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The DRAM Crisis: 600% Price Increases by Micron, SK Hynix, & Samsung — Transcript

by Gamers Nexus · 5,175 words · 883 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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  1. 0:00Quote, since 2022, these firms have
  2. 0:02fixed supply and prices for DRAM,
  3. 0:04engaging in conduct that makes no
  4. 0:06economic sense absent collusion, and
  5. 0:08that has driven up the price of
  6. 0:10conventional DRAM approximately 700% in
  7. 0:13a 4-year period. End quote. This is what
  8. 0:15a new antitrust lawsuit filed by
  9. 0:17Bet-David Donn, a firm specializing in
  10. 0:19high-tech antitrust cases, states in its
  11. 0:22putative class action complaint against
  12. 0:24Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron. The brand
  13. 0:27new filing for this year highlights how
  14. 0:29the DRAM market is prone to successful
  15. 0:31collusion, citing a severe concentration
  16. 0:33of manufacturers, sales of a commodity
  17. 0:36product, price transparency via
  18. 0:37TrendForce, inelastic demand,
  19. 0:39astronomical entry barriers, and several
  20. 0:42opportunities to collude. The suit filed
  21. 0:44by Bet-David Donn, though, underscores
  22. 0:46seemingly coordinated actions between
  23. 0:48the manufacturers, describing how they
  24. 0:50simultaneously restricted output,
  25. 0:52shifted priority to HBM, shelved DDR3
  26. 0:54and DDR4, and implemented stricter
  27. 0:56customer vetting policies, asking
  28. 0:58potential buyers the same exact
  29. 1:00questions. The complaint also highlights
  30. 1:02how, due to surging DRAM prices, DRAM
  31. 1:05has actually surpassed HBM's
  32. 1:07profitability per wafer. While DRAM is
  33. 1:09used in HBM at multiple dies per HBM
  34. 1:12chip, the legal filing seems to instead
  35. 1:14cite conventional DRAM [music] as being
  36. 1:16higher margin. The plaintiffs contend
  37. 1:19that by refusing to expand supply in
  38. 1:21spite of all-time high prices, the
  39. 1:23manufacturers are openly acting against
  40. 1:26their own self-interests, stating,
  41. 1:27quote, yet contrary to all economic and
  42. 1:30business logic, the DRAM oligopolists
  43. 1:32each cut conventional DRAM supply
  44. 1:34further, with Micron going so far as to
  45. 1:37shutter its consumer DRAM business
  46. 1:39crucial at the most profitable point in
  47. 1:42its history. Prices continued to rise,
  48. 1:44and still Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron
  49. 1:47continued to squeeze conventional DRAM
  50. 1:49supply, simultaneously and publicly
  51. 1:51directing their resources toward less
  52. 1:53profitable per die HBM, or in some
  53. 1:56cases, simply junking conventional DRAM
  54. 1:59supply channels altogether." End quote.
  55. 2:01Even the manufacturers admit that
  56. 2:03conventional DRAM is now more profitable
  57. 2:05than HBM, which does contain DRAM, but
  58. 2:09is a different part.
  59. 2:10>> Recently, we have seen a rise in lower
  60. 2:13spec legacy memory prices.
  61. 2:14>> [music]
  62. 2:15>> And it is true that conventional DRAMs
  63. 2:17have higher margins versus HBM. [music]
  64. 2:20>> So, yes, it is correct that the margins
  65. 2:22for non-HBM today are higher than HBM
  66. 2:26margins.
  67. 2:26>> As far as who needs HBM, typically, it's
  68. 2:30this guy.
  69. 2:30>> No HBM for you. I need HBM.
  70. 2:33>> [laughter]
  71. 2:34>> Meanwhile, OEMs and system integrators
  72. 2:36are unable to avoid passing these price
  73. 2:38increases directly onto consumers.
  74. 2:40Within the past year, CyberPower PC, HP,
  75. 2:43Dell, Asus, Lenovo, Acer, Framework,
  76. 2:45Valve, Nintendo, Sony, Microsoft, and
  77. 2:47Apple have all [music] updated price
  78. 2:49increases to their products due to the
  79. 2:51increased RAM prices. Pre-built PC
  80. 2:53company MainGear even started a BYO RAM
  81. 2:56program, telling customers to "Bring
  82. 2:58your own RAM, and quote, we'll build you
  83. 3:00a complete PC." End quote. Lenovo
  84. 3:02recently joked in a not-so-funny way
  85. 3:05that memory prices would, quote, "Never"
  86. 3:07end quote, come back down.
  87. 3:09>> [music]
  88. 3:19>> This filing is currently only considered
  89. 3:21a putative class action complaint. While
  90. 3:23the plaintiffs brought the case intended
  91. 3:25to make it a class action, it's only an
  92. 3:27action on behalf of the individuals
  93. 3:29named in the complaint right now, until
  94. 3:31the judge certifies the case as a class
  95. 3:33action. If certified, the nationwide
  96. 3:36injunctive relief class would include,
  97. 3:38quote, "All persons and entities in the
  98. 3:40United States who indirectly purchased
  99. 3:42conventional DRAM products, including
  100. 3:44DDR3, 4, 5, LPDDR5X, GDDR6 and 7, and
  101. 3:49all other DRAM conforming to JEDEC
  102. 3:51specifications, but excluding HBM,
  103. 3:54manufactured by one or more defendants
  104. 3:56or electronic devices containing such
  105. 3:59DRAM during the period beginning October
  106. 4:0126th, 2022 through the present, which
  107. 4:04they call the class period, end quote.
