Strafrecht AT Teil 21 (Fahrlässigkeitsdelikte) — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:01Since I have already talked so much
- 0:03about negligence offenses and we have
- 0:06seen in several areas that one must
- 0:08examine negligence offenses—be it in
- 0:10the case of the apparatus, where we saw
- 0:13that we combine an attempt with the
- 0:15negligent commission instead of the
- 0:17intentional act that was completed—we
- 0:20will now take a look at negligence
- 0:22offenses. This means we will look at
- 0:25what happens when the intentional
- 0:27offense does not come into play. Let us
- 0:30assume Section 16, Paragraph 1,
- 0:31Sentence 1. Then, however, Section 16,
- 0:34Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 must be
- 0:36observed. It states that criminal
- 0:39liability for negligent commission
- 0:41remains unaffected. In this respect, I
- 0:45would like to refer you to the two
- 0:47articles cited here if you want to get
- 0:49a general overview once more.
- 0:52Negligence offenses often play a
- 0:55marginal role in bar exams. This means
- 0:59that, under normal circumstances, you
- 1:01do not need detailed knowledge, but pay
- 1:03attention: in negligence offenses, you
- 1:05can incorporate all the problems that
- 1:07are also conceivable in the objective
- 1:09elements of other offenses.
- 1:12Specifically with negligence offenses,
- 1:14problems with objective imputation
- 1:17occur frequently, because the doctrine
- 1:19of objective imputation is ultimately
- 1:21almost more important for negligence
- 1:23offenses than for intentional offenses.
- 1:27For if you have a case in which the
- 1:29development, the causal progression,
- 1:32was not foreseeable at all, or a danger
- 1:34materialized in a way completely
- 1:36different from what the perpetrator had
- 1:38imagined, then you can easily rule it
- 1:41out in an intentional offense by saying
- 1:43that the intent did not relate to this
- 1:45at all. And that is exactly what is
- 1:49different in a negligence offense.
- 1:51According to the general view on the
- 1:53structure, although there are
- 1:55dissenting voices, the negligence
- 1:57offense has only an objective element.
- 1:59There is no subjective element. This
- 2:03means that in a negligence offense, you
- 2:05can simply examine the actus reus as a
- 2:07whole, without separating it into
- 2:09objective and subjective. There are
- 2:12views that say we also have a
- 2:14subjective element in the negligence
- 2:16offense. There we must discuss whether
- 2:20the specific perpetrator committed a
- 2:22breach of duty according to their
- 2:24specific standards, and whether they
- 2:26were personally able to foresee the
- 2:28result with their own abilities. In my
- 2:32view, that belongs in the culpability
- 2:33section and not in the actus reus. And
- 2:35that is why I would recommend that you
- 2:37discuss objective questions within the
- 2:39actus reus. It is important that
- 2:45negligent acts are only punishable if
- 2:47the law expressly mandates it. This
- 2:51means that an act committed negligently
- 2:53can only be punished if this is
- 2:55expressly stipulated in a criminal
- 2:57statute. This is stated in Section 15.
- 3:00Section 15 is often cited in exams to
- 3:03clarify that intent must be present.
- 3:06You do not have to cite it. You do not
- 3:08have to write down Section 15. If you
- 3:11have an intentional act in mind, then
- 3:12simply examine the intent. Nevertheless
- 3:16, you should keep Section 15 in mind,
- 3:20because it clarifies that the principle
- 3:23applies here too, that criminal law is
- 3:26the ultima ratio and that not every
- 3:28negligent behavior that leads to damage
- 3:31can be punishable. Imagine if negligent
- 3:34damage to property were a criminal
- 3:35offense. You're with friends, act a bit
- 3:38clumsy, a glass falls to the floor and
- 3:39shatters; then we would already be in
- 3:41the realm of criminal law. That would
- 3:43be completely insane, of course, and
- 3:46that is why there are only a few
- 3:48offenses, relatively few, that are also
- 3:50punishable when committed negligently.
- 3:54For us, the most relevant are certainly
- 3:57Section 229 and Section 222 of the
- 3:59Criminal Code, i.e., negligent homicide
- 4:02and negligent bodily harm. 222 is
- 4:06homicide, 229 is negligent bodily harm.
- 4:10In bar exams, negligent arson also
- 4:12plays a role occasionally. Negligent
- 4:17perjury can also occur, meaning if
- 4:20someone testifies falsely in court and
- 4:23acts carelessly in doing so. This means
- 4:27they say something even though they are
- 4:29not at all sure whether it is true. So
- 4:31they say, it could be, well, I think it
- 4:33might be true, but I'm not sure. In
- 4:36such a case, if you are in court and
- 4:37you don't know for sure, well, then you
- 4:39just have to say that you don't know
- 4:40for sure. Um, that means we only have
- 4:43very narrow areas of criminal liability
- 4:46for negligence in the Criminal Code. We
- 4:50have it in crimes of public danger, um,
- 4:52there is, however, a very practical
- 4:54offense that can also be committed
- 4:57negligently. That is, in the area of
- 4:59drunk driving, you have negligent
- 5:01commission, specifically Section 316.
- 5:10Paragraph 2 states that whoever commits
- 5:12the act negligently is also punished
- 5:13according to Paragraph 1. So, if you
- 5:16drive a car while drunk, you cannot
- 5:18claim, well, I didn't know I was
- 5:20already at 1.1 per mille. I thought I
- 5:23only had 0.9 and was firmly convinced
- 5:25of that; that won't help you at all.
- 5:28And the interesting thing is, with 316,
- 5:30the penalty for negligence is generally
- 5:33just as high as for intent. And this is
- 5:37also quite interesting regarding
- 5:39administrative offenses; when you take
- 5:41speeding, or failure to maintain
- 5:43distance, and such, they are almost
- 5:44always sanctioned due to negligence. So
- 5:48, if you get a letter with a photo,
- 5:50they usually assume negligence, and the
- 5:53reason for that is ultimately that
- 5:56intent is very hard to prove, so they
- 5:59go with negligence instead. Whether
- 6:02that is systematically and
- 6:03constitutionally sound is something we
- 6:04can argue about. Then we have some
- 6:07offenses, which I already mentioned,
- 6:09where we have combinations of intent
- 6:11and negligence. We have another
- 6:15complete or unified negligence offense
- 6:17in Section 315c, endangering road
- 6:19traffic. Please take a brief look at
- 6:22that. Anyone who operates a vehicle in
- 6:25road traffic while under the influence
- 6:27of alcoholic beverages or other
- 6:29intoxicants, or due to mental or
- 6:31physical deficiencies—which also
- 6:34include sleep, or rather, sleep
- 6:35deprivation—So, if you are completely
- 6:38overtired and cause an accident, you
- 6:40can also fall under Section 315c. Then
- 6:46number 2, where we have the "deadly
- 6:48sins" of road traffic, meaning gross,
- 6:51unlawful, and reckless conduct that
- 6:53endangers the life or limb of another
- 6:56person or property of significant value
- 6:58. It is very important, just to state
- 7:01this upfront: If you drive drunk and
- 7:04everything goes well, and no one is
- 7:06endangered, you are under Section 316.
- 7:10If you are caught, you will be punished
- 7:11for that. If you drive drunk, swerve
- 7:14across lanes, and in doing so endanger
- 7:16a pedestrian who just manages to jump
- 7:18aside, then you are under Section 315c
- 7:19of the German Criminal Code. That means
- 7:22we are looking at a different
- 7:23sentencing range there. Then we have a
- 7:25sentencing range of up to 5 years. With
- 7:28316, we have up to one year. And here
- 7:32in 315c, as you see in paragraph 3, it
- 7:35applies if the danger is caused
- 7:37negligently, as in the cases of
- 7:39paragraph 1. That is the most common
- 7:42case. So, when someone drives drunk, in
- 7:46the fewest cases do they actually
- 7:47intend to endanger pedestrians. That
- 7:50usually happens negligently. And then
- 7:53we have paragraph 3 number 2, where one
- 7:55acts negligently. So, I drive drunk
- 7:58negligently because I didn't pay
- 8:00attention to how much I drank, and then
- 8:02I negligently endanger pedestrians.
- 8:04That means you have a
- 8:06negligence-negligence combination there
- 8:08. So, in the area of negligence, we
- 8:10have, first, the very simple negligent
- 8:12result offenses like 222 or 229. We
- 8:17then have offenses that are committed
- 8:20negligently, in which a negligent
- 8:23result is added to an intentional
- 8:25offense. These are the ones here in
- 8:29315c paragraph 3, but also the
- 8:33result-qualified offenses in 227 and
- 8:35251. And then we have the
- 8:39negligence-negligence combinations,
- 8:41i.e., cases in which someone commits an
- 8:44act negligently and causes a danger
- 8:45negligently in the process.
- 8:52Fundamentally, negligent commission is
- 8:55the less serious form of committing an
- 8:57offense. However, the relationship
- 9:00between intent and negligence is
- 9:02disputed. It is partly claimed that
- 9:05anyone who acts intentionally does not
- 9:07act negligently. But I find it more
- 9:12plausible to say that every intentional
- 9:14act also contains an element of
- 9:16negligence, because negligence consists
- 9:19of the breach of duty and the
- 9:21foreseeability of the result. This
- 9:24means you act in breach of duty with
- 9:26regard to a specific result. And this
- 9:28result is also foreseeable, and that is
- 9:30what constitutes negligence. And if I
- 9:33act intentionally with a specific
- 9:34result in mind, that is also a breach
- 9:36of duty. Therefore, I find it more
- 9:39accurate to say there is no mutually
- 9:41exclusive relationship between intent
- 9:43and negligence; rather, intent is the
- 9:45more severe form of negligence. However
- 9:48, this question doesn't really play a
- 9:50role in the exams. Section 16,
- 9:53paragraphs 1 and 2, as I mentioned,
- 9:56explicitly do not exclude negligence.
