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Strafrecht AT Teil 21 (Fahrlässigkeitsdelikte) — Transcript

by Lehrstuhl Wirtschaftstrafrecht · 11,573 words · 1,825 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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  1. 0:01Since I have already talked so much
  2. 0:03about negligence offenses and we have
  3. 0:06seen in several areas that one must
  4. 0:08examine negligence offenses—be it in
  5. 0:10the case of the apparatus, where we saw
  6. 0:13that we combine an attempt with the
  7. 0:15negligent commission instead of the
  8. 0:17intentional act that was completed—we
  9. 0:20will now take a look at negligence
  10. 0:22offenses. This means we will look at
  11. 0:25what happens when the intentional
  12. 0:27offense does not come into play. Let us
  13. 0:30assume Section 16, Paragraph 1,
  14. 0:31Sentence 1. Then, however, Section 16,
  15. 0:34Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 must be
  16. 0:36observed. It states that criminal
  17. 0:39liability for negligent commission
  18. 0:41remains unaffected. In this respect, I
  19. 0:45would like to refer you to the two
  20. 0:47articles cited here if you want to get
  21. 0:49a general overview once more.
  22. 0:52Negligence offenses often play a
  23. 0:55marginal role in bar exams. This means
  24. 0:59that, under normal circumstances, you
  25. 1:01do not need detailed knowledge, but pay
  26. 1:03attention: in negligence offenses, you
  27. 1:05can incorporate all the problems that
  28. 1:07are also conceivable in the objective
  29. 1:09elements of other offenses.
  30. 1:12Specifically with negligence offenses,
  31. 1:14problems with objective imputation
  32. 1:17occur frequently, because the doctrine
  33. 1:19of objective imputation is ultimately
  34. 1:21almost more important for negligence
  35. 1:23offenses than for intentional offenses.
  36. 1:27For if you have a case in which the
  37. 1:29development, the causal progression,
  38. 1:32was not foreseeable at all, or a danger
  39. 1:34materialized in a way completely
  40. 1:36different from what the perpetrator had
  41. 1:38imagined, then you can easily rule it
  42. 1:41out in an intentional offense by saying
  43. 1:43that the intent did not relate to this
  44. 1:45at all. And that is exactly what is
  45. 1:49different in a negligence offense.
  46. 1:51According to the general view on the
  47. 1:53structure, although there are
  48. 1:55dissenting voices, the negligence
  49. 1:57offense has only an objective element.
  50. 1:59There is no subjective element. This
  51. 2:03means that in a negligence offense, you
  52. 2:05can simply examine the actus reus as a
  53. 2:07whole, without separating it into
  54. 2:09objective and subjective. There are
  55. 2:12views that say we also have a
  56. 2:14subjective element in the negligence
  57. 2:16offense. There we must discuss whether
  58. 2:20the specific perpetrator committed a
  59. 2:22breach of duty according to their
  60. 2:24specific standards, and whether they
  61. 2:26were personally able to foresee the
  62. 2:28result with their own abilities. In my
  63. 2:32view, that belongs in the culpability
  64. 2:33section and not in the actus reus. And
  65. 2:35that is why I would recommend that you
  66. 2:37discuss objective questions within the
  67. 2:39actus reus. It is important that
  68. 2:45negligent acts are only punishable if
  69. 2:47the law expressly mandates it. This
  70. 2:51means that an act committed negligently
  71. 2:53can only be punished if this is
  72. 2:55expressly stipulated in a criminal
  73. 2:57statute. This is stated in Section 15.
  74. 3:00Section 15 is often cited in exams to
  75. 3:03clarify that intent must be present.
  76. 3:06You do not have to cite it. You do not
  77. 3:08have to write down Section 15. If you
  78. 3:11have an intentional act in mind, then
  79. 3:12simply examine the intent. Nevertheless
  80. 3:16, you should keep Section 15 in mind,
  81. 3:20because it clarifies that the principle
  82. 3:23applies here too, that criminal law is
  83. 3:26the ultima ratio and that not every
  84. 3:28negligent behavior that leads to damage
  85. 3:31can be punishable. Imagine if negligent
  86. 3:34damage to property were a criminal
  87. 3:35offense. You're with friends, act a bit
  88. 3:38clumsy, a glass falls to the floor and
  89. 3:39shatters; then we would already be in
  90. 3:41the realm of criminal law. That would
  91. 3:43be completely insane, of course, and
  92. 3:46that is why there are only a few
  93. 3:48offenses, relatively few, that are also
  94. 3:50punishable when committed negligently.
  95. 3:54For us, the most relevant are certainly
  96. 3:57Section 229 and Section 222 of the
  97. 3:59Criminal Code, i.e., negligent homicide
  98. 4:02and negligent bodily harm. 222 is
  99. 4:06homicide, 229 is negligent bodily harm.
  100. 4:10In bar exams, negligent arson also
  101. 4:12plays a role occasionally. Negligent
  102. 4:17perjury can also occur, meaning if
  103. 4:20someone testifies falsely in court and
  104. 4:23acts carelessly in doing so. This means
  105. 4:27they say something even though they are
  106. 4:29not at all sure whether it is true. So
  107. 4:31they say, it could be, well, I think it
  108. 4:33might be true, but I'm not sure. In
  109. 4:36such a case, if you are in court and
  110. 4:37you don't know for sure, well, then you
  111. 4:39just have to say that you don't know
  112. 4:40for sure. Um, that means we only have
  113. 4:43very narrow areas of criminal liability
  114. 4:46for negligence in the Criminal Code. We
  115. 4:50have it in crimes of public danger, um,
  116. 4:52there is, however, a very practical
  117. 4:54offense that can also be committed
  118. 4:57negligently. That is, in the area of
  119. 4:59drunk driving, you have negligent
  120. 5:01commission, specifically Section 316.
  121. 5:10Paragraph 2 states that whoever commits
  122. 5:12the act negligently is also punished
  123. 5:13according to Paragraph 1. So, if you
  124. 5:16drive a car while drunk, you cannot
  125. 5:18claim, well, I didn't know I was
  126. 5:20already at 1.1 per mille. I thought I
  127. 5:23only had 0.9 and was firmly convinced
  128. 5:25of that; that won't help you at all.
  129. 5:28And the interesting thing is, with 316,
  130. 5:30the penalty for negligence is generally
  131. 5:33just as high as for intent. And this is
  132. 5:37also quite interesting regarding
  133. 5:39administrative offenses; when you take
  134. 5:41speeding, or failure to maintain
  135. 5:43distance, and such, they are almost
  136. 5:44always sanctioned due to negligence. So
  137. 5:48, if you get a letter with a photo,
  138. 5:50they usually assume negligence, and the
  139. 5:53reason for that is ultimately that
  140. 5:56intent is very hard to prove, so they
  141. 5:59go with negligence instead. Whether
  142. 6:02that is systematically and
  143. 6:03constitutionally sound is something we
  144. 6:04can argue about. Then we have some
  145. 6:07offenses, which I already mentioned,
  146. 6:09where we have combinations of intent
  147. 6:11and negligence. We have another
  148. 6:15complete or unified negligence offense
  149. 6:17in Section 315c, endangering road
  150. 6:19traffic. Please take a brief look at
  151. 6:22that. Anyone who operates a vehicle in
  152. 6:25road traffic while under the influence
  153. 6:27of alcoholic beverages or other
  154. 6:29intoxicants, or due to mental or
  155. 6:31physical deficiencies—which also
  156. 6:34include sleep, or rather, sleep
  157. 6:35deprivation—So, if you are completely
  158. 6:38overtired and cause an accident, you
  159. 6:40can also fall under Section 315c. Then
  160. 6:46number 2, where we have the "deadly
  161. 6:48sins" of road traffic, meaning gross,
  162. 6:51unlawful, and reckless conduct that
  163. 6:53endangers the life or limb of another
  164. 6:56person or property of significant value
  165. 6:58. It is very important, just to state
  166. 7:01this upfront: If you drive drunk and
  167. 7:04everything goes well, and no one is
  168. 7:06endangered, you are under Section 316.
  169. 7:10If you are caught, you will be punished
  170. 7:11for that. If you drive drunk, swerve
  171. 7:14across lanes, and in doing so endanger
  172. 7:16a pedestrian who just manages to jump
  173. 7:18aside, then you are under Section 315c
  174. 7:19of the German Criminal Code. That means
  175. 7:22we are looking at a different
  176. 7:23sentencing range there. Then we have a
  177. 7:25sentencing range of up to 5 years. With
  178. 7:28316, we have up to one year. And here
  179. 7:32in 315c, as you see in paragraph 3, it
  180. 7:35applies if the danger is caused
  181. 7:37negligently, as in the cases of
  182. 7:39paragraph 1. That is the most common
  183. 7:42case. So, when someone drives drunk, in
  184. 7:46the fewest cases do they actually
  185. 7:47intend to endanger pedestrians. That
  186. 7:50usually happens negligently. And then
  187. 7:53we have paragraph 3 number 2, where one
  188. 7:55acts negligently. So, I drive drunk
  189. 7:58negligently because I didn't pay
  190. 8:00attention to how much I drank, and then
  191. 8:02I negligently endanger pedestrians.
  192. 8:04That means you have a
  193. 8:06negligence-negligence combination there
  194. 8:08. So, in the area of negligence, we
  195. 8:10have, first, the very simple negligent
  196. 8:12result offenses like 222 or 229. We
  197. 8:17then have offenses that are committed
  198. 8:20negligently, in which a negligent
  199. 8:23result is added to an intentional
  200. 8:25offense. These are the ones here in
  201. 8:29315c paragraph 3, but also the
  202. 8:33result-qualified offenses in 227 and
  203. 8:35251. And then we have the
  204. 8:39negligence-negligence combinations,
  205. 8:41i.e., cases in which someone commits an
  206. 8:44act negligently and causes a danger
  207. 8:45negligently in the process.
  208. 8:52Fundamentally, negligent commission is
  209. 8:55the less serious form of committing an
  210. 8:57offense. However, the relationship
  211. 9:00between intent and negligence is
  212. 9:02disputed. It is partly claimed that
  213. 9:05anyone who acts intentionally does not
  214. 9:07act negligently. But I find it more
  215. 9:12plausible to say that every intentional
  216. 9:14act also contains an element of
  217. 9:16negligence, because negligence consists
  218. 9:19of the breach of duty and the
  219. 9:21foreseeability of the result. This
  220. 9:24means you act in breach of duty with
  221. 9:26regard to a specific result. And this
  222. 9:28result is also foreseeable, and that is
  223. 9:30what constitutes negligence. And if I
  224. 9:33act intentionally with a specific
  225. 9:34result in mind, that is also a breach
  226. 9:36of duty. Therefore, I find it more
  227. 9:39accurate to say there is no mutually
  228. 9:41exclusive relationship between intent
  229. 9:43and negligence; rather, intent is the
  230. 9:45more severe form of negligence. However
  231. 9:48, this question doesn't really play a
  232. 9:50role in the exams. Section 16,
  233. 9:53paragraphs 1 and 2, as I mentioned,
  234. 9:56explicitly do not exclude negligence.