  108. 4:06And they're not the only law firm
  109. 4:08investigating this. Recently, attorneys
  110. 4:10at Paul LLP contacted Gamers Nexus to
  111. 4:13ask us for help explaining the supply
  112. 4:15chain of semiconductors. While we can't
  113. 4:17disclose the defendants yet, this firm
  114. 4:19is also investigating price fixing in
  115. 4:21the industry and is seeking any US
  116. 4:23buyers of DDR5 memory to contact them to
  117. 4:26be a possible plaintiff. Our
  118. 4:27understanding is also that one of those
  119. 4:29attorneys on the case was involved in
  120. 4:31the early 2000s DOJ bust of the DRAM
  121. 4:33cartel. So, it's heating up for the
  122. 4:35memory makers and possible plaintiffs
  123. 4:37include everyone who buys memory,
  124. 4:40including consumers who indirectly
  125. 4:42bought it through other products, like
  126. 4:44video cards. Let's dive in to what
  127. 4:46appears to be a new DRAM cartel
  128. 4:49with some old members. We brought you
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  178. 6:35to it.
  179. 6:36>> [music]
  180. 6:42>> To understand the present, we need to
  181. 6:43analyze the past. Samsung, SK Hynix, and
  182. 6:46Micron have a long history of illegal
  183. 6:48price fixing cartel collusion. We
  184. 6:50covered this in our hour-and-a-half-long
  185. 6:52deep dive documentary on the original
  186. 6:54DRAM cartel, linked below, which also
  187. 6:56contains some history about what memory
  188. 6:59is and how it got its start, starting
  189. 7:02with actually core memory and rope
  190. 7:04memory, where they would hand-weave the
  191. 7:06software through rings, basically. At
  192. 7:09least 15 manufacturers participated, and
  193. 7:12over 117 employees from the five largest
  194. 7:14manufacturers alone were involved.
  195. 7:17Throughout that collusion period from
  196. 7:191998 to 2002, and just as an aside,
  197. 7:22there were also earlier alleged
  198. 7:25collusion periods we talked about. The
  199. 7:26manufacturers exchanged pricing
  200. 7:28frequently, upheld price floors, rigged
  201. 7:30customer auctions, simultaneously
  202. 7:32restricted output to artificially
  203. 7:34inflate prices, and even organized
  204. 7:36coalitions within the cartel to
  205. 7:38eliminate weaker players. The DOJ then
  206. 7:41launched its investigation after
  207. 7:42noticing spiking DRAM prices as well as
  208. 7:45in response to industry leaders like
  209. 7:47Dell especially at the time making
  210. 7:49comments about quote cartel-like
  211. 7:51behavior end quote. Interestingly, it
  212. 7:53wasn't until after the DOJ subpoenaed
  213. 7:55Micron and Micron applied for the
  214. 7:57corporate leniency program. Basically a
  215. 8:00snitches don't get stitches from the DOJ
  216. 8:02program that the DOJ then subpoenaed
  217. 8:05Micron's fellow cartel members. Shortly
  218. 8:07after the DOJ began issuing subpoenas
  219. 8:10iSuppli's principal memory analyst
  220. 8:12commented via Computerworld quote the
  221. 8:14major PC vendors really felt they were
  222. 8:16getting hit by a unified action. They
  223. 8:18thought DRAM suppliers were in collusion
  224. 8:20to set prices higher. But from the DRAM
  225. 8:22industry standpoint, they went from
  226. 8:24losing a horrible amount of money last
  227. 8:26year to trying to make a little money in
  228. 8:28the first quarter end quote resembling
  229. 8:30the DRAM oversupply in 2022 that
  230. 8:33preceded the currently alleged collusion
  231. 8:35period. Although they paid a hundreds of
  232. 8:38millions of dollars in fines clearly the
  233. 8:40manufacturers have done well in the time
  234. 8:42since. In fact, several of the employees
  235. 8:44were promoted after the cartel including
  236. 8:47one who was involved to CEO of Samsung
  237. 8:50Europe. While the original cartel was
  238. 8:52brought to a brief pause and some level
  239. 8:55of justice, we believe it laid the
  240. 8:57foundation for the current dominance
  241. 8:59that the big three manufacturers
  242. 9:00continue benefiting from today. At the
  243. 9:02time, SK Hynix even prophesized the big
  244. 9:05three one day operating in a legal gray
  245. 9:08area that allowed the manufacturers to
  246. 9:10lawfully share prices between one
  247. 9:12another stating in 1999 quote one of the
  248. 9:15advantage of being a big three is to
  249. 9:18have the controlling power over the
  250. 9:19price and we need to exercise this. One
  251. 9:22of our concern is that it is against the
  252. 9:24antitrust law to set up a certain cartel
  253. 9:27price and they suggest to encourage
  254. 9:29Samsung as the initiator. Why not if
  255. 9:31they accept? We need to have a
  256. 9:33communication channel open among the big
  257. 9:35three or four. each management should
  258. 9:38share their concern about pricing while
  259. 9:40not violating the law." End quote. This
  260. 9:42is especially concerning considering
  261. 9:44several cartel participants remained
  262. 9:46employed well after the DOJ discovered
  263. 9:48the cartel, like Samsung's Sunwoo Lee,
  264. 9:51for example. After the DOJ convicted Lee
  265. 9:53of violating the Sherman Act, fined him
