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Supplemental 6 - Allan McDonald Testimony — Transcript

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0:01[Music]
0:08hello and welcome to the space above us
0:11supplemental six Rogers Commission
0:13testimony of Alan McDonald before we get
0:18started I want to give a quick warning
0:20to anyone who just automatically queued
0:22this up and is driving or something this
0:24supplemental is quite a bit longer than
0:26usual coming in at over an hour and a
0:28half I think it's pretty interesting but
0:30one a friend of mine balked at the
0:32extreme length and I figured it'd be
0:33good to give people a heads up in case
0:35they wanted to skip to whatever's next
0:36in your queue
0:37no hard feelings the intent of the
0:40supplementals is to be a parallel track
0:42to the main episodes that is not
0:44necessarily required to match up one to
0:46one this way if I want to revisit a
0:48topic or go into more depth about
0:50something from my main episode I have a
0:52built-in mechanism to do that it's a
0:54little bit confusing since I put them in
0:55the same feet as the main show to save
0:57everyone from signing up for two feeds
0:59but so far it's worked out I only
1:02mentioned this so that if you are
1:03actually listening to the supplementals
1:05disconnected from the main episodes I
1:07strongly suggest that before listening
1:09to the supplemental you should listen to
1:11my coverage of the Challenger accident
1:12which is in episodes 92 93 and 94 one of
1:18the defining moments associated with the
1:20Challenger accident was the fateful
1:22teleconference between engineers and
1:24managers at NASA's Marshall Space Flight
1:26Center and Morton Thiokol incorporated
1:29the manufacturer of the shuttles solid
1:31rocket boosters we covered this meeting
1:33in depth in episode 94 where we learned
1:36that more in thiokol initially
1:38recommended against launching challenger
1:40in such low temperatures several NASA
1:43managers pushed back questioning the
1:45logic used to arrive at that
1:46recommendation a complete reversal of
1:49the typical relationship between NASA
1:50and contractors rather than being asked
1:53to prove that their product was safe
1:55Morton Thiokol was being asked to prove
1:57that it was not safe managers at Thiokol
2:01under what they perceived as pressure
2:02from NASA reversed their initial
2:05recommendation and instead said that the
2:07SRBs on sts 51l should work no
2:10differently than on sts 51 C as we know
2:14this led to the tragic loss of both the
2:16Challenger and its crew but part of how
2:19we know this is because during the
2:21invest
2:21negations of the presidential commission
2:23tasked with determining what happened
2:25someone heard something that he knew to
2:27be wrong put his career on the line and
2:30stood up to say something that someone
2:32was Morton Thiokol director of the solid
2:35rocket motor project Alan McDonald his
2:38surprise contribution to the proceedings
2:40are the first the Commission heard that
2:42more in Thyatira commented against the
2:45launch would we know as much about the
2:48Challenger accident if Alan McDonald had
2:49not stood up maybe the Rogers Commission
2:52was full of very smart very focused
2:55people who knew had to get to the bottom
2:56of a complicated problem so it's
2:59entirely possible that they would have
3:00figured it out eventually some other way
3:02but we'll never know because he did
3:05which was a pretty gutsy thing to do
3:08McDonald went on to formally testify in
3:11front of the Commission in two hearings
3:13and since one of them was public that
3:15means that we have actual audio and
3:17video of his testimony not just
3:19transcripts what we'll be hearing today
3:21is the entirety of MacDonald's testimony
3:24on February 25th 1986 less than a month
3:27after the accident it's pretty long but
3:30I found it to be riveting also a couple
3:33of times the audio dropped out for a few
3:35seconds so I just cut those sections out
3:38before we play it I want to say thanks
3:40to c-span where I got this audio I
3:42believe that since this hearing was part
3:45of a presidential commission since I
3:47probably count as an educational podcast
3:49and since I paid $1 for the mp3 it
3:52should be fine to share with all of you
3:53I'll be sure to include a link to the
3:56full video in the announcement tweet for
3:57this episode and the show notes which
4:00still don't exist but someday will since
4:03McDonald testifies first I just left the
4:05opening few minutes of the hearing
4:07intact so you can hear how something
4:09like this gets started the first voice
4:11you'll hear is that of the Commission's
4:13chairman William Rogers you'll also hear
4:16questions from other members of the
4:17Commission including Neil Armstrong
4:19Sally Ride and Richard Fineman among
4:21others all right I've talked enough
4:24let's listen to what Alan McDonald has
4:26to say
4:30in our sessions today in tomorrow we
4:32want to present in the thoughtful and
4:34orderly manner the facts relating to the
4:38decision to launch the Challenger
4:41because of its importance
4:43I will ask witnesses to identify the
4:46time and place of any event that they
4:48are addressing and the names and
4:50positions of persons who participated
4:53Commission wants to be fair in the
4:55presentation of the facts because the
4:58subject matter may involve possible
5:00human error as distinguished from
5:03equipment failure the Commission will
5:05attempt to give a right of reply as soon
5:09as possible to any person who believes
5:12he has been unfairly criticized or whose
5:14actions may have been in accurately
5:16portrayed during the last two weeks the
5:19Commission has encouraged NASA to
5:22disclose a large number of facts and
5:24documents relating to the launch which
5:27has been done as a result we believe the
5:30public is better able to understand and
5:32assess many aspects of the accident we
5:36hope that this process will continue
5:38until all the facts are fully known and
5:40as much as possible fully understood
5:42while the Commission has the
5:44responsibility under its mandate from
5:47the President to investigate the
5:49accident and report its findings the
5:52media plays a key role in the process by
5:55keeping the public informed we believe
5:57it has performed this role well and with
5:59a high sense of responsibility if the
6:02Commission effectively performs its
6:03duties in the media performs its role of
6:06accurately reporting the facts as they
6:08develop the public will be well served
6:10witnesses who appear today will be able
6:14to comment or to clarify their testimony
6:17as long as the substance comment on or
6:20clarify the testimony as long as the
6:21substance is not already
6:23of course any additional evidence or
6:26additional material that might assist
6:27the Commission in the performance of its
6:29duties and responsibilities will be
6:31welcomed the first witnesses this
6:34morning will be Alan McDonald following
6:39mr. McDonald and
6:41at the request of Orton thiokol the
6:43Commission will next tier J Mason there
6:46was executive vice president their thigh
6:48ball first I would like now now I would
6:52like to call on our executive director
6:54dr. Kiel who will make a few comments
6:57before we hear mr. McDonald mr. chairman
7:01for the benefit of the Commission we
7:02have put together a chronology of events
7:05relating to the period when the first
7:08temperature concerns were raised with
7:09respect to the Challenger indicating the
7:12activities and also the participants as
7:15the Commission understands them based on
7:16testimony and documentation provide to
7:19the Commission this chronology has been
7:22provided to all the witnesses mr.
7:23chairman so that they'll have an
7:24opportunity to understand our
7:27reconstruction of those events and to
7:29clarify them and also to it as
7:32appropriate to identify the nature of
7:34the discussions at each of these
7:36meetings and activities starting
7:38approximately from the skrub of the
7:40originally planned launch of Challenger
7:43for January 27th at 9:30 8:00 a.m.
7:46ranging up to the launch of the
7:48Challenger On January 28 at 11:38 a.m.
7:52and if there are corrections that have
7:55to be made on this document we'll make
7:58them as we go along it's as accurate as
8:00we can make it its present time now I'd
8:03like to call on mr. McDonald believes
8:09yes
8:12mr. McDonald I think it probably if you
8:14take the middle chair it might be the
8:16best I think in to be consistent let's
8:22swear all the witnesses in again some
8:25have been sworn and some have not so
8:27let's swear them all again please mr.
8:37McDonald you're now employed by FICO
8:41point fight calling that's correct
8:43and how long have you been employed by
8:45them I've been with Morton Thiokol for
8:47the lower 26 years and you're an
8:51engineer yes I have a bachelor's degree
8:54in chemical engineering from Montana
8:57State University and a master's degree
8:59in engineering administration from the
9:00University of Utah and can you give us
9:06those someone or some history of your
9:08employment with I call I'm currently the
9:13director of the space shuttle solid
9:15rocket motor project our
9:18responsibilities are or a technical cost
9:21and schedule performance of the
9:23Steelcase motors that are flown out of
9:25Kennedy and also the development
9:27qualification of the film wonk a solid
9:29rocket motor be flown out of Vandenberg
9:32Air Force Base I've had this position
9:35for a little less than two years I
9:37started as a director in March of 1984
9:41of the shuttle restaurant project prior
9:45to that I was the manager of the project
9:48engineering division at Morton Thiokol
9:50which I was a technical responsibility
9:53from a project engineering standpoint
9:56for all of the programs in the plant
9:58with the exception of space shuttle that
10:01included the Peacekeeper the MX stage
10:03one Trident 1c for production Trident to
10:07development the harm mark 104 standard
10:11missile md2 the improved performance
10:14base motor to finished a contract on
10:17qualification of a long-life motor for
10:19SRAM I had all of the independent
10:21research
10:22and development advanced technology
10:24programs with the rocket propulsion
10:26laboratory and also some work on airbag
10:30air cushion restraint systems I had that
10:34job I guess for about three four years
10:37prior to coming into the shuttle program
10:39and prior to that I was the manager of
10:42the propellant development department
10:44for a few years and prior to that I was
10:47the manager of the project engineering
10:51group for advanced development
10:53development projects I started a Thiokol
10:57in 59
10:59after graduating from Montana State
11:01University and my first job was involved
11:05in designing the external insulation for
11:07the stage one of the Minuteman I did
11:10that design and I was then chosen as a
11:13group leader for flight test of the
11:14Minuteman and was participated in the
11:17flight test about the first 20 flights
11:19the Minuteman out of the Cape subsequent
11:22to that I spent considerable time
11:24working as a chief engineer on
11:28development of some controllable solid
11:30rocket motor concepts for several years
11:32and worked on a lot of advanced
11:34development programs before before I
11:36came in involved in Trident program in
11:40the early 70s the last three or four
11:44years where have you spent your time the
11:48last couple of years
11:49of course I spent my time as director
11:51the sawed rocket motor project which
11:54involves a considerable amount of the
11:56coordination relative to production of
12:00the shuttle solid rocket motors
12:02assessment of the flight readiness
12:04reviews for the space shuttle solid
12:06rocket motors I am the chairman of the
12:10senior material review board for the SRM
12:14that senior material review board has to
12:19review all of the discrepancies on any
12:21of the hardware that's considered a
12:23criticality one or any that's outside
12:26the experience base of
12:28previous experience as chairman that
12:31Lord
12:32there's members from our quality group
12:34or engineering group NASA Marshall
12:36representatives but I have to sign every
12:39one of those that they're they're ready
12:40for flight and also co-chairman of the
12:43problem review board with Marshall Space
12:45Flight Center relative to any problems
12:48that are identified from returned
12:49Hardware that come back to the cake and
12:51what actions are taken to to understand
12:54those problems and provide probably
12:56fixes for those from prevented from
12:58occurring my activities in the past year
13:03to a large extent have been involved
13:05with design certification the film along
13:09face solid rocket motor
13:10I'm also the co-chairman of the Design
13:14certification team represented by Thal
13:17and Marshall at the SRM level for that
13:20and that has taken a conservative amount
13:21my time this past summer in the series
13:23of reviews for certifying the graphite
13:26composite case for our van and ready you
13:30know how much time did you spend in the
13:32performance of those duties that at
13:35Kennedy Space Center well I have been
13:39alternating with my supervisor the vice
13:42president of space booster programs mr.