- 10:00The question is what negligence
- 10:01actually means. And here, as a mnemonic
- 10:04, please remember Section 276,
- 10:06paragraph 2 of the German Civil Code:
- 10:09someone acts negligently if they
- 10:11disregard the care required in daily
- 10:13life. You can also state this in the
- 10:16exam if you ask yourself: well, what
- 10:18does negligence actually mean? I always
- 10:21forget that. Are you allowed to write
- 10:23numbers in the margins of your statute
- 10:24book? Then it is certainly worth noting
- 10:29276 next to 229, paragraph 2. Um, that
- 10:38means only those who disregard the care
- 10:40required in daily life and thereby
- 10:42cause damage are liable to prosecution.
- 10:46This means we are not dealing with pure
- 10:48strict liability. We know pure strict
- 10:51liability from the Road Traffic Act,
- 10:53for example, where you are liable for
- 10:56damages caused by an accident simply
- 10:58because you operated a vehicle. Section
- 11:007 of the Road Traffic Act, I believe,
- 11:02if I have that right. That does not
- 11:04exist in criminal law. It would also
- 11:06contradict the principle of culpability
- 11:08. It is therefore impermissible to
- 11:12attach a criminal penalty—the
- 11:14sharpest and last resort the rule of
- 11:17law knows—to a mere act without some
- 11:20form of fault, broadly speaking, intent
- 11:23or negligence. But even within
- 11:28negligence, there are different levels.
- 11:31We distinguish between conscious and
- 11:33unconscious negligence on one hand, and
- 11:36slight negligence up to recklessness on
- 11:39the other. So please do not confuse
- 11:42conscious negligence with gross
- 11:44negligence. It may be that someone
- 11:47knows: I am not acting entirely in
- 11:49accordance with my duty here. I also
- 11:52recognize the risk. I consider the risk
- 11:54to be very small, and in fact it is
- 11:56very small, but it still goes wrong.
- 11:59Then we would have a case where we
- 12:01might only have a slight breach of duty
- 12:04with a low risk, and as luck would have
- 12:06it, the damage occurs anyway; then we
- 12:09are dealing with conscious negligence
- 12:11and yet slight negligence. And there
- 12:16are cases of unconscious negligence
- 12:17that are completely reckless. So if you
- 12:21have someone who simply cannot assess
- 12:24the risks of road traffic and
- 12:26nevertheless overtakes on a country
- 12:29road in the third lane—that is, on
- 12:31the opposite shoulder—in fog and icy
- 12:34conditions, because they think, "There
- 12:37is absolutely no risk, everything is
- 12:39easy, no one is coming here anyway,"
- 12:42then that is unconscious negligence. Or
- 12:46they don't think about it at all; then
- 12:47we definitely have unconscious
- 12:48negligence. And yet, that is gross
- 12:51recklessness. Recklessness occurs when
- 12:54the perpetrator commits a gross breach
- 12:58of duty and the looming consequence was
- 13:01obvious, meaning it was readily
- 13:03foreseeable. So, it would be reckless,
- 13:08for example, to—the classic case—
- 13:10sit in a glass house and throw stones.
- 13:13That would be a classic case of
- 13:15recklessness. You light a campfire. um,
- 13:18right next to a gas station. Um, you
- 13:23smoke, um, at a gas station, or, um,
- 13:26you light a fire, um, with a haystack
- 13:30lying around somewhere nearby and think
- 13:34that nothing much can happen. So, all
- 13:38cases where you think, "This can't be
- 13:41serious." Um, we don't have a
- 13:44definition of negligence in the law.
- 13:48There were definitions in drafts for
- 13:52the StGB. So, they initially wanted to
- 13:55define negligence in the 1962 draft in
- 13:57Section 18. It stated that a person
- 14:00acts negligently if they disregard the
- 14:01care they are obliged and able to
- 14:03exercise under the circumstances and
- 14:04their personal conditions, and
- 14:06therefore do not recognize that they
- 14:07are fulfilling the statutory offense.
- 14:10That would be a definition that one
- 14:12could certainly memorize for the exam
- 14:14regarding the criteria: disregarding
- 14:16the care one is obliged and able to
- 14:17exercise under the circumstances and
- 14:19their personal conditions, and
- 14:21therefore failing to recognize that.
- 14:27There was also a second paragraph here,
- 14:28which read: "A person also acts
- 14:30negligently if they consider it
- 14:31possible that they are fulfilling the
- 14:33statutory offense, but act in breach of
- 14:35duty and culpably, trusting that they
- 14:37will not fulfill it." So, paragraph 1,
- 14:40unconscious negligence; paragraph 2,
- 14:42conscious negligence. That is what the
- 14:44legislature once wanted to write into
- 14:45the law. However, they distanced
- 14:48themselves from it and did not write
- 14:49anything in, again with the note that
- 14:51case law and legal theory should
- 14:52clarify it. Why, is completely unclear
- 14:55to me; it could have easily been
- 14:57written in there. Ultimately, however,
- 15:00there is no debate over the criteria to
- 15:03be applied here, the very broad
- 15:05criteria. It is relatively clear that
- 15:07this is the starting point. What is
- 15:09being debated is how subjectively
- 15:11negligence is to be understood. So,
- 15:14when asking whether someone acts
- 15:17negligently, do I have to include their
- 15:21specific subjective deficits? For
- 15:24instance, if someone cannot see well
- 15:26enough and therefore could not
- 15:29recognize a certain circumstance—in
- 15:32the truest sense of the word, could not
- 15:34recognize it—but then does not act
- 15:36negligently, the question that always
- 15:38arises, of course, is: if someone takes
- 15:40on a task they cannot perform, then we
- 15:42have negligence at another level. More
- 15:45on that in a moment. The structural
- 15:49outline that is typically used. Here
- 15:51you can find it, um, taken from Kühl,
- 15:53from the textbook by Christian Kühl.
- 15:57First, you examine the factual outcome,
- 15:59as you are aware. Then, an objective
- 16:03breach of duty of care, meaning how
- 16:05should the person have behaved, and did
- 16:06they behave that way? Ultimately, you
- 16:10determine how a person must behave in
- 16:12this situation and to what extent the
- 16:14behavior we have here deviates.
- 16:17deviates from that. So, someone builds
- 16:20a fire somewhere in the forest during a
- 16:22dry summer. A fire then breaks out,
- 16:24which also fulfills Section 306, for
- 16:27example, negligent arson. You ask
- 16:29yourself, well, would a careful,
- 16:32conscientious person in the concrete
- 16:34situation and social role of our camper
- 16:37here build a fire in the middle of a
- 16:40dry forest? Of course not. Then you ask
- 16:45about objective foreseeability. Well,
- 16:48did they have to realize that such a
- 16:50fire, a campfire, could lead to a large
- 16:53fire? Of course one must realize that,
- 16:56logically. Objective imputation, as you
- 16:59are aware. So, you ask yourself, was a
- 17:02legally disapproved risk created here
- 17:05that manifested in the factual outcome?
- 17:09Strictly speaking, you can—and this
- 17:11is sometimes done in the literature—
- 17:14even leave these two aspects out and
- 17:16only focus on objective imputation.
- 17:20Because if you ask whether someone has
- 17:22created a legally disapproved risk,
- 17:24then this legal disapproval is already
- 17:26the breach of duty, the breach of the
- 17:28duty of care. For if someone creates a
- 17:31risk that is not legally disapproved,
- 17:33they are not committing a breach of the
- 17:35duty of care. Conversely. You can only
- 17:38create a legally disapproved, a legally
- 17:41prohibited risk if you violate a duty
- 17:43of care. And objective foreseeability
- 17:48is actually nothing other than what we
- 17:50also ask ourselves when we pose the
- 17:52question: did this risk that was
- 17:54created here manifest itself in the
- 17:56outcome? For then we are asking exactly
- 18:00that: well, should this risk be
- 18:02prevented because these outcomes that
- 18:04have now occurred are threatening? As a
- 18:09result, if you choose this structure,
- 18:12you have removed the element of
- 18:14disapproved risk creation and the
- 18:16element of foreseeability from
- 18:18objective imputation, so that you
- 18:21ultimately only examine whether the
- 18:23protective purpose is fulfilled or
- 18:26violated, depending on the case. So the
- 18:30question in our fire case: why are you
- 18:32not allowed to build a fire in the
- 18:35forest during dry conditions? Well,
- 18:37because exactly that can happen,
- 18:39because it can lead to a major wildfire
- 18:40. That would be the protective purpose
- 18:44of the norm playing a role here, and
- 18:46the causal link of duty, which would be
- 18:48the question: did exactly this risk
- 18:50actually materialize, the very risk
- 18:52that was supposed to be prevented? And
- 18:57perhaps you remember the cases of
- 18:59lawful alternative behavior. That is,
- 19:02the case where someone can say, well,
- 19:05had I driven as fast as permitted, this
- 19:07very accident would still have happened
- 19:10. You remember the case of our drunk
- 19:13driver who can later say, well, had I
- 19:17driven as fast as allowed, even a sober
- 19:20driver could not have prevented this
- 19:24accident. And those are constellations
- 19:27where we can say that the breach of
- 19:29duty is missing. So, I can refer back
- 19:32to what we discussed in the context of
- 19:34objective attribution. Illegality is
- 19:37not a problem. The same applies here as
- 19:39applies otherwise. This means that
- 19:41self-defense is fundamentally
- 19:42conceivable in negligence offenses as
- 19:44well. Take an offender who defends
- 19:47themselves in self-defense, but does
- 19:51not actually intend to harm the
- 19:53attacker, does not expect any injury,
- 19:55yet ends up injuring the attacker
- 19:56anyway. Then you can simply examine
- 20:00self-defense, even in the context of a
- 20:02negligence offense. This is, of course,
- 20:04especially relevant for bodily harm
- 20:06resulting in death. The victim defends
- 20:08themselves with physical force, knows
- 20:10they will injure the attacker, but does
- 20:12not expect a fatal outcome, yet a fatal
- 20:15outcome occurs. This means that even
- 20:18with these crimes qualified by their
- 20:19result, a justification through
- 20:21self-defense can naturally occur. Let's
- 20:27look at culpability. We can address
- 20:30that briefly. In bar exam questions,
- 20:33there are very, very few cases where
- 20:34this plays a role, and yet it is still
- 20:36constantly done incorrectly in those
- 20:38exams. What does subjective breach of
- 20:41the duty of care mean? It means we look
- 20:45at the specific perpetrator and ask:
- 20:48could they even meet the objective
- 20:50requirements that society placed on
- 20:52them? The second step is then: could
- 20:57this specific perpetrator even foresee
- 21:00that the result would occur? There is a
- 21:03well-known case on this topic where the
- 21:06Federal Court of Justice's solution is
- 21:08humanly absolutely understandable, but
- 21:10still a bit difficult in terms of
- 21:12criminal law dogmatics. There was a
- 21:14case that the Kaiserslautern Regional
- 21:17Court had to decide. That was the
- 21:20pudding case. A four-or five-year-old
- 21:25child had sprinkled what she thought
- 21:27was sugar onto her chocolate pudding.
