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Seven Months Into the Iran War: A Conversation with John Mearsheimer & Trita Parsi (Sept. 21, 2026) — Transcript

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0:05Hello and welcome to the program. My
0:08name is Mahaka Samani. I'm executive
0:10director at the Community Alliance for
0:12Peace and Justice, an advocacy group
0:15that seeks to improve US policy toward
0:18the Middle East and South Asia.
0:20We're almost 7 months into the American
0:23Israeli war against Iran. And in this
0:26conversation, we really want to take
0:28stock of the situation and see where
0:31things stand, examine some of the
0:34regional dynamics that have recently
0:36emerged, and also explore the global
0:39ramifications of it all. To help us do
0:42that, we are joined today by two of the
0:44most authoritative voices on global
0:46politics. Dr. John Mayshimer, who is
0:50political science professor at the
0:52University of Chicago, and Dr. Kita
0:54Parcy who is the executive vice
0:57president of the Quincy Institute. Thank
1:00you both so much for joining us.
1:02>> Thank you for having us.
1:04>> Yes, you're more than welcome.
1:06>> So, Professor Mesha, let me begin with
1:09you. Um, Trump administration officials
1:12have claimed that the naval blockade and
1:15operation economic outcast are crippling
1:18Iran's economy and that time is on
1:21Trump's side. Do you agree with this
1:24assessment? And how do you see the US
1:27position in the war right now? Well,
1:30>> you want to remember that the blockade,
1:32it was the second blockade uh that is
1:36now in place was put uh into effect on
1:39July 14th.
1:42And on August 24th, uh Scott Bessant
1:46announced that there was a new strategy
1:50uh that was designed to strangle the
1:53Iranian economy. And the reason he
1:56announced that new uh policy on August
1:5924th was because the blockade was not
2:02working the way the administration
2:05intended. If the blockade that was put
2:08in place again on July 14th was working,
2:12there wouldn't have been any need for
2:13the Bessant strategy uh to strangle Iran
2:17which was put in place again on August
2:1924th. So then the question you want to
2:22ask yourself is what do we see happening
2:25as a result of the Bessen strategy? And
2:28the fact is that the Bessin strategy
2:30doesn't add up to much at all. Uh it was
2:34really all about putting secondary
2:36sanctions on countries like China uh and
2:40India and uh Russia uh countries that
2:45trade with Iran. And if you're going to
2:48strangle Iran economically, that means
2:51you're going to have to cut off all
2:52economic intercourse. And that was the
2:55uh essence of what the uh Besson
2:58strategy was trying to do or going to
3:01try to do. But they've not tried to do
3:04that. They can't do that. It won't work.
3:06So, we're reduced to the blockade alone
3:09for all intents and purposes. And
3:11there's no question the blockade is
3:14inflicting punishment, maybe even
3:16massive punishment on the Iranian
3:19population. But the $64,000 question is,
3:23will that punishment cause the Iranians
3:26uh to surrender to American demands? And
3:29the answer is almost certainly no
3:32because Iran is facing an existential
3:35threat from the United States and from
3:37Israel. And when you're facing an
3:39existential threat, which means your
3:41survival is at stake, you'll fight to
3:43the last person. So the blockade wasn't
3:47working isn't working the way it's
3:49intended. The Bessant strategy is not a
3:53significant force multiplier. And
3:55therefore we're pretty much in a
3:57situation where the Iranians are in the
3:59driver's seat.
4:00>> Sure. And with you know both the
4:02straight of Hormuz and Babal Mandab now
4:05effectively constrained. Um the
4:08International Energy Agency recently
4:10called this the largest oil supply
4:13disruption in market history. Um, so do
4:16you believe that ultimately it is going
4:18to be economic pain rather than military
4:21exhaustion that is going to force an
4:24endgame here?
4:26>> I think that it's quite clear that uh
4:29what's going to force an endgame is the
4:32economic damage that's being done. Uh I
4:36think when it was the Iran versus United
4:39States and Israel war alone, the
4:42economic damage was somewhat contained
4:45by the West. But now that the Houthies
4:48are in the fight against the Saudis
4:51uh and that Saudi oil supplies to Europe
4:55and to the rest of the world have been
4:58greatly curtailed. The economic
5:00consequences of these two wars together
5:03make it quite clear that the West at
5:06some point has to shut this war down
5:09because if they don't the economic
5:11consequences across the globe will be so
5:14serious that we'll run the risk of a
5:16worldwide recession if not depression.
5:20>> Sure. Um so following up with that Tita
5:23I mean how would you assess Iran's
5:25position as the war currently stands?
5:28You know, Iran's economy, as Professor
5:30Mayor Shimmer mentioned, is getting
5:32squeezed really hard. Not to mention the
5:35human cost of the sanctions regime,
5:37which has been exacerbated by this war.
5:40But as he said, oil is still over $100 a
5:44barrel and that pain is spreading
5:46globally. Um, not just staying inside
5:48Iran. So, do you believe that Iran
5:51continues to have that leverage since
5:53the world is now sharing the cost of
5:55this war?
5:58I think John is absolutely right in
5:59pointing out that these sanctions will
6:01at the end of the day have an impact on
6:04the Iranian population. All previous
6:06sanctions to various degrees have had
6:08that. This one as well and we're seeing
6:11now that already a lot of airlines have
6:13cut uh uh flights to Thran. Um, but as
6:18John pointed out, the question is if
6:19this is translating into a change in
6:22their policy. And I think one of the
6:24things that the administration is
6:25fundamentally miscalculating here is
6:28that it would have been one thing if you
6:30were in a situation in which you were
6:34trying to squeeze a country that
6:36essentially had lost but refused to
6:38accept that loss and you kind of corner
6:42them with these sanctions. you squeeze
6:43them until they essentially gave up
6:45because they had no other escalatory
6:48options at their disposal. That is not
6:51the situation here. Iran has plenty of
6:55escalatory or counter escalatory
6:57options. So when you go down the path of
7:00this sanctions effort, either it is not
7:04particularly meaningful, not in the
7:06sense that it won't hurt the population,
7:07but in the sense that it won't change
7:09the government's calculus and then
7:11you've more or less just wasted time and
7:12waste a lot of political capital because
7:14you're annoying a lot of other countries
7:16right now by forcing them to take a cut
7:19and and take a cost or you actually do
7:22inflict so much pain on the Iranian
7:24economy that the Iranians decide to
7:26counter escalate. And that's I think
7:28that's where we are right now when the
7:29booties are taking over uh the entire
7:33Yemen coast in the south. I think it was
7:36primarily driven by Yemen calculations.
7:40But it is nevertheless part of this
7:41larger context in which this is
7:43fundamentally putting counter pressure
7:45on the Saudis and on the US.
