Strafrecht AT Teil 17 (Mittelbare Täterschaft) — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:00Yes, welcome, ladies and gentlemen.
- 0:03Last time, yesterday, we dealt with the
- 0:05issue of indirect perpetration, meaning
- 0:07we asked the question, what happens
- 0:09when not just one person commits a
- 0:11crime, but several together? This means
- 0:16, if you have several people who, for
- 0:18example, commit a robbery together, or
- 0:20one incites another, and the person
- 0:22incited then commits the crime. We have
- 0:29a wide variety of possible
- 0:30constellations there, and the question
- 0:32is always, how is each participant in
- 0:34the crime to be held responsible, or
- 0:36rather, how can they be held criminally
- 0:38liable? We looked at the regulations in
- 0:42the Criminal Code, and keep in mind
- 0:44that these regulations follow a
- 0:45restrictive perpetrator principle. This
- 0:49means that as long as participation in
- 0:51a crime is not provided for by law, no
- 0:53one can be punished for their
- 0:54involvement in that crime. Section 25
- 0:58of the Criminal Code states: "A person
- 1:00who commits a crime themselves or
- 1:02through another is punished as a
- 1:03perpetrator. So, someone strikes a
- 1:07victim themselves. Someone takes an
- 1:11object they want to steal themselves;
- 1:13then we are dealing with a sole
- 1:14perpetrator. Then we have the variant:
- 1:19whoever commits the crime through
- 1:20another person. That is indirect
- 1:23perpetration, which we will deal with
- 1:24even more intensively today. Then there
- 1:27is the possibility that several people
- 1:29commit a crime together. A and B
- 1:31assault C and want to take his cell
- 1:33phone. A holds him down, B reaches out
- 1:36and takes the phone. Then you would
- 1:39have a case of joint commission, which
- 1:41Section 25, paragraph 2 refers to. It
- 1:44says:" If several commit the crime
- 1:46jointly, each is punished as a
- 1:47perpetrator, a co-perpetrator. And then
- 1:50we briefly touched upon the variants of
- 1:53Sections 26 and 27 last time. These are
- 1:57the constellations in which, in Section
- 1:5926, someone induces another person to
- 2:01commit the crime. An inciter is
- 2:04punished the same as a perpetrator. So,
- 2:07whoever incites is punished according
- 2:08to the sentence, the full sentence of
- 2:10the perpetrator—anyone who has
- 2:12intentionally induced another to commit
- 2:14their intentionally committed unlawful
- 2:16act is punished the same as a
- 2:17perpetrator. And the final variant
- 2:21would then be aiding and abetting. So,
- 2:25we are dealing with someone who holds
- 2:26the ladder during a burglary, who
- 2:28provides the burglary tools, or who
- 2:30cheers during a fight. That can be
- 2:33enough for aiding and abetting. An
- 2:36accomplice is punished as anyone who
- 2:38intentionally assists another in their
- 2:39intentionally committed unlawful act.
- 2:44This means we have different variants
- 2:46in which criminal liability can be
- 2:48established. And here on this slide,
- 2:52which is about where we stopped last
- 2:53time, we address the question of
- 2:55indirect perpetration. And I will
- 2:58present to you a few more
- 2:59constellations regarding the topic of
- 3:01indirect perpetration. We are going to
- 3:05look at some constellations that have
- 3:06played a role in the history of case
- 3:08law. Last time, I simply created the
- 3:12case where A explains to B, over there
- 3:14in the garden, O's garden, is my soccer
- 3:16ball, go and get it. That one is mine,
- 3:20but in fact, it is O's soccer ball and
- 3:23A sends B on his way. B is a good guy,
- 3:25I believe, retrieves the soccer ball
- 3:27and has thus objectively committed an
- 3:29act of taking. However, he cannot be
- 3:32punished for theft because he did not
- 3:34know at all that he was breaking
- 3:36someone else's custody, but rather
- 3:37thought he was just getting the soccer
- 3:39ball for A. And this is a case where we
- 3:41are dealing with Section 25, Paragraph
- 3:431, second alternative. The law states
- 3:47that a perpetrator is punished as one
- 3:48who commits the criminal offense
- 3:50through another. And when you are
- 3:54sitting in a criminal law exam, you
- 3:56must naturally ask yourself, in our
- 3:57case with A and B, where B goes to get
- 3:59the soccer ball, could B have made
- 4:01himself criminally liable? And as I
- 4:06just said, for theft according to
- 4:08Section 242 of the German Criminal Code
- 4:10, you need a perpetrator who takes away
- 4:12another's movable property with the
- 4:14intention of unlawfully appropriating
- 4:16it for themselves or a third party. And
- 4:19we do not have that here. He does take
- 4:22away another's movable property, but
- 4:24believes that he is not taking the item
- 4:26in a legal sense, because he thinks
- 4:27that A is the owner and agrees with it.
- 4:31That A is the holder of custody and
- 4:33therefore agrees with it. So that is
- 4:38the approach you must first look at,
- 4:40because indirect perpetration, meaning
- 4:42that someone commits an act through
- 4:44another, is generally excluded if the
- 4:46other person, the instrument of the
- 4:47crime, the front man, is himself
- 4:49responsible for his act. Because
- 4:54committing the act through another
- 4:56according to Section 25, Paragraph 1,
- 4:58second alternative. It assumes that one
- 5:02person sends another on their way as a
- 5:04tool to commit the act. And this
- 5:09quality of being a tool can only be had
- 5:11if one is not personally responsible
- 5:12for their act, because, for example,
- 5:14one is not of sound mind, or if you
- 5:16send a child on their way to commit the
- 5:18act, or someone is simply mistaken
- 5:20about the fact that they are committing
- 5:22an act. And we will now look at such
- 5:27constellations in detail. And it is
- 5:33very important when you are sitting in
- 5:35the exam, as I clearly stated last time
- 5:37, that you discuss the question of
- 5:38whether this case involves indirect
- 5:40perpetration within the context of the
- 5:42lack of punishability and the position
- 5:44that leads to control over the act. We
- 5:48will see this shortly in example cases,
- 5:50then it will become clearer, I think. I
- 5:55have brought along some excerpts from
- 5:56the justifications of the draft law for
- 5:58you. When legislators introduce bills
- 6:05into the Bundestag, they always have,
- 6:07or usually have, a legal text, and
- 6:08accompanying it is a draft that a
- 6:10ministerial official or several
- 6:12officials have considered, thinking
- 6:13about why we want to formulate a law in
- 6:15a certain way. And there we have the
- 6:22constellation that the legislator has
- 6:24chosen a very, very abstract term.
- 6:27Committing the act through another
- 6:29person. If one were to ask you, what
- 6:30does it mean to commit the act through
- 6:32another person? One can imagine a great
- 6:34many things under that. It is actually
- 6:36completely unclear. However, the
- 6:41legislator says that because there are
- 6:43so many conceivable constellations, we
- 6:44must leave the legal wording open and
- 6:46formulate it as abstractly as possible,
- 6:48because we have had bad experiences in
- 6:50legislative and criminal law history
- 6:52with laws that were formulated too
- 6:54specifically. The Prussian General
- 6:59State Laws of the 18th. Late 18th.
- 7:03Century attempted to cast all
- 7:05individual cases into individual laws,
- 7:07and that, of course, cannot work,
- 7:08because if you make a law that says
- 7:10whoever steals a blue car is punished.
- 7:14Yes, what if someone steals a green one
- 7:16or a red one? This means you then have
- 7:20to consider how I can formulate the law
- 7:21broadly enough so that all cases I want
- 7:23to cover are included, and all cases I
- 7:25do not want to cover are excluded. And
- 7:30there, the legislator in this case said
- 7:32, we have the wording: whoever commits
- 7:34the act through another person, so,
- 7:36very, very broad. The legislator said
- 7:39that they had certain cases in mind.
- 7:44But we do not want to make it too
- 7:46narrow, because there can certainly be
- 7:47other cases, and such other cases have
- 7:49developed in the time since the draft.
- 7:54So this draft is from the year '62, if
- 7:56I recall correctly, and then it came
- 7:58into force. '75, so it's been a while.
- 8:02And there you can see what the
- 8:03legislator was thinking. They write: An
- 8:05act can be committed by someone through
- 8:07another person. If, for example, you
- 8:12have a nurse and the doctor gives the
- 8:14nurse poison, and the nurse goes to the
- 8:15patient thinking, "Ah, the sedative the
- 8:17patient needs," and then administers it
- 8:19, while the doctor intended to kill the
- 8:21patient and gave the nurse poison,
- 8:23which the nurse could not have
- 8:24recognized. That is precisely the type
- 8:30of case the legislator has in mind, and
- 8:31we would then be dealing with a
- 8:33constellation of indirect perpetration.
- 8:37And this indirect perpetration, because
- 8:39the law is so vague, we now have to
- 8:41bring to life through individual
- 8:42constellations. And the background you
- 8:46should always keep in mind is that
- 8:48typically—there are exceptions, but
- 8:49fundamentally, and when a lawyer speaks
- 8:51of fundamentally, they don't mean
- 8:53always, but rather that there is the
- 8:54rule and there is the exception. So, in
- 8:59these cases, it is fundamentally the
- 9:00case that the person committing the
- 9:02actual act is not criminally liable
- 9:04because they are somehow subordinate to
- 9:06the mastermind who sent them on their
- 9:07way. And we could formulate it quite
- 9:11abstractly or quite non-legally: they
- 9:13are not responsible for the act. They
- 9:15cannot be held accountable for it. Take
- 9:18our nurse here, who didn't notice;
- 9:20imagine the nurse's situation. In the
- 9:23heat of the moment—it’s a stressful
- 9:25day at the hospital—they are handed a
- 9:27syringe already drawn up, perhaps even
- 9:28with the wrong label, and are told to
- 9:30administer the injection. They cannot
- 9:34verify whether it is the correct
- 9:35medication. If they see it has the
- 9:37wrong color, then they must become
- 9:39suspicious. But they have absolutely no
- 9:41indication of anything wrong. And if
- 9:44they were not punished, or if they are
- 9:46not punished, and we were to say, well,
- 9:47the doctor didn't commit the act, they
- 9:49didn't administer the injection, then
- 9:51we would obviously have the problem
- 9:53that a significant gap in legal
- 9:54protection would arise in criminal law.
- 9:58You could then perfectly plan the
- 9:59perfect crime—not that you aren't
- 10:01discovered, but that you arrange it so
- 10:03that you cannot be punished. And the
- 10:06legislator naturally wants to prevent
- 10:08that, which is why they said we will
- 10:10create a broad law that must then be
- 10:11concretized through jurisprudence and
- 10:13legal scholarship. You can look at that
- 10:19again in peace in the slides. There you
- 10:21will find a few more pieces of
- 10:23background information on indirect
- 10:24perpetration. But I want to do it now
- 10:27using case groups. And we will now look
- 10:33at some categories of cases in which
- 10:35the tool, the "man behind," the
- 10:37caretaker, or the ignorant person does
- 10:38not act in a punishable way, and we
- 10:40will fill these with individual
- 10:42scenarios in a moment. The first case
- 10:46that is conceivable is that of a
- 10:47deficiency in the objective elements of
- 10:49the offense. I had already mentioned
- 10:51this before, if you as the perpetrator
- 10:53induce the victim to kill themselves,
- 10:58then you are inducing the victim to
- 11:00perform an act that is not prohibited
- 11:02under German criminal law. You are
- 11:04allowed to kill yourself under German
- 11:06criminal law. When we discuss assisted
- 11:09suicide and such, those are different
- 11:11constellations. But under German
- 11:14criminal law, every person is not
- 11:16punished if they kill themselves. It is
- 11:18, of course, also quite pointless to
- 11:20punish a person who kills themselves or
- 11:22has attempted to do so. Up until the
- 11:2419th century, this was done in England.