- 21:32She ate it by the spoonful and then
- 21:34realized, yuck, that's salt. The mother
- 21:39, for educational reasons, did not want
- 21:42to let the child throw the pudding away
- 21:45and forced the child to eat it. This
- 21:49ultimately led to the death of the
- 21:50child, because a certain amount of salt
- 21:52is simply lethal. Um, in ancient times,
- 21:56some cultures supposedly used the
- 21:57consumption of massive amounts of salt
- 21:59as a method of suicide. Whether that's
- 22:01actually true, I don't know. Um, but I
- 22:03think it's generally known that too
- 22:05much salt, and not just over a long
- 22:07period, can cause massive acute damage.
- 22:11And in this case, it came down to two
- 22:13questions. First, the question of
- 22:15whether the mother committed bodily
- 22:18harm resulting in death against her
- 22:21daughter, and second, whether it was
- 22:23dangerous bodily harm. It was clear to
- 22:27everyone involved that there was no
- 22:29need to sanction this mother with
- 22:30criminal law anymore. That, uh, would
- 22:33have been ineffective in this case. And
- 22:37the Federal Court of Justice ultimately
- 22:39decided not to assume bodily harm
- 22:41resulting in death, or rather, the case
- 22:43law rejected it. It was stated here
- 22:47that, in principle, it is of course
- 22:50recognizable that an excessive amount
- 22:52of salt for a toddler—I believe it
- 22:55was more than 0.5 grams of salt per
- 22:57kilo of body weight—is lethal. And
- 23:01for a four-year-old, I don't know how
- 23:02much she weighed, but you can calculate
- 23:04how much salt that must have been. Um,
- 23:07it is fundamentally a breach of duty of
- 23:09care to force a child to eat that much
- 23:11salt. And it was also foreseeable
- 23:14because it is part of general medical
- 23:17knowledge. And then they said, well,
- 23:20could she do that in her specific
- 23:22situation? Did she commit a breach of
- 23:24duty of care, and could she have
- 23:26foreseen it? And there, the court—
- 23:29perhaps out of consideration for the
- 23:31mother's personality—said: No, in
- 23:32this specific case, she could not have
- 23:34foreseen it. And the interesting thing
- 23:37about the case is, of course, um, that
- 23:38the Federal Court of Justice can hardly
- 23:40intervene in this assessment of whether
- 23:44she could have foreseen it. That has to
- 23:47be decided by the trial court. And if
- 23:49the trial court took the initiative
- 23:51here and said, we assume she could not
- 23:53foresee it, therefore we will not
- 23:54punish her. The minimum sentence would
- 23:57have been three years. Um, in this way,
- 24:00it is harsh, but we will leave it at
- 24:02that, then that is certainly
- 24:03understandable. Whether it is legally
- 24:06correct in terms of criminal law, we
- 24:07can argue about that. Because for what
- 24:09reason was it not foreseeable for this
- 24:12mother, even though it belongs to
- 24:14general medical knowledge? So, you
- 24:18notice, it seems—at least to me it
- 24:19seems—to be more of a humane decision
- 24:21, which is probably correct in the
- 24:22matter, rather than one that is
- 24:23understandable in terms of criminal law
- 24:25dogma. What does that mean for you in
- 24:27the exam? It means for you in the exam
- 24:30that when dealing with negligence
- 24:31offenses, you should please carefully
- 24:33examine the elements of the crime, then
- 24:35the unlawfulness, and then in the
- 24:37culpability section, briefly establish
- 24:39that this action was also subjectively
- 24:41contrary to the duty of care and that
- 24:43the result was subjectively foreseeable
- 24:45. Unless there is clear information
- 24:48indicating that this is a situation
- 24:51where we cannot assume such criminal
- 24:54liability. Yes, so the question now is,
- 24:57what do I do if we have special
- 24:59knowledge in such constellations? The
- 25:02discussion about special knowledge
- 25:04takes place here, and it is said that
- 25:06we determine the objective breach of
- 25:08duty of care differently. We will see
- 25:11that in a moment. Um, you can recognize
- 25:13it from that as well. An act is not
- 25:15committed in breach of the objective
- 25:17duty of care if a conscientious and
- 25:18prudent member of the relevant circle
- 25:20of persons would have acted in the same
- 25:22way in the social role and concrete
- 25:23situation of the perpetrator. So let's
- 25:26take the mother who is a doctor or, um,
- 25:29a pharmacologist, or at any rate, she
- 25:32knows her way around. Um, at that
- 25:36moment, however, she didn't have it on
- 25:38her radar. But she definitely should
- 25:40have known. Then we would tie the
- 25:43requirements to that; if a
- 25:45conscientious and prudent
- 25:47pharmacologist would have acted in the
- 25:49same way, we would say, yes, well, she
- 25:51should have known that, so we are
- 25:53definitely in there. And for
- 25:57culpability, we would check that again.
- 25:59So you base it on special knowledge,
- 26:01but on objectifiable special knowledge.
- 26:05It becomes problematic, of course—and
- 26:07that’s where it gets interesting—
- 26:09what if she isn't a pharmacologist, but
- 26:12just read a report shortly before about
- 26:14the lethal effects of salt? That isn't
- 26:17really objectifiable in that way. And
- 26:19yet, in that situation, one would
- 26:21probably say that it belongs to the
- 26:23perpetrator's concrete situation if the
- 26:26perpetrator knows it and should have
- 26:28remembered it. But that is one of the
- 26:30major problems. That is, in fact, one
- 26:32reason why part of the literature says
- 26:34we must include the entire perpetrator
- 26:35personality in the objective act and
- 26:37not just the subjective side. You must
- 26:42determine the circle of persons based
- 26:44on long-term perpetrator
- 26:45characteristics such as professional
- 26:46position or long-term or repeatedly
- 26:48performed activities. And that way,
- 26:51standardized special skills are also
- 26:53captured. The problem, of course, is
- 26:56how do I determine the circle of
- 26:57persons? In an exam, however, you
- 27:00should first do the following. Consider
- 27:03, when it comes to determining such
- 27:05standards of care, where might I find
- 27:08regulations? A large area of
- 27:12regulations, when it comes to negligent
- 27:14commission, as you can imagine, is
- 27:16traffic law, the Road Traffic
- 27:18Regulations, the Road Traffic Act.
- 27:20These rules that are in there, how to
- 27:22overtake, that you have to look behind
- 27:24you when reversing, that you shouldn't
- 27:26drive too fast, that you have to keep
- 27:28your distance. These are all
- 27:31regulations that determine how the
- 27:33conscientious and particular member of
- 27:35the relevant group, for instance, the
- 27:37particular and conscientious driver in
- 27:39this case, must behave. He must adhere
- 27:42to all traffic rules. That is a bit
- 27:46utopian, because everyone speeds at
- 27:47some point, but that is the requirement
- 27:49we have here. If you have a different
- 27:52group of people, for instance, if you
- 27:54have a doctor, then you must ask: what
- 27:56is the medical standard? You can figure
- 27:59that out yourselves in the exam, and in
- 28:01that case, you almost have to accept
- 28:03everything. Or you are simply given
- 28:05that information in the exam. In a
- 28:09state exam not too long ago, it was
- 28:12about a father who ran over his own
- 28:15child while reversing his car. The
- 28:21issue was criminal negligence, and at
- 28:23the bottom of the exam paper, under the
- 28:26instructions, section 5 of the Road
- 28:28Traffic Regulations—I believe it was
- 28:30—was printed, detailing the rules for
- 28:32reversing; you should have been smart
- 28:34enough to look at it and use it as a
- 28:37basis. It surprised me a lot that about
- 28:40half of the exam candidates did not
- 28:41incorporate this section 5 of the Road
- 28:43Traffic Regulations into their
- 28:44arguments at all. It explicitly stated
- 28:46how one must reverse, that one must be
- 28:48considerate, that one must have someone
- 28:50guide them if necessary, and so on. So,
- 28:52it contained details that one could
- 28:54have used. That means you should take
- 28:57the "respective circle of traffic"
- 28:59almost literally. Look at the
- 29:02respective regulations; if you have
- 29:04building law regulations, which must be
- 29:07provided, or specific requirements—I
- 29:10remember a case I experienced as an
- 29:12intern at the local court. Um, someone
- 29:17had an excursion restaurant, and behind
- 29:19it in the garden was a slurry pit, and
- 29:22a child fell onto the lid of the pit,
- 29:25broke through, and died—drowned in
- 29:27the slurry. The question ultimately was
- 29:32how the lid of such a slurry pit—
- 29:34which was completely rusted, otherwise
- 29:36it wouldn't have broken when the child
- 29:38stepped on it—should be constructed.
