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Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Hearing, February 25, 1986 — Transcript

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0:47[Music]
0:52[Music]
0:55[Applause]
1:01will the commission come to order please
1:12today the commission will focus on the
1:15events leading to the decision to launch
1:18the Challenger
1:19commission has already reviewed a good
1:22deal of information about the seals and
1:24the O-rings on the solids rocket
1:26boosters should be noted however that it
1:29is not yet clear that the joint area was
1:31originating problem
1:33therefore it is important that all
1:35potential causes of the accident
1:38including the external tank be actively
1:40pursued
1:42in our sessions today and tomorrow we
1:45want to present in a thoughtful and
1:46orderly manner
1:48the facts relating to the decision to
1:51launch the Challenger
1:54because of a simple
1:56I will ask witnesses to identify the
1:58time and place of any event that they
2:00are addressing and the names and
2:02positions of persons who participated
2:07to be fair in the presentation of the
2:08facts
2:10because the subject matter may involve
2:12possible human error as distinguished
2:15from equipment failure the commission
2:17will attempt
2:19to give a right of reply as soon as
2:21possible to any person who believes he
2:24has been unfairly criticized or Whose
2:26actions may have been inaccurately
2:28portrayed
2:30during the last two weeks the commission
2:32has encouraged NASA
2:34to disclose a large number of facts and
2:36documents relating to the launch
2:38which has been done
2:40as a result we believe the public is
2:43better able to understand and assess
2:45many aspects of the accident
2:48we hope that this process will continue
2:49until all the facts are fully known and
2:52as much as possible fully understood
2:55while the commission has the
2:56responsibility
2:58on his mandate from the president to
3:00investigate the accident and report its
3:02findings
3:04the media plays a key role in the
3:06process by keeping the public informed
3:08we believe it has performed this role
3:11well and with our sense of
3:12responsibility
3:13if the commission effectively performs
3:15its duties and the media performs its
3:18role of accurately reporting the facts
3:19as they develop the public will be well
3:22served
3:23Witnesses who appear
3:25the day will be able to comment or to
3:27clarify their testimony as long as the
3:30substance common honor clarify the
3:32testimony as long as the substance is
3:34not altered
3:36of course any additional evidence or
3:38additional material that might assist
3:39the Commission in the performance of its
3:41studies and responsibilities will be
3:43welcome
3:45the first Witnesses this morning will be
3:47Alan
3:49um McDonald
3:50following Mr McDonald and at the request
3:53about inside call
3:55the commission will next year Jay Mason
3:57who's Executive Vice President of the
3:59fire call
4:01at first I would like now and now I
4:04would like to call about our executive
4:06director Dr Keel who will make a few
4:09comments before we hear Mr McDonald
4:12Mr chairman for the benefit of the
4:14commission we have put together a
4:15chronology of events
4:17relating to the period when the first
4:20temperature concerns were raised with
4:21respect to the Challenger indicating the
4:24activities
4:25and also the participants as the
4:27commission understands them based on
4:29testimony and documentation provided to
4:31the to the commission this chronology
4:33has been provided to all the witnesses
4:35Mr chairman so that they'll have an
4:36opportunity to understand our
4:39reconstruction of those events and to
4:41clarify them and also to it as
4:44appropriate to identify the nature of
4:47the discussions at each of these
4:48meetings and activities
4:49starting approximately from the scrub of
4:52the originally planned launch of
4:54Challenger for January 27th at 9 38 a.m
4:58ranging up to the launch of the
5:01Challenger on January 28th at 11 38 A.M
5:05there are Corrections that have to be
5:08made on this document we'll make them as
5:10we go along it's as accurate as we can
5:12make it at the present time
5:15now I like to call on Miss McDonald
5:16please
5:24McDonald I think you probably if you
5:26take the middle chair it might be the
5:29best
5:30I think in uh to be consistent uh let's
5:35swear all the witnesses in again
5:37some have been sworn and some have not
5:39so let's swear them all again please
5:46[Music]
5:51you're now employed by cycle important
5:53psychology that's correct and how long
5:56have you been employed by them I've been
5:58with Martin a little over 26 years
6:01and uh you're an engineer
6:04yes I have a bachelor's very in chemical
6:07engineering from Montana State
6:09University and a master's degree in
6:11engineering Administration from the
6:13University of Utah
6:15and uh
6:17can you give us some some history of
6:20your employment with cycle
6:24our lady director of the Space Shuttle
6:27side rocket motor project uh my
6:30responsibilities are for technical cost
6:33and schedule performance of the steel
6:36case Motors that are flown out of
6:38Kennedy and also the development
6:40qualification of the Summer Long case
6:41solid rocket motor
6:43be flown out of Vandenberg Air Force
6:45Base
6:46I've had this position for a little less
6:48than two years I started as a director
6:51in March of 1984 of the shuttle SRM
6:55project
6:56prior to that I was the manager of the
6:59project engineering division at Martin
7:01fire call which I was a technical
7:05responsibility from a project
7:07engineering standpoint for all of the
7:09programs in the plan for the exception
7:11of the Space Shuttle that included the
7:14Peacekeeper the MX sage1 Trident One C4
7:18production Trident II development
7:20the harm Mark 104 standard missile md2
7:25the improved performance space motor 2
7:28finished a contract on qualifications
7:30long life motor for Schram
7:32had all of the independent research and
7:34development advanced technology programs
7:37with the rocket propulsion Laboratory
7:39and also some work on airbag airfish and
7:43restraint systems
7:45I had that job I guess for about three
7:48four years prior to coming into the
7:50shuttle program and prior to that I was
7:52the
7:53manager of the profound Development
7:56Department for a few years
7:57and prior to that I was the
8:01manager of the project Engineering Group
8:04for advanced development development
8:06projects
8:07I started with fire call in 59
8:11after graduating from Montana State
8:13University and my first job was involved
8:17in designing the external insulation for
8:19the stage one of the Minutemen I did
8:22that design and I was then chosen as a
8:25group leader for flight test of the mid
8:28and was participated in the flight test
8:30about the first 20 flights the minute
8:32man out of the cape
8:33subsequent to that I spent considerable
8:36time working as a chief engineer on
8:40development of some controllable Solid
8:42Rock and motor concepts for several
8:44years
8:45I worked on a lot about the dance
8:46development programs before before I
8:48came involved in the Trident program in
8:52the early 70s
8:54so for the last three or four years
8:57where have you spent your time
8:59the last couple of years of course I
9:02spent my time as director of the solid
9:04rocket motor project which involves a
9:07considerable amount of coordination
9:10relative to production of the shuttle
9:13solid rocket Motors assessment of the
9:15flight Readiness reviews for the space
9:18shuttle side Rocket Motors I am the
9:21chairman of the senior material review
9:24board for the SRM
9:27that senior material review board that
9:30has to review all of the discrepancies
9:33on any of the hardware that's considered
9:35the criticality one or any that's
9:38outside the experience base of our
9:40previous experience
9:41as chairman at board there's members
9:45from our Quality Group our Engineering
9:47Group NASA Marshall Representatives but
9:50I have to sign every one of those that
9:52they're ready for flight I'm also a
9:54co-chairman of the problem review board
9:56with Marshall space flight center
9:58relative to any problems were identified
10:01from returned Hardware that come back to
10:03the tape and what actions are taken to
10:05uh to understand those problems and
10:07provide proper
10:09for those and prevent them from
10:10occurring
10:11my activities in the past year to a
10:16large extent have been involved with the
10:18design certification of the film along
10:21face solid rocket motor I'm also the
10:24co-chairman of the design certification
10:26team represented by Foxhall and Marshall
10:29at the SRM level
10:31before that and that has taken the
10:33conservative among my time this past
10:34summer in the series of reviews for
10:37certifying the graphite composite case
10:39for for Vandenberg
10:42yeah how much time did you spend in the
10:44performance of those duties that at
10:47Kennedy Space Center
10:49well I have been alternating with my
10:52supervisor the vice president of space
10:55militia programs Mr Joe kilminster on
10:57the Joe kilminster and what is this
11:00title uh he's the vice president of the
11:03space booster programs and he and I have
11:05been alternating uh going to the cape
11:08supporting the launches of the srms
11:13immediate supervisor yes and you
11:16alternated going to the cave yes the
11:18heart of that were under uh that works
11:22out very well we both of course have a
11:25fairly heavy Demand on our time with all
11:27the reviews uh initial process primarily
11:30with the trips to Huntsville and the
11:32Marshall space flight center
11:34I attended this course the sds-51l he
11:38was at the Fireflight and our charger is
11:42to attend the l-1 meeting
11:4551l is the Challenger launch that's
11:48correct and you were there at that time
11:51was he Mr the previous launch he was at
11:55the previous launch yeah what about the
11:56one before that one before that I was at
12:00he was one Hank for that we've been
12:02fairly well alternated
12:05what were your responsibilities when you
12:07were there
12:08at the cape at the time of the launch
12:11well at the time of the launch I was in
12:15the firing room too launch control
12:17center
12:19uh
12:20there's the seats there that for the
12:23monitors of many of the functions on the
12:26solid rocket boosters as well as the TV
12:28monitor
12:29on Marshall space flight center has a
12:31group
12:32at their console that involves the
12:36primary contractors for all of the
12:39subsystems the SRB has one monitored and
12:42they have people from usbi who provide
12:45part of the heart
12:47Hardware we also have a monitor from the
12:51uh our support to the Space Shuttle
12:55processing contractor that is right next
12:58to that monitor and Mr Carter Kennedy
13:02our vice president of our space
13:03operations at the cape was at that
13:06monitor it's right next to the Marshall
13:08Monitor and I was sitting with him at
13:09the time of the of the launch but I
13:11wasn't speaking so much about the
13:13Challenger launches I was generally
13:14speaking generally speaking when you or
13:16Mr skillmaster or Infinity you speak for
13:19the company is that it uh yes uh
13:22generally the process is the before a
13:26launch uh there's an L minus one meeting
13:29the day before the launch at which time
13:31all of the problems uh that were still
13:35open prior to the L minus one are
13:37reviewed was to Jess Moore on his board
13:40and uh assure that they're all closed
13:42out and we're ready for the launch
13:45uh subsequent to that meeting there's a
13:48poll that is taken he takes an all poll
13:50and everyone is involved in the launch
13:53including the as well as the propulsion
13:55systems with the payload and everyone
13:56else and every contractor that is
13:59involved in that has to answer to the
14:01polls whether they're ready to go and
14:02launch I attended that meeting as you
14:06know the
14:07L minus one meeting was conducted I
14:10believe on Saturday or something because
14:12I'd like to if you don't mind come to
14:14that and
14:15chronologically in just a moment but so
14:17at those meetings when you were there
14:19you spoke the thought of call yes I
14:21spoke for Thought
14:23um
14:24and how long has you been there prior to
14:27the launch of the Challenger physically
14:30located at Kennedy I was at Marshall
14:34space flight center earlier in the week
14:37on some negotiations for our subsequent
14:40contract and it had went down to uh
14:43Kennedy on the uh I believe it was the
14:47Thursday before the launch sure could
14:48you give some explanation of the
14:51relationship between yourself and
14:53Marshall before you went to Kennedy
14:56uh I'm not sure what you mean my
14:59relationship well what what function was
15:01Marshall performing at that time and
15:03what were you doing in representing
15:06Cyclone well Marshall has uh overall
15:09responsibility for all of the propulsion
15:11subsystems uh on the shuttle and we are
15:15part of the SRB team I work directly
15:19with Larry Ware who is the uh project
15:22manager for Marshall on solid rocket
15:24motor and he works for learning lawy he
15:27was the project manager on the SRB which
15:29includes the solid rocket motor in the
15:32outskirt TVA system in the parachute
15:35recovery system makes up the whole SRV
15:38and I always attend or joke illness
15:41attends the launches with Mr Malloy and
15:45yes the representatives also for the
15:47other subcontractors for for usbi
15:51in case there's any questions that come
15:53up that we can either resolve there or
15:55get resolution to uh prior to the launch
15:58just for the record where's Marshall
15:59located Marshall's located in Huntsville
16:01Alabama
16:02and when did you leave Wentzville
16:04Alabama to go to Cape Kennedy on this
16:06occasion well I think it was Windsor
16:09Thursday afternoon before the uh for the
16:12launch did you go by yourself it was
16:14some uh no I went by myself
16:16you know uh
16:18I want to give you a an opportunity to
16:22give a full description of the events
16:24the day before in the 27th and the day
16:27of the launch
16:29before I do that I I understand that you
16:32made some notes after the accident which
16:36put on papers or some of your
16:38Recollections of the United preceded the
16:40action is that correct that is correct
16:43and you have those notes now
16:45yes I have a I would like to explain to
16:49you that you had Liberty to refer to
16:51those notes
16:52in any way you want to and now beginning
16:57with the first recollection you have of
17:00the weather problem and how it came to
17:02your attention uh give us a full account
17:06of uh the events of that day and the
17:09following days 27th and 28th so we'll
17:12try not to interrupt you except possibly
17:14for clarification
17:15I want you to feel free to tell
17:17everything you recall about it and then
17:19after that we may ask some questions
17:21about to try to amplify any answers that
17:23you made yet
17:25well I first become aware of the concern
17:29of the low temperatures that were
17:30projected for the cape was late in the
17:33afternoon on the 27th
17:36I was at the farmer Kennedy's house he's
17:40the vice president of our as I mentioned
17:43the space operations center at the cape
17:45Corps the stacking of the of the srms
17:48and I had a call from Bob Edward he is
17:52the manager of our ignition system and
17:55final assembly works for me a program
17:57manager at the fire hall in Utah he
18:01called me and said that they had just
18:04received some word earlier that the
18:06weatherman was projecting temperatures
18:09as low as 18 degrees Fahrenheit
18:11sometime in the early morning hours of
18:14the 28th and that they had some meetings
18:17with some of the engineering people had
18:19some concerns about the O-rings getting
18:21to those kinds of temperatures and he
18:24wanted to make me aware of that and also
18:26wanted to get some more updated and
18:28better information on what the actual
18:30temperature history was going to be
18:31predicted so that they could make some
18:34calculations on what they expected real
18:36temperature the O-rings may see he was
18:38calling from Utah he was calling from
18:40Utah
18:41I told him that I would get that
18:43temperature data from for him and call
18:45him back cover Kennedy then when I hung
18:49up called the launch operations center
18:50to get the predicted temperatures from
18:52pad B
18:54as well as what the temperature history
18:56had been during the day up until that
18:58time and pepe was the area where the
19:01launch was I believe as he had that
19:03Challenger was fly off of this was the
19:05first time that would fly off of that
19:07pad
19:08he obtained those temperatures from the
19:11launch operations center and they
19:14basically said that they felt was going
19:17to get near freezing or freezing before
19:19midnight could be as low as 22 degrees
19:22as a minimum in the early morning hours
19:24probably around six o'clock
19:26and that they were predicting a
19:28temperature of about 26 degrees at the
19:31intended launch time about 9 38 the next
19:34morning
19:35I took that data and called back to the
19:37plant Senate to Bob Ebling and relay
19:41that to him and told him you had to use
19:43this temperature data for his
19:45predictions
19:46I thought this was very serious and make
19:49sure that he had the vice president
19:51engineering involved in this and all of
19:53his people
19:54that I wanted them to put together some
19:57calculations and a presentation material
20:00who's the vice president of offering Mr
20:02Bob Lund is our vice president of
20:04engineering at our Martin call facility
20:07in Utah to make sure that he was
20:09involved in this and that this decision
20:11should be an engineering decision not a
20:13program management decision