7:47particularly mindful of the fact that
7:49this was taking place in coordination
7:51with Hashtal Shabi in Iraq that took out
7:54the East West pipeline uh which was one
7:57of these pipelines that was really
7:58working overtime pumping 56 million
8:01barrels a day as a way of compensating
8:03for this huge loss in the straight of
8:05horm that pipeline is out and it's going
8:07to be out for at least a couple of weeks
8:10so I think there's a paradox here if the
8:13sanctions are effective you will see uh
8:16counter escalation if they're not
8:17affected and what have you achieved. So
8:19it is not in any way, shape or form
8:21fundamentally changing the strategic
8:23picture. And this is such a common
8:26pattern in the American approach to Iran
8:28which is that as soon as some form of
8:31new leverage is believed to have been
8:33found, it is interpreted as a strategic
8:36shift rather than just a tactical edge.
8:39And this is at best a tactical edge, I
8:41would say.
8:43>> Sure. And you know, one of the things
8:45that we saw was again Yes. And we'll get
8:46to the Houthi and Ansar question in a
8:49little bit as well. What are some of the
8:51other escalatory options that Iran has
8:53at this point?
8:55>> Well, we still know that of course that
8:58if the US were to strike at desalination
9:01plants in Iran, the Iranians will take
9:03out those in the GCC and in Israel.
9:06>> Uh energy infrastructure will be
9:08responded to by energy infrastructure.
9:11But increasingly you're also hearing
9:13more and more about other forms of
9:15escalatory options that go way beyond
9:18just simple retaliation even though
9:20those would be very devastating for the
9:22global economy. Mhm.
9:24>> The very swift success of the Houthis
9:28Ansarah in Yemen has now also fueled the
9:32conversation in which one escalatory
9:34option that is concerning a lot of
9:36people in the GCC side is that the Iraqi
9:40militia hasht may just run over Kuwait
9:42and take it over altogether.
9:45you may have similar things happening in
9:47Bahrain both through an internal
9:49opposition in combination with support
9:51from some of these militians. So we're
9:53now talking about escalatory options
9:55that would completely redefine the
9:58political map of the region.
10:00And I think one of the concerning things
10:03that actually should be more of a
10:05concern on the American side than it is
10:07and on the Iranian side I've picked up
10:09but they're also a bit concerned about
10:10this is that so far the escalation has
10:14been calibrated more or less on all
10:16sides but we may be entering a stage
10:18right now in which the neither side
10:21actually will be able to control the
10:22escalation. the escalation will get out
10:24of control and that ultimately can be
10:26very bad for everyone because no one
10:28will be able to fully control what
10:29happens.
10:31>> Right? And I'm going to get to Professor
10:33Mesh and if he wants to respond to what
10:35Tita just said. Um but I'm also
10:37wondering I mean is Iran actually in
10:40control of the Iraqi militias if they
10:43decide to overrun Kuwait or you know
10:46things that are happening in Saudi
10:48Arabia? If that happens, are they in
10:50complete control of what happens there
10:52in the region?
10:54>> Well, the conventional wisdom in the
10:56West is that the Iranians are in control
10:58of everything in the Middle East that's
11:01opposed to Israel and the United States.
11:04They run Hezbollah. They run the
11:06Houthis. They run these militias in
11:09Iraq. But in fact uh with regard to the
11:13Houthis Hezbollah this is true of Hamas
11:16as well and those militias there are
11:20significant limits to how much influence
11:23Iran has. That's certainly true with
11:26regard to the Houthis. The Houthis did
11:28not start the fight against Saudi Arabia
11:32because Iran directed them to do so
11:35because Iran needed more leverage
11:38against the United States and against
11:40Israel. What happened here is that the
11:43uh the Iranians
11:46uh uh excuse me, the Saudis uh attacked
11:52uh the uh [snorts] Houthies when they
11:56were flying back from uh the funeral for
12:00the Ayatollah. And it was the Houthis,
12:04not excuse me, it was the Saudis, not
12:06the Houthis, who started the conflict.
12:09and not with any direction from Iran. Uh
12:12so I think that the argument that the
12:15Iranians are the puppet masters and
12:17they're directing everybody in the
12:19Middle East to do what they have to do
12:21is erroneous.
12:24>> Sure. Um Professor Mama also, you know,
12:27earlier this month, uh Trump said he
12:29expects the war to end shortly after the
12:32midterms. We are less than six weeks
12:35away from American midterms. At the same
12:38time, we have continued to see threats
12:40of further military escalation. Um, do
12:43you see a risk of further military
12:46escalation either before or immediately
12:49after the midterms? And what do you
12:51think that will actually achieve?
12:54>> Well, there's no question that there's
12:56always the risk of escalation, and
12:58that's certainly true with President
13:00Trump because he's something of a loose
13:02cannon. Uh but if you think about what
13:06our military options are here, visa v
13:10the Houthis or visav Iran, we have no
13:14military option. Uh it would have been
13:16crazy to attack the Houthies last night
13:19as President Trump was talking about
13:21doing and his adviserss apparently
13:24understood that. I mean, you don't even
13:26need a tripledigit IQ to figure that
13:28out. They told him, "Don't do this." and
13:32therefore he called off the attack. You
13:34want to remember that we have basically
13:38run out of munitions that we can use in
13:40a fight in the Middle East. Uh, one
13:44reason that we ended the 40-day war,
13:46that's between February 28th and April
13:508th, is because we were running out of
13:53munitions. uh we would be crazy to
13:57[snorts] start another fight given our
14:01inventory of precious weaponry. Uh
14:04furthermore, what good is it going to do
14:07even if we have the precious weaponry?
14:09We've been down this road before.
14:12President Trump took on the Houthies
14:14between March and May of 2025 and he
14:17lost. We've been there, done that, and
14:19it did not work out very well. Uh we
14:22bombed uh the Iranians in the 40-day
14:26campaign that I just mentioned. We
14:28didn't succeed there either, which is
14:30why we stopped the bombing campaign. And
14:33it's why we have not restarted the
14:35bombing campaign. We've tried this tit
14:38fortat strategy two or three different
14:40times. That's not worked. And in fact,
14:43the last time we started it, it was
14:45ongoing and we quit. And nevertheless,
14:49the Iranians kept hitting us, but we did
14:52not retaliate. Why? Because we don't
14:54have the weaponry to engage in that kind
14:57of tit fortat strategy. And furthermore,
14:59it doesn't work. So, if there's a
15:02military option here, I don't see it and
15:05I don't read in the press or on the
15:08internet where anybody can describe what
15:10that winning strategy is. So, we have no
15:15military strategy that can get us out of
15:17this disastrous situation. And that's
15:20why Trump at some point is going to have
15:22to cut a deal with the Iranians. And the
15:25problem that he faces is that it's not
15:27going to be a good deal from our point
15:29of view and it's going to be a good deal
15:32from Iran's point of view. Uh, Professor
15:35Mishame, you know, we talk about the US
15:37midterms, but there is another election
15:39that is looming and that is the Israeli
15:41election on October 27th. Um, and the
15:44Iran war is an election issue there
15:47naturally. And do you believe that
15:49Netanyahu might do something militarily
15:53prior to that election in order to gain
15:56ground um for his electoral prospects?
