Strafrecht AT Teil 7 (Notwehr, Notstand) — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:01So, welcome, ladies and gentlemen, to
- 0:03the Criminal Law General Part lecture.
- 0:06I would like to make one brief note. Um
- 0:09, in case you ever want to experience
- 0:11or listen to a different kind of
- 0:13criminal law lecture. I just saw,
- 0:17perhaps you occasionally follow the
- 0:19news on LTO, that our colleagues Satz
- 0:22and Kuttlich have made their lectures
- 0:24available online for free as podcasts.
- 0:28So, if you want to take a listen, I am
- 0:30convinced that both colleagues deliver
- 0:32excellent lectures. I have heard them
- 0:35both multiple times, and Kuttlich in
- 0:36particular is certainly always worth
- 0:38listening to. He is also, at least as
- 0:40far as I see it, often very, very funny
- 0:42, very witty, and conveys a great deal
- 0:44in the process. Right, let's continue.
- 0:49Last time, we dealt with self-defense.
- 0:52I’ll just briefly remind you: we
- 0:55established that Section 32 of the
- 0:57German Criminal Code requires us to be
- 0:59in a situation of self-defense, and a
- 1:02self-defense situation requires an
- 1:04imminent, unlawful attack. That is step
- 1:081 of the objective elements, you could
- 1:10say. Typically, it is better to speak
- 1:13of objective prerequisites to avoid
- 1:15confusion with the elements of a
- 1:17criminal offense. So, the objective
- 1:20prerequisites for the right to
- 1:22self-defense are, on one hand, the
- 1:23imminent, unlawful attack as the
- 1:25situation of self-defense—or
- 1:27emergency assistance if you want to
- 1:29protect a third party—and then the
- 1:30act of self-defense or emergency
- 1:32assistance, which consists of a defense
- 1:34that is necessary. Necessity here means
- 1:39undertaking the action that reliably,
- 1:42immediately, and definitively wards off
- 1:45the attack, or could at least reliably,
- 1:47immediately, and definitively ward off
- 1:50the attack. If you naturally only have
- 1:53less effective means at your disposal,
- 1:55you are allowed to use those as well.
- 1:58This means that if you are facing three
- 2:01attackers and you believe you might be
- 2:03able to prevent some harm by injuring
- 2:05one of the attackers, or by delaying
- 2:07the whole thing, and you believe that
- 2:09although you cannot effectively fend
- 2:11off the attack, you are still allowed
- 2:13to defend yourself. So, anything that
- 2:16might possibly have a prospect of
- 2:18success. Um, and it is important that
- 2:24among these defensive actions, the one
- 2:27must be chosen that is the mildest
- 2:30among those options that are equally
- 2:32effective. This means, however—and I
- 2:36emphasized this last time, and you will
- 2:39find it emphasized again and again in
- 2:41case law—that you do not have to take
- 2:43any risks as a defender. You are
- 2:45allowed to choose the means that
- 2:46reliably, immediately, and definitively
- 2:49wards off the attack. And that can lead
- 2:51to us regarding even the most severe
- 2:53defensive options—in the sense of
- 2:55defensive options with the most severe
- 2:57consequences or most serious injuries
- 2:59to the attacker—as fundamentally
- 3:01necessary. And because of this
- 3:05fundamental necessity for even the most
- 3:07severe acts of defense, we must ask
- 3:09ourselves whether we need to impose
- 3:12restrictions in extreme cases. I
- 3:16recommended that after you have
- 3:18examined the necessity of the defensive
- 3:20action, you should then address the
- 3:22intent to defend and subsequently ask
- 3:25yourself: what about a normative
- 3:27correction, a so-called socio-ethical
- 3:29restriction of the right to
- 3:30self-defense? As we saw last time,
- 3:35self-defense under Section 32 is based
- 3:37on a different foundation than, for
- 3:39example, Section 34 and the state of
- 3:41necessity. It is not based solely on
- 3:44the idea that the overriding interest
- 3:47must be protected—meaning that one
- 3:49protects legal interests and says, to
- 3:52put it bluntly, I am trying to protect
- 3:54a legal interest worth 1,000 euros in
- 3:56property and, in doing so, I destroy a
- 3:59legal interest worth 50 euros. Well,
- 4:02then anyone can calculate which one is
- 4:03significantly overriding. Then it
- 4:06should be relatively clear what needs
- 4:07to be protected when it comes to
- 4:08material assets. But self-defense is
- 4:11not based solely on that, nor can it be
- 4:13reduced to that alone, because we have,
- 4:15on the one hand, the defense of legal
- 4:17interests and, on the other hand, the
- 4:19defense of the legal order. That is the
- 4:21prevailing view. There are also views
- 4:23that say only one or the other is
- 4:25relevant. However, I am presenting to
- 4:28you the dualistic view that is decisive
- 4:32for the exam. There are also
- 4:34mono-causal explanations for
- 4:36self-defense, so to speak. So, some say
- 4:40only one or the other is relevant. This
- 4:45defense of the legal order is often
- 4:48problematic in that it is not very
- 4:52meaningful. I already said last time
- 4:54that self-defense is required when the
- 4:56legal order needs it for its own
- 4:57defense. That is the standard phrase.
- 4:59But that tells us absolutely nothing.
- 5:01When does the legal order actually
- 5:03require special defense? We will look
- 5:07at that on a case-by-case basis here.
- 5:10What is important to me is what you
- 5:11should keep in the back of your mind
- 5:13for the exam. Always consider whether
- 5:16you might need to apply a restriction
- 5:19to self-defense. If you say that one of
- 5:22the two pillars is not quite right here
- 5:25, so to speak. One of the two pillars
- 5:27is not holding up. Either, for example,
- 5:29because the defender is protecting
- 5:31legal interests even though they caused
- 5:33the danger themselves, consciously
- 5:35caused it. Why should one give someone
- 5:38the opportunity to cause harm to
- 5:40another if I am actually responsible
- 5:43myself for the fact that this danger
- 5:45threatens me at all? And the other
- 5:50aspect is the question of what happens
- 5:53if the legal order does not want to be
- 5:56defended in such a way using a
- 5:58dangerous means of defense. We already
- 6:02saw this in our example case, an
- 6:04ancient Imperial Court case, where
- 6:07someone shoots at fleeing fruit thieves
- 6:09and seriously injures one of them. And
- 6:12you would have to say that shooting
- 6:15someone in the leg over a basket of
- 6:17plums is disproportionate. It is, we
- 6:19are talking about a blatant
- 6:21disproportion here. It is
- 6:23disproportionate in the sense that you
- 6:26ask, does our legal system, which
- 6:29prides itself so much on the principle
- 6:32of proportionality, really want to be
- 6:36defended by inflicting a serious injury
- 6:39just to protect a minor legal interest,
- 6:42a low-value legal interest? Well, I
- 6:46don't have current prices for a basket
- 6:48of fruit in my head, but let's assume
- 6:50it's 10 kg of plums and each kilo costs
- 6:53—I have no idea what they cost right
- 6:55now—3 euros. Then that's 30 euros we
- 6:58are talking about here. 30 euros is a
- 7:00value where, in the case of theft under
- 7:02Section 248a of the Criminal Code, we
- 7:04would say it is so insignificant that
- 7:06anyone who has been stolen from can
- 7:08decide for themselves whether
- 7:09prosecution should be carried out or
- 7:11not. And then, at that point, to say,
- 7:14well, the legal system must also be
- 7:16defended with this dangerous means.
- 7:19That would be inconsistent in a way; it
- 7:21would be self-contradictory and hardly
- 7:23compatible with the principle of
- 7:25proportionality. So, you see, you can
- 7:29have weak points on either of these two
- 7:31sides, on either of these two pillars,
- 7:33and whenever you say, well, the legal
- 7:35system surely shouldn't be defended
- 7:37like that. Or when you say, it is
- 7:41actually not appropriate to defend the
- 7:44legal interests of the defender or a
- 7:46third party in this way, then you might
- 7:49say we potentially need to restrict
- 7:51self-defense. We had then considered
- 7:55the possibilities for such restrictions
- 7:57. In particular, we had also seen that,
- 8:00in principle, for Section 32
- 8:04restrictions that the wording does not
- 8:06provide for are not permissible.
- 8:08Article 103 of the Basic Law and
- 8:10Section 1 of the Criminal Code apply.
- 8:14You must apply the right of
- 8:15self-defense exactly as it is written
- 8:17in the law. And if that leads to the
- 8:20right of self-defense going very far
- 8:23and possibly even producing results
- 8:25that we would say seem unjust, then
- 8:28that must generally be accepted because
- 8:30the wording of the law is as it is. So
- 8:34if you look at Section 1 of the
- 8:37Criminal Code, which is identical in
- 8:40wording to Article 103 and thus has
- 8:43constitutional rank, an act can only be
- 8:48punished if its criminality was legally
- 8:50determined before the act was committed
- 8:52. And these requirements for grounds of
- 8:55justification are part of what is
- 8:57legally determined. That means, when
- 9:01you look at Paragraph 1 or Article 103
- 9:042 of the Basic Law, you must not only
- 9:08ask what Paragraph 211, 212, 303, or
- 9:11223 determine, but you must also read
- 9:14in all these provisions regarding
- 9:17justification, arrest rights, and so on
- 9:21. And that is why you cannot simply say
- 9:24, "Well, basically this is a case of
- 9:26justification, but it would lead to an
- 9:28inappropriate result here, so I won't
- 9:30apply it." You must solve this through
- 9:33the wording, and that is typically done
- 9:35via the word "necessitated"(geboten) in
- 9:37Paragraph 32, Subsection 1. So, one
- 9:40says that Section 32 states: "Anyone
- 9:42who commits an act that is necessitated
- 9:45by self-defense does not act unlawfully
- 9:47." And then you go a step further and
- 9:49say that what constitutes self-defense
- 9:51is in Paragraph 32, Subsection 2. Is
- 9:53self-defense. And regarding the feature
- 9:57of necessity (Gebotenheit), which
- 9:59Paragraph 32, Subsection 1 stipulates,
- 10:01the prevailing opinion interprets this,
- 10:03which you see here, and says Defense of
- 10:07legal interests, defense of the legal
- 10:09order. That is what ultimately
- 10:10constitutes necessity. If weaknesses
- 10:13arise in one of these two pillars, then
- 10:16it may be that the self-defense is not
- 10:19necessitated, even though the
- 10:21requirements of 32, Subsection 2 are
- 10:23applicable. We had dealt with the
- 10:28question of attacks by visibly culpable
- 10:32persons. The prevailing opinion says
- 10:34that if someone is visibly culpable,
- 10:36then they must be treated with
- 10:37consideration. And the reasoning can be
- 10:39given quite formally by saying that
- 10:41someone who is incapable of guilt will
- 10:43not be punished. They cannot be
- 10:45punished. One could also say that they
- 10:48cannot help being an attacker. And if
- 10:50they cannot help it, then the legal
- 10:52system does not judge them, almost
- 10:55literally, as harshly as it does
- 10:57someone who carries out an attack in a
- 11:00targeted, intentional, and unlawful
- 11:02manner without being innocent. We also
- 11:07spoke about trivial attacks and defense
- 11:08against mischief. In the vast majority
- 11:11of cases, we do not even have an attack
- 11:13to begin with, and that is why we
- 11:14usually do not get that far. So, in
- 11:17this case of shining a light, I would
- 11:19already say at the objective level,
- 11:20regarding the objective requirements of
- 11:22self-defense, that it is not an attack
- 11:24at all. If you say it is an attack to
- 11:27shine a light on someone else because
- 11:30their physical integrity is briefly
- 11:32impaired, one could certainly say that
- 11:34at that point, the attack is so minor,
- 11:37so lacking in impact, that one cannot
- 11:39exercise a full right of self-defense.
