to increase it more than that they
27:41knew they had to launch a new space
27:45shuttle at Vandenberg Air Force
27:47in the spring of 86 April or May and
27:51with a brand new system saw rockets that
27:55were upgraded hired booster but they
27:58also had developed a new upper stage the
28:02new liquid oxygen liquid hydrogen upper
28:04stage orbit transfer motor that they are
28:08going to carry in the cargo bay they
28:09required a big change in the cargo bay
28:13to retrofit this thing into the shuttle
28:17and they had scheduled that for me and
28:21one of the orbiters they had two
28:23orbiters had to be retrofitted to do
28:25that what a most Challenger which meant
28:28they had to get it back
28:29awful quick to meet that kind of a
28:32schedule it already had been delayed
28:34from the prior launch plus it had its
28:36own delays so there was just a huge
28:40amount of pressure on nasa's place of
28:44meeting schedules and then to compound
28:46it more the prior launch the primary
28:51reason it had such a long delay was that
28:54Larry Malloy from the solid rocket
28:57booster project had included in that
29:02flight a second source item for a card
29:07that's used in the electronics for
29:09steering the nozzle and it it was
29:14screwed up and shut down the launch just
29:17before ignition back in December I think
29:2118th or so and and they found out that
29:24that card that they were gonna have a
29:27second source you know I'm just not a
29:29dollar 98 was pretty cheap for a second
29:32source first time was flying that card
29:35had been rejected by Johnson for use in
29:39space shuttle engines on the orbiter
29:42about a year or so earlier and they just
29:45raked Marshall the center director Bill
29:49Lucas over the coals along with Larry
29:51Malloy about screwing up and using this
29:56component had already been rejected from
29:58the shuttle system and not only should
30:00they know
30:01about that they should have advised the
30:04Johnson Space Center in level two that
30:07they were planning to make such a change
30:08I hate that these things even happen we
30:10have a question for you from jr. here
30:12who Alan you keep bringing up a key word
30:16that came up a lot during the Rogers
30:17Commission which is pressure and I know
30:20at the time they weren't able to
30:21definitively point a figure - what is
30:25that pressure where is that pressure
30:26coming from and it seems like it was it
30:30was just such a big question mark at the
30:32time in the last 30 years have you had a
30:35sense of I'm gonna point directly to the
30:38Reagan administration because I know
30:39that Richard Fineman and several of the
30:41Roger Commission people what William
30:42Rogers were alluding that some of the
30:45pressure could have came from Reagan
30:47have you found in your last 30 or so
30:49years any definitive proof that the
30:53Reagan administration was pushing NASA
30:55in Thiokol and Rockwell and the rest of
30:57the contractors to to launch on schedule
31:01no not directly at all and in fact the
31:06Presidential Commission obviously got
31:08that input from some politicians
31:11immediately that didn't like Reagan
31:14remember foghorn leghorn from South
31:17Carolina made a big statement about that
31:20I think it was fixed hawlings i he was
31:23up for reelection but that's probably
31:25why he did it but as a result of that
31:28they not only interviewed the people
31:31they were gonna interview relative to
31:33the real launch decision but some out of
31:36the administration all to see if they
31:39could find any real substance to that
31:41and they could not and you know this is
31:45a commission that now I had William
31:47Rogers but it had people like me alarm
31:49strong and Sally Ride and and Fineman
31:52and all that her and Chuck Yeager that I
31:55hold in pretty high esteem and if they
31:59would have known that they would have
32:01said it my opinion it was just a big
32:05conspiracy sirree because it sounded
32:07good because again Murphy was there the
32:12launch date was on the State of the
32:14Union
32:15and that spurred these conspiracy
32:19theories in fact one guy wrote a whole
32:22book about a call Challenger reveal
32:24thing that was the whole reason why they
32:25launched is because Reagan won that say
32:29he had this teacher in space on the
32:31State of the Union address that evening
32:33and that was a rich cook Richard cook
32:38you know I think that's way out there
32:43and has no credibility because he even
32:46took that far enough to have it
32:48investigated and they just asked him for
32:52any evidence of any kind that suggests
32:55that was and he said he didn't have
32:56anybody really thinks that's okay okay
32:59so so you know so there's none of that
33:01conspiracy thing however I've heard you
33:04point out a really fascinating thing
33:07that smells conspiratorial after the
33:11explosion you said you were in the