- 11:26They used to hang unsuccessful suicide
- 11:28attempters. Um, with the justification
- 11:30that they wanted to steal a subject
- 11:32from the Queen, and, uh, that is why
- 11:34they were punished for it. But if you
- 11:39induce someone to kill themselves, to
- 11:41injure themselves, or perhaps even
- 11:42simpler, to damage their own property,
- 11:44then you are inducing them to commit an
- 11:46act that is not punishable. Let's take
- 11:49the, let's take the simple case. Our
- 11:53perpetrator induces someone to destroy
- 11:55their property. You tell someone for
- 12:01fun that, um, their sleeping bag, which
- 12:03they have lying around at some festival
- 12:05or somewhere, is infested with mites
- 12:07and that you have already seen some,
- 12:09and now in complete panic they start to
- 12:11burn their sleeping bag, and afterwards
- 12:13you say, it was a joke. Um, then you
- 12:17might potentially be under Section 303.
- 12:20Whoever unlawfully damages or destroys
- 12:22the property of another shall be
- 12:24punished. That is criminal damage to
- 12:26property. But if you go and burn your
- 12:28own sleeping bag, then you are not
- 12:30dealing with the property of another.
- 12:33And that is why the case would apply
- 12:35here where someone destroys or damages
- 12:37their own property but does not act in
- 12:39a punishable way because it is, after
- 12:41all, their own property. Now, however,
- 12:43you have induced them to destroy their
- 12:45own property. But if you were to apply
- 12:49this specific case, this law, to
- 12:51yourself, since you deceived them, then
- 12:53one would say, whoever unlawfully
- 12:54damages the property of another—yes,
- 12:57for me, the sleeping bag is indeed "
- 12:58another's," and you could certainly
- 13:00apply the law in that way. Another
- 13:06point: deficiency in the subjective
- 13:07elements of the offense, acting without
- 13:10intent. You induce a a victim to injure
- 13:19themselves, to kill themselves, or to
- 13:20commit a crime against a third party,
- 13:22because the victim, or rather the
- 13:24instrument of the crime you are using,
- 13:25does not know that they are committing
- 13:27a crime. Assume you tell someone that
- 13:37there is a brand new vitamin powder
- 13:39that is totally healthy and that they
- 13:40should sprinkle it into their friend's
- 13:42food. It's supposedly really good, and
- 13:48it will help you get healthy again even
- 13:50if you have a cold. Your unsuspecting
- 13:52counterpart does it, of course; what
- 13:54did you sneak into it? A deadly poison.
- 13:58Then you would possibly be punished for
- 14:00negligent homicide. That has to be
- 14:02examined on a case-by-case basis if you
- 14:04mixed it in. But you cannot be punished
- 14:07for murder if you do not know that it
- 14:09is dangerous. And that would be the
- 14:14case where we are dealing with a lack
- 14:16of subjective elements; in legal terms,
- 14:18the subjective element means I do not
- 14:19know what the consequences of my
- 14:21actions will be. For example, then you
- 14:25have a lack of subjective elements, and
- 14:27that would also be a possible case of
- 14:29indirect perpetration. There are cases
- 14:34where the action of our "front man,"
- 14:36our instrument of the crime, is even
- 14:37justified. Assume you have someone
- 14:42filing a report, and they make a false
- 14:44report. They spread the word about
- 14:47someone else, saying they tried to kill
- 14:49them, and they even bring in witnesses
- 14:51to testify to it. It's all a conspiracy
- 14:53. What must you do as a judge when you
- 14:55are dealing with such an accusation?
- 14:58You even have witnesses; you might even
- 15:00have some documents that can support it
- 15:01. Yes, in case of doubt, you will have
- 15:04to issue an arrest warrant because you
- 15:06have been deceived. The arrest warrant
- 15:09is nevertheless lawful, and then as a
- 15:11judge, you may—and indeed must—have
- 15:13someone taken into custody, even if it
- 15:15later turns out to be all lies. So
- 15:20these are cases in which, through the
- 15:22deception, we have a lawful action by
- 15:23the judge, which was brought about by
- 15:25the person who did the deceiving. Cases
- 15:30of lack of culpability, these are in
- 15:32particular the cases, so that would be
- 15:34under fourth, in which someone uses a
- 15:38child to commit a specific crime. So
- 15:42someone persuades a nine-year-old to
- 15:44set fire to the neighbor's barn. If the
- 15:46nine-year-old does that, they cannot be
- 15:48punished according to Section 19 of the
- 15:49German Criminal Code, because you can
- 15:51only be punished, even under juvenile
- 15:52criminal law, if you have reached the
- 15:54age of 14. You must have completed your
- 15:5614th year of life, and that leads to
- 15:57the fact that the little one would not
- 15:59be punished. And if we did not have a
- 16:01provision like Section 25, Paragraph 1,
- 16:03Second Alternative, "whoever commits
- 16:05the offense through another," we would
- 16:07have no punishability there, and that
- 16:09is what the legislature wanted to avoid
- 16:11. As for the last part, we will come to
- 16:14that later. I would like to first
- 16:17present to you the case scenarios that
- 16:19have actually been decided in case law.
- 16:21This, for example, concerned one
- 16:23specific case. You see, this is a case
- 16:25from the year 1949. The entire case
- 16:27took place in a concentration camp, in
- 16:29a prisoner camp. A and L are guards in
- 16:32a prisoner camp and severely mistreat G
- 16:34, who is an inmate. They declare to him
- 16:38that they will beat him severely every
- 16:40day until he dies from his injuries.
- 16:42Furthermore, they place a loaded pistol
- 16:44in front of him. They are pursuing the
- 16:45goal that G decides to shoot himself in
- 16:47order to no longer be exposed to the
- 16:49mistreatment. Now, one can naturally
- 16:53ask the question: if the person who is
- 16:55pressured in this way shoots himself,
- 16:57can't one simply speak of a suicide?
- 17:00And here, the courts have been saying
- 17:02for a long, long time: "No, that would
- 17:04be a case of indirect perpetration.""So
- 17:06, in this constellation, we would have
- 17:08a deficiency in the objective elements
- 17:10of the crime." If you have this in an
- 17:13exam, you will have already checked
- 17:14beforehand whether G would have made
- 17:16himself punishable if he were to shoot
- 17:18himself. Then you determine, no, under
- 17:20Section 212, according to general
- 17:22understanding, only the killing of
- 17:24another human being is punishable. So,
- 17:26there is a lack of punishability there.
- 17:32And then you would say here in this
- 17:33case, the act of shooting himself is
- 17:35attributed to these guards A and L as
- 17:37if it were their own. We would
- 17:42therefore examine the actions of these
- 17:44perpetrators and say, well, they did
- 17:45not act themselves. G acted here, but
- 17:49under the conditions that we have just
- 17:51looked at. So, they set a cause; they
- 17:56were superior and had an inferior tool
- 17:58in front of them. Under these
- 18:03conditions, this act of G is to be
- 18:05attributed to A and L as if it were
- 18:07their own. This means that if A and L
- 18:14coerce G until he kills himself out of
- 18:16sheer desperation, then we treat A and
- 18:18L as if they had pulled the trigger
- 18:20themselves due to this superior
- 18:21position, because they were able to
- 18:23influence the victim and forced the
- 18:25victim to do it. This is how the
- 18:31Federal Court of Justice ultimately saw
- 18:33it, and it assumed indirect
- 18:35perpetration here. So, the Federal
- 18:39Court of Justice—or rather, it was
- 18:40the Supreme Court for the British Zone,
- 18:43correctly speaking. So the court said,
- 18:46no unpunishable incitement. In that
- 18:48case, it was only about an attempt
- 18:50because he didn't use the gun. And in
- 18:55the end, they concluded that if someone
- 18:57uses force or threats to influence
- 18:58another person to harm themselves, then
- 19:00the self-harm is indeed unpunishable
- 19:02for the person who was influenced. It
- 19:07does not fulfill a criminal offense, a
- 19:09criminal offense, but the person who
- 19:10performs the influence can still be
- 19:12held criminally liable. And now we come
- 19:17to the Sirius case. That's why I said
- 19:21earlier that it's not bad at all that
- 19:22you are here. It is probably, along
- 19:25with the Cat King case, one of the most
- 19:27idiotic cases that criminal law has to
- 19:29offer. Um, it’s about the question of
- 19:34whether we are dealing with
- 19:36unpunishable suicide or punishable
- 19:37indirect perpetration. And I brought
- 19:43the volume with me because you can
- 19:44hardly tell the facts of the case the
- 19:46way they appear in the official
- 19:47collection. It is about two people who
- 19:52get to know each other. In 1973 and 19
- 19:56or 1974 um the defendant meets the
- 20:00witness HT. Um, she is in her early 20s
- 20:05at the time, and the court writes that
- 20:07she was then still an dependent and
- 20:08complex-ridden young woman. A
- 20:13friendship developed now with
- 20:14philosophical conversations and so on.
- 20:20Um, and um a situation developed in
- 20:21which the defendant later acted as a
- 20:23teacher and friend to this young woman,
- 20:25and she trusted him blindly. In the
- 20:31course of their numerous philosophical
- 20:33conversations, the court writes, the
- 20:34defendant let the witness know that he
- 20:36was an inhabitant of the star Sirius.