  235. 10:00The question is what negligence
  236. 10:01actually means. And here, as a mnemonic
  237. 10:04, please remember Section 276,
  238. 10:06paragraph 2 of the German Civil Code:
  239. 10:09someone acts negligently if they
  240. 10:11disregard the care required in daily
  241. 10:13life. You can also state this in the
  242. 10:16exam if you ask yourself: well, what
  243. 10:18does negligence actually mean? I always
  244. 10:21forget that. Are you allowed to write
  245. 10:23numbers in the margins of your statute
  246. 10:24book? Then it is certainly worth noting
  247. 10:29276 next to 229, paragraph 2. Um, that
  248. 10:38means only those who disregard the care
  249. 10:40required in daily life and thereby
  250. 10:42cause damage are liable to prosecution.
  251. 10:46This means we are not dealing with pure
  252. 10:48strict liability. We know pure strict
  253. 10:51liability from the Road Traffic Act,
  254. 10:53for example, where you are liable for
  255. 10:56damages caused by an accident simply
  256. 10:58because you operated a vehicle. Section
  257. 11:007 of the Road Traffic Act, I believe,
  258. 11:02if I have that right. That does not
  259. 11:04exist in criminal law. It would also
  260. 11:06contradict the principle of culpability
  261. 11:08. It is therefore impermissible to
  262. 11:12attach a criminal penalty—the
  263. 11:14sharpest and last resort the rule of
  264. 11:17law knows—to a mere act without some
  265. 11:20form of fault, broadly speaking, intent
  266. 11:23or negligence. But even within
  267. 11:28negligence, there are different levels.
  268. 11:31We distinguish between conscious and
  269. 11:33unconscious negligence on one hand, and
  270. 11:36slight negligence up to recklessness on
  271. 11:39the other. So please do not confuse
  272. 11:42conscious negligence with gross
  273. 11:44negligence. It may be that someone
  274. 11:47knows: I am not acting entirely in
  275. 11:49accordance with my duty here. I also
  276. 11:52recognize the risk. I consider the risk
  277. 11:54to be very small, and in fact it is
  278. 11:56very small, but it still goes wrong.
  279. 11:59Then we would have a case where we
  280. 12:01might only have a slight breach of duty
  281. 12:04with a low risk, and as luck would have
  282. 12:06it, the damage occurs anyway; then we
  283. 12:09are dealing with conscious negligence
  284. 12:11and yet slight negligence. And there
  285. 12:16are cases of unconscious negligence
  286. 12:17that are completely reckless. So if you
  287. 12:21have someone who simply cannot assess
  288. 12:24the risks of road traffic and
  289. 12:26nevertheless overtakes on a country
  290. 12:29road in the third lane—that is, on
  291. 12:31the opposite shoulder—in fog and icy
  292. 12:34conditions, because they think, "There
  293. 12:37is absolutely no risk, everything is
  294. 12:39easy, no one is coming here anyway,"
  295. 12:42then that is unconscious negligence. Or
  296. 12:46they don't think about it at all; then
  297. 12:47we definitely have unconscious
  298. 12:48negligence. And yet, that is gross
  299. 12:51recklessness. Recklessness occurs when
  300. 12:54the perpetrator commits a gross breach
  301. 12:58of duty and the looming consequence was
  302. 13:01obvious, meaning it was readily
  303. 13:03foreseeable. So, it would be reckless,
  304. 13:08for example, to—the classic case—
  305. 13:10sit in a glass house and throw stones.
  306. 13:13That would be a classic case of
  307. 13:15recklessness. You light a campfire. um,
  308. 13:18right next to a gas station. Um, you
  309. 13:23smoke, um, at a gas station, or, um,
  310. 13:26you light a fire, um, with a haystack
  311. 13:30lying around somewhere nearby and think
  312. 13:34that nothing much can happen. So, all
  313. 13:38cases where you think, "This can't be
  314. 13:41serious." Um, we don't have a
  315. 13:44definition of negligence in the law.
  316. 13:48There were definitions in drafts for
  317. 13:52the StGB. So, they initially wanted to
  318. 13:55define negligence in the 1962 draft in
  319. 13:57Section 18. It stated that a person
  320. 14:00acts negligently if they disregard the
  321. 14:01care they are obliged and able to
  322. 14:03exercise under the circumstances and
  323. 14:04their personal conditions, and
  324. 14:06therefore do not recognize that they
  325. 14:07are fulfilling the statutory offense.
  326. 14:10That would be a definition that one
  327. 14:12could certainly memorize for the exam
  328. 14:14regarding the criteria: disregarding
  329. 14:16the care one is obliged and able to
  330. 14:17exercise under the circumstances and
  331. 14:19their personal conditions, and
  332. 14:21therefore failing to recognize that.
  333. 14:27There was also a second paragraph here,
  334. 14:28which read: "A person also acts
  335. 14:30negligently if they consider it
  336. 14:31possible that they are fulfilling the
  337. 14:33statutory offense, but act in breach of
  338. 14:35duty and culpably, trusting that they
  339. 14:37will not fulfill it." So, paragraph 1,
  340. 14:40unconscious negligence; paragraph 2,
  341. 14:42conscious negligence. That is what the
  342. 14:44legislature once wanted to write into
  343. 14:45the law. However, they distanced
  344. 14:48themselves from it and did not write
  345. 14:49anything in, again with the note that
  346. 14:51case law and legal theory should
  347. 14:52clarify it. Why, is completely unclear
  348. 14:55to me; it could have easily been
  349. 14:57written in there. Ultimately, however,
  350. 15:00there is no debate over the criteria to
  351. 15:03be applied here, the very broad
  352. 15:05criteria. It is relatively clear that
  353. 15:07this is the starting point. What is
  354. 15:09being debated is how subjectively
  355. 15:11negligence is to be understood. So,
  356. 15:14when asking whether someone acts
  357. 15:17negligently, do I have to include their
  358. 15:21specific subjective deficits? For
  359. 15:24instance, if someone cannot see well
  360. 15:26enough and therefore could not
  361. 15:29recognize a certain circumstance—in
  362. 15:32the truest sense of the word, could not
  363. 15:34recognize it—but then does not act
  364. 15:36negligently, the question that always
  365. 15:38arises, of course, is: if someone takes
  366. 15:40on a task they cannot perform, then we
  367. 15:42have negligence at another level. More
  368. 15:45on that in a moment. The structural
  369. 15:49outline that is typically used. Here
  370. 15:51you can find it, um, taken from Kühl,
  371. 15:53from the textbook by Christian Kühl.
  372. 15:57First, you examine the factual outcome,
  373. 15:59as you are aware. Then, an objective
  374. 16:03breach of duty of care, meaning how
  375. 16:05should the person have behaved, and did
  376. 16:06they behave that way? Ultimately, you
  377. 16:10determine how a person must behave in
  378. 16:12this situation and to what extent the
  379. 16:14behavior we have here deviates.
  380. 16:17deviates from that. So, someone builds
  381. 16:20a fire somewhere in the forest during a
  382. 16:22dry summer. A fire then breaks out,
  383. 16:24which also fulfills Section 306, for
  384. 16:27example, negligent arson. You ask
  385. 16:29yourself, well, would a careful,
  386. 16:32conscientious person in the concrete
  387. 16:34situation and social role of our camper
  388. 16:37here build a fire in the middle of a
  389. 16:40dry forest? Of course not. Then you ask
  390. 16:45about objective foreseeability. Well,
  391. 16:48did they have to realize that such a
  392. 16:50fire, a campfire, could lead to a large
  393. 16:53fire? Of course one must realize that,
  394. 16:56logically. Objective imputation, as you
  395. 16:59are aware. So, you ask yourself, was a
  396. 17:02legally disapproved risk created here
  397. 17:05that manifested in the factual outcome?
  398. 17:09Strictly speaking, you can—and this
  399. 17:11is sometimes done in the literature—
  400. 17:14even leave these two aspects out and
  401. 17:16only focus on objective imputation.
  402. 17:20Because if you ask whether someone has
  403. 17:22created a legally disapproved risk,
  404. 17:24then this legal disapproval is already
  405. 17:26the breach of duty, the breach of the
  406. 17:28duty of care. For if someone creates a
  407. 17:31risk that is not legally disapproved,
  408. 17:33they are not committing a breach of the
  409. 17:35duty of care. Conversely. You can only
  410. 17:38create a legally disapproved, a legally
  411. 17:41prohibited risk if you violate a duty
  412. 17:43of care. And objective foreseeability
  413. 17:48is actually nothing other than what we
  414. 17:50also ask ourselves when we pose the
  415. 17:52question: did this risk that was
  416. 17:54created here manifest itself in the
  417. 17:56outcome? For then we are asking exactly
  418. 18:00that: well, should this risk be
  419. 18:02prevented because these outcomes that
  420. 18:04have now occurred are threatening? As a
  421. 18:09result, if you choose this structure,
  422. 18:12you have removed the element of
  423. 18:14disapproved risk creation and the
  424. 18:16element of foreseeability from
  425. 18:18objective imputation, so that you
  426. 18:21ultimately only examine whether the
  427. 18:23protective purpose is fulfilled or
  428. 18:26violated, depending on the case. So the
  429. 18:30question in our fire case: why are you
  430. 18:32not allowed to build a fire in the
  431. 18:35forest during dry conditions? Well,
  432. 18:37because exactly that can happen,
  433. 18:39because it can lead to a major wildfire
  434. 18:40. That would be the protective purpose
  435. 18:44of the norm playing a role here, and
  436. 18:46the causal link of duty, which would be
  437. 18:48the question: did exactly this risk
  438. 18:50actually materialize, the very risk
  439. 18:52that was supposed to be prevented? And
  440. 18:57perhaps you remember the cases of
  441. 18:59lawful alternative behavior. That is,
  442. 19:02the case where someone can say, well,
  443. 19:05had I driven as fast as permitted, this
  444. 19:07very accident would still have happened
  445. 19:10. You remember the case of our drunk
  446. 19:13driver who can later say, well, had I
  447. 19:17driven as fast as allowed, even a sober
  448. 19:20driver could not have prevented this
  449. 19:24accident. And those are constellations
  450. 19:27where we can say that the breach of
  451. 19:29duty is missing. So, I can refer back
  452. 19:32to what we discussed in the context of
  453. 19:34objective attribution. Illegality is
  454. 19:37not a problem. The same applies here as
  455. 19:39applies otherwise. This means that
  456. 19:41self-defense is fundamentally
  457. 19:42conceivable in negligence offenses as
  458. 19:44well. Take an offender who defends
  459. 19:47themselves in self-defense, but does
  460. 19:51not actually intend to harm the
  461. 19:53attacker, does not expect any injury,
  462. 19:55yet ends up injuring the attacker
  463. 19:56anyway. Then you can simply examine
  464. 20:00self-defense, even in the context of a
  465. 20:02negligence offense. This is, of course,
  466. 20:04especially relevant for bodily harm
  467. 20:06resulting in death. The victim defends
  468. 20:08themselves with physical force, knows
  469. 20:10they will injure the attacker, but does
  470. 20:12not expect a fatal outcome, yet a fatal
  471. 20:15outcome occurs. This means that even
  472. 20:18with these crimes qualified by their
  473. 20:19result, a justification through
  474. 20:21self-defense can naturally occur. Let's
  475. 20:27look at culpability. We can address
  476. 20:30that briefly. In bar exam questions,
  477. 20:33there are very, very few cases where
  478. 20:34this plays a role, and yet it is still
  479. 20:36constantly done incorrectly in those
  480. 20:38exams. What does subjective breach of
  481. 20:41the duty of care mean? It means we look
  482. 20:45at the specific perpetrator and ask:
  483. 20:48could they even meet the objective
  484. 20:50requirements that society placed on
  485. 20:52them? The second step is then: could
  486. 20:57this specific perpetrator even foresee
  487. 21:00that the result would occur? There is a
  488. 21:03well-known case on this topic where the
  489. 21:06Federal Court of Justice's solution is
  490. 21:08humanly absolutely understandable, but
  491. 21:10still a bit difficult in terms of
  492. 21:12criminal law dogmatics. There was a
  493. 21:14case that the Kaiserslautern Regional
  494. 21:17Court had to decide. That was the
  495. 21:20pudding case. A four-or five-year-old
  496. 21:25child had sprinkled what she thought
  497. 21:27was sugar onto her chocolate pudding.