20:16and I told him that I would like him to
20:19make sure they prepared some charts and
20:20were in a position to recommend the
20:22launch temperature just don't recommend
20:24a launch but recommend a launch
20:25temperature and have the rationale
20:27for supporting that much temperature
20:30I then hung up and I called Mr Malloy he
20:35was staying at the Holiday Inn in
20:37Merritt Island and they couldn't reach
20:38him
20:39so I called Cecil Houston Cecil Houston
20:43is the resident manager for the Marshall
20:45space flight center office at KSC
20:49and told him about our concerns with the
20:51low temperatures and the potential
20:53problem of the O-rings
20:54and he said that he would set up a
20:57teleconference he had a four-wire system
20:59next to his office
21:01his office is right across from the VAB
21:03in the trailer complex C over there he
21:06was set up the four wire teleconference
21:09involving the engineering people at the
21:11Marshall space flight center at
21:12Huntsville our people back at Cyclone
21:15Utah and that I should come down to his
21:18office and participate at Kennedy from
21:20there
21:21and that he would get back with me and
21:22let me know when that time would be
21:26uh I waited for a short period of time I
21:29don't know exactly how long it wasn't
21:30very long who called back told me that
21:32he had contacted the parties and was all
21:34set up for 8 15 PM Eastern Time For That
21:37teleconference I really relayed that
21:40message on back to the plant told them
21:42that we have to have charts at that time
21:44faxed out
21:45to Kennedy as well as Marshall that we
21:47can discuss for that teleconference
21:50could you explain what charts mean well
21:53their charts any data that we had for uh
21:57showing why we had concerns on the
21:59O-rings of low temperatures what our
22:01history has been
22:03what any any calculations we might be
22:05able to make relative to their
22:07performance
22:09supporting it rationale for what
22:11accessible temperatures what might not
22:13be an acceptable temperature and review
22:15that and these would all Beyond charts
22:18that we would send by a fax machine so
22:20people could read those and we could
22:22discuss those as the rationale for
22:25either recommending a launch or not
22:28[Applause]
22:32that I arrived
22:35at the Kennedy Space Center
22:38at about 8 15 and
22:41the fly arrived there at that that's
22:44Kenny Space Center the other people had
22:46already had arrived were Larry Malloy
22:49was there he is the manager of the
22:53project manager for the SRB for Marshall
22:58was there and he is the manager of the
23:01shuttle project office he's flooring the
23:03white moth
23:04Cecil Houston was there the resident
23:06manager for Marshall and Jack Buchanan
23:09was there he happens the uh our manager
23:12in one back off manager of our launch
23:13Sports Services office at Kennedy
23:17the Silicon hadn't started yet it came
23:21on the network shortly after I got there
23:24but uh
23:25bestow to hold on because the charts
23:28have not been received either at
23:30Marshall or Kennedy at that time
23:32and we waited I guess for probably
23:34another half hour before those charts
23:37finally came through and we could
23:38reproduce them in fact they hadn't all
23:40even been received yet there were some
23:42conclusions recommendation charts didn't
23:45come for about half hour even later than
23:47that that was it essentially a telephone
23:48conference or was there actually a
23:50network with pictures it was a telephone
23:52conference just telling them you could
23:54have that you could hear the voices from
23:56the other two places as well as your own
23:58however
24:00the way those teleconferences work is
24:02buttons that you can push and we'll mute
24:05out to you speaking to someone else or
24:07speaking you can usually hear it better
24:08when you don't have your own mics open
24:11so there's a lot of conversations I'm
24:13sure at all habilities at one time which
24:15you can't hear but I'll relay on what I
24:18had heard on the conferences as best I
24:20can
24:23the teleconference started I guess uh
24:26close to nine o'clock
24:28and even though all the charts weren't
24:31weren't there we were told to begin and
24:33that Martin blackhaw should take a lead
24:35and filter the charts that they had
24:39sense of all centers
24:42the charts were presented by the
24:45engineering people from cycle in fact by
24:49the people that had made those
24:51particular charts some of them were
24:52typed some were handwritten
24:55and they discussed their concerns with
24:58the low temperatures relatively possible
25:01effects on the O-rings primarily the
25:03timing function the seal the feelings
25:06they presented the history of some of
25:10the data that we had accumulated both in
25:12in static tests and this white test
25:14relative to temperatures and the
25:16performance of the O-rings they reviewed
25:18the history of all of our erosion with
25:20any O-rings from the field joints any
25:23Blow by the primary o-ring was soot or
25:25products of combustion and decomposition
25:28that we had noted
25:29the performance of the secondary O-rings
25:32and there was an exchange amongst the
25:34technical people and on that data is
25:37what it meant in discussions
25:40but the real exchange never really came
25:43until the conclusions and
25:45recommendations came in
25:47uh at that point in time our vice
25:50president Mr Bob long presented those
25:53charts
25:55and he presented the charge from the
25:57conclusions and recommendations and the
25:59bottom line was is that the engineering
26:02people would not recommend the launch
26:04below 53 degrees Fahrenheit
26:06the basis for that recommendation was
26:08primarily our concern with the launch
26:11that had occurred about a year earlier
26:12in January of 85 I believe it was 51c it
26:17was our motor number srm15
26:20and that particular
26:23motor had a couple of field joints that
26:25not only had some erosion but they had
26:27some fairly severe Blow by the primary
26:30seals a fairly heavy soot over a fairly
26:32large Arc very deep and black
26:35and even though we could see no
26:39measurable erosion on the secondary
26:40o-ring there was a heat effect and by
26:43that because the machine was gone off of
26:44the O-ring seal it wasn't couldn't age
26:46anything but the sheen was gone
26:48and because of that we were concerned of
26:52launching beyond our experience base
26:54below that temperature
26:57for that temperature
26:59brought a lot of strong comments in
27:03reaction
27:04from several of the NASA officials
27:08uh I believe was Mr Malloy made some
27:11comments about when will ever fly if we
27:13have to live to that some sometime in
27:16the future
27:17and uh also commented that uh you know
27:20we are trying to establish new launch
27:22commit criteria we can't do that you
27:25don't do that the night before a launch
27:27that's a predetermined set of
27:29constraints
27:30and we can't do that and other comments
27:34were made about whether we could ever
27:36fly out of Vandenberg and 24 flights a
27:39year because it wasn't uncommon that 53
27:41degrees in the early morning hours or a
27:43lot of the launches occur
27:46one of the comments that came and this
27:49is by voice recognition I believe is
27:51some of Mr hardy
27:52Marshall space flight center was that he
27:55was appalled at that recommendation
27:58however he also said that he certainly
28:00wouldn't fly without uh not Floyd would
28:04not fly without fire costs concerns
28:06even though he was a fall with that
28:08recommendation
28:10I believe it was uh Stan reinhart's made
28:12a comment that he was under the
28:14impression that the sod rocker Motors
28:17were qualified from 40 to 90 degrees and
28:19that 53 degree recommendation sermon was
28:22inconsistent with that
28:24uh some place in the conversation about
28:28the impact of 53 degrees I believe Cecil
28:30Houston sometimes commented that you
28:33know uh wouldn't be till about Thursday
28:35that we would have uh morning
28:37temperatures probably in the 50s
28:39so he didn't seem to be as alarmed about
28:42when you know we could get to that
28:44temperature
28:46there were several challenges relative
28:49to this was felt uh how conclusive the
28:52effective temperature was on this whole
28:53problem of o-ring erosion of the farset
28:56blow by
28:57and the challenge came from working at
29:00the total beta because even though we
29:03were concerned about this flight which
29:06was the coldest ever and at that time
29:08from Florida a year earlier there was
29:10that flight uh back in the late fall of
29:1385 I think it was probably October 61a
29:16was our srm-22 set that had some Global
29:20idea O-rings no no erosion the primary
29:23O-rings in fact a couple of them I
29:24believe
29:25uh and that's happened to be a launch
29:28that had the highest temperature
29:30so there was some concern at the date it
29:33was inconclusive
29:35and also that we had some Motors that
29:39were static tested as low as 36 degrees
29:41Fahrenheit the M4 I believe and it
29:44showed not only no o-ring erosion but no
29:46blow-by well some of the comments that
29:48came back from that and I believe it was
29:49Roger bosia they commented this uh he
29:52felt that there was a significant
29:54difference in the observation of the
29:57actual soot that passed the primary
29:59o-ring on the SRM 15 sets it was a cold
30:03one versus the one that was worn that
30:06there was a much larger Arc between the
30:09two O-rings was affected the cert was
30:11much blacker it penetrated all the way
30:14up to the secondary o-ring and of course
30:16we had some heat effect there and he
30:17thought there was a significant
30:18difference and that well could be the
30:20difference just due to temperature
30:22uh I commented at that time about the
30:25static test history I told him I did not
30:27feel that that was a valid data
30:31for a couple of reasons one on the
30:33static test Motors the we keep the
30:35static test Motors in a environmental uh
30:38building essentially during the build up
30:41assembly and checkout of all
30:42instrumentation and that environmental
30:45building kept at 70 to 72 degrees that
30:48building then rolled back on a track
30:50about six hours before the static test
30:52so it wasn't exposed very long to the
30:55cold temperatures
30:56secondly in the static test Motors
30:59we went in and actually repaired and
31:02filled holes in the putty these holes
31:06are formed by the Assembly of the rocket
31:09motor as you form the tank clevis
31:11there's aircraft in there that Air's got
31:13to go someplace
31:15and sometimes that air will go up to the
31:17putty we had seen this and also when you
31:21run the leak check on the two seals if
31:23you get any Blow by doing a leak jacket
31:25made into propagate those and the static
31:29test Motors some of these are observed
31:31and they went in and filled those inside
31:33the motor
31:34a prior to static test so I told them I
31:36didn't feel that that data was
31:39conclusive and they shouldn't use that
31:40for deciding what the priority
31:43performance was
31:50other discussion on some of the charts
31:52that we had that was somewhat
31:55inconclusive we had a chart
31:57that had some subscale data where we had
32:00run some tests on Blow by with some
32:03subscale O-rings they actually had the
32:05full-scale diameter 280 thousands but
32:07they were smaller that was the cross
32:09section of the O-ring but they're
32:11smaller diameter Hardware
32:13and there were coal gas tests and uh
32:15we're tempting to try to measure what
32:17kind of blow-by one might get with a
32:19pressurization rates you see in the
32:21motor and we were using argon as the
32:24working fluid and also adding some Freon
32:27and we had run tested around the ambient
32:2930 degrees and those and did not see any
32:32difference so there was some conflicting
32:34data there it said it wouldn't make any
32:38difference but that I want to remind
32:39everyone it was a cold test
32:42that time I commented at the time that I
32:46felt the lower temperatures were in the
32:48direction of Badness for both O-rings
32:51because it slows down the timing
32:53function for both of those but the
32:55effect is much worse for the primary
32:57o-ring compared to the secondary o-ring
33:01because the leak check force is the
33:02primary o-ring in the wrong side of the
33:05O-ring Groove while it forces the
33:07primary o-ring in the proper direction
33:11this
33:12fraction the weighed and considered in
33:15making the valuation as to what the
33:19recommended temperature should be
33:22I was looking at a chart at that time
33:25that we had in fact as a chart that I
33:27had made with some help of our
33:29engineering people back last summer in a
33:31presentation I'd made here in Washington
33:33to the headquarters be from August 19th
33:37it was a chart that showed that there's
33:39really three phases or three regions of
33:42concern and during the ignition Transit
33:45relative to perform at the all right
33:47first phase of that is a condition for
33:50the O-ring the primary O-rings
33:52pressurized it starts as an energizing
33:55process and actually has to move from
33:58the forward face of the O-ring Groove
33:59because that's where it's at as a result
34:01of leak check and then has to move back
34:03and seal on the back face now this uh
34:07process we felt took uh took place in
34:10the early part of the ignition transient
34:12someplace before it got 200 PSI
34:15and in cold weather what's going to
34:18affect that is of course the the grease
34:20that's in that area also is very viscous
34:23instead the O-ring itself is stiff we
34:26knew that the cold temperature shrank
34:29the O-ring some and from our resiliency
34:31tests which are tests that basically
34:34show how the O-ring responds when you
34:37have it under some compression and
34:39release that load it shows as it gets
34:42cold and stiff it doesn't want to
34:43respond very well and I looked at it
34:45something like
34:47flat tire on the bottom of a I remember
34:49when I used to drive nylon tires when it
34:51was cold I get out and there's flat spot
34:53on them and
34:54that already being having to move that
34:58either has got to slide or Scott's role
35:00somewhat it's not a very big dimension
35:02of losing it's uh 20 30 000. but
35:06certainly it can't be as good as when
35:07you don't have that
35:09also being hard it then has to extrude
35:12into the gap between the two already
35:14seals
35:15and the harder it is I'm sure it's
35:18harder to extrude in that gap which
35:19means it may take a higher pressure to
35:22do that which also takes a lot of time
35:25I felt that based on what we had done in
35:28the past we had concluded that this
35:31blow-by phenomena had really occurred in
35:33this first part of the pressurization
35:35cycle
35:36and I think it was good evidence that it
35:38had because the threat that appeared
35:41between the two O-rings was uh exactly
35:44that it was soot we analyzed it but it
35:47didn't see any heat effect on the metal
35:49at all in some cases it discarded the
35:51grease it didn't really burn it so it
35:54was a product to the grease we could not
35:56see any real effect on the secondary
35:58o-ring so it couldn't have happened very
36:00long it couldn't happen then you were
36:02very severe conditions
36:04but at the same time the temperature
36:07effects are concerning that maybe we're
36:09going into another timing regime
36:12however if we felt that we had a good
36:15margin there then we felt that we do
36:18have a good secondary seal during this
36:20time and I think there's been some
36:22misconception about uh
36:24the redundancy the secondary seal
36:28uh the secondary seal is indeed
36:31redundant until the metal Parts between
36:35the time the credits actually rotate
36:37it's a full redundant seal and during
36:39this time period it is redundant and
36:42that's important but once those metal
36:44Parts rotate and you have a probability
36:48it may not be so that's why I was
36:51concerned about that area and but if we
36:53could convince ourselves the data set
36:55that wouldn't make that much different
36:57in that part of the phase then it would
36:58be a reasonable recommendation to say
37:00that we would expect much different
37:02performance
37:04the shortly thereafter
37:05that cycle was uh was asked about their
37:10recommendation and leave and Joe
37:12kilmister has asked himself what his
37:14recommendation would be since it was
37:16engineering that it recommended not
37:18flying at 53 and he said that he would
37:20not go against that recommendation he
37:22couldn't
37:23go against it
37:24So based on the controversy relative to
37:28how conclusive the effects of
37:29temperature actually were on this
37:31phenomena we were asked to reassess and
37:34reevaluate that data
37:36and uh we decided we would do that and
37:39the people at Utah said that well they
37:42would like to have a caucus for about
37:43five minutes and go off the line
37:46could I ask you this not to do this for
37:49moving in Quebec we come to the caucus
37:52in a minute but Quebec and and
37:57explained what was said to
38:02convey the decision of no launch
38:06I gather at that point the decisions I
38:09thought I call was to recommend against
38:10a launch uh that's correct that was at
38:14that point the recommendation was was
38:15not the launch of 53 degrees who did
38:18this talking on that subject was it uh
38:21that was uh Bob long the vice president
38:23engineering presented that position but
38:27uh did you were you able to ascertain
38:29from that conversation uh how the
38:32engineers as a group stood on that
38:35well the engineers as a group uh I you
38:38know I can't speak for the group I was
38:40not there but I did hear the engineers
38:42have presented the charts that they
38:44actually presented as part of that that