- 20:39The Sirians were a race that stood on a
- 20:41far higher philosophical level than
- 20:43humans. He had been sent to Earth with
- 20:46the mission to ensure that some
- 20:48valuable people, including the witness,
- 20:50could continue living on another planet
- 20:51or on Sirius after the complete decay
- 20:53of their bodies and souls. For her to
- 20:57reach that goal, however, the witness
- 20:59needed spiritual and philosophical
- 21:00development. When the defendant
- 21:04realized that the witness believed him
- 21:06completely, he decided to enrich
- 21:07himself at her expense by exploiting
- 21:09this trust. He explained to the witness
- 21:14that she could attain the ability to
- 21:15continue living on another celestial
- 21:17body after her death if the monk Ul,
- 21:19whom he knew, would enter into total
- 21:21meditation for some time. Through this,
- 21:25it would be possible for her body to
- 21:27pass through several levels during
- 21:29sleep and thereby undergo spiritual
- 21:31development. For that, however—and
- 21:34now we get to why it becomes
- 21:35interesting for the defendant—30,000
- 21:37Deutsche Marks would have to be paid to
- 21:39the monastery where the monk lived. The
- 21:42witness believed the defendant, and
- 21:44since she did not have enough money,
- 21:46she obtained the requested sum through
- 21:47a bank loan. And then she kept asking
- 21:51afterward what was going on with Ullik
- 21:53and whether he was finally going to do
- 21:54his job. Then the response was: "Yes,
- 21:56there were still some problems." Um and
- 22:01um, the monk had put himself in great
- 22:03danger with his attempts, but
- 22:04nevertheless achieved no success
- 22:06because her consciousness was building
- 22:08a strong barrier against spiritual
- 22:09advancement. The reason for this lies
- 22:13in the witness's body. The blockade
- 22:14could only be removed by destroying the
- 22:16old body and obtaining a new one. This
- 22:20means, then, the defendant persuaded
- 22:22the witness here to take out a life
- 22:24insurance policy for 500,000 Deutsche
- 22:26Marks. She did just that. She also
- 22:29transferred the right of disposal to
- 22:31him. So he was supposed to be the
- 22:34beneficiary, and then they agreed that
- 22:36she would kill herself with hair dryers
- 22:38in the bathtub. That didn't work out
- 22:43for technical reasons, and then at some
- 22:45point she got the idea that something
- 22:47might be rotten about the whole thing
- 22:51and that's why the whole thing ended up
- 22:52at the Federal Court of Justice,
- 22:54because she was, of course, able to
- 22:55explain what this was all about. And
- 22:58the Federal Court of Justice
- 22:59investigated these facts, which we have
- 23:01shortened a bit here, and asked itself
- 23:03the question: what do we do with a case
- 23:05like this? So, we are dealing with a
- 23:08young woman who, as the lower court
- 23:10writes, is dependent and burdened with
- 23:12complexes. I think one or two people
- 23:15might find slightly harsher or more
- 23:17pitiful words for it when someone
- 23:18believes something like that. But there
- 23:22are people nowadays who believe
- 23:23everything. Everything that is on
- 23:26Facebook is true. Especially if it is
- 23:28spread by certain parties, then it is
- 23:30supposed to be true. Thinking is
- 23:32unwelcome there. Now we have a
- 23:35situation like this. And she really
- 23:37believes it. What do we do then? To say
- 23:40, yes, it's your own fault, criminal
- 23:42law protection does not apply to you.
- 23:44That would certainly be far too extreme
- 23:46. And that is why the Federal Court of
- 23:48Justice said in this case, we are
- 23:53convicting the defendant of attempted
- 23:54murder as an indirect perpetrator. So
- 23:57he was lucky that it didn't work out,
- 23:58otherwise he would have been punished
- 24:00for completed murder. And we say this
- 24:03is not participation in a suicide here.
- 24:06It is therefore not just incitement to
- 24:08suicide, with the reasoning: "Well,
- 24:13while she did want to kill herself, she
- 24:15assumed she wouldn't actually die,
- 24:17which is why we're dealing with an
- 24:18error here." She thought she would
- 24:24immediately reappear on Sirius and was
- 24:25simply not aware that she would
- 24:27actually be putting an end to her
- 24:28physical life. And that is why the
- 24:33Federal Court of Justice stated in this
- 24:35case that, in principle, no one can be
- 24:37held responsible for the actions of
- 24:39another. So, no one can say that if
- 24:41someone else kills themselves, I am
- 24:43responsible for it, even though I
- 24:44contributed nothing to it, except
- 24:46perhaps by talking to them. However,
- 24:50there are exceptions when someone does
- 24:52this in a situation where they either
- 24:53don't realize what they are actually
- 24:55doing. I offer someone poison and tell
- 24:59them it's vitamin powder. Then we have
- 25:03such a scenario. It would be the same,
- 25:05for example, if you offer someone a
- 25:07glass to drink and claim it is orange
- 25:09juice, but it actually has ecstasy or
- 25:11heaven knows what mixed in; then we
- 25:13also have assault via indirect
- 25:15perpetration. Um, and so when we have a
- 25:20situation where someone is not culpable
- 25:22, or if someone is mentally disturbed
- 25:24and therefore cannot recognize what is
- 25:26happening, or, for instance, when we
- 25:28are dealing with children or emergency
- 25:30situations. We discussed in Section 35
- 25:36how that works and when you are in the
- 25:38realm of Section 35, then it looks
- 25:40different. Then, even if someone harms
- 25:44themselves, I can be held responsible
- 25:46for it. Here you can see the
- 25:49corresponding reasoning of the Federal
- 25:51Court of Justice once again to read
- 25:52through at your leisure. Um, the
- 26:12important point here is: If I ask the
- 26:13question whether someone is responsible
- 26:15for their own suicide or if someone
- 26:17else is responsible, then I have to ask
- 26:19myself: How impaired must someone be in
- 26:21their mental faculties for me to say
- 26:23this was not suicide, but the active
- 26:25killing of another? Because the
- 26:32boundary there is certainly extremely
- 26:34fluid. Is it enough? Take the situation
- 26:39that occurs quite often in everyday
- 26:41life. Um, two people break up and one
- 26:44threatens the other, "If you don't get
- 26:46back together with me, I'll kill myself
- 26:48." That scenario happens. What happens
- 26:53if the other person says, "No, you
- 26:55can't blackmail me"? And says, "No,"
- 26:57and it actually leads to suicide. "You
- 27:01can hardly say that this is his
- 27:02responsibility, neither morally nor
- 27:04legally." Where is the line drawn there
- 27:07? Where can I say, at the moment I
- 27:10don't listen to someone else announcing
- 27:12they are going to kill themselves, that
- 27:14I might have a legal responsibility.
- 27:18And there are different views on how
- 27:20this problem can be solved. And there
- 27:23is the solution that says, in the end,
- 27:25it all comes down to guilt. Meaning the
- 27:28question of whether someone acts
- 27:30culpably when they kill themselves. And
- 27:32we already talked about that, Section
- 27:3420. Section 20 of the Criminal Code
- 27:37states: "A person acts without guilt if
- 27:46, at the time of the act, they are
- 27:48unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
- 27:50of the act or to act in accordance with
- 27:52such an appreciation due to a
- 27:53pathological mental disorder, a
- 27:55profound disturbance of consciousness,
- 27:57or mental deficiency or another severe
- 27:59mental abnormality." This wording, '
- 28:02severe mental abnormality,' dates back
- 28:04to the 1960s. Uh, today, one would
- 28:07certainly phrase that differently. That
- 28:10means, in cases where someone is unable
- 28:11to appreciate the wrongfulness of an
- 28:13act and act accordingly, i.e., doesn't
- 28:15recognize that something is wrong or
- 28:17doesn't realize the consequences of the
- 28:19whole thing. In these cases, we would
- 28:21say, if they had seriously injured
- 28:23someone else, we couldn't assume they
- 28:25acted culpably either. So, in cases
- 28:29where they injure themselves, we must
- 28:31not assume they are responsible.
- 28:35Therefore, in this case, the person who
- 28:37induced them to seriously injure
- 28:38themselves is responsible. Let's return
- 28:41to the Sirius case. Let's assume that
- 28:44our witness, who then tried to kill
- 28:46herself with the poison, is capable of
- 28:48guilt. Wait, that she is unable to
- 28:53understand the consequences of her
- 28:54actions, that she is unable to
- 28:56distinguish wrong from right. In this
- 29:02case, this solution would say, if the
- 29:04person with the monk "Ul" and so on,
- 29:06the defendant, induces her to kill
- 29:08herself, then we would be looking at
- 29:10indirect perpetration. These are cases
- 29:18of lack of criminal responsibility,
- 29:19Section 20, or cases of deception,
- 29:21where I deceive someone about how their
- 29:23actions will take effect. Another view
- 29:29would reach the same result in many
- 29:31cases, at least, but via a different
- 29:33approach. It would say, we must start
- 29:45from a consideration of consent and ask
- 29:47whether the action that our instrument,
- 29:49or our victim in this case, proceeds
- 29:51with, would be covered by consent if
- 29:52they had committed it against third
- 29:54parties. And if you recall, we talked
- 30:02about consent; you can consent to the
- 30:04violation of your legal interests. You
- 30:08can agree to have someone, uh, demolish
- 30:10your bike, burn or tear up your penal
- 30:12code, you can agree to that. Then
- 30:15neither of you is committing a crime,
- 30:16because it is, after all, your property
- 30:18. However, the prerequisite for the
- 30:23person not being punished for
- 30:24destroying your bike or burning your
- 30:26penal code is that you declare that you
- 30:28agree to it and that you are, one might
- 30:29say, in full possession of your mental
- 30:31faculties. In other words, that you
- 30:36recognize what consequences this
- 30:37consent will have for you. And if you
- 30:41apply these criteria here to our "
- 30:43Sirius case," one would have to say the
- 30:45person who agreed here, who said, "Yes,
- 30:47I am going to kill myself now, I want
- 30:49to go to Sirius now," did not recognize
- 30:51what consequences this action would
- 30:53have for them. And that is why we are
- 30:57dealing with a situation here in which
- 30:59there is no consent, and therefore
- 31:01indirect perpetration would be the case
- 31:02. So, the starting point here is: if I
- 31:07induce someone to hurt themselves, to
- 31:09harm themselves, then I am generally
- 31:11not responsible for that. If you tell
- 31:14someone, "Punch yourself in the nose,"
- 31:16and they do it, well, that's their
- 31:18problem. But if they are not able to
- 31:23recognize that they are causing
- 31:25themselves harm by punching themselves
- 31:27in the nose, or if they don't even know
- 31:28what consequences punching themselves
- 31:30in the nose has, then they cannot be
- 31:32held responsible for it, and then the
- 31:33responsibility falls back on the person
- 31:35who initiated the act, who therefore
- 31:37induced someone to punch themselves in
- 31:39the nose. Um, we have a case, um, in
- 31:51which this has become particularly
- 31:53relevant, as you can see here, the
- 31:55staged double suicide. These are
- 32:00constellations where two people, um,
- 32:01agree to kill themselves together. We
- 32:06have a case in the case law from the
- 32:081960s that became well-known. There, um
- 32:12, a girl, she was 16 or 17, um, decided
- 32:14together with her boyfriend, who was
- 32:16significantly older, that they would
- 32:18kill themselves because their parents
- 32:20were against them being together. And
- 32:23as it always goes in these scenarios,
- 32:25they sat down—in this case, they got
- 32:27into a car together and wanted to
- 32:29poison themselves with carbon monoxide.
- 32:31He survives, she passes away. And then
- 32:34it was a question of whether we were
- 32:36dealing with a suicide here. She got
- 32:38into the car, after all, and said, "Yes
- 32:41, step on the gas now, I want to kill
- 32:43myself.""And she could have gotten out
- 32:45at any time." In that case, the Federal
- 32:50Court of Justice said: No, he had his
- 32:52foot on the gas, and although she sat
- 32:54there and accepted it, so to speak, she
- 32:56did not actively participate in the act
- 32:58. And that is why it was assumed: This
- 33:04was not a suicide at all, not an act of
- 33:06self-killing, but rather an active
- 33:07killing by the boyfriend, who was then
- 33:09convicted of her murder. The case law
- 33:18—and you can see this in the Sirius
- 33:20case as well—is less concerned with
- 33:21the question of whether we are dealing
- 33:23with a lack of criminal responsibility
- 33:25here. Are we dealing with consent here?
- 33:29It doesn't examine clear criteria, but
- 33:31rather, well, it proceeds according to
- 33:33its own impression, one could say. The
- 33:37judiciary considers, well, I could
- 33:38almost say, whom do we want to convict?
- 33:43So, who bears the responsibility? Who
- 33:45stands at the center of the act? And
- 33:48now we return to what we saw last time.