13:43Joe Gilman stirrer on the Tokyo minster
13:47and what is his title he's the vice
13:49president of the space booster programs
13:52and he and I have been alternating going
13:55to the Cape supporting the launches of
13:57the SRM severe emitters my immediate
14:01supervisor yes and you all invaded going
14:04to the Cape
14:05yes how did that work under that works
14:10out fairly well we both of course have a
14:12fairly heavy demand on our time with all
14:15the reviews in the shadow' process
14:17primarily with the trips to to
14:19Huntsville in the Marshall Space Flight
14:21Center I attended of course the STS 51l
14:26he was that the prior flight and our
14:29Charter is to attend the L minus one
14:31meeting if 51
14:34is the Challenger Lord that's correct
14:36and you were there at that time which he
14:39mister kill mister there the previous
14:42launch he was at the previous launches
14:44what about the one before that one
14:45before that I was at and he was the one
14:49I think for that we've been fairly well
14:50alternated
14:52what were your responsibilities when you
14:55were there at the cave at the time of
14:58the launch well at the time of the
15:02launch I was in the firing room to
15:04launch control center there's a seats
15:09there that for the monitors of many of
15:13the functions on this sod rocket
15:14boosters as well as the TV monitor
15:17Marshall Space Flight Center has a group
15:20at their console that involves the
15:24primary contractors for all of the
15:27subsystems the SRB has one monitor and
15:29they have people from USB I will provide
15:33part of the hardware for this RV and for
15:36the shuttle we also have a monitor from
15:39the our support to the space shuttle
15:43processing contractor that is right next
15:46to that monitor and mr. Carter Kennedy
15:50our vice president of our space
15:51operations at the Cape was at that
15:54monitor that's right next to the
15:55Marshall monitor and I was sitting with
15:57him at the time of the launch I always
15:59been speaking so much about the
16:01Challenger launch as I was generally
16:02speaking generally speaking when you or
16:04mister kill master are at the Kennedy
16:05you speak for the company is that it yes
16:09generally the processes before a launch
16:14there's an L minus one meeting the day
16:17before the launch at which time all of
16:20the problems that were still open prior
16:24to the L minus one are reviewed with
16:26just more on his board and assured that
16:29they're all closed out and were ready
16:31for the launch subsequent to that
16:34meeting there's a Paul that is taking he
16:37takes an oral poll if everyone is
16:39involved in the launch
16:41including them as well as polishing
16:42systems but the payload and everyone
16:44else and every contractor that is
16:46involved in that has to answer to the
16:48poles whether they're ready to go and
16:50launch I attended that meeting as you
16:54know the L minus one meeting was
16:57conducted I leave on Saturday or
17:00something boy if you don't want to come
17:02to that and it's honestly just a moment
17:04but so at those meetings when you were
17:07there you spoke for Thiokol yes I spoke
17:10for that comp and how long had you been
17:14there prior to the launch of the
17:16challenger physically located at Kennedy
17:19I was that Marshall Space Flight Center
17:22earlier in the week on some negotiations
17:26for our subsequent contract and had went
17:29down to Kennedy on the believe it was
17:34the Thursday before the launch gives
17:37home explanation of the relationship
17:39between yourself and Marshall before you
17:42went to Kennedy I'm not sure what you
17:46mean my relationship what what function
17:49was Marshall performing at that time and
17:51what were you doing in representing a
17:53cycle well Marshall has overall
17:57responsibility for all of the propulsion
17:59of subsystems on the shuttle and we are
18:03part of the SRB team I work directly
18:06with Larry where who is the project
18:10manager for Marshall on solid rocket
18:12motor and he works for Larry Malloy he
18:15was the project manager on the SRB which
18:17includes the solid rocket motor in the
18:19aft skirt TVA system and the parachute
18:23recovery system that makes up the whole
18:24SRB and I always attend or joke illness
18:29or attends the launches with mr. Malloy
18:33and he has the representatives also from
18:35the other subcontractors for for USB I
18:37in case there's any questions that come
18:41up that we can either resolve there or
18:43or get resolution to prior to launch
18:46the record where's Marshall located
18:48Marshalls Lockheed in Huntsville Alabama
18:50and when did you leave Huntsville
18:52Alabama to go to Cape Kennedy on this
18:54occasion well I think it was Wednesday
18:57or Thursday afternoon before the for the
18:59launch and you go by yourself or with
19:02someone no I went by myself now I want
19:07to give you a an opportunity to give a
19:10full description of the events the day
19:13before in the 27th and the day of the
19:16launch before I do that I I understand
19:19that you made some notes after the
19:22accident which put on papers some of
19:26your recollections of the events
19:28preceded the accident is that correct
19:29that is correct and you have those notes
19:32now yes I have I would like to explain
19:37to you that you're at liberty to refer
19:39to those notes in any way you want to
19:42and now beginning with the first
19:46recollection you have of the weather
19:48problem and how it came to your
19:50attention give us a full account of the
19:55events of that day in the following day
19:5727th and 28th we'll try not to interrupt
20:01you except possibly for clarification I
20:03want you to feel free to tell everything
20:05you recall about it and then after that
20:08we've asked questions about to try to
20:10amplify any answers that you media well
20:13I first become aware of the concern of
20:17the low temperatures that were projected
20:18for the Cape as late in the afternoon on
20:22the 27th I was at Carver Kennedy's house
20:27he's a vice president of ära
20:30as I mentioned a Space Operations Center
20:32at the Cape supports the stacking of the
20:35of the SRMs
20:36and I had a call from Bob Evelyn he is
20:40the manager of our ignition system and
20:43final assembly works for me program
20:46at all in Utah he called me and
20:50said that they had just received some
20:52word earlier that the weatherman was
20:54projecting temperatures as low as 18
20:57degrees Fahrenheit sometime in the early
21:01morning hours of the 28th and that they
21:03had some meetings with some of the
21:06engineering people had some concerns
21:07about the o-rings getting to those kinds
21:10of temperatures and he wanted to make me
21:12aware of that and also wanted to get
21:15some more updated and better information
21:17on what the actual temperature history
21:19was going to be predicted so that they
21:21could make some calculations on what
21:22they expected the real temperature the
21:24o-rings macey he was calling from Utah I
21:29told him that I would get that
21:31temperature data from for him and call
21:33him back
21:34Carver Kennedy then when I hung up
21:37called the launch operations center to
21:39get the predicted temperatures from pad
21:41B as well as what the temperature
21:43history had been during the day up until
21:46that time B was the area where the
21:49launch pad gave as the pad that the
21:51Challenger was to fly off of and this
21:53was the first time that would fly off of
21:55that pad he obtained those temperatures
21:58from the launch Operations Center and
22:01they basically said that they felt it
22:04was going to get near freezing or
22:06freezing before midnight could be as low
22:09as 22 degrees as a minimum in the early
22:11morning hours probably around 6 o'clock
22:13and that they were predicting a
22:16temperature of about 26 degrees that the
22:19intended launch time about nine thirty
22:21eight the next morning I took that data
22:24and call back to the plant Senate to Bob
22:28Ebeling and relayed that to him and told
22:30him you ought to use this temperature
22:31data for his predictions and that I
22:34thought this was very serious and make
22:36sure that he had the vice president
22:39Engineering involved in this and all his
22:41people that I wanted them to put
22:44together some calculations and a
22:46presentation material who was the vice
22:49president of Opera
22:50Bob lund is our vice president of
22:52engineering at our Morton Thiokol
22:55facility in Utah so to make sure that he
22:57was involved in this and that this
22:59decision should be an engineering
23:00decision not a program management
23:02decision and I told him that I would
23:06like him to make sure they prepared some
23:08charts and were in a position to
23:10recommend the launch temperature this
23:11don't recommend the launch but recommend
23:13a launch temperature and have the
23:14rationale for supporting that launch
23:17temperature I then hung up and I called
23:20mr. Malloy he was staying at the Holiday
23:24Inn in Merritt Island and they couldn't
23:26reach him so I called Cecil Houston
23:30Cecil Houston is the resident manager
23:32for the Marshall Space Flight Center
23:34office at KSC and told him about our
23:38concerns with the low temperatures and
23:40the potential problem of the o-rings and
23:43he said that he would set up a
23:45teleconference he had a four wire system
23:47next to his office his office is right
23:50across from the VA be in the trailer
23:52complex see over there and he was set up
23:55the four wire teleconference involving
23:57the engineering people at the Marshall
23:59Space Flight Center in Huntsville our
24:01people back at I call in Utah and that I
24:05should come down to his office and
24:06participate at Kennedy from there and
24:09that he would get back with me and let
24:10me know when that time would be
24:14I waited for a short period of time I
24:16don't know exactly how long wasn't very
24:18long he called back told me that he had
24:21contacted the parties and was all set up
24:22for 8:15 p.m. Eastern time for that
24:25teleconference I really relate that
24:28message on back to the plant told them
24:30that we have to have charts at that time
24:32faxed out to Kennedy as well as Marshall
24:35that we could discuss for that
24:37teleconference did you explain what
24:40charts mean well their charts any data
24:43that we had for showing Hawaii we had
24:46concerns on the orange of low
24:48temperatures what our history has been
24:50what any any calculations we might be
24:53able to make
24:54relative to their performance supporting
24:58it rationale for what it's an acceptable
25:00temperature what night might not be an
25:01acceptable temperature and to review
25:03that and these would all be on charts
25:06that we would send by a fax machine so
25:08that people could read those and we can
25:10discuss those as the rationale for
25:13either recommending a launch or not that
25:20I arrived at the Kennedy Space Center at
25:27about 8:15 and when I arrived there that
25:31at the Kennedy Space Center the other
25:34people had already had arrived where
25:36Larry Malloy was there he is the manager
25:40the project manager for the SRB for
25:43Marshall
25:45Stan reinhardt's was there he is the
25:48manager of the shuttle project office
25:50he's flirting Malloy's boss
25:51Cecil Houston was there the resident
25:54manager for Marshall and Jack Buchanan
25:57was there he happens to be our manager
25:59Martin that calls manager of our launch
26:01Support Services office at Kennedy the
26:06telecom hadn't started yet it came on
26:09the network shortly after I got there
26:12but was told to hold on because the
26:15charts had not been received either at
26:18Marshall or Kennedy at that time and we
26:20waited I guess for probably another half
26:22hour before those charts finally came
26:25through and we could reproduce them that
26:28they hadn't all even been received yet
26:30there were some conclusions
26:31recommendations charts income for about
26:33a half hour even later than that but
26:35actually a telephone conference it was
26:37there actually a network with pictures
26:39it was a telephone conference just
26:41telling you could have that you could
26:43hear the voices from the other two
26:45places as well as your own however the
26:48way those teleconferences work there's
26:50buttons you can push and that will mute
26:52out you speaking if someone else is
26:55speaking you could usually hear better
26:56when you don't have your own mics open
26:59so there's a lot of conversations I'm
27:01sure
27:02all facilities at one time which you
27:03can't hear but I'll relay on what I had
27:06heard on the conference as best I can
27:08the teleconference started I guess close
27:14to nine o'clock and even though all the
27:18charts weren't weren't there we were
27:20told to begin and that Morton Thiokol
27:22should take the lead and go through the
27:25charts that they had sent to both
27:28centers the charts were presented by the
27:32engineering people from voqal
27:36the fact by the people that had made
27:38those particular charts some one were
27:40typed some handwritten and they
27:44discussed their concerns with the low
27:47temperatures relative the possible
27:49effects on the o-rings primarily the
27:51timing function the seal the eurowings
27:54they presented the history of some of
27:58the data that we had accumulated both in
28:00static tests and his flight tests
28:02relative to temperatures and performance
28:04the o-rings they reviewed the history of
28:07all of our erosion with any old rings in
28:09the field joints and he blow by the
28:12primary o-ring with soot or products of
28:14combustion of decomposition that we had
28:16noted in the performance of the
28:18secondary o-rings and there was an
28:21exchange amongst the technical people
28:23and on that date is what it meant and