16:00>> It's possible. Well, there's no question
16:02that uh Netanyahu benefits from fighting
16:06all these wars because he's able to
16:08portray himself as the ideal person to
16:12lead Israel when a war is taking place.
16:16Uh but you know, he's got a war going in
16:19Lebanon. He can always jack up the war
16:21in Syria. He effectively has a war going
16:24on in both Gaza uh and the West Bank.
16:28I'm not sure that uh uh he's going to
16:32even think about attacking Iran. And the
16:35problem he faces if he thinks about
16:38attacking Iran is that the Iranians, as
16:40Trader was pointing out before, have the
16:43ability to uh counter retaliate. Uh and
16:47the Iranians could cause a lot of damage
16:49in Israel. Uh Israel is a target-rich
16:52environment for the Iranians and it's a
16:55small country. So, uh, Israel would
16:58really be pounded. So, I don't think the
17:00Israelis would be tempted to attack
17:03Iran. And in addition to that, I think
17:05the Americans would tell them not to do
17:08that. I don't think we want to see the
17:10Israelis attack Iran because uh they are
17:14the tail that wags the dog, which is
17:16another way of saying if the Israelis
17:18attack Iran, we'll get dragged in, and
17:21we don't want to get dragged in. So, I
17:24don't see uh Netanyahu starting any
17:27trouble with the Iranians. Uh and I
17:31think uh he'll just leave it at that
17:34going up to the election.
17:36>> Great. Um Trita, let's turn um from the
17:39military uh endgame to the diplomatic
17:41one, right? Um publicly, Iran has laid
17:44out conditions for a resumption of
17:47dialogue and negotiations. um three of
17:50which uh have been pretty consistent
17:52throughout this process. Um you know the
17:55end to the naval blockade, end of
17:57hostilities on all fronts including
17:59Lebanon and Gaza um and the unfreezing
18:02of Iranian assets and we are hearing
18:06reports from the Kataris that uh
18:08messages are being exchanged between the
18:11Washington. Um so what do you you know
18:15are the parties currently discussing the
18:18conditions under which negotiations can
18:20continue or are they talking about other
18:23substantive issues as well?
18:26>> I think what you're seeing right now is
18:28that the Qataris the Pakistanis are
18:31working very hard to see if they can get
18:34some sort of a negotiation going between
18:36the United States and Iran. Trump has
18:38made it very clear he's actually not
18:40interested in diplomacy.
18:42The calculation on the administration's
18:44side based on conversations I've had is
18:47that essentially at this point it's not
18:49going to get worse for Trump. Whatever
18:51the negative effects of the war have
18:54been on the electorate, it's already
18:56factored in. It's not going to get much
18:58worse over the next couple of weeks. But
19:00a lot of headlines about this is not
19:03necessarily helpful and and investing
19:06further in it at this point doesn't make
19:07much sense because they believe having
19:09reopened 30 perhaps 40% of the straight
19:13of Hormuz they are now in a situation in
19:16which the Iranians are hurting more than
19:18the US is hurting and that that's not
19:20taking into account that the rest of the
19:22global economy is hurting. It's not
19:24taking into account that for many of the
19:26GCC states, 30 to 40% of the trade is
19:29not at all sufficient in any way, shape,
19:30or form.
19:32But the administration right now is
19:34really not that interested uh in a
19:37negotiation. Perhaps that will change
19:39after the midterm elections, but I fear
19:42that the higher likelihood is that after
19:44the midterm elections, the
19:46administration is going to opt for a
19:48much more massive bombing campaign than
19:51what we've seen so far. I agree with you
19:53that you know this is a very dumb idea
19:55and that enough munitions etc do not
19:58exist that interceptors are very low.
20:01This is a critical critical factor so
20:04far. Uh but there are other things that
20:07they're looking at that I think is
20:08causing them to believe that perhaps
20:10there is a way. Let me first explain why
20:13I think Trump is in this headsp space.
20:16>> In his mind he needs to do something
20:18that just completely ends this. He has
20:22tried diplomacy and he's seen that what
20:24the political cost was of the MOU. He
20:27got attacked viciously by almost every
20:30side including the Democrats and
20:32including from inside his own
20:33administrations. He's tried the war as
20:36John pointed out round one and round two
20:38and it clearly didn't work that well.
20:39But it was at the end of the day a more
20:41limited war compared to what we're
20:43talking about here. And of course the
20:45economic sanctions which I don't think
20:46frankly the administration themselves
20:48really believe in. Perhaps Bessant does.
20:51None of them have been able to finish
20:53this. He's looking for something that
20:56will complete this in a manner that the
21:00final narrative about this is that the
21:03war was worth it. Not something similar
21:07to what John pointed out that it would
21:09be a negotiation. It would be much more
21:10on Iran's terms than on the US's terms.
21:13And then the war was an error. The
21:15negotiations was an error. The deal was
21:17an error. and all of that is just going
21:19to be devastating for his legacy. So, I
21:22think he's in a headsp space in which
21:24he's searching for something that just
21:25turns the corner on this entirely. I
21:28don't think it's possible, but I think
21:31the argument that is prevailing in the
21:33administration is that he actually
21:36hasn't tried everything because he
21:38threatened to take out the uh uh oil
21:41infrastructure and he didn't. He
21:42threatened to take out critical
21:44infrastructure and he didn't. He
21:46threatened to take an island, but he
21:48didn't. So, he hasn't actually fully
21:51explored that option. Now, there was a
21:53very good reason why he didn't because
21:55the retaliation on the Iranian side was
21:57going to be so devastating. But the
22:00thinking appears to be if you can do
22:03this in such an intense and fast manner
22:06that you knock out Iran's capability for
22:10counter escalation, not that they won't
22:12be able to counter escalate right away,
22:14but that after seven or so days their
22:16capacity is so degraded that they can't
22:19because you've essentially carpet bombed
22:21the country and taken out
22:22infrastructure, etc. then it doesn't
22:25matter if you run out of interceptors
22:27because they won't be able to shoot any
22:29missiles anyways. Now, I think this is
22:32absolute insanity.