- 33:50The theory of "perpetration behind"(
- 33:51Tatherrschaftslehre). And as you know,
- 33:53the Federal Court of Justice has
- 33:54meanwhile advanced to the theory of "
- 33:56perpetration behind." The theory of "
- 33:58perpetration behind" asks: who is the
- 34:00central figure of the event? If you
- 34:04look at this case, we are dealing with
- 34:05the central figure of the event, A,
- 34:07because he is the one who holds the act
- 34:09in his hands. He told the witness some
- 34:14nonsense about the monk Uliko, and he
- 34:16could resolve the whole thing by simply
- 34:18saying, "Yes, Uliko doesn't exist at
- 34:19all, and I just wanted to rip you off."
- 34:24Then she would not have committed the
- 34:26act, meaning the suicide. The Federal
- 34:29Court of Justice thus bases its
- 34:31decision here on an assessment of the
- 34:33overall circumstances, and ultimately,
- 34:34one can hardly see their cards as to
- 34:36what they are actually judging by. Is
- 34:41this a suicide for which the person
- 34:43committing suicide is ultimately
- 34:45responsible, or are we dealing with an
- 34:47attack on life that originates from a
- 34:48third party? There are a few more
- 34:59constellations in which indirect
- 35:00perpetration is also assumed. I would
- 35:04just like to inform you about that
- 35:05briefly; we have already discussed
- 35:07quite a bit. There are case
- 35:13constellations in which the instrument
- 35:15of the crime cannot even be held
- 35:16criminally liable due to the special
- 35:18offense we discussed last time. Let's
- 35:22assume we are dealing with the managing
- 35:24director of a limited liability company
- 35:27(GmbH). This is someone who has a
- 35:30special duty to manage assets and can
- 35:32therefore commit a breach of trust
- 35:34within the meaning of Section 266 of
- 35:36the German Criminal Code. Take a look
- 35:39at the law; it says: Anyone who abuses
- 35:44the authority granted to them by law,
- 35:46official order, or legal transaction to
- 35:48dispose of another person’s assets or
- 35:50to obligate another person, or who
- 35:52violates a duty incumbent upon them by
- 35:54law, official order, legal transaction,
- 35:56or other fiduciary relationship to
- 35:58protect the financial interests of
- 36:00another and thereby causes a
- 36:01disadvantage to the person whose
- 36:03financial interests they are to manage,
- 36:05shall be punished. That’s quite a lot
- 36:08. Assume you are dealing with someone
- 36:11who, as managing director, handles the
- 36:13business of a GmbH, that is to say, a
- 36:16legal entity, a company. And the assets
- 36:20of the GmbH, the land, the vehicles,
- 36:23they belong to the GmbH. Ownership lies
- 36:26with the GmbH and not with the managing
- 36:28director. Unless he is the owner, the
- 36:30proprietor. So, an external managing
- 36:33director makes himself liable to
- 36:35prosecution if he goes ahead and says,
- 36:37"I've always wanted to see how a
- 36:39delivery van burns," and sets the
- 36:41company's delivery van on fire. He is
- 36:45allowed to sell the delivery van; he
- 36:47can even effectively give it away. But
- 36:51if he does that and thereby causes
- 36:53damage to the GmbH, such as by setting
- 36:55a delivery van on fire—a case
- 36:57constellation that has actually
- 36:59occurred in jurisprudence. Then he
- 37:01makes himself liable to prosecution for
- 37:03breach of trust. He is embezzling the
- 37:05company's assets. But only he can do
- 37:10that; an employee or a clerk cannot,
- 37:12because they are not designated to
- 37:13manage the company. And there it is
- 37:20quite conceivable to ask, what happens
- 37:22if the managing director tells someone,
- 37:24"Now you draft the sales contract, you
- 37:26sell the delivery van to my wife for
- 37:27one euro, so the money comes back to me
- 37:29in the family.""But I didn't dirty my
- 37:34own hands." In that constellation, the
- 37:38employee who is not tasked with
- 37:39managing assets could not be held
- 37:41liable. He is not the managing director
- 37:43, after all. And the managing director
- 37:46could say, "I didn't sign the sales
- 37:47contract.""The employee did that." In
- 37:51such constellations, one would say: "
- 37:53Nevertheless, the managing director is
- 37:55responsible because he is acting here
- 37:57as an indirect perpetrator." It works
- 38:00similarly with public officials. If,
- 38:03for example, a police officer says, "
- 38:05Well, if I hit the witness now, I would
- 38:07be making myself liable for assault in
- 38:09office.""That's why I'd rather let
- 38:12someone else do it.""So, I'll bring my
- 38:15friends along; they can do it.""I don't
- 38:17want to be punished for assault in
- 38:19office." Then one would say that the
- 38:22public official is committing assault
- 38:23in office, but as an indirect
- 38:25perpetrator. These are the
- 38:28constellations in which this is
- 38:30discussed. But here, of course, we have
- 38:34to ask the question: can we really say
- 38:36that there is control over the act here
- 38:38? Think about that when you look at it.
- 38:41Now, the police officer actually goes
- 38:43ahead and says, I'll get my buddies to
- 38:45come over, then they can beat you up.
- 38:46Then, then you'll testify. Are the
- 38:49buddies forced to do that? They might
- 38:52enjoy it, depending on their character,
- 38:54but they aren't exactly being forced.
- 38:57The police officer can't really order
- 38:59them to do it, and so there is a heated
- 39:01debate about whether this is a case of
- 39:03indirect perpetration or simply a case
- 39:05of incitement. So we have to
- 39:07distinguish whether we are dealing with
- 39:09just incitement or with indirect
- 39:10perpetration. Let's look at further
- 39:18case constellations. Um, we have
- 39:24essentially already looked at one case
- 39:26constellation, and that is the one in
- 39:27the subjective elements of the crime.
- 39:29It is quickly explained. That is the
- 39:31case with the soccer ball that I just
- 39:33described. So, if the lack of
- 39:35punishability occurs at the level of
- 39:37the subjective elements—I don't know
- 39:39that I am fulfilling the elements of
- 39:41the crime because I simply don't know
- 39:42that I am violating someone else's
- 39:44custody when I take O's soccer ball,
- 39:46because I simply think that A, who gave
- 39:48me the order, is also the owner of the
- 39:49soccer ball. Then I would be dealing
- 39:54with a constellation where we have a
- 39:55deficiency in the subjective elements
- 39:57of the intermediary. He is unpunished
- 40:02because he lacks the intent that is
- 40:04always required. So, in criminal law,
- 40:06the principle generally applies:
- 40:07whoever does not act intentionally does
- 40:09not act in a punishable manner. There
- 40:11are exceptions: negligent acts,
- 40:12negligent bodily injury, negligent
- 40:14arson, negligent homicide. But in
- 40:16principle, whoever does not act
- 40:17intentionally does not make themselves
- 40:18liable to punishment. That is why the
- 40:20saying "ignorance is no excuse" is also
- 40:22true. In German criminal law, it is
- 40:24nonsense. It simply isn't true. There
- 40:26are cases where it doesn't protect you,
- 40:27but as a rule, it doesn't apply like
- 40:29that. Um, and now we have the person
- 40:31getting the ball, who isn't punished
- 40:33because he didn't know that it wasn't
- 40:35A's ball at all. And there we have the
- 40:39constellation where our mastermind
- 40:41exercises control through his superior
- 40:43knowledge. I already said that just now
- 40:46. He only needs to say, that's not my
- 40:47ball at all. But also just to say,
- 40:49Sirius doesn't even exist, right? Sure,
- 40:51Sirius exists, but you won't end up on
- 40:53Sirius if you don't, uh, if you kill
- 40:55yourself now. Um, the case you just saw
- 40:59in the reasoning for the draft laws is
- 41:00the typical case that can be used to
- 41:02describe it very well. The doctor sends
- 41:05the unsuspecting nurse to the patient
- 41:07with a deadly poison instead of a
- 41:09sleeping pill. The patient receives the
- 41:12poison and dies from it; the nurse
- 41:14cannot be punished for murder or
- 41:15manslaughter if she did not know it was
- 41:17a poison. We already touched on that
- 41:21briefly just now. There are other
- 41:26constellations in which this plays a
- 41:27role, which are of a rather special
- 41:29nature. These have actually become
- 41:34obsolete by now. Um, here you have a
- 41:37case in which this could become
- 41:38relevant. H asks V to carry O's heavy
- 41:41bicycle into the basement for him. H
- 41:44explains to V that he wants to threaten
- 41:46O, telling him he will return the bike
- 41:48once O pays his debts to H. In fact,
- 41:50however, H wants to use the bike for
- 41:52himself. So, H now goes to V and says:
- 41:56"Could you maybe carry O's heavy bike
- 41:58into the basement for me? I want to
- 42:00lock it in there until O has paid his
- 42:02debts to me." Now imagine the situation
- 42:04is like this: H has been waiting for
- 42:06years for his money from O, and O is
- 42:08the type of person who says, "Yeah, if
- 42:10you don't force me with violence or
- 42:12with the court, then I don't care. I'm
- 42:14just not paying." And now H, in his
- 42:16desperation, goes to V and says: "
- 42:18Please help me, otherwise I'll never
- 42:20get the money back from O." That would
- 42:23be the situation in which this could
- 42:25take place. But it could also be the
- 42:28situation that H tells V this story.