33:14control room and they said they shut
33:18down everything and you couldn't write
33:20anything you couldn't leave the room you
33:21couldn't look at your screen can you
33:23tell him that's what happened there
33:25right I couldn't take any data off the
33:32screen or anything and they held it up
33:35for about two hours and Vice President
33:38Bush at that time came down to talk to
33:41everyone
33:42saying you know what a horrible thing
33:44this was but we need to get to the
33:47bottom of it and fix it and get back
33:48into space safely as soon as possible
33:51though and I went to one of the failure
33:56teams which propulsion elements were at
33:58Marshall in Huntsville and I flew there
34:00the next day and I frankly thought that
34:04the only thing that did not cause the
34:06accident was a solid rocket boosters
34:08because the only thing I saw still
34:11flying in the film was those two
34:14boosters as if nothing happened
34:15everything else blew up apart so I
34:19figure they're the only me that couldn't
34:20have started caused the problem until I
34:23saw some film in fact I was in the
34:25process of going home
34:27I left Huntsville operation SportsCenter
34:31can find data that would indicate the
34:32solid rocket saying do with the failure
34:34and Larry Malloy yelled at me to get my
34:37ass back in there because the center
34:40director of anaemic Jim Kingsbury's down
34:42at the Cape and just looked in the film
34:44you can see fire coming out of a solid
34:46rocket booster when the sides abort I
34:48said I said to him well you tell him he
34:51doesn't know what the hell he's looking
34:52at simple flying around with fire come
34:55outside they blow up so I went back in I
34:59said you sure it's coming out of the
35:00booster not the tank so we're absolutely
35:03sure I said is it coming out of the
35:07field joint so well let's come out on
35:10the right
35:10booster down near the end this towards
35:13the eet a bit says down around the where
35:17the attaches to the tank I said yeah
35:19that's called the et attached section
35:21that's where the field joins us and ice
35:24but I couldn't understand how this
35:27failure could occur if it was due to our
35:30concerns about cold o-rings at 73
35:33seconds after ignition just didn't make
35:36sense so I said if you looked at any of
35:39the films at liftoff just know I says
35:43well then go get the camera just looking
35:45right at where you see this fire coming
35:47out of 73 seconds and they did and they
35:51said well the camera froze up Murphy
35:55Murphy was there again saying a data as
35:58well find the camera that's closest to
36:00that they did and sure enough and we can
36:05see a puff of smoke coming out of this
36:07joint right where exact same place we
36:11see the fire later on him in flight I
36:14said is that coming out between six
36:18tenths and seven tenths of a second and
36:21a call-back said yeah I was for six
36:23eight eight then I knew for sure that
36:27this thing failed for exactly the reason
36:30we were concerned about it just
36:32manifested itself in a final failure
36:35different we ever expected and that was
36:38it sealed itself up and the film's 30
36:41show
36:41that within a couple seconds and the
36:45aluminum oxide that's that has created
36:49by the propellant burning the solid
36:51propellant uses aluminum as primary fuel
36:53and ammonium proclaim perchlorate as an
36:57oxidizer and when it decomposes this
36:59oxygen burns all this aluminum it's
37:01aluminum oxide which is generally a
37:03high-temperature ceramic but at near
37:056000 degrees that this is that it's
37:08liquid and it's little liquid droplets
37:10are carried by this hot gas it's near
37:126,000 degrees when I went through it
37:14burned the o-rings as the joint was
37:16opening right in the sea right we're
37:19sealing against the metal and it
37:22deposited this aluminum oxide to hit
37:25this coal steel right we're burning the
37:27o-rings and it sealed itself up and it
37:31stayed that way into got to maximum
37:33dynamic pressure which is around 57 59
37:37seconds in the flight or the vehicle
37:40shapes and has most vibration because
37:42the aerodynamic loads are highest at the
37:44same time we had a huge sheer wind which
37:47was unusual as well because this was the
37:50first time they launched when the jet
37:52stream was directly over the Cape it was
37:55trying to push the vehicle off its
37:56course mit was correcting itself
37:58properly but in doing that it flexes it
38:01and it broke that fragile ceramic seal
38:04where those burned o-rings were loose
38:06and the fire started coming out to join
38:08again and that's how it really failed
38:10no people on chat room I'm curious too
38:14and I think I remember hearing this when
38:16the explosion happened you would think
38:19they would the the the crew would be a
38:22little more protected from I mean
38:24because I mean you're going into space
