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Thành Đô 1990: Nguyễn Văn Linh Đã Đổi Lấy Điều Gì Khi Đông Âu Sụp Đổ? — Transcript

by HỒI KÝ THẾ KỶ · 5,470 words · 900 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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0:01In September 1990, in a private room at
0:03the Jinniu Hotel in Chengdu, Nguyen Van
0:06Linh sat down across from Chinese
0:08leaders. The meeting was not widely
0:12publicized while it was taking place.
0:15Citizens back home at that time could
0:17not follow any live reports on what was
0:19being discussed behind the doors of the
0:22Jinniu Hotel. But behind those doors
0:25was a choice that could influence the
0:27path Vietnam would take for many years
0:29to come. Only nearly 10 months earlier,
0:34on the night of November 9, 1989, the
0:36Berlin Wall had been opened. Socialist
0:39regimes in Eastern Europe were
0:41collapsing one after another. The
0:43Soviet Union, Vietnam’s greatest
0:45pillar of support, was sliding toward
0:47dissolution. Peace had not yet come to
0:49Cambodia, and the embargo remained in
0:51place. The economy had just emerged
0:53from years when having a full meal was
0:55something many families had to scrape
0:57by for every day. The person who
1:00stepped into that room was none other
1:01than Nguyen Van Linh, who had opened
1:03the door to Doi Moi to save the
1:05Vietnamese economy from exhaustion. But
1:08now, facing the shadow looming from
1:10Eastern Europe, he had to confront an
1:12even grimmer question. What further
1:15doors must Vietnam open to survive, and
1:18which doors must it close so the regime
1:20would not follow the path of the Soviet
1:22Union and Eastern Europe? Did Nguyen
1:26Van Linh go to Chengdu to lift Vietnam
1:28out of isolation, or because he had
1:30foreseen a collapse that Vietnam, at
1:32any cost, must not repeat? The answer
1:36lies not only in the two days of secret
1:39talks, but also in the pressures,
1:41concessions, and difficult choices that
1:43Vietnam’s leadership had to face as
1:45the world order shattered before their
1:47eyes. To understand why Nguyen Van Linh
1:51made such choices, one must return to
1:53the nature of the Doi Moi process he
1:55pursued. A change strong enough to save
1:58the economy, but which must not lead to
2:00altering the political foundation of
2:02the regime. When Nguyen Van Linh was
2:06elected General Secretary on December
2:0818, 1986, Vietnam stood before a
2:11darkness with no visible exit. The
2:15currency was losing value daily, goods
2:17were scarce, and people's lives were
2:19eroded in long queues. Meanwhile, the
2:21management apparatus continued to
2:23operate on orders that were
2:24increasingly detached from reality.
2:27People needed change, not through new
2:29slogans, but through food, jobs, and
2:31the belief that tomorrow could be less
2:33of a struggle than today. Nguyen Van
2:37Linh stepped into the highest position
2:39of the Party, not as a theorist
2:40accustomed to viewing the country only
2:42through reports. Over half of his
2:45working life was tied to the South, to
2:48Saigon, Gia Dinh, to crowded
2:49neighborhoods and factories lacking raw
2:52materials. Workers had to find their
2:55own ways to keep the machines running.
2:57It was there that he saw something very
3:00simple, yet very difficult to
3:01acknowledge at that time. Life does not
3:05always follow the straight line drawn
3:07out on paper. He understood that if a
3:12mechanism prevented those who worked
3:14more from earning more, forced capable
3:16factories to wait for every order, and
3:18held back goods with administrative
3:20barriers, then that mechanism, no
3:22matter how beautifully defended, could
3:24not help the country overcome poverty.
3:30For Nguyen Van Linh, "Doi Moi"(
3:32Renovation) meant, first and foremost,
3:34giving reality the right to speak, so
3:37workers would have motivation, managers
3:39could have initiative, goods could
3:41circulate, and real-life initiatives
3:43would no longer be seen as deviations
3:46from the norm. That is why, when the
3:49Western press called him the Gorbachev
3:51of Vietnam, the comparison was only
3:53true to a very small extent. Both
3:56emerged at a time when the socialist
3:58system was in crisis, and both spoke of
4:01reform. But the path Nguyen Van Linh
4:04chose was different from the very
4:05starting point. He wanted to change
4:09economic management to ensure the
4:11survival of the country and the regime,
4:13rather than embarking on a political
4:15reform process that would lead to
4:17pluralism or weaken the Party's
4:19leadership. The limits of "Doi Moi" in
4:22Nguyen Van Linh's view were quite
4:24clearly defined. The economic mechanism
4:27had to be dismantled and leadership
4:28methods had to change, but the ruling
4:30role of the Party was not to be
4:32questioned. By the late 1980s, the
4:36upheavals in Eastern Europe would turn
4:39those limits from a viewpoint into a
4:41specific political choice. By the late
4:451980s, those two concerns were no
4:47longer confined to theoretical debates.