- 42:32Actually, there is no O at all, or he
- 42:34doesn't even know who the bike belongs
- 42:36to. He has it carried into his basement
- 42:38so he can keep it. Our, um, our V knows
- 42:43that it is someone else's bicycle. He
- 42:46also believes that the bicycle would
- 42:47belong to O. He also believes that he
- 42:49is taking a bicycle away with it. But
- 42:52what he doesn't believe and what he
- 42:54doesn't know, or rather, what he
- 42:55doesn't have, is the intent required by
- 42:58Section 242, the theft statute. Section
- 43:03242 of the Criminal Code states,
- 43:08whoever takes away another person's
- 43:10movable property with the intent to
- 43:12unlawfully appropriate the object for
- 43:14themselves or a third party shall be
- 43:15punished by imprisonment of up to 5
- 43:17years or a fine. That means you can
- 43:21only commit theft if you have the
- 43:22intent to keep the item for yourself or
- 43:24pass it on to a third party. So, if you
- 43:28borrow a bike right here in front of
- 43:30the door without the owner knowing, and
- 43:32you put it back in the exact same spot
- 43:34later, that is not theft. It is,
- 43:37however, punishable because Section
- 43:39248b states, whoever uses a motor
- 43:43vehicle or a bicycle against the will
- 43:45of the authorized person shall be
- 43:46punished with imprisonment up to and so
- 43:48on. So, you might remember from the
- 43:50first lecture, if you do something like
- 43:52that, then only with rowboats, because
- 43:54248b does not apply there. Um, and if H
- 44:01does not have this intent here, this
- 44:03intent to misappropriate for a third
- 44:05party or the intent to misappropriate,
- 44:06then he cannot be held criminally
- 44:08liable. But the V does not have it. H,
- 44:11however, does have this intent. He
- 44:13wants the vehicle to be carried into
- 44:15his basement and wants to keep it, and
- 44:17that is why he can be held liable for
- 44:19theft via indirect perpetration. Let's
- 44:22look at another case that is also a bit
- 44:24older. It involved Ha in the year 1943,
- 44:37writing to the Air Force unit where her
- 44:39son-in-law O was a non-commissioned
- 44:41officer, meaning that is where he was
- 44:42stationed: "O is committing sabotage,
- 44:44he is tampering with the planes so that
- 44:46they crash, and he should be put
- 44:48against the wall." Obviously, the
- 44:50relationship between son-in-law and
- 44:52mother-in-law was not very good. O was
- 44:56arrested by the Secret Field Police and
- 44:58was held based on an allegedly lawful
- 45:00order. We do not know exactly how that
- 45:02order came about. Judge V kept him in
- 45:04custody for 15 to 20 days. That is also
- 45:06not exactly clear for how long. He was
- 45:08acquitted by the court-martial. They
- 45:09simply could not prove anything against
- 45:11him; perhaps they had not found any
- 45:12evidence for it. Fundamentally, I would
- 45:16say he was lucky, because to say that
- 45:18courts-martial functioned according to
- 45:20rule-of-law standards in 1943 would
- 45:22certainly be a lie. Ha knew that her
- 45:27report was likely unfounded. She
- 45:29counted on a longer period of detention
- 45:31and wanted to cause trouble for her
- 45:33son-in-law. That is how the court
- 45:35phrased it. And that is exactly the
- 45:37case that I just described. If you ask
- 45:39the question here, did the judge commit
- 45:41a criminal offense? Incidentally, the
- 45:44Criminal Code essentially applied even
- 45:46before 1949, i.e., before the Basic Law
- 45:49was in effect. The Criminal Code in
- 45:51this form, essentially—there were
- 45:53many changes—is from 1871, if I
- 45:56recall correctly. What did Section 239
- 46:01say back then? In Section 239 of the
- 46:03Reich Criminal Code. Whoever imprisons
- 46:06a person or otherwise deprives them of
- 46:08their liberty shall be punished with
- 46:10imprisonment of up to 5 years or with a
- 46:12fine. So, deprivation of liberty is
- 46:15punishable, But the judge cannot be
- 46:20held criminally liable for deprivation
- 46:22of liberty if they have someone locked
- 46:23up with an arrest warrant, because that
- 46:25is what the Code of Criminal Procedure
- 46:27provides under certain conditions; an
- 46:29arrest warrant is indeed permissible
- 46:30there. Under German criminal procedure
- 46:33law, you may lock up an innocent person
- 46:35—before the verdict, everyone is
- 46:37innocent, before the final judgment—
- 46:39you may lock up an innocent person if
- 46:40there are corresponding grounds for
- 46:42suspicion. And here we have those
- 46:44grounds for suspicion: the witness
- 46:45testified that it was so, and we cannot
- 46:47now evaluate in retrospect to what
- 46:49extent that was somehow understandable.
- 46:51But assuming it was lawful, then the
- 46:53judge cannot be punished for it. But
- 46:57our witness can be punished, the one
- 46:59who just said, here, my son-in-law is
- 47:01sabotaging everything possible, and she
- 47:03then makes herself liable under, I
- 47:05don't know, no idea which phrasing, so
- 47:07which law of the war criminal law, of
- 47:09the military criminal law that was back
- 47:11then. Um. And in this case, one can
- 47:19then assume that we are dealing with a
- 47:20criminal offense of the deprivation of
- 47:22liberty by the judge. This
- 47:26constellation is still quite
- 47:27conceivable today and does not occur
- 47:29that rarely. If you have a false
- 47:33accusation, so if you make a false
- 47:35accusation and because of that someone
- 47:37goes to prison, then you should of
- 47:39course take a look at Section 239 of
- 47:41the Criminal Code beforehand.
- 47:44Deprivation of liberty is a criminal
- 47:46offense. Deprivation of liberty that
- 47:49lasts longer than a week is punished
- 47:51with imprisonment from one to ten years
- 47:52. So, deprivation of liberty that lasts
- 47:56longer than a week is a crime. Now we
- 47:59are already moving in a somewhat higher
- 48:01range. In this case, it was then the
- 48:08case that the Federal Court of Justice
- 48:10said it is irrelevant that she, the
- 48:12witness, did not carry out the
- 48:13imprisonment herself. Whoever causes
- 48:17the result of a statutory criminal
- 48:19offense is the perpetrator. Unless
- 48:22special provisions or the specific
- 48:23nature of the offense dictate otherwise
- 48:25. That is what we already discussed in
- 48:28the last lesson. You cannot be an
- 48:30indirect perpetrator of a drunk driving
- 48:32offense. So, if you get someone drunk
- 48:35in order to then let them drive off
- 48:40drunk in a car and have planned exactly
- 48:42that, then you can make yourself liable
- 48:44for incitement, for aiding and abetting
- 48:45, for whatever, but you cannot be
- 48:47punished yourself for drunk driving.
- 48:50For the simple reason in Section 316 of
- 48:53the Criminal Code, it says, whoever
- 48:59operates a vehicle in traffic, and if
- 49:01you get someone drunk, you are not
- 49:03operating a motor vehicle. Good, that
- 49:07is what is meant when it says, unless
- 49:09special provisions and the specific
- 49:10nature of the offense dictate otherwise
- 49:12. This also applies if one brings about
- 49:15the result through the actions of
- 49:16another, in this case, the judge.
- 49:18Unless the elements of incitement or
- 49:20aiding and abetting were present. So,
- 49:25in conclusion, the court states here
- 49:27that anyone who deceives a judge to
- 49:29obtain a lawful but incorrect arrest
- 49:31warrant is liable for deprivation of
- 49:33liberty as an indirect perpetrator.
- 49:46This means that when assessing criminal
- 49:48liability, you might find that the
- 49:49person who acted directly, for example
- 49:51the witness, the judge, or the lady who
- 49:53tried to kill herself with the hair
- 49:55dryer, did not commit a crime. In our
- 50:03case, the judge did not commit a crime
- 50:05and is even justified. His action was
- 50:07legally sound. He had to act that way
- 50:10because he had information that a crime
- 50:12had been committed and that he had to
- 50:14prosecute it. This means that we are
- 50:17dealing here with a lack of criminal
- 50:18liability regarding the judge. He
- 50:20cannot be punished because he can issue
- 50:22a lawful arrest warrant. The control
- 50:27over the act, which we always need,
- 50:29meaning from the instrumental status of
- 50:31our front man, must result in control
- 50:33over the act. So, the person behind the
- 50:36scenes must have the possibility,
- 50:38because the front man has a defect—
- 50:40due to an error, lack of capacity, or
- 50:42whatever else—to control the
- 50:44situation. So, because of this defect
- 50:47in the front man, the person behind the
- 50:49scenes must be able to control the
- 50:50situation. And that is the case when
- 50:54our person behind the scenes could
- 50:55easily resolve this commission of the
- 50:57act. Here, the witness would only need
- 50:59to say, "Yes, it was all a lie, it
- 51:01isn't true," and at that moment, the
- 51:03arrest warrant would be revoked. This
- 51:07means she has control over it, and that
- 51:09is why we are dealing with a scenario
- 51:10here where we must assume indirect
- 51:12perpetration based on the procurement
- 51:14of a justified arrest warrant. So we
- 51:18would examine the judge and determine
- 51:20that he committed a deprivation of
- 51:22liberty, but it was justified; it was
- 51:23lawful based on the arrest warrant. And
- 51:28our witness, the complainant, the
- 51:29alleged witness, she committed a
- 51:31deception here. Through that, she
- 51:35caused the judge's error and thereby
- 51:37controlled the entire situation. She
- 51:39had control over the act; she is an
- 51:41indirect perpetrator. The same applies
- 51:44if the person behind the scenes
- 51:46intentionally creates a situation of
- 51:48self-defense. So, if our, um, our later
- 51:55perpetrator, for example, ensures that
- 51:57......a situation, for example,
- 52:03escalates into a state of self-defense,
- 52:05then one can speak of indirect
- 52:07perpetration. There is a case from the
- 52:10textbook. I always confuse who is who
- 52:13and who does what there. Um, it
- 52:16involved the characters Schutz, Lux,
- 52:18and Fuchs. And, um, Schütz goes over
- 52:24and says: "Dear Lux, you always wanted
- 52:27to kill Fuchs, didn't you?" Now I’ll
- 52:32tell you where the fox will be prowling
- 52:33tonight. "And um, a situation is being
- 52:38brought about in which the person
- 52:40subsequently affected, the fox, is then
- 52:42in mortal danger. And if our um, now
- 52:50I’m just thinking, the marksman
- 52:52should actually be the one doing the
- 52:53shooting. The fox is the one luring the
- 52:55lynx into the trap, or vice versa. It
- 52:57doesn’t matter. In any case, the
- 53:01person lying in wait: if they are
- 53:03attacked, for instance, or if the
- 53:04person meant to be shot fights back and
- 53:06a situation of self-defense arises,
- 53:08which the mastermind who orchestrated
- 53:10the whole situation had intended, then
- 53:12one could also consider whether we are
- 53:14dealing with indirect perpetration here
- 53:16. So if I ensure that someone gets into
- 53:22a self-defense situation because I know
- 53:24beforehand that the other person who
- 53:26will be in that situation is
- 53:27particularly aggressive or something
- 53:29like that, then such a constellation of
- 53:31indirect perpetration is also
- 53:32conceivable. The case constellation of
- 53:39lacking culpability, which we just
- 53:41touched upon, is another constellation.
- 53:46Um, what happens when the instrument
- 53:48acts without culpability? For example,
- 53:51a child is sent off to steal a soccer
- 53:53ball, set fire to the neighbor's house,
- 53:55or the neighbor's barn, or something
- 53:57similar. This case is relatively
- 54:01unproblematic. It is also regarded as a
- 54:04case of indirect perpetration. So H
- 54:07gives the mentally ill V money to shoot
- 54:09O. V then actually shoots O. More
- 54:11realistically, these are typical
- 54:13textbook cases. Uh, it would actually
- 54:18be more realistic to say, so um, H
- 54:20gives the eleven-year-old V money to
- 54:22set fire to the neighbor's barn, and he
- 54:24then does it. I mean, I don't know how
- 54:29many eleven-year-olds you could get to
- 54:31do that for 500 or 1,000 euros. Um, I
- 54:33don't want to find out. In that case,
- 54:36the instrument lacks culpability. The
- 54:38condition, if the condition is age 19,
- 54:41so an adolescent, not an adolescent,
- 54:43but a child under 14, or the conditions
- 54:45for lack of culpability are present. We
- 54:49are dealing with someone who suffers
- 54:51from some kind of mental illness and
- 54:52cannot foresee the consequences of
- 54:54their actions. I actually experienced
- 55:01this once in an oral hearing here in
- 55:03Mannheim, where a woman was being
- 55:04prosecuted for theft. At her home, they
- 55:10found 40 packaged handbags. Um, and
- 55:13there was an expert witness there who
- 55:15said, yes, we are dealing with a case
- 55:17of kleptomania here, indeed the
- 55:19compulsion, the barely controllable or
- 55:21uncontrollable urge to steal things.
- 55:23And there, one must also ask the
- 55:25question that was discussed in the
- 55:26courtroom: are we dealing with a crime
- 55:28here or not? Um, it can certainly
- 55:33happen in such constellations that we
- 55:35cannot clearly distinguish between
- 55:37indirect perpetration and incitement.
- 55:42Both are possible in these
- 55:44constellations. However, we will look
- 55:46at this more closely under incitement.
- 55:49It is easier to distinguish that once
- 55:50we have already discussed incitement.