- 29:42The expert witness testified that it
- 29:44had to meet certain DIN standards and
- 29:46withstand a pressure of 1.8 tons, or
- 29:48whatever it was, and the lid, of course
- 29:50, did not meet that. So, it was said
- 29:54that we have a standard for the
- 29:56relevant group—homeowners who have
- 29:58such a slurry pit and must cover it—
- 30:00and then the corresponding DIN
- 30:02standards. It is clear that you don't
- 30:05have a suitcase full of DIN standards
- 30:07with you, so they must be provided to
- 30:09you along the way. That is, of course,
- 30:11a bit more difficult in the real life
- 30:13of a lawyer. You have to find that
- 30:14standard first. In case of doubt, the
- 30:19principle applies that avoidable
- 30:21dangers to the legal interests of
- 30:23others must be avoided. At least that
- 30:26is what Mormann says in his basic
- 30:27criminal law course. You have to be
- 30:28very careful there, of course. How far
- 30:30must one go in avoiding doubtful
- 30:32dangers? I would then weigh that up.
- 30:34And if you have no idea what to do,
- 30:36well, then you follow your gut feeling.
- 30:40Often, it is the case that you can
- 30:42barely say what constitutes an act that
- 30:44lacks due care if you don't have clear
- 30:46rules, and there are many areas where
- 30:48there are no clear rules, although one
- 30:50is sometimes very surprised that there
- 30:52are, in fact, rules for many areas. And
- 30:57in that area, for example, a soccer
- 30:59rule of the German Football Association
- 31:02or handball rules or the rules for
- 31:04whatever else could apply. Um, there
- 31:07are also injuries in badminton, if I
- 31:09recall correctly. I remember well
- 31:11playing doubles with my sister and, um,
- 31:14she didn't quite hit it right. Um, then
- 31:17there was a black eye. Um, you
- 31:19obviously can't prevent that with rules
- 31:21. Um, right. So, as already mentioned,
- 31:26the standards of the road traffic
- 31:28regulations, the road traffic act, or
- 31:29other protective laws are what you have
- 31:31to look at. If there are no rules, then
- 31:34you fall back on this general principle
- 31:36that you have here. So, you base it on
- 31:39the conscientious and prudent member of
- 31:41the relevant group. Additionally, it
- 31:44should be noted that the principle of
- 31:46trust and permitted risk also applies.
- 31:49What does that mean? It means that you
- 31:52cannot act negligently if you follow
- 31:55all the rules. That sounds very
- 31:59plausible and straightforward, but it
- 32:01can certainly become relevant at times.
- 32:04Imagine you are driving your car in
- 32:10accordance with traffic rules. You were
- 32:12doing 30 mph in the city and there is
- 32:14no reason not to. You see no children
- 32:16playing on the side of the road and
- 32:18there is no warning sign. Um, that
- 32:20there is a school nearby or whatever.
- 32:23And now someone runs into your car and
- 32:26you say: "Yes, I couldn't have
- 32:28prevented that. I followed the traffic
- 32:30rules, the other person did not. What
- 32:32am I supposed to do?" You will be heard
- 32:35with this argument; the principle of
- 32:37trust means that whoever acts with due
- 32:40care themselves is entitled to demand
- 32:42and expect the same from others, as
- 32:45long as there are no indications that
- 32:47the other person will not exercise such
- 32:50care. That means if you see children
- 32:54playing with a ball on the side of the
- 32:56road—like those typical images you
- 32:57might know from your driving test,
- 32:59where the ball rolls into the street—
- 33:01you can't just say, "Well, I didn't
- 33:03expect a child to jump out after it,"
- 33:05and keep driving at 50. So, in
- 33:08situations like that, if you see
- 33:10someone staggering along the side of
- 33:12the road while drunk, you must be
- 33:14prepared to brake. If children are
- 33:16playing on the side of the road, you
- 33:18must be prepared to brake. If for any
- 33:20other reason you recognize that people
- 33:22likely won't follow the rules, you
- 33:25cannot rely on the principle of trust.
- 33:28But imagine if we all drove so slowly
- 33:30in traffic that we were always ready to
- 33:33brake, that we could avoid every single
- 33:35accident at any time. Well, then we
- 33:38would be driving at a walking pace
- 33:39everywhere. And that is where German
- 33:43traffic law, and criminal law as well,
- 33:45says: that is a risk. Of course, if you
- 33:48drive faster than a walking pace, you
- 33:50are taking a risk, but it is a
- 33:51permitted risk, and that is where the
- 33:53principle of trust applies. You must
- 33:58objectively assess the breach of duty.
- 34:00We have already done much of this in
- 34:02the context of the objective elements
- 34:04of intentional offenses. Often, rules
- 34:07of social conduct play a role here, but
- 34:10not everything that is socially common
- 34:12is also permitted, because it is
- 34:15socially common to drive 10 km/h faster
- 34:17than the traffic signs indicate. That
- 34:20is quite common, perhaps even 20 km/h.
- 34:23Many say, "Well, then I'll just get a
- 34:25ticket for up to 50 euros or so; I'll
- 34:27accept that." That may be socially
- 34:29common, but it is far from permitted.
- 34:31That still constitutes the creation of
- 34:33a legally relevant risk. Often, the
- 34:37constitutional protection of certain
- 34:40behaviors must also be taken into
- 34:42account. That means if certain actions
- 34:44create a danger but are part of a
- 34:46profession, then Article 12 can mean
- 34:49that these dangers must be accepted by
- 34:51the general public. And to specify
- 34:55these abstract balancing criteria,
- 34:57permission standards have developed—
- 35:00that is, regulations that allow certain
- 35:04risks but also limit them. The
- 35:07principle of trust must be taken into
- 35:09account. Self-endangerment must be
- 35:10taken into account. So, if someone
- 35:12endangers themselves, you are not
- 35:14responsible as a negligent perpetrator.
- 35:17Or consensual endangerment of others
- 35:19can also play a role here and eliminate
- 35:22negligence altogether. I mentioned
- 35:27earlier that a minority view here wants
- 35:29to examine the subjective breach of the
- 35:32duty of care within the offense itself,
- 35:34meaning to ask whether the specific
- 35:37perpetrator acted contrary to the duty
- 35:39of care—not because they violated
- 35:41general rules applicable to everyone,
- 35:44but because they might be unable to
- 35:46meet certain requirements due to
- 35:48personal, subjective deficits. And uh,
- 35:53the prevailing opinion says: "No, that
- 35:55is a question of culpability." Take,
- 35:58for example, the doctor who performs a
- 36:01surgery even though they are not
- 36:04qualified to perform it at all. That
- 36:08would be a case where one would say,
- 36:10well, they are violating the rules, but
- 36:12they couldn't have performed the
- 36:14operation anyway because they lacked
- 36:15the necessary skills. This does not
- 36:19mean that such a doctor, who takes on
- 36:20an operation they cannot perform, would
- 36:21not be punishable. They would then
- 36:23simply not be punished for the faulty
- 36:25operation, but rather punished for
- 36:26having taken on the operation in the
- 36:28first place. This is what we call "
- 36:30assumption of duty" negligence. This
- 36:32means that if I am in a specific
- 36:34situation and cannot meet the
- 36:36requirements, then I am acting without
- 36:38fault. But then I must be held
- 36:41accountable for the fact that I should
- 36:43never have taken on that operation, and
- 36:44the charge of negligence can be applied
- 36:46to that. The question is, how narrowly
- 36:48can I define the circle of relevant
- 36:50activity? There is a discussion about
- 36:51that. What do I do if I have an
- 36:54outstanding specialist who is vastly
- 36:57superior to their colleagues, for
- 36:59instance, a doctor? They are the only
- 37:02one who can perform a certain operation
- 37:04at that level. And now they behave like
- 37:07a perfectly normal top-tier surgeon.
- 37:11And a top-tier surgeon would have made
- 37:13that same mistake; the patient would
- 37:15have been injured. But in reality, this
- 37:17surgeon, who is an absolute exception,
- 37:19would not have. Then the question would
- 37:22be: Are they punished because they
- 37:25worked poorly by their own standards?
- 37:27For everyone else, it would still have
- 37:29been a top-tier performance. This is
- 37:31being debated. Part of the legal
- 37:33literature says: "Yes, everyone must
- 37:35work at their own level, and if I allow
- 37:37myself mistakes at my highest level,
- 37:39then I will be punished for those
- 37:41mistakes." Others say that while you
- 37:45must use your skills, that would
- 37:47penalize the absolute expert, because
- 37:49higher demands—including criminal law
- 37:52demands—would be placed on them. Both
- 37:54sides are well-argued. I would be
- 37:58uncertain myself about what stance I
- 37:59would take there. There is a lot to be
- 38:02said for the argument that everyone
- 38:04must use all their skills to prevent
- 38:05harm. But on the other hand, you would
- 38:08have to say, well, just because he is
- 38:10particularly gifted, he shouldn't
- 38:12actually be worse off under criminal
- 38:14law. Let's look at foreseeability. So
- 38:18the first thing we looked at was the
- 38:20breach of duty. The second is then the
- 38:22question of foreseeability. Here we
- 38:24must ask the question, whether, based
- 38:28on experience, a result occurred that
- 38:31was inherent in the breach of duty, in
- 38:34the breach of the duty of care. So was
- 38:38it foreseeable that this specific fatal
- 38:41or injury result would occur? Here, too
- 38:47, the breach of duty of care and the
- 38:49foreseeability are actually to be
- 38:51determined objectively, but from the
- 38:53individual perspective of the actor,
- 38:56taking into account all the
- 38:57circumstances of the individual case.