4:51They manifested as concrete pressures.
4:53Tightening around Vietnam from multiple
4:55sides. A war in Cambodia that had not
4:57yet fully closed. An economy losing its
5:00support base and a diplomatic isolation
5:02loop with no end in sight. If one looks
5:06at Vietnam in the late 1980s through
5:08economic figures alone, one sees a
5:10country struggling to stand up after
5:12years of deprivation. But behind those
5:16figures were three concurrent rings
5:17tightening around the future. Cambodia,
5:21the decline of economic aid, and
5:23diplomatic isolation. For Nguyen Van
5:27Linh, these were no longer separate
5:29issues. Each day the army remained in
5:31Cambodia was an additional burden. Each
5:33year the embargo remained, the Doi Moi
5:35process found it harder to secure
5:37capital, technology, and markets to
5:39move forward. The first ring was named
5:41Cambodia. After the Khmer Rouge regime
5:45was toppled in early 1979, Vietnamese
5:47volunteer troops remained to support
5:49the new government in Phnom Penh and
5:51prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning.
5:55The war lasted nearly a decade,
5:57draining resources, manpower, and the
6:00youth of many soldiers. Back home, many
6:03families waited wearily for the day of
6:05reunion. Internationally, that presence
6:08became a pretext for many countries to
6:10continue pressuring and isolating
6:12Vietnam. On May 6, 1989, at the 10th
6:16anniversary of the People's Republic of
6:18Kampuchea's National Day, General
6:20Secretary Nguyen Van Linh announced
6:22that Vietnam would withdraw all troops
6:25from Cambodia by September of that year
6:27, one year earlier than planned, if a
6:29political solution was reached. Also in
6:33January 1989, Vietnam and China resumed
6:36contacts at the deputy foreign
6:38ministerial level regarding the
6:40Cambodian issue. By April 5, Hanoi
6:44announced it would withdraw all troops
6:46whether or not a political solution had
6:48been achieved by then. According to
6:51Vietnam's official declaration, the
6:53withdrawal of volunteer troops from
6:55Cambodia was completed at the end of
6:57September 1989. A withdrawal on the
7:01battlefield was also a diplomatic
7:03message. Vietnam was unilaterally
7:05removing the primary pretext used to
7:07maintain the encirclement. The second
7:09ring lay within the economy. In May
7:121989, Vietnam implemented a more robust
7:15and comprehensive reform program. But
7:18just as those steps began to take
7:20effect, funding from the Soviet Union
7:22dwindled, and the preferential exchange
7:24mechanism within the Council for Mutual
7:26Economic Assistance began to crumble. A
7:30country just learning to stand on its
7:32own two feet realized that its familiar
7:34support was slipping away. If new paths
7:36to the outside world could not be
7:38opened, the reforms might run out of
7:40air just as they were taking their
7:42first steps. The final encirclement was
7:45diplomatic; on May 20, 1988, the
7:48Politburo issued Resolution No. 13 on
7:50tasks and foreign policy in the new
7:53situation. Foreign policy thinking
7:57began to shift toward creating a
7:58peaceful environment, reducing
8:00confrontation, expanding relations, and
8:02dedicating resources to development.
8:04Vietnam had to simultaneously resolve
8:06the Cambodia issue, improve relations
8:08with China, find a way toward
8:10normalization with the United States,
8:12and reconnect with Southeast Asia. Also
8:15in 1989, Nguyen Van Linh and the
8:17Politburo advocated for the withdrawal
8:20of troops from the Vietnam-China border
8:23area. That rarely mentioned decision
8:25aimed to reduce military costs in the
8:27North and send a signal that Hanoi
8:29wanted to end the prolonged state of
8:31confrontation. It was not about
8:34forgetting what had happened at the
8:36border. It was the choice of a country
8:39that understood that remaining in a
8:41fighting stance in every direction
8:43would leave it unable to heal its
8:45internal wounds. Those three
8:49encirclements meant Nguyen Van Linh’s
8:51question was no longer whether to
8:52change, but in what order to change so
8:54the country would not collapse halfway.