- 55:56In any case, it is important that the
- 55:57action control of the tool must be
- 55:59superseded by the will or knowledge
- 56:01control of the mastermind for the
- 56:02assumption of indirect perpetration.
- 56:05What does that mean? It must be the
- 56:09case that the mastermind can send the
- 56:11tool on its way, but can also call it
- 56:13back. So, they really must have control
- 56:18. So, if you actually have the H who
- 56:23goes to the 13-year-old V and says:" Go
- 56:25set fire to the neighbor's place, "and
- 56:27the V thinks:" Yes, I was wondering
- 56:29what to do tonight, I think that's a
- 56:31good idea, I'll do that now, "but the H
- 56:33cannot exercise any control at all. He
- 56:37might say, forget it, I've changed my
- 56:39mind. If the V says, no, now I have
- 56:42something to do tonight and I'm doing
- 56:43it anyway. So, you do need some kind of
- 56:47control options. If it ultimately just
- 56:50amounts to him planting the idea, but
- 56:52then he cannot exercise any further
- 56:54control, then we cannot say he is
- 56:56committing the act through another.
- 56:58Section 25 says, after all, a person
- 57:04who commits a crime through another is
- 57:06punished as a perpetrator. And if the V
- 57:09now says, no, I think the idea is good,
- 57:11I'm doing it now. Then we are at
- 57:14Section 26, which says an instigator is
- 57:16punished as a perpetrator if they
- 57:18intentionally induced another to commit
- 57:20their intentionally committed unlawful
- 57:22act. So Section 26, the incitement, the
- 57:25inducing is the triggering of the
- 57:27decision to commit the crime, the
- 57:28bringing about of the criminal intent.
- 57:31But that is not enough for Section 25
- 57:33regarding committing through another.
- 57:36For that, we need control over the act
- 57:38itself. So I must be able to call off
- 57:42the act at any time, and I can only do
- 57:44that if I can also exercise a certain
- 57:46amount of control over the person I am
- 57:48using as a tool. These are, therefore,
- 57:56the case constellations in which this
- 57:58needs to be distinguished. And it is
- 58:02important that the mastermind knows the
- 58:04state of the tool and must use it or
- 58:06consciously exploit it for their crime.
- 58:10Then indirect perpetration is to be
- 58:12assumed, not just when you know, yes,
- 58:14they are unaccountable and now I'll
- 58:16send them on their way. So if he thinks
- 58:19, um, I can no longer control them
- 58:20after that, then we are already out of
- 58:22indirect perpetration. Good. Um, case
- 58:31constellations in which it is not about
- 58:33someone who is constantly limited in
- 58:35their ability to distinguish wrong from
- 58:36right, but where we are dealing with a
- 58:38situation in which they cannot abide by
- 58:40the law in the specific instance. These
- 58:46cases also fall under indirect
- 58:48perpetration. Section 19, that was the
- 58:53regulation that children cannot be
- 58:55punished. It reads: Anyone who is not
- 58:57yet 14 years old at the time of
- 58:58committing the act is not criminally
- 59:00responsible. Section 20 states:" Anyone
- 59:02who, at the time of the act, due to a
- 59:04pathological mental disorder and so on,
- 59:06cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of
- 59:08the act or act in accordance with that
- 59:10appreciation, acts without guilt. "
- 59:13These are therefore cases in which
- 59:15someone, due to biological,
- 59:17physiological, or psychological
- 59:18disorders, is unable to appreciate the
- 59:20wrongfulness of the act. However, we
- 59:23have also already spoken about the
- 59:25cases of Section 35. I am reminded of
- 59:29that shipwreck case. So the ship sank,
- 59:34the survivors rescued themselves into a
- 59:36lifeboat and after some time they come
- 59:37up with the idea that, in order to
- 59:39survive somehow—they might still have
- 59:41a little water—one of the four must
- 59:43die because they want to eat him. That
- 59:47was that constellation from the year
- 59:491863, which I presented to you. And now
- 59:54they decide—in that case they decided
- 59:56on the cabin boy, who was already
- 59:57almost dead—to kill him and eat him.
- 1:00:01Um, and that is where Section 35 then
- 1:00:03comes into play. Whoever, in the face
- 1:00:07of a present, unavoidable danger to
- 1:00:09life, limb, or liberty, commits an
- 1:00:10unlawful act to avert the danger from
- 1:00:13themselves, a relative, or another
- 1:00:14person close to them, acts without
- 1:00:16guilt. So, whoever finds themselves in
- 1:00:21a hopeless situation, one could
- 1:00:23translate, and commits a crime because
- 1:00:25of it, cannot be punished. Well, if one
- 1:00:29could not have expected them to endure
- 1:00:31this situation. Let's take the case
- 1:00:37where a witness is threatened that if
- 1:00:43they testify truthfully to the police
- 1:00:45and testify truthfully in court, then
- 1:00:47they will be killed or beaten up or
- 1:00:49whatever. We have spoken about this
- 1:00:52case constellation. You remember the
- 1:00:54duress emergency. These are
- 1:00:56constellations in which we say, here
- 1:01:00the witness is not justified under
- 1:01:02Section 34 of the German Criminal Code
- 1:01:04if they testify falsely. So, we can't
- 1:01:09allow him to, to testify falsely with
- 1:01:12the, the legal, um, approval, so to
- 1:01:14speak, that is, with legal permission.
- 1:01:19But we cannot punish him. Section 35
- 1:01:21would then simply say: if someone, in
- 1:01:24the face of an imminent danger that
- 1:01:26cannot otherwise be averted—yes, I am
- 1:01:28in imminent danger if someone threatens
- 1:01:30to beat me up badly or kill me—to my
- 1:01:32life, that is, limb, life, or liberty,
- 1:01:35commits an unlawful act, a false
- 1:01:37statement to the police to avert the
- 1:01:39danger from themselves, they act
- 1:01:41without guilt. That means, if we were
- 1:01:44to examine this, here someone makes a
- 1:01:46false statement to the police—let's
- 1:01:48leave the court out of it, it gets too
- 1:01:50complicated. Someone gives a false
- 1:01:52statement to the police, they are
- 1:01:54questioned about an act and then say,
- 1:01:56no, I didn't see anything. Um, the, the
- 1:02:00XY, they weren't there or they were
- 1:02:02with me, we were out somewhere,
- 1:02:03whatever. They say, make a false
- 1:02:07statement, and with that, the
- 1:02:09accusation against the one coercing us
- 1:02:11collapses. Then we would say, they have
- 1:02:17made themselves liable for prosecution
- 1:02:19for obstruction of justice under
- 1:02:21Section 258 of the Criminal Code, but
- 1:02:23they cannot be punished because in such
- 1:02:25a situation, while we cannot grant
- 1:02:26anyone the right to testify falsely, we
- 1:02:28can say the situation was so
- 1:02:30unreasonable that we must not punish
- 1:02:32them. The law often makes the
- 1:02:37distinction between granting someone
- 1:02:39the right to do something or not
- 1:02:40granting the right, but not punishing
- 1:02:42them for it. I’m just reminded of
- 1:02:45that airplane shoot-down case; that’s
- 1:02:46where it becomes clearest. And so, if
- 1:02:49we have such a constellation where we
- 1:02:51apply Section 35 of the Criminal Code,
- 1:02:54then the person who testifies falsely
- 1:02:56acts without guilt. So we are dealing
- 1:03:00with a constellation where the person
- 1:03:02giving the false statement cannot be
- 1:03:04convicted of obstruction of justice
- 1:03:05under Section 258 of the Criminal Code.
- 1:03:13But the mastermind, they brought about
- 1:03:15this, this pressure situation, this
- 1:03:16emergency situation that leads to
- 1:03:18immunity, and that is why we are
- 1:03:20dealing here with a constellation that
- 1:03:21can establish indirect perpetration. So
- 1:03:27here, the mastermind, with their
- 1:03:28threatening situation and intimidation,
- 1:03:30ensured that the person at the front
- 1:03:32gave false testimony and therefore has
- 1:03:34the status of a perpetrator. They hold
- 1:03:36the reins of the situation, and they
- 1:03:37could also say at any time, I've
- 1:03:39changed my mind, I'm not threatening
- 1:03:40you anymore. Then the witness would
- 1:03:43also be able to testify truthfully, and
- 1:03:44then we wouldn't be in the commission
- 1:03:46of the criminal offense. That means,
- 1:03:48therefore, Whoever—and you see this
- 1:03:53ultimately by inverse conclusion here
- 1:03:55too—whoever causes a state of
- 1:03:57necessity and thereby controls the
- 1:03:59person acting in necessity, acts as an
- 1:04:01indirect perpetrator. Whoever merely
- 1:04:04finds this state of necessity and then
- 1:04:08exploits it, they are liable for
- 1:04:12incitement and aiding and abetting, or
- 1:04:14possibly incitement or aiding and
- 1:04:16abetting, but not for indirect
- 1:04:17perpetration. The indirect perpetrator
- 1:04:20causes this state of necessity and then
- 1:04:22exploits it. Um, there are different
- 1:04:30types of errors that we still need to
- 1:04:32consider here. So we are always at this
- 1:04:34stage. We examine the intermediary, the
- 1:04:37tool, and ask ourselves: is he liable?
- 1:04:39If he is not liable, then we turn to
- 1:04:41the indirect perpetrator. Um, what
- 1:04:47happens with permission errors or, um,
- 1:04:49permission-related factual errors? We
- 1:04:54have discussed these two instruments.
- 1:04:56The prohibition error, just as a
- 1:04:58reminder, is Section 17 of the German
- 1:05:00Criminal Code (StGB). If the
- 1:05:03perpetrator lacks the insight that they
- 1:05:05are doing wrong at the time of the act,
- 1:05:07they act without guilt if they could
- 1:05:08not have avoided this error. These
- 1:05:11types of case constellations certainly
- 1:05:13do occur. An example that still comes
- 1:05:18to mind was a case in which a driver
- 1:05:20had their driver's license
- 1:05:21provisionally revoked. This is a
- 1:05:24measure within the framework of
- 1:05:25criminal proceedings. Um, the
- 1:05:27accusation in that case, I believe, was
- 1:05:29unauthorized removal from the scene of
- 1:05:31an accident. So, he caused damage and
- 1:05:33then—the accusation was—committed
- 1:05:35what is commonly referred to as a
- 1:05:37hit-and-run. And then criminal
- 1:05:41proceedings were initiated against him
- 1:05:42and his driver's license was
- 1:05:44provisionally revoked. That means as
- 1:05:46long as the proceedings are ongoing,
- 1:05:47you do not have a driver's license. And
- 1:05:50he went to his lawyer and said," Yes,
- 1:05:51am I allowed to drive during this time?
- 1:05:54"While the license has been revoked?
