Süleymancıların Siyasetle İmtihanı: Süleymancılara Yönelik Operasyon Mali mi yoksa Siyasi mi? — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:00Hello, dear friends. Today in this
- 0:05video, I will focus on the
- 0:07Süleymancıs and the potential
- 0:10political reasons behind the operation
- 0:13directed at them. I don’t know how
- 0:17much time has passed, but back then,
- 0:20when reports emerged in the press about
- 0:24Ekrem İmamoğlu having close ties with
- 0:27the Süleymancı community, I had made
- 0:31a video titled "Süleymancılık" on
- 0:34that occasion. In that video, I had
- 0:38provided comprehensive information
- 0:40regarding the origin, emergence, and
- 0:43development of Süleymancılık, as
- 0:45well as the nature of its relationship
- 0:47with politics. Now, let’s call
- 0:51Süleymancılık a community, similar
- 0:53to the structure of a congregation or a
- 0:56sect. I won’t be talking about their
- 1:01specific characteristics or their
- 1:04unique activities here. What I want to
- 1:09explain here is why the Süleymancıs
- 1:13were targeted. Now, on August 13, 2026,
- 1:19just a few days ago, the state
- 1:21conducted an operation against the
- 1:24Süleymancıs, and the Minister of
- 1:27Justice came out and said this was not
- 1:30an operation directed at a religious
- 1:33community. In other words, the
- 1:36justification for this operation is not
- 1:39religious. What is it, then? It is
- 1:42financial; that is, what has emerged is
- 1:46that this community was allegedly
- 1:50transferring billions of liras, a sum
- 1:53like 100 billion, abroad in an
- 1:56irregular, illegitimate manner,
- 1:58contrary to the Tax Procedure Law,
- 2:01engaging in money laundering, and, in a
- 2:04sense, establishing what we might call
- 2:07a criminal organization. The operation
- 2:13was carried out on grounds such as
- 2:15committing a type of fraud that causes
- 2:18damage to public institutions and
- 2:20organized fraud. Currently, over 40
- 2:24people, including Alihan Kuriş, the
- 2:27head of the community, have been
- 2:30detained. Why the Süleymancıs? That
- 2:34is our topic. Therefore, the term "
- 2:39Süleymancı" and "Süleymancılık" is
- 2:43a naming convention used by opposing
- 2:47groups towards this community. The
- 2:52Süleymancıs do not like or accept
- 2:54this label, this characterization.
- 2:56Among themselves, they call each other
- 2:59"Ihvan." They call themselves the
- 3:01students of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan.
- 3:04They call themselves "Süleymanlı."
- 3:06They say "Dersam," they say "Oğlu."
- 3:08But since the term "Süleymancı" is
- 3:11widespread, I am using it. This naming
- 3:14is not a term embraced or approved by
- 3:16the members of the community. Perhaps
- 3:21this name became more popular and
- 3:24gained prevalence during the conflict
- 3:27between the Süleymancıs and the
- 3:29Diyanet community, which became quite
- 3:32tense back when Tayyar Altıkulaç was
- 3:35the President of Religious Affairs. Now
- 3:42, there are many other communities. As
- 3:46deep-rooted as the Süleymancıs. The
- 3:49Süleymancıs, after all, came of age
- 3:51in the final period of the Ottoman
- 3:53Empire. They witnessed the Second
- 3:54Constitutional Era. They saw the
- 3:56founding phase of the Republic. They
- 4:01witnessed almost the final years of the
- 4:04Democrat Party's rule. And they passed
- 4:07away in 1959. I believe Süleyman Hilmi
- 4:11Tunahan was born in 1888; after the
- 4:14Unification of Education Law (Tevhid-i
- 4:16Tedrisat) came into effect in 1924,
- 4:18right at the beginning of the Republic,
- 4:21a man who had grown up in the final
- 4:23generation of the Ottoman madrasa, who
- 4:26had been a teacher and scholar, was
- 4:28suddenly reduced to the status of an
- 4:31ordinary preacher, and then even that
- 4:35authority to preach was taken away from
- 4:37him...From that period on, these are
- 4:40structures that emerged and
- 4:42proliferated on the same ground as
- 4:44other Nurcu groups that harbored
- 4:46deep-seated resentment toward the
- 4:48Republic and the republican revolutions
- 4:51, meaning they were never on good terms
- 4:54with the Republic. Although it is
- 4:58claimed that they have a Naqshbandi,
- 5:00Mujaddidi origin, it is not a structure
- 5:02where such sectarian reflexes and
- 5:04rituals are very prominent. It is an
- 5:07interesting, unique, and distinctive
- 5:10structure. In the 1920s, under the
- 5:14influence of the intense pressure on
- 5:17the religious sphere, Süleyman Hilmi
- 5:20Tunahan could not find students to
- 5:25teach. The purpose of teaching it is
- 5:27this: at the very least, they should
- 5:29learn the Quranic alphabet. They should
- 5:33firmly grasp the Holy Quran and
- 5:36fundamental religious knowledge, let's
- 5:39say. Something at this level, an
- 5:41interest, a concern. Because during
- 5:44those times, these religious studies
- 5:46and so on, they weren't legal. We look
- 5:50at what he left behind in life; just an
- 5:51alphabet primer, like a guide to
- 5:53learning the Quran. Other than that,
- 5:55there is no other written work of his.