  266. 9:55a quarter million dollars, and sentenced
  267. 9:58him to seven to eight months in prison,
  268. 10:00Samsung promoted the exec to CEO and
  269. 10:03president of Samsung Europe, a title Lee
  270. 10:05held until 2015. The point is, we think
  271. 10:09these companies were more than capable
  272. 10:11of rebuilding the cartel with all the
  273. 10:13players who remained in or were [music]
  274. 10:15promoted to powerful positions
  275. 10:18post-cartel collapse. And now, they have
  276. 10:20experience. More recently, in 2018,
  277. 10:23Hagens Berman law firm filed another
  278. 10:25class action against the manufacturers
  279. 10:27citing Gamers Nexus in source material
  280. 10:29for the memory makers allegedly
  281. 10:31violating antitrust laws between 2016
  282. 10:34and 2018. The court of appeals for the
  283. 10:36ninth circuit ultimately affirmed the
  284. 10:38case's dismissal in 2022 on account of
  285. 10:41insufficient evidence, but maybe now
  286. 10:44there's enough.
  287. 10:45>> [music]
  288. 10:51[music]
  289. 10:56>> As for the conspiracy period in question
  290. 10:58today, the new complaint alleges, quote,
  291. 11:00"Beginning in October 2022 and
  292. 11:02continuing to the present, defendants
  293. 11:04have engaged in a coordinated scheme to
  294. 11:06restrict the supply of commodity DRAM,
  295. 11:08artificially inflating prices throughout
  296. 11:10the United States. The scheme has been
  297. 11:12executed through a series of parallel
  298. 11:13actions that, taken together, constitute
  299. 11:16a comprehensive program of supply
  300. 11:18management by agreement." End quote. The
  301. 11:21filing describes how, after
  302. 11:22oversupplying the market during the
  303. 11:23pandemic, the big three manufacturers
  304. 11:26coordinated supply reductions in late
  305. 11:272022 and early 2023, starting with SK
  306. 11:31Hynix in October and Micron in November.
  307. 11:34Samsung initially held out. At the time,
  308. 11:37an industry analyst reported via Reuters
  309. 11:40stated, quote, "Samsung might be seeing
  310. 11:42this time as a good opportunity to
  311. 11:44increase market share, which should help
  312. 11:46it in the long term at the expense of SK
  313. 11:49Hynix and Micron." End quote. Instead of
  314. 11:51competing though, Samsung ultimately
  315. 11:54followed suit, announcing its own cuts
  316. 11:56in April. This is particularly out of
  317. 11:58character for Samsung, which has
  318. 12:00historically leveraged its dominance to
  319. 12:02drive out smaller firms during market
  320. 12:05downturns. An internal Infineon report
  321. 12:07from 2001 that we uncovered in our DRAM
  322. 12:10cartel documentary read, quote, "I
  323. 12:12talked to Dieter Mackowiak from Samsung.
  324. 12:14Samsung will proceed to take market
  325. 12:16share and make life difficult for all
  326. 12:18weaker competitors." End quote. Another
  327. 12:21stated, quote, "I talked with our friend
  328. 12:22Mackowiak. They want to kill Hynix and
  329. 12:25take their market share. They're ready
  330. 12:27to fight to drive prices down
  331. 12:29intentionally. The next months might be
  332. 12:31horrible." End quote. Today's new
  333. 12:33putative filing describes how Samsung
  334. 12:35continued throwing its weight around
  335. 12:37long after the original cartel period,
  336. 12:39explaining, quote, "In the 2008 to 2009
  337. 12:42downturn, Samsung kept producing and
  338. 12:44investing while rivals collapsed.
  339. 12:46Qimonda, then among the largest DRAM
  340. 12:49makers, declared insolvency in January
  341. 12:512009. Elpida, Japan's last DRAM maker,
  342. 12:55followed into bankruptcy in 2012."
  343. 12:57Industry commentary described the
  344. 12:59strategy as winning a game of capex
  345. 13:02chicken. Samsung publicly refused
  346. 13:04production cuts in the 2019 downturn as
  347. 13:07well." End quote. After Samsung
  348. 13:08allegedly restricted output with the
  349. 13:11others, the big three manufacturers
  350. 13:12simultaneously began transferring
  351. 13:14substantial production capacity and
  352. 13:16capital away from DRAM and towards HBM,
  353. 13:19or high bandwidth memory. Throughout
  354. 13:212023 and 2024, the manufacturers
  355. 13:23continued restricting DRAM output in
  356. 13:25attempts to stabilize prices, according
  357. 13:28to the complaint, referencing some of
  358. 13:29the same earnings calls we referenced in
  359. 13:32our DRAM cartel documentary, where we
  360. 13:34stated that the cartel gets around the
  361. 13:36no backdoor collusion rule by simply
  362. 13:39doing it publicly. The DRAM restrictions
  363. 13:41signaled their intentions to competitors
  364. 13:43through public statements and earnings
  365. 13:45reports with phrases like supply capex
  366. 13:48discipline or investment efficiency. In
  367. 13:51one instance, Micron even stated, quote,
  368. 13:54"Tool installation and production output
  369. 13:55will be ramped in line with industry
  370. 13:57demand growth, which is consistent with
  371. 13:59our goal to maintain stable bit supply
  372. 14:02share, as well as supply discipline."