28:26discussions but the real exchange never
28:30really came until the conclusions and
28:33recommendations came in that point in
28:37time our Vice President mr. Bob LAN
28:40presented those charts and he presented
28:44the charts and the conclusions and
28:46recommendations and the bottom line was
28:48is that the engineering people would not
28:51recommend the launch below 53 degrees
28:53Fahrenheit the basis for that
28:55recommendation was primarily our concern
28:58with the launch that had heard about a
29:00year earlier in January of 85 I believe
29:03it was 51 C was our motor number SRM 15
29:07and that particular
29:11motor had a couple of filled joints that
29:13not only had some erosion but they had
29:15some fairly severe blow by the primary
29:18seals a fairly heavy suit over a fairly
29:20large arc very deep and black and even
29:24though we could see no measurable
29:27erosion on the secondary o-ring there
29:29was a heat effect by that it was machine
29:32was gone off for the o-ring seal that
29:33wasn't could imagine anything but the
29:35sheen was gone and because of that we
29:38were concerned of launching beyond our
29:41experience base below that temperature
29:44well that temperature brought a lot of
29:49strong comments and reaction from
29:52several of the NASA officials I believe
29:57was mr. Malloy made some comments about
29:59when will ever fly if we have to live
30:02that some sometime in the future and
30:06also commented that we are trying to
30:09establish new launch commit criteria we
30:12can't do that you don't do that night
30:15before a launch that's a predetermined
30:17set of constraints and we can't do that
30:20and other comments were made about
30:22whether we could ever fly out of
30:25Vandenberg 24 flights a year because it
30:27wasn't uncommon that 53 degrees in the
30:30early morning hours or a lot of the
30:32launches occur one of the comments that
30:36came and this was by voice recognition I
30:38believe is from mr. Hardy Marshall Space
30:41Flight Center was that he was appalled
30:43at that recommendation however he also
30:47said that he certainly wouldn't fly
30:48without factos concurrence he would not
30:52fly without backhauls concurrence even
30:55though he was appalled that that
30:56recommendation I believe it was Stan
31:00reinhardt's made a comment that he was
31:02under the impression that the sod Rock
31:04motors fall 40-degree recommendation
31:13someplace in the conversation about the
31:16impact of 53 degrees I believe Cecil
31:18Houston that sometime commented that you
31:21know wouldn't be to about Thursday that
31:24we would have morning temperatures
31:25probably in the 50s so he didn't seem to
31:29be as alarmed about when you know we
31:31could get to that temperature there were
31:35several challenges relative to the with
31:38risk felt how conclusive the effect of
31:40temperature was on this whole problem of
31:42erosion or sit blow by and the challenge
31:46came from looking at the total data
31:49because even though we were as concerned
31:52about this flight which was the coldest
31:54ever and at that time from Florida a
31:57year earlier there was a flight back in
32:00the late fall of 85 and English probably
32:02October 61 a was our SRM 22 set that had
32:07some blow by do rings no no erosion of
32:10primary o-rings fact a couple of them I
32:12believe and this happened to be a launch
32:16it had the highest temperature so there
32:18was some concern that the data was
32:21inconclusive and also that we had some
32:26motors that were static tested as low as
32:28thirty six degrees Fahrenheit diem for I
32:30believe and it showed not only no o-ring
32:33erosion but no blow by well some of the
32:35comments that came back from that and I
32:37believe this Roger Beaujolais commented
32:39that he felt that there was a
32:41significant difference in the
32:43observation of the actual suit that
32:46passed the primary or ring on the SRM
32:49fifteen set that was the cold one versus
32:52the one that was warned that there was a
32:54much larger arc between the two o-rings
32:57of it affected the suit was much blacker
33:00it penetrated all the way up to the
33:03secondary o-ring and of course we had
33:04some heat effect there and he thought
33:05there was a significant difference from
33:07that well could be the difference just
33:08due to temperature I commented at that
33:12time about the static test history I
33:14told them I did not feel that that was a
33:16valid data for a couple of reasons one
33:20on the static test motors the we keep
33:23the static test motors
33:24the environmental building essentially
33:27during the build-up assembly and check
33:30out of all instrumentation and that
33:32environmental buildings kept at 72 72
33:35degrees that buildings then roll back on
33:37a track about six hours before the
33:39static test so it wasn't exposed very
33:41long to the cold temperatures and
33:44secondly in aesthetic test motors we
33:48went in and actually repaired and filled
33:51holes in the putty these holes are
33:54formed by assembly of the rocket motors
33:57you form the tank clevis there's air
33:59trapped in there and that airs got to go
34:01someplace and sometimes that air will go
34:05up through the putty we have seen this
34:07and also when you run the leak check on
34:10the two seals
34:11if you get any blow by doing a leak
34:13check it may tend to propagate those and
34:15in a static test motors so some of these
34:18were observed and they went in and fill
34:20those inside the motor prior to static
34:24test I told him I didn't feel that that
34:25data was closer than they shouldn't use
34:28that for deciding what the o-ring
34:31performance was at that time there was
34:38other discussion on some of the charts
34:40that we had that was somewhat
34:43inconclusive we had a chart that had
34:46some sub scale data well we had run some
34:49tests on global with some sub scale
34:51o-rings they actually had the full scale
34:53diameter 280,000 but they were smaller
34:56that was the cross section of the o-ring
34:58with their smaller diameter hardware and
35:01they were a cold gas test and we're
35:03attempting to try to measure what kind
35:05of blow by one might get with a
35:07pressurization rate CC in the motor and
35:09we were using argon as the working fluid
35:13also I think some freon and we had run
35:16tests at around ambient 30 degrees and
35:18those and did not see any difference so
35:21there was some conflicting data there
35:23did it said it
35:25make any difference but that one in mind
35:27everyone was a cold test that time I
35:31commented at the time that I felt that
35:34lower temperatures were in the direction
35:37of badness for both always because it
35:40slows down the timing function for both
35:42of those but the effect is much worse
35:44for the primary o-ring compared to the
35:47secondary o-ring because the leak check
35:50forces the primary o-ring in the wrong
35:52side of the o-ring groove while it
35:55forces the primary o-ring in the proper
35:58direction this fact should be weighed
36:03and considered in making an evaluation
36:04as to what the recommended temperature
36:08should be I was looking at a chart at
36:13that time that we had in fact as the
36:15chart that I had made with some help of
36:17our engineering people back last summer
36:19in a presentation I had made here in
36:21Washington to to headquarters people in
36:23August 19 there was a chart that showed
36:26that there's really three phases or
36:29three regions of concern and during the
36:32ignition transient relative to
36:34performance the o-ring first phase of
36:36that is a condition where the o-ring the
36:39primary o-ring is pressurized it starts
36:41as a energizing process and actually has
36:44to move from the forward face of the
36:46o-ring groove because that's where it's
36:48at as a result of leak check and then
36:50has to move back and seal on the back
36:53face and this process we felt took took
36:57place in the early part of the ignition
36:59transient someplace before it got to 200
37:02psi and in cold weather what's going to
37:06affect that is of course the the grease
37:08that's in that area also is very viscous
37:10and stiff the o-ring of self is stiff we
37:14knew that the coal temperature shrank
37:17the o-ring some and from our resiliency
37:20tests which are tests that basically
37:22show how the o-ring responds when you
37:25have it under some compression and
37:27release that load shows as it gets cold
37:30and stiff it doesn't want to respond
37:31very well
37:32I looked at at something like flat tire
37:35on the bottom of a I remember when he
37:38used to drive nylon tires and was cold
37:40they get out into her flat spot on them
37:41and and that o-ring being having to move
37:45and either's got to slide there's got to
37:48roll somewhat it's not a very big
37:50dimension it moves in its twenty thirty
37:52thousand but certainly can't be as good
37:55as when you don't have that also being
37:58hard then has to extrude into the gap
38:01between the two o-rings sales and the
38:04harder it is I'm sure it's harder to
38:06extrude in that gap which means that may
38:08take a higher pressure to do that which
38:10also takes longer time I felt that based
38:15on what we had done in the past we had
38:17concluded that this blow by phenomenon
38:20had really occurred in this first part
38:22of the pressurization cycle and I think
38:25there was good evidence that it had
38:27because the soot that appeared between
38:29the two o-rings was exactly that it was
38:33soot we analyzed it but it didn't see
38:35any heat effect on the metal at all some
38:38cases that discard the grease it didn't
38:40really burn it some of it wasn't
38:42products of the grease it could not see
38:45any real effect on the secondary o-ring
38:47so it couldn't have happened very long
38:48it couldn't happen then you're very
38:51severe conditions but at the same time
38:54the temperature effects are concerning
38:57that maybe we were going into another
38:58timing regime however if we felt that we
39:03had a good margin there then we felt
39:06that we do have a good secondary seal
39:08during this time and I think there's
39:10been some misconception about the
39:13redundancy the secondary seal the
39:18secondary seal is indeed redundant until
39:21the metal parts between the tank levels
39:24actually rotate it's a full redundant
39:26seal and during this time period it is
39:28redundant and that's important but once
39:31those metal parts rotate
39:34you have a problem of resiliency it may
39:37not be so that's why I was concerned
39:39about that area but if we convince
39:42ourselves that the data said that
39:44wouldn't make that much different in
39:45that part of the phase then it would be
39:47a reasonable recommendation to say that
39:48we wouldn't expect much different
39:50performance but shortly thereafter that
39:55cycle was was asked about their
39:58recommendation I believe in joke
40:00emminster was asked himself what his
40:02recommendation would be since it was
40:04engineering that had recommended not
40:06flying at 53 and he said that you would
40:08not go against that recommendation he
40:10couldn't go against it but based on the
40:14controversy relative to how conclusive
40:16the effects of temperature actually were
40:18on this phenomena we were asked to
40:21reassess and reevaluate that data and we
40:26decided we would do that and the people
40:28at Utah said that well they would like
40:30to have a caucus for about five minutes
40:32and offline I asked you to something
40:36there just a moment go back we come to
40:39the clock the caucus in a minute but
40:41come back and and explain what were said
40:47to to convey the decision of no launch I
40:53gather at that point the decision by
40:56Thiokol was to recommend against a
40:59launch that is correct that was at that
41:02point the recommendation list was not
41:03the launch below 53 degrees did this
41:07talking on that subject was it that was
41:09Bob London the vice-president
41:12engineering presented that position but
41:14did you were you able ascertain from
41:17that conversation how the engineers as a
41:20group stood on that well the engineers
41:24is a group like you know I can't speak
41:27for the group I was not there but I did
41:29hear the engineers that presented the
41:31charts that they actually presented as
41:33part of that that supported the 53
41:36degree recommendation and I felt there
41:38very strong in their conviction is why
41:40they felt uncomfortable to go outside
41:42that experience which did who were the
41:45Roger Beaujolais I think was one of
41:48strongest ones and Arnie Thompson's that
41:51presented those positions and presented
41:54the charts mr. Lowden himself at the
41:57time he asked mr. Lyon to decide himself
41:59at the time didn't present the detail
42:02technical charts but he did present the
42:04conclusions recommendations and that was
42:06his recommendation as vice president
42:08engineer was anybody on the who's on the
42:12telecom from cycle side recommending
42:16launch at that time no there was no one
42:20that recommended launch and I don't
42:22recall there was anyone that either
42:24Marshall or backhaul from NASA that
42:27didn't agree that you know cold
42:29temperatures went in the wrong direction
42:31didn't help anything but no no one from
42:33that call at that time recommended
42:35launch and what were the comments by
42:40NASA officials about that recommendation
42:43that you recall well as I recall there
42:47are some fairly strong comments about
42:48being appalled by the recommendation
42:51about trying to institute new launch
42:54commit criteria at the last minute about
42:57when will ever get this launch off that
43:00those are fairly strong comments those
43:02become escorting your recollection were
43:04made by whom well the comments relative
43:08to the launch commit criteria and when
43:11will ever get this office made by mr.