22:34But this is where I think unfortunately
22:37we're likely going to be. The exit ramps
22:40that are being tried by some of these
22:43mediators are valiant efforts, but at
22:47the end of the day is not providing
22:49Trump with a type of a clean victory
22:51that he's looking for, which I think is
22:53a fantasy at this point. If you wanted a
22:55clean victory, don't start a war. He
22:57started a war unnecessarily and he is
22:58now trying to find a way in which
23:00everything will be okay and it's just
23:02not going to be possible. Now, so I
23:04think in the next couple of weeks, it
23:05will be interesting to see whether
23:09uh these negotiations managed to create
23:11some sort of opening that really has to
23:13convince Trump to think about diplomacy
23:15more seriously. Let me add one thing.
23:19The Houthi victory in Yemen on the face
23:23of it definitely adds leverage to the
23:25Iranian coalition so to say. But I think
23:28it may also have another effect that
23:30could go completely counter to that
23:32which is that Trump has said that he's
23:35not going to go in and help the Houthies
23:36and then he said that he might and then
23:38he changed his mind again. He keeps on
23:39going back and forth. A key factor as to
23:42why he wasn't so eager to do it is
23:43partly what John pointed out. The US
23:45tried this. it didn't work, but also
23:47because he's very ticked off at the
23:50Saudis because the Saudis halfway
23:52through the war stopped allowing the US
23:54to use their airspace and their bases.
23:58And as a result, this significantly
24:00limited America's ability to wage that
24:03war.
24:05There's voices in the administration
24:06that right now say, "Yes, we can help
24:08with the Houthis in return for the
24:10Saudis reopening their airspace and
24:12reopening their bases." But essentially
24:14the deal for the Saudis is okay, you
24:17don't have to have a war with the
24:18Houthis. We'll take care of that.
24:19Instead, you're going to have a war with
24:20Iran. I don't know if that's going to
24:21work. It doesn't sound like a very
24:23attractive offer to the Saudis. But what
24:27I'm pointing to that there seems to be
24:29this desperate search for something that
24:32can make a total military victory
24:34possible again despite everything that
24:36we've experienced in the last seven
24:38months.
24:39>> Sure. Uh TJ, we'll come to Yes, please
24:42go ahead. Can I just respond to treat
24:44because this is such an important issue.
24:46>> Yes.
24:47>> What I would say tra is that there is no
24:50way we can employ military force to win
24:54the war. I mean they may think that if
24:57we carpet bomb uh Iran and we hit energy
25:01infrastructure and other kinds of
25:03infrastructure that we haven't hit up to
25:05now that this is going to cause the
25:08Iranians to surrender. That's not going
25:10to happen. If anything, it's going to
25:12have a rally around the flag. And
25:14furthermore, as you pointed out, the end
25:17result is that the Iranians themselves
25:19will counter retaliate. They will wreck
25:22the Middle East. They will wreck the
25:24Gulf countries. They will probably go to
25:27great lengths to wreck Israel as well.
25:29And the end result is you're going to
25:31crash the international economy.
25:33President Trump said he didn't want to
25:35be Herbert Hoover. He didn't want an
25:36economic catastrophe. Those were his
25:39words. And the reason that we have
25:41really not gone full force in terms of
25:43attacking Iran is because we know that
25:47it would have devastating effects for
25:49the international economy. So they may
25:52pursue the strategy you described. But
25:55it is completely foolish to do so.
25:57>> Absolutely.
25:58>> Because it not produce a success.
26:01>> I agree with you 100%, John. And I think
26:03part of what is happening here is a
26:07similar phenomenon to what we saw back
26:09in January and February in which
26:12information was not reaching Trump.
26:14There was a filter. There was a
26:16curation. Much of it was done by the
26:18Israelis constantly feeding him
26:20information about how weak the Iranians
26:22are which then led him to believe that
26:24this is just going to be like Venezuela
26:25but you know 2 or 3 days longer and that
26:29this whole thing could be over with in 4
26:30days. I think we're in a similar
26:32situation. Some of it is not at this
26:34point because of curation. It's because
26:35I think Trump is simply not taking in
26:38information that contradicts what he
26:40wants to believe. Found it very
26:42interesting that he tweeted a Guardian
26:44story in which it cited the Iranian
26:47president saying that there needs to be
26:49a way to find an end to this war. And
26:52the context of it, of course, is that
26:54he's pointing to that as evidence that
26:56his economic sanctions are working and
26:58bringing the Iranians to the knees so
27:00that they're ready to surrender. The
27:02Iranian president has said from day one
27:04that there needs to be a way to find uh
27:06an end to this war. There's nothing new
27:08about that whatsoever.
27:10But this is what I think is reaching
27:12him. This is what is registering with
27:13him. And he's once again led to believe
27:16that things that are frankly completely
27:18insane
27:19um are worth trying. Now, I'm not saying
27:22that this is inevitable in any way,
27:23shape, or form. And I do think that
27:25there may be m uh dynamics that will
27:27happen after the midterm in which
27:29certain voices in the administration may
27:31be more assertive against some of these
27:33things than they have been so far
27:34because they do have a political future
27:36even though Trump doesn't. But what I'm
27:39trying to point to is that we're not in
27:41a space right now in which the
27:43administration is really seriously
27:44looking at any diplomatic options. I
27:47don't think people around Trump can go
27:49to him with diplomatic options right now
27:51and get much of a positive reaction from
27:54him at all. And until that happens,
27:56we're not going to have serious
27:58diplomacy. And in the meantime, we're
28:00heading towards a complete train wreck.
28:04Uh but treat because um you know the way
28:07the scenario that you have described I'm
28:09sure there is an understanding within
28:11the Iranian government as well that that
28:13is the headsp space that Trump is in and
28:16I'm sure even though as professor mesh
28:18said they will you know uh be able to
28:21revive themselves after something like
28:23that as horrific as that um I don't
28:26think the Iranian government wants its
28:28population carpet bombed either. Do you
28:31believe that in this the Iranian
28:34government is at this time perhaps
28:36viewing this window before the midterms
28:39to then push for a greater diplomatic
28:43effort and is willing to concede in some
28:46areas such as around the straight of
28:48Hormuz or other um issues that it has
28:51brought to the four before.
28:54>> What you have is that the Iranians
28:55actually are engaged in that diplomacy.
28:57I mean, it is the Iranians. I mean, they
28:59have senior people in Riad right now
29:01talking. They're engaging with the
29:02Pakistanis and the uh um the Qataris on
29:06this. The lack of engagement
29:08diplomatically is on the American side.
29:11So, that's one. On the second point, are
29:12they willing to give more concessions?
29:14I've not noted any significant movement
29:18uh on that. And um there's one opening
29:21I've seen which is that you know they've
29:23been insisting on theou still being the
29:25king.