  498. 21:32She ate it by the spoonful and then
  499. 21:34realized, yuck, that's salt. The mother
  500. 21:39, for educational reasons, did not want
  501. 21:42to let the child throw the pudding away
  502. 21:45and forced the child to eat it. This
  503. 21:49ultimately led to the death of the
  504. 21:50child, because a certain amount of salt
  505. 21:52is simply lethal. Um, in ancient times,
  506. 21:56some cultures supposedly used the
  507. 21:57consumption of massive amounts of salt
  508. 21:59as a method of suicide. Whether that's
  509. 22:01actually true, I don't know. Um, but I
  510. 22:03think it's generally known that too
  511. 22:05much salt, and not just over a long
  512. 22:07period, can cause massive acute damage.
  513. 22:11And in this case, it came down to two
  514. 22:13questions. First, the question of
  515. 22:15whether the mother committed bodily
  516. 22:18harm resulting in death against her
  517. 22:21daughter, and second, whether it was
  518. 22:23dangerous bodily harm. It was clear to
  519. 22:27everyone involved that there was no
  520. 22:29need to sanction this mother with
  521. 22:30criminal law anymore. That, uh, would
  522. 22:33have been ineffective in this case. And
  523. 22:37the Federal Court of Justice ultimately
  524. 22:39decided not to assume bodily harm
  525. 22:41resulting in death, or rather, the case
  526. 22:43law rejected it. It was stated here
  527. 22:47that, in principle, it is of course
  528. 22:50recognizable that an excessive amount
  529. 22:52of salt for a toddler—I believe it
  530. 22:55was more than 0.5 grams of salt per
  531. 22:57kilo of body weight—is lethal. And
  532. 23:01for a four-year-old, I don't know how
  533. 23:02much she weighed, but you can calculate
  534. 23:04how much salt that must have been. Um,
  535. 23:07it is fundamentally a breach of duty of
  536. 23:09care to force a child to eat that much
  537. 23:11salt. And it was also foreseeable
  538. 23:14because it is part of general medical
  539. 23:17knowledge. And then they said, well,
  540. 23:20could she do that in her specific
  541. 23:22situation? Did she commit a breach of
  542. 23:24duty of care, and could she have
  543. 23:26foreseen it? And there, the court—
  544. 23:29perhaps out of consideration for the
  545. 23:31mother's personality—said: No, in
  546. 23:32this specific case, she could not have
  547. 23:34foreseen it. And the interesting thing
  548. 23:37about the case is, of course, um, that
  549. 23:38the Federal Court of Justice can hardly
  550. 23:40intervene in this assessment of whether
  551. 23:44she could have foreseen it. That has to
  552. 23:47be decided by the trial court. And if
  553. 23:49the trial court took the initiative
  554. 23:51here and said, we assume she could not
  555. 23:53foresee it, therefore we will not
  556. 23:54punish her. The minimum sentence would
  557. 23:57have been three years. Um, in this way,
  558. 24:00it is harsh, but we will leave it at
  559. 24:02that, then that is certainly
  560. 24:03understandable. Whether it is legally
  561. 24:06correct in terms of criminal law, we
  562. 24:07can argue about that. Because for what
  563. 24:09reason was it not foreseeable for this
  564. 24:12mother, even though it belongs to
  565. 24:14general medical knowledge? So, you
  566. 24:18notice, it seems—at least to me it
  567. 24:19seems—to be more of a humane decision
  568. 24:21, which is probably correct in the
  569. 24:22matter, rather than one that is
  570. 24:23understandable in terms of criminal law
  571. 24:25dogma. What does that mean for you in
  572. 24:27the exam? It means for you in the exam
  573. 24:30that when dealing with negligence
  574. 24:31offenses, you should please carefully
  575. 24:33examine the elements of the crime, then
  576. 24:35the unlawfulness, and then in the
  577. 24:37culpability section, briefly establish
  578. 24:39that this action was also subjectively
  579. 24:41contrary to the duty of care and that
  580. 24:43the result was subjectively foreseeable
  581. 24:45. Unless there is clear information
  582. 24:48indicating that this is a situation
  583. 24:51where we cannot assume such criminal
  584. 24:54liability. Yes, so the question now is,
  585. 24:57what do I do if we have special
  586. 24:59knowledge in such constellations? The
  587. 25:02discussion about special knowledge
  588. 25:04takes place here, and it is said that
  589. 25:06we determine the objective breach of
  590. 25:08duty of care differently. We will see
  591. 25:11that in a moment. Um, you can recognize
  592. 25:13it from that as well. An act is not
  593. 25:15committed in breach of the objective
  594. 25:17duty of care if a conscientious and
  595. 25:18prudent member of the relevant circle
  596. 25:20of persons would have acted in the same
  597. 25:22way in the social role and concrete
  598. 25:23situation of the perpetrator. So let's
  599. 25:26take the mother who is a doctor or, um,
  600. 25:29a pharmacologist, or at any rate, she
  601. 25:32knows her way around. Um, at that
  602. 25:36moment, however, she didn't have it on
  603. 25:38her radar. But she definitely should
  604. 25:40have known. Then we would tie the
  605. 25:43requirements to that; if a
  606. 25:45conscientious and prudent
  607. 25:47pharmacologist would have acted in the
  608. 25:49same way, we would say, yes, well, she
  609. 25:51should have known that, so we are
  610. 25:53definitely in there. And for
  611. 25:57culpability, we would check that again.
  612. 25:59So you base it on special knowledge,
  613. 26:01but on objectifiable special knowledge.
  614. 26:05It becomes problematic, of course—and
  615. 26:07that’s where it gets interesting—
  616. 26:09what if she isn't a pharmacologist, but
  617. 26:12just read a report shortly before about
  618. 26:14the lethal effects of salt? That isn't
  619. 26:17really objectifiable in that way. And
  620. 26:19yet, in that situation, one would
  621. 26:21probably say that it belongs to the
  622. 26:23perpetrator's concrete situation if the
  623. 26:26perpetrator knows it and should have
  624. 26:28remembered it. But that is one of the
  625. 26:30major problems. That is, in fact, one
  626. 26:32reason why part of the literature says
  627. 26:34we must include the entire perpetrator
  628. 26:35personality in the objective act and
  629. 26:37not just the subjective side. You must
  630. 26:42determine the circle of persons based
  631. 26:44on long-term perpetrator
  632. 26:45characteristics such as professional
  633. 26:46position or long-term or repeatedly
  634. 26:48performed activities. And that way,
  635. 26:51standardized special skills are also
  636. 26:53captured. The problem, of course, is
  637. 26:56how do I determine the circle of
  638. 26:57persons? In an exam, however, you
  639. 27:00should first do the following. Consider
  640. 27:03, when it comes to determining such
  641. 27:05standards of care, where might I find
  642. 27:08regulations? A large area of
  643. 27:12regulations, when it comes to negligent
  644. 27:14commission, as you can imagine, is
  645. 27:16traffic law, the Road Traffic
  646. 27:18Regulations, the Road Traffic Act.
  647. 27:20These rules that are in there, how to
  648. 27:22overtake, that you have to look behind
  649. 27:24you when reversing, that you shouldn't
  650. 27:26drive too fast, that you have to keep
  651. 27:28your distance. These are all
  652. 27:31regulations that determine how the
  653. 27:33conscientious and particular member of
  654. 27:35the relevant group, for instance, the
  655. 27:37particular and conscientious driver in
  656. 27:39this case, must behave. He must adhere
  657. 27:42to all traffic rules. That is a bit
  658. 27:46utopian, because everyone speeds at
  659. 27:47some point, but that is the requirement
  660. 27:49we have here. If you have a different
  661. 27:52group of people, for instance, if you
  662. 27:54have a doctor, then you must ask: what
  663. 27:56is the medical standard? You can figure
  664. 27:59that out yourselves in the exam, and in
  665. 28:01that case, you almost have to accept
  666. 28:03everything. Or you are simply given
  667. 28:05that information in the exam. In a
  668. 28:09state exam not too long ago, it was
  669. 28:12about a father who ran over his own
  670. 28:15child while reversing his car. The
  671. 28:21issue was criminal negligence, and at
  672. 28:23the bottom of the exam paper, under the
  673. 28:26instructions, section 5 of the Road
  674. 28:28Traffic Regulations—I believe it was
  675. 28:30—was printed, detailing the rules for
  676. 28:32reversing; you should have been smart
  677. 28:34enough to look at it and use it as a
  678. 28:37basis. It surprised me a lot that about
  679. 28:40half of the exam candidates did not
  680. 28:41incorporate this section 5 of the Road
  681. 28:43Traffic Regulations into their
  682. 28:44arguments at all. It explicitly stated
  683. 28:46how one must reverse, that one must be
  684. 28:48considerate, that one must have someone
  685. 28:50guide them if necessary, and so on. So,
  686. 28:52it contained details that one could
  687. 28:54have used. That means you should take
  688. 28:57the "respective circle of traffic"
  689. 28:59almost literally. Look at the
  690. 29:02respective regulations; if you have
  691. 29:04building law regulations, which must be
  692. 29:07provided, or specific requirements—I
  693. 29:10remember a case I experienced as an
  694. 29:12intern at the local court. Um, someone
  695. 29:17had an excursion restaurant, and behind
  696. 29:19it in the garden was a slurry pit, and
  697. 29:22a child fell onto the lid of the pit,
  698. 29:25broke through, and died—drowned in
  699. 29:27the slurry. The question ultimately was
  700. 29:32how the lid of such a slurry pit—
  701. 29:34which was completely rusted, otherwise
  702. 29:36it wouldn't have broken when the child
  703. 29:38stepped on it—should be constructed.