43:12Larry Malloy the comment about being
43:15appalled was George Hardy he was at
43:17Marshall I think I recognize his voice
43:19but I was by a voice recognition so any
43:26question remember we should have to that
43:28point in there before you made went off
43:32the met that you asked to make a comment
43:34about the secondary wholly ringed seal
43:37seeking that has been but I asked
43:39did you make a kite it may catch on to
43:42this could you recall it yes I think I
43:45read it to you and I'd be glad to do
43:48that again I made the comment that lower
43:50temperatures are in the direction of
43:52badness for both ol rings because it
43:55slows down the timing function but the
43:57effect is much worse for the primary
43:59o-ring compared to the secondary o-ring
44:01because the leak check forces the
44:03primary o-ring into the wrong side of
44:05the groove while the secondary o-ring
44:07goes in the right direction and this
44:10condition should be evaluated in making
44:12the final decision for recommending the
44:14lowest acceptable temperature for launch
44:16that was a comment I made that confused
44:18some people some of the witnesses I
44:20spoke to thought that that was a a
44:22comment in support of the launch the
44:24fact that this secondary whole ring seal
44:25would seat well that comment is a
44:28good-news bad-news comment there is good
44:32news and there's bad news the good news
44:34is that the secondary seal is in the
44:36right position but that's not unique to
44:38temperature it's always that way the bad
44:41news is is that the primary seals the
44:43one we're depending on for the full
44:44ignition transient and it's going to be
44:47a lot worse than it was but even the
44:48secondary as I mentioned wouldn't be as
44:51good cold as it would be normally but I
44:54was comment you were not supporting the
44:55launch no not by that comment I wasn't
44:57supporting the launch I was just saying
44:59that's an important consideration and I
45:01felt that if we could run some
45:02calculations to show that the
45:06temperature did not affect the timing
45:09then that would be supportive of a
45:10launch if it did it certainly and that
45:13was the concern that it pushed that
45:14timing out long enough we had a chart in
45:17there said that if that timing goes
45:18beyond that 200 psi regime or you're
45:20still our routing the primary o-ring
45:22that for whatever reason if you ever buy
45:25passes at that time you can't depend on
45:26the secondary and that's what's
45:28important the time of the caucus then
45:31you
45:34never favorite launch no and you made it
45:38clear that you were opposed to launch
45:39well I never said I was opposed to the
45:42launch so just made a few comments about
45:44why I thought some of the data was not
45:47appropriate like the static test were
45:49saying the o-rings were good 36 degrees
45:51I made this comment about the lower
45:56temperatures affecting both though rings
45:58but it affects them a little bit
45:59differently because one of them it's a
46:01dynamic o-ring and moves one of them has
46:03a lot more movement and effects on it
46:05the other one does because it has to
46:07move across the group I made those
46:09comments except of the recommendation I
46:12accepted the recommendation yes I
46:13thought was appropriate recommendation
46:15in other words you accept the
46:16recommendation of no launch that was
46:18made by your company that's correct
46:20mister would you would you be surprised
46:25if your comments were interpreted by
46:30both your own company personnel and
46:32Marshall personnel is being supporting
46:35of the Marshall position yeah I would be
46:38surprised at that yes I think I wouldn't
46:42be surprised that that would be
46:44evaluated as the vector that I'm
46:46surprised that was interpreted as
46:48supportive you know mr. McDonald you
46:51mentioned the 90 degree qualification
46:56limit was that referring to ambient air
46:59temperatures well I had a discussion
47:02about that later
47:05it was my impression that the motor
47:08itself was qualified from 40 to 90
47:10degrees for operating and we got into a
47:16discussion in fact during the the caucus
47:19that was supposed to last for five
47:20minutes that lasted for about a half
47:22hour on that very subject I told the
47:26people that were there from NASA that I
47:28first of all didn't agree that the motor
47:30was even qualified from 40 to 90
47:32relative to all of its elements and
47:34subsystems I wasn't there in the
47:36qualification the Steelcase motor but I
47:38just recently went through
47:40that process in the film long-case SRM
47:43and that I'm not aware of the testing or
47:47analysis of the o-rings were good to
47:49those temperatures and that therefore
47:52it's part of the elements and the way I
47:54interpret the DES spec is that all of
47:56the components and elements that make up
47:59the SRM should be qualified those
48:00temperatures mr. Miller Larry Malloy at
48:03that time told me well no the 40 degrees
48:06refers to a propellant mean bulk
48:08temperature and the propellant mean bulk
48:10temperature was being predicted to be 55
48:13degrees for that launch and that as long
48:15as the propellant mean bulk temperature
48:17wasn't below 40 degrees that you could
48:20expose the other parts of the motor the
48:22lower temperature as long as you didn't
48:24drop the propellant mean love
48:25temperature outside of the 40 degrees I
48:28responded a ton I thought that was
48:29absolutely ridiculous because you could
48:31expose that motor to very severe cold
48:34temperatures sub-zero temperatures for a
48:36fairly long periods of time you wouldn't
48:38change bail mean buck temperature at all
48:40it's such a massive amount of propellant
48:42insulator there that takes a long time
48:44to do that
48:44and I'm sure that the spec really didn't
48:47mean that that you could so my
48:49interpretation is certainly different
48:50than his was there in fact the minimum
48:55temperature established by specification
48:58or by Road or in some manner that
49:01related to the o-rings or the joint well
49:04I couldn't know I wasn't aware of one
49:07for the o-rings I found out later that
49:10there was a in our specification it
49:13refers to a higher level specification
49:15which is level two at Johnson I think as
49:18I was 7700 spec that says that the
49:21shuttle vehicle has to be capable of
49:23launching in 31 to 99 degrees or
49:26something like that and therefore since
49:28it's a higher level spec that we should
49:30be able to comply with that but I'm not
49:33aware that all of the elements or
49:35subsystems were ever qualified to that
49:36further than a higher level spec could
49:39you explain its if that specification
49:42come down from the
49:45Johnson Space Center who is responsible
49:48for the overall operation of the vehicle
49:49shuttle vehicle and what it's capable of
49:53operating in the environments both
49:55pre-flight and flight and that
49:58specification for the overall vehicle
50:00gets incorporated as part of the lower
50:03level specifications that go through
50:05level three which is Marshall Space
50:06Flight Center to the various elements
50:08and they refer to that and when they
50:10refer to that the way the system is
50:13supposed to work is you're supposed to
50:14comply with your own specification plus
50:16any higher level specifications that may
50:18involve the entire shuttle system and I
50:22was unaware of that frankly that
50:26criteria was in there I'm still a little
50:28bit puzzled about it because it doesn't
50:30have any time of limitation on it either
50:31I was 31 degrees for five minutes or 40
50:35days I was there a design temperature
50:40limit that the timeless motor was
50:42designed with respect to low
50:44temperatures I really can't answer that
50:46because I wasn't involved in the
50:48original design qualification if I may
50:50I'd like to continue we can come to some
50:52of these other questions I'd like to
50:54continue the chronology because they
50:56were going fine and you stopped about
50:59the caucus mr. Armstrong has a question
51:01when one questioned supporting your your
51:05answer that you just gave had had Morton
51:11Thiokol to your knowledge ever informed
51:14NASA that the launch commit criteria
51:18were inadequate or did not in fact cover
51:22the kinds of conditions that you are
51:24concerned about I'm not aware they ever
51:26did not to my knowledge and so we're
51:29really talking about event that was
51:31within the launch criteria launch commit
51:33criteria but outside what your
51:36experience based was well I I guess I
51:38don't even I'm not convinced of that
51:40either I didn't learn about
51:42the 31 degree thing until sometime
51:44afterwards but we were told to make this
51:47evaluation on the basis of launching a
51:49tow 938 in the morning or the predicta
51:52temperature was 26 degrees Fahrenheit
51:54that was predicted temperature and that
51:56was the decision that's made whether we
51:57could launch at that time so I'm not
52:00sure where that came from either
52:02yeah just one follow-up to Neal's
52:05question are you aware of NASA ever
52:08asking thiokol to qualify the SRM or the
52:12SRB to 31 degrees I'm not aware of it
52:15but again I wasn't in that part of the
52:17program they may have but I can't say we
52:22may know let's go back you said that a
52:25suggestion was made that have a recess
52:30for five minutes
52:31who made that suggestion that suggestion
52:36is made from someone at that call I
52:39can't recall what that was Joe I think
52:41was probably joking minister but I'm not
52:43sure you know what happened you said
52:47that that lasted almost a half an hour
52:50instead of five minutes that's correct
52:52then during that time what did you do
52:54and who are you with well I was in the
52:57conference room at Kennedy with mr.