29:26>> But I noticed one opening there which is
29:29that they're viewing theou as the
29:32beginning of a negotiation but it
29:34doesn't have to be the end of the
29:36negotiation.
29:38Meaning that you start off on within
29:41theou framework but depending on how the
29:43negotiations evolve you may end up with
29:45something completely different. So
29:46they're not married to the MU, but they
29:48will not be willing to give it up unless
29:50they give it up within a negotiation.
29:53Whereas the Trump administration's
29:55position is that the MOU is dead and
29:57they're not going to return to an MOU.
30:01Now whether that means that they can
30:02return to a conversation that starts off
30:04with the MOU or not entirely clear but
30:07um I'm not again I'm not confident that
30:09that important but still nuance shift on
30:12the Iranian position is sufficient to
30:15make any impact on Trump's thinking. Um
30:19but when it comes to the larger issue
30:21are they willing to give any major
30:22concessions etc. I think they are in a
30:26headsp space in which they just don't
30:28think a deal with Trump is really worth
30:31it that he can say yes that he will
30:33stick to a yes they see him constantly
30:36changing his mind they don't seem to
30:38have a view of him as mentally stable
30:40and as a result that means that no major
30:44concessions are going to be given
30:46meaning concessions that are
30:48irreversible things that Iran gives up
30:51and cannot get back they're not going to
30:53give it to someone who seems to change
30:55his mind five times every week because
30:57it's just not rational to do so. It's
31:00this there's no stable situation. Um and
31:03again, this is part of the reason I
31:05think you know there is this madman
31:06theory that you want to act a little bit
31:08irrational in order to make sure that
31:10the other side becomes more cautious and
31:12fearful of you and it may work every
31:14once in a while. in a military setting,
31:17in a diplomatic setting, all it does is
31:19just blows up any confidence in the val
31:22in the value of a deal with someone
31:25who's uh exhibiting that type of a
31:27behavior. And I think that's exactly
31:28what's happening to Trump right now.
31:30>> Can I add to what was saying? This is
31:33not to disagree at all, but just to push
31:35it a bit further. I think if you're the
31:38Iranians, you have to understand that
31:41whether Trump is the president, Joe
31:43Biden is the president, or anybody else,
31:47uh the United States is a is and is
31:50going to remain a mortal enemy of Iran.
31:54And that's for one simple reason,
31:56because of Israel. Israel basically
31:58drives US Middle East policy. And Israel
32:01is committed to the destruction of Iran.
32:03and therefore the Americans will remain
32:06uh to some extent at least committed to
32:09destroying Iran. So Iran wants to milk
32:14the present situation for all it's
32:16worth. It does not want to make any
32:19concessions. It wants the Americans to
32:22make concessions. Iran wants to get
32:24itself in a situation where it can deal
32:27with the United States a year from now,
32:305 years from now, 10 years from now.
32:32there's not going to be any meaningful
32:34peace agreement here. Uh so I think the
32:38Iranians are going to drive a very hard
32:41bargain. I also think you want to
32:44remember that from an Iranian point of
32:45view, if this war escalates and more
32:48damage is done to the international
32:50economy and the United States is put in
32:52a more difficult situation, that works
32:55to Iran's advantage. I'm not sure
32:58escalation is such a bad thing from
33:00Iran's point of view. Uh I don't know
33:03enough from the inside in Iran to make a
33:05firm decision on whether I think what I
33:07said is correct or not, but uh I think
33:10there are probably powerful incentives
33:13for the Iranians to escalate to get
33:16better leverage over the United States,
33:19to not have to make concessions
33:21themselves, and to have to get the
33:24United States to make concessions.
33:26Again, the bottom line here is that
33:28moving forward, the United States,
33:31whether Trump is in charge or not, will
33:33remain a mortal enemy, and you have to
33:36position yourself, if you're Iran, to
33:38deal with that mortal enemy.
33:41Just to add to what John said, you know,
33:43the conversation on the Iranian side
33:45towards adopting a doctrine of uh
33:49preeemption has now been quite public
33:52for the last couple of months. And we've
33:54also seen it come into effect. So for
33:57instance, some of the strikes in Jordan
33:59were uh taking place not in retaliation
34:02against an immediate strike by the US,
34:04but because essentially this is war at
34:06this point and they're not just going to
34:08be sitting and responding.
34:10Now, that does also mean that if the
34:13Iranians come to the conclusion that the
34:15likelihood of the US and Israel engaging
34:18in a major major attack against Iran
34:21after the midterm elections that the
34:23Iranians may themselves strike
34:24preemptively prior to that in order to
34:27deprive the US from having the luxury of
34:30deciding the timing of that war. In
34:32fact, many of the attacks against Jordan
34:36at this point are driven by several
34:38different factors. One of them being
34:40that they want to do less against the
34:41GCC states because they're trying to
34:43make sure that they can find some sort
34:44of a commonality with them, but also
34:46because those bases
34:49are now the ones that will be most
34:51crucial for the United States in case
34:54there is a larger war and Israel enters
34:56that war. Those are the bases that are
34:57going to be used to shoot down Iranian
34:59missiles that will be heading towards
35:00Israel.
35:02So you are taking those out right now in
35:05order to signal the Israelis you will
35:07hurt a lot if you entered in this war if
35:10you go in for some huge attack against
35:12the Iranians after the midterm elections
35:14because this is essentially making sure
35:16that the Iranian missiles will have a
35:18higher penetration rate by taking out as
35:20much as possible of that infrastructure
35:22in Jordan.
35:25>> And there's one other issue that we
35:26haven't talked about that's of enormous
35:28importance. It used to be the primary
35:30issue that we were concerned about when
35:32talking about Iran and that's the
35:33nuclear issue.
35:35>> Nobody's talking about anymore.
35:37>> Yeah. Well, the Iranian parliament is
35:39talking about it and the Iranian
35:41parliament is talking about the
35:42possibility of withdrawing from the NPT
35:46and developing an Iranian nuclear
35:49deterrent. And I would imagine that
35:51there will be uh significant movement in
35:54that direction moving forward. Whether
35:56the Iranians ultimately decide to
35:58develop a nuclear deterrent remains to
36:00be seen. But given everything that's
36:02happened and given that we all agree
36:04that moving forward the United States
36:06and Israel remain mortal enemies of
36:08Iran, the incentives for Iran to acquire
36:12a nuclear deterrent are enormous.