  704. 29:42The expert witness testified that it
  705. 29:44had to meet certain DIN standards and
  706. 29:46withstand a pressure of 1.8 tons, or
  707. 29:48whatever it was, and the lid, of course
  708. 29:50, did not meet that. So, it was said
  709. 29:54that we have a standard for the
  710. 29:56relevant group—homeowners who have
  711. 29:58such a slurry pit and must cover it—
  712. 30:00and then the corresponding DIN
  713. 30:02standards. It is clear that you don't
  714. 30:05have a suitcase full of DIN standards
  715. 30:07with you, so they must be provided to
  716. 30:09you along the way. That is, of course,
  717. 30:11a bit more difficult in the real life
  718. 30:13of a lawyer. You have to find that
  719. 30:14standard first. In case of doubt, the
  720. 30:19principle applies that avoidable
  721. 30:21dangers to the legal interests of
  722. 30:23others must be avoided. At least that
  723. 30:26is what Mormann says in his basic
  724. 30:27criminal law course. You have to be
  725. 30:28very careful there, of course. How far
  726. 30:30must one go in avoiding doubtful
  727. 30:32dangers? I would then weigh that up.
  728. 30:34And if you have no idea what to do,
  729. 30:36well, then you follow your gut feeling.
  730. 30:40Often, it is the case that you can
  731. 30:42barely say what constitutes an act that
  732. 30:44lacks due care if you don't have clear
  733. 30:46rules, and there are many areas where
  734. 30:48there are no clear rules, although one
  735. 30:50is sometimes very surprised that there
  736. 30:52are, in fact, rules for many areas. And
  737. 30:57in that area, for example, a soccer
  738. 30:59rule of the German Football Association
  739. 31:02or handball rules or the rules for
  740. 31:04whatever else could apply. Um, there
  741. 31:07are also injuries in badminton, if I
  742. 31:09recall correctly. I remember well
  743. 31:11playing doubles with my sister and, um,
  744. 31:14she didn't quite hit it right. Um, then
  745. 31:17there was a black eye. Um, you
  746. 31:19obviously can't prevent that with rules
  747. 31:21. Um, right. So, as already mentioned,
  748. 31:26the standards of the road traffic
  749. 31:28regulations, the road traffic act, or
  750. 31:29other protective laws are what you have
  751. 31:31to look at. If there are no rules, then
  752. 31:34you fall back on this general principle
  753. 31:36that you have here. So, you base it on
  754. 31:39the conscientious and prudent member of
  755. 31:41the relevant group. Additionally, it
  756. 31:44should be noted that the principle of
  757. 31:46trust and permitted risk also applies.
  758. 31:49What does that mean? It means that you
  759. 31:52cannot act negligently if you follow
  760. 31:55all the rules. That sounds very
  761. 31:59plausible and straightforward, but it
  762. 32:01can certainly become relevant at times.
  763. 32:04Imagine you are driving your car in
  764. 32:10accordance with traffic rules. You were
  765. 32:12doing 30 mph in the city and there is
  766. 32:14no reason not to. You see no children
  767. 32:16playing on the side of the road and
  768. 32:18there is no warning sign. Um, that
  769. 32:20there is a school nearby or whatever.
  770. 32:23And now someone runs into your car and
  771. 32:26you say: "Yes, I couldn't have
  772. 32:28prevented that. I followed the traffic
  773. 32:30rules, the other person did not. What
  774. 32:32am I supposed to do?" You will be heard
  775. 32:35with this argument; the principle of
  776. 32:37trust means that whoever acts with due
  777. 32:40care themselves is entitled to demand
  778. 32:42and expect the same from others, as
  779. 32:45long as there are no indications that
  780. 32:47the other person will not exercise such
  781. 32:50care. That means if you see children
  782. 32:54playing with a ball on the side of the
  783. 32:56road—like those typical images you
  784. 32:57might know from your driving test,
  785. 32:59where the ball rolls into the street—
  786. 33:01you can't just say, "Well, I didn't
  787. 33:03expect a child to jump out after it,"
  788. 33:05and keep driving at 50. So, in
  789. 33:08situations like that, if you see
  790. 33:10someone staggering along the side of
  791. 33:12the road while drunk, you must be
  792. 33:14prepared to brake. If children are
  793. 33:16playing on the side of the road, you
  794. 33:18must be prepared to brake. If for any
  795. 33:20other reason you recognize that people
  796. 33:22likely won't follow the rules, you
  797. 33:25cannot rely on the principle of trust.
  798. 33:28But imagine if we all drove so slowly
  799. 33:30in traffic that we were always ready to
  800. 33:33brake, that we could avoid every single
  801. 33:35accident at any time. Well, then we
  802. 33:38would be driving at a walking pace
  803. 33:39everywhere. And that is where German
  804. 33:43traffic law, and criminal law as well,
  805. 33:45says: that is a risk. Of course, if you
  806. 33:48drive faster than a walking pace, you
  807. 33:50are taking a risk, but it is a
  808. 33:51permitted risk, and that is where the
  809. 33:53principle of trust applies. You must
  810. 33:58objectively assess the breach of duty.
  811. 34:00We have already done much of this in
  812. 34:02the context of the objective elements
  813. 34:04of intentional offenses. Often, rules
  814. 34:07of social conduct play a role here, but
  815. 34:10not everything that is socially common
  816. 34:12is also permitted, because it is
  817. 34:15socially common to drive 10 km/h faster
  818. 34:17than the traffic signs indicate. That
  819. 34:20is quite common, perhaps even 20 km/h.
  820. 34:23Many say, "Well, then I'll just get a
  821. 34:25ticket for up to 50 euros or so; I'll
  822. 34:27accept that." That may be socially
  823. 34:29common, but it is far from permitted.
  824. 34:31That still constitutes the creation of
  825. 34:33a legally relevant risk. Often, the
  826. 34:37constitutional protection of certain
  827. 34:40behaviors must also be taken into
  828. 34:42account. That means if certain actions
  829. 34:44create a danger but are part of a
  830. 34:46profession, then Article 12 can mean
  831. 34:49that these dangers must be accepted by
  832. 34:51the general public. And to specify
  833. 34:55these abstract balancing criteria,
  834. 34:57permission standards have developed—
  835. 35:00that is, regulations that allow certain
  836. 35:04risks but also limit them. The
  837. 35:07principle of trust must be taken into
  838. 35:09account. Self-endangerment must be
  839. 35:10taken into account. So, if someone
  840. 35:12endangers themselves, you are not
  841. 35:14responsible as a negligent perpetrator.
  842. 35:17Or consensual endangerment of others
  843. 35:19can also play a role here and eliminate
  844. 35:22negligence altogether. I mentioned
  845. 35:27earlier that a minority view here wants
  846. 35:29to examine the subjective breach of the
  847. 35:32duty of care within the offense itself,
  848. 35:34meaning to ask whether the specific
  849. 35:37perpetrator acted contrary to the duty
  850. 35:39of care—not because they violated
  851. 35:41general rules applicable to everyone,
  852. 35:44but because they might be unable to
  853. 35:46meet certain requirements due to
  854. 35:48personal, subjective deficits. And uh,
  855. 35:53the prevailing opinion says: "No, that
  856. 35:55is a question of culpability." Take,
  857. 35:58for example, the doctor who performs a
  858. 36:01surgery even though they are not
  859. 36:04qualified to perform it at all. That
  860. 36:08would be a case where one would say,
  861. 36:10well, they are violating the rules, but
  862. 36:12they couldn't have performed the
  863. 36:14operation anyway because they lacked
  864. 36:15the necessary skills. This does not
  865. 36:19mean that such a doctor, who takes on
  866. 36:20an operation they cannot perform, would
  867. 36:21not be punishable. They would then
  868. 36:23simply not be punished for the faulty
  869. 36:25operation, but rather punished for
  870. 36:26having taken on the operation in the
  871. 36:28first place. This is what we call "
  872. 36:30assumption of duty" negligence. This
  873. 36:32means that if I am in a specific
  874. 36:34situation and cannot meet the
  875. 36:36requirements, then I am acting without
  876. 36:38fault. But then I must be held
  877. 36:41accountable for the fact that I should
  878. 36:43never have taken on that operation, and
  879. 36:44the charge of negligence can be applied
  880. 36:46to that. The question is, how narrowly
  881. 36:48can I define the circle of relevant
  882. 36:50activity? There is a discussion about
  883. 36:51that. What do I do if I have an
  884. 36:54outstanding specialist who is vastly
  885. 36:57superior to their colleagues, for
  886. 36:59instance, a doctor? They are the only
  887. 37:02one who can perform a certain operation
  888. 37:04at that level. And now they behave like
  889. 37:07a perfectly normal top-tier surgeon.
  890. 37:11And a top-tier surgeon would have made
  891. 37:13that same mistake; the patient would
  892. 37:15have been injured. But in reality, this
  893. 37:17surgeon, who is an absolute exception,
  894. 37:19would not have. Then the question would
  895. 37:22be: Are they punished because they
  896. 37:25worked poorly by their own standards?
  897. 37:27For everyone else, it would still have
  898. 37:29been a top-tier performance. This is
  899. 37:31being debated. Part of the legal
  900. 37:33literature says: "Yes, everyone must
  901. 37:35work at their own level, and if I allow
  902. 37:37myself mistakes at my highest level,
  903. 37:39then I will be punished for those
  904. 37:41mistakes." Others say that while you
  905. 37:45must use your skills, that would
  906. 37:47penalize the absolute expert, because
  907. 37:49higher demands—including criminal law
  908. 37:52demands—would be placed on them. Both
  909. 37:54sides are well-argued. I would be
  910. 37:58uncertain myself about what stance I
  911. 37:59would take there. There is a lot to be
  912. 38:02said for the argument that everyone
  913. 38:04must use all their skills to prevent
  914. 38:05harm. But on the other hand, you would
  915. 38:08have to say, well, just because he is
  916. 38:10particularly gifted, he shouldn't
  917. 38:12actually be worse off under criminal
  918. 38:14law. Let's look at foreseeability. So
  919. 38:18the first thing we looked at was the
  920. 38:20breach of duty. The second is then the
  921. 38:22question of foreseeability. Here we
  922. 38:24must ask the question, whether, based
  923. 38:28on experience, a result occurred that
  924. 38:31was inherent in the breach of duty, in
  925. 38:34the breach of the duty of care. So was
  926. 38:38it foreseeable that this specific fatal
  927. 38:41or injury result would occur? Here, too
  928. 38:47, the breach of duty of care and the
  929. 38:49foreseeability are actually to be
  930. 38:51determined objectively, but from the
  931. 38:53individual perspective of the actor,
  932. 38:56taking into account all the
  933. 38:57circumstances of the individual case.
  934. 39:00That means we put ourselves in the
  935. 39:03perpetrator's individual perspective.
  936. 39:06We cannot simply assume some
  937. 39:08third-party perspective and ask
  938. 39:10ourselves from their point of view—
  939. 39:13looking through their eyes—how
  940. 39:15foreseeability should be assessed here,
  941. 39:17if we take all the circumstances of the
  942. 39:20individual case into account. We
  943. 39:23therefore consider his sources of
  944. 39:26information, how much time he has to
  945. 39:29assess and evaluate that information,
  946. 39:33and it is also important that we cannot
  947. 39:37really demand more than that our
  948. 39:40perpetrator could have acquired the
  949. 39:43knowledge regarding the occurrence of
  950. 39:46the result in that concrete situation.