- 5:57Yes, he is a teacher, and it is said he
- 5:59was a scholar of wide scope, but
- 6:01looking at his field of activity, that
- 6:03scholarship and depth aren't very
- 6:05visible. At the beginning, since he
- 6:08couldn't find students, he started
- 6:10classes by gathering people from the
- 6:11local notables. The first activities of
- 6:16this organization regarding these
- 6:18student dorms began while he was living
- 6:21in Kısıklı, Üsküdar, around 1951,
- 6:24in his guest house or outbuildings,
- 6:27that is, in an illegal manner. Now,
- 6:31thousands of dorms are being mentioned.
- 6:33It has arrived at a completely
- 6:34different place. It grew, and when the
- 6:37first generation of expatriates went to
- 6:40Germany, this community was the group
- 6:42that first noticed the void they
- 6:44encountered and made the first serious
- 6:47move. So, for that reason, their
- 6:50organization in Germany and Europe is
- 6:52much older than FETO. It is much older
- 6:55than the National View movement, and it
- 6:57has a deeply rooted organization there.
- 6:59It is still that way today. Anyway, let
- 7:02me put it this way. This structure's
- 7:06relationship with the state is one we
- 7:09could call paradoxical. I will come to
- 7:11politics from here. And from there,
- 7:13what could be the possible reasons for
- 7:15the operation? I will touch upon those.
- 7:18The structure's relationship with the
- 7:20state is paradoxical, a bit strange.
- 7:23Actually, other structures are like
- 7:25this, too. Now, they are fundamentally
- 7:27opposed to its founding philosophy. The
- 7:31Ottoman Empire was more sacred to them.
- 7:35It was a more glorious structure. The
- 7:38Republic is a glitch, an anomaly, a
- 7:40deviation according to them. Fair
- 7:43enough. But you emerged within this
- 7:48republic. How will you exist? Yes, you
- 7:52are opposed as a founding philosophy,
- 7:55but you don't take the state on
- 7:57directly either. You set it as a
- 8:03strategy for yourself to appear within
- 8:07that state, at least in a legitimate
- 8:10guise. For example, there is a saying
- 8:14attributed to Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan.
- 8:17Students come from Anatolia as pure
- 8:20minds, as unspoiled brains and souls.
- 8:24They come to Istanbul, dragging their
- 8:26feet. But after passing through this
- 8:29workshop or lodge of ours in Istanbul,
- 8:32they turn into Istanbul gentlemen. That
- 8:37is why, if you notice, since you are
- 8:41living under the sovereignty of this
- 8:45state and operating here, you are
- 8:49obliged to present a compatible image,
- 8:53even if you don't adopt modernity in
- 8:57terms of mentality or worldview. That
- 9:03is why community members appear with
- 9:06suits and a neat appearance, in a
- 9:09structure we would call an Istanbul
- 9:12gentleman. So, they look favorably upon
- 9:17this side, this aspect of modernization
- 9:19, but they have an irreconcilable
- 9:24opposition to the republic's founding
- 9:27philosophy and secular foundation.
- 9:30These Nur communities are like this,
- 9:32too. Well, FETO was like this as well.
- 9:37Then it aimed to become the state.