- 39:00That means we put ourselves in the
- 39:03perpetrator's individual perspective.
- 39:06We cannot simply assume some
- 39:08third-party perspective and ask
- 39:10ourselves from their point of view—
- 39:13looking through their eyes—how
- 39:15foreseeability should be assessed here,
- 39:17if we take all the circumstances of the
- 39:20individual case into account. We
- 39:23therefore consider his sources of
- 39:26information, how much time he has to
- 39:29assess and evaluate that information,
- 39:33and it is also important that we cannot
- 39:37really demand more than that our
- 39:40perpetrator could have acquired the
- 39:43knowledge regarding the occurrence of
- 39:46the result in that concrete situation.
- 39:51What does that mean? If we have someone
- 39:55who could theoretically have foreseen
- 39:58the result, but if he had fulfilled all
- 40:01his duties and still would not have
- 40:04seen the result as a possible
- 40:06consequence, then we cannot assume
- 40:09foreseeability. This means that for
- 40:13foreseeability, we must ultimately be
- 40:15guided by what is possible based on
- 40:17experience. However, that is rarely
- 40:20where the problems lie in an exam. In
- 40:23most cases regarding negligence, it is
- 40:25simply important to subsume it cleanly
- 40:27and to look at the objective imputation
- 40:29. In a rule of thumb, recognizability
- 40:33is affirmed if there was a specific
- 40:35reason for the action to consider the
- 40:37possibility of the realization of the
- 40:38offense. What does that mean? It means
- 40:43that a result was recognizable if our
- 40:46perpetrator carried out the action and
- 40:49anyone else should have thought about
- 40:51the fact that exactly this result would
- 40:54occur. This means that here, too, we
- 40:58have a certain negligence element, a
- 41:00certain breach-of-duty element. We are
- 41:03telling him, well, if you had thought
- 41:04about it properly, you would have
- 41:06immediately realized that this result
- 41:07would occur. Here you also have the
- 41:13table salt case again, which I referred
- 41:16to earlier as the pudding case. It was
- 41:19a four-year-old daughter who weighed 15
- 41:21kg, and 0.5 to 1 g of table salt per
- 41:24kilogram of body weight, according to
- 41:26the findings of the Federal Court of
- 41:28Justice, usually leads to death. We
- 41:32discussed the case, and here you also
- 41:35have the excerpts from the decision.
- 41:40And there, the regional court—or
- 41:41rather the Federal Court of Justice—
- 41:43states that the regional court clearly
- 41:45explained that the defendant, through
- 41:47no fault of her own, had no knowledge
- 41:49that even small amounts of table salt
- 41:51could cause life-threatening poisoning
- 41:53in a child. I said a few things about
- 41:56that earlier. Foreseeability, as you
- 42:01can see from the number of slides, is
- 42:03not the decisive problem. We have
- 42:06already dealt with the breach of duty
- 42:08connection in the context of
- 42:10intentional offenses. Here are a few
- 42:13more aspects that play a special role
- 42:15in negligence offenses. Here, too, you
- 42:20must of course examine whether the
- 42:23breach of duty that was committed led
- 42:25to the result in such a way that the
- 42:28breach of duty is a condition that
- 42:31cannot be omitted. This means you have
- 42:35to ask yourself what would have
- 42:37happened if our perpetrator had acted
- 42:40lawfully—for example, if he had
- 42:42observed the prescribed speed limit or
- 42:45if he had been driving sober instead of
- 42:47drunk. And then these problems often
- 42:51arise, which occur when an expert
- 42:56witness in a criminal trial determines,
- 42:58"Well, if our perpetrator had only been
- 43:00driving at the prescribed 50 km/h, the
- 43:03accident would have happened anyway."
- 43:06Or if the expert determines that the
- 43:09accused was indeed intoxicated—and
- 43:13intoxicated to such an extent that he
- 43:16could no longer safely operate the
- 43:19vehicle—but under the given
- 43:22conditions, even a sober driver could
- 43:26not have prevented this accident
- 43:29because it was unavoidable even for a
- 43:32careful driver. In these cases, the
- 43:36case law says—regarding the
- 43:38intoxicated driver, we already
- 43:40mentioned that the case law handles it
- 43:42a bit differently—because they come
- 43:44up with the idea that an intoxicated
- 43:46driver should be extra careful, thus
- 43:49developing the figure of the "careful
- 43:51drunk driver." But in principle,
- 43:55according to the so-called avoidability
- 43:58theory, the case law states that a
- 44:00breach of duty of care is not causal
- 44:02for a result—meaning the breach of
- 44:05duty is not causal, so the connection
- 44:07of the breach of duty does not exist.
- 44:12So please do not confuse this with the
- 44:13causality of the action; this is about
- 44:15the causality of the breach of duty. It
- 44:18is therefore not causal if it is not
- 44:20established with near-certain
- 44:22probability that the result would have
- 44:24occurred even without the breach of
- 44:26duty. This means that in court
- 44:29proceedings, or possibly earlier during
- 44:32the preliminary proceedings by the
- 44:34public prosecutor's office, you must
- 44:37determine whether this breach of duty
- 44:39was the cause or the trigger for this
- 44:42result with near-certain probability.
- 44:47And if you cannot determine that, then
- 44:49the connection of the breach of duty is
- 44:51missing. This means the nexus of duty
- 44:55violation that we are examining here
- 44:58ultimately arises from the question of
- 45:01whether, if you mentally remove the
- 45:03duty violation, the outcome would still
- 45:06have occurred. And if you mentally
- 45:10remove the duty violation—speeding or
- 45:13drunk driving—and, this is very
- 45:15important, replace it with compliant
- 45:17behavior, and the outcome would still
- 45:19have occurred, then we are not dealing
- 45:22with objectively imputable outcomes. In
- 45:26other words, it is crucial here that
- 45:29you cannot simply think away the duty
- 45:31violation in the sense that nothing
- 45:34remains; rather, it is a logical
- 45:36consequence that when you think away
- 45:38the duty violation, lawful, compliant
- 45:41behavior takes its place. So, when you
- 45:45have such a case where the expert
- 45:47states that with compliant behavior the
- 45:50outcome would likely have occurred
- 45:52anyway, you examine the nexus of duty
- 45:55violation and determine that if they
- 45:58had driven properly, the outcome would
- 46:00likely have occurred, meaning the nexus
- 46:03of duty violation is absent. The theory
- 46:06of risk enhancement, supported by part
- 46:08of the legal literature, sees this a
- 46:10bit differently and says it ultimately
- 46:12depends on the increase in risk. The
- 46:15duty violation is already considered
- 46:16causal in that case. According to this
- 46:18view, there is already a nexus of duty
- 46:21violation if the perpetrator has
- 46:23increased the risk of infringement of a
- 46:25legal interest for the victim. That
- 46:29means if an expert says, I cannot rule
- 46:32out that the accident would have
- 46:34occurred even if the perpetrator had
- 46:37driven at the permitted 50 instead of
- 46:39the prohibited 60. But it is relatively
- 46:44certain, or established with a
- 46:46probability bordering on certainty,
- 46:48that the victim would have had a better
- 46:51chance of escaping the accident in that
- 46:53case. Then this view argues that victim
- 46:58interests are better served if we say
- 47:01it is sufficient here that the risk of
- 47:04the outcome occurring has been
- 47:07increased. It does not have to be
- 47:09established with certainty bordering on
- 47:11the absolute that the outcome would
- 47:12have been avoided. It is sufficient
- 47:16that speeding or other negligent
- 47:18behavior simply increased the risk of
- 47:21the outcome occurring. And the
- 47:25justification for this is ultimately
- 47:27victim interests. Arguments raised
- 47:30against this view state that such a
- 47:32solution contradicts the principle of
- 47:34in dubio pro reo, because it assumes an
- 47:37outcome is imputed even though
- 47:39causality cannot be proven. Whether
- 47:44this is truly a violation of the in
- 47:47dubio pro reo principle is certainly
- 47:50debatable, because the principle of
- 47:54doubt—in dubio pro reo—is violated
- 47:57if I cannot establish the facts
- 48:00necessary for a legal decision against
- 48:04the defendant, yet I convict them
- 48:07anyway. That is the case where in dubio
- 48:10pro reo would be violated. But here we
- 48:12are dealing with a different case. We
- 48:15are not saying—and this theory of
- 48:18increased risk is not saying—that the
- 48:20facts cannot be determined; rather,
- 48:23this view actually says, well, we have
- 48:25established the fact that a risk exists
- 48:28. We are simply changing the criteria
- 48:30by which we measure the facts. In other
- 48:33words, this view states that causality
- 48:36is not the causation of a result, but
- 48:38rather that causality here is the
- 48:41increase of risk. And for that reason,
- 48:43it can hardly be said that the
- 48:44principle of*in dubio pro reo*is
- 48:46violated. But one can certainly ask:
- 48:49why are we focusing on the increase of
- 48:51risk here? Ultimately, this turns the
- 48:55result-based crime, the injury offense,
- 48:58into a endangerment offense. What does
- 49:01that mean? If we say that the fact that
- 49:04the risk has been increased is
- 49:06sufficient, then we are not punishing
- 49:08our perpetrator for causing the result,
- 49:10but for increasing the risk. And you
- 49:14are typically punished for an increase
- 49:16in risk when we are dealing with an
- 49:18endangerment offense. An endangerment
- 49:20offense, for example, is Section 315c,
- 49:26that is an endangerment offense; it
- 49:28states in the wording of the law in
- 49:29paragraph 1 that one "thereby endangers
- 49:32the life or limb of another person or
- 49:34property of significant value." And in
- 49:38Section 222 it says: "kills another
- 49:41person," or in 229, "injures another
- 49:44person." In this respect, the theory of
- 49:48increased risk is prominently
- 49:50represented in legal literature. One
- 49:53probably also cannot argue, um, that
- 49:56the principle of*in dubio pro reo*is
- 49:58violated. But the prevailing view does
- 50:00exactly that. So, the prevailing view
- 50:01says that is a violation of*in dubio
- 50:03pro reo*, though one must be careful
- 50:05with this criticism. However, it is
- 50:08certainly true that this theory of
- 50:10increased risk turns an injury offense
- 50:12—where someone is injured or someone
- 50:14dies—into an endangerment offense if
- 50:16you base criminal liability on the
- 50:18increase of a risk, on the endangerment
- 50:20, and no longer on the injury itself. I
- 50:24am a bit unsure now; did we not cover
- 50:27the case of the, um, careful drunk
- 50:30driver in the first part, not even when
- 50:33discussing duty violations? Right, okay
- 50:35, then we will go through it in detail
- 50:37now. Um, this is a problem that has
- 50:40arisen in legal literature and in case
- 50:43law. The situation is this: a
- 50:45perpetrator drives a vehicle while
- 50:47intoxicated and behaves in a way that a
- 50:49conscientious and careful driver is
- 50:51expected to behave. What does that mean
- 50:53? Of course, he is not behaving like a
- 50:57careful and conscientious driver simply
- 51:00by driving while drunk, but imagine
- 51:02someone driving with a 1.8 blood
- 51:04alcohol level, but they are driving 50,
- 51:07are ready to brake, and are not
- 51:09swerving. There are just some people
- 51:11who seem to drive properly only with a
- 51:13blood alcohol level of 0.18%. No idea.