38:46supported the 53 degree recommendation I
38:49felt they're very strong in their
38:51conviction is why they felt
38:53uncomfortable to go outside that
38:55experience space
38:56that who were the Roger mojalay I think
39:00was one of the strongest ones and Arne
39:02Thompson that presented those positions
39:05and represented the charts that Mr
39:07learned himself at the time oh yes Mr
39:10Lund himself at the time uh didn't
39:13present the detailed technical charts
39:15but he did present the conclusions
39:17recommendations and that was his
39:18recommendation as vice presidential was
39:22anybody on the uh who was on a telecom
39:25from PI call side
39:27recommending launch
39:30at that time no there was no one that
39:33recommended launch and I don't recall
39:35there was anyone at either Marshall or
39:37or fire calls from NASA that didn't
39:40agree that you know Colt Hampshire is
39:42one in the wrong direction didn't help
39:43anything but no no one from Taco at that
39:46time recommended launch
39:48and what were the comments by uh NASA
39:53officials about that recommendation that
39:55you recall
39:57well as I recall there were some fairly
40:00strong comments about being appalled by
40:02recommendation about trying to Institute
40:05who launched commit criteria at the last
40:07minute uh about when we'll ever get this
40:10launch off
40:12I thought those were fairly strong
40:13comments and those were comments
40:15according to your recollection were made
40:16by whom
40:17well the comments relative to the launch
40:21commit criteria and when they'll ever
40:23get this office made by Mr Larry Molloy
40:25uh the comment about being appalled was
40:28George Hardy he was at Marshall I think
40:30I recognized his voice but that was my
40:32voice recognition
40:35so it was decided that that on any of
40:38any questions remember the commission
40:39have I said that Mr McDonald I have one
40:42question uh before you made uh went off
40:44the Met did you ask or make a comment
40:46about the secondary ovary ring Field
40:49seating that has been were they asked to
40:51make one no did you make it I did make a
40:53comment yes could you recall that
40:55comment please uh yes I think I read it
40:59to you and I'd be glad to do that again
41:01I made the comment that lower
41:03temperatures are in the direction of
41:04Badness for both O-rings because it
41:07slows down the timing function
41:09but the effect is much worse for the
41:11primary o-ring compared to the secondary
41:13o-ring because Elite check force is the
41:15primary o-ring into the wrong side of
41:17the groove while the secondary o-ring
41:19goes in the right direction and this
41:22condition should be evaluated making the
41:24final decision for recommending the
41:26lowest acceptable temperature for launch
41:28that was common I made that confused
41:30some people some of the witnesses I
41:32spoke to thought that that was a a
41:34comment in support of the launch the
41:36fact that this secondary o-ring seal
41:37would seat
41:39well that comment is a good news bad
41:41news comment
41:43uh there is good news and there's bad
41:45news the good news is that the secondary
41:47field is in the right position but
41:49that's not unique to temperatures always
41:51that way the bad news is is that the
41:54primary seals the one we're depending on
41:56for the full admission transient and
41:58it's going to be a lot worse than it was
41:59but even the secondary as I imagine
42:01wouldn't be as good cold as it would be
42:04normally but five has comment you are
42:07not supporting the launch no not by that
42:09comment I wasn't supporting the launch I
42:10was just saying that's an important
42:11consideration and I felt that if we
42:14could run some calculations to show
42:16that the temperature did not affect the
42:20timing then that would be supportive of
42:22the launch if it did it certainly and
42:24that was a concern that if it pushed
42:26that timing out long enough we had a
42:28chart in there said that if that timing
42:30goes beyond that 200 PSI regime while
42:32you're still eroding the primary o-ring
42:34that for whatever reason if you ever
42:36bypass it at that time you can't depend
42:38on the secondary and that's what's
42:39important thank you
42:42caucus then you
42:45never favored launch now and you made it
42:50clear that you were opposed to Lawrence
42:51well I never said I was opposed to
42:54launched I just made a few comments
42:56about why I thought some of the data was
42:58not appropriate like pathetic tests were
43:01saying the O-rings were good to 36
43:02degrees I made this comment about the uh
43:06uh lower temperatures affecting both
43:10O-rings but effects a little bit
43:11differently because one of them it's a
43:13dynamic ordering a moves one has a lot
43:15more movement and effects on it than the
43:17other one does because they have to move
43:19across the group
43:20I made those comments did you but you
43:22accepted the recommendation except in
43:24the recommendation yes I thought it was
43:26appropriate recommendation in other
43:27words you accept the recommendation of
43:29no launch that was made by your company
43:31that's correct
43:32uh Mr Hanson would you would you be
43:36surprised if uh your comments uh were
43:41interpreted by uh both your own company
43:43personnel and Marsh Personnel is being
43:46supporting of the Marshall position
43:49yeah I would be uh surprised uh at that
43:52yes I think I wouldn't be surprised if
43:54that would be uh evaluated as the effect
43:58of that I'm surprised I was interpreted
44:00and supportive yeah thank you
44:02you mentioned the 40 to 90 degree uh
44:07qualification limit was that referring
44:09to ambient air temperatures
44:13well I had a discussion about that later
44:17it was my impression that the motor
44:20itself was qualified from 40 to 90
44:23degrees for operating
44:25and uh
44:26we got into a discussion in fact during
44:29the the caucus That was supposed to last
44:32for five minutes that lasted for about a
44:33half hour on that very subject
44:36I saw the people that were there from
44:39that but I first of all didn't agree
44:41that the motor was even qualified for 40
44:44to 90 relative to all the tolerance and
44:46subsystems I wasn't there in the
44:48qualification the steel case motor that
44:50I just recently went through that
44:52process in the film along case SRM
44:55and that I'm not aware of the testing or
44:59analysis of the O-rings were good to
45:01those temperatures
45:03and that therefore it's part of the
45:05elements and the way I interpret the
45:07spec is that all of the components and
45:10elements that make up the SRM should be
45:12qualified as temperatures
45:13Mr Larry Malloy at that time told me
45:16well no the 40 degrees refers to a
45:19propellant mean bulk temperature and the
45:21propelled mean bulk temperature was
45:23being predicted to be 55 degrees for
45:25that launch
45:26and that as long as Propel mean bulk
45:29temperature wasn't below 40 degrees so
45:31you could expose the other parts of the
45:33motor the lower temperature as long as
45:35you didn't drop the Propel mean low
45:37temperature outside of the four degrees
45:39I responded to the time I thought that
45:41was absolutely ridiculous because you
45:43could expose that motor to very severe
45:45cold temperatures Sub-Zero temperatures
45:47for a fairly long period of time and you
45:49would change phylamine bump temperature
45:51at all there's such a massive amount of
45:54propel and insulator there that takes a
45:55long time to do that and I'm sure that
45:58this Factory didn't mean that that you
46:00could do that so my interpretation is
46:02certainly different than his
46:04because they're in fact a minimum
46:07temperature
46:08established by a specification or by
46:11rotor in some manner that related to the
46:14O-rings or the joint well at that time
46:18I wasn't aware of one for the O-rings I
46:20found out later that there was a in our
46:24specification it refers to a higher
46:26level sophistication which is level two
46:28at Johnson I think because I was 7 700
46:31respect it says that the shuttle vehicle
46:33has to be capable of launching in 31 to
46:3799 degrees or something like that and
46:39therefore since it's a higher level spec
46:41that we should be able to comply with
46:44that but I'm not aware that all of the
46:46elements and subsystems were qualified
46:48to that which doesn't mean by higher
46:50level spec could you explain that
46:52it's that's specification uh come down
46:56from the uh Johnson Space Center who is
46:59responsible for the overall operation of
47:01the vehicle shuttle vehicle and what
47:04it's capable of operating in
47:06environments both pre-flight and flight
47:08and
47:10that investigation for the overall
47:12vehicle gets incorporated as part of the
47:15lower level specifications that go
47:16through level three which is Marshall
47:18space flight center to the various
47:19elements and they refer to that
47:22when they refer to that the way the
47:24system's supposed to work is you're
47:25supposed to comply with your own
47:27specification plus any higher level
47:29specifications that may involve the
47:31entire shuttle system
47:33and I was unaware of that frankly uh
47:37that criteria was in there I'm still a
47:40little bit puzzled about it because it
47:41doesn't have any time limitation on it
47:43either I was 31 degrees for five minutes
47:46or 40 days well was there a fire call
47:50Design
47:51temperature limit at the time this motor
47:54was designed with respect to low
47:56temperatures I really can't answer that
47:58because I wasn't involved in the
48:00original design qualification
48:02thank you
48:04and come to some of these other
48:05questions I'd like to continue the
48:07chronology because we're going fine and
48:10you stopped about the caucus Mr
48:11Armstrong has a question
48:15of your answer that you just gave uh had
48:22had Morton thank all to your knowledge
48:25ever informed NASA that the launch
48:29commit criteria were inadequate or did
48:31not in fact cover the kinds of
48:34conditions that you were concerned about
48:36I'm not aware they ever did not
48:38knowledge and so we're really talking
48:42about event that was within the launch
48:43criteria launch commit criteria but
48:46outside what your experience based with
48:48well I I guess I don't even I'm not
48:51convinced of that either I didn't learn
48:53about the 31 degree thing until sometime
48:56afterwards but we were told to make this
48:59evaluation on the basis of launching at
49:010938 in the morning or the predicted
49:04temperature was 26 degrees Fahrenheit
49:06that was predicted temperature and that
49:08was the occasion that's made whether we
49:09could launch at that time so I'm not
49:12sure if that came from either
49:14yeah just one follow-up to Neil's
49:17question are you aware of NASA ever
49:20asking fire call to qualify the SRM or
49:23the SRB to 31 degrees
49:26uh I'm not aware of it but again I
49:28wasn't in that part of the program they
49:30may have I I I can't say
49:33if we may know let's go back you said
49:36that a suggestion was made that uh
49:41a recess for five minutes who made that
49:44suggestion uh
49:47that said yes it was made from someone
49:50at fire hall I can't recall with that
49:52was Joe I think it was probably Joe
49:54filmmaster but I'm not sure
49:56what happened uh you said that that
49:59lasted almost a half an hour instead of
50:03five minutes that's correct and during
50:05that time what did you do and who are
50:07you with well I was uh in the conference
50:10room at Kennedy with Mr Reinhardt and Mr
50:13Malloy Mr Houston and Jack Buchanan
50:15still and I
50:17gave you my conversation about
50:19interpretation of the qualification
50:20without share there I also commented
50:24that time that uh
50:26I suggested that maybe we consider a
50:28late afternoon launch I didn't feel good
50:31about the below temperature launch
50:33because when I first come down to
50:36Kennedy uh the original schedule was to
50:38launch that in the late afternoon a
50:40quarter to four or something like that
50:42and based on the weather report I heard
50:44the temperatures would be uh 48 50
50:47degrees
50:48in the late afternoon so I said why
50:50don't we go to a late afternoon launch
50:52and I was told that that was considered
50:55but it was rejected because of some
50:58problem either with visibility or
51:00whether one of the transatlantic abort
51:02sites I think was Dick Carr Captain
51:04block one of those
51:07uh I really expected in the reason it
51:11was taking so long for this five minute
51:13caucus was in that we were either trying
51:15to find some more information support
51:17our recommendation
51:19or that we were trying to run some kind
51:21of calculation to determine how far away
51:24from that we could go because clearly 26
51:27degrees is a long ways from 53.
51:30I personally felt we certainly wouldn't
51:31go above 40 because I thought my
51:33interpretation of qualification was
51:35correct and we wouldn't do that but that
51:39reason it was taken as long as the
51:42engineers were reassessing all the data
51:44they had and finding any more that they
51:46may have and trying to quantify more a
51:49lot of that data was straight
51:49qualitative
51:55[Music]
51:58hour and uh
52:00I believe it was uh Joe filmster came on
52:03the line and said that even though we
52:06had some concerns about the lower
52:08temperatures
52:09that we would recommend that they
52:12proceed in the launch
52:14based on the fact that we felt the
52:16temperature data that we had was not
52:19totally conclusive
52:20and he outlined several uh concerns
52:24still that we had relatively effective
52:26temperature but also some rationales why
52:28we felt it was a safe to proceed can you
52:31relate what he said
52:33well it was the uh information basically
52:37that ended up finally on the fact
52:39statement uh relative to our concerns
52:41the O-rings being colder and harder and
52:45uh but that we also had some data that
52:49was inconclusive relative temperature
52:51and I'm sure it was the warmer
52:53temperature launch where we had some
52:55blow by
52:56I didn't
52:58see anything that I recognized there was
53:00new information but maybe they had some
53:02and I felt all the engineers were
53:04certainly there that had generated the
53:06original data evaluating it and maybe
53:09they had
53:11reconsidered or re-evaluated the data
53:14they had and tried to quantify it or
53:15felt it was probably okay
53:20when he completed that uh
53:22he was asked I believe it was by Mr
53:25hardy you're not sure to you know put
53:27that rationale in writing and
53:30and to sign it
53:33uh make sure to get it down to the cape
53:35I think by morning early morning and uh
53:39I was sitting across table from learning
53:40Mallory at the time and I said well I
53:42felt that I was one that's going to have
53:44to sign it because I was at uh okay I
53:46said I wouldn't sign that I couldn't
53:48have to come from the plant
53:52Minister said that you know he would
53:54draft a a letter or a statement and send
53:58it down and he would do it tonight
54:00wouldn't wait until morning and
54:03I was instructed to stay there until
54:05that came came down and he would also
54:07send it out to Marshall and it'd be a
54:10few minutes uh before that would come
54:12down
54:15he went off the line at that time and I
54:18asked Cecil Houston where the the facts
54:20was and he told me that the other end of
54:23the building
54:24I had a conversation with uh
54:27Staples back on this before they went
54:29offline or they can send that
54:31information in the Jackie Shannon's
54:33office which is a fax machine right next
54:34door to this conference we're head or
54:37they can send it into the Marshall
54:38office they had a fit and Bose machine
54:41or something and they said well the
54:42whole thing in the same one we send all
54:44this other material because they have
54:45the right number and all that happened
54:46to be the Marshall one which was the
54:47other end of the building
54:49I said fine I would wait
54:52again took some time for that facts to
54:55get there so all the parties were in the
54:57meeting were still sitting there
54:59and uh
55:01we started to talk about some things I
55:04told them I didn't feel very good about
55:05this recommendation and
55:07I recognize it's a very difficult to
55:10quite Quantified
55:11at what temperature these seals may be
55:13acceptable for they aren't acceptable
55:15you know based on the data that
55:17certainly was inconclusive there's no
55:19doubt in my mind
55:20uh not the difficult thing to quantify
55:22but I even though I didn't agree with
55:25the
55:2640 degree
55:28qualification of the motor
55:30and all elements were qualified to that
55:33it's my understanding that uh
55:36there's a lot of people at most NASA and
55:38fire call signed up to that so the
55:42design certification process with a
55:44critical design reviews
55:46and I was absolutely surprised that NASA
55:49would accept any recommendation below 40
55:51degrees Fahrenheit especially when it
55:52predicted temperature as low as 26
55:55degrees Fahrenheit
55:57so am I may be naive about what
55:59generates a launch commit criteria
56:02but I was under the impression that was
56:04generated based on the qualification of
56:07all elements or subsystems space shuttle
56:09that anything that was outside that
56:11qualification was a launch commit
56:13criteria and we never went outside that
56:15envelope
56:16and I don't know why NASA would ever
56:18launch below 40 degrees Fahrenheit if
56:20that's what the SRM was qualified to
56:25I made the direct statement that if
56:27anything happened to this launch uh
56:29until my show wouldn't want to be the
56:31person that had to stand in front of a
56:32board of inquiry
56:34to explain why I launched this outside
56:36of the
56:37qualification of the solid rock motor or
