The DRAM Crisis: 600% Price Increases by Micron, SK Hynix, & Samsung — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:00Quote, since 2022, these firms have
- 0:02fixed supply and prices for DRAM,
- 0:04engaging in conduct that makes no
- 0:06economic sense absent collusion, and
- 0:08that has driven up the price of
- 0:10conventional DRAM approximately 700% in
- 0:13a 4-year period. End quote. This is what
- 0:15a new antitrust lawsuit filed by
- 0:17Bet-David Donn, a firm specializing in
- 0:19high-tech antitrust cases, states in its
- 0:22putative class action complaint against
- 0:24Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron. The brand
- 0:27new filing for this year highlights how
- 0:29the DRAM market is prone to successful
- 0:31collusion, citing a severe concentration
- 0:33of manufacturers, sales of a commodity
- 0:36product, price transparency via
- 0:37TrendForce, inelastic demand,
- 0:39astronomical entry barriers, and several
- 0:42opportunities to collude. The suit filed
- 0:44by Bet-David Donn, though, underscores
- 0:46seemingly coordinated actions between
- 0:48the manufacturers, describing how they
- 0:50simultaneously restricted output,
- 0:52shifted priority to HBM, shelved DDR3
- 0:54and DDR4, and implemented stricter
- 0:56customer vetting policies, asking
- 0:58potential buyers the same exact
- 1:00questions. The complaint also highlights
- 1:02how, due to surging DRAM prices, DRAM
- 1:05has actually surpassed HBM's
- 1:07profitability per wafer. While DRAM is
- 1:09used in HBM at multiple dies per HBM
- 1:12chip, the legal filing seems to instead
- 1:14cite conventional DRAM [music] as being
- 1:16higher margin. The plaintiffs contend
- 1:19that by refusing to expand supply in
- 1:21spite of all-time high prices, the
- 1:23manufacturers are openly acting against
- 1:26their own self-interests, stating,
- 1:27quote, yet contrary to all economic and
- 1:30business logic, the DRAM oligopolists
- 1:32each cut conventional DRAM supply
- 1:34further, with Micron going so far as to
- 1:37shutter its consumer DRAM business
- 1:39crucial at the most profitable point in
- 1:42its history. Prices continued to rise,
- 1:44and still Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron
- 1:47continued to squeeze conventional DRAM
- 1:49supply, simultaneously and publicly
- 1:51directing their resources toward less
- 1:53profitable per die HBM, or in some
- 1:56cases, simply junking conventional DRAM
- 1:59supply channels altogether." End quote.
- 2:01Even the manufacturers admit that
- 2:03conventional DRAM is now more profitable
- 2:05than HBM, which does contain DRAM, but
- 2:09is a different part.
- 2:10>> Recently, we have seen a rise in lower
- 2:13spec legacy memory prices.
- 2:14>> [music]
- 2:15>> And it is true that conventional DRAMs
- 2:17have higher margins versus HBM. [music]
- 2:20>> So, yes, it is correct that the margins
- 2:22for non-HBM today are higher than HBM
- 2:26margins.
- 2:26>> As far as who needs HBM, typically, it's
- 2:30this guy.
- 2:30>> No HBM for you. I need HBM.
- 2:33>> [laughter]
- 2:34>> Meanwhile, OEMs and system integrators
- 2:36are unable to avoid passing these price
- 2:38increases directly onto consumers.
- 2:40Within the past year, CyberPower PC, HP,
- 2:43Dell, Asus, Lenovo, Acer, Framework,
- 2:45Valve, Nintendo, Sony, Microsoft, and
- 2:47Apple have all [music] updated price
- 2:49increases to their products due to the
- 2:51increased RAM prices. Pre-built PC
- 2:53company MainGear even started a BYO RAM
- 2:56program, telling customers to "Bring
- 2:58your own RAM, and quote, we'll build you
- 3:00a complete PC." End quote. Lenovo
- 3:02recently joked in a not-so-funny way
- 3:05that memory prices would, quote, "Never"
- 3:07end quote, come back down.
- 3:09>> [music]
- 3:19>> This filing is currently only considered
- 3:21a putative class action complaint. While
- 3:23the plaintiffs brought the case intended
- 3:25to make it a class action, it's only an
- 3:27action on behalf of the individuals
- 3:29named in the complaint right now, until
- 3:31the judge certifies the case as a class
- 3:33action. If certified, the nationwide
- 3:36injunctive relief class would include,
- 3:38quote, "All persons and entities in the
- 3:40United States who indirectly purchased
- 3:42conventional DRAM products, including
- 3:44DDR3, 4, 5, LPDDR5X, GDDR6 and 7, and
- 3:49all other DRAM conforming to JEDEC
- 3:51specifications, but excluding HBM,
- 3:54manufactured by one or more defendants
- 3:56or electronic devices containing such
- 3:59DRAM during the period beginning October
- 4:0126th, 2022 through the present, which
- 4:04they call the class period, end quote.