- 51:16But when you sometimes hear that people
- 51:18are pulled off the road with 0.55%and
- 51:21only got caught in routine checks, then
- 51:23you can imagine what this is about. So,
- 51:27um, we are dealing with a driver who
- 51:29exceeds the 0.11%limit, but otherwise
- 51:32drove completely correctly. They were
- 51:34only driving at 50 km/h. And now the
- 51:37Federal Court of Justice says um, in
- 51:42these cases, the question is not how a
- 51:45careful driver would have driven
- 51:48otherwise. So the question is not
- 51:53whether a careful, sober driver would
- 51:55also have driven 50, been ready to
- 51:57brake, or behaved the same way in that
- 52:00situation; rather, the Federal Court of
- 52:03Justice asks how would the um, careful
- 52:09intoxicated driver or drunken driver
- 52:12have behaved? So the Federal Court of
- 52:15Justice says we don't have to look at
- 52:17lawful alternative behavior, but rather
- 52:19ask ourselves how the drunken driver
- 52:21should have behaved so that their
- 52:23braking distance would be the same? And
- 52:27the driver is then accused of the fact
- 52:29that if you are drunk and driving, you
- 52:31shouldn't be driving 50, but only 30.
- 52:34And if they had only driven 30, the
- 52:36braking distance would have been
- 52:37shorter and the accident would have
- 52:38been avoided. And that's where legal
- 52:42scholars said, "Well, that is certainly
- 52:45fascinating," and it is the almost
- 52:47unanimous, I would say, unanimous view
- 52:50of legal scholars, which says: The
- 52:52Federal Court of Justice, and the
- 52:54Bavarian Supreme Court before it, is
- 52:57now replacing an unlawful act—driving
- 52:59under the influence at 50 km/h—with
- 53:02another, namely driving under the
- 53:04influence, just a bit slower. Which of
- 53:07course remains unlawful, instead of
- 53:09replacing the unlawful variant with the
- 53:12lawful one. And that is why the
- 53:17prevailing opinion says you shouldn't
- 53:20ask about the careful intoxicated or
- 53:22drunken driver, but rather whether the
- 53:25outcome would also have occurred if the
- 53:28perpetrator had behaved like a sober
- 53:30but otherwise careful driver. And that
- 53:34is where the decisive formation of
- 53:35hypotheses comes into play. By the way,
- 53:38the case recently appeared in an exam
- 53:40paper again. That's why the probability
- 53:43of it appearing again is low, but it
- 53:45can certainly occur again in these
- 53:46constellations. As I just told you, it
- 53:49is crucial which hypotheses you form.
- 53:53You, you are only allowed to include an
- 53:55alternative that would also be lawful,
- 53:57otherwise you wouldn't be dealing with
- 53:58lawful alternative behavior. And that
- 54:01is why the approach of the Federal
- 54:03Court of Justice is flawed by saying
- 54:05here, "Well, I will now focus on the
- 54:06careful drunken driver." In these
- 54:09situations, I must focus on the person
- 54:11acting lawfully. And that is why it is
- 54:16correctly designated with the term or
- 54:18the catchphrase "lawful alternative
- 54:21conduct," and not just any alternative
- 54:24conduct that protects legal interests;
- 54:27it must be lawful. So, should you
- 54:33encounter a case in the exam where the
- 54:39perpetrator or the accused—I must say
- 54:41the acting figure, since they
- 54:42ultimately do not become the
- 54:44perpetrator—causes a result, but a
- 54:46person acting lawfully would also have
- 54:48caused this result, then you must
- 54:50examine closely: which alternative am I
- 54:52constructing, i.e., what am I comparing
- 54:54it to? And this hypothesis must be a
- 54:58hypothesis of other lawful conduct. It
- 55:01cannot simply be, as the Federal Court
- 55:04of Justice did, the alternative of some
- 55:06other conduct that somehow better
- 55:08protects legal interests. Um, also
- 55:14important here are alternative causes,
- 55:16which we have already discussed; those
- 55:18are the pile-up cases. So, if I as the
- 55:21accused can say, "Yes, if I hadn't been
- 55:24speeding there, the other person coming
- 55:26behind me would have crashed into them
- 55:28anyway." That is not a constellation
- 55:31that is relevant here. We are not
- 55:33dealing with alternative causes in
- 55:36these constellations. So, the legality,
- 55:39the replacement of an act with lawful
- 55:42conduct. Um, that is not a question of
- 55:45alternative causes, but rather a
- 55:47question of the hypothesis of lawful
- 55:49alternative conduct. The question of
- 55:53the protective purpose of the norms is
- 55:54something we have already discussed.
- 55:55Therefore, I will repeat it briefly
- 55:57here. We can only sanction someone if
- 56:01the result brought about directly
- 56:03involved the danger the norm was
- 56:04intended to prevent and this danger
- 56:06turned into harm. This means you must,
- 56:10in particular, ask the question: are we
- 56:13even dealing with the spatial and
- 56:15material scope of protection of the
- 56:17norm here? You all know the case. The
- 56:21perpetrator runs a red light in
- 56:23Mannheim, and because of that, arrives
- 56:266 seconds earlier in Ludwigshafen. And
- 56:29because they arrive at that spot, they
- 56:31run over someone who just ran into the
- 56:34street. There, they behave perfectly
- 56:36according to traffic rules, perfectly
- 56:38with due care, but not here in Mannheim
- 56:40. And, um, there we have a
- 56:43constellation where we can say, of
- 56:45course, driving into the intersection
- 56:47despite the red light signal is a
- 56:48breach of duty. No question about it.
- 56:52But this red light signal is only
- 56:54intended to protect the intersection
- 56:56area from danger and is not meant to
- 56:58prevent you from arriving somewhere
- 57:00else 6 seconds earlier. And that is why
- 57:03this is not a case where the protective
- 57:05scope of the norm is involved. We had
- 57:07looked at another case. You might
- 57:10remember: What if there’s a sign on
- 57:12the highway that says “100 km/h for
- 57:15noise control between 10 p.m. and 6
- 57:17a.m.” and someone drives through
- 57:19there at 3 a.m. at 180 km/h, resulting
- 57:22in an accident? According to the
- 57:26generally accepted view, you cannot say
- 57:28the breach of duty lies solely in
- 57:30violating the noise control regulation,
- 57:32because the breach of duty must be
- 57:34aimed at protecting the person—the
- 57:36physical integrity of other people—
- 57:39and that is not the case with noise
- 57:41control. You could, of course, argue:
- 57:44There is a recommended speed on
- 57:46highways, and anyone who significantly
- 57:47exceeds it could certainly be
- 57:49committing a breach of duty. However,
- 57:51this is highly controversial. Let us
- 57:54look at the justification elements and
- 57:55the unlawfulness elements of negligence
- 57:57offenses. Um, regarding grounds for
- 58:04justification, we obviously have a
- 58:06significant problem with, um, the
- 58:09subjective justification, or could we
- 58:11have a significant problem with the
- 58:14subjective justification element?
- 58:18Because if you don’t even know that
- 58:20you are acting in a way that is
- 58:21criminally relevant, because you are
- 58:23acting negligently, then it is
- 58:25difficult for you to have the awareness
- 58:27that you are justified. So, it is hard
- 58:31to demand that you say, “Yes, I am
- 58:33performing this act only because I know
- 58:35that I can rely on a ground for
- 58:36justification.” There are certainly
- 58:40cases where that is possible, as it
- 58:42could be that you are committing the
- 58:43act with conscious negligence and know
- 58:45that you could injure someone. You
- 58:48actually rule it out, but you are aware
- 58:50of the risk and also know that in that
- 58:52specific case you are allowed to act
- 58:54that way because you are justified. So,
- 58:56in cases of conscious negligence, the
- 58:58problem generally does not arise. In
- 59:00cases of unconscious negligence, where
- 59:02someone does not know they are acting
- 59:04in breach of duty or that they could
- 59:06bring about a result, they will rarely
- 59:08think about whether they might be
- 59:10justified. And that is why, in these
- 59:13cases, the subjective element is left
- 59:16aside. It is not required that a
- 59:19subjective element be present in such
- 59:21instances. So, if someone negligently
- 59:23injures another person while acting in
- 59:25self-defense, but is not aware of it,
- 59:27then we are looking at impunity.
- 59:28However, that is a constellation I have
- 59:30not yet encountered in bar exam papers.