- 11:44That is as far as we got last time. Now
- 11:47we will deal with close personal
- 11:49relationships. As I mentioned last time
- 11:52, typically, in these cases of close
- 11:55personal ties, the constellations
- 11:57judged or assessed by the courts
- 11:59involved the abusive husband coming
- 12:02home. In legal precedent, it was always
- 12:05the abusive husband. Whether abusive
- 12:07wives don't exist or didn't exist, I
- 12:09highly doubt that, but those cases
- 12:10simply did not become known to the
- 12:12courts. So, the abusive husband comes
- 12:16home and, um, beats his wife for the
- 12:18tenth time because he is completely
- 12:20drunk, and eventually, um, she says, I
- 12:22won't put up with this anymore, and
- 12:24pulls out a knife, threatening him two
- 12:27or three times: if you hit me again,
- 12:29I'll stab you. And then it actually
- 12:33comes to the point where she, um,
- 12:34carries out an action that, based on
- 12:36what we have said so far about attack,
- 12:38about the self-defense situation and
- 12:40the act of self-defense, the intent to
- 12:42defend, is purely and simply
- 12:44self-defense. And then the question was
- 12:48raised: do we perhaps have to say that
- 12:50such a defense is nevertheless not
- 12:53required, because—well, because that
- 12:56is the decisive question—why should
- 12:58this self-defense not be required? And
- 13:02for a while, legal precedent said: we
- 13:06will ultimately refer to Section 13.
- 13:11Whoever fails to prevent a result that
- 13:13is part of the elements of a criminal
- 13:15statute is only punishable under this
- 13:17law if they are legally responsible for
- 13:20ensuring that the result does not occur
- 13:22. Now you might ask, what does that
- 13:24have to do with this? Section 13
- 13:26describes what we call a guarantor duty
- 13:30. So, Section 13 says: "In certain
- 13:33cases, I am not only responsible for
- 13:36not actively harming anyone, but I must
- 13:39also, if someone is threatened with
- 13:41harm, do everything possible to ensure
- 13:44that this harm does not occur." The
- 13:47simplest case is a child falling into a
- 13:49pond and the father standing nearby; he
- 13:51is, of course, obligated to save the
- 13:54child and prevent the child from
- 13:55drowning. This naturally applies just
- 13:58as much to the mother, the kindergarten
- 14:00teacher, the elementary school teacher,
- 14:02or whoever else has specifically taken
- 14:04on these duties in a concrete case.
- 14:07This also applies, of course, if you
- 14:09are out with a hiking group, you are a
- 14:11mountain guide—assume you are on a
- 14:13glacier somewhere, as long as that is
- 14:15still possible. And, um, then someone
- 14:18slips, one of the fellow hikers, and
- 14:20the mountain guide says: "Well, it's
- 14:23your own fault.""Um, there you see now,
- 14:26you didn't listen three times when I
- 14:28said don't step there; bad luck." That
- 14:31would of course be a case where, if the
- 14:33mountain guide does not help and an
- 14:35injury occurs, then he would be
- 14:36responsible for that injury. He would
- 14:39be punished as if he had pushed him
- 14:41himself. In principle. And let's take
- 14:46parents and children or spouses as well
- 14:49, so if they are married, engaged, or
- 14:51living in a permanent partnership, then
- 14:54you would probably have to affirm that
- 14:57as well. If you then find your partner
- 15:00lying on the floor because they had a
- 15:02stroke and you say, well, tough luck,
- 15:05then you would possibly be liable for
- 15:07prosecution for an omission, not just
- 15:09for failure to provide assistance, but
- 15:11possibly even for murder by omission.
- 15:14That comes into consideration if you
- 15:15say: "Yes, now I finally inherit," then
- 15:17you would even be guilty of murder by
- 15:19omission and could therefore even be
- 15:20sentenced to life imprisonment. And now
- 15:24the case law says, hence the premise,
- 15:26if someone is responsible for ensuring
- 15:29that a certain result does not occur,
- 15:31the wife must protect her husband from
- 15:34taking harm, from suffering physical
- 15:36harm, then it would be contradictory if
- 15:39she were allowed to stab here. That
- 15:43sounds quite plausible at first. But
- 15:46what one must consider, is that this
- 15:52approach, that the wife must protect
- 15:55her husband from harm if he becomes ill
- 15:58or has an injury, has an accident, and
- 16:00so on. That the whole thing is based on
- 16:04the fact that a relationship of trust
- 16:06exists between the two, so that he can
- 16:09justifiably rely on her helping him if
- 16:11he gets into such an emergency
- 16:14situation. And there, one will rightly
- 16:17hardly be able to assume that anymore,
- 16:19at least in a broken marriage. So, if
- 16:22he then says: "Yes, I am allowed to
- 16:24beat you, but you, I then expect that
- 16:27you will help me if I then suffer an
- 16:29injury." That does not sound very
- 16:31convincing. And that is why case law in
- 16:34more recent times also says, well, if
- 16:36the abusive husband is then stabbed in
- 16:38self-defense, then that has nothing
- 16:40more to do with socio-ethical
- 16:41restrictions. There, it is no longer
- 16:44restricted, then in the end he just had
- 16:46bad luck. For quite a long time, it was
- 16:49always expected of the wife that she
- 16:50would accept minor injuries. At least
- 16:53that is something we have moved away
- 16:55from now, I think fortunately, and say,
- 16:58well, whoever is beating here, and at
- 17:00least when it is not the first time it
- 17:02happens, cannot rely on being saved and
- 17:05protected anymore and is just out of
- 17:07luck. The situation is a bit different.
- 17:12This is about mothers and children, or
- 17:15a mother and in this case, um, the son.
- 17:19You can't just say, yes, this um
- 17:22relationship, uh, that can also be
- 17:24dissolved. I mean, a marriage can be
- 17:26divorced. The relationship between
- 17:28parents and children cannot be divorced
- 17:29. And it's not entirely unproblematic;
- 17:31how do you deal with such cases? T is
- 17:34the mother of 17-year-old O. Because of
- 17:36O's poor school performance, the two
- 17:38have frequently had verbal arguments.
- 17:40When T makes reproaches to O once again
- 17:43, O gives her a not very violent, but
- 17:45still painful slap in the face. T then
- 17:47grabs a large meat knife lying on the
- 17:49countertop and threatens O that she
- 17:50will stab him if he raises his hand
- 17:52against her again. O raises his hand
- 17:55for another strike to hit her. T stabs
- 17:57O in the stomach area and causes
- 17:59injuries from which O dies. And these
- 18:03cases are unfortunately not entirely,
- 18:06uh, pulled out of thin air, but
- 18:07actually, of course, not regular, but
- 18:10they do indeed occur. And the question
- 18:14here is: does T still have the duty to
- 18:17show consideration at this moment
- 18:19because it is her son, because she is
- 18:22obligated to show consideration for him
- 18:24, to protect him from dangers, to
- 18:27protect him from physical harm? And
- 18:30that will probably still be affirmed in
- 18:32this case. One can certainly have
- 18:34doubts there, too, of course. You could
- 18:36also say the guarantor duty, this right
- 18:39to trust that O is protected, that is
- 18:41extinguished the moment he raises his
- 18:44hand against his mother; one can
- 18:46certainly argue that. But I believe, I
- 18:48am relatively sure, that the Federal
- 18:49Court of Justice would assume a
- 18:51limitation of the right of self-defense
- 18:52here. So please discuss it in the exam
- 18:56if you have a case where a guarantor
- 18:59exercises self-defense with full force
- 19:02against the person for whose physical
- 19:05integrity, etc., they are a guarantor.
- 19:10The gross disproportion, we have
- 19:12discussed that before. These are also,
- 19:15unfortunately, cases that, as I said
- 19:16last time, are not entirely excluded.
- 19:19The neighbor N of T is a barbecue
- 19:20enthusiast and indulges in his hobby
- 19:22every evening in the summer. For this,
- 19:25N always invites guests. There is then
- 19:26shouting and rowdiness until late at
- 19:28night. Because of the heat, T does not
- 19:29want to close his apartment windows at
- 19:31night. Having already called the police
- 19:33several times, but they no longer come,
- 19:35T shouts over to N that he will end the
- 19:37barbecue with a rifle. This statement
- 19:40is met with laughter. The same applies
- 19:42to a warning shot that T fires.
- 19:43Therefore, T shoots N in the leg with a
- 19:46rifle. And one would have to say, um,
- 19:51that the prohibition of excess, the
- 19:53concept of excess, is relevant here.
- 19:56The legal order can hardly intend for
- 19:58severe damage to a legal interest to be
- 20:00caused in order to avert entirely
- 20:02insignificant harm. I still see it that
- 20:05way, even though we have neighbors who
- 20:07grill every night, although fortunately
- 20:09there isn't rowdy shouting every night.
- 20:13Um, but I think if you've barely slept
- 20:14three or four times at night because a
- 20:16party was going on until 4 a.m. and you
- 20:18weren't part of it, um, then you
- 20:20certainly have some understanding for
- 20:22why someone would react with resentment
- 20:24. You still have to restrain yourself;
- 20:26you simply cannot invoke self-defense
- 20:28there. Let’s move on to the cases
- 20:35that repeatedly cause problems in bar
- 20:37exams: self-defense provocations. And
- 20:41that is the umbrella term for all cases
- 20:43in which the self-defense was in some
- 20:45way co-triggered by the person who
- 20:47later defends themselves, and
- 20:49specifically, culpably co-triggered. T
- 20:55had started a brawl in a pub and then
- 20:58went home. There, he was visited by the
- 21:00landlord W, who wanted to question him
- 21:02about the sequence of events of the
- 21:04beating—the brawl, that is. After T
- 21:06had described the events to him, W
- 21:08explained that the other guests had
- 21:10blamed T for the incident. Thereupon, T
- 21:13went back to the pub. Once there, T was
- 21:15attacked from behind by O, who slammed
- 21:18him against a wall. T then stabbed O
- 21:20down with a knife. This is also a
- 21:23Federal Court of Justice decision that
- 21:24we are dealing with here. And the
- 21:26question is: How do we evaluate the
- 21:29fact that T was involved in a brawl at
- 21:32the inn and then heard that everyone
- 21:34else claimed it was his fault, and then
- 21:37he goes back, probably even with the
- 21:39intention: "I’ll clear this up now,
- 21:42I’ll show them." And what happens?