8:58Peace at this time was not just a
9:00post-war aspiration; peace had become
9:02the condition for people to have more
9:04rice at home, for factories to have raw
9:06materials to operate, and for the
9:08reform process to have a chance at
9:10survival. But just as Vietnam began to
9:13open a path to the outside world, the
9:15upheavals from the Soviet Union and
9:17Eastern Europe pushed the leadership
9:19toward a conflicting choice. The
9:20economy needed to be opened faster,
9:22while politics had to be kept tighter.
9:26In 1989, as the socialist world began
9:28to tremble, a sign appeared in the
9:30fields of Vietnam that was enough to
9:33change the mood of the entire nation.
9:37After many years of having to import
9:39food, Vietnam had met its domestic
9:41needs and exported over 1 million tons
9:44of rice. The ships leaving the harbor
9:46carried more than just cargo; they
9:48carried the feeling that a nation once
9:50worried about every meal had begun to
9:52regain the ability to feed itself. This
9:56achievement is linked to Resolution No.
9:5910 of the Politburo, issued on April 5,
10:011988, which gave more autonomy to
10:03farming households and loosened
10:05production constraints. When farmers
10:09could enjoy more of the fruits of their
10:11labor, productive capacity was rapidly
10:13unleashed. For the people, renovation
10:16was not found in grand, abstract
10:18concepts. It appeared in fuller rice
10:21bowls and the fading fear of
10:22pre-harvest hunger. It was seen in the
10:25belief that a sound policy could touch
10:27real life. As the economy began to show
10:30bright spots, a different kind of
10:32concern rose within the halls of the
10:34Central Committee. On August 24, 1989,
10:38the Seventh Plenum of the 6th Central
10:41Committee issued a resolution on
10:43several urgent issues in ideological
10:45work. The document viewed the upheavals
10:50in socialist countries as warnings
10:52against political pluralism,
10:53unrestrained democratization, the
10:55weakening of the Party's leadership,
10:57and placing too much hope in the West.
11:01What was happening beyond the borders
11:03was viewed as a future that Vietnam
11:05must avoid. On March 27, 1990, the
11:09Eighth Plenum of the 6th Central
11:11Committee passed a specific resolution
11:13on the situation in socialist countries
11:16. The document acknowledged that reform
11:20and restructuring were necessary, while
11:22arguing that errors during
11:23implementation had pushed the crises in
11:26the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to
11:28severe levels. At this conference, Mr.
11:30Tran Xuan Bach, then a Politburo member
11:33and Secretary of the Party Central
11:34Committee, was disciplined for
11:36promoting views of political pluralism
11:38and a multi-party system. That event
11:41was not just about the fate of a
11:43high-ranking official; it marked the
11:45boundary that political reform was not
11:47permitted to cross. From then on, the
11:49renovation process unfolded at two
11:50different paces. The economy continued
11:52to be deregulated to help people
11:54conduct business, allow enterprises to
11:55be more proactive, and keep goods in
11:57circulation. Politics was renewed in
11:59terms of leadership methods to fight
12:01bureaucracy, promote democracy, and
12:03listen to the people, but it remained
12:05under Party leadership, coupled with
12:07discipline and without leading to
12:08pluralism or a multi-party system. For
12:11Nguyen Van Linh, economic reform was a
12:13condition for the nation's survival.
12:16Controlling the pace of politics was
12:18the condition to ensure change did not
12:20exceed its original goals. One could
12:22see this choice as the caution of
12:24someone who had witnessed too much
12:26collapse. One could also wonder if
12:29separating these two streams of reform
12:31helped Vietnam avoid a shock or left
12:33behind limitations the future would
12:35have to face. History does not answer
12:40with a neat "right" or "wrong." It only
12:43shows that in 1989, as rice began to
12:45reach the world, the economic space
12:48expanded, while political boundaries
12:50were more clearly defined. However,
12:54these domestic choices were not enough
12:56to lead Vietnam out of its predicament.
12:58Ahead lay a more difficult knot, where
13:00memories of the Khmer Rouge's crimes,
13:02the interests of major powers, and the
13:04future of Cambodia were tightly
13:06intertwined. In late September 1989,
13:09Vietnam organized what was declared to
13:11be the final withdrawal of its
13:13volunteer troops from Cambodia. For
13:16many soldiers, it was a homecoming
13:17after years spent in deep forests
13:19filled with malaria, ambushes, and
13:21villages still haunted by the stench of
13:24death from a genocidal regime. Mothers
13:26were finally able to see their sons
13:27walk through the front door again.