53:00Reinhart
53:00and mr. Molloy mr. Houston and Jack
53:02Buchanan still and I gave you my
53:06conversation about interpretation of the
53:08qualification temperature there I also
53:11come in at that time that I suggested
53:15that maybe we consider a late afternoon
53:16launch I didn't feel good about the
53:20low-temperature launch because when I
53:23had first come down to Kennedy the
53:25original schedule was to launch that in
53:27the late afternoon I think a quarter to
53:29four or something like that and based on
53:31the weather report I heard the
53:33temperatures would be 48 to 50 degrees
53:36in the late afternoon so I said why
53:38don't we go to a late afternoon launch
53:40and I was told that that was considered
53:43but it was rejected because of some
53:46problem either with visibility or
53:48whether one the transatlantic abort
53:50sites
53:51English day car Casablanca one of those
53:54I really expected the reason that was
53:59taking so long for this five-minute
54:01caucus was is that we were either trying
54:03to find some more information to support
54:05our recommendation or that we were
54:08trying to run some kind of calculation
54:10to determine how far away from that we
54:13could go because clearly 26 degrees was
54:16long ways from 53 I personally felt we
54:19certainly wouldn't go below 40 because I
54:21thought my interpretation the
54:22qualification was correct and we
54:25wouldn't do that but that reason was
54:29taken long as the engineers were
54:30reassessing all the data they had and
54:32finding anymore that they may have and
54:35trying to quantify more of part of that
54:37date of a straight qualitative and
54:41finally they the people from façon Utah
54:44did come back on the line
54:45after about a half hour and I believe it
54:50was Jo elminster came on the line and
54:53said that even though we had some
54:55concerns about the lower temperatures
54:57that we would recommend that they
55:00proceed with the launch based on the
55:03fact that we felt the temperature data
55:05that we had was not totally conclusive
55:07and he outlined several concerns still
55:12that we had relative the effective
55:14temperature but also some rationales why
55:16we felt it was safe to proceed what he
55:20said well it was the information
55:24basically that ended up finally on the
55:27facts statement relative to our concerns
55:29the o-rings being colder and harder but
55:34that we also had some data that was
55:38inconclusive relative temperature and
55:40I'm sure it was the warmer temperature
55:42launch where we had some blow by I
55:44didn't see anything that I recognized
55:48that was new and for me
55:49but maybe they had some Haldol the
55:51engineers were certainly there that had
55:54generated the original data and
55:55evaluating it and maybe they had
55:59reconsidered or re-evaluated the data
56:02they had and tried to quantify it or
56:03conservators probably okay when he
56:08completed that he was asked I believe it
56:13was by mr. Hardy I'm not sure to you
56:15know put that rationale in writing and
56:17and assign it make sure they get it down
56:23to the Cape I think by morning early
56:25morning and I was sitting across table
56:28from Larry Malloy at the time and I said
56:30well I felt that I was one of those
56:32gonna have to sign it because I was that
56:33gate I said I would sign that I couldn't
56:36it have to come from the plant she'll
56:40kill minister said that you know he
56:42would draft a letter or a statement and
56:45send it down and he would do it tonight
56:48wouldn't wait until morning and I was
56:51instructed to stay there until that came
56:54came down and that he would also send it
56:56out to Marshall and then it'd be a few
56:58minutes before that would come down he
57:04went off line at that time and I asked
57:06seasonal Houston where the the fax was
57:08and he told me was at the other end of
57:11the building I had a conversation with
57:14people at that called this point they
57:17went offline where they can send that
57:19information in the Jack Buchanan's
57:21office which was the fax machine right
57:22next door to this conference we had or
57:25they're gonna send it into the Marshall
57:26office they had a Pitney Bowes machine
57:29or something and they said well well
57:31send in the same one we sent all this
57:32other material because they have the
57:33right
57:34be the marshal one which was the other
57:36end of the building so I said fine I
57:38would wait again took some time for that
57:42fax to get there so all of the parties
57:44were in a meeting we're still sitting
57:46there and we started to talk about some
57:50things I tell them I didn't feel very
57:53good about this recommendation and I
57:55recognize it's a very difficult to quite
57:58quantify at what temperature these seals
58:01may be acceptable where they aren't
58:03acceptable you know based on that data
58:04they're somewhat certainly wasn't
58:06conclusive there's no doubt in my mind
58:08and that's a difficult thing to quantify
58:10but I even though I didn't agree with
58:12the 40 degree qualification of the motor
58:18that all elements were qualified - that
58:21was my understanding that there's a lot
58:25of people at both NASA and thiokol
58:27signed up to that so the design
58:30certification process for the critical
58:33design reviews and I was absolutely
58:35surprised that NASA would accept any
58:37recommendation below 40 degrees
58:39Fahrenheit especially when the product
58:41predicted temperature as low as 26
58:43degrees Fahrenheit don't mind maybe
58:46naive about what generates launch commit
58:48criteria but I was under the impression
58:52that that was generated based on the
58:53qualification of all elements or
58:55subsystems space shuttle that anything
58:58that was outside that qualification was
59:00a launch commit criteria and we never
59:02went outside that envelope and I don't
59:05know why NASA would ever launch below 40
59:07degrees Fahrenheit
59:08if that's what the SRM was qualified to
59:12in fact I made the direct statement that
59:15if anything happened to this launch tell
59:17them I sure wouldn't want to be the
59:19person that had to stand in front of a
59:20board of inquiry to explain why I
59:23launched this outside of the
59:26qualification of the solid rocket motor
59:28or any shuttle system when I made that
59:31statement no one commented on that I was
59:35very still very upset so I
59:38I asked that they reconsider this
59:43decision for three reasons
59:45not one for three I said if I were the
59:48launch director I'd cancel this launch
59:51for three reasons not just one first one
59:53being the concern of the Colo ring so we
59:55just discussed but there were two others
59:58I just left Carville Kennedy's house in
1:00:01the title Titusville Florida and he's
1:00:04responsible not only for stacking of the
1:00:07SRM she's responsible for the retrieval
1:00:08operations and he had been in
1:00:11communication with someone that was at
1:00:13hangar AF I believe that contacts the
1:00:16booster recovery ships at sea and they
1:00:21had told him that the booster recovery
1:00:23ships were in a absolute survival mode
1:00:26it was how they put it that they were in
1:00:28seas or high as 30 feet they were there
1:00:32was winds at 50 knots sustained
1:00:34gusting to 70 knots pitching the boat as
1:00:37much as 30 degrees
1:00:39they even felt the rough seas may have
1:00:41damaged some of the retrieval equipment
1:00:43on the back of the ship they were
1:00:45steering directly into the wind heading
1:00:47for Shore at about three knots and
1:00:49they've been doing that for some time
1:00:50there's no way that they would be able
1:00:52to support early morning launch because
1:00:55they wouldn't be in a recovery area I
1:00:58then reminded everyone in the room that
1:01:01you know there's some firsts on this
1:01:02launch this is the first time that we're
1:01:04going to use the new electronic control
1:01:07system for separating the nozzle
1:01:10extension cone on the SRBs
1:01:12at Apogee rather than just before water
1:01:14impact while it's under full main
1:01:16parachute and then we're going to
1:01:18separate the parachutes at water impact
1:01:20for the very first time on this launch
1:01:22and that based on the sea States that I
1:01:26had just heard that appeared to me that
1:01:28it was going to be nearly impossible to
1:01:31recover that hardware he did the
1:01:34parachutes or the freshman's that there
1:01:37is and also I felt that they were
1:01:39putting the boosters at some risk as far
1:01:41as recovery was concerned because the
1:01:43ship's were steering away
1:01:47also said that the third reason for not
1:01:50launching is the formation of ice I knew
1:01:52the sound suppression systems a water
1:01:55system and I felt it probably a lot of
1:01:57ice around there and I'm no expert on
1:02:00all these matters but I do feel that
1:02:01there may be a chance of that changing
1:02:04acoustics may be a problem with debris
1:02:06may have some effect on the structures I
1:02:08didn't know but I didn't think was
1:02:10prudent the launch under that kind of a
1:02:13condition I was told that you know these
1:02:17weren't really my problems and I read
1:02:18n't concern myself for these but I said
1:02:22you know all three of these together
1:02:25should be more than sufficient to cancel
1:02:27the launch if the one that we discussed
1:02:31earlier wasn't the NASA people were
1:02:34there said that too well they would pass
1:02:36these on they could tell I was I was
1:02:38disturbed and they'd passed those on as
1:02:41concerns and that they would do it in an
1:02:44advisory capacity I was then asked by
1:02:47mr. Malloy where the sign fax was
1:02:49because some time had transpired since
1:02:51the teleconference had ended then that
1:02:53still wasn't there so I said okay I'll
1:02:55go check on that I went down to the
1:02:57other end of the building to this fax
1:03:00machine and there was nothing there and
1:03:02come out yet and I really wondered if it
1:03:04was working it was getting kind of late
1:03:06so I stayed down there I guess for about
1:03:09ten minutes and it finally came in
1:03:12I brought the fax back it was a single
1:03:14sheet of paper to jack Buchanan's office
1:03:17where we reproduced copies for everyone
1:03:19I walked into when it was Cecil
1:03:23Houston's office there and there was a
1:03:24telecon being conducted and I believe
1:03:26Elizabeth Arne Aldridge and there in the
1:03:29middle of this telecon and they were
1:03:30discussing the conditions of the booster
1:03:33recovery ships and the high sea states
1:03:36and the fact they were in the survival
1:03:38mode and I recall that Arnie Aldrich
1:03:43asked during the law if he felt there
1:03:45was any risk to recovering the Boosters
1:03:48because of this and he says no he didn't
1:03:50think there was any no significant risk
1:03:52in recovering the Boosters because they
1:03:55had beacons and monitors and they're
1:03:57going to bear
1:03:57in the area also but that there was a
1:04:00high probability that they would not
1:04:02recover the parachutes or the frustum
1:04:05and the conclusion was that guess they'd
1:04:09have to make a decision to launch in the
1:04:11basis that they would have high
1:04:13probability not recovering that hardware
1:04:15but they were compromising the recovery
1:04:18of the Boosters significantly and
1:04:21remember Arnie asking Larry you know the
1:04:25value of that hardware and I think he
1:04:27gave some number of close to million
1:04:29dollars and asked him if he could afford
1:04:31to lose it and support the schedules of
1:04:33the program and he said that he had
1:04:35sufficient inventory to do that but
1:04:39Arnie also told him that in no way have
1:04:42those two ships attempt to turn around
1:04:44in those kinds of conditions and the
1:04:46safety of ships is important to try to
1:04:49support that launch and turn around too
1:04:52soon so to tell him to continue on
1:04:53towards Shore until was really safe to
1:04:55turn around
1:04:57they then briefly discussed the ice
1:05:00issue about the ice and it was a concern
1:05:03raised there and Arnie believe it was
1:05:06Arnie responded that they had discussed
1:05:08that issue earlier in the day so it's
1:05:10fairly brief conversation and heard the
1:05:14ice I don't know
1:05:16and finally the conversation concluded
1:05:20and the recommendation was to proceed on
1:05:23with the book launch I stayed around a
1:05:27few more minutes and talk to Jack the
1:05:29Canon for a few minutes um and went back
1:05:31to Carver's house in Titusville where I
1:05:33stayed and got in there I guess the
1:05:35world before 1 o'clock sometime I guess
1:05:39that's what tequila asked at the
1:05:51conclusion of your testimony executive
1:05:54session whether you felt that you were
1:05:56under pressure for had been under
1:05:58pressure or the company's been under
1:06:00pressure to reverse its decision I think
1:06:03your answer was yes do you remember that
1:06:05yes definitely I there's no doubt in my
1:06:08mind I felt some pressure I feel that I
1:06:11have a responsible management position
1:06:14in here and I felt pressure by the
1:06:16strong statement Simon would you explain
1:06:18the reasons for the feeling pressure
1:06:20well I've I've been in many flight rates
1:06:24of use probably as many as as anyone the
1:06:27past year and a half at attack Hall and
1:06:31I've had to get up and stand before I
1:06:34think a very critical audience at
1:06:37Marshall a very good one
1:06:39justifying why our hardware was ready to
1:06:42fly and I have to get up and explain
1:06:44every major defect and why we can fly
1:06:49with that defect and to the most part
1:06:52they're very minor very very minor and
1:06:56and I've been hassled about how I'm sure
1:06:59that that's okay to fly with no such
1:07:02things as losing vacuum in a carbon
1:07:05cloth phenolic part in the nozzle while
1:07:07the MIT parts basically cured you know
1:07:10definitely effective that it's a
1:07:11critical process there's a lot of those
1:07:13critical processes and I have to dress
1:07:15every one of those the great detail is
1:07:18why I'm sure that that part has not been
1:07:21compromised
1:07:22and it's been that way through all the
1:07:25reviews I've ever had and that's the way
1:07:28it should be it's not pleasant but
1:07:31that's what it should be
1:07:32and I was surprised here at at this
1:07:35particular meeting that the tone of the
1:07:37meeting was just opposite of that I
1:07:39didn't have to prove I was ready to fly
1:07:41in fact I think Bob Crippen made the
1:07:43most accurate statement I ever heard his
1:07:45conclusion that meeting was is that
1:07:48philosophy seemed of change because you
1:07:50know he had the same impression idea
1:07:52that the contract had always had to get
1:07:54up and stand up and prove that his
1:07:55hardware was ready to fly in this case
1:07:57we had to prove it wasn't and that's a
1:08:00big difference
1:08:00and I felt that was precious well I
1:08:08think the strong statements were made by
1:08:10mr. Malloy and even some of those that
1:08:13the people at Marshall are on there mr.