38:25you would think that the crew would be
38:26protected from majority of things how
38:30did they survive for a brief moment
38:34because then somebody asked what did
38:36they live until they hit the water or
38:38were they instantly killed or do we know
38:42well yeah NASA initially said they were
38:45instantly killed and because they didn't
38:48fly find the crew cabin until six weeks
38:50later oh wow
38:52and at the bottom of the ocean
38:55and when they looked closer at the films
38:58much to everyone's surprise that when
39:01the explosion occurred from the tank it
39:04blew the orbiter part in large integral
39:06sections the crew cabin separated intact
39:12on the front end of the auger away from
39:15it the orbiter was primarily in one
39:17piece frankly the engines at the back in
39:21a pod the Space Shuttle main engines got
39:23separated as a pod you can actually see
39:25the residual fuel still firing at them
39:28and those three huge pieces came down
39:31and the crew cabin was found intact and
39:34they concluded that they died instantly
39:36from this huge explosion and arel dan
39:39there glowed the ripped everything apart
39:41at near fifty thousand feet going near
39:44Mach two and when they found them in the
39:47bottom of the ocean they found out that
39:50the pilot and commander were in what
39:55they call peeps they actually were
39:58launching a shirtsleeve environment like
40:00you are in an airplane but they have
40:02emergency oxygen available to them
40:04but unfortunately the tank for the
40:07oxygens in the cargo bay behind that got
40:10separated off so they didn't have the
40:13emergency oxygen but they had what they
40:15call peeps which are personal egress air
40:18paths and they're in there for each crew
40:21member in case while they're sitting on
40:23the launch pad they spring the leak of
40:25these toxic fuels which is nitrogen
40:28tetroxide and hydrazine in the cargo bay
40:30that used for the ohms or there might be
40:33a fire outside because there's leaking
40:35hydrogen or something that they can exit
40:37the cabin and get away from the vehicle
40:41if they have to so give some two or
40:43three minutes of actual airs and these
40:47peeps are in the crew cab and they and
40:50the pilot and Commander they found had
40:52their peeps on with most of it you used
40:54up and they can't even activate them it
40:57has to be done by a crew member behind
40:59them secondly they found they said
41:03others had their peeps they didn't say
41:05whether they all did or not but they
41:08also
41:08found an audiotape which they never
41:11released in the supposition was it was
41:14from the teacher Christa McAuliffe
41:17taping her experience into going into
41:20space and the inference was it probably
41:23went all the way out to water in fact
41:24before they all died and I think that's
41:28most likely all the way out to water
41:29impact see I think myself and I think
41:32most people you talk to think they died
41:33instantly when that exploded it seemed
41:39though if you look at the when they
41:42recovered the group davin that they were
41:43in their feet they just didn't say
41:45whether everyone was I wonder I don't
41:48think most people realize that and I
41:50thought that was the most tragic thing
41:51about this story is that they lived for
41:53possibly another three minutes or so huh
41:55oh yeah I got because I walked in walked
42:01into a meeting I wasn't supposed to be
42:03in with a Presidential Commission the
42:05first one and told them what they just
42:07searched NASA isn't what really happens
42:10really happens they changed my life
42:14forever because chairman Rogers couldn't
42:16believe what I said he said would you
42:19please repeat what I think I heard
42:21because if you if I heard what I think I
42:23heard this will be in litigation for
42:25years to come
42:27because I told them you know NASA said
42:29that fact only recommended that to go
42:32ahead and proceed with the launch and
42:33they have a written written
42:34recommendation that I says well you need
42:37to know what happened before they got
42:39that recommendation well before we we
42:42conclude the interview because this is
42:45so fascinating but when you said about
42:47the litigation for years somebody in the
42:49chat room asked how long was the
42:50litigation and then I want to go back to
42:52how you were removed and then your
42:55statement is saying only person in US
42:57history restored to his job by Congress
43:00can you touch on that for us yeah sure
43:03first of all I was in litigation for
43:05almost three years Wow and part of that
43:08was because when they found them alive
43:10that pilot's wife sued for another level
43:14when you know your impending gonna die
43:17or you know you get it goes to a
43:19different level that was over a billion
43:22yeah the reason that he got reinstated
43:25which I didn't realize the time because