- 4:06And they're not the only law firm
- 4:08investigating this. Recently, attorneys
- 4:10at Paul LLP contacted Gamers Nexus to
- 4:13ask us for help explaining the supply
- 4:15chain of semiconductors. While we can't
- 4:17disclose the defendants yet, this firm
- 4:19is also investigating price fixing in
- 4:21the industry and is seeking any US
- 4:23buyers of DDR5 memory to contact them to
- 4:26be a possible plaintiff. Our
- 4:27understanding is also that one of those
- 4:29attorneys on the case was involved in
- 4:31the early 2000s DOJ bust of the DRAM
- 4:33cartel. So, it's heating up for the
- 4:35memory makers and possible plaintiffs
- 4:37include everyone who buys memory,
- 4:40including consumers who indirectly
- 4:42bought it through other products, like
- 4:44video cards. Let's dive in to what
- 4:46appears to be a new DRAM cartel
- 4:49with some old members. We brought you
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- 6:35to it.
- 6:36>> [music]
- 6:42>> To understand the present, we need to
- 6:43analyze the past. Samsung, SK Hynix, and
- 6:46Micron have a long history of illegal
- 6:48price fixing cartel collusion. We
- 6:50covered this in our hour-and-a-half-long
- 6:52deep dive documentary on the original
- 6:54DRAM cartel, linked below, which also
- 6:56contains some history about what memory
- 6:59is and how it got its start, starting
- 7:02with actually core memory and rope
- 7:04memory, where they would hand-weave the
- 7:06software through rings, basically. At
- 7:09least 15 manufacturers participated, and
- 7:12over 117 employees from the five largest
- 7:14manufacturers alone were involved.
- 7:17Throughout that collusion period from
- 7:191998 to 2002, and just as an aside,
- 7:22there were also earlier alleged
- 7:25collusion periods we talked about. The
- 7:26manufacturers exchanged pricing
- 7:28frequently, upheld price floors, rigged
- 7:30customer auctions, simultaneously
- 7:32restricted output to artificially
- 7:34inflate prices, and even organized
- 7:36coalitions within the cartel to
- 7:38eliminate weaker players. The DOJ then
- 7:41launched its investigation after
- 7:42noticing spiking DRAM prices as well as
- 7:45in response to industry leaders like
- 7:47Dell especially at the time making
- 7:49comments about quote cartel-like
- 7:51behavior end quote. Interestingly, it
- 7:53wasn't until after the DOJ subpoenaed
- 7:55Micron and Micron applied for the
- 7:57corporate leniency program. Basically a
- 8:00snitches don't get stitches from the DOJ
- 8:02program that the DOJ then subpoenaed
- 8:05Micron's fellow cartel members. Shortly
- 8:07after the DOJ began issuing subpoenas
- 8:10iSuppli's principal memory analyst
- 8:12commented via Computerworld quote the
- 8:14major PC vendors really felt they were
- 8:16getting hit by a unified action. They
- 8:18thought DRAM suppliers were in collusion
- 8:20to set prices higher. But from the DRAM
- 8:22industry standpoint, they went from
- 8:24losing a horrible amount of money last
- 8:26year to trying to make a little money in
- 8:28the first quarter end quote resembling
- 8:30the DRAM oversupply in 2022 that
- 8:33preceded the currently alleged collusion
- 8:35period. Although they paid a hundreds of
- 8:38millions of dollars in fines clearly the
- 8:40manufacturers have done well in the time
- 8:42since. In fact, several of the employees
- 8:44were promoted after the cartel including
- 8:47one who was involved to CEO of Samsung
- 8:50Europe. While the original cartel was
- 8:52brought to a brief pause and some level
- 8:55of justice, we believe it laid the
- 8:57foundation for the current dominance
- 8:59that the big three manufacturers
- 9:00continue benefiting from today. At the
- 9:02time, SK Hynix even prophesized the big
- 9:05three one day operating in a legal gray
- 9:08area that allowed the manufacturers to
- 9:10lawfully share prices between one
- 9:12another stating in 1999 quote one of the
- 9:15advantage of being a big three is to
- 9:18have the controlling power over the
- 9:19price and we need to exercise this. One