- 21:47What happens is that one might say,
- 21:49what had to happen, it comes to another
- 21:50brawl, and he even brought a knife
- 21:52along. Now we can discuss why he took
- 21:55the knife, does he always have it with
- 21:56him, or did he take it to be able to
- 21:58defend himself if necessary. The
- 22:00question is to what extent the concept
- 22:02of abuse applies here. Whoever has
- 22:04culpably brought about an attack on the
- 22:06legal order should not be allowed to
- 22:09invoke the defense of the legal order.
- 22:11It is then quite understandable if you
- 22:16say he is going back to stir things up
- 22:20again and then he is attacked. You
- 22:24could say he intentionally and
- 22:25consciously—whether on purpose or at
- 22:27least premeditated—did so with the
- 22:29certain knowledge that he would then
- 22:31have to defend himself. He had provoked
- 22:33this situation. Um, the problem is,
- 22:38what about cases where I say, well, I
- 22:40know something could happen, I could be
- 22:42attacked again. I'm preparing for that
- 22:46eventuality, but we can also consider,
- 22:49is that enough to say it’s abusive?
- 22:52Um, the concept of consent also always
- 22:55plays a role. I don't find it very
- 22:58convincing to say that someone goes
- 22:59back with the desire to get punched in
- 23:02the face. I don't think that's very
- 23:05likely. So, with cases of provocation,
- 23:08we really have to look at how far these
- 23:11ideas go, the concept of abuse for
- 23:13example, so you have to differentiate
- 23:16very carefully. One must particularly
- 23:19say that if behavior is socially
- 23:21acceptable, it can hardly lead to the
- 23:23loss of the right to self-defense. So,
- 23:26just imagine, I don't know what the
- 23:30conditions are like around here, but
- 23:33imagine you walk into a Dortmund pub
- 23:35after a Dortmund versus Schalke game
- 23:38wearing a Schalke jersey. And then you
- 23:42behave a little loudly there. You would
- 23:46say that is still socially acceptable.
- 23:48If you are then attacked, you would
- 23:50have to say that is not a socially
- 23:52unacceptable provocation. Then you have
- 23:54the full right to self-defense. If, of
- 23:56course, you then start making insulting
- 23:58remarks about Schalke fans or Dortmund
- 24:00fans, then it might eventually tip over
- 24:02into something that is considered
- 24:04socially unacceptable. You also have to
- 24:06take the respective environment into
- 24:07account, what is acceptable there and
- 24:08what is no longer acceptable. And then
- 24:11at some point it can tip over so that
- 24:13you are dealing with the concept of
- 24:15abuse. But one thing is clear, let's
- 24:19assume someone threatens you. "If you
- 24:22show up here again, you'll get beaten
- 24:25up," and there's no reason why you
- 24:27shouldn't return to your favorite
- 24:29theater or your favorite café. You're
- 24:32just going there to have your coffee,
- 24:34no one can forbid you from doing that,
- 24:36and that is socially acceptable, so
- 24:38there's no reason to say there would be
- 24:39a restriction, meaning the right to
- 24:41self-defense would be restricted here.
- 24:44This means that the abuse, this concept
- 24:46of abuse, always relies on, always
- 24:48presupposes, that someone is behaving
- 24:50in a socially unacceptable way. And
- 24:54that can really only begin, well, when
- 24:57you purposefully bring about an attack
- 24:59—which you then want to defend
- 25:01yourself against—that is to say,
- 25:04provoke it, target it specifically, or
- 25:06at least perform an action that is
- 25:08unlawful or in some way impairs the
- 25:11other person and could therefore lead
- 25:13to this behavior. There is a strong
- 25:17view in legal literature that argues
- 25:19provocation of self-defense never leads
- 25:22to restrictions on the right to
- 25:23self-defense. For the simple reason
- 25:26that, well, everyone has to keep
- 25:28themselves in check, and if you provoke
- 25:30someone, it may be that you make
- 25:31yourself liable for insult. But if the
- 25:34other person then attacks you, that is
- 25:37their decision, their deliberate
- 25:39decision to attack you, and they would
- 25:41be punished accordingly if they do
- 25:43attack you. And why should the interest
- 25:46in upholding the rule of law be
- 25:47diminished in any way there? So, it is
- 25:50highly controversial. The prevailing
- 25:53view assumes that there are
- 25:55restrictions. Um, what would be
- 25:59important to me in this context is the
- 26:02following. In the vast majority of
- 26:05cases in exams, these restrictions on
- 26:07self-defense hardly lead to a different
- 26:10result. We will see why in a moment.
- 26:13What is the consequence of us saying
- 26:15that we must restrict self-defense? I
- 26:17already told you last time, the
- 26:19consequence can in no way be that
- 26:21someone, because they provoked the
- 26:23attack, because they are dealing with
- 26:25someone lacking capacity, um, because
- 26:27they are a guarantor, has to let
- 26:29themselves be beaten up, seriously
- 26:30injured, or even killed. That means a
- 26:34total loss of the right to self-defense
- 26:36should only very rarely be considered,
- 26:38only in cases of very light, minor
- 26:40attacks. Therefore, only a restriction
- 26:42of the right to self-defense is ever
- 26:44considered. In cases where we are
- 26:50dealing with an abuse of rights,
- 26:53perhaps, one will have to say that I
- 26:55must accept certain restrictions. I may
- 26:59also have to refrain from immediate
- 27:03aggressive defense at first. We have a
- 27:06restriction, we have a, a
- 27:08classification. Evasion is clear.
- 27:11Evasion means you remove yourself from
- 27:12the attack. We learned that this is not
- 27:14a defense, but it is still possibly
- 27:16reasonable to expect. Then we speak of
- 27:19defensive shielding. So, if you only
- 27:22engage in, for example, um, light
- 27:24resistance, if you only protect
- 27:26yourself with your arms against blows
- 27:29or similar, I would simply describe
- 27:31that as non-aggressive defense. And
- 27:35only in the last step, so when you act
- 27:37aggressively against the attacker, then
- 27:39we are in the so-called area of active
- 27:41defense. So, the term "active defense"
- 27:45appears here. Uh, is, I believe, a very
- 27:48antiquated, uh, term. You may have
- 27:51heard this before: when a castle was
- 27:52built in the Middle Ages and another
- 27:54castle was built on the other side of
- 27:55the mountain for defense, they were
- 27:57called "Trutzburgen" or defensive
- 27:58strongholds. Um, so here it’s about
- 28:02this being an aggressive measure, this
- 28:05active defense. Um, so this is the view
- 28:08that states in the cases we saw earlier
- 28:12, case groups 1 through 4, so to speak.
- 28:15That means, um, the case group except
- 28:19...Looking back, except for this
- 28:24provocation of self-defense, the
- 28:27prevailing opinion assumes that one
- 28:29must not immediately strike back, but
- 28:32rather restraint is required first. The
- 28:36prevailing view—it is also sufficient
- 28:38in my opinion if you present this in
- 28:40your exam. The prevailing view, however
- 28:42, says we proceed according to a type
- 28:44of three-stage theory. You probably
- 28:46know the three-stage theory from
- 28:48constitutional law, uh, from the
- 28:49pharmacy ruling. Here it means
- 28:51something a little different. First,
- 28:54one must, if at all possible, flee or
- 28:57use an opportunity to evade. That is
- 28:59the first step. If that is not possible
- 29:02, then one must try to protect oneself.
- 29:05Where there is a big difference between
- 29:07evading and somehow protecting oneself,
- 29:09I honestly cannot explain to you
- 29:11precisely. Ultimately, that is not what
- 29:13matters. What is relevant here is that
- 29:17you may have to accept slight
- 29:19impairments. It does not mean, of
- 29:23course, that in the case of a knife
- 29:24attack you just hold up your arms and
- 29:26let them be cut up. It is also clear
- 29:28that this, uh, that this passive
- 29:30defense does not help you in that
- 29:31situation. And only in the third, in
- 29:35the third step, are we then allowed as
- 29:37defenders to resort to active defense.
- 29:41And I had already said, if necessary in
- 29:43an exceptional case, it may be that you
- 29:45have no right of self-defense at all,
- 29:47but only when it comes to minor
- 29:49infringements. So, if a nine-year-old
- 29:52keeps drumming on you with their flat
- 29:54hand, you may not at some point resort
- 29:56to self-defense—to active defense. Um
- 29:59, then you must simply live with it, or
- 30:02you must resort to milder measures.
- 30:05There was also a quite fascinating,
- 30:07some time ago, a long time ago, a quite
- 30:08fascinating decision on that. Um, when
- 30:11it is, um, permissible to react to
- 30:14children with active defense, and at
- 30:16some point, the limit is reached there
- 30:19as well. So you are of course not
- 30:22allowed to seriously injure the
- 30:23nine-year-old, that is also clear. But
- 30:25even then, it can certainly be possible
- 30:27within the framework of self-defense to
- 30:29give a child a slap or something
- 30:31similar. But you must first be unable
- 30:35to evade and have no other possibility
- 30:38at all, um, for a defense to somehow
- 30:41promise success. Regarding the fifth
- 30:46category, namely provocation, there are
- 30:48very different views held. You can find
- 30:51this in Hillenkamp Cornelius AT as the
- 30:53second problem. Um, specifically in
- 30:57cases of intentional provocation, one
- 30:59view says—as I already mentioned—
- 31:01that there are no restrictions at all
- 31:03on the right to self-defense, for the
- 31:06simple reason: everyone is responsible
- 31:08for their own behavior, and if you
- 31:10provoke someone, they eventually choose
- 31:12freely and responsibly to attack you,
- 31:15and that is then their problem, so to
- 31:17speak. And that is why, according to
- 31:21this view, which is for example
- 31:23represented by Matt in the ATL book, we
- 31:26have no restriction of the right to
- 31:28self-defense. The opposing view, the
- 31:32extreme opposing view, says there is no
- 31:34right to self-defense at all if the
- 31:36self-defense situation has been
- 31:38intentionally brought about. So, if I
- 31:42go and want to seriously injure or kill
- 31:44someone under the guise of the right to
- 31:46self-defense, I provoke them until they
- 31:48strike, and I am armed and take
- 31:50advantage of that. In that case, this
- 31:53opposing view says there is no right to
- 31:54self-defense at all. And you can
- 31:57imagine that between these two extreme
- 31:59poles, we have the restriction of the
- 32:01right to self-defense according to the
- 32:03prevailing opinion, which assumes that
- 32:05we must restrict it here according to
- 32:06the three-stage theory. So much for
- 32:12intentional provocation. However, this
- 32:15applies, in particular this loss of the
- 32:17, this loss of the right to
- 32:18self-defense only applies, even
- 32:20according to this extreme view, if we
- 32:22are dealing with a targeted creation of
- 32:24the self-defense situation. Not if it
- 32:27was negligently provoked. So, you bring
- 32:30about a situation that could escalate.