- 9:40Anyway, regarding their opposition to
- 9:43that founding philosophy, Tayyar
- 9:48Altıkulaç, who struggled a lot with
- 9:49them while at the Directorate of
- 9:51Religious Affairs, says this. They say
- 9:54it is a structure that aims to
- 9:56overthrow the country's regime. Whether
- 10:00you call it dissimulation, diplomacy,
- 10:05or just a fake smile, rather than
- 10:09confronting the state, they organized
- 10:13their dress codes and courses by
- 10:17following official legal procedures.
- 10:24But within their curriculum, they
- 10:25dictated their own beliefs and what
- 10:27they wanted to teach to the students.
- 10:32In the beginning, there was what we
- 10:33call permanent studentship, where one
- 10:35only builds a career within the
- 10:37community. Meaning they trained people
- 10:41to achieve the community's goals, and
- 10:44later they started taking in school
- 10:48students—for example, university or
- 10:51high school students—and preparing
- 10:54them for professional careers in
- 10:57medicine, engineering, and law. Thus,
- 11:02community members began to occupy many
- 11:04professional business groups and
- 11:06bureaucracy at the grassroots level.
- 11:09But these things happened over the
- 11:10course of time. So, how was their
- 11:12relationship with politics all along?
- 11:15Well, against the single party, they
- 11:19had a strange reaction and opposition.
- 11:23Then the Menderes era arrived. During
- 11:28the Menderes era, Süleyman Hilmi
- 11:29Tunahan initially looked favorably upon
- 11:32the Menderes administration. Because
- 11:34there was a sense of relief in the
- 11:36religious sphere. He got his preacher's
- 11:40license back. Yes. This led to a
- 11:43favorable view of the Democrat Party
- 11:46government. Indeed. From this, we
- 11:50understand that initially, they
- 11:53supported whatever party was the rival
- 11:56to the CHP. But time passed. The
- 12:01reasons were: The Democrat Party's
- 12:04steps toward freedom in the religious
- 12:07sphere were not enough. The Hagia
- 12:10Sophia issue, and even Süleyman Hilmi
- 12:13Tunahan praying for the people fighting
- 12:16for independence in the Algerian War of
- 12:19Independence while the state adopted a
- 12:22different stance, created a rift
- 12:24between them and the Democrat Party.
- 12:27Especially in 1959, when someone in the
- 12:33congregation called out that he was the
- 12:36Mahdi while Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan was
- 12:38preaching at the Bursa Grand Mosque, he
- 12:41and his son-in-law Kemal Kaçar were
- 12:43taken into custody. They were held
- 12:46inside for 59 or 60 days—about two
- 12:48months. This led to a complete break in
- 12:51ties with the Democrat Party. Meanwhile
- 12:55, as they moved away from the Democrat
- 12:57Party, what happened? Well, there was
- 13:00the Nation Party, the Republican Nation
- 13:02Party, the party led by Osman
- 13:05Bölükbaşı. Kemal Kaçar, after
- 13:09Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, meaning the
- 13:14person who took over the community
- 13:17after Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan's death
- 13:21in 1959, and who was also his
- 13:23son-in-law, was elected as a deputy for
- 13:26Kütahya from the Nation Party. Later,
- 13:31the Justice Party emerged. Kemal Kaçar
- 13:35served as a deputy for several terms in
- 13:38the Justice Party as well. Likewise,
- 13:41heavy hitters from the first generation
- 13:44of the community, like Hilmi Türkmen
- 13:47and Ali Ak, also served as deputies.
- 13:51Where did they serve? Back then, there
- 13:53was no Islamist political party on the
- 13:55scene yet. They were in the main body
- 13:59of the right-wing, the Justice Party,
- 14:02led by Süleyman Demirel, just like the
- 14:05unconditional support of the New Asya
- 14:08group for Demirel. But these people,
- 14:12like Kaçar and Hilmi Türkmen, also
- 14:14took part in the opposition faction
- 14:17within the Justice Party against
- 14:19Demirel. They played roles there too.
- 14:23They did not show total obedience there
- 14:26either. They positioned themselves
- 14:28within the opposition group that was
- 14:30trying to transform that party as well.
- 14:33But in the end, they were involved in
- 14:36politics in the direction of the
- 14:38Justice Party. It is interesting. Even
- 14:41though Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan was more
- 14:44interested in education and teaching,
- 14:47and a spiritual atmosphere was felt
- 14:49more intensely—for instance, they
- 14:51would say, "You are students of Imam
- 14:54Rabbani"—he attached special
- 14:56importance to the Mektubat. With Kemal
- 15:00Kaçar, both the traditional face of
- 15:04the work and the character of the
- 15:06community changed. The leader of the
- 15:10community turned into a man actively
- 15:12involved in politics, a man who became
- 15:15a member of parliament. This Kaçar, in
- 15:18fact, had received a good education. He
- 15:23graduated from Galatasaray High School.