- 9:22of our concern is that it is against the
- 9:24antitrust law to set up a certain cartel
- 9:27price and they suggest to encourage
- 9:29Samsung as the initiator. Why not if
- 9:31they accept? We need to have a
- 9:33communication channel open among the big
- 9:35three or four. each management should
- 9:38share their concern about pricing while
- 9:40not violating the law." End quote. This
- 9:42is especially concerning considering
- 9:44several cartel participants remained
- 9:46employed well after the DOJ discovered
- 9:48the cartel, like Samsung's Sunwoo Lee,
- 9:51for example. After the DOJ convicted Lee
- 9:53of violating the Sherman Act, fined him
- 9:55a quarter million dollars, and sentenced
- 9:58him to seven to eight months in prison,
- 10:00Samsung promoted the exec to CEO and
- 10:03president of Samsung Europe, a title Lee
- 10:05held until 2015. The point is, we think
- 10:09these companies were more than capable
- 10:11of rebuilding the cartel with all the
- 10:13players who remained in or were [music]
- 10:15promoted to powerful positions
- 10:18post-cartel collapse. And now, they have
- 10:20experience. More recently, in 2018,
- 10:23Hagens Berman law firm filed another
- 10:25class action against the manufacturers
- 10:27citing Gamers Nexus in source material
- 10:29for the memory makers allegedly
- 10:31violating antitrust laws between 2016
- 10:34and 2018. The court of appeals for the
- 10:36ninth circuit ultimately affirmed the
- 10:38case's dismissal in 2022 on account of
- 10:41insufficient evidence, but maybe now
- 10:44there's enough.
- 10:45>> [music]
- 10:51[music]
- 10:56>> As for the conspiracy period in question
- 10:58today, the new complaint alleges, quote,
- 11:00"Beginning in October 2022 and
- 11:02continuing to the present, defendants
- 11:04have engaged in a coordinated scheme to
- 11:06restrict the supply of commodity DRAM,
- 11:08artificially inflating prices throughout
- 11:10the United States. The scheme has been
- 11:12executed through a series of parallel
- 11:13actions that, taken together, constitute
- 11:16a comprehensive program of supply
- 11:18management by agreement." End quote. The
- 11:21filing describes how, after
- 11:22oversupplying the market during the
- 11:23pandemic, the big three manufacturers
- 11:26coordinated supply reductions in late
- 11:272022 and early 2023, starting with SK
- 11:31Hynix in October and Micron in November.
- 11:34Samsung initially held out. At the time,
- 11:37an industry analyst reported via Reuters
- 11:40stated, quote, "Samsung might be seeing
- 11:42this time as a good opportunity to
- 11:44increase market share, which should help
- 11:46it in the long term at the expense of SK
- 11:49Hynix and Micron." End quote. Instead of
- 11:51competing though, Samsung ultimately
- 11:54followed suit, announcing its own cuts
- 11:56in April. This is particularly out of
- 11:58character for Samsung, which has
- 12:00historically leveraged its dominance to
- 12:02drive out smaller firms during market
- 12:05downturns. An internal Infineon report
- 12:07from 2001 that we uncovered in our DRAM
- 12:10cartel documentary read, quote, "I
- 12:12talked to Dieter Mackowiak from Samsung.
- 12:14Samsung will proceed to take market
- 12:16share and make life difficult for all
- 12:18weaker competitors." End quote. Another
- 12:21stated, quote, "I talked with our friend
- 12:22Mackowiak. They want to kill Hynix and
- 12:25take their market share. They're ready
- 12:27to fight to drive prices down
- 12:29intentionally. The next months might be
- 12:31horrible." End quote. Today's new
- 12:33putative filing describes how Samsung
- 12:35continued throwing its weight around
- 12:37long after the original cartel period,
- 12:39explaining, quote, "In the 2008 to 2009
- 12:42downturn, Samsung kept producing and
- 12:44investing while rivals collapsed.
- 12:46Qimonda, then among the largest DRAM
- 12:49makers, declared insolvency in January
- 12:512009. Elpida, Japan's last DRAM maker,
- 12:55followed into bankruptcy in 2012."