- 32:33You have no interest in that. You don't
- 32:35want that at all. You might not have
- 32:37even thought about it. These cases are
- 32:38not what is meant. What is meant are
- 32:41the cases of intentional provocation
- 32:43where the defender intentionally
- 32:45creates the self-defense situation in
- 32:47order to be able to defend themselves
- 32:49—in quotation marks—under the guise
- 32:51of self-defense. The other cases, which
- 32:57I already hinted at, are socially
- 33:00inadequate provocations. So our
- 33:03defender, for example, provokes the
- 33:05attacker with insults and waits each
- 33:08time after every insult to see if
- 33:10something happens now. Otherwise, one
- 33:13would have to think about an attack on
- 33:15honor through insults and the immediacy
- 33:17of the attack. But he waits each time,
- 33:18"well, will something happen," and
- 33:20waits for the reaction. And with these
- 33:22socially inadequate provocations, um,
- 33:27there we are then possibly dealing with
- 33:29a restriction of the right to
- 33:30self-defense. But I just realize, while
- 33:33I'm thinking about it, if he is of
- 33:34course waiting for "will something
- 33:36finally happen so I can strike," then
- 33:37we are already in the first category.
- 33:40So, take the case where it’s simply
- 33:42about provocations, insults, that are
- 33:44just on the borderline where we have to
- 33:46say it is socially inadequate, but not
- 33:48yet an unlawful attack in the sense of
- 33:50self-defense. Um, the opposing view
- 33:55restricts the right of self-defense
- 33:57there, and then one would also have to
- 33:59say that this restriction, which is
- 34:01probably the prevailing opinion,
- 34:03follows this three-stage theory. With
- 34:07socially adequate provocations, it is
- 34:09clear that there is no restriction on
- 34:10the right of self-defense. Socially
- 34:12adequate action can never be an abuse.
- 34:15And that is why we do not get anywhere
- 34:16here with considerations of abuse. In
- 34:21the exam questions of the last few
- 34:24years, it was relatively common that
- 34:27there were cases of negligent
- 34:29provocation or negligently induced
- 34:32self-defense situations. But in the
- 34:35specific situation, it explicitly
- 34:37stated in the facts that there was no
- 34:39possibility to evade, and as a last
- 34:41resort, he then reached for a weapon.
- 34:44In these cases, you can briefly state
- 34:46that one could speak of a provocation
- 34:49of self-defense or a negligent
- 34:51causation of self-defense here, but
- 34:53even if we were to restrict
- 34:54self-defense here, it would not matter,
- 34:57because according to the three-stage
- 34:59theory, he could not evade. He no
- 35:02longer had the possibility of defensive
- 35:03protection. It was only about reactive
- 35:05defense, and he then only had this last
- 35:07resort. And no one has to let
- 35:09themselves be severely beaten up or
- 35:10mortally wounded. And that is why you
- 35:13then have no major problems at that
- 35:15point. You then do not need to decide
- 35:17the dispute. So, to repeat, you must [
- 35:19address] this dispute between the views
- 35:21, which, incidentally, are very diffuse
- 35:23and also have no clear criteria. You
- 35:27only have to decide the dispute if a
- 35:30restriction of the self-defense options
- 35:33is feasible at all, i.e., if our
- 35:36defender could evade. So, if the facts
- 35:40state that he could have easily evaded
- 35:42and you have a negligent causation of
- 35:44the self-defense situation, a
- 35:45provocation of the self-defense
- 35:46situation, then you must discuss the
- 35:48problem. If it says in the facts that
- 35:51he could not evade, he had no other
- 35:53option, then all of that becomes
- 35:55unnecessary. The only solution that
- 35:57would then say there is no right of
- 36:00self-defense, that would ultimately be
- 36:02the, um, the view that was once held by
- 36:05the Federal Court of Justice and also
- 36:08in a decision in the year 2001 um, was
- 36:12upheld. There, the Federal Court of
- 36:16Justice said the perpetrator is not
- 36:18responsible for the act he committed in
- 36:21self-defense, but he is ultimately
- 36:23responsible for the attack that was
- 36:25exerted upon him, so a kind of indirect
- 36:28perpetration constellation. Um, that is
- 36:32where the so-called actio libera in
- 36:35causa is spoken of. Only this solution
- 36:38is now to be considered outdated. As
- 36:41far as I can tell, it is no longer
- 36:42represented either. So the Federal
- 36:45Court of Justice took a detour to
- 36:47construct criminal liability, saying he
- 36:49is not responsible for the shot fired
- 36:51in self-defense, but for bringing about
- 36:54the self-defense situation, and thus
- 36:56not for intentional killing, but
- 36:58possibly for negligent homicide. That
- 37:01result is not at all convincing. The
- 37:03decision should be NJW 2001 1075 or
- 37:06something like that. Um, you can take a
- 37:09look at it, um, if that interests you.
- 37:20We are now looking at a special case
- 37:22that is certainly discussed in the
- 37:24literature. But it has not played a
- 37:28particular role in case law, as far as
- 37:31I know. In the European Charter for
- 37:39Human Rights, i.e., the ECHR, the
- 37:41European Convention for the Protection
- 37:43of Human Rights, Article 2 states that
- 37:45no one shall be deprived of their life
- 37:47intentionally, except by—and then
- 37:49things like death sentences and similar
- 37:51come up. Thankfully, that has become
- 37:54obsolete in the meantime, because even
- 37:56under the European Convention on Human
- 37:58Rights, the death penalty is prohibited
- 38:00by an additional protocol. Um, a
- 38:03killing is not considered a violation
- 38:05of this article. That is interesting
- 38:07for us now if it is caused by the use
- 38:10of force that is absolutely necessary
- 38:12to defend someone against unlawful
- 38:14danger. And the question now is, how do
- 38:19we deal with these types of cases? The
- 38:23question is, am I allowed to kill
- 38:26someone to protect, for example, my
- 38:28property or to protect my freedom? Or
- 38:33does Article 2 of the Human Rights
- 38:36Convention say that any defense of
- 38:38property through lethal self-defense is
- 38:41automatically prohibited? And that
- 38:44brings us to some aspects of
- 38:46international law that we must then
- 38:47look at, at least briefly. The first
- 38:51question is, does this regulation
- 38:54restrict the right to self-defense at
- 38:57all, because international law is
- 39:00fundamentally a yes, a field of law
- 39:04that is addressed to states, addressed
- 39:05to the contracting parties. Direct
- 39:08obligations do not arise from
- 39:09international law, at least according
- 39:12to conventional doctrine, for
- 39:14individuals. We have exceptions,
- 39:15especially in international criminal
- 39:17law. There are now penalties or
- 39:20criminal offenses that are also
- 39:22addressed to individuals, which also
- 39:24threaten individuals with punishment.
- 39:27But one could say that, in principle,
- 39:29international law and international
- 39:32treaties commit two or more states to a
- 39:34certain action or omission. And here,
- 39:38the Federal Republic of Germany has
- 39:41committed itself, through its signature
- 39:44or through its ratification and
- 39:46implementation of the European
- 39:48Convention on Human Rights, not to kill
- 39:51anyone intentionally, except in
- 39:53self-defense situations. The question
- 39:58is how far this applies to German law.
- 40:00And the point that is relevant here is
- 40:02the question of defending someone
- 40:04against unlawful violence. How is that
- 40:07to be understood? means defending
- 40:10someone, defending someone against
- 40:12unlawful violence, only attacks on the
- 40:15body, only attacks on one's own freedom
- 40:18, attacks on, um, sexual
- 40:20self-determination, do attacks on
- 40:23property also count? So, what is
- 40:27certain is that if someone attacks you
- 40:29and threatens to violate your highly
- 40:32personal legal interests, then this
- 40:34article does not apply. Then this
- 40:37exception from, um, Article 2, which
- 40:40states that a killing can indeed be
- 40:43permissible, does not apply. The
- 40:48question that arises at this point,
- 40:50however, is: is it unlawful violence
- 40:52against someone if you steal their car
- 40:54radio from their car? And there is much
- 40:58to be said for saying no, that is not
- 41:00unlawful violence against a person. And
- 41:03if you say this exception does not
- 41:06apply here, then you arrive at the
- 41:08problem of whether Article 2, Paragraph
- 41:122 potentially prohibits self-defense,
- 41:14lethal self-defense, in attacks on
- 41:17property. So the question then arises:
- 41:21this Article 2 plays a role when you
- 41:24have a situation of self-defense and
- 41:27the attack is directed against property
- 41:29, against possession, or against other
- 41:32non-highly personal legal interests,
- 41:35trespassing or whatever else might play
- 41:38a role there. And then you have to
- 41:42answer the question: what does it mean
- 41:43to defend someone against unlawful
- 41:45violence? Does the protection of
- 41:47property also belong to that? I would
- 41:49say rather no. But the opposite is, of
- 41:51course, defensible. The next point is
- 41:54then, um does this Article 2 even apply
- 41:59in the context of the right to
- 42:01self-defense, because it fundamentally
- 42:03does not bind the citizen, but rather
- 42:05binds the states. It only obligates the
- 42:08states. Why should it obligate the
- 42:10individual who is exercising
- 42:11self-defense? One can certainly argue
- 42:15against this, too, by saying it may not
- 42:17obligate the individual, but every
- 42:20national law must be interpreted in
- 42:22light of international law, in light of
- 42:24human rights. And that is why I must
- 42:28take this into account at this point in
- 42:29the interpretation. So I have to say,
- 42:32self-defense is not justified here. So,
- 42:37that would be this argument here; the
- 42:38prevailing opinion says the ECHR only
- 42:39concerns the legal relationship between
- 42:41states. That is fundamentally correct,
- 42:43but it does not change the fact that I
- 42:44must interpret all criminal law in
- 42:46light of human rights as well. The most
- 42:50effective argument at this point, in my
- 42:53view, I believe is this argument here,
- 42:56which states that in the cases where a
- 43:02restriction is made, we are dealing
- 43:04with intentional killings. In English,
- 43:08the term "intentionally" is used here,
- 43:11and "intentionnel" in French. This
- 43:15means, um, that we have to assume that
- 43:18at least cases in which a killing
- 43:21occurs with dolus eventualis are not
- 43:23covered by this exception at all, but
- 43:26only cases in which we are dealing with
- 43:29knowledge or intent. And in my view,
- 43:34that makes many things easier for you
- 43:35in your exams. Because when would a
- 43:40defender shoot at a thief stealing a
- 43:42car radio with the intent to kill him?