1:08:16Hardy were early strong statements that
1:08:18I took as pressure about one will ever
1:08:22fly this thing and launch commit
1:08:24criteria that we can't generate last
1:08:27minute and appalled by our
1:08:30recommendation to fly temperatures high
1:08:34as 53 degrees and and that to me that
1:08:36that was pressure to me and it may not
1:08:38have been interpreted by theirs but it
1:08:40was pressure to me that you want to
1:08:43refer to it at this time or at any time
1:08:47no no I I just felt that the way the
1:08:51comments from aid as strong as they were
1:08:52made and the fact that the the
1:08:55conditions for for justifying this
1:08:57launch were it were so much different
1:08:58than anything I had been involved with
1:09:00before I was the telefax is concerned
1:09:03would you normally have signed that
1:09:05telefax or was that was the procedure
1:09:07that was followed the normal procedure
1:09:09well I'm not sure I guess what the
1:09:12normal procedure is I felt that since I
1:09:15was there representing of the senior
1:09:18official at the Cape and I'm the one
1:09:21that usually is responsible for that I
1:09:23know at the L minus one
1:09:25we have a normal launch there's a poll
1:09:28that's conducted by Jess more of all the
1:09:31contractors were there ready to fly and
1:09:33I'm the guy there to ask it up and say
1:09:35yeah that calls hardware's ready to fly
1:09:37I felt that's my responsibility that's
1:09:40why I'm there I can't recall what we
1:09:43were asked to sign anything like that
1:09:45before we have a presentation that's
1:09:49given at every Flight Readiness review
1:09:51that signed off by the principal parties
1:09:54Joe elements are usually signs all those
1:09:56on the formal review but if anything
1:09:58comes up afterwards it's it's been done
1:10:01on an oral basis but I don't know I've
1:10:03never been put in that position I don't
1:10:05know if Joe has I don't believe he has
1:10:10the the fact that a written decision was
1:10:16requested as far as you're concerned was
1:10:18not the normal way to do it it was not
1:10:21the normal as far as that's concerned
1:10:23and as I recall your testimony you
1:10:26testified that you made it clear that
1:10:28you would not sign a written statement
1:10:29approving the launch it might correct
1:10:32yeah that's correct I think that's been
1:10:34misinterpreted at least by the press
1:10:36they said that uh I was overruled by my
1:10:39supervisor that's not true at all I
1:10:41chose not to sign that I didn't he
1:10:44didn't overrule me I felt that that
1:10:45decision I started was an engineering
1:10:48decision by the people that understood
1:10:51the problem the best that had all of the
1:10:53data and facts and they're the ones that
1:10:54should recommend it and that's why I
1:10:55made that it wasn't I was overruled
1:10:58thank you very much I'm sure other
1:11:00commission members will ask you mr.
1:11:01Johnston yeah you were talking about the
1:11:0540-degree qualified qualification of
1:11:08various components of the solid rocket
1:11:11very sturdy and one I was aware of the
1:11:1540-degree limit on that on the green
1:11:18bulk temperature but was there anything
1:11:22else that the 40 degrees referred to
1:11:25well in the spec going back after fact
1:11:29and looking at it that's what it had
1:11:30refers to is a propellant mean buf
1:11:32temperature
1:11:35I guess that's my opinions an oversight
1:11:38may be in the spec or the launch
1:11:42temperature of 31 to 99 should be
1:11:45stronger in there to apply to all
1:11:47components and by qualification that
1:11:50either has to be qualified by test or
1:11:52some analysis and that means every
1:11:53element and I'm not aware that all those
1:11:56elements were qualified for that
1:11:59temperature I know we bought overhangs
1:12:01that said they're good minus 30
1:12:03but I never saw the analysis and the
1:12:05application that we use them in that
1:12:07says that they're they're good to that
1:12:09and yes that's a difference it's a
1:12:10material problem versus a design problem
1:12:12I understand that and I understand that
1:12:16the four degrees was intended to protect
1:12:18against grain cracking and the
1:12:20consequences of that but what what I
1:12:25didn't quite understand is why you said
1:12:28you wouldn't recommend any time
1:12:30launching below 40 degrees I'm trying to
1:12:33get up well I felt that's what everybody
1:12:37had signed up to is what this thing was
1:12:39really qualified from an operating
1:12:40standpoint now the motor does get
1:12:42exposed to much lower temperatures we
1:12:44have a criteria in our specification
1:12:47expose that to much lower temperatures
1:12:49you know sub-zero temperatures and
1:12:5060-mile winds coming across Wyoming
1:12:52because we ship these things from Utah
1:12:55down to the Cape so in a transportation
1:12:57mode they are subjected to some very
1:12:59severe temperatures for periods of time
1:13:02and there has been analysis to show that
1:13:05they will withstand those temperatures
1:13:07as long as you don't operate them at
1:13:09those temperatures the 40 degrees they
1:13:12won't crack there's no problem there
1:13:13that's a primarily a performance
1:13:16standpoint you lose total impulse and
1:13:18performance the lower the temperatures
1:13:20you go the gear below 40 you start
1:13:22losing performance out of shuttle and
1:13:23that's why that number came about as far
1:13:26as the capability the grain structural
1:13:29capability it can withstand a lot colder
1:13:31temperatures than that and we have
1:13:33analysis for the storage and
1:13:35transportation shows that and it has
1:13:36good margins of safety very high margins
1:13:38of safety for exposure to lower
1:13:41temperatures
1:13:42it's just the things like the o-rings
1:13:44and some of these other components I'm
1:13:45not aware that we have really analyzed
1:13:47or tested those well enough to
1:13:49understand how they would operate in
1:13:52that kind of a temperature there's a
1:13:54difference between exposing and storing
1:13:57them versus operate used as a
1:14:07justification was there an analysis to
1:14:11indicate what the o-ring temperature
1:14:12during that test was well it was done
1:14:16after the fact and I believe in the
1:14:18presentation that was made on the night
1:14:22before the launch it they calculated
1:14:24like 47 degrees is what they presented
1:14:26is what they expected the o-ring
1:14:28temperature have really been when that
1:14:30was that it tested a couple of other
1:14:33questions regarding the the conference
1:14:36was there a specific request by NASA to
1:14:39reconsider or was the reconsideration as
1:14:42a result of the implications of the
1:14:45remarks made by the NASA people in the
1:14:47conference I mean the reconsideration of
1:14:51what of the initial decision not to
1:14:54launch that is the initial
1:14:56recommendation of Thiokol was not to
1:14:58launch and then that was reconsidered
1:15:01did anyone from NASA explicitly asked
1:15:04for reconsideration or would the
1:15:06reconsideration occur because of the
1:15:08negative remarks and comments on that
1:15:11decision well I think it was the latter
1:15:15I can't fully recall where they directed
1:15:18this to do that or not that we they had
1:15:20concluded that the the temperature data
1:15:23was inconclusive and I don't know
1:15:24whether we volunteered to reassess it or
1:15:26they said we need to them it's not clear
1:15:28to me on that I'm not sure one further
1:15:31question in regard to the signature on
1:15:34the sheet which was faxed from mr. Kell
1:15:38mr. was there a specific request for
1:15:40that to be signed and who made that
1:15:42request yeah there was a specific
1:15:46request for that to be signed
1:15:50I believe it was George Hardy it may
1:15:53have been learning the law but I think
1:15:55it was charge Hardy had requested that
1:15:57time did you consider bringing your
1:16:03concerns about the final recommendation
1:16:06to the personal attention of mr. war or
1:16:12mr. Aldrich or dr. Lucas well I'm very
1:16:19familiar with the process by which these
1:16:21things are reviewed and I was absolutely
1:16:25positive in sure that they would were
1:16:28brought to hit their attention because
1:16:30that's the way things go I talked to the
1:16:33SRB project manager I talked to his boss
1:16:35the shuttle project manager the shuttle
1:16:38project office and I was sure that those
1:16:39all went through that review I had no
1:16:41doubt in my mind that they had NASA folk
1:16:49indicated that they would pass your
1:16:51concerns along and I presume in the
1:16:54Joule thought they would the three
1:16:57concerns that you were talking about the
1:16:59o-rings the ocean seal and the ice right
1:17:02but could they have simply meant the
1:17:04last two concerns the sea in the ice
1:17:06that's one question the other is who
1:17:09were the NASA folk that promised to pass
1:17:14your concerns along I I guess you could
1:17:16interpret maybe as I thought it would be
1:17:18all three but the people were mr. Malloy
1:17:20and mr. Reinhart said they they would
1:17:24pass those on and I presume they passed
1:17:26them all on then same reason why they
1:17:29wouldn't
1:17:38watching should be an engineering
1:17:39decision that program management of the
1:17:42city how would you characterize the
1:17:44final decision to launch from thiokol
1:17:47was it engineering or was it management
1:17:50well I I guess I'd have to characterize
1:17:53it as the management decision in the
1:17:55final decision did I understand you to
1:18:04say that you chair the board on on crit
1:18:07ones on the SRM from YES on all defects
1:18:11that are affected by that finish could
1:18:13you give us your understanding of the
1:18:15meaning of criticality one and just an
1:18:19estimate of how many parts in the SRM
1:18:21system are classified as current one
1:18:23well I don't have a good number for you
1:18:27but there's a tremendous amount of crit
1:18:29ones on the SRM primarily because the
1:18:34motor doesn't have very many redundant
1:18:37features solid rocket motors don't
1:18:39and of course bottom its structure and
1:18:43structure is all becomes a great one if
1:18:45it fails Kirtland is a single point
1:18:51failure that if that element fails
1:18:54there's there's no recovery you lose the
1:18:57you lose the hardware and it's
1:18:59catastrophic
1:19:00there's a lot of elements in the SRM
1:19:02there under that category relative to
1:19:06the o-ring seals the redundancy was
1:19:08built in because that was a critical
1:19:10element as a pressure seal in order to
1:19:14provide that redundancy I think there is
1:19:17some confusion of late as to what that
1:19:22Creek 1 1 R was relative the seals and
1:19:25how it was removed I wasn't involved at
1:19:29the time but it was found that because
1:19:32this joint rotated that if you took all
1:19:35of the worst engineering tolerances and
1:19:39dimensions are allowed by the pram
1:19:40that means the maximum clevis opening
1:19:44you could have to start with the
1:19:46smallest and thinnest tang that you
1:19:48could put into that clevis opening and
1:19:50the minimum Oh ring that you could put
1:19:52in there with a maximum size of the
1:19:54grooves that you could possibly put in
1:19:56there that you put all those
1:19:58combinations together you could show
1:20:00that you would actually lose squeeze on
1:20:02the secondary o-ring once you pressurize
1:20:04the system and the joint rotated and
1:20:06therefore if you ever had to call upon
1:20:09that o-ring as a redundant system during
1:20:12that time period you couldn't depend on
1:20:14it out I went back and had an assessment
1:20:18made of have we flown any hardware in
1:20:23that condition because I was a bit
1:20:25shocked about that as much as anyone
1:20:27when I first found that out which was by
1:20:29the way last August and I made that
1:20:31presentation here to NASA headquarters I