- 15:26He started his business life; back in
- 15:29the day, he listened to Süleyman Hilmi
- 15:33Tunahan while he was preaching at the
- 15:36Ağa Mosque in Beyoğlu and pledged
- 15:39allegiance to him. Then he became his
- 15:42son-in-law. Anyway, this man is a man
- 15:46in a tie. Therefore, the religious
- 15:52aspect of the mission undertaken by
- 15:55that master—the last link in that
- 15:58chain of saints, the golden chain—
- 16:01remained with Süleyman Efendi. After
- 16:08this Kemal Kaçar, they said, "We only
- 16:11represent the administrative side."
- 16:15They made a distinction like the
- 16:17caliphs who said, "We represent the
- 16:20Prophet’s political leadership, his
- 16:22imamate, not his prophethood." But when
- 16:25the time came, a charismatic
- 16:26personality was attributed to him as
- 16:28well. He also assumed both the
- 16:31religious identity and the leadership.
- 16:34Although the period between '59 and '71
- 16:37was the period when Kaçar was
- 16:39absolutely dominant in the community.
- 16:44In that interim period, the community
- 16:47was led by a consultative council that
- 16:50included names from Süleyman Hilmi
- 16:53Tunahan’s first group of prominent
- 16:55students, such as Mehmet Arıkan,
- 16:58Hüseyin Kaplan, Hilmi Türkmen, and
- 17:01Ali Ak, with Kemal Kaçar among them.
- 17:05Later, Kaçar eliminated these
- 17:08heavyweights around him and seized the
- 17:11leadership alone. But he is a
- 17:14completely politicized figure. However,
- 17:17interestingly, the instruction given to
- 17:19the members at the base of the
- 17:21community is that "politics is the
- 17:23devil's work.""Do not enter politics.""
- 17:25Do not get involved.""Do not walk
- 17:27around with a political identity, with
- 17:30a politicized identity.""Do not talk
- 17:32about these subjects" are the
- 17:33instructions given below. You look and
- 17:36they seem like an apolitical mass, but
- 17:38the leader at the top is a member of
- 17:40parliament for the Justice Party. It
- 17:43has been like this from the beginning.
- 17:45This structure has a tremendous
- 17:48structural objection and opposition to
- 17:52the state, its founding philosophy,
- 17:55republican principles, and revolutions.
- 18:01But they also have a strategy of
- 18:04walking a path without conflict,
- 18:06maintaining a distance while staying in
- 18:08constant touch with this state. Indeed,
- 18:12when the 1980 coup happened, the
- 18:14military authorities were going to
- 18:16prune these Süleymancıs too. They
- 18:18were going to seize all their
- 18:19dormitories. Goodness me. They were not
- 18:21seized. Why weren't they? If you ask
- 18:24the community, they came and audited
- 18:26them. They examined them with extreme
- 18:28scrutiny. They couldn't find any
- 18:31practice that was contrary to
- 18:32regulations or laws. That’s why they
- 18:34didn't close our dormitories. That's
- 18:36not it. That business is not that
- 18:38simple. Clearly, while it was assumed
- 18:44that Fethullah Gülen and his community
- 18:47would also get into trouble at the same
- 18:50time, it is understood from
- 18:53Fethullah’s laudatory article written
- 18:56to the soldiers in Sızıntı magazine
- 18:59in 1980 that some kind of bargain was
- 19:02made with the state and the government,
- 19:05directly or indirectly; there was a
- 19:08trade, obedience was shown, and they
- 19:11were not touched. This communication is
- 19:14always established. That is why they
- 19:17always looked and supported the party
- 19:20that was on the field and was a
- 19:22candidate for power. That one was the
- 19:25same. Fethullah was the same. They
- 19:27never played a wrong hand. But when the
- 19:33AK Party came to power, until then
- 19:35Kemal Kaçar never approached Islamist
- 19:39political parties—that is, Erbakan
- 19:42Hodja, the National Order, the National
- 19:45Salvation. He did not approach them.