- 12:57Industry commentary described the
- 12:59strategy as winning a game of capex
- 13:02chicken. Samsung publicly refused
- 13:04production cuts in the 2019 downturn as
- 13:07well." End quote. After Samsung
- 13:08allegedly restricted output with the
- 13:11others, the big three manufacturers
- 13:12simultaneously began transferring
- 13:14substantial production capacity and
- 13:16capital away from DRAM and towards HBM,
- 13:19or high bandwidth memory. Throughout
- 13:212023 and 2024, the manufacturers
- 13:23continued restricting DRAM output in
- 13:25attempts to stabilize prices, according
- 13:28to the complaint, referencing some of
- 13:29the same earnings calls we referenced in
- 13:32our DRAM cartel documentary, where we
- 13:34stated that the cartel gets around the
- 13:36no backdoor collusion rule by simply
- 13:39doing it publicly. The DRAM restrictions
- 13:41signaled their intentions to competitors
- 13:43through public statements and earnings
- 13:45reports with phrases like supply capex
- 13:48discipline or investment efficiency. In
- 13:51one instance, Micron even stated, quote,
- 13:54"Tool installation and production output
- 13:55will be ramped in line with industry
- 13:57demand growth, which is consistent with
- 13:59our goal to maintain stable bit supply
- 14:02share, as well as supply discipline."
- 14:04End quote. The filing points out, quote,
- 14:06"A commitment to hold stable bit supply
- 14:08share is a commitment not to take
- 14:10customers from Samsung or SK Hynix. Made
- 14:13publicly, it assured them of exactly
- 14:16that." End quote. And so, to the
- 14:19/r/hardware subreddit, a great big we
- 14:22told you so. Maybe you can accuse the
- 14:24multiple law firms of clickbait, too.
- 14:27Anyway, DRAM prices were beginning to
- 14:29stabilize by early 2025. At the time,
- 14:32Business Korea reported, quote, "DRAM
- 14:34prices had previously shown double-digit
- 14:37plunges in September, -17.07%,
- 14:40and November, -20.59%,
- 14:43last year. They maintained stability for
- 14:45four consecutive months from December
- 14:47before turning upward." End quote.
- 14:49Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron also
- 14:51seemingly coordinated an exit from DDR4
- 14:54around this time. Each announcing DDR4's
- 14:57EOL status within a 3-month span of each
- 14:59other. By third quarter 2025, CTEE,
- 15:02citing TrendForce, reported that DRAM
- 15:04contract prices had increased by 171.8%
- 15:09year-over-year. The legal complaint
- 15:10explains, quote, "A 171%
- 15:13price increase in conventional DRAM
- 15:15between Q3 '24 and Q3 '25, which then
- 15:19continued to increase to approximately
- 15:21697%
- 15:23is the single most powerful signal
- 15:24available to induce supply expansion.
- 15:27The simultaneous decision by all three
- 15:29defendants to forego a material
- 15:32commodity supply response is rational
- 15:35only if each is confident the others
- 15:38will likewise refrain, and the
- 15:39defendants can therefore ride the
- 15:41surging prices to record margins and
- 15:44profits." End quote. Meanwhile, the
- 15:46smaller DRAM manufacturers without a
- 15:48stake in the collusion, namely Winbond,
- 15:50Nanya, and CXMT, the Chinese
- 15:52manufacturer we covered in a separate
- 15:54documentary, we'll link that below, all
- 15:57expanded their output. But these
- 15:59companies have never been part of the
- 16:01big three. The complaint clarifies,
- 16:03quote, "If expansion were unprofitable,
- 16:05the smallest producers with the highest
- 16:07costs would not have posted record
- 16:09results doing so. The only firms for
- 16:11which continued output restraint was
- 16:13profitable were the three co-conspirator
- 16:16defendants, so long as not one of them
- 16:18broke ranks and attempted market share
- 16:21from the others." End quote. Then, in
- 16:23October, OpenAI announced its Stargate
- 16:26project in partnership with Samsung and
- 16:28SK Hynix, claiming the project was
- 16:30targeting, quote, "900,000 DRAM wafer
- 16:33starts per month." End quote, which
- 16:35Tom's Hardware estimated, quote, "May
- 16:37represent around 40% of total DRAM
- 16:39output." End quote. Effectively, OpenAI
- 16:42and Sam Altman issued a letter of
- 16:44intent. Samsung and SK Hynix effectively
- 16:46conceded the consumer DRAM market to
- 16:48Micron by committing such a large
- 16:50percentage of their DRAM wafer starts to
- 16:52OpenAI. At the time, Micron was the only
- 16:55big three manufacturer with a
- 16:56direct-to-consumer sales channel of any
- 16:58meaningful quantity. Hynix does have
- 17:01Klevv, but they don't really sell much
- 17:03of it. And Micron was the only
- 17:05manufacturer with significant capacity
- 17:07for consumer DRAM amidst what it called,
- 17:09quote, "The most severe memory supply
- 17:11shortage in more than 40 years." End
- 17:13quote. Rather than capitalize on the
- 17:15all-time high retail prices with its
- 17:17unique positioning, Micron shattered the
- 17:2029 years worth of goodwill it built with
- 17:22consumers and killed Crucial, quote, in
- 17:24order to improve supply and support for
- 17:27our larger strategic customers in faster
- 17:30growing segments, end quote. Micron
- 17:31announced its decision only 2 months