56:40any shuttle system
56:42I made that statement No One commented
56:44on that
56:46was very still very upset
56:49so I
56:51I asked that they reconsider
56:53this uh
56:55decision for three reasons not one for
56:58three
56:59I said if I were the launch director I'd
57:01cancel this launch for three reasons not
57:04just one first one being the concern of
57:06the cold o-ring so we just discussed but
57:09there were two others
57:11I just left Carver Kennedy's house with
57:13Titusville Florida
57:16and he's responsible not only for
57:18stacking of the srms he's responsible
57:20for the retrieval operations
57:22and he had been in communication uh with
57:24someone that was a hangar AF I believe
57:27that contacts the booster recovery ship
57:29to see
57:32and they had told him that the booster
57:34recovery ships were in a absolute
57:37survival mode was how they put it that
57:39they were in Seas or high of 30 feet
57:42uh they were there was winds at 50 knots
57:45sustained gusting to 70 knots
57:48pitching the boat as much as 30 degrees
57:51they even felt the rough Seas may have
57:53damaged some of the retrieval equipment
57:54on the back of the ship
57:56they were steering directly into the
57:58wind heading for sure at about three
58:00knots and they've been doing that for
58:01some time there's no way that they would
58:04be able to support so early morning
58:06launch if they wouldn't be in the
58:08recovery area
58:09[Music]
58:10I then reminded everyone in the room
58:13that you know there's some first on this
58:14launch this is the first time that we're
58:16going to use the new
58:18electronic control system for separating
58:21the nozzle extension cone on the srbs at
58:24apogee rather than just before water
58:26impact while it's under full main
58:28parachute
58:29and we're able to separate the
58:31parachutes that water impact for the
58:32very first time on this launch
58:35and that based on the sea states that I
58:38had just heard that appeared to me that
58:40it was going to be nearly impossible to
58:42be covered that Hardware either the
58:45parachutes or the freshers
58:48and also I felt that they were putting
58:51the boosters at some risk as far as
58:53recovery was concerned because the ships
58:55were steering away
58:59I also said that the third reason for
59:01not launching is the formation of ice I
59:04knew the sound suppression systems a
59:07water system
59:08and I felt there's probably a lot of ice
59:09around there and I'm no expert in all
59:12these matters but I do feel that there
59:14may be a chance of that changing the
59:16Acoustics may be a problem with debris
59:18may have some effective structures I
59:20didn't know
59:21but I didn't think it was prudent to
59:23Launch under that kind of a condition
59:27I was told that you know these weren't
59:29really my problems and I really
59:30shouldn't concern myself with these uh
59:33but I said you know all three of these
59:36together
59:37should be more than sufficient to cancel
59:39the launch
59:41from the one that we discussed earlier
59:43what
59:45and that's the people were there said
59:47that well they would pass these on they
59:49could tell I was I was Disturbed and
59:50they passed those on and
59:53as concerns and that they would do it in
59:55advisory capacity
59:58by Mr Malloy where the sign facts was
1:00:01because some time had transpired since
1:00:03the teleconference had ended and still
1:00:05wasn't there so I said okay I'll go
1:00:07check on that I went down to the other
1:00:09end of the building
1:00:10to this fax machine and there was
1:00:13nothing there to come out yet and I
1:00:15really wondered if it was working it was
1:00:17getting kind of late
1:00:18so I stayed down there I guess for about
1:00:2110 minutes and finally came in
1:00:23I brought the facts back it was a single
1:00:26sheet of paper to Jack Buchanan's office
1:00:29where we reproduced copies for everyone
1:00:32I walked into uh I think it was Cecil
1:00:35Houston's office there and there was a
1:00:36telecon being conducted and I believe it
1:00:38was the thorny Aldridge
1:00:40and they're in the middle of this
1:00:41telecon and they were discussing the
1:00:43conditions of the booster recovery ships
1:00:46and the high fee States and the fact
1:00:49that they were in the survival mode
1:00:51and I recall that Arnie Aldrich asked
1:00:55Brian Malloy if he felt there was any uh
1:00:58risk to recovering the boosters because
1:01:00of this and he said no he didn't think
1:01:02there was any you know significant risk
1:01:04in carving boosters because they had
1:01:07beacons and monitors and they're kind of
1:01:09aircraft in the area also but that there
1:01:12was a high probability that they would
1:01:13not recover the parachutes or the
1:01:16presidents
1:01:18and the conclusion was that uh yet
1:01:21they'd have to make a decision to launch
1:01:23the basis that they would have the high
1:01:25probability not recovering that Hardware
1:01:27but they were compromising the recovery
1:01:30of the booster significantly
1:01:32and I remember Arnie asking uh
1:01:36Larry you know the value of that
1:01:38hardware and I think he gave some number
1:01:40close to a million dollars and asked him
1:01:42if he could you know afford the visits
1:01:44and support the schedules and program
1:01:46and he said that he had sufficient
1:01:48inventory to do that
1:01:50uh but Ernie also told him that in no
1:01:53way have those ships attempt to turn
1:01:56around in those kinds of conditions and
1:01:58the safety shift is important to try to
1:02:01support that launch and you turn around
1:02:03too soon so to tell him to continue on
1:02:05towards Shore until it was really safe
1:02:07to turn around
1:02:09they then briefly discussed the ice
1:02:12issue about the ice and there was a
1:02:15concern right there and Arnie I believe
1:02:17that was Arnie responded that they had
1:02:19discussed that issue earlier in the day
1:02:21it was fairly brief conversation
1:02:23alrighty is Mr Aldridge uh yes Mr
1:02:26Aldrich
1:02:27uh they also made it clear that they
1:02:30were acting in advisory pasty only if
1:02:33they weren't making some recommendations
1:02:34or acting in visual capacity but wanted
1:02:37to be aware of this information
1:02:39I didn't hear anything discussed about
1:02:41the O-ring steel problem I presume that
1:02:43was done while I was down waiting for
1:02:46that fax because that was the first
1:02:48concern but you're not sure of that but
1:02:50I'm not sure I presumed it was because I
1:02:51got in the middle of the conversation on
1:02:53the hosters and heard the ice I don't
1:02:55know
1:02:56and finally the conversation concluded
1:03:00and the recommendation was to proceed on
1:03:03with the uh it was launch uh I stayed
1:03:07around a few more minutes and talked to
1:03:08Jack McCannon for a few minutes and went
1:03:11back to Carver's house in Titusville
1:03:13where I stayed and got in there I guess
1:03:14a little before one o'clock sometime
1:03:20although I would say
1:03:23a couple of questions one
1:03:26when you first appeared before the
1:03:29commission I remember you were
1:03:32explaining the fact that your company
1:03:35originally
1:03:36had recommended against the launch
1:03:40and then you
1:03:41testify that after the caucus
1:03:46they came back and changed their mind
1:03:49said go ahead with the launch
1:03:51and you said it was based on
1:03:53inconclusive data
1:03:56and I remember asking you how could they
1:03:59have changed their mind based on
1:04:01inconclusive data can you explain that
1:04:04well I I can't explain that that was a
1:04:08comment that was made that the data was
1:04:10inconclusive relative to the effects of
1:04:12the temperature
1:04:13and I I prefer you ask those questions
1:04:16to those that made that decision I don't
1:04:18know I wasn't there I wasn't there but
1:04:21all that data was
1:04:23the reassess and evaluated and what
1:04:25conclusions were gone one other question
1:04:27Mr Dr Keel asked if the conclusion of
1:04:31your testimony in the executive session
1:04:32whether you felt that you were under
1:04:35pressure or had been under pressure of
1:04:37the companies and Under Pressure to
1:04:40reverse its decision I think your answer
1:04:41was yes do you remember that yes uh
1:04:44definitely I there's no doubt in my mind
1:04:47I felt some pressure I feel that I have
1:04:50a responsible
1:04:51management position in here and I felt
1:04:53pressure
1:04:55would you explain the reasons for the
1:04:57for feeling pressure
1:04:59well I've
1:05:01I've been in many quite range of years
1:05:03probably as many as as anyone in the
1:05:05past year and a half that at that costs
1:05:09and I've had to get up and stand before
1:05:12I think a very critical audience at
1:05:15Marshall and very good one
1:05:17justifying why our Hardware was ready to
1:05:20fly and I have to get up and explain
1:05:23every major defect
1:05:25is why we can fly with that defect
1:05:29and for the most part they're very minor
1:05:32very very minor and and I have been
1:05:35hassled about how I'm sure that that's
1:05:38okay to fly with
1:05:39now such things as losing vacuum in a
1:05:43carbon clock phenomic part in the nozzle
1:05:45while the parts basically cured
1:05:48now the Desiree effect of that it's a
1:05:49critical process there's a lot of those
1:05:51critical processes
1:05:52and I have to address every one of those
1:05:54the great detail is why I'm sure that
1:05:57that part
1:05:59has not been compromised
1:06:01and it's been that way through all the
1:06:03reviews I've ever had
1:06:05and that's the way it should be
1:06:08it's not pleasant but that's what it
1:06:09should be and I was surprised here at
1:06:12this particular meeting that the tone of
1:06:15the meeting was was just opposite of
1:06:17that I didn't have to prove
1:06:19I was ready to fly in fact I think Mount
1:06:21Griffin made the most accurate statement
1:06:22I ever heard his conclusion that meeting
1:06:25was is the philosophy scenes have
1:06:27changed because you know he had the same
1:06:29impression I did that the contractor
1:06:31always had to get up and stand up and
1:06:33prove that his Hardware was raised why
1:06:35in this case we had to prove it wasn't
1:06:37and that's a big difference and I felt
1:06:39that was precious
1:06:41and can you explain a little more what
1:06:42source the pressure came from in your
1:06:45mind well I think the strong statements
1:06:48were made by Mr Malloy and even some of
1:06:51those people at Marshall uh they're on
1:06:53there Mr hardy where I think hardly
1:06:55strong statement that I think has
1:06:57pressure
1:06:58about uh when will ever fly this thing
1:07:02and launch commit criteria that we can't
1:07:04generate at the last minute and uh
1:07:07appalled by our recommendation the
1:07:09supply temperatures high as 53 degrees
1:07:13and and that to me that that was
1:07:15pressured me and may not have been
1:07:17interpreted by others that it was
1:07:18pressure to me any other pressure that
1:07:20you want to refer to at this time or at
1:07:23any time
1:07:25no no I I just felt that the way the
1:07:29comments were made as strong as they
1:07:31were made is the fact that the the
1:07:33conditions were for justifying this
1:07:35launch were so much different than
1:07:37anything I had been involved with before
1:07:39as far as the telephone is concerned
1:07:41would you normally have signed that
1:07:43telefox or was the was the procedure
1:07:45that was followed the normal procedure
1:07:48well I'm not sure I guess what the
1:07:50normal procedure is I felt that since I
1:07:53was uh
1:07:54they are representing as a senior
1:07:56official at the cape uh then I'm the one
1:07:59that usually is responsible for that I
1:08:01know at the L minus one and we have a
1:08:04normal launch
1:08:05there's a poll that's conducted by Jess
1:08:08Moore of all the contractors where
1:08:10they're ready to fly and I'm the guy
1:08:12there that has to say yeah if that calls
1:08:14Hardware is ready to fly
1:08:15uh I felt that's my responsibility
1:08:18that's why I'm there
1:08:19I can't recall what we were asked to
1:08:22sign anything like that before
1:08:25we have a presentation that's given it
1:08:28every quite Readiness review that signed
1:08:30off by the principal party you know
1:08:32filmmaster usually finds all those on
1:08:34the formal review but if anything comes
1:08:36up afterwards it's it's been done on an
1:08:39oral basis but I don't know I've never
1:08:41been put in that position I don't know
1:08:43if Joe has I don't believe he has
1:08:45so uh
1:08:49the the fact that
1:08:51I written a decision was requested as
1:08:55far as you were concerned was not the
1:08:57normal way to do it it was not the
1:09:00normal as far as that's concerned and I
1:09:02as I recall you a testimony you testify
1:09:05that you made it clear that you would
1:09:06not sign a written statement approved in
1:09:08a large am I correct yeah that's correct
1:09:11and I think that's been misinterpreted
1:09:13at least by the Press they said that uh
1:09:15I was overruled by my supervised that's
1:09:18not true at all I chill is not to sign
1:09:21that I did he didn't overrule me I felt
1:09:23that that decision when I started was an
1:09:26engineering decision by the people that
1:09:29understood the problem the best that had
1:09:30all of the date and facts and they're
1:09:32the ones who should recommend it and
1:09:33that's why I made that it wasn't I was
1:09:35on the road
1:09:36thank you very much I'm sure other
1:09:38commission members are less than Mr
1:09:39Thompson
1:09:41yeah you were talking about the 40
1:09:43degree uh qualified qualification of
1:09:46various uh components of this electronic
1:09:50experience and at one I was aware of the
1:09:5340 degree limit on the on the green uh
1:09:57bulk temperature but was there anything
1:10:00else uh that the 40 degrees referred to
1:10:03well in the stack uh going back after
1:10:07sacral looking at it that's what it had
1:10:09refers to as a profound mean buff
1:10:10temperature
1:10:12uh
1:10:13I guess that's my thing is an oversight
1:10:16may be inspect
1:10:18or the
1:10:20launch temperature 31 to 99 should be
1:10:23stronger in there to apply to all
1:10:26components and by qualification it
1:10:28either has to be qualified by test or
1:10:30some analysis and that means every
1:10:31element
1:10:32and I'm not aware that all those
1:10:34elements were qualified with that
1:10:37temperature I know we bought O-rings
1:10:39that said they're good to minus 30 but I
1:10:42never saw the analysis and the
1:10:44application that we use them in that
1:10:45says that they're they're good to that
1:10:47that's the difference it's a material
1:10:49problem versus a design problem I
1:10:52understand that and I understand that
1:10:54the 40 degrees was intended to protect
1:10:56against grain cracking and the
1:10:58consequences of that but uh What uh what
1:11:03I didn't quite understand is why you
1:11:06said you wouldn't recommend any time
1:11:09launching below 40 degrees I'm trying to
1:11:11get a well the reason I said that is I
1:11:14felt that's what everybody had signed up
1:11:16to is what this thing was really
1:11:17qualified from an operating standpoint
1:11:19now the motor does get exposed to much
1:11:21lower temperatures we have a criteria in
1:11:24our specification expose that to much
1:11:26lower temperatures you know Sub-Zero
1:11:28temperatures and 60 mile winds come
1:11:30across Wyoming because we ship these
1:11:32things from Utah down to the cape so in
1:11:34a transportation mode they are subjected
1:11:37to some very severe uh temperatures for
1:11:39periods of time
1:11:41and there has been analysis uh to show
1:11:43that they will withstand those
1:11:45temperatures as long as you don't
1:11:46operate them
1:11:47at those temperatures uh the 40 degrees
1:11:49they won't crack there's no problem
1:11:51there that's a uh primarily a
1:11:53performance standpoint you lose total
1:11:55impulse and performance the lower the
1:11:57temperature you go you have a low 40 you
1:11:59start listening to Performance out of
1:12:01the shuttle and that's why that number
1:12:02came about as far as the capability the
1:12:05grain structural capability it can
1:12:08withstand a lot colder temperatures than
1:12:10that and then we have analysis for the
1:12:12storage and transportation shows that
1:12:14and it has a good margin to safety very
1:12:16high margin to safety for exposure to
1:12:19lower temperatures it's just the things
1:12:21like the O-rings and some of these other
1:12:23components I'm not aware that we have
1:12:25really analyzed or tested those well
1:12:27enough to understand how they would
1:12:29operate in that kind of a temperature
1:12:31there's a difference between exposing
1:12:33them and storing them versus operating
1:12:37thank you
1:12:39I have a question just referring back to
1:12:42the static test that you mentioned at 36
1:12:44degrees which was used as a
1:12:46justification was there an analysis to
1:12:49indicate what the O-ring temperature
1:12:50during that test was
1:12:53well it was done after the fact and I
1:12:56believe in the presentation that was
1:12:57made
1:12:58on the night before the launch it they
1:13:02calculated like 47 degrees is what they
1:13:04presented as what they expected the
1:13:06O-ring temperature to really Bend when
1:13:08that was static tested
1:13:10I have a couple of other questions
1:13:11regarding the uh the conference
1:13:14was there a specific request by NASA to
1:13:18reconsider or was the reconsideration as
1:13:21a result of the implications of the
1:13:23remarks made by the NASA people in the
1:13:26conference
1:13:27I mean the reconsideration of what of
1:13:30the launched of the initial decision not
1:13:32to launch that is the initial
1:13:34recommendation of fire call was not to
1:13:36launch and then that was reconsidered
1:13:39did anyone from NASA explicitly asked