13:30Children who only knew their fathers
13:31through an old photograph could finally
13:33hear them call their names. But on
13:36Cambodian soil, the sound of gunfire
13:38had not ceased. The Vietnamese army had
13:40withdrawn, yet the war between the
13:42Phnom Penh government and opposition
13:44forces continued. From this point on,
13:47the Cambodia issue was no longer about
13:49when Vietnam would withdraw its troops,
13:51but shifted to a more difficult
13:52question. Who would hold power during
13:55the transition period and who had the
13:56right to represent the future of that
13:58country? From July 30 to August 30,
14:021989, an international conference on
14:05Cambodia was held in Paris with the
14:07participation of many nations, the UN
14:10Secretary-General, and the four
14:12Cambodian factions. In the same meeting
14:15room were the Phnom Penh government led
14:18by Hun Sen, the royalist forces
14:20associated with Prince Norodom Sihanouk
14:22, the forces of Son Sann, and the Khmer
14:25Rouge represented by Khieu Samphan.
14:28After a month of negotiations, the
14:30conference made progress on many issues
14:32, but by the closing day, it was still
14:34unable to form a comprehensive solution
14:36. The sessions had to be suspended
14:38because the most difficult part
14:39remained unresolved. How would the
14:41transition mechanism be organized? How
14:43would power be divided among the
14:45parties, and to what extent would the
14:47United Nations oversee that process?
14:50Behind those cold diplomatic formulas
14:52lay an irony that many Vietnamese found
14:54difficult to accept. Ten years earlier,
14:58Vietnamese troops had entered Cambodia
15:00amidst the massacres on the
15:02southwestern border and helped topple
15:04the Pol Pot regime. Many Vietnamese
15:07soldiers had sacrificed their lives and
15:09remained on Cambodian soil during the
15:11fight against the Khmer Rouge forces.
15:13Now, as a peace solution was placed on
15:15the table, Khmer Rouge representatives
15:17remained present as a party that could
15:19not be ignored. They had lost the
15:22capital but had not lost their armed
15:24forces. They were known to the world
15:25for the killing fields but still
15:27received external support and
15:29maintained a position in the opposition
15:31coalition recognized at the United
15:32Nations. This was the most painful knot
15:36in the Cambodian puzzle. If the Khmer
15:39Rouge were completely excluded from the
15:41process, the war could continue because
15:43they still had troops, bases, and
15:45sources of aid. If their participation
15:48were accepted, a force responsible for
15:50the genocidal catastrophe would have
15:52the opportunity to return to political
15:54life. Between justice for the dead and
15:58the need to end the bloodshed for the
16:00living was a gap that could not be
16:02bridged merely by words in diplomatic
16:03communiqués. Within Vietnam, that
16:08impasse also gave rise to different
16:10approaches. According to the memoirs of
16:14First Deputy Foreign Minister Tran
16:16Quang Co, there was once an idea called
16:19the "Red solution," seeking a
16:20settlement between the Phnom Penh
16:22government and communist forces in the
16:25opposition, including Khmer Rouge
16:27elements, to create a plan China could
16:29accept. Mr. Tran Quang Co opposed this
16:32direction and later viewed it as a
16:34difficult moral reversal, shifting from
16:37opposing genocide to accepting
16:39negotiations with a force linked to
16:41genocide. However, this is the account
16:44and assessment of a witness who was
16:46directly involved in diplomatic work.
16:48It must be placed alongside official
16:50documents and international sources,
16:52and cannot be considered the complete,
16:54unified voice of the Vietnamese
16:56leadership at that time. For Nguyen Van
16:58Linh, the issue was not just about
17:00loving or hating a force, and it
17:02certainly could not be solved by
17:04Vietnam's memories alone. On that
17:06chessboard were the interests of China,
17:08the Soviet Union, the United States,
17:10Southeast Asian nations, and four
17:12mutually suspicious Cambodian factions.
17:15Each side spoke of peace, but each
17:17envisioned a post-peace order in a
17:19different way. The Phnom Penh
17:21government wanted to protect what had
17:23been built after the collapse of the
17:25Khmer Rouge. The opposing forces
17:27demanded a share of power. China wanted
17:30its allies not to be excluded from the
17:32process. The West and Southeast Asian
17:34countries wanted an international
17:36mechanism strong enough to ensure troop
17:38withdrawals, a ceasefire, and the
17:40holding of elections. Nguyen Van Linh
17:42faced a choice where no option was
17:44entirely untainted. Maintaining his
17:47position could prolong isolation and
17:49cause continued bloodshed in Cambodia.