- 59:35Regarding self-endangerment. Um, what
- 59:39about cases where someone, um, injures
- 59:42another and in doing so promotes
- 59:44self-endangerment, or contributes to
- 59:47self-endangerment? Um, consent to the
- 59:51danger of the act justifies the injury
- 59:53if the right-holder was aware of the
- 59:55specific danger that the perpetrator
- 59:56created through their behavior. What
- 59:59does that mean? It means that for
- 1:00:02negligence offenses, consent can
- 1:00:04certainly be sufficient. These are, of
- 1:00:09course, scenarios where someone
- 1:00:11consents to physical injury, for
- 1:00:13instance, but the danger of death is
- 1:00:15also present. Take the simple case of a
- 1:00:20surgery. A surgery that has a 5%risk of
- 1:00:25ending fatally. The patient consents
- 1:00:29because, in the weighing of options,
- 1:00:32the consequences would be even worse,
- 1:00:34and so they say, yes, I accept this 5%
- 1:00:37risk that I could die during the, uh,
- 1:00:39during the surgery. And there it is
- 1:00:45assumed that criminal liability is not
- 1:00:48an option if our later victim has
- 1:00:51consented to the act that comes with
- 1:00:55this danger. So, you can consent to
- 1:00:59injuries, but consenting to a specific
- 1:01:02danger can also lead to the exclusion
- 1:01:05of criminal liability for the
- 1:01:07endangerment. This is, by the way, the
- 1:01:10reason why you can effectively consent
- 1:01:12to life-threatening danger so the
- 1:01:14perpetrator is not punished, but you
- 1:01:17cannot consent to a fatal injury under
- 1:01:19Section 216 of the German Criminal Code
- 1:01:21. This means justification arises from
- 1:01:26consensual endangerment. Um, and here,
- 1:01:32the general limits must be observed.
- 1:01:36This means only someone who has the
- 1:01:38right to the legal interest themselves
- 1:01:41can dispose of it. It must be a legal
- 1:01:43interest that is open to disposition at
- 1:01:45all. The person consenting must be
- 1:01:47capable of consenting. They must
- 1:01:48therefore recognize the dangers. They
- 1:01:50must be able to assess the risks, and
- 1:01:53they must have consented expressly,
- 1:01:55prior to the act, and free from defects
- 1:01:57of will, and the perpetrator must act
- 1:01:59with knowledge of and based on that
- 1:02:02consent. Here the question is whether
- 1:02:06one can even speak of self-endangerment
- 1:02:08. More accurately, one should actually
- 1:02:10speak of consensual endangerment by
- 1:02:13another. The, um, boundaries between
- 1:02:15endangerment by another and
- 1:02:16self-endangerment are, however, often
- 1:02:18fluid. Take the example of car surfing.
- 1:02:25Is that now endangerment by another or
- 1:02:27self-endangerment? If you lie up there
- 1:02:30on the roof and wait for the other
- 1:02:32person to drive off, and then they
- 1:02:34swerve through country lanes at 50 or
- 1:02:3660, and you hold onto the roof or at
- 1:02:38least try to. Yes, these are case
- 1:02:41scenarios in which this becomes
- 1:02:42relevant. Is that self-endangerment? It
- 1:02:44is likely more of an endangerment by
- 1:02:46another, so one should probably
- 1:02:48categorize this heading under
- 1:02:50endangerment by another. Um, these
- 1:02:53racing cases always play a role again
- 1:02:55and again. In this case, it was about
- 1:03:00someone challenging another to a race,
- 1:03:03and then it was about whether, if one
- 1:03:05of the two involved in the race dies,
- 1:03:07is that self-endangerment or
- 1:03:08endangerment by another if an accident
- 1:03:11occurs between the participants?
- 1:03:14According to the case law of the
- 1:03:15Federal Court of Justice, anyone who
- 1:03:17intentionally or negligently induces,
- 1:03:19enables, or promotes the
- 1:03:20self-responsible act of a person
- 1:03:22leading to self-harm or suicide is
- 1:03:23generally not liable for punishment,
- 1:03:25provided they do not possess superior
- 1:03:27expert knowledge and thus grasp the
- 1:03:29risk better than the person harming or
- 1:03:31killing themselves. So, take the case
- 1:03:33where one person challenges another to
- 1:03:35a race. In the meantime, we have
- 1:03:38criminal provisions against that, it is
- 1:03:40section 315d, I believe. Um, take the
- 1:03:46case where someone is challenged and
- 1:03:48now organizes a race with another
- 1:03:49person, and as a result of this race, a
- 1:03:51death occurs. And there, of course, the
- 1:03:55question is: am I dealing here with
- 1:03:57self-responsible self-endangerment? And
- 1:04:00ultimately, we will have to apply these
- 1:04:03criteria. So, you can speak of
- 1:04:04self-endangerment again in that case.
- 1:04:07Um, does the person who entered the
- 1:04:09race have the freedom of disposition
- 1:04:11over the legal interest; well, they are
- 1:04:14allowed to endanger their physical
- 1:04:16integrity. They are even allowed to
- 1:04:18endanger their life, it is said. They
- 1:04:20are allowed to—legally speaking, they
- 1:04:22are allowed to kill themselves—but
- 1:04:24for consent, Section 216 of the
- 1:04:25Criminal Code is of course relevant
- 1:04:27here. Are they capable of consenting,
- 1:04:30meaning do they know what risks are
- 1:04:32involved with this race and, well, have
- 1:04:35they explicitly declared this before
- 1:04:37the act, free from defects of will?
- 1:04:39That, of course, falls away in the case
- 1:04:41of self-responsible self-endangerment
- 1:04:42when you have such a racing scenario
- 1:04:44here. Um, it is the case that in these
- 1:04:47scenarios, the act, the conduct itself
- 1:04:51ultimately replaces the declaration.
- 1:04:57This means that self-responsible
- 1:04:58self-endangerment can lead to impunity
- 1:05:01here, even if you, as the other
- 1:05:03participant in the race, worked toward
- 1:05:05the race happening and all participants
- 1:05:07know it can be dangerous. It is a
- 1:05:12different story, of course, if you cut
- 1:05:14the brake lines before the race and
- 1:05:17then challenge them to the race; then
- 1:05:19we are not dealing with knowledge on an
- 1:05:21equal level. Then we have superior
- 1:05:24expert knowledge here. Additionally,
- 1:05:28such conduct is exempt from punishment
- 1:05:31if it is not aimed at suicide or
- 1:05:33self-harm and has materialized through
- 1:05:36a risk consciously taken by the victim.
- 1:05:40That would also be the decisive point
- 1:05:42in this racing case, um. Here you have
- 1:05:46the corresponding statements from the
- 1:05:48Federal Court of Justice's decision
- 1:05:49regarding this. If we take another
- 1:05:53close look at consent, another note
- 1:05:55here that I mentioned earlier regarding
- 1:05:56Section 216 of the Criminal Code.
- 1:06:01Section 216 of the Criminal Code, which
- 1:06:03prohibits homicide in every case—at
- 1:06:05least in principle, in every case—we
- 1:06:07are currently discussing exceptions
- 1:06:09regarding palliative medicine. Then it
- 1:06:13is the case that this limiting effect
- 1:06:15only becomes relevant for consent to
- 1:06:17killing, but not, according to
- 1:06:18prevailing opinion, at least not for
- 1:06:20endangering life. This means that
- 1:06:24Section 216 of the Criminal Code is not
- 1:06:27suitable as an indication that
- 1:06:29endangering another person is
- 1:06:31impermissible, even if that person has
- 1:06:33consented. And therefore, Section 216
- 1:06:39does not apply to Section 222 for
- 1:06:41systematic and teleological reasons.
- 1:06:44Section 216 is intended exclusively to
- 1:06:46prevent the intentional killing of
- 1:06:48another human being. But not to prevent
- 1:06:51someone else from being endangered,
- 1:06:53because otherwise we would have massive
- 1:06:54problems, especially in the field of
- 1:06:56medical procedures, because then no one
- 1:06:58could consent to an operation that also
- 1:07:00entails a certain risk of a fatal
- 1:07:02outcome in a way that exempts them from
- 1:07:04punishment. Regarding the determination
- 1:07:08of guilt, I had already pointed out
- 1:07:10that you must ensure that subjective
- 1:07:11breaches of the duty of care are
- 1:07:13established. That is, the question of
- 1:07:16whether the specific individual was
- 1:07:18able to meet the care requirements
- 1:07:21according to their personal abilities,
- 1:07:23i.e., whether someone perhaps has
- 1:07:25deficits due to personal reasons that
- 1:07:28make them unable to meet the general
- 1:07:30standards of care here. And the
- 1:07:35subjective foreseeability: could our
- 1:07:37specific perpetrator, the person we are
- 1:07:40currently looking at, foresee this
- 1:07:42result? Or was there any reason why
- 1:07:45they could not, because they lacked
- 1:07:46some knowledge that everyone else has,
- 1:07:48which belongs to the general standard?