- 43:46Then we would already have to have
- 43:47doubts about the intent of self-defense
- 43:49. Because if he shoots to kill him,
- 43:50then in most cases the intent of
- 43:52self-defense would likely be missing.
- 43:53These are almost always cases of dolus
- 43:55eventualis. So, he shoots at him to
- 43:58stop him and anticipates that it might
- 44:00lead to death. Because of the word "
- 44:02absichtlich" or "intentionally" in
- 44:04English, one could hardly categorize
- 44:06these cases under these specific
- 44:08scenarios. Only in a case where our,
- 44:12well, where our defender tries to stop
- 44:15the car thief with a hand grenade and
- 44:17is certain it will definitely lead to
- 44:20death, then one could consider whether
- 44:22this restriction even becomes relevant.
- 44:27So, if you are dealing with a scenario
- 44:30in an exam where lethal self-defense is
- 44:34used to protect property. These are
- 44:37almost always cases involving property.
- 44:40Then you should address Article 2 of
- 44:42the ECHR. And indicate that you might
- 44:47say, well, whether it applies here is
- 44:49doubtful. On one hand, one could say
- 44:52that this is also a defense against the
- 44:54use of force. Furthermore, one could
- 44:57say the ECHR does not concern the
- 45:00relationship between citizens at all,
- 45:02but only between states. And finally,
- 45:05one could say that, based on the
- 45:07wording, it is not applicable if you
- 45:10are not dealing with intentional
- 45:11killing. In my view, you only run into
- 45:15difficulties with the ECHR if you are
- 45:17dealing with intentional or knowing
- 45:19killings. And then you would have to
- 45:22decide, and in my view, there is a lot
- 45:25to suggest that the right to
- 45:26self-defense must be restricted in
- 45:28light of the ECHR. Because you may know
- 45:34that international law from
- 45:35international treaties is integrated
- 45:38into German law with the rank of
- 45:40federal law. That means this, uh,
- 45:43Article 2 of the ECHR has the same rank
- 45:46as Section 32. So, you must then read
- 45:49it in conjunction with Section 32 of
- 45:50the German Criminal Code (StGB). And in
- 45:55that respect, we would have no problem
- 45:56with the prohibition of analogy or
- 45:58similar issues. But to repeat and
- 46:00clarify once more, in my view, the
- 46:02problem only arises if you have
- 46:04determined that we are dealing with a
- 46:06knowing or intentional killing here. If
- 46:11only self-defense is practiced with
- 46:13dolus eventualis, then the question
- 46:15does not even arise. At the very least,
- 46:18you can answer them relatively quickly
- 46:20with three arguments, uh, in that
- 46:21regard. Further literature on the
- 46:25restriction of self-defense. Um, I can
- 46:28only provide you with a few decisions
- 46:30that might be helpful there. I find it
- 46:32very exciting to read this decision by
- 46:34the Munich Regional Court. Um, NSZ 88.
- 46:39Um, and otherwise here, you also have
- 46:42the knee-shot case I mentioned, NJW
- 46:442001, page 1075; it was the subject of
- 46:47an exam a few years ago. That is also
- 46:50part of the standard repertoire that
- 46:52you should have read at least once. Um,
- 46:56furthermore, you can take a look—
- 46:58above all, I can of course recommend
- 47:01Hillenkamp for you to look into. All
- 47:03the views that are represented on this
- 47:05subject are presented there in
- 47:07particular. Good, let's look at another
- 47:11point, namely the question: what about
- 47:14self-defense by police officers? I had
- 47:16already touched on it. This also
- 47:21appears occasionally in exam papers. I
- 47:23have now taken this case from
- 47:26Hillenkamp, uh, 32 Problems of the
- 47:28General Part. Police officer P is
- 47:31surrounded by a group of bikers during
- 47:33a traffic stop, whose leader A demands
- 47:35that P undress for the amusement of
- 47:37those standing around. When P refuses,
- 47:40the bikers begin to forcibly undress
- 47:42him. Because he sees no other way to
- 47:44defend himself, he draws his service
- 47:45pistol and threatens the bikers with it
- 47:47. When they just laugh and keep tearing
- 47:50at his clothes, P shoots A to put an
- 47:52end to the incident. In doing so, he
- 47:54expects a fatal outcome. So, this isn't
- 47:57exactly the case from Hillenkamp, but
- 47:59you will find the presentation of the
- 48:01individual views there. And the
- 48:03question now is, um, whether we are
- 48:05dealing with a person in the police
- 48:07officer who enjoys the full right of
- 48:10self-defense, given that they are
- 48:12acting as a public servant and are
- 48:14bound by, uh, police law. And here,
- 48:19arguments vary on how to solve the
- 48:22problem. The purely public law theory
- 48:27assumes that the, um, police officer
- 48:29only has the rights that result from
- 48:32police law. I believe you will learn in
- 48:38detail later, um, what measures a
- 48:40police officer can take. But there, a
- 48:44fatal shot at a, at a citizen is, of
- 48:46course, only very, very, very
- 48:48restrictedly permissible, only when it
- 48:50comes to dangers to life and limb and
- 48:52the like. With this solution, one could
- 48:56certainly consider saying that he must
- 48:58let himself be forcibly undressed and
- 49:00not make use of his weapon. That would
- 49:02be the approach that this public law
- 49:04solution pursues. A limited public law
- 49:09theory would assume here that, while
- 49:13public law requirements are
- 49:15fundamentally relevant, when highly
- 49:18personal legal interests are at stake,
- 49:21self-defense can also be invoked. So,
- 49:26the police officer may—when it comes
- 49:29to life, limb, their personal freedom
- 49:33of movement, and the like—defend
- 49:35themselves using the means of
- 49:38self-defense. The mixed public-criminal
- 49:42law theory, well, it would ultimately
- 49:45say that they may, in effect, draw from
- 49:48both areas. They may do what they are
- 49:52allowed to do as a police officer,
- 49:54because they are acting as a police
- 49:56officer, and they also have the
- 49:58criminal law options they would have as
- 50:00a private citizen. So they are allowed
- 50:02to defend themselves as a citizen and
- 50:04take measures as a police officer. And
- 50:06then we have a whole range of
- 50:08differentiating theories that pursue
- 50:11various approaches and contain
- 50:13different combinations. I have not yet
- 50:16encountered this problem arising in an
- 50:19exam paper. What is important for you
- 50:22is to realize, okay, I am dealing with
- 50:24a public official, so restrictions
- 50:25might potentially come into play. It
- 50:30definitely becomes problematic when
- 50:32third parties are involved, so if the
- 50:34police officer is supposed to protect
- 50:36third parties, then there is really no
- 50:38reason anymore for any restrictions to
- 50:40be applied. here. That would naturally
- 50:42be the case if it were to actually
- 50:44reach a trial, and there you would
- 50:46simply have to consider which solution
- 50:48you find most plausible. And I must
- 50:50honestly say, I see no reason why a
- 50:52police officer should not be allowed to
- 50:55rely on the rights of self-defense
- 50:57available to every citizen. That the
- 50:59police officer is allowed to defend
- 51:01themselves less than a private citizen
- 51:02when it comes to their personal legal
- 51:04interests. That is not very convincing
- 51:06to me. Yes, go ahead. The question is
- 51:07whether one must proceed with more
- 51:09nuance regarding milder means. You
- 51:10naturally have to do that with a police
- 51:12officer anyway; if someone is trained,
- 51:14one expects a better risk assessment
- 51:16from them. They are also trained in
- 51:18close-quarters combat, after all. One
- 51:20expects them not to reach for their
- 51:21weapon, their firearm, immediately, but
- 51:23rather that they might potentially use
- 51:25other means. Whether one can then
- 51:27demand that they accept minor injuries,
- 51:29for example, is something that can be
- 51:30discussed. I would not assume so, but
- 51:32it is certainly a defensible position.
- 51:34And that is why you also see
- 51:35differentiating theories. Yes, that is
- 51:38where you can ask the question: what
- 51:39must I expect from you—or rather,
- 51:41what must I expect from the police
- 51:43officer? No one expects you to rattle
- 51:45off these theories in the exam, either.
- 51:48It is only crucial that you consider
- 51:50whether a police officer, who acts as a
- 51:53servant of the state and also
- 51:55represents state power, might be more
- 51:57strictly bound by the principle of
- 52:00proportionality. And I would simply say
- 52:04, as long as it concerns their own
- 52:05person, there is no reason why a police
- 52:07officer should have to tolerate more
- 52:09than any of the rest of us. When it
- 52:13comes to enforcing the protection of
- 52:15property, that is open for discussion,
- 52:17but regarding strictly personal legal
- 52:19interests, I would have reservations.
- 52:24In my view, because I also do not find
- 52:26the theories to be clearly
- 52:28distinguishable, it is only relevant
- 52:30that you recognize the problem and take
- 52:32this specific question into account.
- 52:36Does the fact that a police officer is
- 52:38both a police officer and a citizen
- 52:40change anything regarding their rights
- 52:42to self-defense? Well, the purely
- 52:46criminal law theory, which I had
- 52:47withheld from you, states as a result
- 52:49that Section 32 is applicable. Why
- 52:51should anything else be applicable? So,
- 52:54you must decide on this question: do I
- 52:57apply only public law, do I apply only
- 53:00criminal law, or do I mediate in a
- 53:02certain way? Any questions so far
- 53:08regarding self-defense? If any further
- 53:16questions arise, please do not hesitate
- 53:18to ask. We will now deal with Section
- 53:2334. We will therefore look at the
- 53:26emergency paragraph, which has been
- 53:29under discussion time and again. Most
- 53:35recently, as already mentioned,
- 53:37regarding the intense question of
- 53:39whether animal rights activists may
- 53:41enter animal barns to bring the
- 53:43conditions that sometimes prevail there
- 53:45to the public's attention. That was a
- 53:48big discussion. Section 34 is
- 53:51structured similarly to what we already
- 53:54saw with Section 32. I had already
- 53:56mentioned that to you. Objective
- 53:57elements, subjective elements. And here
- 54:00, too, we have a certain review of the
- 54:02whole matter afterward with an
- 54:04appropriateness clause. Who, in the
- 54:07face of an immediate, otherwise
- 54:09unavoidable danger to life, limb,
- 54:11liberty, honor, property, or another
- 54:13legal interest? Please take a look at
- 54:17this in comparison to Section 35. In
- 54:19Section 35, the excusing emergency, it
- 54:22states: whoever, in the face of an
- 54:24immediate, otherwise unavoidable danger
- 54:26—that is the same—to life, limb, or
- 54:28liberty, and that is where it stops,
- 54:30and it does not say "or another legal
- 54:32interest." So, very importantly, in
- 54:35Section 35, only life, limb, or liberty
- 54:37—and liberty here means physical
- 54:39freedom of movement—and nothing else.