- 19:51But after Kaçar, may I say, uh, the
- 20:00person who became the head of, uh, the
- 20:03community is Arif Ahmet Deniz Olgun. I
- 20:08mean, this community is actually a bit
- 20:10like a family business. A runaway
- 20:13son-in-law. But these Deniz Olgun
- 20:15people are grandsons of Süleyman Hilmi
- 20:18Tunahan’s daughter. so, they are
- 20:23gathered around the family in some way.
- 20:27It is a structure that consistently
- 20:28draws its leadership from within the
- 20:30family. Deniz Olgun also stood out with
- 20:36a political identity like the runaway,
- 20:38but this time something interesting
- 20:40happened. Deniz Olgun joined the 20th
- 20:47term, meaning between 1995-99, as an
- 20:52Antalya deputy from the Welfare Party.
- 20:57This was a change of direction for the
- 21:00community for the first time. I mean,
- 21:02as a political preference. Clearly,
- 21:05while Arif Ahmet Deniz Olgun was making
- 21:07this choice, not all of the community
- 21:09approved or supported the Welfare Party
- 21:12. But he made such a choice. However,
- 21:15February 28th happened. As soon as he
- 21:19received the message of the state's
- 21:22tutelary nature on that February 28th,
- 21:24Ahmet Deniz Olgun resigned from the
- 21:26Welfare Party. He remained independent.
- 21:30Later, he probably even served as a
- 21:32minister in the Anasol-D governments.
- 21:34So, he threw himself back into that
- 21:36mass party, the party approved by the
- 21:38regime. We see this here. He saw the
- 21:42rise of the Welfare Party. But he also
- 21:46saw its alliance with the True Path
- 21:48Party. Maybe he said, "The regime must
- 21:51have approved of them.""Let me take a
- 21:53place in this as well." Because the
- 21:55government is winking at them. I mean,
- 21:57they are winking at the government. Uh,
- 22:00there is likely a closeness between
- 22:04Tayyip Erdoğan at that time, during
- 22:07his Istanbul Mayoralty and so on, and
- 22:10Arif Ahmet Deniz Olgun as well. It is
- 22:14even said he had a role in him becoming
- 22:16a deputy. He thought this way, but when
- 22:20February 28th toppled the Refahyol
- 22:23government, once he realized it was a
- 22:25party that hadn't received approval
- 22:27from the regime, he headed toward the
- 22:30Motherland Party. From this, we see the
- 22:34following. They make it a principle to
- 22:37be within the right-wing mass party
- 22:40that the regime approves of, so that we
- 22:42don't encounter any road accidents or
- 22:44the like. However, after the AK Party
- 22:49came to power in 2002, something
- 22:51interesting happened. One, uh, side of
- 22:55the community still represents that
- 22:57vein coming from the Justice Party and
- 22:59the Motherland Party, through the True
- 23:01Path. But one side also, if you please,
- 23:05even takes part in the founding staff
- 23:08of the AK Party. I mean, there is
- 23:11Mehmet Beyazıt Deniz Olgun, Arif Ahmet
- 23:14Deniz Olgun's older brother, and Mehmet
- 23:16Beyazıt Deniz Olgun's son, Fatih
- 23:18Süleyman Deniz Olgun. Their mother is,
- 23:23uh, his grandfather. Sheikh Süleyman
- 23:30Hilmi Tunahan, they are all family. Now
- 23:34, Mehmet Beyazıt was in the party's
- 23:37founding staff of the AK Party and
- 23:40served as a deputy from 2002-2007;
- 23:43Fatih Süleyman Deniz Olgun also served
- 23:46as an AK Party deputy between 2018-2023
- 23:49. There is such a structure. However,
- 23:56while it was expected that after Arif
- 23:59Ahmet Deniz Olgun, his older brother
- 24:02Mehmet would take charge of the
- 24:05community, Arif Ahmet Deniz Olgun's
- 24:07nephew Alihan Kuriş came to power.
- 24:13Alihan Kuriş was on the wing that
- 24:16represented the initial reflex of
- 24:19staying away from these Islamist
- 24:21political structures. As a matter of
- 24:26fact, since 2016, and in 2016, Ahmet
- 24:30Arif Deniz Olgun passed away. There are
- 24:34rumors that the death was a bit
- 24:36suspicious, but files were opened. Then
- 24:38a decision of non-prosecution was
- 24:40issued. Anyway. After '16, this Alihan
- 24:43Kuriş came. After that, he made it
- 24:48felt that he was distant from the
- 24:50political power through his statements
- 24:53and such, and then a tension began
- 24:56between the AK Party government and the
- 24:59leadership representing this community,
- 25:02and consequently, the community itself.