36:16>> Can I say something on this? John John
36:18is absolutely right and I was just in
36:20the region uh last week um uh in
36:24sessions in which uh senior officials
36:27from almost all of the countries we have
36:28mentioned uh here in this discussion
36:30were present. I also had conversations
36:32with Iranian officials who played a
36:34critical role in the JCPOA
36:38and they themselves are saying at this
36:40point there is a huge amount of regret
36:42inside of Iran that uh the program was
36:46never weaponized and that if things move
36:49towards weaponization
36:51uh at this point it will have tremendous
36:53amount of support both within the
36:55population and within the foreign policy
36:58elite establishment itself. Now, for
37:01some in Washington, this is irrelevant
37:03because they had already assumed quite
37:05erroneously that the Iranians were going
37:07to go for a nuclear weapon uh
37:09regardless, which was completely false.
37:11If that was the case, they would have
37:12not signed the JCPOA.
37:14But these attacks so far have only not
37:18only increased the demand for a nuclear
37:21deterrence on the Iranian side, it has
37:23actually done so in many other countries
37:24as well. opposing Turkey show for
37:26instance that the demand for nuclear
37:28deterrent has increased dramatically
37:30partly because of what happened here and
37:32also partly because they don't believe
37:33that NATO would come to Turkeykey's aid
37:36in case of an Israeli attack against
37:38Turkey. So from a non-prololiferation
37:41perspective, this has been beyond
37:42disastrous.
37:44>> And don't forget Saudi Arabia treaty.
37:47Yes. Absolutely.
37:48>> Given their military weakness, the fact
37:51that the United States would not come to
37:53their support, the incentives for the
37:55Saudis to want nuclear weapons and if
37:58they sense that Iran is going down the
38:01nuclear road again, the incentives for
38:03them will be uh very high. And at the
38:07height of Saudi Arabia's incentives for
38:09a nuclear deterrence, the United States
38:11is signing a deal with them, giving them
38:14the enrichment capabilities that the US
38:16for more than 40 years has tried to
38:18deprive the Iranians of.
38:21>> Right. Absolutely. Well, and speaking of
38:23Saudi Arabia, U. Professor Mshime,
38:25again, we've seen this massive
38:27escalation between Saudi Arabia and the
38:30Ansar over the past few weeks. Um and
38:33nobody has come to Saudi Arabia's
38:36assistance. I mean not the US that you
38:39know Trump again just over the weekend
38:41declined to come to their aid. Um
38:44Pakistan and Turkey with which Saudi
38:46Arabia had signed the Makkah defense
38:48agreement. They have not stepped up
38:50militarily either. Um the only I feel
38:54you know uh uh there were reports and
38:57I'm I don't think they're completely
38:58confirmed but within Israeli media there
39:00were reports of the Saudis now reaching
39:03out to Israelis to the Israelis for
39:06intelligence support. Um so my question
39:10is what does that say for Saudi
39:13alliances in the region? American
39:16security guarantees for Saudi Arabia.
39:18And do you believe, and I, this might be
39:21a little far-fetched, but do you believe
39:23that if Israel does step in to help
39:26Saudi Arabia out when nobody else in the
39:29region is, do you think that is going to
39:31be one step toward normalization?
39:34>> Well, a couple points. One is I don't
39:36think Israel is going to help Saudi
39:38Arabia. I think the Israelis prefer to
39:40stay on the sidelines
39:42uh in this conflict and concentrate on
39:44Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, and Syria
39:48>> and maybe Iran, but they want to stay
39:51out of the Saudi Houthi fight. Uh with
39:55regard to Saudi Arabia, it's very
39:56interesting. If we had talked a couple
39:59weeks ago and we had talked about Saudi
40:02Arabia's threat environment, I would
40:04have focused almost exclusively on Iran
40:07and I would not have thought about the
40:09Houthis as a meaningful threat to Saudi
40:12Arabia. Uh that would have just shown my
40:15ignorance because it's now quite clear
40:17that Saudi Arabia really faces two
40:20threats. One is from Iran and the other
40:23is from the Houthies. And I'd be curious
40:25to hear what treat has to say, but I
40:27think one could make an argument that
40:29the Houthies are a much greater threat
40:31to Saudi Arabia's survival than Iran is.
40:35So the Saudis face a two-front war
40:38problem and they effectively have no
40:43country or countries that will come to
40:46their defense or provide them with
40:49significant assistance uh in defending
40:52themselves either against Iran or
40:54against the Houthis. So they are in real
40:57trouble today and I think moving forward
41:01what they're going to have to think
41:02about is how to work out some sort of
41:05motives for vendai certainly with the
41:07Iranians but even with the Houthies
41:10>> treat
41:12John is absolutely right and I think
41:14again the Mecca agreement was tested
41:18just within days of having been signed
41:21and I think uh Pakistan and Turkey He
41:26also probably had discounted the
41:27likelihood of this type of anescalation
41:29by the Houthies. Um I think it's
41:32important to point out and John
41:34mentioned this earlier on the Saudis
41:36unfortunately started this themselves.
41:39>> Yeah.
41:40>> We had pass they had pacified the front
41:43with the Houthis when the Iranian
41:45airplane landed in Sona because of the
41:47airport of uh because of the funeral of
41:51Ky.
41:53uh the Saudis saw that as an effort to
41:55breach the blockade which is still in
41:57place and they struck at the airport and
42:00this is what triggered this whole thing.
42:03Now what one thing that is really
42:04fascinating is that the Houthis gained
42:08much of this control in the manner in
42:11which they won these battles similarly
42:13to how the Taliban did it when they just
42:15within a couple of days swept all of P
42:18off which is that they were negotiating
42:20with a lot of these different soldiers
42:22and then buying them off
42:23>> and they were doing this over the course
42:25of weeks and months without Saudi or US
42:28intelligence picking it up.
42:30>> Wow. And I think it tells us something
42:32of how little we know or understand of
42:34the situation in Yemen right now. Now,
42:37if the Houthis were to escalate further
42:39and go into Saudi territory, it would
42:41put the Turks and the Pakistanis in a
42:43very very awkward position. I don't
42:45think they for a second want to have a
42:48conflict uh with the Yemenes on this
42:50issue. But it actually really would be a
42:53very very severe threat to the unity of
42:56Saudi Arabia and the stability of its
42:58government. I mean, the entire 2030
43:00plan, all of this is going down the
43:03drain because of this war. And up until
43:05just a couple of weeks ago, the Saudis
43:07had actually managed to keep themselves
43:09out of this rather well. They were not
43:12struck by the Iranians because they had
43:14struck a deal with the Iranians. They
43:15were not allowing the US to use Saudi
43:17airspace or uh bases in the country. And
43:21as a result, they were not fully
43:23insulated, but they were fairing better
43:25than most of the other countries. And
43:26they had their East West pipeline. All
43:28of that is gone now. All of it because
43:30they decided to bomb the Sana airport
43:32which was a massive mistake.
43:34>> And Trina, just to add one point to
43:36this, there are reports from quite
43:38reliable sources that President Trump
43:41encouraged the Saudis to attack the
43:44Houthis. Uh, which I find mind-boggling.