- 1:05:56And the lawyer said," Yes, of course
- 1:05:58you can drive, "which was, of course,
- 1:06:00nonsense. Why would one revoke a
- 1:06:02driver's license from someone who is
- 1:06:03feared to be committing criminal
- 1:06:05offenses in road traffic? Yes, because
- 1:06:07you want to prevent them from
- 1:06:09committing further crimes, but the
- 1:06:10lawyer told him," Yes, yes, of course,
- 1:06:12we can keep driving. "And the Higher
- 1:06:14Regional Court of Frankfurt then said:"
- 1:06:16Well, if I go to my lawyer, who was
- 1:06:18even a specialist lawyer for traffic
- 1:06:20law or criminal law, and he tells me
- 1:06:21everything is fine. "" Yes, how am I
- 1:06:23supposed to know otherwise? "And the
- 1:06:26court says that if I cannot recognize
- 1:06:28that the lawyer is telling me nonsense
- 1:06:30—how I as a layman would be able to
- 1:06:32recognize that, I'd be curious—then I
- 1:06:34am not liable either, and then we have
- 1:06:35such a prohibition error. In this case,
- 1:06:42however, if the lawyer knowingly gave
- 1:06:43him incorrect advice, he still could
- 1:06:45not be held criminally liable for
- 1:06:47driving a motor vehicle without a
- 1:06:49license, because the lawyer himself did
- 1:06:51not drive. He could then be held liable
- 1:06:55for incitement. That would be
- 1:06:56conceivable. We have spoken at great
- 1:06:58length about the putatively justified
- 1:07:00act. That was the case with the Hells
- 1:07:02Angels, for example. These are the
- 1:07:05types of scenarios where someone
- 1:07:06believes they are being attacked. In
- 1:07:09reality, they are not being attacked at
- 1:07:11all, yet they defend themselves in the
- 1:07:12perceived situation of an attack. That,
- 1:07:18for instance, would be a case of
- 1:07:19indirect perpetration, if I ensure that
- 1:07:21someone who is not actually being
- 1:07:23attacked feels that they are. So,
- 1:07:30imagine you are planning some Halloween
- 1:07:32prank to scare a friend who is a bit
- 1:07:34jumpy. And because someone knows this,
- 1:07:40they tell your friend:" This is a
- 1:07:41really unsafe area, and I would really
- 1:07:43prepare yourself to be mugged. ""
- 1:07:46Better take some pepper spray with you,
- 1:07:47and if you see anyone, hit them
- 1:07:49immediately, "knowing full well that
- 1:07:50you are planning this prank. That would
- 1:07:53be a scenario where we would likely end
- 1:07:55up with bodily injury to three or four
- 1:07:57people because they got pepper spray in
- 1:07:59their eyes. And the person behind it
- 1:08:03all, sitting in the bushes rubbing
- 1:08:05their hands in glee, would be
- 1:08:06criminally liable for bodily injury as
- 1:08:08an indirect perpetrator. And the person
- 1:08:13who used the pepper spray would not be
- 1:08:15held liable if the situation was such
- 1:08:16that one could genuinely expect an
- 1:08:18assault. And if some people come
- 1:08:22jumping out of the bushes wearing masks
- 1:08:24or strange disguises and try to lash
- 1:08:26out at you, it certainly suggests that
- 1:08:28it is an attack. And now we come to the
- 1:08:34infamous" Cat King "case. The" Cat King
- 1:08:43"case has become infamous. If you type"
- 1:08:46Cat King "into Wikipedia, you will
- 1:08:48immediately find the ruling, because it
- 1:08:50is actually even stranger than the
- 1:08:51Sirius case. The starting point was the
- 1:08:55following constellation. We are dealing
- 1:09:00with a woman who is the mastermind here
- 1:09:02. The mastermind is a woman who clearly
- 1:09:06had a somewhat problematic relationship
- 1:09:08with men and other people in general.
- 1:09:14And she was of the opinion that she had
- 1:09:16to—interestingly enough—bind a
- 1:09:17police officer to her, and they then
- 1:09:19lived together in what the Federal
- 1:09:21Court of Justice described as a web of
- 1:09:23relationships characterized by
- 1:09:24mysticism and superstition, which other
- 1:09:26people also joined. And she told him
- 1:09:34that there was a great evil demon, the
- 1:09:36Cat King, and that he was threatening
- 1:09:38the world. That he wanted to kill
- 1:09:43millions of people. The only thing that
- 1:09:45could stop him from doing that would be
- 1:09:47a human sacrifice. And the human
- 1:09:51sacrifice she wanted was obviously her
- 1:09:53opponent, um, so her competitor. Um,
- 1:09:57she had a relationship with him, if I
- 1:09:58understood that correctly, and the
- 1:10:00rival was to be eliminated. And yes, it
- 1:10:04happened as it had to happen, one could
- 1:10:07almost say. He then actually attacked
- 1:10:10her, this chosen victim, with a knife
- 1:10:12in her shop. And that is when the, uh,
- 1:10:16crime took place, on the 30th. In July
- 1:10:19'86, you read that right, not 1886,
- 1:10:231986. Uh, he attacked her in her flower
- 1:10:27shop and stabbed her in the neck. You
- 1:10:32see, through acting tricks, feigning
- 1:10:34hypnotic and clairvoyant abilities, and
- 1:10:36performing mystical rituals, H
- 1:10:37convinced V to believe in the existence
- 1:10:39of the Cat King. The question that
- 1:10:46arises here now, of course, is not just
- 1:10:48treatment methods for H, but especially
- 1:10:50the punishability, um, the
- 1:10:52punishability of H. And this is where
- 1:10:59an intense and important question
- 1:11:01arises, because the Federal Court of
- 1:11:03Justice later determined that V, who
- 1:11:04committed the act, can be punished for
- 1:11:06it. So it assumed that there was no, as
- 1:11:13Section 20 states, morbid mental
- 1:11:15disturbance or disorder of
- 1:11:16consciousness or other mental
- 1:11:18abnormality, in other words, the fact
- 1:11:20that he believed there was a Cat King,
- 1:11:22but rather he was punished. And the
- 1:11:29Federal Court of Justice assumed here
- 1:11:31that while a reduction in sentence is
- 1:11:33conceivable, that it is possible,
- 1:11:34because he had such a completely
- 1:11:36distorted worldview and because he
- 1:11:38actually thought—and that is the
- 1:11:39interesting part of this case—he
- 1:11:41actually thought he would be saving
- 1:11:42millions of human lives by bringing
- 1:11:44this human sacrifice to the Cat King.
- 1:11:53And the question here was now, can H be
- 1:11:55punished for having forced the police
- 1:11:57officer V to stab O. Who is the
- 1:11:58perpetrator here now? And we said
- 1:12:03before, in principle, the tool is only
- 1:12:05a tool if it acts irresponsibly,
- 1:12:07meaning it does not act responsibly,
- 1:12:09and therefore cannot be punished for
- 1:12:11its deed. And that would not be the
- 1:12:19case here at all, because the tool, as
- 1:12:20we have seen or will see, is punished
- 1:12:22for this act. The tool may think it is
- 1:12:28in an emergency situation, but the
- 1:12:30Federal Court of Justice has very
- 1:12:31clearly stated that anyone who believes
- 1:12:33they are in an emergency situation and
- 1:12:35has the possibility and the time to
- 1:12:37check, should please do so, otherwise
- 1:12:39they might be punished. And here it
- 1:12:42would indeed be, interestingly enough
- 1:12:44the Federal Court of Justice also said
- 1:12:46this, there would certainly be the
- 1:12:47possibility to confide in a priest and
- 1:12:49ask him if the Cat King exists. That
- 1:12:51was what the Federal Court of Justice
- 1:12:52suggested. But the problem, of course,
- 1:12:56with such, um, with such, um,
- 1:12:58conspiracy myths is that you believe
- 1:13:00everyone belongs to them, and therefore
- 1:13:02the priest, who could of course also be
- 1:13:04a member or follower of the Cat King,
- 1:13:06cannot really tell you if he actually
- 1:13:08exists. So what does the Federal Court
- 1:13:12of Justice make of this? It poses the
- 1:13:15question: Are there cases where
- 1:13:16indirect perpetration is conceivable
- 1:13:18without a lack of culpability on the
- 1:13:20part of the primary actor? So, what is
- 1:13:23discussed as problematic are those
- 1:13:24cases in which the mastermind can
- 1:13:26indeed exert a certain control over the
- 1:13:28primary actor. But for that reason,
- 1:13:30culpability is not excluded. So, to our
- 1:13:32primary actor, we say: You shouldn't
- 1:13:34have believed this nonsense. You will
- 1:13:36now be punished. So, ignorance actually
- 1:13:39does not help here for once. And the
- 1:13:43Federal Court of Justice says there are
- 1:13:45cases in which the mastermind is
- 1:13:46punished, even though the primary actor
- 1:13:48is acting with full responsibility. And
- 1:13:51that is actually a bit strange. We
- 1:13:53usually say the mastermind is punished
- 1:13:55because they have control over the
- 1:13:57primary actor and commit the act with
- 1:13:58this tool, with this other person. And
- 1:14:01that is why the mastermind can be
- 1:14:03punished as a perpetrator and the
- 1:14:04primary actor as a perpetrator. And the
- 1:14:08Federal Court of Justice says there are
- 1:14:10simply cases where there is control,
- 1:14:12despite culpability. And these are the
- 1:14:15cases that the Federal Court of Justice
- 1:14:17has particularly in mind. Unjust
- 1:14:19regimes, the Nazi state, the GDR, but
- 1:14:22also structured criminal organizations.
- 1:14:24And very exciting, the Federal Court of
- 1:14:26Justice extends this to companies as
- 1:14:28well. So, if you have a company, for
- 1:14:34example, in which someone commits
- 1:14:36environmental crimes and the top
- 1:14:37management ordered it, but otherwise
- 1:14:39has nothing further to do with these
- 1:14:41environmental crimes, it is quite
- 1:14:42conceivable according to the case law
- 1:14:44of the Federal Court of Justice that
- 1:14:46the person who dumps the filth into the
- 1:14:48water is punished—and the managing
- 1:14:49director or the board of directors too,
- 1:14:51but not just for incitement because
- 1:14:53they ordered it, but as perpetrators in
- 1:14:55certain constellations. In our case, I
- 1:15:02also find it quite understandable to
- 1:15:04say that whoever allows themselves to
- 1:15:06be controlled here, or whoever is
- 1:15:08controlled here, can also be punished,
- 1:15:09and yet the punishment for the
- 1:15:11mastermind does not fall away. Because
- 1:15:16just consider what the power situation
- 1:15:18was actually like in this case, in this
- 1:15:20Cat King case. That’s not for me to
- 1:15:26say. Um, so just consider, could H tell
- 1:15:31him what he had to do and not do? I
- 1:15:36mean, apart from the culpability. But
- 1:15:40if she can make him believe that there
- 1:15:41is a Cat King, what do you think she
- 1:15:43could have made him believe otherwise?
- 1:15:46She could have told him anything at all
- 1:15:48and would have then exerted control
- 1:15:49over him. When you are dealing with
- 1:15:52particularly um simple-minded people,
- 1:15:57dealing with particularly gullible
- 1:15:59people, then it is just easier to
- 1:16:01control them. Even if we say these
- 1:16:04people must be held accountable for
- 1:16:06letting themselves be deceived, that
- 1:16:08does not change the fact that the
- 1:16:09possibility of control exists. And that
- 1:16:15is why the Federal Court of Justice,
- 1:16:17just like in the Sirius case, assumed
- 1:16:18here that we are dealing with indirect
- 1:16:20perpetration and not just incitement or
- 1:16:22uh aiding and abetting. That means the
- 1:16:29Federal Court of Justice said here, in
- 1:16:31these cases Yes, please. The question
- 1:16:47that arises here, and which is also
- 1:16:48raised in the literature, is whether
- 1:16:50the whole thing could not be solved via
- 1:16:52co-perpetration, meaning that in our uh
- 1:16:54in our constellation here with the Cat
- 1:16:55King, several people commit the crime
- 1:16:57together, so everyone is punished as a
- 1:16:59perpetrator. That has been discussed.