- 17:33after OpenAI's Stargate announcement for
- 17:36the memory purchases, that is, and the
- 17:38punitive filing contends, quote, in a
- 17:40competitive market a firm does not
- 17:42abandon a high-margin segment at the
- 17:44peak of a price spike, particularly
- 17:46where it has an established
- 17:48direct-to-consumer channel that its
- 17:50rivals lack. It expands into it. That AI
- 17:53data center demand was strong explains
- 17:55why Micron might wish to sell more to
- 17:58data center customers. It does not
- 18:00explain why Micron eliminated its
- 18:02consumer channel rather than supplying
- 18:05it when consumer prices were at record
- 18:07highs and the channel was highly
- 18:09profitable, end quote. The complaint
- 18:11then claims, beginning January 2026,
- 18:14that Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron
- 18:16simultaneously implemented stricter
- 18:17customer vetting procedures. Tom's
- 18:19Hardware, citing Nikkei Asia, quotes a
- 18:22GPU and server supplier who explained,
- 18:24quote, the three companies became
- 18:26stricter and asked us about who we will
- 18:28supply to, how much quantity, and if the
- 18:31demand of our customers are real, end
- 18:33quote. All three manufacturers beginning
- 18:35to ask the same questions at the same
- 18:36time is a huge red flag of collusion and
- 18:39indicates what we believe is a
- 18:40coordinated effort. The filing notes,
- 18:43quote, in a competitive market firms
- 18:45differentiate on customer service. They
- 18:47do not simultaneously adopt the same
- 18:49order vetting questions, end quote. The
- 18:52complaint continues describing how
- 18:54despite all the claims of, quote,
- 18:56focusing on profitability, end quote,
- 18:58while shifting DRAM resources to HBM,
- 19:01DRAM actually surpassed HBM's
- 19:03profitability per wafer in early 2026.
- 19:07According to CNBC, quote, when Micron
- 19:09makes one bit of HBM memory, it has to
- 19:12forego making three bits of more
- 19:14conventional memory for other devices,
- 19:16end quote. Per our own reporting, due to
- 19:18yields and DRAM requirements, HBM can
- 19:21sometimes require 2.3 to three times as
- 19:24much DRAM die area as consumer GDDR7
- 19:27memory for the same capacity in bits,
- 19:30not counting the extra base logic die
- 19:33and interposer you need for HBM. As
- 19:35explained in the court documents, quote,
- 19:36the three-to-one ratio implies that HBM
- 19:38is the more profitable use of capacity
- 19:40only if the profit from one HBM bit
- 19:43exceeds the profit from three
- 19:44conventional DRAM bits sold into the
- 19:46shortage. Stated as a threshold, a bit
- 19:49of HBM is the better use of a unit of
- 19:51capacity only where the HBM revenue
- 19:54premium per bit multiplied by the HBM
- 19:56margin exceeds three times the ordinary
- 19:59margin proxy, end quote. The complaint
- 20:02cites Micron's second quarter 2026
- 20:04financials where reported operating
- 20:06margins of 76% for mobile and client,
- 20:09consumer basically, 67% for core data
- 20:12center, and 66% for cloud memory. In the
- 20:15time since, Micron has posted another
- 20:17quarter that we've already covered in a
- 20:19different video, but in that one, Micron
- 20:22reported an obscenely high consumer
- 20:24memory operating margin of 86%
- 20:27on 87% gross margin. Just one year
- 20:30prior, in the same table, Micron
- 20:32reported 15% operating margin for the
- 20:35same part of its consumer business,
- 20:38again, now 86%. And that's from the same
- 20:41company that shuttered its consumer
- 20:42memory direct sales channel. But the
- 20:45suit cites the prior quarter with
- 20:46slightly lower margin due to the filing
- 20:48time. Using Micron's reported mobile and
- 20:51client business unit $7.711 billion
- 20:54quarterly revenue and 76% operating
- 20:56margin, the complaint calculates, quote,
- 20:58the operating profit associated with
- 21:00capturing even a small additional share
- 21:02of that segment's consumer and client
- 21:03demand, end quote, to create some tables
- 21:06and charts. Per the complaint, if Micron
- 21:08increased its consumer sales by 5%, it
- 21:11would have received an additional
- 21:12roughly $293 million in operating
- 21:15quarterly income, or an additional $1.17
- 21:19billion when annualized. That'd be even
- 21:21higher on the Q3 filing. The complaint
- 21:24also calculates a section for the
- 21:26required HBM revenue premium per bit to
- 21:28beat three conventional DRAM bits as it
- 21:31corresponds to different HBM margins. As
- 21:33shown in this table, at 70% HBM margin,
- 21:36the manufacturer needs a 3.26x revenue
- 21:39premium per HBM bit in order to gain
- 21:42more profit than three conventional DRAM
- 21:44bits. In other words, the manufacturers
- 21:46are leaving substantial profit on the
- 21:48table by not competing for the consumer
- 21:51DRAM market, something they chose to not
- 21:54supply. And even the manufacturers admit
- 21:57that DRAM has now surpassed HBM's
- 22:00profitability. In Samsung's first
- 22:02quarter 2026 earnings call, it stated,
- 22:04>> Currently, we have seen a rise in lower
- 22:07spec legacy memory prices, and it is
- 22:10true that conventional DRAMs
- 22:12have higher margins versus HBM.