1:20:35did I wasn't aware of it myself that we
1:20:37had such a condition that we were flying
1:20:39with a current one on on that part of
1:20:41the hardware based on the information
1:20:45that I have received on all of the
1:20:49joints ever flown on the shuttle there
1:20:52was only one time where we had a
1:20:55tolerant stack up of a joint that would
1:20:59have fallen from a criticality 1r to one
1:21:02and that was on STS 4 we have never had
1:21:05one since we didn't have one for that
1:21:07and we always had adequate squeeze from
1:21:10the hardware when it rotates to maintain
1:21:13it as a criticality 1r now I understand
1:21:17it because I thought that
1:21:19the piece of paper in the critical items
1:21:21list specifically lists the primary
1:21:24o-ring as a criticality one yes it does
1:21:27and the reason it does that is because
1:21:28the draw drawing tolerances allow you to
1:21:31install hardware - that may come
1:21:34together on a worst-case basis that it
1:21:37cannot guarantee a secondary seal and
1:21:39therefore if you can use all the
1:21:40hardware that's in the inventory but you
1:21:41could possibly have in the inventory
1:21:43bill - acceptable prints you could end
1:21:45up with a very small fraction of it's a
1:21:48very small fraction that could go
1:21:49together that way and therefore that
1:21:52document was written to cover all that
1:21:54but in reality other than that one case
1:21:57we've never settled hardware that way
1:21:59we've had we haven't had the thinnest
1:22:01tangs with the widest open crevices with
1:22:03a minimum overrun seven foot together
1:22:05that's a concern in a sale as a very
1:22:08serious concern in my opinion because
1:22:11that decision was made at the time based
1:22:14on what we knew about joint rotation
1:22:17since that time we're getting this
1:22:19information on resiliency in effects of
1:22:21temperature which were never put into
1:22:23that at that time that brings that
1:22:24question back out in front yeah you know
1:22:27I told you we didn't fly from
1:22:29criticality one on one that's true based
1:22:32on the decisions and the information is
1:22:34known that changed it from one are to
1:22:36one just on the tolerances and
1:22:38dimensions as far as this resiliency
1:22:40thing I can't assess that yet well
1:22:43enough to know but I do know we never
1:22:45stacked Hardware together that had
1:22:47torrents are so bad that we didn't have
1:22:49contact of the secondary all right
1:22:52neither did one joint but just to be
1:22:54clear I guess that you don't on a joint
1:22:56by joint basis go back to the NASA board
1:22:59and kind of reclaimer that crit one and
1:23:02turn it back into a 1r do you it's
1:23:04always classified as a criticality one
1:23:06on the primary seal that's actually
1:23:08you're correct now we do as part of our
1:23:10flight readiness of you do present those
1:23:13joints that we're mating and what those
1:23:14orange squeezes are and on every flight
1:23:17did any discussion of the primary seal
1:23:21as a criticality one come up during the
1:23:23your meetings on audio minus one no they
1:23:27did you suggested that the secondary CEO
1:23:32would not be much affected by the
1:23:33temperature but now you're telling us
1:23:35that because of the complete or nearly
1:23:38complete loss of resilience that is the
1:23:41tendency to spring back the secondary
1:23:43seal would require very little rotation
1:23:45to open do I understand correctly I said
1:23:49it wouldn't be as affected as much as
1:23:51the primary seal because it doesn't have
1:23:55to move from one end of the slot the
1:23:57other but as far as the effect of
1:23:58resilience you're absolutely correct it
1:24:00still has the same problem as far as
1:24:02extruding in the gap that's still got
1:24:03the same problem we were talking about
1:24:06it somewhere there was a discussion
1:24:08about the secondary seal being redundant
1:24:11until the metal parts rotate when the
1:24:15pressure starts to build up it can't
1:24:17move the primary seal until there is
1:24:19some pressure and then there's a very
1:24:21small pressure perhaps and a very small
1:24:23rotation isn't the true isn't the truth
1:24:25the rotations more or less proportional
1:24:27to the pressure others there's some
1:24:28delay of some sort there is no way time
1:24:31delay between them - there is some delay
1:24:34because the joints stiff enough that
1:24:36under certain pressures you don't move
1:24:38it at all so you have to build up some
1:24:39pressure to make any rotation so there
1:24:42is a delay in that time period but at
1:24:44some point in time it becomes a direct
1:24:46function of the pressure the laws of
1:24:48elasticity such that everything is
1:24:50proportional to the force and all of the
1:24:52spices of apportionable force then
1:24:54wouldn't it be true that at every
1:24:56pressure there's some rotation and the
1:24:57rotation is more or less proportional to
1:24:59the pressure well I think that when
1:25:03you're down to few psi or 50 psi I don't
1:25:07think
1:25:07dating anything you want teddy in 1/10
1:25:12as much as you rotated a 500 psi is that
1:25:15right well the structure is so stiff
1:25:18that I can't believe you're updating at
1:25:19all at 50 psi you are moving the o-ring
1:25:27seal back into the grill powder to just
1:25:32go back to this criticality one so that
1:25:34I can understand it a little better in
1:25:3919 what 1985 change was made 83 83 82 83
1:25:50at that point it was listed as
1:25:53criticality 1 with an R is that right
1:25:58that's correct
1:25:59not does that mean that it was decided
1:26:03that if there was a failure and that
1:26:07seemed boring that the mission and the
1:26:11crew would be destroyed the whole thing
1:26:14would be a catastrophe but at that point
1:26:16the are met that was there was a
1:26:18redundancy there that you had to raise
1:26:22that each at that point was considered
1:26:24to support the other or at least one was
1:26:26a backup for the other that's that's
1:26:28what are meant that's correct it's
1:26:29redundant means redundant why the RS air
1:26:32that's right now at that time experience
1:26:35clearly demonstrated that the the
1:26:40analysis that you've been using up to
1:26:43that point may not have been correct so
1:26:46that instead of having both a primary
1:26:49and a secondary Co which provided
1:26:51redundancy became the conclusion you
1:26:53didn't have the redundancy therefore it
1:26:57was changed to criticality 1 the arm was
1:27:00removed is that correct that's correct
1:27:02and so from that point on I believe it
1:27:05was in what's the date
1:27:09December 82 those shuttles have been
1:27:14flown on the basis of criticality 1 so
1:27:18there was a failure that sealed the
1:27:20catastrophe would result because there
1:27:22was no redundancy is that correct well I
1:27:25guess that's the interpretation of that
1:27:27but recognizing the actual hardware that
1:27:30was put together and what we knew at
1:27:33that time I don't believe that was that
1:27:35was true what was true was is that the
1:27:37drawings as I mentioned allowed a
1:27:39condition where that could you could fly
1:27:42that hardware in that condition just to
1:27:45be clear what the SIL says is that the
1:27:48primary o-ring is a criticality one and
1:27:51you're not allowed to consider the
1:27:52secondary o-ring as a backup to that
1:27:54that's true Sally that's absolutely
1:27:56correct that's what it meant and that
1:28:01was that was known I assume by everyone
1:28:04that was working on the program with
1:28:06most of the top people working on the
1:28:07program is that would that be sure well
1:28:10I I kind of thought I was when the top
1:28:12people work in the program and I didn't
1:28:13know that until August of 1985 when I
1:28:17put that presentation together I I
1:28:19presume it was I did find out there was
1:28:22some disagreement between both Thiokol
1:28:26and Marshall and interpreting that
1:28:28relative to the joint rotation the joint
1:28:32rotation of was used for concluding that
1:28:35was obtained from two different sources
1:28:38one of those sources was from the
1:28:40structural test article one first
1:28:43structural test article and this is way
1:28:45before my time but where this test
1:28:50article is taken to Marshall and it's
1:28:52basically a four word segment it's
1:28:54unloaded now
1:28:56a nap segment where they input the both
1:29:00the pre-launch loads and they put flight
1:29:02loads and all that business into the
1:29:04test article and this test is run
1:29:08horizontally the arms horizontal and
1:29:12they measure through the leap check
1:29:14floor to understand or some places the
1:29:16actual rotation of these parts and got
1:29:20some fairly high numbers up around 60
1:29:22thousandths I believe is what they said
1:29:24it rotated we had run some tests
1:29:28ourselves in a vertical assembly during
1:29:31a Hydra test and measured some of the
1:29:34rotations and got numbers like 30 to 40
1:29:38thousands so there was some disagreement
1:29:41as to which numbers were correct
1:29:43some of our people felt that the
1:29:45horizontal assembly may have made the
1:29:48structural test article numbers not
1:29:51representative the vertical assembly is
1:29:53better and in fact because of that
1:29:56disagreement we're in the process and
1:30:00started early last summer at the
1:30:03direction of Marshall to come up with
1:30:04what's called a referee test to do some
1:30:08very careful instrumentation in a
1:30:10vertical assembly to get a better handle
1:30:12on the exact amount of joint rotation
1:30:16those joint rotations that are used are
1:30:19those that are predicted for the maximum
1:30:21expected operating pressure which by the
1:30:24way we have never obtained
1:30:27fortunately hope we never do but that's
1:30:28a three sigma out there someplace but
1:30:33that still is a point of controversy as
1:30:35to what that number really is because
1:30:37the sale I believe that critical items
1:30:40list that change that from one
1:30:41redundancy to one and not only assume
1:30:44the MU LP but I believe it assumed the
1:30:47larger rotation which is about 50% more
1:30:50than some of the data that we got from
1:30:52vertical so I don't I still don't fully
1:30:55understand that what I do understand is
1:30:58that it was made at the time
1:31:00when temperature effects were not known
1:31:02and the resiliency problem that doctor
1:31:05finally brought up I think some more
1:31:06seriously may I ask you just want to
1:31:10finish this okay sure going back to
1:31:12beginning in 1985 when you've realized
1:31:17that the criticality 1 was the who was
1:31:20on the critical items list you knew from
1:31:24that point on that a single failure
1:31:27would be catastrophe as far as the
1:31:30mission is concerned well as I mentioned
1:31:34earlier that you have to postulate what
1:31:40your failure mechanism is and I felt
1:31:44very strongly that the blow by that we
1:31:49had observed as indeed was on the early
1:31:51part of the ignition transient I think
1:31:53we all felt that way we've modelled that
1:31:55by the way I think fairly reasonably on
1:31:57the erosion and that at that point in
1:32:00time when the hardware really hasn't had
1:32:03a chance to rotate taking the
1:32:04temperature effects out now that we do
1:32:07indeed have a good redundant seal
1:32:09because if we lose the primary o-ring at
1:32:11that time that secondary seals in a
1:32:14better shape and the primary to really
1:32:15seal it hasn't come off its land at all
1:32:19if you ignore the resiliency problem in
1:32:24a different scenario
1:32:26suppose that the resident pressure is
1:32:28increasing for some reason the primaries
1:32:31are just to understand what the
1:32:33situation is the primary seal begins to
1:32:35erode and by the time the pressure gets
1:32:37to some figure like 600 or 700 psi which
1:32:40is I think just below the maximum
1:32:42operating pressure
1:32:43it finally erodes all the way through so