1:13:42for reconsideration or would the
1:13:44reconsideration occur because of the
1:13:46negative remarks and comments on that
1:13:49decision
1:13:51well I think it was the the latter I
1:13:54can't fully recall that they directed
1:13:56this is that or not that we they had
1:13:59concluded that the the temperature data
1:14:01was inconclusive and I don't know
1:14:03whether we volunteered to reassess it or
1:14:04they said we need to I'm not fair to me
1:14:07on that I'm not sure one further
1:14:09question in regard to the signature on
1:14:12the sheet which was faxed from Mr
1:14:16killminster was there a specific request
1:14:18for that to be signed and who made that
1:14:21request
1:14:22uh yeah there was a specific request for
1:14:25that to be signed uh I believe it was uh
1:14:30George Hardy and may have been learning
1:14:32the lawyer that I think it was George
1:14:33Hardy had requested that
1:14:36[Music]
1:14:38um Foundation
1:14:45to the personal attention of Mr
1:14:49or Mr Aldrich or Dr Lucas
1:14:53well I'm uh
1:14:56very familiar with the process by which
1:14:59these things are reviewed and uh
1:15:02I was absolutely positive and sure that
1:15:05they would were brought to his their
1:15:07attention because that's the way things
1:15:09go I talked to the SRB project manager I
1:15:12talked to his boss the shuttle project
1:15:14manager the shuttle project office and I
1:15:17was sure that those all went through
1:15:18that review I had no doubt in my mind
1:15:20that they had
1:15:26NASA folk indicated that they would pass
1:15:29your concerns along and I presume that
1:15:32you
1:15:33thought they would the three concerns
1:15:36that you were talking about the O-rings
1:15:37the ocean sea and the eye right but
1:15:41could they have simply meant the last
1:15:42two concerns the Sea and the ice that's
1:15:45one question the other is which were who
1:15:48were the NASA folk that promised to pass
1:15:52your concerns along I I guess you could
1:15:54interpret maybe if I thought it would be
1:15:56all three but the people were Mr Malai
1:15:59and uh
1:16:00and Mr Reinhardt said that those pathos
1:16:03on and I he said only passed them all on
1:16:05I
1:16:06didn't see a reason why they would
1:16:11go
1:16:12you mentioned earlier that you thought
1:16:14this decision on launching should be an
1:16:17engineering decision not a program
1:16:19management decision
1:16:21how would you characterize the final
1:16:23decision to launch from thyakov was it
1:16:26engineering or was it management
1:16:29well I I guess I'd have to characterize
1:16:31it as a management decision in the final
1:16:33decision thank you
1:16:37so got a couple questions on criticality
1:16:40ones
1:16:41um did I understand you to say that you
1:16:43chair the board on on crit ones on the
1:16:46SRM from uh yes on all defects that are
1:16:49affected by that could you give us your
1:16:52understanding of the meaning of
1:16:54criticality one and just an estimate of
1:16:57how many parts in the SRM system are
1:17:00classified as grit one
1:17:02well I don't have a good number for you
1:17:05but there's a tremendous amount of crit
1:17:07ones on the SRM
1:17:09primarily because the uh
1:17:12the motor doesn't have very many
1:17:15redundant features solid rocker Motors
1:17:17don't and uh of course bottom is
1:17:20structure and structure is all becomes a
1:17:23great one but fails uh could you define
1:17:26a crit One Credit One is a single point
1:17:29failure that if that element fails
1:17:32there's there's no recovery you lose the
1:17:35you lose the hardware and it's
1:17:37catastrophic there's a lot of elements
1:17:40in the SRM they're under that category
1:17:42relative to the O-ring seals the
1:17:45redundancy was built in because that was
1:17:48a critical element
1:17:49as a pressure CEO
1:17:51in order to provide that redundancy I
1:17:55think there is some confusion of the
1:17:58blade as to what that crit 1 and 1R was
1:18:02relative the seals and how it was
1:18:04removed
1:18:05uh I wasn't involved at the time that uh
1:18:09it was found that because this joint
1:18:11rotated
1:18:12that if you took all of the worst
1:18:15engineering tolerances and dimensions
1:18:17are allowed by the prints and that means
1:18:19the maximum clevis opening you could
1:18:22have to start with the smallest and
1:18:25thinest Tang that you could put into
1:18:26that clevis opening the minimum o-ring
1:18:29that you could put in there with a
1:18:31maximum size of the grooves that you
1:18:33could possibly put in there
1:18:35that you put all those combinations
1:18:37together you could show that you would
1:18:39actually lose squeeze on the secondary
1:18:41o-ring once you pressurized the system
1:18:43and the joint rotated and therefore if
1:18:46you ever had to call upon that O-ring as
1:18:49a redundant system during that time
1:18:51period you couldn't depend on it now
1:18:55I can had an assessment made
1:18:58of
1:18:59have we flown any hardware in that
1:19:01condition because I was a bit shocked
1:19:03about that as much as anyone when I
1:19:05first found that out which was by the
1:19:07way last August and I made that
1:19:09presentation here to not the
1:19:12headquarters I did I wasn't aware of it
1:19:14myself that we had such condition and we
1:19:17were flying with a crit one on on that
1:19:19part of the hardware
1:19:20uh
1:19:22based on the information that I have
1:19:25received on all of the joints ever flown
1:19:28on the shuttle
1:19:30there was only one time where we had a
1:19:33tolerance backup
1:19:35of a joint that would have fallen from a
1:19:38criticality one R to one and that was on
1:19:40sps4
1:19:42they have never had one since we didn't
1:19:44have one for that we always had adequate
1:19:47squeeze from the hardware when it
1:19:51rotates to maintain it as a criticality
1:19:531R now I'm not quite sure I understand
1:19:55it because I thought that the the piece
1:19:58of paper in the critical items list
1:19:59specifically lists the primary o-ring as
1:20:03a criticality one yes it does and the
1:20:05reason it does that is because the draw
1:20:07drawing tolerances allow you to install
1:20:10uh Hardware to that may come together on
1:20:13a worst case basis that cannot guarantee
1:20:16a secondary seal and therefore it's
1:20:17going to use all the hardware that's in
1:20:18the inventory or you could possibly have
1:20:20in the inventory Bill to acceptable
1:20:23prints you could end up with a very
1:20:25small fraction of it it's a very small
1:20:27fraction that could go together that way
1:20:28and therefore that document was written
1:20:31to cover all that but in reality uh
1:20:34other than that one case we've never
1:20:36stumbled Hardware that way we've had we
1:20:38haven't had the finished tanks with the
1:20:40widest ultimate crevices was a minimum
1:20:42over and put together
1:20:44that's a concern in a sale is a very
1:20:47serious concern in my opinion because
1:20:49that decision was made at the time based
1:20:52on what we knew about joint rotation
1:20:55since that time we're getting this
1:20:57information on resiliency and effects of
1:20:59temperature which were never put into
1:21:00that at that time that brings that
1:21:03question back out in front yeah you know
1:21:05I told you we didn't fly
1:21:07from criticality one R1 lets true based
1:21:10on the decisions and the information is
1:21:13known that changed it from 1R to one
1:21:14just on the tolerances and dimensions as
1:21:17far as this resiliency thing I can't
1:21:19assess that yet well enough to know but
1:21:23I do know we never stacked Hardware
1:21:24together that had tolerances so bad that
1:21:27we didn't have the contact of the
1:21:29secondary o-ring other than one joint
1:21:31but just to be clear I guess that you
1:21:33don't on a joint by joint basis go back
1:21:35to the NASA board and kind of reclamor
1:21:39the crit one and turn it back into a 1R
1:21:42do you it's always classified as a
1:21:44criticality one on the primary seal
1:21:45that's absolutely right you're correct
1:21:47now we do as part of our slight
1:21:48Readiness if you do present those joints
1:21:51that we're mating and what those o-ring
1:21:53squeezes are and on every flight
1:21:56did any discussion of the primary seal
1:21:59of criticality one come up during the
1:22:01the your meetings on on L minus one uh
1:22:04no they did
1:22:06okay thank you
1:22:08that's the secondary CEO would not be
1:22:10much affected by the temperature but now
1:22:12you're telling us
1:22:13because of those complete or nearly
1:22:16complete loss of resilience that is the
1:22:19tendency to spring back the secondary
1:22:21seal would require very little rotation
1:22:23to open do I understand correctly uh I
1:22:27said it wouldn't be affected as much as
1:22:29a primary field because it doesn't have
1:22:33to move from one end of the slot to the
1:22:35other as far as the effect of resilience
1:22:37you're absolutely correct it still has
1:22:38the same problems as far as extruding in
1:22:40the Gap has still got the same problem
1:22:43we were talking about somewhere there
1:22:46was a discussion about the secondary
1:22:47seal
1:22:48being redundant until the metal Parts
1:22:51rotate
1:22:52when the pressure starts to build up it
1:22:55can't move the primary seal until there
1:22:57is some pressure and noon there's a very
1:22:59small pressure perhaps
1:23:01and the very small rotation isn't it
1:23:03true isn't it true if the rotation is
1:23:04more or less proportioned to the
1:23:05pressure or is there some delay of some
1:23:07sort there is no time delay between the
1:23:10two there is some delay because the
1:23:12joint's stiff enough that uh under
1:23:14certain pressure heaters don't move it
1:23:16at all so you have to build up some
1:23:17pressure to make any rotation so there
1:23:20is a delay in that time period but at
1:23:22some point in time it becomes a direct
1:23:24function of the pressure listen to laws
1:23:26of elasticity such that everything is
1:23:28proportional to the force and all the
1:23:30displacements of proportionable force
1:23:32then wouldn't it be true that at every
1:23:34pressure there's some rotation and the
1:23:36rotation is more or less proportional to
1:23:37the pressure
1:23:39well I I think that uh when you're down
1:23:42to uh tpsi or 50 psi I don't think
1:23:45you're rotating anything
1:23:48if you're rotating at one tenth as much
1:23:51as you rotated at 500 PSI is that right
1:23:53well the structure is so stiff that I
1:23:56can't believe you're rotating at all
1:23:59at 50 psi
1:24:03you are moving the O-ring seal back into
1:24:05the grill power the
1:24:09just go back to this criticality one so
1:24:12that uh
1:24:15I can understand it a little about it
1:24:17it in nineteen
1:24:20what 1985 change was made
1:24:2483 83 I guess 82 or 83. at that point it
1:24:31was listed as criticality one with an R
1:24:35is that right that's correct not does
1:24:39that mean that it was decided that if it
1:24:43was a failure and that seam ordering
1:24:47that the mission in the crew would be
1:24:50destroyed the whole thing would be a
1:24:52catastrophe but at that point the r
1:24:54meant that there was there was a
1:24:57redundancy there that you had two rings
1:25:00that each at that point was considered
1:25:02to support the other or at least one was
1:25:04a backup for the other that's what our
1:25:06meant that's correct it's redundant it
1:25:08means redundant that's why the r is
1:25:10there that's right now at that time the
1:25:13experience fairly demonstrated that the
1:25:17the uh analysis that you've been using
1:25:21up to that point may not have been
1:25:22correct so that instead of having
1:25:25uh both the primary and the secondary
1:25:28seal which provided redundancy it came
1:25:31to the conclusion you didn't have the
1:25:32redundancy
1:25:34therefore it would change to criticality
1:25:36one the eye was removed is that correct
1:25:39that's correct and so from that point on
1:25:43I believe it was in
1:25:44what's the date
1:25:47December 82
1:25:51those shuttles have been flown
1:25:54on the basis of criticality one so there
1:25:56was a failure of that seal a catastrophe
1:25:59would result because there was no
1:26:01redundancy is that correct
1:26:03well I guess that's the interpretation
1:26:05of that but recognizing the actual
1:26:07Hardware that was put together uh and
1:26:10what we knew at that time I don't
1:26:11believe that was that was true and what
1:26:14was true was that the drawings as I
1:26:16mentioned allowed a condition where that
1:26:19could you could fly that Hardware in
1:26:20that condition but but just to be just
1:26:24what Brazil says is that the primary
1:26:27O-rings is a criticality one and you're
1:26:29not allowed to consider the secondary
1:26:31o-ring as a backup to that that's true
1:26:33sorry that's absolutely correct that's
1:26:35what it meant
1:26:38and that was known I assumed by everyone
1:26:42that was working on the program where
1:26:44most of the top people working on the
1:26:45program is that would that be true
1:26:47well I I kind of thought I was one of
1:26:50the top people working the program and I
1:26:51didn't know that until uh August of 1985
1:26:54when I put that presentation together I
1:26:56I presume it was I did find out there
1:27:00was some
1:27:01disagreement between uh both fire call
1:27:04and Marshall and interpreting that
1:27:06relative to the Joint rotation The Joint
1:27:11rotation that was used for concluding
1:27:13that was obtained from two different
1:27:15sources
1:27:16one of those sources was from the
1:27:19structural test article one first
1:27:21structural test article and this was
1:27:22waiting for my time but
1:27:25where this test article was taken to
1:27:29Marshall and that's basically a forward
1:27:31segment unloaded now and an app segment
1:27:35you know where they input the uh both
1:27:38the pre-launch loads and they put flight
1:27:40loads and all that business into the
1:27:42test article
1:27:45and this test is run horizontally
1:27:48he owns horizontal and they measured
1:27:51through the elite Jack board I
1:27:53understand there's some places the
1:27:54actual rotation of the parks
1:27:57and that's a fairly High numbers up
1:28:00around 50 000 I believe is what they
1:28:02said it rotated
1:28:04we had run some tests ourselves in a
1:28:07vertical assembly during a hybrid test
1:28:11and measured some of the rotations and
1:28:14got numbers like 30 to 40 thousands
1:28:17so there was some disagreement as to
1:28:20which numbers were correct some of our
1:28:22people felt that the horizontal assembly
1:28:24may have made the the structural test
1:28:27article numbers uh not representative
1:28:30the vertical assembly is better
1:28:32and in fact because of that disagreement
1:28:35uh we're in the process and started uh
1:28:39early last summer at the direction of
1:28:41Marshall to come up with what's called a
1:28:43referee test
1:28:45uh to do some very careful
1:28:47instrumentation in a vertical assembly
1:28:49to get a better handle on the exact
1:28:51amount
1:28:53of joint rotation
1:28:55those joint rotations that are used or
1:28:57those that are predicted for the maximum
1:28:59expected operating pressure which by the
1:29:02way we have never obtained unfortunately
1:29:05hope we never knew but that's a three
1:29:07sigma out there someplace
1:29:10but that still is a point of controversy
1:29:13as to what that number really is because
1:29:15the still I believe the critical items
1:29:18will have to change that from one
1:29:19redundancy to one
1:29:21not only assume the meop but I believe
1:29:24it is filmed the larger rotation which
1:29:27is about 50 percent more than some of
1:29:30the data that we got from vertical so I
1:29:31don't I still don't fully understand
1:29:34that what I do understand is that it was
1:29:37made at the time when temperature
1:29:39effects were not known and the
1:29:42resiliency problem is Dr Fineman brought
1:29:44up I think the more serious one do it
1:29:49coming back though beginning in 1985
1:29:53when you've realized that the
1:29:55criticality one was the who was on the
1:29:58critical items list
1:30:00uh you knew from that point on that a
1:30:04single failure uh with the uh
1:30:07catastrophe as far as the mission is
1:30:09concerned
1:30:10well uh as I mentioned earlier that uh
1:30:15you have to postulate what your failure
1:30:18mechanism is and uh
1:30:21I felt very strongly that
1:30:25the blow by that we had observed indeed
1:30:28was on the early part of the ignition
1:30:30Transit I think we all felt that way
1:30:32we've modeled that by the way I think
1:30:34fairly reasonably on the erosion
1:30:36uh and that at that point in time when
1:30:40the hardware really hasn't had a chance
1:30:41to rotate taking the temperature effects
1:30:43out now
1:30:44that we do indeed have a good redundant
1:30:46seal because if we lose the primary
1:30:49o-ring at that time that secondary seal
1:30:51is in a better shape than the primary
1:30:53you really see them it hasn't come off
1:30:55its land at all if you ignore the
1:30:59resiliency problem
1:31:01in a different scenario
1:31:04suppose that there was the pressure is
1:31:06increasing for some reason the primaries
1:31:09just to understand what the situation is
1:31:11the primary seal begins to erode
1:31:14and by the time the pressure gets to
1:31:16something like 600 or 700 PSI which is I
1:31:19think just below the maximum operating
1:31:20pressure it finally erodes all the way
1:31:23through so that the gas can pass through
1:31:26the primary seal
1:31:27would you think there was a reasonable
1:31:29probability that the whole thing would
1:31:30fail because the rotation by that time
1:31:33is enough that the secondary seal can't
1:31:34hold it yes I think there was and that
1:31:37was our assessment now that there was a
1:31:39reasonable problem though okay that you
1:31:40first knew or thought of in August 1985.