  373. 14:04End quote. The filing points out, quote,
  374. 14:06"A commitment to hold stable bit supply
  375. 14:08share is a commitment not to take
  376. 14:10customers from Samsung or SK Hynix. Made
  377. 14:13publicly, it assured them of exactly
  378. 14:16that." End quote. And so, to the
  379. 14:19/r/hardware subreddit, a great big we
  380. 14:22told you so. Maybe you can accuse the
  381. 14:24multiple law firms of clickbait, too.
  382. 14:27Anyway, DRAM prices were beginning to
  383. 14:29stabilize by early 2025. At the time,
  384. 14:32Business Korea reported, quote, "DRAM
  385. 14:34prices had previously shown double-digit
  386. 14:37plunges in September, -17.07%,
  387. 14:40and November, -20.59%,
  388. 14:43last year. They maintained stability for
  389. 14:45four consecutive months from December
  390. 14:47before turning upward." End quote.
  391. 14:49Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron also
  392. 14:51seemingly coordinated an exit from DDR4
  393. 14:54around this time. Each announcing DDR4's
  394. 14:57EOL status within a 3-month span of each
  395. 14:59other. By third quarter 2025, CTEE,
  396. 15:02citing TrendForce, reported that DRAM
  397. 15:04contract prices had increased by 171.8%
  398. 15:09year-over-year. The legal complaint
  399. 15:10explains, quote, "A 171%
  400. 15:13price increase in conventional DRAM
  401. 15:15between Q3 '24 and Q3 '25, which then
  402. 15:19continued to increase to approximately
  403. 15:21697%
  404. 15:23is the single most powerful signal
  405. 15:24available to induce supply expansion.
  406. 15:27The simultaneous decision by all three
  407. 15:29defendants to forego a material
  408. 15:32commodity supply response is rational
  409. 15:35only if each is confident the others
  410. 15:38will likewise refrain, and the
  411. 15:39defendants can therefore ride the
  412. 15:41surging prices to record margins and
  413. 15:44profits." End quote. Meanwhile, the
  414. 15:46smaller DRAM manufacturers without a
  415. 15:48stake in the collusion, namely Winbond,
  416. 15:50Nanya, and CXMT, the Chinese
  417. 15:52manufacturer we covered in a separate
  418. 15:54documentary, we'll link that below, all
  419. 15:57expanded their output. But these
  420. 15:59companies have never been part of the
  421. 16:01big three. The complaint clarifies,
  422. 16:03quote, "If expansion were unprofitable,
  423. 16:05the smallest producers with the highest
  424. 16:07costs would not have posted record
  425. 16:09results doing so. The only firms for
  426. 16:11which continued output restraint was
  427. 16:13profitable were the three co-conspirator
  428. 16:16defendants, so long as not one of them
  429. 16:18broke ranks and attempted market share
  430. 16:21from the others." End quote. Then, in
  431. 16:23October, OpenAI announced its Stargate
  432. 16:26project in partnership with Samsung and
  433. 16:28SK Hynix, claiming the project was
  434. 16:30targeting, quote, "900,000 DRAM wafer
  435. 16:33starts per month." End quote, which
  436. 16:35Tom's Hardware estimated, quote, "May
  437. 16:37represent around 40% of total DRAM
  438. 16:39output." End quote. Effectively, OpenAI
  439. 16:42and Sam Altman issued a letter of
  440. 16:44intent. Samsung and SK Hynix effectively
  441. 16:46conceded the consumer DRAM market to
  442. 16:48Micron by committing such a large
  443. 16:50percentage of their DRAM wafer starts to
  444. 16:52OpenAI. At the time, Micron was the only
  445. 16:55big three manufacturer with a
  446. 16:56direct-to-consumer sales channel of any
  447. 16:58meaningful quantity. Hynix does have
  448. 17:01Klevv, but they don't really sell much
  449. 17:03of it. And Micron was the only
  450. 17:05manufacturer with significant capacity
  451. 17:07for consumer DRAM amidst what it called,
  452. 17:09quote, "The most severe memory supply
  453. 17:11shortage in more than 40 years." End
  454. 17:13quote. Rather than capitalize on the
  455. 17:15all-time high retail prices with its
  456. 17:17unique positioning, Micron shattered the
  457. 17:2029 years worth of goodwill it built with
  458. 17:22consumers and killed Crucial, quote, in
  459. 17:24order to improve supply and support for
  460. 17:27our larger strategic customers in faster
  461. 17:30growing segments, end quote. Micron
  462. 17:31announced its decision only 2 months
  463. 17:33after OpenAI's Stargate announcement for
  464. 17:36the memory purchases, that is, and the
  465. 17:38punitive filing contends, quote, in a
  466. 17:40competitive market a firm does not
  467. 17:42abandon a high-margin segment at the
  468. 17:44peak of a price spike, particularly
  469. 17:46where it has an established
  470. 17:48direct-to-consumer channel that its
  471. 17:50rivals lack. It expands into it. That AI
  472. 17:53data center demand was strong explains
  473. 17:55why Micron might wish to sell more to
  474. 17:58data center customers. It does not
  475. 18:00explain why Micron eliminated its
  476. 18:02consumer channel rather than supplying
  477. 18:05it when consumer prices were at record