- 22:15And we are aware of certain outside
- 22:18views that focusing our sales mix on
- 22:20conventional DRAMs may be more
- 22:22beneficial
- 22:23in terms of short-term performance
- 22:25versus HBM.
- 22:26>> Micron CEO affirmed this in Micron's
- 22:28second quarter 2026 earnings call,
- 22:30acknowledging,
- 22:31>> So, yes, it is correct that the margins
- 22:33for non-HBM to they are higher than HBM
- 22:36margins.
- 22:37>> And then SK Group chairman reportedly
- 22:39stated through machine translation,
- 22:40quote, "The HBM margin is 60% and the
- 22:43general memory chip margin is 80%," end
- 22:46quote, as reported by Korean media
- 22:48outlet News 1. We think one key factor
- 22:50contributing to this is that HBM
- 22:52contract prices are negotiated annually,
- 22:54while DRAM contract prices are
- 22:56negotiated quarterly, meaning DRAM
- 22:58prices are going to reflect market
- 23:00changes faster than HBM. The complaint
- 23:02asserts, quote, AI demand explains why
- 23:05HBM became attractive. It does not
- 23:07explain Samsung's abandonment of its
- 23:08historical maverick strategy, Micron's
- 23:11exit from Crucial at peak consumer
- 23:13prices, or the uniform refusal by all
- 23:15three defendants to expand commodity
- 23:17DRAM supply in response to record
- 23:19commodity prices, end quote. Finally,
- 23:21the document concludes by explaining how
- 23:23the DRAM industry's characteristics make
- 23:25it particularly susceptible to
- 23:27successful collusion, citing the
- 23:28extremely concentrated market, sales of
- 23:30commodity products, price transparency
- 23:32from TrendForce's contract price
- 23:34reports, inelastic demand,
- 23:35insurmountable entry barriers, and
- 23:37numerous colluding opportunities.
- 23:41>> [music]
- 23:47[music]
- 23:50>> A lot of the alleged collusion today
- 23:52comes down to the market dynamics
- 23:54between competitors in the DRAM
- 23:56industry, which Soyoung Lee describes
- 23:58well in his report titled Chicken Game
- 24:01Analysis on Global Competition. Using
- 24:03the concepts of game theory, Lee
- 24:05illustrates how each manufacturer has
- 24:07the choice to either expand or maintain
- 24:10or reduce capacity. If two manufacturers
- 24:12exist and both manufacturers expand
- 24:14capacity, the result is an oversupply
- 24:17and both receive lower profits. If one
- 24:19expands while the other maintains, the
- 24:20manufacturer who expands earns higher
- 24:22profits and market share. If both
- 24:24manufacturers choose to maintain,
- 24:26however, each walks away with a moderate
- 24:28payout. Pretty basic stuff. Of course,
- 24:31in a perfectly competitive market, you
- 24:33don't know how your competitor is going
- 24:35to play the game. Additionally, if you
- 24:37somehow knew your competitor planned to
- 24:39maintain or reduce capacity, like, say,
- 24:41if they stated something like,
- 24:44"Our DRAM wafer starts will remain
- 24:45significantly below 2022 levels for the
- 24:47foreseeable future." in their earnings
- 24:48report, you'd expand capacity to earn
- 24:51higher profits and seize market share
- 24:52from your competition. Unfortunately,
- 24:54while it certainly appears like the
- 24:56manufacturers are choosing to not
- 24:58compete from our perspective anyway. The
- 25:00manufacturers could claim that this is
- 25:02simply conscious parallelism. Cornell
- 25:05Law School defines this market tactic
- 25:08stating, quote, "Conscious parallelism
- 25:10refers to businesses changing their
- 25:11prices to reflect the prices of
- 25:13competitors within a market without
- 25:14colluding or communicating with
- 25:16competitors. Unlike price fixing, which
- 25:18involves conscious agreement between
- 25:19competitors and violating antitrust
- 25:21laws, conscious parallelism occurs where
- 25:24businesses just change prices in
- 25:26reaction to competitors. And conscious
- 25:28parallelism does not constitute illegal
- 25:30activity on its own." End quote.