- 54:42Only these three legal interests can be
- 54:44protected. In Section 34, it is all
- 54:46legal interests that are somehow
- 54:48conceivable. It therefore extends to
- 54:51the safety of road traffic, for example
- 54:53, if you take the keys away from
- 54:55someone who is completely drunk so that
- 54:57they do not drive a car while
- 54:58intoxicated. Anyone who, in the event
- 55:03of an imminent danger to life, limb,
- 55:05liberty, honor, property, or another
- 55:07legal interest that cannot be averted
- 55:09otherwise, commits an act to avert that
- 55:11danger from themselves or another—so
- 55:13to avert the danger from themselves or
- 55:15another, there we have that "in order
- 55:17to," that intent again—does not act
- 55:19unlawfully, meaning it is a
- 55:21justification, provided that upon
- 55:23weighing the conflicting interests,
- 55:25namely the legal interests affected and
- 55:27the degree of the danger threatening
- 55:29them, the protected interest
- 55:31substantially outweighs the one
- 55:33impaired. So, point 1: You need an
- 55:37imminent danger, which is averted by an
- 55:40action that then infringes upon legal
- 55:43interests. So, you do need an act as a
- 55:46starting point. And in weighing the
- 55:50protected legal interests against those
- 55:53infringed upon by the act, you must
- 55:56conclude that the preserved interests
- 55:58are of higher value, that they
- 56:01substantially outweigh the others. We
- 56:04will now look at the details. It is
- 56:07important that the wording "cannot be
- 56:09averted otherwise," so this phrase "
- 56:12cannot be averted otherwise," is
- 56:15understood to mean that the action
- 56:17taken must be the necessary action. So,
- 56:21a danger that cannot be averted
- 56:23otherwise means the action was the only
- 56:26solution to avert the danger. It must,
- 56:28therefore, be the necessary action.
- 56:31This does not result directly from the
- 56:33wording, but it is generally
- 56:34interpreted that way. And that then
- 56:36leads to the fact that we have a
- 56:40structure very similar to Section 32.
- 56:44The starting point here is that the
- 56:47legal interests of uninvolved parties
- 56:49are affected, not the legal interests
- 56:51of the aggressor. The justification,
- 56:55therefore, cannot lie in the
- 56:57affirmation of the law, but only in the
- 57:00protection of legal interests. Take our
- 57:03example again of breaking into the hut
- 57:06to get the lifebuoy out. The owner of
- 57:09the hut, who stores his lifebuoy there,
- 57:12has not done anything unlawful in any
- 57:14way. He has done nothing blameworthy;
- 57:16he did not cause the danger. And that
- 57:19is why one cannot say he must now
- 57:21endure special restrictions because he
- 57:23is at fault for something. The question
- 57:27here is solely: May I harm a completely
- 57:31uninvolved person to avoid greater harm
- 57:35? And this is not about the affirmation
- 57:38of the law. The aggressor, who is to be
- 57:41punished anyway, is not the one being
- 57:43harmed here; it is a third party. This
- 57:47could mean that one might simply um,
- 57:50break into their hut and take their
- 57:53lifebuoy. It could be breaking a car
- 57:56window to, uh, hotwire the car to drive
- 57:58an injured person to the hospital. So,
- 58:01many such things are conceivable. And
- 58:04there, the question is simply: why
- 58:06should the person injured by the act
- 58:07have to renounce their rights? Why
- 58:10should they stand by idly? It is about
- 58:14justification. You are not allowed to
- 58:16resist if someone takes your car to
- 58:17take an injured person to the hospital.
- 58:20Why should you accept that? And that is
- 58:24where we ultimately return to the old
- 58:26philosophers. Um, you can find this in
- 58:31Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of
- 58:32Right. I cannot recommend that you read
- 58:35it. Um, a great philosopher of science,
- 58:38in my view, once said about Hegel, if I
- 58:41recall correctly, that Hegel was not a
- 58:43philosopher because he had less love
- 58:46for the truth than for his own
- 58:48philosophical system. But Hegel is
- 58:51certainly one of the fundamental
- 58:53philosophers for our criminal law,
- 58:54alongside Kant, of course. It says that
- 58:58on one side, there is the infinite
- 58:59violation of existence. This naturally
- 59:01refers to the violation or the killing
- 59:04of humans, and thus the total
- 59:05lawlessness, while on the other side,
- 59:07there is only the violation of a single
- 59:09limited existence of freedom. That is
- 59:12very cumbersome. What is meant? He says
- 59:15, let's take our case of the rescue
- 59:17with the lifebuoy. That would be the
- 59:19case that fits. The infinite violation
- 59:21of existence, that is, the destruction
- 59:24of human life, I must accept if I do
- 59:26not break into the cabin. Only the
- 59:29violation of a single limited existence
- 59:32of freedom. A single limited existence
- 59:34of freedom would be translated today as
- 59:37an aspect of the exercise of freedom.
- 59:39And this aspect of the exercise of
- 59:41freedom is property freedom, the
- 59:43freedom to use my property. And that is
- 59:46the aspect that is relevant here. This
- 59:48means, if you trace it back to Hegel,
- 59:51you would say it is ultimately a
- 59:53question of weighing interests. And the
- 59:55whole thing is based on the principle
- 59:57of solidarity. In my view, we
- 1:00:01understandably expect others to forgo
- 1:00:05their less significant legal interests
- 1:00:09so that we can uphold more valuable
- 1:00:12legal interests. And everyone may
- 1:00:17expect this, especially in situations
- 1:00:19involving the infinite violation of
- 1:00:22existence, but also when it comes to
- 1:00:24other serious restrictions we want to
- 1:00:27prevent. And, um, the whole thing is
- 1:00:31therefore a matter of solidarity, of
- 1:00:34consideration for others in the
- 1:00:36respective context. And we can, of
- 1:00:40course, also solve problems that arise
- 1:00:43in a civil law manner. So, if you have
- 1:00:46to accept that someone damages your
- 1:00:47property to save another, well, then
- 1:00:49you simply receive compensation. In
- 1:00:51normal cases, everything is then
- 1:00:53repairable. It becomes problematic, of
- 1:00:55course, when you are expected to accept
- 1:00:58physical injuries to prevent the death
- 1:01:00or more serious injury of someone else.
- 1:01:02That is also conceivable. Such cases
- 1:01:04also occur. The problem at this point,
- 1:01:09and the reason we must think carefully
- 1:01:11about Section 34, is whether we are
- 1:01:12truly dealing with a justification here
- 1:01:14. The right of interference under
- 1:01:19Section 34 results in a duty to
- 1:01:22tolerate. That means if you say Section
- 1:01:2634 of the German Criminal Code applies,
- 1:01:28it results in you having to tolerate
- 1:01:31the interference. You are not allowed
- 1:01:33to defend yourself against it using
- 1:01:34self-defense. So, if someone breaks
- 1:01:38your car window in order to transport
- 1:01:41an injured person, you cannot say, "I
- 1:01:44don't want the car to be damaged." Well
- 1:01:48, you can say that, but if you are then
- 1:01:50forced by violence to accept it, you
- 1:01:52are not allowed to defend yourself
- 1:01:54against it. This means if you were to
- 1:01:58defend yourself against it, you would
- 1:02:00then be the aggressor, and one would
- 1:02:01then be allowed to defend against you
- 1:02:03in return with self-defense. And that
- 1:02:05is the decisive point. Section 34
- 1:02:08therefore leads to the act being
- 1:02:11carried out being lawful. Section 34
- 1:02:18thus demands a special sacrifice from
- 1:02:24an uninvolved party, from the person
- 1:02:26injured by the act. Because everyone
- 1:02:29else does not have to endure this.
- 1:02:30Everyone else does not have to provide
- 1:02:32their car, only you, because you were,
- 1:02:34one could say, in the wrong place at
- 1:02:36the wrong time. And that is why the
- 1:02:41prerequisite is an emergency situation;
- 1:02:44there must be an extraordinary
- 1:02:45emergency. Only that can justify the
- 1:02:49demand for solidarity. And that is why
- 1:02:52we also have in Section 35—and we are
- 1:02:55allowed to interpret this into Section
- 1:02:5934 in a certain way—this sentence,
- 1:03:01sentence 2: "This does not apply if the
- 1:03:06perpetrator, according to the
- 1:03:07circumstances, particularly because
- 1:03:09they caused the danger themselves or
- 1:03:10because they were in a special legal
- 1:03:12relationship, could be expected to
- 1:03:14accept the danger." So if if you are
- 1:03:19threatened by a danger, let's assume
- 1:03:21for your property. But you caused the
- 1:03:23danger yourself, in the end, or did not
- 1:03:26protect yourself against it as one
- 1:03:28would expect, then it could well be
- 1:03:30that you are told, "Well, the damage
- 1:03:32that is threatened is higher than the
- 1:03:34damage I would cause if I were to avert
- 1:03:37it." But you just have to accept this
- 1:03:40higher damage. You have to accept it
- 1:03:42because you yourself set the cause for
- 1:03:44it. There are indeed individual cases
- 1:03:48where that is conceivable. That is more
- 1:03:53often a problem of Section 35, but it
- 1:03:55is also conceivable in Section 34. In
- 1:03:59Section 35, these are typically cases,
- 1:04:02for example, where a police officer or
- 1:04:04a firefighter must accept greater
- 1:04:06dangers when they run into a burning
- 1:04:08house. Uh, then he simply has to expect
- 1:04:12to be injured as well, and if there is
- 1:04:15a danger, he cannot just withdraw and
- 1:04:17leave others in the lurch, so to speak.