  951. 39:51What does that mean? If we have someone
  952. 39:55who could theoretically have foreseen
  953. 39:58the result, but if he had fulfilled all
  954. 40:01his duties and still would not have
  955. 40:04seen the result as a possible
  956. 40:06consequence, then we cannot assume
  957. 40:09foreseeability. This means that for
  958. 40:13foreseeability, we must ultimately be
  959. 40:15guided by what is possible based on
  960. 40:17experience. However, that is rarely
  961. 40:20where the problems lie in an exam. In
  962. 40:23most cases regarding negligence, it is
  963. 40:25simply important to subsume it cleanly
  964. 40:27and to look at the objective imputation
  965. 40:29. In a rule of thumb, recognizability
  966. 40:33is affirmed if there was a specific
  967. 40:35reason for the action to consider the
  968. 40:37possibility of the realization of the
  969. 40:38offense. What does that mean? It means
  970. 40:43that a result was recognizable if our
  971. 40:46perpetrator carried out the action and
  972. 40:49anyone else should have thought about
  973. 40:51the fact that exactly this result would
  974. 40:54occur. This means that here, too, we
  975. 40:58have a certain negligence element, a
  976. 41:00certain breach-of-duty element. We are
  977. 41:03telling him, well, if you had thought
  978. 41:04about it properly, you would have
  979. 41:06immediately realized that this result
  980. 41:07would occur. Here you also have the
  981. 41:13table salt case again, which I referred
  982. 41:16to earlier as the pudding case. It was
  983. 41:19a four-year-old daughter who weighed 15
  984. 41:21kg, and 0.5 to 1 g of table salt per
  985. 41:24kilogram of body weight, according to
  986. 41:26the findings of the Federal Court of
  987. 41:28Justice, usually leads to death. We
  988. 41:32discussed the case, and here you also
  989. 41:35have the excerpts from the decision.
  990. 41:40And there, the regional court—or
  991. 41:41rather the Federal Court of Justice—
  992. 41:43states that the regional court clearly
  993. 41:45explained that the defendant, through
  994. 41:47no fault of her own, had no knowledge
  995. 41:49that even small amounts of table salt
  996. 41:51could cause life-threatening poisoning
  997. 41:53in a child. I said a few things about
  998. 41:56that earlier. Foreseeability, as you
  999. 42:01can see from the number of slides, is
  1000. 42:03not the decisive problem. We have
  1001. 42:06already dealt with the breach of duty
  1002. 42:08connection in the context of
  1003. 42:10intentional offenses. Here are a few
  1004. 42:13more aspects that play a special role
  1005. 42:15in negligence offenses. Here, too, you
  1006. 42:20must of course examine whether the
  1007. 42:23breach of duty that was committed led
  1008. 42:25to the result in such a way that the
  1009. 42:28breach of duty is a condition that
  1010. 42:31cannot be omitted. This means you have
  1011. 42:35to ask yourself what would have
  1012. 42:37happened if our perpetrator had acted
  1013. 42:40lawfully—for example, if he had
  1014. 42:42observed the prescribed speed limit or
  1015. 42:45if he had been driving sober instead of
  1016. 42:47drunk. And then these problems often
  1017. 42:51arise, which occur when an expert
  1018. 42:56witness in a criminal trial determines,
  1019. 42:58"Well, if our perpetrator had only been
  1020. 43:00driving at the prescribed 50 km/h, the
  1021. 43:03accident would have happened anyway."
  1022. 43:06Or if the expert determines that the
  1023. 43:09accused was indeed intoxicated—and
  1024. 43:13intoxicated to such an extent that he
  1025. 43:16could no longer safely operate the
  1026. 43:19vehicle—but under the given
  1027. 43:22conditions, even a sober driver could
  1028. 43:26not have prevented this accident
  1029. 43:29because it was unavoidable even for a
  1030. 43:32careful driver. In these cases, the
  1031. 43:36case law says—regarding the
  1032. 43:38intoxicated driver, we already
  1033. 43:40mentioned that the case law handles it
  1034. 43:42a bit differently—because they come
  1035. 43:44up with the idea that an intoxicated
  1036. 43:46driver should be extra careful, thus
  1037. 43:49developing the figure of the "careful
  1038. 43:51drunk driver." But in principle,
  1039. 43:55according to the so-called avoidability
  1040. 43:58theory, the case law states that a
  1041. 44:00breach of duty of care is not causal
  1042. 44:02for a result—meaning the breach of
  1043. 44:05duty is not causal, so the connection
  1044. 44:07of the breach of duty does not exist.
  1045. 44:12So please do not confuse this with the
  1046. 44:13causality of the action; this is about
  1047. 44:15the causality of the breach of duty. It
  1048. 44:18is therefore not causal if it is not
  1049. 44:20established with near-certain
  1050. 44:22probability that the result would have
  1051. 44:24occurred even without the breach of
  1052. 44:26duty. This means that in court
  1053. 44:29proceedings, or possibly earlier during
  1054. 44:32the preliminary proceedings by the
  1055. 44:34public prosecutor's office, you must
  1056. 44:37determine whether this breach of duty
  1057. 44:39was the cause or the trigger for this
  1058. 44:42result with near-certain probability.
  1059. 44:47And if you cannot determine that, then
  1060. 44:49the connection of the breach of duty is
  1061. 44:51missing. This means the nexus of duty
  1062. 44:55violation that we are examining here
  1063. 44:58ultimately arises from the question of
  1064. 45:01whether, if you mentally remove the
  1065. 45:03duty violation, the outcome would still
  1066. 45:06have occurred. And if you mentally
  1067. 45:10remove the duty violation—speeding or
  1068. 45:13drunk driving—and, this is very
  1069. 45:15important, replace it with compliant
  1070. 45:17behavior, and the outcome would still
  1071. 45:19have occurred, then we are not dealing
  1072. 45:22with objectively imputable outcomes. In
  1073. 45:26other words, it is crucial here that
  1074. 45:29you cannot simply think away the duty
  1075. 45:31violation in the sense that nothing
  1076. 45:34remains; rather, it is a logical
  1077. 45:36consequence that when you think away
  1078. 45:38the duty violation, lawful, compliant
  1079. 45:41behavior takes its place. So, when you
  1080. 45:45have such a case where the expert
  1081. 45:47states that with compliant behavior the
  1082. 45:50outcome would likely have occurred
  1083. 45:52anyway, you examine the nexus of duty
  1084. 45:55violation and determine that if they
  1085. 45:58had driven properly, the outcome would
  1086. 46:00likely have occurred, meaning the nexus
  1087. 46:03of duty violation is absent. The theory
  1088. 46:06of risk enhancement, supported by part
  1089. 46:08of the legal literature, sees this a
  1090. 46:10bit differently and says it ultimately
  1091. 46:12depends on the increase in risk. The
  1092. 46:15duty violation is already considered
  1093. 46:16causal in that case. According to this
  1094. 46:18view, there is already a nexus of duty
  1095. 46:21violation if the perpetrator has
  1096. 46:23increased the risk of infringement of a
  1097. 46:25legal interest for the victim. That
  1098. 46:29means if an expert says, I cannot rule
  1099. 46:32out that the accident would have
  1100. 46:34occurred even if the perpetrator had
  1101. 46:37driven at the permitted 50 instead of
  1102. 46:39the prohibited 60. But it is relatively
  1103. 46:44certain, or established with a
  1104. 46:46probability bordering on certainty,
  1105. 46:48that the victim would have had a better
  1106. 46:51chance of escaping the accident in that
  1107. 46:53case. Then this view argues that victim
  1108. 46:58interests are better served if we say
  1109. 47:01it is sufficient here that the risk of
  1110. 47:04the outcome occurring has been
  1111. 47:07increased. It does not have to be
  1112. 47:09established with certainty bordering on
  1113. 47:11the absolute that the outcome would
  1114. 47:12have been avoided. It is sufficient
  1115. 47:16that speeding or other negligent
  1116. 47:18behavior simply increased the risk of
  1117. 47:21the outcome occurring. And the
  1118. 47:25justification for this is ultimately
  1119. 47:27victim interests. Arguments raised
  1120. 47:30against this view state that such a
  1121. 47:32solution contradicts the principle of
  1122. 47:34in dubio pro reo, because it assumes an
  1123. 47:37outcome is imputed even though
  1124. 47:39causality cannot be proven. Whether
  1125. 47:44this is truly a violation of the in
  1126. 47:47dubio pro reo principle is certainly
  1127. 47:50debatable, because the principle of
  1128. 47:54doubt—in dubio pro reo—is violated
  1129. 47:57if I cannot establish the facts
  1130. 48:00necessary for a legal decision against
  1131. 48:04the defendant, yet I convict them
  1132. 48:07anyway. That is the case where in dubio
  1133. 48:10pro reo would be violated. But here we
  1134. 48:12are dealing with a different case. We
  1135. 48:15are not saying—and this theory of
  1136. 48:18increased risk is not saying—that the
  1137. 48:20facts cannot be determined; rather,
  1138. 48:23this view actually says, well, we have
  1139. 48:25established the fact that a risk exists
  1140. 48:28. We are simply changing the criteria
  1141. 48:30by which we measure the facts. In other
  1142. 48:33words, this view states that causality
  1143. 48:36is not the causation of a result, but
  1144. 48:38rather that causality here is the
  1145. 48:41increase of risk. And for that reason,
  1146. 48:43it can hardly be said that the
  1147. 48:44principle of*in dubio pro reo*is
  1148. 48:46violated. But one can certainly ask:
  1149. 48:49why are we focusing on the increase of
  1150. 48:51risk here? Ultimately, this turns the
  1151. 48:55result-based crime, the injury offense,
  1152. 48:58into a endangerment offense. What does
  1153. 49:01that mean? If we say that the fact that
  1154. 49:04the risk has been increased is
  1155. 49:06sufficient, then we are not punishing
  1156. 49:08our perpetrator for causing the result,
  1157. 49:10but for increasing the risk. And you
  1158. 49:14are typically punished for an increase
  1159. 49:16in risk when we are dealing with an
  1160. 49:18endangerment offense. An endangerment
  1161. 49:20offense, for example, is Section 315c,
  1162. 49:26that is an endangerment offense; it
  1163. 49:28states in the wording of the law in
  1164. 49:29paragraph 1 that one "thereby endangers
  1165. 49:32the life or limb of another person or
  1166. 49:34property of significant value." And in
  1167. 49:38Section 222 it says: "kills another
  1168. 49:41person," or in 229, "injures another
  1169. 49:44person." In this respect, the theory of
  1170. 49:48increased risk is prominently
  1171. 49:50represented in legal literature. One
  1172. 49:53probably also cannot argue, um, that
  1173. 49:56the principle of*in dubio pro reo*is
  1174. 49:58violated. But the prevailing view does
  1175. 50:00exactly that. So, the prevailing view
  1176. 50:01says that is a violation of*in dubio
  1177. 50:03pro reo*, though one must be careful
  1178. 50:05with this criticism. However, it is
  1179. 50:08certainly true that this theory of
  1180. 50:10increased risk turns an injury offense
  1181. 50:12—where someone is injured or someone
  1182. 50:14dies—into an endangerment offense if
  1183. 50:16you base criminal liability on the
  1184. 50:18increase of a risk, on the endangerment
  1185. 50:20, and no longer on the injury itself. I
  1186. 50:24am a bit unsure now; did we not cover
  1187. 50:27the case of the, um, careful drunk
  1188. 50:30driver in the first part, not even when
  1189. 50:33discussing duty violations? Right, okay
  1190. 50:35, then we will go through it in detail
  1191. 50:37now. Um, this is a problem that has
  1192. 50:40arisen in legal literature and in case
  1193. 50:43law. The situation is this: a
  1194. 50:45perpetrator drives a vehicle while
  1195. 50:47intoxicated and behaves in a way that a
  1196. 50:49conscientious and careful driver is
  1197. 50:51expected to behave. What does that mean
  1198. 50:53? Of course, he is not behaving like a
  1199. 50:57careful and conscientious driver simply
  1200. 51:00by driving while drunk, but imagine
  1201. 51:02someone driving with a 1.8 blood
  1202. 51:04alcohol level, but they are driving 50,
  1203. 51:07are ready to brake, and are not
  1204. 51:09swerving. There are just some people
  1205. 51:11who seem to drive properly only with a
  1206. 51:13blood alcohol level of 0.18%. No idea.