- 25:34>> [music]
- 25:36>> This is actually somewhat related to why
- 25:38the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
- 25:39Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
- 25:41prior DRAM antitrust lawsuit filed in
- 25:442018. The court's decision read, quote,
- 25:47"Plaintiffs' factual allegations do not
- 25:49amount to the something more required to
- 25:51support a plausible inference of
- 25:52conspiracy. Dismissal of plaintiffs'
- 25:55claims premised on an alleged agreement
- 25:57between defendants was therefore
- 25:58proper." End quote. The current
- 26:00complaint, the new one, addresses this
- 26:02aspect from the previously failed case
- 26:05stating, quote, "The 2016 to 2018
- 26:08litigation was ultimately unsuccessful.
- 26:10Unlike the present action, the 2018
- 26:12complaint alleged only parallel pricing
- 26:14without identifying unlawful coordinated
- 26:16conduct as set forth here. Simultaneous
- 26:19production cuts, coordinated product
- 26:21line exits, used equipment withdrawal by
- 26:23Samsung and SK Hynix, and parallel
- 26:25customer vetting among other specific
- 26:27facts and conduct explained in this
- 26:29complaint." End quote. For context,
- 26:31Thomson Reuters describes Section 1 of
- 26:33the Sherman Antitrust Act, what the
- 26:35plaintiffs alleged the manufacturers
- 26:36violated, by saying this, quote, "Every
- 26:39contract, combination in the form of
- 26:41trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
- 26:43restraint of trade or commerce among the
- 26:45several states or with foreign nations
- 26:47is declared to be illegal. If read
- 26:49literally, Section 1 of the Sherman Act
- 26:52would prohibit every commercial contract
- 26:54because all contracts cause some
- 26:56restraint on trade. Fortunately, courts
- 26:58have found that only agreements that
- 27:00unreasonably restrain trade are
- 27:02prohibited, end quote. According to
- 27:04George Washington University Law School,
- 27:06we found this explainer, quote, "Courts
- 27:08allow a collusive agreement to be
- 27:10established by circumstantial evidence,
- 27:12but the evidence must show additional
- 27:14evidence, plus factors, beyond parallel
- 27:17movement in price, end quote." Thompson
- 27:19Reuters describes some of the plus
- 27:21factors typically accepted in addition
- 27:23to parallel movements, stating, quote,
- 27:25"Plus factors include the defendants
- 27:27acted contrary to their individual
- 27:29economic interests, the defendants had
- 27:31meetings or conversations, i.e.,
- 27:33opportunities to agree, the defendants
- 27:35had a motive to collude, engaged in
- 27:37abrupt or unprecedented changes in
- 27:39behavior, and the industry is
- 27:41concentrated with few competitors, end
- 27:43quote." We believe that each of those
- 27:45factors, the plus factors, exist in this
- 27:48case, but that's not for us to decide.
- 27:50Ultimately, we'd like to see more from
- 27:52the DOJ here, like in the early 2000s,
- 27:55but the current DOJ is
- 27:58busy finding a replacement.
- 28:00>> One word about Jeffrey Epstein. How
- 28:04ironic is that? You know why? Because
- 28:06Donald Trump
- 28:08the Dow the Dow right now is over
- 28:13the Dow is over $50,000.
- 28:15I don't know why you're laughing. You're
- 28:16a great stock trader.
- 28:18>> Our understanding is that the consumers
- 28:19never would have discovered the original
- 28:21DRAM cartel had the DOJ not subpoenaed
- 28:24the manufacturers in response to both
- 28:27the increasing prices and the
- 28:29cartel-like allegations from industry
- 28:32leaders. To our knowledge, the DOJ
- 28:34hasn't investigated the DRAM
- 28:35manufacturers since. Cafferty Donn LLP,
- 28:38the firm who submitted this putative
- 28:39complaint, isn't the only law firm
- 28:41investigating the DRAM manufacturers for
- 28:43price fixing right now. It's heating up.