  478. 18:07highs and the channel was highly
  479. 18:09profitable, end quote. The complaint
  480. 18:11then claims, beginning January 2026,
  481. 18:14that Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron
  482. 18:16simultaneously implemented stricter
  483. 18:17customer vetting procedures. Tom's
  484. 18:19Hardware, citing Nikkei Asia, quotes a
  485. 18:22GPU and server supplier who explained,
  486. 18:24quote, the three companies became
  487. 18:26stricter and asked us about who we will
  488. 18:28supply to, how much quantity, and if the
  489. 18:31demand of our customers are real, end
  490. 18:33quote. All three manufacturers beginning
  491. 18:35to ask the same questions at the same
  492. 18:36time is a huge red flag of collusion and
  493. 18:39indicates what we believe is a
  494. 18:40coordinated effort. The filing notes,
  495. 18:43quote, in a competitive market firms
  496. 18:45differentiate on customer service. They
  497. 18:47do not simultaneously adopt the same
  498. 18:49order vetting questions, end quote. The
  499. 18:52complaint continues describing how
  500. 18:54despite all the claims of, quote,
  501. 18:56focusing on profitability, end quote,
  502. 18:58while shifting DRAM resources to HBM,
  503. 19:01DRAM actually surpassed HBM's
  504. 19:03profitability per wafer in early 2026.
  505. 19:07According to CNBC, quote, when Micron
  506. 19:09makes one bit of HBM memory, it has to
  507. 19:12forego making three bits of more
  508. 19:14conventional memory for other devices,
  509. 19:16end quote. Per our own reporting, due to
  510. 19:18yields and DRAM requirements, HBM can
  511. 19:21sometimes require 2.3 to three times as
  512. 19:24much DRAM die area as consumer GDDR7
  513. 19:27memory for the same capacity in bits,
  514. 19:30not counting the extra base logic die
  515. 19:33and interposer you need for HBM. As
  516. 19:35explained in the court documents, quote,
  517. 19:36the three-to-one ratio implies that HBM
  518. 19:38is the more profitable use of capacity
  519. 19:40only if the profit from one HBM bit
  520. 19:43exceeds the profit from three
  521. 19:44conventional DRAM bits sold into the
  522. 19:46shortage. Stated as a threshold, a bit
  523. 19:49of HBM is the better use of a unit of
  524. 19:51capacity only where the HBM revenue
  525. 19:54premium per bit multiplied by the HBM
  526. 19:56margin exceeds three times the ordinary
  527. 19:59margin proxy, end quote. The complaint
  528. 20:02cites Micron's second quarter 2026
  529. 20:04financials where reported operating
  530. 20:06margins of 76% for mobile and client,
  531. 20:09consumer basically, 67% for core data
  532. 20:12center, and 66% for cloud memory. In the
  533. 20:15time since, Micron has posted another
  534. 20:17quarter that we've already covered in a
  535. 20:19different video, but in that one, Micron
  536. 20:22reported an obscenely high consumer
  537. 20:24memory operating margin of 86%
  538. 20:27on 87% gross margin. Just one year
  539. 20:30prior, in the same table, Micron
  540. 20:32reported 15% operating margin for the
  541. 20:35same part of its consumer business,
  542. 20:38again, now 86%. And that's from the same
  543. 20:41company that shuttered its consumer
  544. 20:42memory direct sales channel. But the
  545. 20:45suit cites the prior quarter with
  546. 20:46slightly lower margin due to the filing
  547. 20:48time. Using Micron's reported mobile and
  548. 20:51client business unit $7.711 billion
  549. 20:54quarterly revenue and 76% operating
  550. 20:56margin, the complaint calculates, quote,
  551. 20:58the operating profit associated with
  552. 21:00capturing even a small additional share
  553. 21:02of that segment's consumer and client
  554. 21:03demand, end quote, to create some tables
  555. 21:06and charts. Per the complaint, if Micron
  556. 21:08increased its consumer sales by 5%, it
  557. 21:11would have received an additional
  558. 21:12roughly $293 million in operating
  559. 21:15quarterly income, or an additional $1.17
  560. 21:19billion when annualized. That'd be even
  561. 21:21higher on the Q3 filing. The complaint
  562. 21:24also calculates a section for the
  563. 21:26required HBM revenue premium per bit to
  564. 21:28beat three conventional DRAM bits as it
  565. 21:31corresponds to different HBM margins. As
  566. 21:33shown in this table, at 70% HBM margin,
  567. 21:36the manufacturer needs a 3.26x revenue
  568. 21:39premium per HBM bit in order to gain
  569. 21:42more profit than three conventional DRAM
  570. 21:44bits. In other words, the manufacturers
  571. 21:46are leaving substantial profit on the
  572. 21:48table by not competing for the consumer
  573. 21:51DRAM market, something they chose to not
  574. 21:54supply. And even the manufacturers admit
  575. 21:57that DRAM has now surpassed HBM's
  576. 22:00profitability. In Samsung's first
  577. 22:02quarter 2026 earnings call, it stated,
  578. 22:04>> Currently, we have seen a rise in lower
  579. 22:07spec legacy memory prices, and it is
  580. 22:10true that conventional DRAMs
  581. 22:12have higher margins versus HBM.