43:49>> Yeah, I would I wouldn't be surprised by
43:51that at all. What is surprising is why
43:53would the Saudis take Trump's advice?
43:56>> Yeah, you do.
43:58Uh treat a quick question, quick
44:00followup. Um you know the Makkah defense
44:02agreement, you said that that's put the
44:04Pakistanis and the Turks in a very
44:05awkward position. Now their failure to
44:08help uh Saudi Arabia, was that because
44:12their militaries are not yet integrated?
44:14That was the excuse that was given um by
44:17some analysts. or is it because of their
44:20um the local sentiments within their
44:22respective populations that will not let
44:24them um intervene in that way against
44:27the Houthis? And if that is the case,
44:30then what is the point of this defense
44:32agreement?
44:34>> On the latter point, let's just make one
44:36thing clear. The Houthis are extremely
44:40popular in the Arab street right now and
44:43in the larger Muslim world. uh because
44:46this very poor country uh managing to
44:50stand up both to the US and to Israel
44:52when so many of these other Arab
44:54countries are uh caving, failing, you
44:58name it. I mean, so much of Jordan's
45:01military is being used to protect Israel
45:03right now against Iranian missiles in
45:05the midst of an Israeli genocide against
45:08the Palestinian people. Do not
45:10underestimate how good that makes the
45:12Houthis look when they're fighting back.
45:14So I think it would be tremendously
45:16problematic politically for these
45:18countries to get involved but also it
45:20would be very problematic for them
45:22militarily. Few countries if any have
45:24actually intervened successfully uh in
45:27Yemen and I don't think the Turks have
45:30the slightest appetite for this
45:31particularly when they're also
45:33increasingly facing um a greater and
45:36greater threat from Israel. and for them
45:38to be overstretched in Yemen of all
45:40places in the middle of all of this
45:42makes absolutely no sense. So I think
45:45the Mecca agreement at the end of the
45:46day was a rushed effort to try to just
45:50fill in some sort of agreement within
45:53this vacuum that has been left by the
45:55complete collapse of the American
45:58hegemony in the Middle East, the
45:59American security umbrella. It may have
46:02been very well intended and it may still
46:04end up being able to work if it becomes
46:06an inclusive arrangement rather than
46:08turning into some sort of a Middle East
46:10and NATO, but as John knows much better
46:13than me, these agreements only um work
46:17as long as as far as their credibility
46:19is willing to carry them. And the
46:21credibility right now that the Turks and
46:25the Pakistanis would go to war with Iran
46:27on behalf of Saudi Arabia is not there.
46:30and it's not even there when it comes to
46:31the vouties. So yes, if there's some
46:35minor piracy taking place, perhaps they
46:37would come to Saudi Arabia's aid, but
46:39that is not the issue that uh Saudi
46:41Arabia is currently facing.
46:44>> Sure. Um uh treat I just did want to
46:47sort of again stay on the Houthi topic
46:49for just a little while longer and that
46:51is you know u the US has held direct
46:54contact with the Houthis um who have
46:57said that they will honor their 2025
46:59ceasefire agreement with Washington and
47:01refrain from targeting American vessels
47:05while focusing entirely on attacks on
47:07Saudi interests. Um, do you believe I
47:11mean what does that tell us about Houthi
47:13leverage? But then also do you believe
47:15they'll actually be able to force an end
47:18to the Saudi blockade through these
47:20attacks at this moment?
47:23Well, on the first point, uh I think it
47:25is something very interesting compared
47:28to just what it would have been four or
47:29five years ago, which is that the Trump
47:31administration, despite all of these
47:33strategic mistakes, actually is willing
47:35uh and uh is engaged in direct
47:37conversations with all of these
47:39different entities, including Hamas.
47:41Whereas in the past, it would almost
47:44always happen through one of the US's
47:46partners who have completely different
47:48interests at time, the Israelis in
47:50particular. Now the administration is
47:52talking directly to them and this has
47:54been very effective in making sure that
47:57this agreement still holds that the
47:58Houthis are only targeting Saudi ships.
48:01Now of course from a global economic
48:03standpoint if you're only targeting
48:05Saudi ships that still means that you
48:06are targeting the most important thing.
48:09But uh as long as they're not striking
48:11the US it gives the US a way out uh of
48:15not getting involved in this. Uh, and I
48:17think what we have seen so far is that
48:19the Houthis actually held their word on
48:21these things, including when it comes to
48:22when they would stop firing at Israel,
48:24which they did after was a ceasefire
48:26there. [snorts] So, I I I think those
48:28things do matter tremendously, and I
48:31think it is uh part of the uh factors
48:34that are taken into account by the
48:37administration. Now, as to the second
48:40part of your question, could you repeat
48:41it?
48:42>> Um, do you think that the Houthis will
48:43be able to end the Saudi blockade? Yes.
48:46Uh I do think that the Houthis are now
48:50amassing so much leverage and that the
48:53counter Houthi forces in the in Yemen
48:56right now is just a hodgepodge of
48:57different groups that have even deeper
48:59disagreements within themselves and
49:01against each other than they have with
49:02the Houthis. that the likelihood of
49:05being able to turn this around is such
49:07that the the Saudis should very very
49:10seriously consider a deal in which
49:12lifting the blockade is a way for them
49:14to get out of this war. I don't know if
49:16that's where the Saudis are at this
49:18point, but I think would be a mistake
49:19for them to continue this war in order
49:22to sustain a blockade.
49:24>> Sure. Thank you. Uh, Professor Mish, I
49:26just wanted to shift gears just a little
49:28bit. You know, you were recently in
49:29Russia. Um, how is Moscow recalibrating
49:34its position on Iran? What did you take
49:36away from your conversations there and
49:38how they're seeing this entire conflict
49:40evolve? Um, and also something about
49:44China. You know, it has also entered the
49:46diplomatic fray um and has been pressing
49:49Iran over the Houthi escalation as
49:51disruption to energy markets is
49:54increasingly affecting Beijing's
49:56interests. Um I think China also during
49:59the brick summit has had sort of
50:01indicated some kind of a multilateral um
50:04sort of mediation effort. Um so how do
50:07you see these two countries now
50:10approaching this conflict?
50:13>> When I was in uh Russia, I was in both
50:16Moscow and St. Petersburg uh for about
50:19eight days and uh I talked extensively
50:23to people in what I would call the
50:25Russian national security elite. Uh and
50:29of course as you would expect most of
50:31the people who I talked to fastened on
50:34the Ukraine conflict because that's
50:36what's of enormous importance
50:39uh to the Russians. But the subject of
50:41Iran did come up on a number of
50:43occasions and it's quite clear that the
50:46Russians have a vested interest in
50:48seeing Iran win the war against the
50:52United States. Uh I don't think the
50:56Russians view the United States as their
50:58primary enemy. I think they view the
51:00United States is basically an enemy. Uh
51:04but from a Russian point of view, the
51:06real enemy is Europe and in particular
51:09the British and the Germans. Uh the
51:13Americans, I think, uh there they have a
51:16complicated outlook. They see President
51:19Trump as well-intentioned, but they
51:21don't think he's capable of settling the
51:24Ukraine conflict in any meaningful way.