  1207. 51:16But when you sometimes hear that people
  1208. 51:18are pulled off the road with 0.55%and
  1209. 51:21only got caught in routine checks, then
  1210. 51:23you can imagine what this is about. So,
  1211. 51:27um, we are dealing with a driver who
  1212. 51:29exceeds the 0.11%limit, but otherwise
  1213. 51:32drove completely correctly. They were
  1214. 51:34only driving at 50 km/h. And now the
  1215. 51:37Federal Court of Justice says um, in
  1216. 51:42these cases, the question is not how a
  1217. 51:45careful driver would have driven
  1218. 51:48otherwise. So the question is not
  1219. 51:53whether a careful, sober driver would
  1220. 51:55also have driven 50, been ready to
  1221. 51:57brake, or behaved the same way in that
  1222. 52:00situation; rather, the Federal Court of
  1223. 52:03Justice asks how would the um, careful
  1224. 52:09intoxicated driver or drunken driver
  1225. 52:12have behaved? So the Federal Court of
  1226. 52:15Justice says we don't have to look at
  1227. 52:17lawful alternative behavior, but rather
  1228. 52:19ask ourselves how the drunken driver
  1229. 52:21should have behaved so that their
  1230. 52:23braking distance would be the same? And
  1231. 52:27the driver is then accused of the fact
  1232. 52:29that if you are drunk and driving, you
  1233. 52:31shouldn't be driving 50, but only 30.
  1234. 52:34And if they had only driven 30, the
  1235. 52:36braking distance would have been
  1236. 52:37shorter and the accident would have
  1237. 52:38been avoided. And that's where legal
  1238. 52:42scholars said, "Well, that is certainly
  1239. 52:45fascinating," and it is the almost
  1240. 52:47unanimous, I would say, unanimous view
  1241. 52:50of legal scholars, which says: The
  1242. 52:52Federal Court of Justice, and the
  1243. 52:54Bavarian Supreme Court before it, is
  1244. 52:57now replacing an unlawful act—driving
  1245. 52:59under the influence at 50 km/h—with
  1246. 53:02another, namely driving under the
  1247. 53:04influence, just a bit slower. Which of
  1248. 53:07course remains unlawful, instead of
  1249. 53:09replacing the unlawful variant with the
  1250. 53:12lawful one. And that is why the
  1251. 53:17prevailing opinion says you shouldn't
  1252. 53:20ask about the careful intoxicated or
  1253. 53:22drunken driver, but rather whether the
  1254. 53:25outcome would also have occurred if the
  1255. 53:28perpetrator had behaved like a sober
  1256. 53:30but otherwise careful driver. And that
  1257. 53:34is where the decisive formation of
  1258. 53:35hypotheses comes into play. By the way,
  1259. 53:38the case recently appeared in an exam
  1260. 53:40paper again. That's why the probability
  1261. 53:43of it appearing again is low, but it
  1262. 53:45can certainly occur again in these
  1263. 53:46constellations. As I just told you, it
  1264. 53:49is crucial which hypotheses you form.
  1265. 53:53You, you are only allowed to include an
  1266. 53:55alternative that would also be lawful,
  1267. 53:57otherwise you wouldn't be dealing with
  1268. 53:58lawful alternative behavior. And that
  1269. 54:01is why the approach of the Federal
  1270. 54:03Court of Justice is flawed by saying
  1271. 54:05here, "Well, I will now focus on the
  1272. 54:06careful drunken driver." In these
  1273. 54:09situations, I must focus on the person
  1274. 54:11acting lawfully. And that is why it is
  1275. 54:16correctly designated with the term or
  1276. 54:18the catchphrase "lawful alternative
  1277. 54:21conduct," and not just any alternative
  1278. 54:24conduct that protects legal interests;
  1279. 54:27it must be lawful. So, should you
  1280. 54:33encounter a case in the exam where the
  1281. 54:39perpetrator or the accused—I must say
  1282. 54:41the acting figure, since they
  1283. 54:42ultimately do not become the
  1284. 54:44perpetrator—causes a result, but a
  1285. 54:46person acting lawfully would also have
  1286. 54:48caused this result, then you must
  1287. 54:50examine closely: which alternative am I
  1288. 54:52constructing, i.e., what am I comparing
  1289. 54:54it to? And this hypothesis must be a
  1290. 54:58hypothesis of other lawful conduct. It
  1291. 55:01cannot simply be, as the Federal Court
  1292. 55:04of Justice did, the alternative of some
  1293. 55:06other conduct that somehow better
  1294. 55:08protects legal interests. Um, also
  1295. 55:14important here are alternative causes,
  1296. 55:16which we have already discussed; those
  1297. 55:18are the pile-up cases. So, if I as the
  1298. 55:21accused can say, "Yes, if I hadn't been
  1299. 55:24speeding there, the other person coming
  1300. 55:26behind me would have crashed into them
  1301. 55:28anyway." That is not a constellation
  1302. 55:31that is relevant here. We are not
  1303. 55:33dealing with alternative causes in
  1304. 55:36these constellations. So, the legality,
  1305. 55:39the replacement of an act with lawful
  1306. 55:42conduct. Um, that is not a question of
  1307. 55:45alternative causes, but rather a
  1308. 55:47question of the hypothesis of lawful
  1309. 55:49alternative conduct. The question of
  1310. 55:53the protective purpose of the norms is
  1311. 55:54something we have already discussed.
  1312. 55:55Therefore, I will repeat it briefly
  1313. 55:57here. We can only sanction someone if
  1314. 56:01the result brought about directly
  1315. 56:03involved the danger the norm was
  1316. 56:04intended to prevent and this danger
  1317. 56:06turned into harm. This means you must,
  1318. 56:10in particular, ask the question: are we
  1319. 56:13even dealing with the spatial and
  1320. 56:15material scope of protection of the
  1321. 56:17norm here? You all know the case. The
  1322. 56:21perpetrator runs a red light in
  1323. 56:23Mannheim, and because of that, arrives
  1324. 56:266 seconds earlier in Ludwigshafen. And
  1325. 56:29because they arrive at that spot, they
  1326. 56:31run over someone who just ran into the
  1327. 56:34street. There, they behave perfectly
  1328. 56:36according to traffic rules, perfectly
  1329. 56:38with due care, but not here in Mannheim
  1330. 56:40. And, um, there we have a
  1331. 56:43constellation where we can say, of
  1332. 56:45course, driving into the intersection
  1333. 56:47despite the red light signal is a
  1334. 56:48breach of duty. No question about it.
  1335. 56:52But this red light signal is only
  1336. 56:54intended to protect the intersection
  1337. 56:56area from danger and is not meant to
  1338. 56:58prevent you from arriving somewhere
  1339. 57:00else 6 seconds earlier. And that is why
  1340. 57:03this is not a case where the protective
  1341. 57:05scope of the norm is involved. We had
  1342. 57:07looked at another case. You might
  1343. 57:10remember: What if there’s a sign on
  1344. 57:12the highway that says “100 km/h for
  1345. 57:15noise control between 10 p.m. and 6
  1346. 57:17a.m.” and someone drives through
  1347. 57:19there at 3 a.m. at 180 km/h, resulting
  1348. 57:22in an accident? According to the
  1349. 57:26generally accepted view, you cannot say
  1350. 57:28the breach of duty lies solely in
  1351. 57:30violating the noise control regulation,
  1352. 57:32because the breach of duty must be
  1353. 57:34aimed at protecting the person—the
  1354. 57:36physical integrity of other people—
  1355. 57:39and that is not the case with noise
  1356. 57:41control. You could, of course, argue:
  1357. 57:44There is a recommended speed on
  1358. 57:46highways, and anyone who significantly
  1359. 57:47exceeds it could certainly be
  1360. 57:49committing a breach of duty. However,
  1361. 57:51this is highly controversial. Let us
  1362. 57:54look at the justification elements and
  1363. 57:55the unlawfulness elements of negligence
  1364. 57:57offenses. Um, regarding grounds for
  1365. 58:04justification, we obviously have a
  1366. 58:06significant problem with, um, the
  1367. 58:09subjective justification, or could we
  1368. 58:11have a significant problem with the
  1369. 58:14subjective justification element?
  1370. 58:18Because if you don’t even know that
  1371. 58:20you are acting in a way that is
  1372. 58:21criminally relevant, because you are
  1373. 58:23acting negligently, then it is
  1374. 58:25difficult for you to have the awareness
  1375. 58:27that you are justified. So, it is hard
  1376. 58:31to demand that you say, “Yes, I am
  1377. 58:33performing this act only because I know
  1378. 58:35that I can rely on a ground for
  1379. 58:36justification.” There are certainly
  1380. 58:40cases where that is possible, as it
  1381. 58:42could be that you are committing the
  1382. 58:43act with conscious negligence and know
  1383. 58:45that you could injure someone. You
  1384. 58:48actually rule it out, but you are aware
  1385. 58:50of the risk and also know that in that
  1386. 58:52specific case you are allowed to act
  1387. 58:54that way because you are justified. So,
  1388. 58:56in cases of conscious negligence, the
  1389. 58:58problem generally does not arise. In
  1390. 59:00cases of unconscious negligence, where
  1391. 59:02someone does not know they are acting
  1392. 59:04in breach of duty or that they could
  1393. 59:06bring about a result, they will rarely
  1394. 59:08think about whether they might be
  1395. 59:10justified. And that is why, in these
  1396. 59:13cases, the subjective element is left
  1397. 59:16aside. It is not required that a
  1398. 59:19subjective element be present in such
  1399. 59:21instances. So, if someone negligently
  1400. 59:23injures another person while acting in
  1401. 59:25self-defense, but is not aware of it,
  1402. 59:27then we are looking at impunity.
  1403. 59:28However, that is a constellation I have
  1404. 59:30not yet encountered in bar exam papers.