- 25:08Then this man became politically
- 25:10associated with opposition movements,
- 25:13meaning his name was mentioned
- 25:15alongside Ekrem İmamoğlu and so on.
- 25:18Thus, he entered the government's radar
- 25:21in this way. He entered it this way as
- 25:25an entity that was opposed to the
- 25:27ruling power. From time to time, the
- 25:31local municipalities of the ruling
- 25:35power intervened in some of their
- 25:39dormitories. There were small-scale
- 25:42incidents, but the community as a whole
- 25:44was still trying to move forward by
- 25:47avoiding friction and confrontation,
- 25:49keeping to the sidelines, but still
- 25:51making it felt that they were the
- 25:53opposition. By the way, the other names
- 25:59who were actually candidates for the
- 26:03leadership of this community, Mehmet
- 26:06Beyazıt Deniz Olgun and his son Fatih
- 26:09Süleyman, they are on the AK Party
- 26:12side, but the community is led by Ali
- 26:15Han, the nephew of Arif Ahmet
- 26:18Denizolgun. Ali Han...after the
- 26:21community leader who was Ali Han's
- 26:24uncle and died in 2016. Yes. Now,
- 26:26however, the current leader did not
- 26:29approach the government; he did not
- 26:32look upon it warmly. He did not pledge
- 26:36allegiance to the government, he did
- 26:38not obey. He maintained an opposition
- 26:41line. That is how I said he entered the
- 26:44radar. But to not be defiant, not to
- 26:49confront, to continue on their way as
- 26:54quietly as possible, was their
- 26:57intention. It seems that after they
- 27:01entered the radar, the state began to
- 27:03closely monitor their records.
- 27:07Yesterday, today, the operation began.
- 27:12Now, if you look at the financial
- 27:15grounds presented to us in this
- 27:17operation; things like violating the
- 27:20Tax Procedure Law, or money laundering,
- 27:22or smuggling money abroad, or organized
- 27:25fraud in a way that harms public
- 27:28institutions, rest assured that when
- 27:30you open the file of the Menzil
- 27:32community, you could likely find the
- 27:36same crimes and same irregularities in
- 27:39almost the same categories. I mean,
- 27:42send a Court of Accounts auditor there.
- 27:46These foundations, associations,
- 27:48activities, and companies affiliated
- 27:50with this community, look into them to
- 27:54see what they are and what they are not
- 27:55. See how many categories of
- 27:57irregularities emerge. This could
- 28:00likewise be true for the İsmail Ağa
- 28:02community, but here, the Süleymancıs
- 28:05were targeted in this manner. The
- 28:09reason for this was their display of an
- 28:14opposition stance against the political
- 28:16power. A question can be asked here. If
- 28:25Mehmet Beyazıt Deniz Olgun, who was in
- 28:28the founding cadre of the AK Party, or
- 28:30Fatih Süleyman Deniz Olgun were the
- 28:33leader of this community today, would
- 28:38such an operation be carried out
- 28:40against this community? My personal
- 28:43opinion is that it would not. Indeed,
- 28:47names who were constantly talked about
- 28:51in the government media as facing
- 28:54investigations while they were mayors
- 28:58in CHP municipalities are no longer
- 29:02subject to any investigation or
- 29:05prosecution after switching to the AK
- 29:09Party. Just like this. I believe that
- 29:14if the other names who stand with the
- 29:17government and served as deputies for a
- 29:20term had been leading the community
- 29:22today instead of Alihan Kuriş, rest
- 29:25assured these files would not have been
- 29:28opened this way. I think, even in
- 29:32society, look, the reflexes of the
- 29:34Süleymancıs...I have always had a
- 29:36structural allergy to the communities
- 29:39in Turkey. Follow the FETÖ process.
- 29:43That "Hashashin" term is a term that
- 29:45emerged from this humble person. Anyway
- 29:50, I have had this stance for a long
- 29:53time, but as for what this community is
- 29:56, what it does, and what it has done in
- 29:59Turkey, you can listen to those in the
- 30:02other video. I have explained it at
- 30:06length. The issue here is not the
- 30:10legitimacy or the place of the
- 30:12community within the regime. I believe
- 30:17the primary and fundamental reason for
- 30:21this operation against this community
- 30:24is the coldness, tension, and distance
- 30:28between them and the political power.
