Tesla peut-il BLOQUER votre voiture ? On vérifie ! — Transcript

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1. 0:00Hello and welcome to this news update.
2. 0:04Today, as you can see, I am not in the
3. 0:05usual setting. I am sorry. For now, I
4. 0:08am having a bit of trouble with my
5. 0:10right eye. So, I need to avoid drafts
6. 0:14and stay in, let's say, reasonable
7. 0:16temperatures. There it is. Right. Well,
8. 0:20let's move on to our topic. Now, with
9. 0:23the rise in cyberattacks and more and
10. 0:25more documented cases of
11. 0:26internet-connected devices being hacked
12. 0:28. or partially or totally disabled.
13. 0:32Some people don't hesitate to cry wolf
14. 0:34regarding connected cars. While claims
15. 0:37are emerging on social media like "
16. 0:39Tesla can stop your car" or "the
17. 0:41Chinese control your vehicle." I did a
18. 0:45little investigation and believe me,
19. 0:47well, you're not ready to hear what I
20. 0:49found. Before we jump into the
21. 1:05technical side, we need to provide some
22. 1:06context. The story made a lot of noise
23. 1:10in 2024 when Ramzan Kadyrov accused
24. 1:12Elon Musk of disabling his Cybertruck
25. 1:14remotely. However, there was no
26. 1:18independent technical evidence that
27. 1:20could publicly establish his account.
28. 1:24Furthermore, the vehicle was used
29. 1:25outside the geographic zone where it
30. 1:27could receive updates and was
31. 1:29functioning normally. A technical
32. 1:31failure is therefore more likely than
33. 1:33an action by the manufacturer. Second
34. 1:35case in 2025. After a video was
35. 1:38released claiming to show another
36. 1:40Cybertruck immobilized remotely, Tesla
37. 1:42issued an explicit denial. Tesla cannot
38. 1:46disable vehicles remotely. The video
39. 1:51was identified as fake, with an image
40. 1:53showing a screen that doesn't even
41. 1:55exist in Tesla's code. Independent
42. 1:58analysts who analyze Tesla's
43. 2:00infotainment code confirm this. However
44. 2:03, this does not mean that a Tesla car
45. 2:05has no remote control functions. Of
46. 2:08course, the manufacturer documents
47. 2:10connected features, app-based controls,
48. 2:12and electronic start authorization
49. 2:14mechanisms. However, these capabilities
50. 2:18absolutely do not prove that they can
51. 2:20arbitrarily stop a car in motion or
52. 2:22prevent it from starting. So these two
53. 2:25cases demonstrate no real capacity or
54. 2:27intent by the manufacturer but do not
55. 2:29disprove the technical possibility of
56. 2:31doing so. Not for Tesla, nor for any
57. 2:35other manufacturer. Let's see what we
58. 2:38can find in the patent office archives
59. 2:40on the subject. The first mention of
60. 2:44remote vehicle deactivation dates back
61. 2:47to 1998 with patent GB 234074B. Filed
62. 2:52in the United Kingdom by Stuart Johnson
63. 2:55and Roger Castle. Their filing relies
64. 2:59on several prior patents including GB
65. 3:04230 965 A from 1997, also filed by them
66. 3:09. In 2000, PSA filed patent FR 281 55
67. 3:1491 A1, which presents a system for
68. 3:16remote locking of electronic control
69. 3:20units. In 2002, Ford officially
70. 3:23introduced a remote anti-theft
71. 3:25deactivation and progressive speed
72. 3:27reduction feature. GM followed shortly
73. 3:31after in 2004, implementing the system
74. 3:34into its OnStar service. It wasn't
75. 3:37until 2011 that PSA formalized features
76. 3:40allowing them to limit vehicle usage in
77. 3:42cases of theft, unpaid leases, or
78. 3:45non-payment of other services. Renault
79. 3:49did the same for the Zoe, which could
80. 3:51be blocked from charging if the battery
81. 3:53rental fee wasn't paid. As we can see,
82. 3:56the remotely blocked car is nothing new
83. 3:58, nor is it only implementable on
84. 4:00electric vehicles. It arrived as soon
85. 4:04as it was technically possible. From
86. 4:07the moment a communication system was
87. 4:09integrated into a car, remote control
88. 4:11became possible. I am not saying that
89. 4:14was necessarily the case. I am saying
90. 4:16that there is no technical obstacle to
91. 4:19it, and any past, present, or future
92. 4:21update could implement such functions.
93. 4:25Yet, these telematics tools are really
94. 4:27not from yesterday, nor are they
95. 4:29exclusive to startups or Tesla. Here
96. 4:32are the dates and names of the systems
97. 4:34I found in traditional automotive
98. 4:36brands. 1996, General Motors OnStar.
99. 4:401997, Mercedes-Benz TeleAid. 1998: BMW
100. 4:46Telematics Assist; 1999: Renault
101. 4:49Odysline; 2000: Fiat Connect; 2000:
102. 4:52Mazda Telematics; 2002: Toyota J-Book;
103. 4:562002: Nissan Carwings; 2005: Lexus
104. 4:59G-Link in Japan; 2007: Ford SYNC. And I
105. 5:03am only talking about official systems
106. 5:07here; however, since 1995-96, the GSM
107. 5:13network, or even some low-bandwidth
108. 5:15networks like Skyfox, could allow
109. 5:18sending or receiving commands to cars.
110. 5:21In other words, with the right shop
111. 5:24update, and the hardware already
112. 5:26present in our cars for over 30 years,
113. 5:28no car or brand is potentially safe
114. 5:31from such abuse. Let's look at this
115. 5:33from a purely pragmatic point of view.
116. 5:35Why would a manufacturer risk using
117. 5:37such a system abusively? With social
118. 5:40media and the speed at which this kind
119. 5:42of information would go viral if
120. 5:43verified. It's a bit like using an
121. 5:47atomic bomb. The mere act of pressing
122. 5:50the button would mean its own
123. 5:51destruction by public opinion and its
124. 5:53present or future customers. That is
125. 5:56why some want to scare us with these
126. 5:58kinds of things and present the system
127. 6:01as already being used. Since there is
128. 6:04only a tiny chance of it happening, it
129. 6:06is better to fantasize about it to
130. 6:08steer customers away from highly
131. 6:10attractive products in favor of old
132. 6:12reliable values or the interests of the
133. 6:14person making the post. So, we can see
134. 6:18that it is not only deceptive but also
135. 6:20demagogic, since all manufacturers have
136. 6:22taken similar measures to what they
137. 6:24brand as a problem for one brand, just
138. 6:27like the manufacturers of any high-tech
139. 6:29product, including your phone or your
140. 6:31TV. or the smart freezer at your
141. 6:35supermarket. The risk isn't what the
142. 6:39manufacturer might do with it, but
143. 6:40rather what a skilled enough hacker
144. 6:42could perpetrate given the
145. 6:44possibilities. Where the risk is
146. 6:48highest, namely the most technological
147. 6:50and recent cars, access security is
148. 6:53also at its maximum. We should
149. 6:57therefore worry more about takeovers of
150. 7:00older systems, as there are, in fact,
151. 7:03more thefts of 2005 models or Twingo 1s
152. 7:06than of Teslas or other computerized
153. 7:08cars, because it requires fewer skills
154. 7:11and is much easier to carry out. And
155. 7:15with those final words, I wish you a
156. 7:16safe drive and see you soon for the
157. 7:18next episode of Chocro de Garage. Take
158. 7:20care. Ciao!