- 1:17:08Um the problem that then naturally
- 1:17:10arises is, can you really assume a
- 1:17:11joint commission if he now goes into
- 1:17:13the lamp shop, stabs her, and H is
- 1:17:15somewhere else? She might not even know
- 1:17:20exactly where the act is taking place.
- 1:17:23There is no joint commission in the
- 1:17:25sense of a common criminal plan, but
- 1:17:27renowned criminal law experts have
- 1:17:28pointed exactly to that and said,
- 1:17:30wouldn't co-perpetration be a sensible
- 1:17:32solution? Whether co-perpetration
- 1:17:37really reflects this here, I actually
- 1:17:39do not think so, because I believe that
- 1:17:41with co-perpetration one gets the
- 1:17:42impression that they got together and
- 1:17:44committed an act, and indirect
- 1:17:46perpetration better expresses what
- 1:17:47actually happened. One is the
- 1:17:51controlling mastermind and, in this
- 1:17:53case, the mastermind, and the one who
- 1:17:54carries out the act is then the
- 1:17:56instrument of the crime. But
- 1:17:58co-perpetration would be just as
- 1:18:00defensible. Well, I have unfortunately
- 1:18:02forgotten who represented it, but it
- 1:18:04was certainly uh well-reasoned and um a
- 1:18:06sensible approach, no question at all.
- 1:18:10Um we will see it again in a moment. Um
- 1:18:16, the Federal Court of Justice did it
- 1:18:18this way and said we are dealing here
- 1:18:20with indirect perpetration. This has
- 1:18:23met with massive resistance in the
- 1:18:24literature. The literature says here in
- 1:18:28this area, in particular as represented
- 1:18:30here for example by Rotsch, I cannot
- 1:18:32say that both were perpetrators of the
- 1:18:34same act. I cannot say the mastermind
- 1:18:38is responsible for the act of the
- 1:18:40direct perpetrator. Everyone is only
- 1:18:42responsible for their own actions. And
- 1:18:45if the person in front, the instrument,
- 1:18:47has committed a criminal act, then I,
- 1:18:49as the person behind, cannot also be
- 1:18:51held responsible unless I am a
- 1:18:53co-perpetrator. Section 25 is based on
- 1:18:59the premise that the other person
- 1:19:00involved is not punished as a criminal
- 1:19:02offender. I can only have an instrument
- 1:19:08in the sense of Section 25 (1) if the
- 1:19:10person in front is not criminally
- 1:19:12responsible. The wording for this is
- 1:19:15also the justification. Indirect
- 1:19:18perpetration is based on a shifting of
- 1:19:20responsibility from the direct actor to
- 1:19:22the person behind. So this view says
- 1:19:25that whoever commits an act through
- 1:19:26another person takes on the
- 1:19:28responsibility, or rather, the
- 1:19:29responsibility the person in front
- 1:19:31would actually have is transferred to
- 1:19:32them because they steered the whole
- 1:19:34thing. And the solution of the Federal
- 1:19:37Court of Justice, where both are
- 1:19:38perpetrators at once, would not lead to
- 1:19:40a shift of responsibility, but to a
- 1:19:42doubling of responsibility. And that
- 1:19:44cannot be right; that is an incorrect
- 1:19:46solution. Here, the person in front,
- 1:19:52our V who did the stabbing, would be
- 1:19:54the perpetrator, and H, who stood
- 1:19:56behind, would be an instigator, and
- 1:19:58this view is not a problem at all.
- 1:20:04Section 26 says:" Yes, an instigator is
- 1:20:09punished the same as a perpetrator. "
- 1:20:12Why all this fuss? Whether they are an
- 1:20:16instigator or an indirect perpetrator,
- 1:20:18they are punished the same as a
- 1:20:19perpetrator. The penalty is the same;
- 1:20:21it makes no difference. There are cases
- 1:20:25where it actually makes a difference,
- 1:20:27namely in attempt constellations. Um,
- 1:20:30one must know that the attempt to
- 1:20:32incite is only punishable for felonies.
- 1:20:36So, it makes a difference if we are
- 1:20:38dealing with misdemeanors, bodily
- 1:20:40injury, theft, or similar. And if the
- 1:20:44act remains an attempt, then it also
- 1:20:46makes a difference in substance.
- 1:20:49Furthermore, the argument has always
- 1:20:51been that it also makes a difference in
- 1:20:53the verdict. Am I convicted of murder
- 1:20:56or of incitement to murder? That is a
- 1:20:58significant difference. This means
- 1:21:04there is a view in legal literature—
- 1:21:06which is important to know for exams—
- 1:21:08that if the person in front can be
- 1:21:09punished, if the instrument can be
- 1:21:11punished, then the person behind cannot
- 1:21:13be an indirect perpetrator. They are
- 1:21:16then an instigator or an accessory, but
- 1:21:18they are not an indirect perpetrator.
- 1:21:23Another view opposes this, which states
- 1:21:33that in cases where there is an error,
- 1:21:34one can assume indirect perpetration,
- 1:21:36because there we are dealing with
- 1:21:38control. So that would be exactly our"
- 1:21:43Cat King "case. So, this view argues
- 1:21:46that in the Cat King case, we can
- 1:21:48certainly speak of indirect
- 1:21:49perpetration. We are justified in
- 1:21:53doubling the responsibility for a
- 1:21:54simple reason. The mastermind can
- 1:21:57control the front man by means of a
- 1:21:59mistake. They can tell them exactly
- 1:22:01what to do and what not to do. And if
- 1:22:04they were to clarify the mistake, the
- 1:22:06criminal plan would simply collapse.
- 1:22:08Then there would be no crime committed
- 1:22:10anymore. If she had told him that the
- 1:22:13thing with the Cat King was all a big
- 1:22:14lie, that we just wanted to tease him a
- 1:22:16bit, then he surely wouldn't have
- 1:22:17committed the act, and the matter would
- 1:22:19have been closed. And that leads this
- 1:22:24view to say that as far as mistakes are
- 1:22:26concerned, if I can control someone
- 1:22:27through a mistake, then indirect
- 1:22:29perpetration exists, because this
- 1:22:35surplus of intent, this surplus of
- 1:22:36knowledge, leads to me being able to
- 1:22:38control someone. So, true to the motto
- 1:22:42that knowledge is power, and through
- 1:22:44knowledge—and above all, superior
- 1:22:46knowledge—you can certainly control
- 1:22:48people. The argument raised against
- 1:22:55this was then, um, that ultimately the,
- 1:22:57um, criminal liability would be reduced
- 1:23:06to a charge of negligence, at least in
- 1:23:08cases where innocence under Section 17
- 1:23:10does not apply. And that is our Cat
- 1:23:14King case. We say to him," You should
- 1:23:16have realized that the Cat King does
- 1:23:18not exist. "In these cases, we punish
- 1:23:23for intent, and we cannot assume here
- 1:23:25that merely a charge of negligence,
- 1:23:26which would be a prerequisite for the
- 1:23:28application of Section 16, is all that
- 1:23:30remains. So, this view is countered by
- 1:23:36that argument. We must not compare
- 1:23:38Section 16, where someone does not know
- 1:23:40what they are doing, with the case
- 1:23:41where someone does not know that they
- 1:23:43are doing wrong. So, the difference
- 1:23:45between Section 16 and Section 17 is
- 1:23:47essentially that under Section 16,
- 1:23:49someone is not punished for intentional
- 1:23:51commission because they do not know the
- 1:23:53facts, because they do not know the
- 1:23:55circumstances under which they are
- 1:23:57acting. Under Section 17, someone is
- 1:23:59generally not punished because they do
- 1:24:01not know that what they are doing is
- 1:24:03wrong. And that is a different case.
- 1:24:07And these different cases must not be
- 1:24:09thrown into the same pot. And another
- 1:24:16argument that is cited here is that in
- 1:24:18cases where we are dealing with
- 1:24:19organizational authority, that doesn't
- 1:24:21apply either. Organizational authority,
- 1:24:24those are the cases involving unjust
- 1:24:26regimes. That was discussed in
- 1:24:29particular, um, regarding the shootings
- 1:24:31at the Berlin Wall, but also regarding
- 1:24:33crimes committed by Nazi perpetrators.
- 1:24:38For example, this was discussed during
- 1:24:40the legal proceedings of the trial
- 1:24:42against Eichmann in Jerusalem. It was
- 1:24:46discussed extensively, and that is
- 1:24:47quite interesting. Roxin, one of the
- 1:24:52greats of criminal law—Professor
- 1:24:54Roxin is now in his mid-80 s—has been
- 1:24:56heavily influencing criminal law since
- 1:24:58the 60s. In 1963, he wrote an essay on
- 1:25:05how one can establish criminal
- 1:25:06liability in cases where" desk
- 1:25:08perpetrators "have nothing to do with
- 1:25:10the actual crime. So, his aim was to
- 1:25:18justify why Eichmann, who had people
- 1:25:20deported and killed by train, who
- 1:25:22organized it all and was often the
- 1:25:24organizer of the KZ death machinery.
- 1:25:30How can one punish him, even though he
- 1:25:32never saw any of the victims? He didn't
- 1:25:35fire a single shot, he didn't
- 1:25:37contribute anything directly to the
- 1:25:38killing of people, but he organized
- 1:25:40everything. And that is where Roxin
- 1:25:47said that anyone who, within the
- 1:25:48framework of an organized killing
- 1:25:50machine like the Nazi regime,
- 1:25:52contributes to it, co-organizes it, and
- 1:25:54ensures that the individual soldier or
- 1:25:56guard doing the shooting becomes a mere
- 1:25:58replaceable cog. He can also be a
- 1:26:04perpetrator in the background, and we
- 1:26:06don't need direct involvement there.
- 1:26:11And here arises the problem that this
- 1:26:12view—which says perpetrator behind
- 1:26:14the perpetrator only exists in cases of
- 1:26:16error—cannot explain the problem of
- 1:26:18organized power structures. Well, we
- 1:26:24have reached a point where we will
- 1:26:26continue next time. I am sorry that
- 1:26:29those of you hearing about criminal law
- 1:26:31for the first time were thrown right
- 1:26:33into a difficult topic. I hope you were
- 1:26:36still able to take something away from
- 1:26:37this, and for everyone else, thank you
- 1:26:39for your presence and attention. See
- 1:26:41you next time.
About this transcript
This page contains the full transcript of Strafrecht AT Teil 17 (Mittelbare Täterschaft) by Lehrstuhl Wirtschaftstrafrecht, generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 13,498 words across 2,062 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.
What you can do with it
Use the transcript to take notes, quote the speaker, build a study guide, generate a summary with ChatGPT or Claude via the YouTube Summary tool, or export it as a timed subtitle file with YouTube to SRT. You can also re-open it in the transcriber to choose a caption track available on the video.
Free YouTube transcript tool
YouTube2Text is a free YouTube transcript generator — no signup, no daily limit. Paste any YouTube link and get the full transcript instantly, with timestamps, click-to-jump, caption language selection, AI prompts for ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, and exports to TXT, SRT, VTT, or Markdown.