1:31:43that's correct not before that's correct
1:31:45now follow me up on that would you
1:31:48assume that other people have been
1:31:49working on the program and working on
1:31:51the sale and the O-rings would
1:31:52understand that too
1:31:54uh yes I think uh there's another
1:31:57important piece of information uh
1:32:01back in the end of April
1:32:0485
1:32:06forgot the exact flight but it was the
1:32:09last one in April
1:32:12we had a problem with the orange field
1:32:15nozzle uh that's light after it came
1:32:20back the nozzle is still attached to the
1:32:22app segment and we disassemble the
1:32:26segments when they're brought back to
1:32:27the court and then they're put on rail
1:32:30cars to send back to Utah and we never
1:32:31got the segment back and until I don't
1:32:33know sometimes a lot of part of June or
1:32:35something
1:32:35but this light was very in April we
1:32:38disassembled that nozzle we found that
1:32:41we had violated the primary seal back in
1:32:43three locations and burned completely
1:32:45through it
1:32:47uh the secondary seal also hey road is
1:32:50like 32 thousands
1:32:52uh it better health and it did its job
1:32:56uh that was in a nozzle joint uh uh the
1:33:00primary field and also joined as a board
1:33:02so yield quite similar to the steel
1:33:04joint tolerances are a little different
1:33:06but the secondary seal is a face seal
1:33:11it's uh
1:33:12you know they're both somewhat Dynamic
1:33:15Fields this more a static field and the
1:33:16bar Seal face deals truck down of the
1:33:19bolts and it obviously did its job and
1:33:23our conclusion was in that particular
1:33:25instance was that the
1:33:28even though we passed Elite chest with
1:33:30the vacuum party may have massive Lake
1:33:32check we were using at that time a uh a
1:33:36pressure uh stabilizing pressure to run
1:33:39that meat check at 100 PSI
1:33:41we had had some data earlier that showed
1:33:45us that
1:33:47the consistency that honey is quite
1:33:50variable and you can actually uh the
1:33:52putty will come a good sealant in many
1:33:54cases and it can hold as much as 100 PSI
1:33:58for a good period of time sometimes
1:33:59they're well through sometimes it won't
1:34:01so our concern was that maybe we're not
1:34:03really checking the O-ring seals we're
1:34:05checking the putty and we've got to make
1:34:06sure we're checking the ordering seals
1:34:08so he jacks the pressure up to 200 PSI
1:34:11that was the last flight that we were
1:34:13still under the 100 PSI which is the
1:34:14previous requirement
1:34:17to stabilize it at 100 and then once you
1:34:20stabilize it for a period of time there
1:34:22you drop the pressure completely again
1:34:24you bring it up to 50 psi and that's
1:34:27what you run the leak Jack at for about
1:34:2910 minutes it only allow one PSI drop
1:34:32on that particular set of Hardware since
1:34:35it was the last one we ran with 100 PSI
1:34:38because the change hadn't gotten through
1:34:40with all the paperwork system on what we
1:34:42understood about what honey behaves
1:34:44Under Pressure because we went 200 PSI
1:34:47to the field joints at that time this
1:34:50hadn't gotten a nozzle
1:34:51that we concluded that the party May
1:34:53well have masked that late check as it
1:34:55was at 100 and therefore we may have had
1:34:57some defects in that seal
1:34:59that we didn't detect
1:35:01and as a result that seal leaked at
1:35:05ignition from time to zero
1:35:07and when that happens you get
1:35:11severe erosion on your o-ring because
1:35:12you get the jet impingement so we've
1:35:14been calculating which is direct onto
1:35:16the O-ring seal like a flat plate but
1:35:19when you bypass the o-ring in a leak
1:35:22like that it actually chokes at that
1:35:24point so you're forming a throat and he
1:35:26rose very rapidly from underneath as
1:35:28well as jet impingement and you lose
1:35:30quite a bit of seal we lost most of the
1:35:32seal in fact
1:35:33but the nozzle feels very good the
1:35:36secondary steel because it's around the
1:35:37corner expands excuse me it spans goes
1:35:42down around the corner and eroded some
1:35:45of the secondary seal
1:35:47uh we ran a lot of analysis after that
1:35:50because that was the first time that we
1:35:52had observed erosion of a primary seal
1:35:55we did developed our models to predict
1:35:58the erosion what would happen in Blow by
1:36:01erosion and it was because of that that
1:36:04we found that hardware and it was late
1:36:07in June it was into July that we got all
1:36:10that data together we're down to
1:36:11Marshall and had very detailed reviews
1:36:13because that is a was a serious concern
1:36:15to everyone
1:36:17we had violated primary CEO was in the
1:36:19nozzle joint
1:36:20that we were asked to come to Washington
1:36:23the headquarters and review that there's
1:36:25a very serious concern
1:36:27it was that time that I got with the
1:36:30engineering people and said we need to
1:36:32not only put that whole story together
1:36:33we need to put the whole story together
1:36:35on all the pressure seals
1:36:37because I and several others still felt
1:36:40that even though that problem happened
1:36:41with the nozzle the field joint was a
1:36:43more serious concern
1:36:45because I felt very good about the
1:36:47secondary seal of the nozzle I didn't or
1:36:50the field joint and I put together a
1:36:52presentation for August that I think
1:36:54showed where our real concerns were and
1:36:57why we felt the highest priority was a
1:36:59fuel joint even though we just
1:37:00experienced that problem with a nozzle
1:37:03we felt we had corrected the problem
1:37:05with the nozzles as we all subsequent
1:37:07flights had the 200 PSI leak check so
1:37:10that we could not uh miss a possible
1:37:12defective seal or contamination may have
1:37:15prevented that seal from saving in the
1:37:17first place
1:37:18so that was some of the background that
1:37:20I think really turned up the game
1:37:22on the whole SEAL issue
1:37:25from about April really in June on prior
1:37:29to that time we were doing a lot of work
1:37:31to better understand this this rotation
1:37:33business and all but we have done a
1:37:36tremendous amount of work in fact you
1:37:39may have read in in the press and it's
1:37:41true that we actually had went to a Fae
1:37:44conference last fall a couple of our top
1:37:47Engineers went there to try to get help
1:37:49from the wholesale industry in the SAE
1:37:51about field joint
1:37:54uh is there a better way to seal that
1:37:56joint as soon as I say a society of
1:37:59Automotive engineers
1:38:00and uh we we did a lot of work to try to
1:38:05get help from the outside as well as do
1:38:08the work we had inside and
1:38:10I think that's all relevant to the
1:38:12discussion though were you surprised
1:38:14that some of the top people in the
1:38:16decision-making process didn't know
1:38:18about this at all
1:38:19didn't know about the Cil or the
1:38:22criticality one or well the whole thing
1:38:24the concern and your point on the part
1:38:26of it Cycles Engineers it's the original
1:38:29decision that had been not to Launch
1:38:31so that oh that oh I'm very surprised at
1:38:34that I hardly believe that I the issue
1:38:37is so controversial I thought that I'm
1:38:39sure that they were aware that I I have
1:38:42a hard time believing they didn't
1:38:45ask one question uh in talking about
1:38:49criticality one going to 1R
1:38:52I think you made the comment that you'd
1:38:55have to have all the tolerances going in
1:38:56the wrong direction to meet that
1:38:58condition but you did say that one unit
1:39:00did meet that condition yes the best of
1:39:03my knowledge and I had some record
1:39:06search done that I was told that there
1:39:08was a condition in the uh I think it was
1:39:11a forward field joint of the fps4
1:39:14someplace that uh was in that condition
1:39:17but what if that launch had been done at
1:39:19a cold temperature wouldn't it may have
1:39:21you taken it over the edge
1:39:24I don't know
1:39:25[Music]
1:39:26it's possible I certainly don't feel
1:39:29good about that but the the reason I
1:39:32asked the question it's it seemed to me
1:39:33that if it was a criticality one item
1:39:36then everybody should treat it as
1:39:38criticality one
1:39:39and not rationalize that that may not
1:39:42ever happen well I agree with that I am
1:39:45do you think everybody else agrees with
1:39:47that
1:39:47so I think he has to our engineering
1:39:49people agree to that and that's why the
1:39:51recommendation we had made originally
1:39:53was it was the basis for that
1:39:55recommendation
1:39:56we felt that we
1:39:59had observed the condition a year
1:40:01earlier that we did feel was uh
1:40:03attributed to temperature in some way or
1:40:05another and it was not a good condition
1:40:07and we didn't want to go much beyond
1:40:09that because uh even though that one was
1:40:12successful it certainly wasn't a good
1:40:14condition
1:40:16was it at NASA's uh was it NASA or
1:40:20thiacoal that originally initiated the
1:40:23change from criticality 1R to
1:40:26criticality one for the primary o-ring
1:40:30oh I have to tell you based on what I
1:40:33was told because I wasn't involved in
1:40:35that change but I was told that that was
1:40:38a NASA initiated what experience led to
1:40:42that change do you know
1:40:45I'm not sure if I experience led to the
1:40:48change I presume it was the
1:40:50understanding from The Joint rotation
1:40:52data and the growing tolerances of all
1:40:57these parts that that condition could
1:40:59exist someplace in the hardware and
1:41:02therefore if we were going to fly the
1:41:04hardware as it was designed that either
1:41:07through refurbishment or new hardware
1:41:09that was within those torrances maybe
1:41:10matched together sometime to give us a
1:41:12condition like that but I I think you'd
1:41:14have to ask the people that were
1:41:15involved in the organization how do you
1:41:18account for what appears to be the fact
1:41:21that between December 82 and the middle
1:41:25of 85 when fire call became concerned
1:41:28about the erosion of the bovine
1:41:31um that
1:41:33flights did not occur seemingly during
1:41:36that time it led to the same concern
1:41:41you know I can't explain then I
1:41:43certainly didn't know about it until
1:41:45August 8th I don't know I I think that
1:41:48everyone was concerned at least from the
1:41:50standpoint that we always had to present
1:41:53data on the joints that we were making
1:41:55the show we had adequate squeeze now
1:41:59you know that data was presented and I'm
1:42:01sure people were concerned about that
1:42:05thank you
1:42:07the questions we'll have a 10-minute
1:42:09recess
1:42:14[Music]
1:42:20to take the stand
1:42:34s
1:42:35[Music]
1:42:48[Music]
1:42:55[Music]
1:42:56[Applause]
1:43:02this place new requested if you appear
1:43:06after mystery Donald and we were glad to
1:43:09welcome you and go ahead and proceed any
1:43:12way you'd like thank you Mr chairman
1:43:15uh we've given you a handout there and I
1:43:19wanted to start on page 18.
1:43:21we had originally thought to provide
1:43:24some technical background that that can
1:43:26be covered later
1:43:28peace
1:43:30on page 18. that I said we have of
1:43:34course have received quite a lot of this
1:43:36information executive session and we
1:43:38will certainly be pleased to look at the
1:43:42information on this first 18 pages but
1:43:45to proceed in any way you like okay
1:43:47thank you
1:43:49my intent here is to uh
1:43:52explain the organization structure and
1:43:55those people that participated in the
1:43:57discussions and then go through the
1:43:59chronology
1:44:01of the occurrences at night on the 27th
1:44:05of January
1:44:06first off uh I'm the senior vice
1:44:09president of Wasatch operations we have
1:44:12on the chart you have there selected
1:44:15only those people with participated in
1:44:17the discussions
1:44:19but I might point out that there are
1:44:21three divisions reporting to me the
1:44:24space division under Mr Wiggins who was
1:44:27listed there and there is there are also
1:44:30a tactical and strategic division
1:44:33reporting to me
1:44:35Mr Lund who shows there as vice
1:44:37president of engineering provides
1:44:39Engineering Services for all of our uh
1:44:43all three divisions
1:44:45we've covered
1:44:46just the space division in detail
1:44:50you'll see that Mr kilminster reports to
1:44:54Mr Wiggins and he's the head of the he's
1:44:56the vice president of space booster
1:44:58programs and of course you've just heard
1:45:01from Mr Mcdonald
1:45:03and reporting to him are Mr Abilene and
1:45:05Russell
1:45:07and then from the KSC office is Jack
1:45:10Buchanan also reporting to Mr kilminster
1:45:14within the engineering organization
1:45:16there's a space shuttle project
1:45:18Engineering Group under Mr Brinton
1:45:22and uh Mr Macbeth reports to him
1:45:26then the other part of engineering is
1:45:28engineering design organization you'll
1:45:31see the people listed there I don't need
1:45:33to read them but they were all
1:45:34participants in the discussion
1:45:38we added a couple of notes Here uh we
1:45:41thought were curtain one is that we do
1:45:44have a fight Readiness review add more
1:45:47than five call before
1:45:49Marshall has their fight Readiness
1:45:52reviews and Mr Wiggins chairs that fight
1:45:55right instant free review group
1:45:57and uh the results of that flight
1:46:01writing this review are signed off both
1:46:03by Mr kilmister and Mr Brinton to
1:46:06indicate that we're ready to fly
1:46:09and then Mr kilminster then attends the
1:46:12uh the fight Readiness reviews of NASA
1:46:15one other point we made here which was
1:46:18also discussed by Mr McDonald and that
1:46:20is that he and Mr kilminster have been
1:46:24alternating as the attendees at the
1:46:27launches
1:46:28now as I go through the chronology we'll
1:46:32you'll see the names of various people
1:46:34here and you'll find them all in this
1:46:37chart but I will try to point out where
1:46:40they fit as I go through the phenology
1:46:43thank you
1:46:45[Music]
1:46:47uh
1:46:48we have the times here listed both in
1:46:51the Eastern Standard and Mountain
1:46:52Standard Time
1:46:54and uh
1:46:56the significant occurrences as we move
1:46:59through it at one o'clock Eastern time
1:47:03Mr Macbeth and
1:47:06Mr Tony Thompson and Charlie Sater home
1:47:09all received calls from Boyd Britton who
1:47:12was at marshall
1:47:13that's something I ought to point out
1:47:15that throughout this discussion Mr
1:47:18Brinton Who is the
1:47:21manager of space shuttle project
1:47:23engineering was at Marshall space flight
1:47:25center as where Mr Speed
1:47:29and as you know Mr McDonald was at
1:47:32Kennedy as was Mr Buchanan
1:47:35the rest of the people that we have
1:47:37listed here then were all at the Wasatch
1:47:40in Utah
1:47:44um as a result of the the call at one
1:47:47o'clock Mr Evelyn and kantner were
1:47:50notified and uh
1:47:52the Sater home started a bulk
1:47:54temperature analysis in the propellant
1:47:56and Brian Russell arranged a meeting Mr
1:47:59ebling's office
1:48:01they convened that meeting in Mr
1:48:03ebling's office and uh the attendees are
1:48:07as listed there
1:48:10during that meeting they discussed the
1:48:14O-ring resiliency data at 50 75 and 100
1:48:19degrees
1:48:20they talked about the amount of
1:48:23blow-by-in erosion that had been seen on
1:48:25the 51c which was the previous coldest
1:48:29launch were you at those meetings I was
1:48:32not at that meeting no sir so this is
1:48:34his as far as that's right I I do get to
1:48:38where I enter the picture here in a
1:48:41moment this was an effort to get a a gen
1:48:45an overview of what happened and where
1:48:47to try to make the rest of the testimony
1:48:50flow a little better
1:48:53um
1:48:54they did look at the other launch in
1:48:57static test temperatures and concluded
1:49:00that they did have a concern
1:49:03they broke that meeting up and started
1:49:07to do some work uh Mr ma was to run the
1:49:11calculation of what the O-ring
1:49:13temperature would be if the ambient were
1:49:1618 degrees
1:49:17and Mr Evelyn notified Mr kilminster of
1:49:21the concern that they had
1:49:23and uh Mr kilmister asked Evelyn to get
1:49:27the Engineering Management including Mr
1:49:28Lund involved and notify both Mr
1:49:32McDonald and Mr Brinton of the Marshall
1:49:36concern are the concern I assume that
1:49:39there was no recording made of these
1:49:41meetings this was reconstructed from
1:49:43conversations you've had with other
1:49:44people that's correct
1:49:50uh we did we did talk to all the people
1:49:53involved so we felt we had a consensus
1:49:55of of the sequence
1:50:02then Mr Buchanan
1:50:05called to give us a uh some temperature
1:50:08predictions at that time they were
1:50:11predicting uh 34 degrees at launch time
1:50:14at 9 38.
1:50:18then Mr Thompson briefed the Jack cap on
1:50:22his concerns
1:50:24and Mr McDonald called from Kennedy
1:50:29to Hope hoping to have a telecon between
1:50:32the Morton cycle and NASA on those
1:50:34concerns there were people called to the
1:50:37conference room to support the telecon
1:50:39and that uh required interrupting the
1:50:43meeting that was at that point underway
1:50:45in Mr Lund's office
1:50:48so just for semantics
1:50:51you say people called to support
1:50:53telegram you means to take part in the
1:50:55silicone
1:50:56correct the
1:50:59the conference room we have there has uh
1:51:02uh microphone so that you can be in the
1:51:05conference room and anyone can talk and
1:51:07be picked up uh their conversation my
1:51:10question really is to do the word
1:51:12support
1:51:13where you say your confidence to support
1:51:15Telecom and interrupted to support
1:51:17Telecom you mean take part in Excel
1:51:19accounts to take part that's correct
1:51:21correct
1:51:24the uh that that conference or telecon
1:51:28then proceeded with the the people that
1:51:31are listed there some 13
1:51:33including uh the uh people at Marshall
1:51:37and at Kennedy
1:51:42uh at the time that started uh they
1:51:45notified Mr kilminster that was starting
1:51:48at the same time essentially he received
1:51:52a call from that LSS means of onto
1:51:55report Services that's the the uh people
1:51:58that worked for Mr Buchanan down at the
1:52:00Kennedy they called and gave him an
1:52:03updated overnight temperature
1:52:05predictions uh on a two-hour uh basis
1:52:09every two hours they gave him what the
1:52:11temperature was going to be
1:52:13so with any notes or records kept with
1:52:16this kind of is this all reconstructed
1:52:19from memory
1:52:20well
1:52:22I don't know of any specific notes
1:52:25although there may be
1:52:28um
1:52:30just have to answer it that way
1:52:33we uh I I know the calculations that
1:52:37were run we those calculations exist
1:52:40because they took those on every two
1:52:42hour basis and and had started using 18
1:52:46degrees and then proceeded to use the
1:52:48more update updated temperatures because
1:52:50ultimately we if we were told it was
1:52:53forecast to be a 29 degree o-ring
1:52:55temperature
1:52:57in any event
1:52:59those those concerns uh that were
1:53:03existed were discussed
1:53:05and they amounted to the fact that the
1:53:09cold previous coldest launched had given
1:53:12us the greatest uh bull Buy
1:53:15and uh that coupled with concern about
1:53:19the safer o-ring
1:53:21uh that would exist at a lower
1:53:24temperature was the focus of the
1:53:27discussion
1:53:28uh it was just that a discussion and so
1:53:32uh it was decided and NASA requested
1:53:36that we put together an organized uh
1:53:39analysis or and organize the data and
1:53:43write down what our concerns were so
1:53:45they could be reviewed in a more
1:53:47careful fashion
1:53:49so there was a telecon then scheduled
1:53:52for uh 6 15. to do that
1:53:56and uh
1:53:58at that point Mr kilmister called uh Mr
1:54:02Wiggins and me we were in a another
1:54:05meeting in our Brigham City plant
1:54:08and uh told us that there were concerns
1:54:11and that the telecon was going to start
1:54:13at 6 15.