- 28:45Similarly, a cross-sector trade
- 28:47association recently sent a letter to
- 28:49the secretaries of the US Treasury and
- 28:51Commerce departments regarding, {quote}
- 28:53an urgent imbalance in the market for
- 28:55memory chips that could lead to
- 28:56significant and sustained near-term
- 28:58price increases for American households
- 29:01and disrupt critical US supply chains,
- 29:03{end quote}. The letter, signed by
- 29:04several national industry associations,
- 29:06urged the US White House and its
- 29:08administration to, among other requests,
- 29:11{quote} ensure that memory semiconductor
- 29:13capacity adequately serves all segments
- 29:15of the market, including consumer-facing
- 29:18and manufacturing industries, and to
- 29:20{quote} closely track conditions in the
- 29:21memory market, including with respect to
- 29:23supply and demand, {end quote}. In the
- 29:25DOJ's Red Flags of Collusion, it
- 29:28describes its four-part MAPS analysis,
- 29:31explaining how you can analyze an
- 29:33industry's market, applications,
- 29:35patterns, and suspicious behavior to
- 29:37detect collusion. Starting with the
- 29:39market aspect, the DOJ states, {quote}
- 29:41The award may be the target of collusion
- 29:43if there are few competitors in the
- 29:45market that offer a good or service, a
- 29:47small group of major vendors controls a
- 29:48large share of the market, the good or
- 29:50service is standardized so that the
- 29:52determining factor in the award is
- 29:54price, rather than other competitive
- 29:56factors, such as design, quality, or
- 29:58service, {end quote}. All of these
- 29:59factors, again, exist in the DRAM
- 30:01market. Moving to the application
- 30:03section, it asks, {quote} Are there
- 30:05similarities between vendor applications
- 30:07or proposals, {end quote}? And while the
- 30:09DOJ doesn't explicitly mention it in its
- 30:12examples, we would consider the
- 30:14manufacturers simultaneously
- 30:15implementing stricter customer vetting
- 30:17procedures and asking the same exact
- 30:19questions as both a similarity between
- 30:22applications and suspicious behavior.
- 30:25The post concludes, {quote} If you
- 30:27notice any combination of these red
- 30:28flags, you should report your concerns
- 30:30to the Antitrust Division, {end quote}.
- 30:32While we don't think there's currently
- 30:34any explicit evidence of collusion, we
- 30:36think the amount of seemingly
- 30:37coordinated actions, the unprecedented
- 30:40price increases, and the amount of
- 30:42consumers who purchase electronics with
- 30:44RAM should be more than enough for the
- 30:46DOJ to at least investigate the market
- 30:48for anti-competitive practices. Of
- 30:50course, it's not like the US antitrust
- 30:52agencies currently have any reason to
- 30:54turn a blind eye to this sort of
- 30:55behavior, say for example, if something
- 30:57ridiculous happened like the executive
- 30:59branch were to garner good PR with
- 31:01hundreds of millions of dollars of
- 31:02donations for a memory maker, and
- 31:03likewise grant billions of dollars of
- 31:04tax breaks, while also enacting control
- 31:06over the DOJ as the executive branch, or
- 31:08at least it seems that way. But, that
- 31:10would be ridiculous.
- 31:12>> This is critical capability.
- 31:14>> So, this filing is currently in the
- 31:16earliest possible stages, and the judge
- 31:19is yet to certify this putative class
- 31:21action complaint as a legitimate class
- 31:23action lawsuit. If the judge certifies
- 31:25the putative filing as a class action,
- 31:27the defendants will likely file a motion
- 31:29to dismiss. If that fails, the case then
- 31:32enters the discovery period, which is
- 31:34what they would really want to avoid.
- 31:36For additional reference, the original
- 31:37DRAM antitrust litigation filed in 2002
- 31:41required nearly 12 years between the
- 31:43plaintiffs initially filing the case and
- 31:45the court granting the final approval of
- 31:47settlements. It'll take a while to see
- 31:49how this plays out, but we'll be here to
- 31:51cover it, even if it's 12 years from
- 31:53now, but hopefully it's sooner. That's
- 31:55it for this one. You should watch our
- 31:56DRAM cartel history piece that we posted
- 31:58previously. We'll link that in the
- 31:59description, and you should open another
- 32:01tab for our rise of Chinese memory
- 32:04content about CXMT, a new competitor to
- 32:07these big three. You can directly
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- 32:24hearkening back to a better time when
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- 32:32to throw a few bucks our way each month.
- 32:34Thanks for watching. Thanks for your
- 32:35support. Subscribe for more, and we'll
- 32:37see you all next time.
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