17:52Conceding too early could weaken the
17:54Phnom Penh government and hand back
17:56political standing to the force that
17:58Vietnam had paid a high price to topple
18:00. To end a war, how far can one
18:04compromise with those who actually
18:06caused the war itself? By mid-1990,
18:11Hanoi understood that the Cambodian
18:13knot could not be untied solely in
18:15Phnom Penh or at the Paris conference.
18:19China remained the most important
18:21backer of the forces opposing the Hun
18:23Sen government and viewed progress in
18:25Cambodia as a condition for improving
18:27relations with Vietnam, which wanted to
18:29find a way out of the war. Nguyen Van
18:32Linh was forced to find a path to
18:34Beijing, even if that path was not
18:36direct and the ultimate destination was
18:38a secret meeting in Chengdu. The path
18:42that led Nguyen Van Linh to Chengdu did
18:44not begin with an official invitation.
18:47It was opened through oral messages,
18:49secret meetings, and numerous probes
18:51that neither side wanted to make public
18:53to the world yet. When Vietnam-China
18:57relations were still frozen, General
18:59Secretary Nguyen Van Linh asked General
19:01Secretary of the Lao People's
19:03Revolutionary Party Kaysone Phomvihane
19:05to relay a message to Chinese leader
19:07Deng Xiaoping, hoping to find a way to
19:09resolve the Cambodian issue and restore
19:11relations between the two countries. On
19:15January 18, 1989, Vietnam and China
19:17held a deputy foreign ministerial
19:20meeting on the Cambodia issue.
19:25According to Tran Quang Co's memoirs,
19:27this round of work was part of a series
19:29of negotiations held from January 16 to
19:3219 in Beijing. Most of the time was not
19:35spent on the lost friendship, but
19:37focused on a condition China always
19:39placed at the forefront. The Cambodia
19:42issue had to be resolved. before
19:44Vietnam-China relations could be truly
19:46normalized. In the following months,
19:49that door would intermittently open and
19:51close. According to Tran Quang Co's
19:54memoirs, several Vietnamese diplomats
19:56continued to travel to Beijing,
19:58sometimes using the pretext of working
20:00at the Embassy to conduct unofficial
20:02exchanges. Each side understood that
20:05the other needed an agreement, but
20:06neither wanted to appear as the one who
20:08needed it more. Vietnam wanted to end
20:11its isolation and focus its energy on
20:13development. China wanted to ensure
20:15that the Cambodian solution would not
20:17exclude the forces it backed. Behind
20:20every soft word lay very hard-headed
20:22calculations regarding influence,
20:24position, and the post-war order to be
20:26formed in Southeast Asia. Within Hanoi,
20:29there was not yet a completely unified
20:32perspective. According to the memoirs
20:35of First Deputy Foreign Minister Tran
20:37Quang Co, one approach placed great
20:39hope in resolving matters directly with
20:41China based on strategic interests and
20:43ideological closeness between the two
20:45ruling parties. Another approach argued
20:47that Vietnam should not place its
20:49entire exit strategy on one door, but
20:51needed to simultaneously engage the
20:52United Nations, the Soviet Union, the
20:54United States, Western European nations
20:56, and the Association of Southeast
20:57Asian Nations. That difference was not
21:01merely a debate between individuals. It
21:04was a question about Vietnam's place in
21:06a world moving away from a bipolar
21:08structure. Should it seek security in
21:11relations with a neighboring socialist
21:13country, or must it step more broadly
21:15into an international order changing
21:17every day? On August 28, 1990, the five
21:21permanent members of the UN Security
21:24Council, including China, the Soviet
21:26Union, the United States, France, and
21:28the United Kingdom, reached a consensus
21:30on the framework for a comprehensive
21:33political solution in Cambodia. That
21:35framework emphasized the United Nations
21:37'role in moving toward a ceasefire,
21:39disarmament, refugee repatriation, and
21:41organizing general elections. This
21:44meant the Cambodian issue had begun to
21:46shift away from private arrangements
21:48between a few nations and into a
21:50broader international process. Just one
21:52day later, on August 29, Chinese
21:54Ambassador Zhang Dewei met with General
21:57Secretary Nguyen Van Linh and Chairman
21:59of the Council of Ministers Do Muoi. He
22:02delivered an invitation from General
22:03Secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Li
22:05Peng. The Chinese side proposed that
22:09three Vietnamese leaders, including
22:11Nguyen Van Linh, Do Muoi, and advisor
22:13Pham Van Dong, travel to Chengdu on
22:15September 3 for a secret summit.