- 30:34Therefore, it seems that is why such an
- 30:38operation was initiated. As I said, if
- 30:45you look for violations of financial
- 30:47regulations, you would find dozens of
- 30:50faults if you were to audit the records
- 30:53and ledgers of all these communities.
- 30:56But that is not the issue. Look at the
- 31:00Menzil community, for example; you saw
- 31:02how they ended up disgraced before the
- 31:04eyes of the nation, fighting among
- 31:05themselves over inheritance. A sorry
- 31:09state. Now, if they were to say before
- 31:12an election that they would support the
- 31:15opposition, for instance, a new party,
- 31:17instead of the political power. Just
- 31:19watch what would happen after that. Now
- 31:23, a trustee might be appointed here too
- 31:27, perhaps someone like Fatih Süleyman
- 31:30Deniz Olgun or Mehmet Beyazıt, I don't
- 31:33know, but I think someone approved by
- 31:37the government will be appointed to
- 31:40manage it. Uh, Alihan Kuriş's
- 31:51dissenting stance, what is the basis
- 31:54for it? I am speculating. When the AK
- 32:00Party was first founded, why didn't
- 32:02Alihan Kuriş stand close to it? One
- 32:05reason is that the AK Party brought in
- 32:08a name like Tayyar Altıkulaç from the
- 32:11beginning. Who is this Tayyar
- 32:14Altıkulaç? He is a legendary former
- 32:19head of Religious Affairs who fought to
- 32:22the death against these Suleymanist and
- 32:24other Nurcu communities, kept them out
- 32:27of the Diyanet, liquidated them
- 32:29whenever possible, and exhibited a
- 32:32strictly statist reflex. So where is he
- 32:35now? He is a deputy within the AK Party
- 32:38. That left a bad taste in their mouths
- 32:41. Secondly, there is a name like Turan
- 32:44Kıratlı within the AK Party. Who is
- 32:48this? A heavy hitter who was ostracized
- 32:50by the community. He is also within the
- 32:53AK Party. This is likely what drove
- 32:56Alihan Kuriş and his close circle to
- 32:58keep their distance from the AK Party.
- 33:03Meaning, they took the people who have
- 33:05hurt us until today into the AK Party
- 33:07and rewarded them. We should keep our
- 33:10distance, though other family members
- 33:12did take part in the AK Party. But the
- 33:15Kuriş faction did not stay that way.
- 33:17They continued along the line of the
- 33:22traditional right-wing mass parties,
- 33:25like Demirel's Justice Party, the True
- 33:27Path, or the Motherland Party. And as
- 33:32of today, they saw the CHP—even
- 33:35though the CHP became the "CHP of
- 33:38Butlan" 35 years ago—as an
- 33:40alternative. They wanted to lean toward
- 33:43them. Imamoğlu's profile also has a
- 33:46slightly conservative scent. They
- 33:50established a rapport there. And thus,
- 33:52they entered the radar. Following this,
- 33:55as of today, they faced this operation.
- 33:58What I am saying is that the
- 33:59fundamental reason for this operation
- 34:02is their conflict with the political
- 34:04power and their place in the opposition
- 34:06camp. Uh, for this reason, uh, this
- 34:11operation was put into effect. The
- 34:16community will likely be directed and
- 34:20managed by names approved by the
- 34:22government, but I don't know how much
- 34:25the grassroots will obey those
- 34:28appointed. The situation is along these
- 34:32lines. Therefore, yes, the most popular
- 34:37excuse today is corruption, theft, and
- 34:40so on. Yes. That could be found as a
- 34:46justification, but as I said, if Fatih
- 34:49Süleyman Deniz Olgun, the person who
- 34:52was a deputy for the AK Party between
- 34:552018 and 2023, had been leading this
- 34:58community, this operation would likely
- 35:01not have happened. I wish you all
- 35:06health and well-being. Goodbye. Stay
- 35:08well. Yeah.
About this transcript
This page contains the full transcript of Süleymancıların Siyasetle İmtihanı: Süleymancılara Yönelik Operasyon Mali mi yoksa Siyasi mi? by Mustafa Öztürk Arşivi, generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 4,201 words across 681 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.
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