  582. 22:15And we are aware of certain outside
  583. 22:18views that focusing our sales mix on
  584. 22:20conventional DRAMs may be more
  585. 22:22beneficial
  586. 22:23in terms of short-term performance
  587. 22:25versus HBM.
  588. 22:26>> Micron CEO affirmed this in Micron's
  589. 22:28second quarter 2026 earnings call,
  590. 22:30acknowledging,
  591. 22:31>> So, yes, it is correct that the margins
  592. 22:33for non-HBM to they are higher than HBM
  593. 22:36margins.
  594. 22:37>> And then SK Group chairman reportedly
  595. 22:39stated through machine translation,
  596. 22:40quote, "The HBM margin is 60% and the
  597. 22:43general memory chip margin is 80%," end
  598. 22:46quote, as reported by Korean media
  599. 22:48outlet News 1. We think one key factor
  600. 22:50contributing to this is that HBM
  601. 22:52contract prices are negotiated annually,
  602. 22:54while DRAM contract prices are
  603. 22:56negotiated quarterly, meaning DRAM
  604. 22:58prices are going to reflect market
  605. 23:00changes faster than HBM. The complaint
  606. 23:02asserts, quote, AI demand explains why
  607. 23:05HBM became attractive. It does not
  608. 23:07explain Samsung's abandonment of its
  609. 23:08historical maverick strategy, Micron's
  610. 23:11exit from Crucial at peak consumer
  611. 23:13prices, or the uniform refusal by all
  612. 23:15three defendants to expand commodity
  613. 23:17DRAM supply in response to record
  614. 23:19commodity prices, end quote. Finally,
  615. 23:21the document concludes by explaining how
  616. 23:23the DRAM industry's characteristics make
  617. 23:25it particularly susceptible to
  618. 23:27successful collusion, citing the
  619. 23:28extremely concentrated market, sales of
  620. 23:30commodity products, price transparency
  621. 23:32from TrendForce's contract price
  622. 23:34reports, inelastic demand,
  623. 23:35insurmountable entry barriers, and
  624. 23:37numerous colluding opportunities.
  625. 23:41>> [music]
  626. 23:47[music]
  627. 23:50>> A lot of the alleged collusion today
  628. 23:52comes down to the market dynamics
  629. 23:54between competitors in the DRAM
  630. 23:56industry, which Soyoung Lee describes
  631. 23:58well in his report titled Chicken Game
  632. 24:01Analysis on Global Competition. Using
  633. 24:03the concepts of game theory, Lee
  634. 24:05illustrates how each manufacturer has
  635. 24:07the choice to either expand or maintain
  636. 24:10or reduce capacity. If two manufacturers
  637. 24:12exist and both manufacturers expand
  638. 24:14capacity, the result is an oversupply
  639. 24:17and both receive lower profits. If one
  640. 24:19expands while the other maintains, the
  641. 24:20manufacturer who expands earns higher
  642. 24:22profits and market share. If both
  643. 24:24manufacturers choose to maintain,
  644. 24:26however, each walks away with a moderate
  645. 24:28payout. Pretty basic stuff. Of course,
  646. 24:31in a perfectly competitive market, you
  647. 24:33don't know how your competitor is going
  648. 24:35to play the game. Additionally, if you
  649. 24:37somehow knew your competitor planned to
  650. 24:39maintain or reduce capacity, like, say,
  651. 24:41if they stated something like,
  652. 24:44"Our DRAM wafer starts will remain
  653. 24:45significantly below 2022 levels for the
  654. 24:47foreseeable future." in their earnings
  655. 24:48report, you'd expand capacity to earn
  656. 24:51higher profits and seize market share
  657. 24:52from your competition. Unfortunately,
  658. 24:54while it certainly appears like the
  659. 24:56manufacturers are choosing to not
  660. 24:58compete from our perspective anyway. The
  661. 25:00manufacturers could claim that this is
  662. 25:02simply conscious parallelism. Cornell
  663. 25:05Law School defines this market tactic
  664. 25:08stating, quote, "Conscious parallelism
  665. 25:10refers to businesses changing their
  666. 25:11prices to reflect the prices of
  667. 25:13competitors within a market without
  668. 25:14colluding or communicating with
  669. 25:16competitors. Unlike price fixing, which
  670. 25:18involves conscious agreement between
  671. 25:19competitors and violating antitrust
  672. 25:21laws, conscious parallelism occurs where
  673. 25:24businesses just change prices in
  674. 25:26reaction to competitors. And conscious
  675. 25:28parallelism does not constitute illegal
  676. 25:30activity on its own." End quote.