22:17According to Tran Quang Co’s account,
22:19just five days earlier, China had still
22:21rejected the possibility of a
22:23high-level meeting. Such a sudden
22:25change might suggest Beijing did not
22:27want to be left out while the UN
22:28Security Council's framework for
22:30solving the Cambodian issue was nearly
22:32complete. This is one way to interpret
22:35the events of that time. It is not a
22:38motive that has been publicly confirmed
22:40by the Chinese side. According to the
22:42list recorded in Tran Quang Co’s
22:44memoirs, besides the three high-ranking
22:46leaders, the delegation also included
22:47Central Office Chief Hong Ha, Head of
22:49the Central External Relations
22:51Commission Hoang Bich Son, and Deputy
22:53Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem. Foreign
22:55Minister Nguyen Co Thach was not
22:57present. One should not immediately
23:01deduce from this absence a planned
23:03exclusion, as official records have not
23:05fully disclosed the reasons for
23:06selecting the delegation members.
23:09However, in a context where differences
23:11existed among agencies and leaders
23:13regarding how to approach China, it
23:15remained an unavoidable detail. In
23:20September 1990, the high-level
23:22Vietnam-China summit began at the
23:25Jinniu Hotel in Chengdu. After months
23:28of going through side doors,
23:30intermediate messages, and unsuccessful
23:32contacts, Nguyen Van Linh finally stood
23:35before the direct negotiation he had
23:37sought. But when the doors of the
23:40Jinniu Hotel opened, Vietnam did not
23:42enter that room from a position of
23:44holding all the cards. The
23:47international framework on Cambodia had
23:49already taken shape. China clearly
23:51understood Hanoi's urgency, while the
23:53time available for cautious options was
23:55growing shorter. Two days of talks are
23:57about to begin. What remains is what
24:00Nguyen Van Linh will retain, what he
24:02will accept, and how history will view
24:04the price of that resolution. In the
24:09month and year of 1990, the doors of
24:11the meeting room at the Kim Nguu Hotel
24:13closed. Outside was a tranquil capital
24:16city. Inside, the leaders of the two
24:18countries began their first high-level
24:20dialogue after more than 10 years of
24:22broken relations. The opening remarks
24:25were framed in the language of
24:26comradeship and memories of a time when
24:28they stood on the same front line. The
24:31official biography of Nguyen Van Linh
24:33describes the meeting as open and
24:35cordial. But the cordiality of the
24:38words did not lighten the weight of the
24:40decisions that had to be made. The full
24:43text of the meeting minutes has not yet
24:45been widely released. What can be known
24:47must be pieced together from official
24:49sources, accounts from insiders, and
24:51international records that emerged
24:53later. The Vietnamese side confirmed
24:55that both parties agreed to promote the
24:57resolution of the Cambodian issue and
24:59pave the way for restoring
25:00Vietnam-China relations. Notably, the
25:03official biography also acknowledges
25:05that Nguyen Van Linh accepted certain
25:07concessions to achieve those two goals.
25:10Just a short sentence, but it is enough
25:12to show that Vietnam could not bring
25:14home everything it desired. The most
25:16difficult point lay in the Supreme
25:18National Council of Cambodia, the body
25:20intended to represent national
25:22sovereignty during the transition
25:23period. According to the memoirs of
25:26First Deputy Foreign Minister Tran
25:28Quang Co, the Chinese side proposed six
25:30representatives from the Phnom Penh
25:32government, two from each of the three
25:34opposition factions, plus Prince
25:36Norodom Sihanouk. Phnom Penh would have
25:39six seats, while the opposition and
25:40Prince Sihanouk would have seven
25:42positions. Mr. Tran Quang Co believed
25:44that plan was disadvantageous for Phnom
25:47Penh and recounted that General
25:48Secretary Nguyen Van Linh agreed quite
25:50quickly. This is the account and
25:53assessment of an important witness, not
25:55the full official transcript. A
25:57difference of only one seat, but the
25:59political implications were enormous.