- 1:07:51But they did lack it; we already looked
- 1:07:53at that in the saline solution case. I
- 1:07:57would like to briefly address
- 1:07:58assumption of risk fault again. I had
- 1:08:00already hinted at that. That is the
- 1:08:03case where a doctor—though it could
- 1:08:06be any other case—takes on a risk,
- 1:08:09undertakes an act that is fundamentally
- 1:08:12a breach of duty, but they are not in a
- 1:08:15position in the concrete situation to
- 1:08:18bring this action to a successful
- 1:08:20conclusion. So, a doctor who is still
- 1:08:25at an early stage of training takes on
- 1:08:27an operation that actually only a
- 1:08:29specialist with the corresponding
- 1:08:30knowledge can perform properly and lege
- 1:08:33artis. Accordingly, they also do not
- 1:08:36succeed. This results in a fatal or
- 1:08:38serious injury. Then one would either
- 1:08:41say at that point, we set the standard
- 1:08:45slightly differently. That is in fact
- 1:08:48done in some cases. Then it is said,
- 1:08:50could they fulfill their standard that
- 1:08:53is to be set for them, did they fulfill
- 1:08:56it, and one might then perhaps say,
- 1:08:58well, the standard of a doctor who
- 1:09:01performs such an operation, they did
- 1:09:03not meet it at all, objectively did not
- 1:09:06meet it. With that, we are already
- 1:09:09dealing with a breach of duty. So, we
- 1:09:12would then simply say, the doctor is
- 1:09:14perhaps a doctor after three years, who
- 1:09:17also does not have the corresponding
- 1:09:19specialist qualification, no
- 1:09:20corresponding experience. We measure
- 1:09:22him against high standards nonetheless.
- 1:09:26Um, and then we have to discuss the
- 1:09:28issue regarding the subjective element.
- 1:09:33Or what one can do nonetheless, is say
- 1:09:35we are dealing with a doctor who is not
- 1:09:37yet fully trained. We measure him
- 1:09:40against those standards. Uh, he did
- 1:09:43meet them, but we are still dealing
- 1:09:44with a violation. The more sensible
- 1:09:48solution in these cases, however, would
- 1:09:51be to say he did not meet the standards
- 1:09:53, he could not subjectively meet them
- 1:09:55either, but what I must actually charge
- 1:09:57him with is the acceptance of the
- 1:09:59patient or the taking on of the
- 1:10:01operation. And then you can clearly
- 1:10:03separate what you want to charge him
- 1:10:05with. Do you want to charge him with
- 1:10:08not performing the operation correctly,
- 1:10:10or do you want to charge him with
- 1:10:11taking on the operation even though he
- 1:10:13knew he couldn't perform it correctly,
- 1:10:15or at least should have known he
- 1:10:16couldn't perform it correctly? That
- 1:10:19means this assumption of responsibility
- 1:10:22—and this is very central—relies on
- 1:10:24a different point in time. Culpability
- 1:10:26in assumption refers to a breach of
- 1:10:29duty at the time of the assumption, not
- 1:10:31at the time of the operation. This is,
- 1:10:34of course, also conceivable in many
- 1:10:36other areas when someone takes on tasks
- 1:10:38they cannot fulfill. And that doesn't
- 1:10:41have to be bodily injury. It can also
- 1:10:43be property crimes. If someone
- 1:10:46overextends themselves by taking over
- 1:10:47the management of a company and it is
- 1:10:49clear to them that this will lead to
- 1:10:51damage to the company, then that can
- 1:10:52certainly be a breach of trust, for
- 1:10:54example. Then we still have to address
- 1:10:59the actio libera in causa within the
- 1:11:01framework of negligence crimes, meaning
- 1:11:04scenarios in which the perpetrator,
- 1:11:09because they are too drunk or too
- 1:11:11impaired by other intoxicating
- 1:11:14substances, is unable to realize they
- 1:11:16are committing a crime. So, we have a
- 1:11:19problem with Section 20 of the German
- 1:11:21Criminal Code. We looked at this
- 1:11:24closely, and the Federal Court of
- 1:11:26Justice says that for negligence crimes
- 1:11:28, we don't actually need actio libera
- 1:11:30in causa, because with negligence
- 1:11:32crimes, we do it in a way that any act
- 1:11:34that somehow led to the result is
- 1:11:36sufficient. So, let's assume, our
- 1:11:41perpetrator gets so drunk that at the
- 1:11:43time they are racing around in a car
- 1:11:45and injure someone, they are no longer
- 1:11:47criminally responsible. We can say
- 1:11:51anyway, well, getting that drunk with
- 1:11:53the knowledge that it is quite possible
- 1:11:55I might still drive a car. I never know
- 1:11:59what I'll do when I'm drunk. I might
- 1:12:01possibly drive a car then. In a
- 1:12:04situation like this, one would say that
- 1:12:06getting drunk itself is the act of
- 1:12:08negligence, and that is sufficient
- 1:12:09without any issues. This means that in
- 1:12:13these configurations where we otherwise
- 1:12:15use anticipatory steps, we have no
- 1:12:18problems with negligence offenses
- 1:12:20anyway, because we say that for these
- 1:12:22pure negligence offenses, there are
- 1:12:25many cases where we anticipate the
- 1:12:27result and include outcomes far outside
- 1:12:29the actual sphere of danger. You can
- 1:12:34already have negligence offenses if,
- 1:12:36for example, the perpetrator does not
- 1:12:39write the manual for an electrical
- 1:12:41device in a way that avoids errors, and
- 1:12:43then a death occurs. Writing the manual
- 1:12:46could certainly be negligent homicide,
- 1:12:48depending on how you phrase it. This
- 1:12:52means that the*actio libera in causa*is
- 1:12:54not actually necessary here. In the
- 1:12:56exam, you can still affirm it; then you
- 1:12:59must simply determine that our
- 1:13:01perpetrator acted negligently regarding
- 1:13:03the intoxication and negligently
- 1:13:05regarding the fact that they would
- 1:13:08later commit such an act while in a
- 1:13:10state of incapacity. Let's look at
- 1:13:14recklessness, which becomes quite
- 1:13:16relevant. Less in the area of simple
- 1:13:21negligence offenses and much more in
- 1:13:23the area of Section 251 in particular.
- 1:13:30For in Section 251, it says: "If the
- 1:13:35perpetrator, through the robbery, at
- 1:13:37least recklessly causes the death of
- 1:13:39another person. Then the penalty is
- 1:13:41life imprisonment or imprisonment of
- 1:13:42not less than 10 years." This means, if
- 1:13:49you are dealing with a robber who
- 1:13:51strikes the victim in order to be able
- 1:13:54to take their belongings. And then the
- 1:13:57victim dies. Then we are in the area
- 1:14:00where this severe penalty, i.e., life
- 1:14:02imprisonment or imprisonment of not
- 1:14:03less than 10 years, may be considered.
- 1:14:08And we need to take a look at
- 1:14:10recklessness. This is a special form of
- 1:14:13negligence. It is generally translated
- 1:14:16as gross negligence. We certainly find
- 1:14:18this in jurisprudence and textbooks. Um
- 1:14:22, the definition that was supposed to
- 1:14:24be included in the law was an act of
- 1:14:26special levity or special indifference
- 1:14:29as a form of gross negligence. Special
- 1:14:34indifference gives the impression that
- 1:14:36it must involve conscious negligence.
- 1:14:40However, one can also act recklessly,
- 1:14:43if one did not recognize the risk of
- 1:14:45the outcome at all, but otherwise
- 1:14:48commits a serious breach of duty and
- 1:14:50causes an outcome that they did not
- 1:14:53recognize, but which was completely
- 1:14:56obvious. And you see here that the case
- 1:15:01law in many areas is closely linked to
- 1:15:04civil law jurisprudence. This means,
- 1:15:07ultimately, it assumes gross negligence
- 1:15:09. This is partially criticized in the
- 1:15:12literature because it is imprecise. You
- 1:15:15can find the BGH definition here, which
- 1:15:17I actually find quite understandable
- 1:15:18and also very handy for memorizing for
- 1:15:20the exam. With "Leichtfertigkeit"(
- 1:15:23recklessness), the law describes
- 1:15:24behavior that shows a high degree of
- 1:15:26negligence, meaning it is grossly
- 1:15:27negligent. That is actually a
- 1:15:30redundancy, but to make it clear once
- 1:15:33again, it aligns with the concept of
- 1:15:35gross carelessness used by the regional
- 1:15:38court. According to this, a person acts
- 1:15:41recklessly if they disregard an obvious
- 1:15:44possibility due to special carelessness
- 1:15:46or special indifference. Special
- 1:15:49carelessness—I would agree with that
- 1:15:51here. Indifference always has that
- 1:15:53sense of "I thought about it, but I
- 1:15:56don't care." That is not what is meant.
- 1:15:59So, what's decisive is that we are
- 1:16:01dealing with an obvious possibility and
- 1:16:04that the perpetrator is acting with
- 1:16:06special carelessness. Those are the two
- 1:16:09aspects, then. You could also translate
- 1:16:11"Leichtfertigkeit" as thoughtlessness,
- 1:16:13but it's important that you have these
- 1:16:15two aspects. On one hand, a serious
- 1:16:17breach of duty, and on the other,
- 1:16:20obvious predictability. Here you can
- 1:16:24see it clearly again: the obvious
- 1:16:27possibility and the gross breach of
- 1:16:30duty. How you examine this in the exam
- 1:16:31doesn't really matter. There is a lot
- 1:16:34to be said for first addressing the
- 1:16:37gross breach of duty and then moving on
- 1:16:40to the obvious possibility of the
- 1:16:42consequence occurring in view of that
- 1:16:45gross breach of duty. It should also be
- 1:16:50emphasized at this point that the
- 1:16:51motives do not matter. So, ruthlessness
- 1:16:55is not required, and selfishness is not
- 1:16:57required. That means not like in
- 1:17:01Section 315c, this phrasing that you
- 1:17:04have there in the second number,
- 1:17:12whoever acts in road traffic in a
- 1:17:14grossly improper and reckless manner—
- 1:17:16we don't need this "reckless" behavior.
- 1:17:19This "grossly improper" part already
- 1:17:21makes it clear what "Leichtfertigkeit"
- 1:17:22is about, even though "Leichtfertigkeit
- 1:17:24" is not an element of Section 315c. So
- 1:17:27please pay attention to that point. Two
- 1:17:30elements: gross breach of duty, obvious
- 1:17:32predictability. That characterizes
- 1:17:35recklessness. And with that, as you can
- 1:17:39see, we have already finished with
- 1:17:41negligence. Okay.
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