  1405. 59:35Regarding self-endangerment. Um, what
  1406. 59:39about cases where someone, um, injures
  1407. 59:42another and in doing so promotes
  1408. 59:44self-endangerment, or contributes to
  1409. 59:47self-endangerment? Um, consent to the
  1410. 59:51danger of the act justifies the injury
  1411. 59:53if the right-holder was aware of the
  1412. 59:55specific danger that the perpetrator
  1413. 59:56created through their behavior. What
  1414. 59:59does that mean? It means that for
  1415. 1:00:02negligence offenses, consent can
  1416. 1:00:04certainly be sufficient. These are, of
  1417. 1:00:09course, scenarios where someone
  1418. 1:00:11consents to physical injury, for
  1419. 1:00:13instance, but the danger of death is
  1420. 1:00:15also present. Take the simple case of a
  1421. 1:00:20surgery. A surgery that has a 5%risk of
  1422. 1:00:25ending fatally. The patient consents
  1423. 1:00:29because, in the weighing of options,
  1424. 1:00:32the consequences would be even worse,
  1425. 1:00:34and so they say, yes, I accept this 5%
  1426. 1:00:37risk that I could die during the, uh,
  1427. 1:00:39during the surgery. And there it is
  1428. 1:00:45assumed that criminal liability is not
  1429. 1:00:48an option if our later victim has
  1430. 1:00:51consented to the act that comes with
  1431. 1:00:55this danger. So, you can consent to
  1432. 1:00:59injuries, but consenting to a specific
  1433. 1:01:02danger can also lead to the exclusion
  1434. 1:01:05of criminal liability for the
  1435. 1:01:07endangerment. This is, by the way, the
  1436. 1:01:10reason why you can effectively consent
  1437. 1:01:12to life-threatening danger so the
  1438. 1:01:14perpetrator is not punished, but you
  1439. 1:01:17cannot consent to a fatal injury under
  1440. 1:01:19Section 216 of the German Criminal Code
  1441. 1:01:21. This means justification arises from
  1442. 1:01:26consensual endangerment. Um, and here,
  1443. 1:01:32the general limits must be observed.
  1444. 1:01:36This means only someone who has the
  1445. 1:01:38right to the legal interest themselves
  1446. 1:01:41can dispose of it. It must be a legal
  1447. 1:01:43interest that is open to disposition at
  1448. 1:01:45all. The person consenting must be
  1449. 1:01:47capable of consenting. They must
  1450. 1:01:48therefore recognize the dangers. They
  1451. 1:01:50must be able to assess the risks, and
  1452. 1:01:53they must have consented expressly,
  1453. 1:01:55prior to the act, and free from defects
  1454. 1:01:57of will, and the perpetrator must act
  1455. 1:01:59with knowledge of and based on that
  1456. 1:02:02consent. Here the question is whether
  1457. 1:02:06one can even speak of self-endangerment
  1458. 1:02:08. More accurately, one should actually
  1459. 1:02:10speak of consensual endangerment by
  1460. 1:02:13another. The, um, boundaries between
  1461. 1:02:15endangerment by another and
  1462. 1:02:16self-endangerment are, however, often
  1463. 1:02:18fluid. Take the example of car surfing.
  1464. 1:02:25Is that now endangerment by another or
  1465. 1:02:27self-endangerment? If you lie up there
  1466. 1:02:30on the roof and wait for the other
  1467. 1:02:32person to drive off, and then they
  1468. 1:02:34swerve through country lanes at 50 or
  1469. 1:02:3660, and you hold onto the roof or at
  1470. 1:02:38least try to. Yes, these are case
  1471. 1:02:41scenarios in which this becomes
  1472. 1:02:42relevant. Is that self-endangerment? It
  1473. 1:02:44is likely more of an endangerment by
  1474. 1:02:46another, so one should probably
  1475. 1:02:48categorize this heading under
  1476. 1:02:50endangerment by another. Um, these
  1477. 1:02:53racing cases always play a role again
  1478. 1:02:55and again. In this case, it was about
  1479. 1:03:00someone challenging another to a race,
  1480. 1:03:03and then it was about whether, if one
  1481. 1:03:05of the two involved in the race dies,
  1482. 1:03:07is that self-endangerment or
  1483. 1:03:08endangerment by another if an accident
  1484. 1:03:11occurs between the participants?
  1485. 1:03:14According to the case law of the
  1486. 1:03:15Federal Court of Justice, anyone who
  1487. 1:03:17intentionally or negligently induces,
  1488. 1:03:19enables, or promotes the
  1489. 1:03:20self-responsible act of a person
  1490. 1:03:22leading to self-harm or suicide is
  1491. 1:03:23generally not liable for punishment,
  1492. 1:03:25provided they do not possess superior
  1493. 1:03:27expert knowledge and thus grasp the
  1494. 1:03:29risk better than the person harming or
  1495. 1:03:31killing themselves. So, take the case
  1496. 1:03:33where one person challenges another to
  1497. 1:03:35a race. In the meantime, we have
  1498. 1:03:38criminal provisions against that, it is
  1499. 1:03:40section 315d, I believe. Um, take the
  1500. 1:03:46case where someone is challenged and
  1501. 1:03:48now organizes a race with another
  1502. 1:03:49person, and as a result of this race, a
  1503. 1:03:51death occurs. And there, of course, the
  1504. 1:03:55question is: am I dealing here with
  1505. 1:03:57self-responsible self-endangerment? And
  1506. 1:04:00ultimately, we will have to apply these
  1507. 1:04:03criteria. So, you can speak of
  1508. 1:04:04self-endangerment again in that case.
  1509. 1:04:07Um, does the person who entered the
  1510. 1:04:09race have the freedom of disposition
  1511. 1:04:11over the legal interest; well, they are
  1512. 1:04:14allowed to endanger their physical
  1513. 1:04:16integrity. They are even allowed to
  1514. 1:04:18endanger their life, it is said. They
  1515. 1:04:20are allowed to—legally speaking, they
  1516. 1:04:22are allowed to kill themselves—but
  1517. 1:04:24for consent, Section 216 of the
  1518. 1:04:25Criminal Code is of course relevant
  1519. 1:04:27here. Are they capable of consenting,
  1520. 1:04:30meaning do they know what risks are
  1521. 1:04:32involved with this race and, well, have
  1522. 1:04:35they explicitly declared this before
  1523. 1:04:37the act, free from defects of will?
  1524. 1:04:39That, of course, falls away in the case
  1525. 1:04:41of self-responsible self-endangerment
  1526. 1:04:42when you have such a racing scenario
  1527. 1:04:44here. Um, it is the case that in these
  1528. 1:04:47scenarios, the act, the conduct itself
  1529. 1:04:51ultimately replaces the declaration.
  1530. 1:04:57This means that self-responsible
  1531. 1:04:58self-endangerment can lead to impunity
  1532. 1:05:01here, even if you, as the other
  1533. 1:05:03participant in the race, worked toward
  1534. 1:05:05the race happening and all participants
  1535. 1:05:07know it can be dangerous. It is a
  1536. 1:05:12different story, of course, if you cut
  1537. 1:05:14the brake lines before the race and
  1538. 1:05:17then challenge them to the race; then
  1539. 1:05:19we are not dealing with knowledge on an
  1540. 1:05:21equal level. Then we have superior
  1541. 1:05:24expert knowledge here. Additionally,
  1542. 1:05:28such conduct is exempt from punishment
  1543. 1:05:31if it is not aimed at suicide or
  1544. 1:05:33self-harm and has materialized through
  1545. 1:05:36a risk consciously taken by the victim.
  1546. 1:05:40That would also be the decisive point
  1547. 1:05:42in this racing case, um. Here you have
  1548. 1:05:46the corresponding statements from the
  1549. 1:05:48Federal Court of Justice's decision
  1550. 1:05:49regarding this. If we take another
  1551. 1:05:53close look at consent, another note
  1552. 1:05:55here that I mentioned earlier regarding
  1553. 1:05:56Section 216 of the Criminal Code.
  1554. 1:06:01Section 216 of the Criminal Code, which
  1555. 1:06:03prohibits homicide in every case—at
  1556. 1:06:05least in principle, in every case—we
  1557. 1:06:07are currently discussing exceptions
  1558. 1:06:09regarding palliative medicine. Then it
  1559. 1:06:13is the case that this limiting effect
  1560. 1:06:15only becomes relevant for consent to
  1561. 1:06:17killing, but not, according to
  1562. 1:06:18prevailing opinion, at least not for
  1563. 1:06:20endangering life. This means that
  1564. 1:06:24Section 216 of the Criminal Code is not
  1565. 1:06:27suitable as an indication that
  1566. 1:06:29endangering another person is
  1567. 1:06:31impermissible, even if that person has
  1568. 1:06:33consented. And therefore, Section 216
  1569. 1:06:39does not apply to Section 222 for
  1570. 1:06:41systematic and teleological reasons.
  1571. 1:06:44Section 216 is intended exclusively to
  1572. 1:06:46prevent the intentional killing of
  1573. 1:06:48another human being. But not to prevent
  1574. 1:06:51someone else from being endangered,
  1575. 1:06:53because otherwise we would have massive
  1576. 1:06:54problems, especially in the field of
  1577. 1:06:56medical procedures, because then no one
  1578. 1:06:58could consent to an operation that also
  1579. 1:07:00entails a certain risk of a fatal
  1580. 1:07:02outcome in a way that exempts them from
  1581. 1:07:04punishment. Regarding the determination
  1582. 1:07:08of guilt, I had already pointed out
  1583. 1:07:10that you must ensure that subjective
  1584. 1:07:11breaches of the duty of care are
  1585. 1:07:13established. That is, the question of
  1586. 1:07:16whether the specific individual was
  1587. 1:07:18able to meet the care requirements
  1588. 1:07:21according to their personal abilities,
  1589. 1:07:23i.e., whether someone perhaps has
  1590. 1:07:25deficits due to personal reasons that
  1591. 1:07:28make them unable to meet the general
  1592. 1:07:30standards of care here. And the
  1593. 1:07:35subjective foreseeability: could our
  1594. 1:07:37specific perpetrator, the person we are
  1595. 1:07:40currently looking at, foresee this
  1596. 1:07:42result? Or was there any reason why
  1597. 1:07:45they could not, because they lacked
  1598. 1:07:46some knowledge that everyone else has,
  1599. 1:07:48which belongs to the general standard?
  1600. 1:07:51But they did lack it; we already looked
  1601. 1:07:53at that in the saline solution case. I
  1602. 1:07:57would like to briefly address
  1603. 1:07:58assumption of risk fault again. I had
  1604. 1:08:00already hinted at that. That is the
  1605. 1:08:03case where a doctor—though it could
  1606. 1:08:06be any other case—takes on a risk,
  1607. 1:08:09undertakes an act that is fundamentally
  1608. 1:08:12a breach of duty, but they are not in a
  1609. 1:08:15position in the concrete situation to
  1610. 1:08:18bring this action to a successful
  1611. 1:08:20conclusion. So, a doctor who is still
  1612. 1:08:25at an early stage of training takes on
  1613. 1:08:27an operation that actually only a
  1614. 1:08:29specialist with the corresponding
  1615. 1:08:30knowledge can perform properly and lege
  1616. 1:08:33artis. Accordingly, they also do not
  1617. 1:08:36succeed. This results in a fatal or
  1618. 1:08:38serious injury. Then one would either
  1619. 1:08:41say at that point, we set the standard
  1620. 1:08:45slightly differently. That is in fact
  1621. 1:08:48done in some cases. Then it is said,
  1622. 1:08:50could they fulfill their standard that
  1623. 1:08:53is to be set for them, did they fulfill
  1624. 1:08:56it, and one might then perhaps say,
  1625. 1:08:58well, the standard of a doctor who
  1626. 1:09:01performs such an operation, they did
  1627. 1:09:03not meet it at all, objectively did not
  1628. 1:09:06meet it. With that, we are already
  1629. 1:09:09dealing with a breach of duty. So, we
  1630. 1:09:12would then simply say, the doctor is
  1631. 1:09:14perhaps a doctor after three years, who
  1632. 1:09:17also does not have the corresponding
  1633. 1:09:19specialist qualification, no
  1634. 1:09:20corresponding experience. We measure
  1635. 1:09:22him against high standards nonetheless.