26:01Six representatives of the Phnom Penh
26:03government stood against seven
26:04positions belonging to the three
26:06opposition factions and Prince Norodom
26:08Sihanouk. In Tran Quang Co's assessment
26:10, that formula risked weakening the
26:12position of the government that was
26:14controlling most of Cambodia. United
26:17Nations records show that the future of
26:19Cambodia was not decided solely in the
26:21capital. At the Jakarta meeting on
26:25September 9th and 10th, 1990, the
26:27Cambodian factions accepted the
26:29framework built by the five permanent
26:31members of the Security Council, while
26:34agreeing to establish a 12-member
26:36Supreme National Council, which would
26:38elect a chairman as its 13th member. On
26:42the evening of that month, diplomatic
26:44language unexpectedly turned to poetry.
26:46General Secretary Jiang Zemin recited
26:48two lines of ancient verse, speaking of
26:50brothers remaining after a catastrophe
26:52and how a smile upon meeting again
26:54washes away old grievances. Nguyen Van
26:56Linh replied with a four-line poem
26:58about brotherhood, how anger would pass
27:00, and how friendship would be renewed.
27:02Official biographies record the image
27:04of him taking the initiative to shake
27:06hands and embrace General Secretary
27:08Jiang Zemin amidst applause. It was a
27:09moment full of symbolism. Two nations
27:12that once called each other brothers,
27:13then went through war and over a decade
27:15of confrontation. now sought to use old
27:18memories to open a new path. But poetry
27:21could not erase the questions that
27:23remained. How far did Vietnam concede?
27:25Did the choices made in Chengdu help
27:27the peace process move faster, or did
27:29they make Phnom Penh more suspicious?
27:32As the full files have not been
27:34released, any absolute conclusion risks
27:36straying from the historical record.
27:39Nguyen Van Linh left Chengdu with a
27:41door just slightly ajar, while the
27:43extent of the concessions and the true
27:45effectiveness of the meeting remain
27:47subjects of debate in later historical
27:49sources. To know what he truly chose,
27:53one must look at the decisions and
27:55consequences that appeared immediately
27:57after those two days at the Jinniu
27:59Hotel. In the days following the
28:01Chengdu meeting, diplomatic movements
28:03took place more rapidly. On September
28:0620, 1990, the UN Security Council
28:09passed Resolution 668, supporting a
28:13framework for a comprehensive political
28:15solution in Cambodia. More than a year
28:18later, on October 23, 1991, the Paris
28:21Peace Agreements on Cambodia were
28:23signed. The war did not disappear
28:27immediately, but the door to peace had
28:29been opened by an international
28:31mechanism much broader than the private
28:33negotiations between Vietnam and China.
28:37Looking at that chain of events, it can
28:39be seen that Nguyen Van Linh's primary
28:41choice was to maintain the political
28:42system in the face of the tremors from
28:44Eastern Europe. He did not deny the
28:47need for reform but would not allow
28:49reform to lead Vietnam down the path of
28:51pluralism and a multi-party system. In
28:55his view, the lesson from the Soviet
28:57Union and Eastern Europe was not to
28:59open up faster at any cost, but that
29:01uncontrolled reform could disintegrate
29:03the entire state before any positive
29:05results could emerge. Therefore, the
29:08economy continued to be liberalized
29:10step by step, while political
29:11boundaries were more clearly
29:13established. The second choice was to
29:16lead Vietnam away from a state of
29:17prolonged confrontation. After decades
29:19of war, the country could no longer
29:21continue to pour its resources into
29:23Cambodia. the northern border and an
29:25economy almost entirely cut off from
29:27the world's vital resources. Nguyen Van
29:31Linh accepted adjusting his stance,
29:33promoting a political solution for
29:34Cambodia, and seeking to resolve
29:36relations with China. It was not
29:38necessarily a choice between honor and
29:40concession. It was a more painful
29:43question. What must be preserved so
29:45that the country has enough strength to
29:47move forward? The third choice is the
29:49most often misunderstood. Nguyen Van
29:51Linh did not simply choose China over
29:53the Soviet Union, much less advocate
29:55for locking Vietnam into a new
29:57ideological alliance. The direction
30:00formed in the late 1980s was to reduce
30:02confrontation, expand relations, and
30:05gradually escape from isolation.
30:08Normalization with China was seen as a
30:10knot that had to be untied first, but
30:13it was not the only door. Vietnam still
30:15sought ways to improve relations with
30:17Southeast Asian countries, the United
30:20States, Japan, and the West. In June
30:231991, Nguyen Van Linh stepped down as
30:26General Secretary. By November of the
30:29same year, General Secretary Do Muoi
30:30and Chairman of the Council of
30:32Ministers Vo Van Kiet visited China.