43:28once I told the Commission what really
43:30happened my general manager me that he
43:33removed me from my job and gave me an on
43:36job I said if scheduling or something
43:38open that quick and and I just about
43:41dead well as it turned out well I didn't
43:46I get called in after the presidential
43:49commissions reports been issued and a
43:52new general manager was in charge then
43:55and he said that we'd agreed with NASA
43:59to form this new task force much like
44:02the skunkworks does it lucky to lemon a
44:06lot of red tape because high-priority a
44:08program and we're going to have the lead
44:10activity the key NASA people are going
44:13to move out to our clan we'd like to
44:15offer you that job yeah would you take
44:18it
44:18that's it sure and I thought gee I must
44:21be the most qualified guy well about a
44:23month later I got this phone call from
44:25congressman Markey from Massachusetts
44:28he's a senator now so mr. McDonald is a
44:30true that you're leading this super task
44:32force to restore the shuttle safe flight
44:34or is that just some stuff your
44:36company's putting onto the media to make
44:39it appears if you've got a responsible
44:40job well now all I got you doing is some
44:43scheduling does the Presidential
44:45Commission leak that to the press I said
44:48well I'm really doing that I'm working
44:49six seven days a week 16 days 16 hours a
44:52day you know something I don't know I'm
44:55sure you're aware of House Joint
44:57Resolution 634 aren't you I says no I
45:00never heard about what the hell is that
45:02that's a resolution I introduced a
45:04Congress passed by the full house also
45:06that's why my colleagues in the Senate
45:09by the full Senate to restore you to
45:10your job would you like to have a copy
45:13of that yeah just a copy along with the
45:18letter I sent to your CEO in Chicago and
45:21what it basically said was if they
45:23didn't restore me to a job equivalent to
45:25the one I had for I testified for the
45:27Presidential Commission they'd be not
45:29only cancelled the existing space
45:31shuttle contract they would ban the
45:33company for life from having any
45:36Contracting you know it's pretty awesome
45:38so and I didn't realize how significant
45:41that was until after I wrote my book and
45:43I was speaking at Cornell University
45:45College of Engineering and I was having
45:48lunch with some of the faculty and one
45:50of the professors turned to me and said
45:51mr. McDonald I couldn't believe what I
45:53read in your book and so what's that
45:55just you restored your job by an act of
45:57Congress back in Washington a month ago
46:03for conference and they had an afternoon
46:04off so went over the Library of Congress
46:07and I filled out this card of what you
46:09said in your book and I gave it to him
46:10and I said could you verify this is true
46:12it's about ten minutes later this lady
46:14came back - that's absolutely true mr.
46:16McDonald restored to his job in act the
46:18Congress passed by the full house and
46:20the full Senate house in 634 I mean he
46:24said that's amazing she says yeah it is
46:27amazing but more amazing in that mr.
46:29McDonald probably doesn't recognize that
46:31he is the only person in American
46:33history that has ever happened it's
46:36awesome it's nice to see good guys
46:37finish first for warrants because yes I
46:39mean lesson learned here kids is that
46:41you're lucky stood up and did the right
46:42thing if people were to listen to them
46:44maybe this would not have ever happened
46:46so well we appreciate your time is up
46:49we'd love to have you come back sometime
46:51and in your book I mean come on your
46:54book go get this book it's called truth
46:55lies and the o-rings inside the space
47:00shuttle Challenger disaster and you can
47:02pick that up on Amazon where else can
47:04they pick that up on your website I'm
47:05sure pretty much anywhere University
47:11Press of Florida Tony if you could list
47:13the addresses of the available boys can
47:15we get security number of all your
47:16children and you find my book was Neil
47:22Armstrong about me great great well
47:27congratulations on the book and much
47:30success to all the stuff that's being
47:33accomplished because of the book so we'd
47:35love to have you back but thank you sir
47:37appreciate it thank you all right well
47:40that was another episode of truth be
47:42told we really appreciate appreciate the
47:44if I can speak appreciate you guys in
47:46the chatroom we'd love to hear from you
47:48and stick around for more
47:50truth be told captain Ron and I would
47:52love to have you go to our website truth
47:53be told web a worldwide calm and please
47:56subscribe to our YouTube channel right
47:58below and thank you for your comments
48:00until next time this is Tony sweet
48:02captain Ron

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