  677. 25:34>> [music]
  678. 25:36>> This is actually somewhat related to why
  679. 25:38the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
  680. 25:39Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
  681. 25:41prior DRAM antitrust lawsuit filed in
  682. 25:442018. The court's decision read, quote,
  683. 25:47"Plaintiffs' factual allegations do not
  684. 25:49amount to the something more required to
  685. 25:51support a plausible inference of
  686. 25:52conspiracy. Dismissal of plaintiffs'
  687. 25:55claims premised on an alleged agreement
  688. 25:57between defendants was therefore
  689. 25:58proper." End quote. The current
  690. 26:00complaint, the new one, addresses this
  691. 26:02aspect from the previously failed case
  692. 26:05stating, quote, "The 2016 to 2018
  693. 26:08litigation was ultimately unsuccessful.
  694. 26:10Unlike the present action, the 2018
  695. 26:12complaint alleged only parallel pricing
  696. 26:14without identifying unlawful coordinated
  697. 26:16conduct as set forth here. Simultaneous
  698. 26:19production cuts, coordinated product
  699. 26:21line exits, used equipment withdrawal by
  700. 26:23Samsung and SK Hynix, and parallel
  701. 26:25customer vetting among other specific
  702. 26:27facts and conduct explained in this
  703. 26:29complaint." End quote. For context,
  704. 26:31Thomson Reuters describes Section 1 of
  705. 26:33the Sherman Antitrust Act, what the
  706. 26:35plaintiffs alleged the manufacturers
  707. 26:36violated, by saying this, quote, "Every
  708. 26:39contract, combination in the form of
  709. 26:41trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
  710. 26:43restraint of trade or commerce among the
  711. 26:45several states or with foreign nations
  712. 26:47is declared to be illegal. If read
  713. 26:49literally, Section 1 of the Sherman Act
  714. 26:52would prohibit every commercial contract
  715. 26:54because all contracts cause some
  716. 26:56restraint on trade. Fortunately, courts
  717. 26:58have found that only agreements that
  718. 27:00unreasonably restrain trade are
  719. 27:02prohibited, end quote. According to
  720. 27:04George Washington University Law School,
  721. 27:06we found this explainer, quote, "Courts
  722. 27:08allow a collusive agreement to be
  723. 27:10established by circumstantial evidence,
  724. 27:12but the evidence must show additional
  725. 27:14evidence, plus factors, beyond parallel
  726. 27:17movement in price, end quote." Thompson
  727. 27:19Reuters describes some of the plus
  728. 27:21factors typically accepted in addition
  729. 27:23to parallel movements, stating, quote,
  730. 27:25"Plus factors include the defendants
  731. 27:27acted contrary to their individual
  732. 27:29economic interests, the defendants had
  733. 27:31meetings or conversations, i.e.,
  734. 27:33opportunities to agree, the defendants
  735. 27:35had a motive to collude, engaged in
  736. 27:37abrupt or unprecedented changes in
  737. 27:39behavior, and the industry is
  738. 27:41concentrated with few competitors, end
  739. 27:43quote." We believe that each of those
  740. 27:45factors, the plus factors, exist in this
  741. 27:48case, but that's not for us to decide.
  742. 27:50Ultimately, we'd like to see more from
  743. 27:52the DOJ here, like in the early 2000s,
  744. 27:55but the current DOJ is
  745. 27:58busy finding a replacement.
  746. 28:00>> One word about Jeffrey Epstein. How
  747. 28:04ironic is that? You know why? Because
  748. 28:06Donald Trump
  749. 28:08the Dow the Dow right now is over
  750. 28:13the Dow is over $50,000.
  751. 28:15I don't know why you're laughing. You're
  752. 28:16a great stock trader.
  753. 28:18>> Our understanding is that the consumers
  754. 28:19never would have discovered the original
  755. 28:21DRAM cartel had the DOJ not subpoenaed
  756. 28:24the manufacturers in response to both
  757. 28:27the increasing prices and the
  758. 28:29cartel-like allegations from industry
  759. 28:32leaders. To our knowledge, the DOJ
  760. 28:34hasn't investigated the DRAM
  761. 28:35manufacturers since. Cafferty Donn LLP,
  762. 28:38the firm who submitted this putative
  763. 28:39complaint, isn't the only law firm
  764. 28:41investigating the DRAM manufacturers for
  765. 28:43price fixing right now. It's heating up.