- 1:04:21That plays a role here. Um. What also
- 1:04:27needs to be noted is that solidarity
- 1:04:29can only be demanded if our emergency
- 1:04:31perpetrator cannot get a handle on this
- 1:04:34distress, this emergency situation,
- 1:04:36with their own means. So, let's assume
- 1:04:42there are two huts by a lake. And these
- 1:04:48two huts, there are life buoys in both
- 1:04:51huts, both are locked, and you now see
- 1:04:54that you can or must save someone there
- 1:04:57. You think, well, before I buy a new
- 1:05:00lock, I'd rather break into my
- 1:05:01neighbor's hut. I have to break into my
- 1:05:03own anyway because I don't have the key
- 1:05:05with me. Then you just break into the
- 1:05:06neighbor's hut. You would say, well, I
- 1:05:09could also handle that with my own
- 1:05:11resources, or rather, by infringing on
- 1:05:13my own legal interests, I would just
- 1:05:15demand compensation via likely agency
- 1:05:17without authority or something similar,
- 1:05:19and I wouldn't have to intervene in the
- 1:05:22legal interests of third parties. So
- 1:05:25that would be a case where you
- 1:05:27sacrifice your own legal interests to
- 1:05:30avert damage. This applies even more,
- 1:05:33of course, if you want to save your own
- 1:05:35legal interests. So, if your hut is
- 1:05:38burning down and you have a fire
- 1:05:40extinguisher in your car, but don't
- 1:05:42have the key with you, and your
- 1:05:43neighbor also has a fire extinguisher
- 1:05:45in their car, you smash their window
- 1:05:48because you don't want to damage your
- 1:05:50own car. That would be a similar
- 1:05:51constellation. So, if you can infringe
- 1:05:54upon your own, quote-unquote, legal
- 1:05:57interests to avert the emergency, then
- 1:05:59you have no claim to solidarity from
- 1:06:02others. So solidarity is only ever
- 1:06:04justified, at least under Section 34,
- 1:06:07but that should generally also apply,
- 1:06:09if you cannot help yourself with your
- 1:06:11own means. And then the balancing of
- 1:06:15interests must take place, which
- 1:06:16justifies the special sacrifice in the
- 1:06:18sense of a predominant interest. You
- 1:06:21can only demand a special sacrifice
- 1:06:23from this uninvolved third party if
- 1:06:26this sacrifice leads to higher-value
- 1:06:29legal interests being protected. And
- 1:06:36this balancing must turn out in such a
- 1:06:39way that it is clear to everyone that
- 1:06:41the loss of the legal interest would
- 1:06:44have to be consented to. That is what
- 1:06:50you can connect with the word "
- 1:06:51essential" in Section 34. So, it is not
- 1:06:55enough to say, yes, one could consider
- 1:06:57whether a higher-value legal interest
- 1:06:59is being protected here; rather, it
- 1:07:01must significantly outweigh it in order
- 1:07:03to be able to defend it to the legal
- 1:07:05community, i.e., to society. Why did I
- 1:07:08have to forgo something as the person
- 1:07:10affected? Why did I have to forgo it?
- 1:07:13And then the perpetrator must be able
- 1:07:15to say, it is clear that due to this
- 1:07:16situation, this balancing of interests,
- 1:07:18one legal interest significantly
- 1:07:20outweighs the other, and that is why
- 1:07:21you had to practice restraint and
- 1:07:23receive compensation or whatever else.
- 1:07:26So this concept of "significantly
- 1:07:28outweighs" arises from the fact that
- 1:07:31the preponderance must be clear in
- 1:07:33order to make it obvious to the public,
- 1:07:36to society, why this solidarity could
- 1:07:38be demanded here. And yes, go ahead.
- 1:07:44Yes, so the question is, how do I
- 1:07:45account for the fact that in a crisis
- 1:07:47situation—someone is about to drown
- 1:07:49—you don't start doing calculations
- 1:07:51there. Uh, typing into a calculator
- 1:07:53just now, which is more valuable, car X
- 1:07:55or car Y, regarding the window, what
- 1:07:57costs more? Um, so in the concrete
- 1:08:00crisis situation, you often cannot
- 1:08:04assess that so quickly and so, so
- 1:08:07easily. One would have to say that, in
- 1:08:11principle, an objective assessment
- 1:08:13applies, which the judge later makes at
- 1:08:15their desk when they review it, but we
- 1:08:18do have error privileges. So, if it is
- 1:08:21later determined that you were mistaken
- 1:08:23, that you damaged the wrong legal
- 1:08:25interest, that the other one you
- 1:08:26damaged was much more valuable than the
- 1:08:28one you should have damaged to avert
- 1:08:30the harm. Then one will have to say,
- 1:08:32that is just bad luck. That might not
- 1:08:35be lawful, but it is excused, or there
- 1:08:37is no intent. Let's look at it when we
- 1:08:40cover the mistake regarding the
- 1:08:42requirements of justification, then it
- 1:08:44might become clearer, then you can also
- 1:08:46make it clear that, in the end, if you
- 1:08:48really have an interest in protecting
- 1:08:49legal goods, you will not be punished
- 1:08:51either. Then you will always find a
- 1:08:53solution that avoids punishment, so to
- 1:08:55speak. But the question does not appear
- 1:09:01in exam papers, of course, but in
- 1:09:03practice, it is highly relevant. I just
- 1:09:07want to recall the example of a
- 1:09:09constellation from the Federal Court of
- 1:09:12Justice, in which a member of the Hells
- 1:09:15Angels shot at a police officer, an
- 1:09:18elite squad officer. That led to such a
- 1:09:22huge scene, the whole discussion of
- 1:09:24when do I have criminal liability and
- 1:09:26when not. And ultimately, one had to
- 1:09:29say, the way the police prepared this
- 1:09:31operation, it had to go wrong. They
- 1:09:34prepared it in such a way that it could
- 1:09:36really only end in a tragedy. And there
- 1:09:39you have to say that even if the
- 1:09:41defender, in quotation marks, shoots at
- 1:09:43a police officer and the situation was
- 1:09:45so unclear that they could hardly do
- 1:09:47otherwise, well, then it might not be
- 1:09:49justified, but it simply will not be
- 1:09:51punished. Let's take a look. Let's look
- 1:09:56at the fundamentals of Section 34.
- 1:10:00Before Section 34, there was no
- 1:10:02predecessor regulation. You might know
- 1:10:05that in 1975 our entire penal code was
- 1:10:07completely reorganized. The general
- 1:10:10part was significantly overhauled. That
- 1:10:12is why you will not find many things in
- 1:10:14old commentaries. Um, what is regulated
- 1:10:17accordingly today. Previously, there
- 1:10:19was no regulation for Section 34. There
- 1:10:21was only Section 193 of the Penal Code.
- 1:10:24I already mentioned that, the pursuit
- 1:10:25of legitimate interests. That contains
- 1:10:28the basic idea that we have today in
- 1:10:30Section 34. The emergency that allows
- 1:10:35for solidarity is the imminent danger
- 1:10:37that you see in Section 34. And as
- 1:10:42already mentioned, solidarity may only
- 1:10:44be demanded by someone who cannot avert
- 1:10:47the danger or the damage in any other
- 1:10:49way than through this very act, through
- 1:10:52the violation of others 'legal
- 1:10:54interests. So if you can avert the
- 1:10:57damage without smashing the neighbor's
- 1:11:00car windows, but simply just as
- 1:11:03effectively, just as sensibly, by
- 1:11:05opening your own car with the key and
- 1:11:08taking out the fire extinguisher, then
- 1:11:11of course you have no claim to it. Um,
- 1:11:16the balancing of interests is what we
- 1:11:18have in Section 34 with the phrasing "
- 1:11:20weighing of conflicting interests." The
- 1:11:23legislature was also kind enough to
- 1:11:25give you, for the exam, what these
- 1:11:27conflicting interests entail in terms
- 1:11:29of criteria, namely, specifically. "
- 1:11:32Specifically" means in particular or
- 1:11:34for example. the affected legal
- 1:11:40interests and the degree of danger
- 1:11:42threatening them. Under this, one can
- 1:11:46first pack the question, um, which
- 1:11:48legal interests are affected at all? So
- 1:11:52, conceivable legal interests that
- 1:11:54could be affected are the general right
- 1:11:56of personality, freedom of movement,
- 1:11:58body, life, honor, which we saw, and
- 1:12:00property, which is in Section 34. But
- 1:12:04it can also be an established and
- 1:12:06active business; it can be, um, the,
- 1:12:09the, animal welfare; it can be road
- 1:12:11traffic, so everything you can imagine
- 1:12:14in terms of legal interests; it can be
- 1:12:16the interest in effective criminal
- 1:12:19prosecution, in the, um, functionality
- 1:12:21of the, the garbage collection,
- 1:12:24theoretically, so everything that is
- 1:12:26conceivable as an interest. and no one
- 1:12:32may be required to make an excessive
- 1:12:35sacrifice. And you will find that in
- 1:12:37the phrasing of Section 34, sentence 2.
- 1:12:40This, i.e., the justification, only
- 1:12:42applies, however, insofar as the act is
- 1:12:44an appropriate means to avert the
- 1:12:46danger. And at the end, we look at that
- 1:12:49again and ask ourselves, is that really
- 1:12:52reasonable? An example case where this
- 1:12:56is discussed as being unreasonable, and
- 1:12:59which is arguably the prevailing view,
- 1:13:01would be the scenario of forcing
- 1:13:04someone to donate blood. So, imagine
- 1:13:08you're in a hospital, waiting for
- 1:13:10someone, and a doctor who knows you
- 1:13:13comes by and says, "Oh, you have blood
- 1:13:16type AB negative, that's so rare. Come
- 1:13:19here, we're going to take half a liter
- 1:13:20from you now. We need it right now,
- 1:13:22we're all out." And then you say, "For
- 1:13:24heaven's sake, I really don't want that
- 1:13:26." Um, then two strong nurses come
- 1:13:28along, hold you down, and then your
- 1:13:30blood is taken. And one might say: Yes,
- 1:13:33if someone's life is saved in an
- 1:13:35operation, an ongoing operation, and
- 1:13:38you only have to give up a few
- 1:13:40milliliters of blood, the prevailing
- 1:13:43view would say this is a case where we
- 1:13:46are interfering so deeply with the core
- 1:13:49of your personality, aside from
- 1:13:51questions of, um, religious conviction.
- 1:13:54Then that would be a situation where we
- 1:13:56would say, that is not appropriate. One
- 1:13:58can argue about that. I don't know if I
- 1:14:01consider that completely inappropriate.
- 1:14:03A clear case, I think I used this as an
- 1:14:05example before. The doctor notes, oh,
- 1:14:06you still have two kidneys, right? We
- 1:14:08happen to need one. That would be a
- 1:14:11case where we would clearly have an
- 1:14:12inappropriate solution. Let's look at
- 1:14:16the facts of the case, meaning the exam
- 1:14:19procedure. Then um, in the context of
- 1:14:26unlawfulness or the, um, the mistake
- 1:14:28regarding justification, you must first
- 1:14:31examine the objective grounds for
- 1:14:34justification. So we need an emergency
- 1:14:38situation, and that consists of a
- 1:14:40present, unavoidable danger that cannot
- 1:14:42be averted otherwise. You can actually
- 1:14:44strike "cannot be averted otherwise."
- 1:14:46We need a present danger. That's just
- 1:14:49included above because of the legal
- 1:14:50wording. The second point is then the
- 1:14:53emergency action. You need a rescue
- 1:14:55action that is necessary to avert this
- 1:14:59danger. So any action that ensures the
- 1:15:01threatened damage does not occur. Then
- 1:15:06you must determine that the saved
- 1:15:08interest, the so-called protected
- 1:15:11interest, is worth more. Um, this means
- 1:15:15the interest outweighs the one being
- 1:15:17damaged, so the so-called interfered
- 1:15:20interest is outweighed. So you ask
- 1:15:22yourself, what is the value of the
- 1:15:24interfered interest? The interest you
- 1:15:27are violating—house rules, property,
- 1:15:29physical integrity—and then ask what
- 1:15:31the value of the protected interest is,
- 1:15:33and you must compare them. There is a
- 1:15:37specific criterion in section 34.