1:54:15so we hopped in the next great question
1:54:18yes sir
1:54:22you you had data
1:54:25where you reached a conclusion what was
1:54:29the purpose of NASA asking you to better
1:54:31organize that data was that for them to
1:54:34review it and reach some of their own
1:54:35decisions or just to see if your
1:54:38thinking was proper at this point we had
1:54:40not reached a conclusion during the
1:54:43parts that I'm covering here we'd had
1:54:46the discussion I still don't understand
1:54:48why they needed the data better
1:54:50organized we were providing it verbally
1:54:53over the telecon they didn't have it in
1:54:55front of them
1:54:56so we were talking about things like
1:54:58curves and that sort of thing that they
1:55:00didn't have the direct visibility of and
1:55:03we had not yet reached any conclusion we
1:55:06were just saying that we were concerned
1:55:07because it was cold
1:55:10so the request was to get that data and
1:55:14fax it down so they could look at it at
1:55:17the same time that we were looking at it
1:55:19[Applause]
1:55:20and then uh when Mr Wiggins and I were
1:55:24notified they were in the process of
1:55:26putting together what data the need was
1:55:30needed for the discussion
1:55:32and at the same time uh Mr Lund was uh
1:55:36trying to prepare the uh some
1:55:39conclusions and recommendations
1:55:42uh so the church preparation and the
1:55:45conclusion recommendations were going on
1:55:47simultaneously
1:55:49and uh Mr Lund or Mr Wiggins and I then
1:55:53arrived as that was going on
1:55:56and uh
1:55:58as it turned out we were not able to get
1:56:01all the charts together in time to start
1:56:03the telecon and we got the first charts
1:56:06faxed down there by 6 30.
1:56:08and uh
1:56:10the last charts didn't get down until 7
1:56:1220. so we were working this in a
1:56:15real-time basis
1:56:18uh we did start the discussion again at
1:56:21seven and uh the engineers that had
1:56:26prepared some of the charts discussed
1:56:28their charts and then ultimately Mr Lund
1:56:31discovered or discussed the conclusion
1:56:33and recommendations chart
1:56:36uh the fundamental issue however was the
1:56:41concern about the fare effective cold
1:56:44would have
1:56:46on getting the primary o-ring to move
1:56:49into its ceiling position and seal
1:56:52and uh if if it needs clarification
1:56:56later Mr Lund has some charts to explain
1:56:59that but
1:57:00the uh when we run the leak test
1:57:04hmm the primary o-ring is moved into
1:57:09the furthest point away from its ceiling
1:57:12position and that's maybe 20 thousandths
1:57:15of an inch or so whereas the secondary
1:57:18is moved towards its ceiling position
1:57:22and uh the concern was whether the cold
1:57:26the stiffness of the O-ring and the
1:57:29grease
1:57:30would delay the the movement of the the
1:57:34primary O-rings so that it would not
1:57:36seat properly and there would be Blow by
1:57:39and uh
1:57:40uh perhaps damage to the secondary
1:57:43o-ring
1:57:46we looked at the the erosion history
1:57:50we'd had
1:57:52to see what correlation there was with
1:57:54temperature and there there really
1:57:57wasn't any correlation uh
1:58:00there were there was uh also a review of
1:58:04the blow by history in which Mr
1:58:06McDonald's covered very well
1:58:08and uh the correlation that appeared
1:58:11there was that that we had Blow by in
1:58:14both 75 and 53 degrees but it was much
1:58:17more severe at 53 degrees and so it was
1:58:22thought that that was evidence that the
1:58:23cold did in fact affect performance of
1:58:26the O-ring
1:58:32hardness of the O-ring
1:58:35and uh as a as an indication of how
1:58:38stiff and difficult it might be for the
1:58:40O-ring to move
1:58:41and uh we determined that from 50
1:58:45degrees
1:58:46to 30 degrees a 20 degree drop would
1:58:50increase the hardness by about 10
1:58:52percent
1:58:53uh in fact that put it in the range of
1:58:57when we we discussed this that night in
1:59:01the early in the program we were
1:59:02deciding what hardness we wanted and we
1:59:04had used
1:59:05some 90 eurometer O-rings in some of the
1:59:10uh hydrostatic tests we ultimately ended
1:59:14up with the 80 durometer o-ring
1:59:19but that was pointed out that we'd had
1:59:22some experience with that O-ring which
1:59:24was harder
1:59:26then uh what do you mean by hardnesses
1:59:30push it into the tiny crack but that
1:59:33it's supposed to go into
1:59:35what is the feature that hardness it's
1:59:37not resiliency it's the difficulty of
1:59:40pushing it into a corner yeah well it
1:59:42was it was thought that that stiffness
1:59:44might make it move more slowly moving
1:59:47across the Gap and then it would be
1:59:50harder to extrude it in however once
1:59:54it's sealed the being slower to extrude
1:59:57per se wouldn't be a problem once it's
1:59:59sealed
2:00:03the the points we're talking about of
2:00:06course were the points that were
2:00:07discussed back and forth that night
2:00:10um
2:00:10we did look at the temperature history
2:00:12on our previous tests and flights
2:00:16and uh
2:00:18we discussed the fact that we had to run
2:00:21the subscale blowby test at 30 degrees
2:00:23which had shown no Boulevard
2:00:26uh that was only an indicator because
2:00:30that was a cold test and it was with a
2:00:33fixed uh joint Gap so it was just
2:00:37another another point of data that we
2:00:40had to put in the in our heads
2:00:43this had a vertical or a horizontal test
2:00:46rig that you ran the subscale testing
2:00:51um I don't know
2:00:52did you find out for us please yes sir
2:00:55there's several fellas there no I'm sure
2:01:01very cool
2:01:07[Music]
2:01:08uh out of that discussion uh we got to
2:01:12the point where we just it was we
2:01:15couldn't make a clear conclusion of the
2:01:18effect of temperature on the O-ring
2:01:19performance
2:01:21and uh the uh a number of the engineers
2:01:25felt that on that basis they ought to
2:01:29stay where we were in our flight history
2:01:32and uh
2:01:34with the information we had at that
2:01:36point and as far as we had proceeded in
2:01:39our thought process
2:01:41that appeared to be the right thing to
2:01:44do so we proceeded to uh present that
2:01:48information
2:01:49isn't it fair to say though that all of
2:01:52the engineers felt that way notice which
2:01:55ones were which ones they were at that
2:01:58point it was a it was not a
2:02:03Pro con sort of discussion it was
2:02:07where are we in our thought process and
2:02:10where we were in our thought process was
2:02:12that what we've discussed today says
2:02:15let's stay with our experience
2:02:18and what I mean is didn't all the
2:02:20engineers agree with it
2:02:25anymore
2:02:29I would say that at that point we all
2:02:33agreed with that that it wasn't uh
2:02:36engineering or anyone else we just had
2:02:38had looked at what we had and went
2:02:41through our thought process and at that
2:02:44point we felt that that's that was the
2:02:46recommendation
2:02:48though that you took unanimously was the
2:02:51engineering position was the base
2:02:53recommendation on previous flight
2:02:55history and you say 51c which was the
2:02:59coldest launch had been made and we had
2:03:02the most trouble isn't that right
2:03:04that's right
2:03:10the uh the the next comments then were
2:03:15as essentially as Mr McDonald said that
2:03:18Malloy Mr Malloy uh said he disagreed
2:03:21because he didn't feel that uh that we
2:03:24had shown any correlation between
2:03:26blow-bye and erosion with temperature
2:03:28and that uh therefore
2:03:31the rationale that had been used when we
2:03:35decided to fly in the first place it was
2:03:37still a vowel attraction now
2:03:39and Mr hardy expressed surprised at the
2:03:43recommendation because it was above the
2:03:45qualification temperature however he
2:03:47said he wouldn't recommend flying
2:03:49against our recommendation
2:03:51and then Mr McDonald came on and uh
2:03:55said that he too had concern about the
2:03:59cold so he pointed out that the
2:04:02secondary o-ring was in the position to
2:04:06seal where it didn't have to move as the
2:04:08primary did
2:04:09and at this point ought to be considered
2:04:13uh with that with that discussion we
2:04:17were
2:04:20we were on let's say we felt that we
2:04:24needed to have further discussions to
2:04:27see if these comments uh would in fact
2:04:32cause us to have any change of our
2:04:35position
2:04:36and uh so we decided to do that off the
2:04:40uh off the net and we asked for a caucus
2:04:44now in the caucus
2:04:46we Revisited all of our previous
2:04:49discussions
2:04:52and the important things that came out
2:04:56of that was that as we had recognized we
2:05:01we were we did have the possibility that
2:05:04the old the primary o-ring might be
2:05:06slower to move in the ceiling position
2:05:08and that was our concern and that's what
2:05:10we had focused on originally
2:05:13uh the fact that we couldn't uh show
2:05:18direct correlation with the O-ring
2:05:19temperature was discussed but we still
2:05:22felt that there was some concern about
2:05:24it being colder
2:05:26within
2:05:28recognized that
2:05:31if the primary did move more slowly
2:05:35that we could get some bovine erosion on
2:05:38the primer
2:05:40but we we had pointed out to us in that
2:05:43caucus point that had not come across
2:05:46clearly or in our earlier discussions
2:05:48and that is that we had run tests
2:05:52where we deliberately cut large pieces
2:05:55out of the O-rings to see what the
2:05:59threshold of ceiling was
2:06:01and we found uh that we could go to 125
2:06:05thousandths of a cut out of the O-ring
2:06:08and it would still seal
2:06:11information is that a static test for a
2:06:15dynamic test that's done by by blowing
2:06:19the pressure against the O-ring and it
2:06:21was done both cold and hot but not in a
2:06:23moving joint not if that's correct right
2:06:26and and I might follow that the
2:06:31uh through the whole discussion
2:06:34we were concerned about the or we
2:06:38recognized that the O-ring either
2:06:41primary primary or secondary would have
2:06:44to seal before the joint at a time to
2:06:48explain
2:06:49now the the gas pressure
2:06:53uh gets to the O-ring uh before
2:06:58The Joint has the chance to expand
2:07:02but the question was with the slower
2:07:05movement of the O-ring would it still be
2:07:08there in the seat before the joint
2:07:11expanded
2:07:12Mr Mason what kind of a time frame were
2:07:15you talking about here in the time it
2:07:16takes to get there well the the charts
2:07:20that we had said that if you see in 160
2:07:24milliseconds
2:07:26that well let's see this goes back to
2:07:28that one or one uh discussion that you
2:07:32had and the the uh now what that boiled
2:07:36down to was that
2:07:38during the first 160 milliseconds the
2:07:41joint is still closed enough that the
2:07:43secondary o-ring actually provides
2:07:45redundancy
2:07:47up to 103 or up to 300 milliseconds
2:07:50there's less certainty and above that
2:07:52it's uh there's a serious question about
2:07:55that now again that chart was based on
2:07:59the worst conditions as far as joint
2:08:02conditions were concerned as tolerances
2:08:05and what we had here we knew was a
2:08:07fairly nominal compression condition
2:08:12160 milliseconds that joint is
2:08:16officially classified as a criticality
2:08:191R
2:08:22it's not officially no man that's right
2:08:25it's just a criticality one so even
2:08:27during the first 160 milliseconds you
2:08:29are not allowed to consider the
2:08:31secondary seal a backup to the primary
2:08:33seal
2:08:34by the critic by the critical items list
2:08:38well uh I I don't certainly want to
2:08:41debate that point I what we did before
2:08:43we considered uh we did consider that
2:08:46that
2:08:47when that when it was established that
2:08:50it went from one R to one it was
2:08:51identified that we were losing
2:08:53redundancy after the ignition transient
2:08:57and uh
2:09:00we did consider and that is where I'm
2:09:03headed that that there was some
2:09:05protection during the ignition Transit
2:09:08from the secondary o-ring
2:09:12[Music]
2:09:15Dr Wright's questions
2:09:19well let me uh let me try again it
2:09:22sounds it sounds to me yeah exercise
2:09:25some kind of engineering judgment on
2:09:27whether you can consider this a 1R or a
2:09:30one
2:09:31and I just don't think that the system
2:09:34allows that I think that once something
2:09:36is is classified as a criticality one
2:09:39that sets a red flag in everyone's mind
2:09:42that that's an extremely
2:09:44dangerous situation and uh
2:09:49I'm just not sure that you're allowed to
2:09:52go back and rationalize it as uh well
2:09:54during this hundred milliseconds we may
2:09:56have a secondary seal we may be may be
2:09:59allowed to consider it a redundant seal
2:10:01we may have protection to a criticality
2:10:04one system
2:10:06well
2:10:07um I can't I really can't address the
2:10:11the propriety of it as far as as the
2:10:13system is concerned I I'd have to State
2:10:16what we did
2:10:18and uh we we had recognized uh when we
2:10:23when the criticality was changed from
2:10:25one hour to one that it was done because
2:10:28we didn't have a full-time redundant
2:10:30seal and uh
2:10:34at the at the time of this discussion
2:10:37uh we were not addressing uh the thing
2:10:41from a one or one Viewpoint we were
2:10:43addressing it from what we knew of how
2:10:45the joint performed
2:10:47and what we knew was that early in the
2:10:50ignition transient that the secondary in
2:10:53fact did function until the uh until the
2:10:56joint rotated
2:10:58now but isn't that in fact changing the
2:11:01critical items list
2:11:06of the list shows that it there was no
2:11:10redundancy and if I understand your
2:11:11answer you're saying we as a management
2:11:13team decided there was redundancy
2:11:17we we did consider that as a factor in
2:11:22our uh in our decision process and uh I
2:11:27need to let me let me say first I I
2:11:29didn't get to the thing in the in the
2:11:32right sequence our our primary concern
2:11:36and the thing we addressed in our in our
2:11:39earlier conversation was getting making
2:11:42sure the primary o-ring would seal
2:11:45and uh
2:11:48when we had this uh further discussion
2:11:52it was pointed out that we had run the
2:11:55test
2:11:55which showed that we could tolerate
2:11:59about three times as much erosion in the
2:12:01primary o-ring as we had previously
2:12:04experienced in fact in fact experienced
2:12:07in the 51 C I should say in that in that
2:12:11cold test
2:12:12so we felt that we had a substantial
2:12:17margin because we had the ability to
2:12:20tolerate more much more erosionally than
2:12:22we had
2:12:23and that the erosion was driven by the
2:12:28volume of gas that could be passed uh
2:12:31past that O-ring and that that we felt
2:12:35was limited so that it would very
2:12:37unlikely that it could get beyond the
2:12:39three-time erosion that we agree on the
2:12:42uh three times the erosion we had seen
2:12:44before can I ask some questions
2:12:47isn't the erosion partly depend upon the
2:12:50speed of the gas the size of the hole
2:12:52through which it comes
2:12:57do you have some kind of cow
2:12:59Toes that you couldn't get more erosion
2:13:02than the amount that you got in 51c
2:13:12it tells us what that limit is or not
2:13:16what made you think that 51c was the
2:13:19maximum erosion that you could
2:13:20reasonably expect
2:13:25we did I we didn't say that we didn't
2:13:28feel that that was the maximum we could
2:13:30expect we said that if there was a a
2:13:35temperature effect that made it move
2:13:37slower we might get some more erosion
2:13:40and we felt that the factor of three
2:13:42times was was not likely to be exceeded
2:13:46well let me explain I'm not interested
2:13:48at the moment in the temperature I'm
2:13:50going to criticize the original decision
2:13:53that you could operate at 53 degrees
2:13:54which is a different point of view
2:13:57than what we're talking about based on
2:13:59the idea that you've already seen that
2:14:02you have one-third the amount of erosion
2:14:04necessary to split the primary ring at a
2:14:07time when the secondary has a high
2:14:09probability of not being deceitable as
2:14:12Mr McDonald said and I'd like to know
2:14:15how you judge by having seen one-third
2:14:19of an O-ring disintegrated in one flight
2:14:23that is very unlikely
2:14:26that you would get three times that
2:14:27erosion on another flight
2:14:29of this on the same circumstances
2:14:35well uh
2:14:37that that's the that's the Judgment
2:14:40issue that we finally got down to I try