  766. 28:45Similarly, a cross-sector trade
  767. 28:47association recently sent a letter to
  768. 28:49the secretaries of the US Treasury and
  769. 28:51Commerce departments regarding, {quote}
  770. 28:53an urgent imbalance in the market for
  771. 28:55memory chips that could lead to
  772. 28:56significant and sustained near-term
  773. 28:58price increases for American households
  774. 29:01and disrupt critical US supply chains,
  775. 29:03{end quote}. The letter, signed by
  776. 29:04several national industry associations,
  777. 29:06urged the US White House and its
  778. 29:08administration to, among other requests,
  779. 29:11{quote} ensure that memory semiconductor
  780. 29:13capacity adequately serves all segments
  781. 29:15of the market, including consumer-facing
  782. 29:18and manufacturing industries, and to
  783. 29:20{quote} closely track conditions in the
  784. 29:21memory market, including with respect to
  785. 29:23supply and demand, {end quote}. In the
  786. 29:25DOJ's Red Flags of Collusion, it
  787. 29:28describes its four-part MAPS analysis,
  788. 29:31explaining how you can analyze an
  789. 29:33industry's market, applications,
  790. 29:35patterns, and suspicious behavior to
  791. 29:37detect collusion. Starting with the
  792. 29:39market aspect, the DOJ states, {quote}
  793. 29:41The award may be the target of collusion
  794. 29:43if there are few competitors in the
  795. 29:45market that offer a good or service, a
  796. 29:47small group of major vendors controls a
  797. 29:48large share of the market, the good or
  798. 29:50service is standardized so that the
  799. 29:52determining factor in the award is
  800. 29:54price, rather than other competitive
  801. 29:56factors, such as design, quality, or
  802. 29:58service, {end quote}. All of these
  803. 29:59factors, again, exist in the DRAM
  804. 30:01market. Moving to the application
  805. 30:03section, it asks, {quote} Are there
  806. 30:05similarities between vendor applications
  807. 30:07or proposals, {end quote}? And while the
  808. 30:09DOJ doesn't explicitly mention it in its
  809. 30:12examples, we would consider the
  810. 30:14manufacturers simultaneously
  811. 30:15implementing stricter customer vetting
  812. 30:17procedures and asking the same exact
  813. 30:19questions as both a similarity between
  814. 30:22applications and suspicious behavior.
  815. 30:25The post concludes, {quote} If you
  816. 30:27notice any combination of these red
  817. 30:28flags, you should report your concerns
  818. 30:30to the Antitrust Division, {end quote}.
  819. 30:32While we don't think there's currently
  820. 30:34any explicit evidence of collusion, we
  821. 30:36think the amount of seemingly
  822. 30:37coordinated actions, the unprecedented
  823. 30:40price increases, and the amount of
  824. 30:42consumers who purchase electronics with
  825. 30:44RAM should be more than enough for the
  826. 30:46DOJ to at least investigate the market
  827. 30:48for anti-competitive practices. Of
  828. 30:50course, it's not like the US antitrust
  829. 30:52agencies currently have any reason to
  830. 30:54turn a blind eye to this sort of
  831. 30:55behavior, say for example, if something
  832. 30:57ridiculous happened like the executive
  833. 30:59branch were to garner good PR with
  834. 31:01hundreds of millions of dollars of
  835. 31:02donations for a memory maker, and
  836. 31:03likewise grant billions of dollars of
  837. 31:04tax breaks, while also enacting control
  838. 31:06over the DOJ as the executive branch, or
  839. 31:08at least it seems that way. But, that
  840. 31:10would be ridiculous.
  841. 31:12>> This is critical capability.
  842. 31:14>> So, this filing is currently in the
  843. 31:16earliest possible stages, and the judge
  844. 31:19is yet to certify this putative class
  845. 31:21action complaint as a legitimate class
  846. 31:23action lawsuit. If the judge certifies
  847. 31:25the putative filing as a class action,
  848. 31:27the defendants will likely file a motion
  849. 31:29to dismiss. If that fails, the case then
  850. 31:32enters the discovery period, which is
  851. 31:34what they would really want to avoid.
  852. 31:36For additional reference, the original
  853. 31:37DRAM antitrust litigation filed in 2002
  854. 31:41required nearly 12 years between the
  855. 31:43plaintiffs initially filing the case and
  856. 31:45the court granting the final approval of
  857. 31:47settlements. It'll take a while to see
  858. 31:49how this plays out, but we'll be here to
  859. 31:51cover it, even if it's 12 years from
  860. 31:53now, but hopefully it's sooner. That's
  861. 31:55it for this one. You should watch our
  862. 31:56DRAM cartel history piece that we posted
  863. 31:58previously. We'll link that in the
  864. 31:59description, and you should open another
  865. 32:01tab for our rise of Chinese memory
  866. 32:04content about CXMT, a new competitor to
  867. 32:07these big three. You can directly
  868. 32:09support our work by going to
  869. 32:10store.gamersnexus.net
  870. 32:12and picking up one of our shirts, such
  871. 32:14as our GPU shredder shirt, and we have
  872. 32:16more microslab shirts on the way into
  873. 32:18the warehouse. Those have continued to
  874. 32:20sell through, so thank you. You can also
  875. 32:22get one of our retro IO coaster packs,
  876. 32:24hearkening back to a better time when
  877. 32:26not everything was a cloud-based and
  878. 32:28shitified service, or you can head over
  879. 32:30to patreon.com/gamersnexus
  880. 32:32to throw a few bucks our way each month.
  881. 32:34Thanks for watching. Thanks for your
  882. 32:35support. Subscribe for more, and we'll
  883. 32:37see you all next time.

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