- 1:15:40Imminent danger, the value of the legal
- 1:15:43interests, and also the intensity of
- 1:15:46the infringement. And then we perform a
- 1:15:49proportionality test, which in exams is
- 1:15:52usually just a formality, except in
- 1:15:54those extreme cases I mentioned—
- 1:15:56taking blood, organs, and so on. That
- 1:15:59is where one could say that
- 1:16:00disproportion is an issue. And then we
- 1:16:03also need to consider the subjective
- 1:16:05element of justification. So, here
- 1:16:09again, the intent to avert danger, and
- 1:16:12then we examine guilt, but we haven't
- 1:16:15discussed that yet. So much for the
- 1:16:18examination structure and the testing
- 1:16:20scheme for section 34. Please do not
- 1:16:24view these examination schemes as
- 1:16:26divinely ordained or as axioms of legal
- 1:16:29science. They simply help ensure you
- 1:16:32don't forget anything. That's what it's
- 1:16:34about. And if you have no reason to
- 1:16:36deviate from them—which sometimes
- 1:16:38happens—then stick to the scheme, and
- 1:16:40you will encounter every problem that
- 1:16:42might arise. They will be served to you
- 1:16:44on a silver platter, so to speak.
- 1:16:50Let’s look at the objective elements.
- 1:16:57To speak of a state of necessity, we
- 1:16:59first need a danger to a legally
- 1:17:01protected interest capable of being in
- 1:17:04necessity. A protected interest is
- 1:17:07every one mentioned in section 34, but
- 1:17:09in principle, all other legal interests
- 1:17:11recognized by the legal order as well.
- 1:17:13You can see that from the wording of
- 1:17:15section 34, "or another legal interest.
- 1:17:17" In final exams, I have seen several
- 1:17:21times that it escaped candidates that
- 1:17:23section 34 uses different legal
- 1:17:25interests as a basis than section 35.
- 1:17:29So, there is the crucial difference I
- 1:17:31pointed out earlier. Section 35 only
- 1:17:34includes the three you should perhaps
- 1:17:36underline in the text, and in section
- 1:17:3834, all others as well. And there is
- 1:17:43certainly case law on that. For
- 1:17:45instance, according to an old decision
- 1:17:47by the Higher Regional Court of
- 1:17:48Oldenburg, section 34 also protects
- 1:17:50one's job. How far you can go with that
- 1:17:53is the big question. Traffic safety is
- 1:17:56protected. This appears in exam papers
- 1:17:59time and again, where keys are taken
- 1:18:02away or cars are blocked in so that a
- 1:18:04completely drunk driver cannot drive
- 1:18:07away, or similar situations. Animal
- 1:18:11welfare; there you see intense
- 1:18:13discussions, those are the decisions
- 1:18:16that have been issued, and the courts
- 1:18:19agree that section 34 should also
- 1:18:22protect animals from cruelty. In legal
- 1:18:26literature, there are very few opposing
- 1:18:28voices—in my view, I know of only one
- 1:18:30single article that spoke out against
- 1:18:33it, which I personally don't think
- 1:18:35should be taken seriously, not because
- 1:18:37of the result, but because of the
- 1:18:39methodology used.
- 1:18:40Yes, exactly. So, they are not
- 1:18:42identical to 32. Yes, to repeat the
- 1:18:45question again, what does that look
- 1:18:48like? What is the difference between
- 1:18:50the protected legal interests under
- 1:18:52Section 32 and those protected here
- 1:18:54under Section 34? And with Section 34,
- 1:18:58and that is the decisive difference,
- 1:19:00the prevailing opinion assumes that
- 1:19:02under Section 32, the legal interests
- 1:19:04of the general public are not protected
- 1:19:06, so road safety, for example, is not
- 1:19:08protected under Section 32, but under
- 1:19:11Section 34, road safety is also a
- 1:19:12protected interest or one capable of
- 1:19:15being an emergency interest. And that
- 1:19:18is where, for example, the dispute
- 1:19:21arises again for Section 34 and 32. The
- 1:19:25prevailing view says animal welfare or
- 1:19:28the protection of animals from cruelty
- 1:19:31is not a subject of self-defense.
- 1:19:36Satzger/Bolke say this in the new
- 1:19:38edition, Rengier in the new edition,
- 1:19:39Rönau in the Latzel commentary sees it
- 1:19:41differently. But with Section 34, there
- 1:19:45is agreement, and you can see that
- 1:19:47clearly. So 34 protects a much wider
- 1:19:49area, including the legal interests of
- 1:19:52the general public. So, using
- 1:19:54self-defense to protect your job, that
- 1:19:56would be quite a stretch. Regarding
- 1:19:59road safety, people largely agree that
- 1:20:01this is also not permissible. With 34,
- 1:20:03you can go very far. Whether 34
- 1:20:06actually applies, however, is a
- 1:20:07completely different question. That is
- 1:20:09always a matter of balancing interests.
- 1:20:12Danger is any situation occurring from
- 1:20:14any cause in which, according to the
- 1:20:17specific circumstances, the occurrence
- 1:20:19of damage to a legal interest,
- 1:20:20including a legal interest of a third
- 1:20:23party, is probable. So, whenever damage
- 1:20:26is imminent, regardless of how, we can
- 1:20:30assume there is a danger. And that can
- 1:20:33be a danger that is man-made. It can
- 1:20:36also be a danger that threatens through
- 1:20:38a human being. So, an attack within the
- 1:20:40meaning of 32 can also be a danger
- 1:20:42within the meaning of 34. The case I
- 1:20:45had described. You are now defending
- 1:20:48yourself against your attacker by
- 1:20:49ripping a slat out of your neighbor's
- 1:20:51fence. The neighbor is not your
- 1:20:53attacker. Then you have the attack
- 1:20:55within the meaning of 32 from the
- 1:20:57attacker who is currently assaulting
- 1:20:59you and a danger within the meaning of
- 1:21:0234 also due to this danger to your
- 1:21:05physical integrity. But since you want
- 1:21:09to justify the interference with your
- 1:21:11neighbor's legal interest, you cannot
- 1:21:14use 32, but must use 34, so that in
- 1:21:16principle an attack, any attack, is a
- 1:21:19danger within the meaning of 34. So not
- 1:21:23every danger is an attack within the
- 1:21:24meaning of 32, but every attack within
- 1:21:26the meaning of 32 is a danger within
- 1:21:27the meaning of 34. This means that a
- 1:21:33legal interest must have fallen into
- 1:21:35crisis here, and there must be an
- 1:21:36imminent risk of damage or an
- 1:21:38intensification of damage. So, dangers
- 1:21:42can be, for example. It is raining
- 1:21:45heavily and, uh, the basement of your
- 1:21:47house is filling up. Um, damage is of
- 1:21:50course already occurring when the
- 1:21:52basement has flooded, but it makes a
- 1:21:54difference whether it is 20 cm under
- 1:21:56water or 1 meter. And that would then
- 1:21:59be the additional damage that is
- 1:22:00looming. And if you then break into
- 1:22:02your neighbor's house to get the pump,
- 1:22:04that would be a possible case of
- 1:22:05Section 34. It does not matter whether
- 1:22:08the damage is caused by a natural
- 1:22:11disaster, a meteorite impact, or
- 1:22:13whatever else, or by human behavior.
- 1:22:16There just has to be some kind of
- 1:22:17danger looming. The remote possibility
- 1:22:21of damage is not sufficient. That means
- 1:22:26, if it is raining a little outside and
- 1:22:28you already break into your neighbor's
- 1:22:30to get the pump, that wouldn't even be
- 1:22:32a danger situation, quite apart from
- 1:22:34the question of an imminent danger. So
- 1:22:37there must be a certain probability of
- 1:22:40damage. You will learn to fear and hate
- 1:22:44the term "danger" in police law. You
- 1:22:46will deal with it intensively. The
- 1:22:50danger is to be determined from an
- 1:22:52objective ex-ante assessment. That
- 1:22:54means you have to ask yourself what an
- 1:22:57objective observer would have thought
- 1:22:59in the specific situation of our
- 1:23:01emergency perpetrator, and how they
- 1:23:03would have assessed the danger
- 1:23:05situation. However, this also means
- 1:23:10that a situation that appears
- 1:23:12completely harmless in hindsight, or
- 1:23:14one that turns out to be harmless later
- 1:23:17, can still be a danger. So if you,
- 1:23:23because you are rightly convinced that
- 1:23:27your basement will be flooded.
- 1:23:30Everything points to it and you fetch
- 1:23:32the pump just in time from your
- 1:23:33perspective, and later everything turns
- 1:23:35out to be fine. You are still covered
- 1:23:38by Section 34 because it only turns out
- 1:23:41afterwards that there was no danger at
- 1:23:43all. So if you then say, um, afterwards
- 1:23:48everyone knew it beforehand, well, we
- 1:23:51are in a situation where subsequent
- 1:23:54better knowledge does not help us.
- 1:24:00Errors by the specific perpetrator are
- 1:24:02irrelevant here. So if you simply
- 1:24:04misjudge the situation, you might slip
- 1:24:06into a mistake of justification, but
- 1:24:08that does not mean that a danger
- 1:24:10actually exists. So, objective
- 1:24:12assessment. It is controversial there.
- 1:24:16Yes, that is an individual dispute or a
- 1:24:18case-by-case dispute. Must I focus on
- 1:24:20the knowledgeable, the sensible, or the
- 1:24:23objective observer? So, must you now
- 1:24:26judge the question of whether the
- 1:24:28basement is flooding from the
- 1:24:30perspective of a firefighter, a
- 1:24:32homeowner, or an objectively omniscient
- 1:24:34person? That is a dispute I have never
- 1:24:39encountered in an exam. Should it ever
- 1:24:42come up in an exam that, say, a
- 1:24:44firefighter would have known this, you
- 1:24:47just decide somehow; not much
- 1:24:48specialized knowledge is expected of
- 1:24:51you. If you do have that specialized
- 1:24:52knowledge, then it must be taken into
- 1:24:54account. So, if you are an expert on
- 1:24:56flooded basements and have dealt with
- 1:24:57it 20 times, then you must apply your
- 1:24:59specialized knowledge. The origin of
- 1:25:02the danger is irrelevant. And the
- 1:25:06further questions that we definitely
- 1:25:08need to look at more closely, we will
- 1:25:10save those for next week. I thank you
- 1:25:13sincerely for your attention and
- 1:25:14participation.
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