  1636. 1:09:26Um, and then we have to discuss the
  1637. 1:09:28issue regarding the subjective element.
  1638. 1:09:33Or what one can do nonetheless, is say
  1639. 1:09:35we are dealing with a doctor who is not
  1640. 1:09:37yet fully trained. We measure him
  1641. 1:09:40against those standards. Uh, he did
  1642. 1:09:43meet them, but we are still dealing
  1643. 1:09:44with a violation. The more sensible
  1644. 1:09:48solution in these cases, however, would
  1645. 1:09:51be to say he did not meet the standards
  1646. 1:09:53, he could not subjectively meet them
  1647. 1:09:55either, but what I must actually charge
  1648. 1:09:57him with is the acceptance of the
  1649. 1:09:59patient or the taking on of the
  1650. 1:10:01operation. And then you can clearly
  1651. 1:10:03separate what you want to charge him
  1652. 1:10:05with. Do you want to charge him with
  1653. 1:10:08not performing the operation correctly,
  1654. 1:10:10or do you want to charge him with
  1655. 1:10:11taking on the operation even though he
  1656. 1:10:13knew he couldn't perform it correctly,
  1657. 1:10:15or at least should have known he
  1658. 1:10:16couldn't perform it correctly? That
  1659. 1:10:19means this assumption of responsibility
  1660. 1:10:22—and this is very central—relies on
  1661. 1:10:24a different point in time. Culpability
  1662. 1:10:26in assumption refers to a breach of
  1663. 1:10:29duty at the time of the assumption, not
  1664. 1:10:31at the time of the operation. This is,
  1665. 1:10:34of course, also conceivable in many
  1666. 1:10:36other areas when someone takes on tasks
  1667. 1:10:38they cannot fulfill. And that doesn't
  1668. 1:10:41have to be bodily injury. It can also
  1669. 1:10:43be property crimes. If someone
  1670. 1:10:46overextends themselves by taking over
  1671. 1:10:47the management of a company and it is
  1672. 1:10:49clear to them that this will lead to
  1673. 1:10:51damage to the company, then that can
  1674. 1:10:52certainly be a breach of trust, for
  1675. 1:10:54example. Then we still have to address
  1676. 1:10:59the actio libera in causa within the
  1677. 1:11:01framework of negligence crimes, meaning
  1678. 1:11:04scenarios in which the perpetrator,
  1679. 1:11:09because they are too drunk or too
  1680. 1:11:11impaired by other intoxicating
  1681. 1:11:14substances, is unable to realize they
  1682. 1:11:16are committing a crime. So, we have a
  1683. 1:11:19problem with Section 20 of the German
  1684. 1:11:21Criminal Code. We looked at this
  1685. 1:11:24closely, and the Federal Court of
  1686. 1:11:26Justice says that for negligence crimes
  1687. 1:11:28, we don't actually need actio libera
  1688. 1:11:30in causa, because with negligence
  1689. 1:11:32crimes, we do it in a way that any act
  1690. 1:11:34that somehow led to the result is
  1691. 1:11:36sufficient. So, let's assume, our
  1692. 1:11:41perpetrator gets so drunk that at the
  1693. 1:11:43time they are racing around in a car
  1694. 1:11:45and injure someone, they are no longer
  1695. 1:11:47criminally responsible. We can say
  1696. 1:11:51anyway, well, getting that drunk with
  1697. 1:11:53the knowledge that it is quite possible
  1698. 1:11:55I might still drive a car. I never know
  1699. 1:11:59what I'll do when I'm drunk. I might
  1700. 1:12:01possibly drive a car then. In a
  1701. 1:12:04situation like this, one would say that
  1702. 1:12:06getting drunk itself is the act of
  1703. 1:12:08negligence, and that is sufficient
  1704. 1:12:09without any issues. This means that in
  1705. 1:12:13these configurations where we otherwise
  1706. 1:12:15use anticipatory steps, we have no
  1707. 1:12:18problems with negligence offenses
  1708. 1:12:20anyway, because we say that for these
  1709. 1:12:22pure negligence offenses, there are
  1710. 1:12:25many cases where we anticipate the
  1711. 1:12:27result and include outcomes far outside
  1712. 1:12:29the actual sphere of danger. You can
  1713. 1:12:34already have negligence offenses if,
  1714. 1:12:36for example, the perpetrator does not
  1715. 1:12:39write the manual for an electrical
  1716. 1:12:41device in a way that avoids errors, and
  1717. 1:12:43then a death occurs. Writing the manual
  1718. 1:12:46could certainly be negligent homicide,
  1719. 1:12:48depending on how you phrase it. This
  1720. 1:12:52means that the*actio libera in causa*is
  1721. 1:12:54not actually necessary here. In the
  1722. 1:12:56exam, you can still affirm it; then you
  1723. 1:12:59must simply determine that our
  1724. 1:13:01perpetrator acted negligently regarding
  1725. 1:13:03the intoxication and negligently
  1726. 1:13:05regarding the fact that they would
  1727. 1:13:08later commit such an act while in a
  1728. 1:13:10state of incapacity. Let's look at
  1729. 1:13:14recklessness, which becomes quite
  1730. 1:13:16relevant. Less in the area of simple
  1731. 1:13:21negligence offenses and much more in
  1732. 1:13:23the area of Section 251 in particular.
  1733. 1:13:30For in Section 251, it says: "If the
  1734. 1:13:35perpetrator, through the robbery, at
  1735. 1:13:37least recklessly causes the death of
  1736. 1:13:39another person. Then the penalty is
  1737. 1:13:41life imprisonment or imprisonment of
  1738. 1:13:42not less than 10 years." This means, if
  1739. 1:13:49you are dealing with a robber who
  1740. 1:13:51strikes the victim in order to be able
  1741. 1:13:54to take their belongings. And then the
  1742. 1:13:57victim dies. Then we are in the area
  1743. 1:14:00where this severe penalty, i.e., life
  1744. 1:14:02imprisonment or imprisonment of not
  1745. 1:14:03less than 10 years, may be considered.
  1746. 1:14:08And we need to take a look at
  1747. 1:14:10recklessness. This is a special form of
  1748. 1:14:13negligence. It is generally translated
  1749. 1:14:16as gross negligence. We certainly find
  1750. 1:14:18this in jurisprudence and textbooks. Um
  1751. 1:14:22, the definition that was supposed to
  1752. 1:14:24be included in the law was an act of
  1753. 1:14:26special levity or special indifference
  1754. 1:14:29as a form of gross negligence. Special
  1755. 1:14:34indifference gives the impression that
  1756. 1:14:36it must involve conscious negligence.
  1757. 1:14:40However, one can also act recklessly,
  1758. 1:14:43if one did not recognize the risk of
  1759. 1:14:45the outcome at all, but otherwise
  1760. 1:14:48commits a serious breach of duty and
  1761. 1:14:50causes an outcome that they did not
  1762. 1:14:53recognize, but which was completely
  1763. 1:14:56obvious. And you see here that the case
  1764. 1:15:01law in many areas is closely linked to
  1765. 1:15:04civil law jurisprudence. This means,
  1766. 1:15:07ultimately, it assumes gross negligence
  1767. 1:15:09. This is partially criticized in the
  1768. 1:15:12literature because it is imprecise. You
  1769. 1:15:15can find the BGH definition here, which
  1770. 1:15:17I actually find quite understandable
  1771. 1:15:18and also very handy for memorizing for
  1772. 1:15:20the exam. With "Leichtfertigkeit"(
  1773. 1:15:23recklessness), the law describes
  1774. 1:15:24behavior that shows a high degree of
  1775. 1:15:26negligence, meaning it is grossly
  1776. 1:15:27negligent. That is actually a
  1777. 1:15:30redundancy, but to make it clear once
  1778. 1:15:33again, it aligns with the concept of
  1779. 1:15:35gross carelessness used by the regional
  1780. 1:15:38court. According to this, a person acts
  1781. 1:15:41recklessly if they disregard an obvious
  1782. 1:15:44possibility due to special carelessness
  1783. 1:15:46or special indifference. Special
  1784. 1:15:49carelessness—I would agree with that
  1785. 1:15:51here. Indifference always has that
  1786. 1:15:53sense of "I thought about it, but I
  1787. 1:15:56don't care." That is not what is meant.
  1788. 1:15:59So, what's decisive is that we are
  1789. 1:16:01dealing with an obvious possibility and
  1790. 1:16:04that the perpetrator is acting with
  1791. 1:16:06special carelessness. Those are the two
  1792. 1:16:09aspects, then. You could also translate
  1793. 1:16:11"Leichtfertigkeit" as thoughtlessness,
  1794. 1:16:13but it's important that you have these
  1795. 1:16:15two aspects. On one hand, a serious
  1796. 1:16:17breach of duty, and on the other,
  1797. 1:16:20obvious predictability. Here you can
  1798. 1:16:24see it clearly again: the obvious
  1799. 1:16:27possibility and the gross breach of
  1800. 1:16:30duty. How you examine this in the exam
  1801. 1:16:31doesn't really matter. There is a lot
  1802. 1:16:34to be said for first addressing the
  1803. 1:16:37gross breach of duty and then moving on
  1804. 1:16:40to the obvious possibility of the
  1805. 1:16:42consequence occurring in view of that
  1806. 1:16:45gross breach of duty. It should also be
  1807. 1:16:50emphasized at this point that the
  1808. 1:16:51motives do not matter. So, ruthlessness
  1809. 1:16:55is not required, and selfishness is not
  1810. 1:16:57required. That means not like in
  1811. 1:17:01Section 315c, this phrasing that you
  1812. 1:17:04have there in the second number,
  1813. 1:17:12whoever acts in road traffic in a
  1814. 1:17:14grossly improper and reckless manner—
  1815. 1:17:16we don't need this "reckless" behavior.
  1816. 1:17:19This "grossly improper" part already
  1817. 1:17:21makes it clear what "Leichtfertigkeit"
  1818. 1:17:22is about, even though "Leichtfertigkeit
  1819. 1:17:24" is not an element of Section 315c. So
  1820. 1:17:27please pay attention to that point. Two
  1821. 1:17:30elements: gross breach of duty, obvious
  1822. 1:17:32predictability. That characterizes
  1823. 1:17:35recklessness. And with that, as you can
  1824. 1:17:39see, we have already finished with
  1825. 1:17:41negligence. Okay.

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