1:32:46that the gas can pass through the
1:32:48primary seal would you think there was a
1:32:50reasonable probability if the whole
1:32:52thing would fail because the rotation by
1:32:54that time is enough the secondary seal
1:32:56can't hold it yes I think it was and
1:32:59that was our assessment notice that
1:33:00there was a reasonable probability
1:33:02now you first knew what thought of in
1:33:04August 1985 that's correct not before
1:33:06that's correct right now wouldn't you
1:33:10assume that other people who had been
1:33:11working on the program and working on
1:33:13the sale and the orderings would
1:33:14understand that too
1:33:16yes I think there's another important
1:33:20piece of information back in the end of
1:33:25April 85 forgot the exact flight but it
1:33:30was the last one in April we had a
1:33:35problem with the Joran sealed nozzle
1:33:39that flight after it came back the
1:33:43nozzle still attached to the aft segment
1:33:45and we disassembled the segments when
1:33:48they were brought back to the port and
1:33:51then they're put on railcar to send back
1:33:52to Utah we never got the segment back
1:33:54until I don't know sometime a lot of
1:33:56part of June or something this flight
1:33:58was the very end April we disassembled
1:34:01that nozzle we found that we had
1:34:03violated the primary seal back in three
1:34:06locations and burned completely through
1:34:09the secondary seal also had eroded like
1:34:1230 mm I bet it held and it did its job
1:34:18that was in a nozzle joint the primary
1:34:22sealed the nozzle joined as a bore seal
1:34:24quite similar to the filled joint
1:34:27tolerances are a little different but
1:34:29the secondary seal is a face seal it's
1:34:34you know they're both somewhat dynamic
1:34:36seals this more of a static seal and the
1:34:38Varsity of the face seals torque down
1:34:40put the bolts and it obviously did his
1:34:44job and our conclusion was and in that
1:34:47particular instance was that the even
1:34:51though we passed the leak check that the
1:34:52vacuum buddy may have masked that leak
1:34:54check we were using at that time a
1:34:57pressure stabilizing pressure to run
1:35:01that leak check at 100 psi we had had
1:35:04some data
1:35:06earlier that showed us that the
1:35:09consistency that hoody is quite variable
1:35:12and you can actually the putty will come
1:35:15a good sealant in many cases and it can
1:35:17hold as much as 100 psi for a good
1:35:20period of time sometimes they'll blow
1:35:22through sometimes it won't so our
1:35:24concern was that me were not really
1:35:25checking the o-ring seals were checking
1:35:27the putty and we're going to make sure
1:35:28we're checking the o-ring seals so we
1:35:31jacked the pressure up to 200 psi that
1:35:33was the last flight that we were still
1:35:35under the hundred psi which is the
1:35:36previous requirement to stabilize it at
1:35:41a hundred and then once you stabilize it
1:35:43for a period of time there you drop the
1:35:45pressure completely again you bring it
1:35:47up to 50 psi and that's what you run the
1:35:49leak check at for about 10 minutes and
1:35:52we allow one psi drop on that particular
1:35:55set of hardware since it was the last
1:35:57one we ran with 100 psi because the
1:36:01change hadn't gotten through with all
1:36:03the paperwork system on what we
1:36:04understood about what putty behaves
1:36:06under pressure because we went to 200
1:36:09psi for the filled joints at that time
1:36:11just hadn't gotten a nozzle that we
1:36:14concluded that the putty may well have
1:36:15masked that leak check as it was at a
1:36:17hundred and therefore we may have had
1:36:19some defect in that seal that we didn't
1:36:22detect and as a result that seal leaked
1:36:26that ignition from time to zero and when
1:36:31that happens you get severe erosion in
1:36:34the ordering because you get the jet
1:36:35impingement have we been calculated
1:36:37which is direct on to the o-ring seal
1:36:39like a flat plate but when you bypass
1:36:42the o-ring in a leak like that it
1:36:45actually chokes at that points you're
1:36:46forming a throat and erodes very rapidly
1:36:49from underneath as well as jet of
1:36:51henchmen then you lose quite a bit of
1:36:52the seal we lost most of the seal in
1:36:54fact but the nozzle seal is very good
1:36:58the secondary seal that is around the
1:36:59corner and expands
1:37:02fans down around the quarter and he
1:37:06wrote at some of the secondary seal we
1:37:09ran a lot of analysis after that because
1:37:12that was the first time that we had
1:37:14observed erosion of a primary seal we do
1:37:18developed our models to predict the
1:37:21erosion what would happen in blow by
1:37:23erosion and it was because of that that
1:37:26we found that hardware and it was late
1:37:29in June it was into July that we got all
1:37:32that data together we down to Marshall
1:37:34and had very detailed reviews because
1:37:36that is a was a serious concern to
1:37:38everyone that we had violated primary
1:37:40seal was in the nozzle joint that we
1:37:43were asked to come to Washington the
1:37:45headquarters and review that it was very
1:37:47serious concerned it was that time that
1:37:51I got with the engineering people and
1:37:53said we need to put that whole story
1:37:55together we need to put the whole story
1:37:57together on all the pressure seals
1:37:59because I and several others still felt
1:38:02that even though that problem happened
1:38:03with the nozzle of the field joint was a
1:38:05more serious concern because I felt very
1:38:08good about the secondary seal in the
1:38:10nozzle I didn't for the field Johnny and
1:38:13I put together a presentation for August
1:38:15that I think showed where our real
1:38:17concerns were and why we felt highest
1:38:20priority was a field joke even though we
1:38:22just experienced that problem with a
1:38:24nozzle we felt we had corrected the
1:38:27problem with the nozzle because we all
1:38:28subsequent flights had the 200 psi leak
1:38:31check so that we could not miss a
1:38:34possible defective seal or contamination
1:38:36that may have prevented that seal from
1:38:38seeding in the first place but that was
1:38:41some of the background that I think
1:38:42really turned up the game on the hole
1:38:45seal issue from about April Riddhi and
1:38:49June on prior to that time we were doing
1:38:52a lot of work to better understand this
1:38:54this rotation business and all but we
1:38:57have done a tremendous amount of work in
1:38:59fact you may have read in the press and
1:39:03it's true that we actually had
1:39:05went to a SAE conference last fall a
1:39:08couple of our top engineers went there
1:39:10to try to get help from the wholesale
1:39:12industry in the SAE about field joint is
1:39:17there a better way to seal that joint is
1:39:18there a society of automotive engineers
1:39:21and we did a lot of work to try to get
1:39:28help from the outside as well as do the
1:39:30work we had inside it I think that's all
1:39:33relevant to the discussion about the top
1:39:37people and the decision making process
1:39:39didn't know about this at all didn't
1:39:42know about the CIL or the criticality
1:39:44minor the whole thing that concern on
1:39:47your part or the part of it by calls
1:39:49engineers that the original decision had
1:39:52been not to launch though that I was
1:39:55that on very surprised of that I could
1:39:57hardly believe that I the issue is so
1:40:00controversial I thought that I'm sure
1:40:02that they were aware that I about time
1:40:04believing they did in talking about
1:40:11criticality one going to 1r I think you
1:40:16made the comment that you'd have to have
1:40:17all the tolerances going in the wrong
1:40:19direction to meet that condition but you
1:40:21did say that one unit did meet that
1:40:23condition yes best of my knowledge and I
1:40:26had some record search done that I was
1:40:29told that there was a condition in the
1:40:32thankless forward field joint of the SDS
1:40:36for some place that was in that
1:40:38condition what if that block had been
1:40:41done at a cold temperature wouldn't it
1:40:42have maybe taken it over the edge I
1:40:45don't know it's possible I certainly
1:40:50don't feel good about that but
1:40:52it's the the reason I ask the question
1:40:54it's it seemed to me that if it was
1:40:56critical at the one item then everybody
1:40:59should treat it as criticality one and
1:41:01not rationalized that it may not ever
1:41:04happen well I agree with that everybody
1:41:08else agrees with that well I think yes
1:41:11our engineering people agree to that and
1:41:12that's why the recommendation who had
1:41:14made originally this was the basis for
1:41:17that recommendation we felt that we had
1:41:22observed a condition a year earlier that
1:41:24we did feel was attributed to
1:41:26temperature in some way or another and
1:41:28it was not a good condition that we
1:41:29didn't want to go much beyond that
1:41:32because even though that one was
1:41:34successful certainly wasn't a good
1:41:36condition that NASA's was at NASA or a
1:41:42thiokol that originally initiated the
1:41:45change from criticality one art a
1:41:48criticality one for the primary over
1:41:52well I have to tell you based on what I
1:41:55was told because I wasn't involved in
1:41:57that change but I was told that that was
1:41:59a NASA initiated but what experience led
1:42:03to that change do you know I'm not sure
1:42:08of what experience led to the change I
1:42:10presume it was the understanding from
1:42:13the joint rotation data and the drawing
1:42:18tolerances of all these parts that that
1:42:20condition could exist someplace in the
1:42:23hardware and therefore we were going to
1:42:25fly the hardware as it was designed that
1:42:28either through refurbishment or new
1:42:31hardware that was within those storage
1:42:32may be matched together sometime to give
1:42:34us a condition like that but I I think
1:42:36you'd have to ask the people that were
1:42:37involved in that particular station how
1:42:40do you account for what appears to be
1:42:42the fact that between December 82 and
1:42:46the middle of 85 and Thiokol became
1:42:49concerned about the erosion of the blow
1:42:51by that flights did not occur seemingly
1:42:57during that time
1:42:59that led to the same concern I can't
1:43:04explain that I certainly didn't know
1:43:06about it until August 8th I don't know I
1:43:09think that everyone was concerned at
1:43:12least from the standpoint that we always
1:43:13had to present data on the joints that
1:43:17we were mating the show we had adequate
1:43:19squeeze and all you know that data was
1:43:23presented and I'm sure people are
1:43:24concerned about that if there's no other
1:43:29questions we'll have a 10-minute recess
1:43:36there it is
1:43:37I don't really have any sort of sage
1:43:40follow-up to MacDonald's testimony other
1:43:42than to say that I found it to be pretty
1:43:44remarkable it seems to me that it's
1:43:46about as close as we can ever get to a
1:43:48proper recording of the actual
1:43:50teleconference the night before
1:43:51challengers launch is it possible that
1:43:54McDonald is embellishing points or
1:43:56omitting data that makes him look bad of
1:43:58course and he'd have plenty incentive to
1:44:00do so but based on the testimony of
1:44:03others notes he took at the time and
1:44:05crossed checks with other documents and
1:44:07what actually happened I think he's
1:44:09telling the truth if you'd like to hear
1:44:11more from Alan McDonald he wrote a great
1:44:13book called truth lies and or ings which
1:44:16I found particularly useful for learning
1:44:18more about the teleconference itself as
1:44:20well as what life was like at Morton
1:44:22Thiokol leading up to the accident so if
1:44:24this giant episode wasn't enough now you
1:44:27know where to find more ad astra catch
1:44:30you on the next pass
1:44:34[Music]
1:44:40you

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