30:34The two countries officially declared
30:36the past closed and normalized their
30:38relations. Chengdu was therefore an
30:41important paving step, but the final
30:43result did not take place within Nguyen
30:45Van Linh's term, nor could it be
30:47explained solely by the two days of
30:49talks at the Jinniu Hotel. Subsequent
30:53history shows that Vietnam did not
30:55return to a single orbit. The country
30:57continued to reform, expand foreign
30:59relations, join the Association of
31:01Southeast Asian Nations, and normalize
31:03relations with the United States. What
31:06Nguyen Van Linh left behind was not a
31:08completed blueprint but a direction of
31:10movement: maintaining political
31:11stability, reducing external
31:13confrontation, and creating space for
31:15the economy to continue changing. But
31:18that choice did not come without its
31:20own price. Prioritizing stability may
31:25have helped Vietnam avoid a collapse
31:27like that in Eastern Europe, but it
31:29also made the limits of political
31:31reform more apparent. Normalization
31:34with China helped break the state of
31:36isolation but left behind enduring
31:38debates over the extent of concessions,
31:40the necessity of caution, and the
31:42lessons in dealing with a large
31:44neighbor. Nguyen Van Linh chose
31:47survival before choosing a perfect
31:49vision. He chose to continue reform,
31:53but not to let it step outside the
31:55political framework he believed needed
31:57to be protected. He chose to ease
31:59tensions with China, but as part of a
32:01broader strategy to bring Vietnam back
32:03to the region and the world. It was the
32:06choice of a person standing before many
32:08doors, knowing that no door could be
32:10opened without incurring a loss. And to
32:13look back more fairly at those choices,
32:16one must return to that final image. A
32:19door had been opened for the country,
32:21while the limitations of the era
32:22remained held back behind it. Many
32:26years after the meeting in Chengdu,
32:28people still debate how right Nguyen
32:30Van Linh was, what he conceded, and
32:32whether Vietnam could have chosen a
32:34different path back then. But history
32:38did not unfold in the tranquility of
32:40books written long after the fact. It
32:43took place while Eastern Europe was
32:45collapsing, the Soviet Union was
32:47weakening, Cambodia had no peace,
32:49Vietnam's economy was fragile, and
32:51diplomatic doors remained closed.
32:54Therefore, it should not be remembered
32:56as a closed answer, but as a moment
32:58still full of open questions. There are
33:01things confirmed by official documents,
33:03things only recounted in memoirs, and
33:05questions that to this day still lack
33:07enough records to be fully answered.
33:12There are moments when a leader cannot
33:14choose between right and wrong, but can
33:16only choose between paths that all
33:18carry loss, before judging those who
33:20sat in that room. Perhaps we should
33:24each ask ourselves: if we were in the
33:26shoes of a poor, isolated Vietnam, just
33:28emerging from war and watching its
33:30greatest support system crumble, are we
33:33certain we would have found a less
33:35painful path? "Century Memoirs" tells
33:40this story, not to exonerate Nguyen Van
33:42Linh, nor to condemn him with unproven
33:45allegations. We simply wish to return
33:50to that moment with you, to view
33:51history with calmer eyes and listen to
33:53the silences that official reports
33:55never fully revealed. Because sometimes
34:00the most haunting thing about history
34:02is not a decision already made, but the
34:04question: if another path had been
34:06chosen back then, what would Vietnam
34:08look like today? Please share your
34:12perspectives, not to divide into
34:13winners and losers in a debate, but so
34:16that the past may be viewed with
34:18fairness, clarity, and compassion. This
34:22is "Century Memoirs," a place where
34:24history is not just told, but also
34:26heard. Time always moves on, but
34:29memories remain. Today's story may have
34:32come to an end, but perhaps it has just
34:34ignited a spark from the past within
34:36you. If you found this video meaningful
34:40, please like it, share it with fellow
34:42history lovers, and subscribe to the "
34:44Century Memoirs" channel to continue
34:46our journey of connecting yesterday
34:48with today and tomorrow. Thank you for
34:50listening, and we look forward to
34:51seeing you in the next chapter of the
34:53flow of history. M.

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This page contains the full transcript of Thành Đô 1990: Nguyễn Văn Linh Đã Đổi Lấy Điều Gì Khi Đông Âu Sụp Đổ? by HỒI KÝ THẾ KỶ, generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 5,470 words across 900 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.

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