51:27His diplomatic skills are just not up
51:29for it. So in the end they understand
51:32that the United States has remained an
51:35enemy despite Trump's efforts to reverse
51:38direction and therefore they have a
51:41vested interest they the Russians in
51:44making sure that anything that can be
51:46done to weaken America's position in the
51:48world is taken advantage of. And I think
51:51from their perspective, what is
51:52happening in Iran, what is happening in
51:55the Persian Gulf to the United States is
51:58to Russia's advantage. And you want to
52:01remember that right now uh the Trump
52:06administration is putting great pressure
52:08on Zalinski to stop Ukrainian attacks
52:12against oil and gas facilities to
52:14include refineries inside of Russia
52:18because that is affecting the amount of
52:21oil and gas that is in global markets.
52:25So if you think about it, what's
52:27happening here is that as a result of
52:29the Iran war, as a result of Iran's
52:33success against the United States, the
52:36United States is putting pressure on
52:38Ukraine to limit its attacks on Russia,
52:41which is obviously to Russia's
52:43advantage. So, I think the Russians
52:46understand quite clearly uh that it
52:49would be good if Iran defeated the
52:52United States in this war, whatever that
52:55means. And I think there's a lot of
52:57evidence. I didn't see any of it inside
52:59of Russia, but just from reading
53:01newspapers and reading on the internet,
53:03there's a lot of evidence that the
53:04Russians are helping the Ukrainians. And
53:08there's evidence that the Chinese are
53:10helping the Ukrainians, excuse me, the
53:12Iranians as well. And this is hardly
53:14surprising. It's exactly what you'd
53:16expect. Because of the Americans
53:19inability to execute, or I should say to
53:22formulate and execute uh a rational
53:25legal foreign policy, we've driven the
53:27Russians, the Chinese, and the Iranians
53:29together.
53:31>> Do you think that with uh President Xi
53:33visiting uh the White House later this
53:36week, uh Trump is going to ask for his
53:39help in mediating? Well, you know, I
53:42know that Tita has mentioned that it's
53:45not interested in diplomacy at this
53:47point, but in either pressuring Iran is,
53:50you know, is Trump going to ask for
53:52Chinese help at this point?
53:53>> I bet he's already asked them uh I bet
53:56he's asked the Russians for help. Trump
53:58is desperate to settle this war. Uh how
54:01he does it is another matter, and that's
54:03what we were talking about before. But
54:05Trump fully understands that he made a
54:08huge blunder starting this war. The
54:10problem is he can't figure out how to
54:12get out of it. So he's asked Xi Jinping,
54:16I'm sure, you know, he's been working
54:17with the Pakistanis
54:19to see if the Pakistanis or even the
54:21cutteries or the Turks can help him uh
54:24work out some sort of arrangements with
54:26the Iranians. The problem that Trump
54:29faces is that the Iranians, for reasons
54:31we described before, are driving a hard
54:34bargain. It's in Iran's uh interest to
54:38make sure it gets every possible
54:40concession from the United States. And
54:42of course, it's in Trump's interest to
54:43make sure that doesn't happen. And
54:46therefore, he doesn't want to cut a deal
54:47at this point because it'll look
54:49something like the memorandum of
54:51understanding on 17 June, which was
54:53basically a surrender document from the
54:56American point of view. He doesn't want
54:57to do that, and he's looking for a way
55:00to get the Iranians to make concessions.
55:02So both sides make concessions and Trump
55:05can declare victory, but he can't get
55:07the Iranians to do it. So he's trying to
55:10solicit help from the Russians, from the
55:12Chinese, and so forth and so on. And I'm
55:15sure that when Xi Jinping comes to the
55:17United States, he'll talk to him again
55:19about it. But uh I do not believe it's
55:22going to work because the Iranians are
55:24sophisticated enough to understand that
55:27they have to do what is in their
55:29national interest and what is in their
55:31national interest is to drive an
55:34extremely hard bargain with the United
55:36States to make as few concessions as
55:39possible because as I said before the
55:42United States and Israel will remain
55:45mortal enemies for the foreseeable
55:47future.
55:49Thank you um Dr. M Sha. So Tita, the
55:52last question goes to you. Um you know
55:54the 81st session of the UN General
55:56Assembly is already underway and high
55:59level week begins tomorrow. Um Trump is
56:02expected to discuss the Iran war with
56:04Gulf leaders in New York. Um and
56:07President Peshkan and foreign minister
56:09RXG are also going to be um there. Um,
56:12should we expect any meaningful
56:14diplomatic movement on the sidelines of
56:17the UNGA at this point?
56:20>> Not any major, but I think there will be
56:23diplomatic activity that will not be
56:24unimportant. It will be interesting to
56:26see if what the GCC states come back to
56:30Trump with is something that moves him
56:32or not. Uh, I'm a little bit skeptical.
56:35I'm not seeing the signs of that
56:36readiness in the administration yet. Um
56:39and again I think they are not feeling
56:41much of a pressure to do anything
56:43because they think that they have the
56:45situation more or less under control.
56:47Not a good situation but one in which
56:49the pressure will gradually increase on
56:51the Iranian side while gradually
56:53decrease on the American side. But I
56:56think there will nevertheless be an
56:57important week because the entire world
57:00will be there. The Iranians will be
57:01there and others will be there. And um
57:04you know this was a war uh an illegal
57:07war uh and war of aggression. And I
57:10think the Iranians are going there more
57:11than anything else to score a lot of PR
57:14points, but also to make sure that
57:16they're there in case anything happens,
57:19if there's any developments,
57:20particularly as it appears that Trump is
57:23going to use this week not to push for
57:25diplomacy, but to use all of these
57:27different meetings to press on other
57:29countries to adopt extr territorial
57:32sanctions against Iran. And I think the
57:33Iranians are partly there because they
57:35want to be available to push back
57:37against that.
57:40Well, excellent. Let's hope that there
57:42is some um movement in any positive
57:45direction uh because where we are right
57:47now just does not seem to be sustainable
57:49at all. Um again, I would like to thank
57:52you both so much for your time, your
57:54insights, and for making sense of this
57:57very very complex and rapidly evolving
57:59situation for all of us. I always learn
58:01so much from you both. Thank you both so
58:04much.

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