2:14:42and understand in her judgment
2:14:45when uh when we had the previous erosion
2:14:49to get that we had to fill all the
2:14:51cavity that was there Holly annular
2:14:54cavity so there wasn't any way to get
2:14:58any more substantially any more gas flow
2:15:01doesn't it depend on the speed of the
2:15:03gas and the temperature is it depend
2:15:05maybe on the complexity
2:15:08of the Blue Hole that goes through the
2:15:11putty
2:15:13so that it would be a matter of accident
2:15:14how much you got
2:15:16could it for example have been that you
2:15:18got one-third the amount of erosion for
2:15:21instance because the putty hole is
2:15:23smaller and longer
2:15:25with a reasonable probability well uh
2:15:28the the engineers which are here have I
2:15:33I don't have off the top of my head the
2:15:35the numbers but we did run tests was
2:15:38focused yet
2:15:40and it was focused the most amount to
2:15:43see how much erosion we would get and I
2:15:46believe they can they can do a better
2:15:47job of correlating that than I can I can
2:15:51comment that my understanding of it was
2:15:54that it would appear that because
2:15:57there's a limited volume and we hadn't
2:15:59looked at what a most highly focused yet
2:16:02would erode the the combination of that
2:16:05knowledge made us feel that probability
2:16:08of getting three times the erosion was
2:16:10very unlikely thank you
2:16:13isn't isn't it true that the amount of
2:16:15erosion you can tolerate actually
2:16:17depends on the particular rocket motor
2:16:19you're dealing with because the amount
2:16:21of compression can vary on a particular
2:16:24o-ring depending on where you are within
2:16:27the tolerances of the two pieces which
2:16:29make up that rocket motor as you analyze
2:16:32a particular amount of compression on
2:16:3451l these particular joints to see
2:16:37whether or not that was the average
2:16:39amount of compression and how much uh
2:16:43erosion of the O-ring you could actually
2:16:45tolerate we yes we did look at the
2:16:49compression on that particular joint and
2:16:51we compared it and matter of fact to the
2:16:53compression that we'd had on the
2:16:55previous cold launch
2:16:58and the compression was essentially
2:17:01nominal so I recall was around forty
2:17:03thousands
2:17:04so we did consider that
2:17:09this for for just a second
2:17:12um
2:17:13we've got a criticality one system and
2:17:16there's some question in in your minds
2:17:18whether it'll perform at uh at the the
2:17:22temperatures that are predicted at
2:17:23launch around 29 or 30 degrees is what
2:17:26you're
2:17:27basing your your judgments on
2:17:30what test data did you have to show that
2:17:34or any test date at all on joint
2:17:37rotation or the timing function or or
2:17:41even seal erosion down at 30 degrees
2:17:44that would allow you to make a
2:17:47reasonable engineering judgment that
2:17:49this critical one item criticality one
2:17:51item was was safe to fly
2:17:54well it was the various items that I
2:17:57mentioned we had the durometer of the
2:18:00O-ring down to uh
2:18:03uh below 20 degrees I don't remember
2:18:07exactly but it was it was down well
2:18:09below the temperatures and we we could
2:18:11see what the change in durometer was
2:18:14with temperature
2:18:15we did have the two tests we had run
2:18:17with the fixed joint at 30 degrees to
2:18:20indicate that the O-ring would would
2:18:22seal if it moved in in the right timing
2:18:25but she said that at the time you
2:18:27weren't you weren't uh weren't uh
2:18:30putting much emphasis on those tests
2:18:33there were six plates in front of the
2:18:36thing you're using the Argon gas not the
2:18:37three ounce by that time we were trying
2:18:40to avoid over emphasizing that test is
2:18:43perhaps a better way to say it we wanted
2:18:45to make sure we recognized that it
2:18:47wasn't a totally representative test
2:18:49because it didn't have the joint
2:18:51rotation on the other hand we felt
2:18:53because it was at the temperature and
2:18:56did indicate that the O-ring would seal
2:18:58if the timing was proper so that the
2:19:01O-ring was in position before the joint
2:19:03rotated we expected the seal fed did you
2:19:06have data that would show you how the
2:19:08joint would rotate at those temperatures
2:19:11well we know how the joint rotation I
2:19:14don't believe there's any real effect of
2:19:16temperature on the joint rotation if
2:19:19anything it would slow it down had that
2:19:21analysis went down the joint rotation
2:19:24analysis to see what the temperature
2:19:26effect on on joint rotation is
2:19:29I do not believe that's been done how
2:19:32about the uh any tests or analysis to
2:19:34determine what the timing function would
2:19:36be at those temperatures had those been
2:19:38done at the time well there had it not
2:19:40have been done at the time we were in
2:19:42the process of devising the test to try
2:19:45to establish that
2:19:47so those tests hadn't been done when you
2:19:50made this decision they had not been
2:19:52done well I I better not go beyond my
2:19:55knowledge on the subject uh I don't know
2:19:58personally what How Far We've progressed
2:20:01in the in the timing test I can say this
2:20:05we didn't have enough information that
2:20:08we could quantify the the effect of the
2:20:12cold okay you said that that your
2:20:15previous uh you had a a factor of three
2:20:18safety in in Seal erosion that sounds to
2:20:22me like you were willing to accept
2:20:23damage to a criticality one system
2:20:26did you have any prediction of what the
2:20:28seal erosion would be or any again test
2:20:31or analysis on what seal erosion would
2:20:33would be under these conditions or were
2:20:36you extrapolating from the 53 degree
2:20:38temperature and did you have a model to
2:20:40do that extrapolation
2:20:41[Applause]
2:20:43well that's a lot of questions
2:20:45um
2:20:46we
2:20:49we were we had done some modeling of the
2:20:52uh of the flow in the in the Overflow
2:20:58effect on the O-ring
2:21:00and and I'm not qualified to really talk
2:21:04about it and if that in detail but the
2:21:06engineers when they get here can provide
2:21:09more detail on that
2:21:11um
2:21:12I've lost track of the uh try to answer
2:21:15all your questions and I have lost track
2:21:18and could you ask me again okay the
2:21:21first one I guess I was asking about was
2:21:23the the seal erosion do you know that
2:21:25whether you had any test date on the
2:21:26seal erosion well I know we had a lot of
2:21:29information as I said where we had had
2:21:32focused deliberately focused uh hot
2:21:36gases to see what how fast the water
2:21:39Road what kind of gas flow rates were
2:21:41necessary
2:21:42and uh
2:21:45that's on on erosion so let me ask a
2:21:48different different sort of question
2:21:51um were you willing to accept damage to
2:21:55a criticality one system it sounds it
2:21:58sounds as though
2:21:59um you were willing to allow erosion on
2:22:02the primary o-ring
2:22:04the answer has to be yes now let me uh
2:22:08explain that the position we were in is
2:22:12that the first thing that has to happen
2:22:14is you have to have the a below uh hole
2:22:18through the putty
2:22:20and uh our experience is that that
2:22:23happens
2:22:25like five percent of the time I don't
2:22:28have that number exactly but if you look
2:22:30at our our history in the flight Motors
2:22:33that's like five percent of the time
2:22:35when that happens you can either get no
2:22:39effect just simply yes the hot gas
2:22:42pressurizes the O-ring or you can get
2:22:45blow-by and then the O-ring seats or you
2:22:48can get erosion
2:22:50and we had erosion if the memory serves
2:22:53me four times
2:22:54uh in the in the some 144 joints we'd
2:23:00had
2:23:00so we uh we we recognized that we might
2:23:06get
2:23:07some erosion
2:23:09we also recognize that it was a low
2:23:13frequency event
2:23:15and that but that the possibility
2:23:17existed and that if it did happen if we
2:23:21had erosion that it would in our opinion
2:23:24seal
2:23:25because of the extra margin that we'd
2:23:29identified by running the tests on the
2:23:31amount of flow it would take to get
2:23:34enough erosion to actually keep the
2:23:36primary from seeding
2:23:38[Music]
2:23:40I guess what I'm what I'm really trying
2:23:42to understand and
2:23:44um is
2:23:47whether you really had the engineering
2:23:49data
2:23:50or an engineering analysis
2:23:52to back up the decision that this
2:23:56criticality one system was safe to fly
2:24:00at those temperatures you know what
2:24:02we've seen in the chart so far is that
2:24:03the data was inconclusive so you said go
2:24:06ahead uh you know no yeah I'm sorry that
2:24:09I would hope to convey that but
2:24:12the the reason for the discussion was
2:24:15the fact that we didn't have enough data
2:24:19to quantify the effect of the cold
2:24:22and that was that was the heart of our
2:24:25discussion is how much effect is the
2:24:28cold going to have on the performance
2:24:31and the question
2:24:34um
2:24:35your engineers with the data they had
2:24:38and with the concerted attemption did
2:24:41reach a tentative conclusion at least
2:24:43that's why not wait for at least the
2:24:46temperature that had already been
2:24:48flowing
2:24:49um
2:24:50yeah I guess you were responsible your
2:24:54engineers were responsible for the
2:24:56design
2:24:56and the testing and qualification of
2:24:59that design and I would assume the
2:25:01interpretation of the data
2:25:04and therefore I'm extremely puzzled why
2:25:07um
2:25:08uh a NASA person could disagree and ask
2:25:12you to uh
2:25:13review
2:25:15the decision your engineers had reached
2:25:17since it seemed to me theirs was the
2:25:19responsibility for the design
2:25:21well we let's say uh the the request to
2:25:28reassess was
2:25:29not a major factor in my view I the uh
2:25:34the fact that we were
2:25:37picking a temperature-based purely on
2:25:40the one test or the one flight
2:25:43and we've had uh we had
2:25:47had static tests at other temperatures
2:25:50and and Mr McDonald explained why we
2:25:53didn't consider those conclusive but we
2:25:56it was difficult to say that 53 degrees
2:25:59was exactly the temperature that you
2:26:02ought to fly at
2:26:03and when Mr McDonald made the point
2:26:06about the secondary o-ring being in a in
2:26:10a favorable position
2:26:12we felt it was appropriate to consider
2:26:15that point and that's the reason that we
2:26:18said well let's make sure that we've
2:26:21considered everything
2:26:23and the two things that came out of that
2:26:25assessment were
2:26:28that we did have we believed that we had
2:26:32a margin a substantial margin of
2:26:35allowable erosion and still have that
2:26:38primary ring C concealed properly
2:26:43we didn't know for sure that the what
2:26:46the effect of that code was on the time
2:26:49to move but we said if in fact it does
2:26:53delay moving and it causes blow-by then
2:26:57the secondary ring is already in
2:27:00position the bobi who has to occur if it
2:27:04occurs occurs immediately the Bovi
2:27:07occurs on pressurization
2:27:09and so under those conditions if you
2:27:12were to have blow by you would be
2:27:14seeding the the secondary now I
2:27:16understand the the point about the the
2:27:191R versus one I simply have to be honest
2:27:22and say that we that's the way we were
2:27:24looking at it then that that during the
2:27:27ignition transient
2:27:28that the the secondary really could
2:27:32function and we had never said that it
2:27:34couldn't function on the ignition trench
2:27:38even when we wrote the Cil we'd
2:27:40indicated that
2:27:42um in any event we did expect the
2:27:46primary deceit we expected to seat
2:27:49because we had some Tolerance on the uh
2:27:53on this ability to uh to erode and still
2:27:57seats and seal
2:27:59so those that was our that was our
2:28:04thought process now the discussion was a
2:28:07free open discussion with all the people
2:28:10there and uh the I believe that it was
2:28:16not a uh well I at that point it was
2:28:19clear to me we were not going to get a
2:28:20unanimous decision
2:28:23um and so the question was
2:28:27um did we have a reasonable uh position
2:28:31to to go to 53 degrees or did we have
2:28:34confidence that we could fly with a 29
2:28:38degree o-ring
2:28:39and uh the the people who were there had
2:28:44heard all the discussion
2:28:45so I concluded it was appropriate to
2:28:48talk to to get a poll of the chief
2:28:52engineer and the chief program manager
2:28:54and Mr Wiggins who has a division
2:28:57responsibility to see how they felt
2:29:00whether they felt that we could safely
2:29:03fly with all the information that had
2:29:05been presented
2:29:06and we did conduct that poll and then we
2:29:11did conclude that it was it was safe to
2:29:14Launch
2:29:16could you tell us what the poll showed
2:29:18you
2:29:19you say that you and Mr kilmister and Mr
2:29:22Wiggins
2:29:23and Mr Lawrence were you unanimous how
2:29:26about the others we will only hold the
2:29:29management people because we had already
2:29:31established that we were not going to be
2:29:34unanimous and we'd already heard that
2:29:37wasn't the question the question is what
2:29:38about the others you testified before
2:29:41that you thought probably all the
2:29:44engineers
2:29:45so were against the launch to all you
2:29:47say you took a poll you only follow the
2:29:50managers you didn't ask the engineers
2:29:52how they felt after the review of the
2:29:54data in that discussion I felt that
2:29:57everyone had uh represented their
2:30:00opinion and there are a number that I
2:30:02felt indicated as we did that with the
2:30:06consideration of the erosion margin
2:30:09and well the very factors that I just
2:30:11talked about they also considered that
2:30:14to be a reasonable you know did they
2:30:17express the change of mind did they say
2:30:19well I've changed my mind
2:30:21not per se
2:30:23no uh okay excuse me I just feel that it
2:30:28would it's the kind of discussion that
2:30:30we we frequently have in which all of
2:30:34the people Express their opinions and
2:30:37they make them clear did you ever have
2:30:39an experience where all the engineers
2:30:40voted one way and management voted the
2:30:42other
2:30:45that wasn't the case here well what was
2:30:47the case here looks that way it looks as
2:30:49if you said the managers you pull be
2:30:51unanimous and the engineers who were
2:30:54opposed to launch were still apparently
2:30:56opposed to it well there were some
2:30:58Engineers which ones Mr Beaujolais and
2:31:02Mr Thompson were the outspoken one no no
2:31:05I'm asking which one has changed their
2:31:07minds
2:31:09before you testified that all the
2:31:11engineers were opposed to Launch
2:31:13now you went through this process you
2:31:15just described at the commission my
2:31:17question is did any of the engineers
2:31:19change their minds and if so which ones
2:31:23well let's say I
2:31:27I would say then that uh
2:31:31let's look at the list here it
2:31:34I can
2:31:36based on the conversations that we had
2:31:39there
2:31:43that uh
2:31:45Mr Macbeth and cap
2:31:48were supportive
2:31:52and uh
2:31:54Mr Brinton
2:31:57who is at marshall
2:31:59it's harder to judge because you didn't
2:32:01he didn't have a lot to say the
2:32:05what we were faced with is uh that there
2:32:09was the outspoken individuals in the
2:32:11rest uh participated to a lesser degree
2:32:16but I believe that we are
2:32:21familiar enough with the people in their
2:32:23manner to be able to judge their their
2:32:26feelings and we heard what they had to
2:32:28say
2:32:29facing earlier in testimony uh in
2:32:33private session indicated that Mr
2:32:34Beaujolais Mr Thompson were the most
2:32:38knowledgeable on the seals is that
2:32:39correct
2:32:41yes then the two most knowledgeable
2:32:44Engineers were still opposed and my
2:32:47understanding if they were still
2:32:48strongly opposed
2:32:50uh why did you proceed in the light of
2:32:53your two experts being very strongly
2:32:56opposed well
2:32:58um
2:33:00the it's it's kind of a horse races to
2:33:04who is the most expert on the subject
2:33:06because they're different
2:33:08areas of expertise some of the gas flow
2:33:11some in the metal parts we identified
2:33:14that Mr Beaujolais and Thompson were
2:33:16both generally knowledgeable people on
2:33:19those joints and they were they were
2:33:21people that we whose opinion we regarded
2:33:24however Mr cap
2:33:26has uh the long history
2:33:30on the joint and he's as knowledgeable
2:33:32in my opinion as they are
2:33:35and Mr Sayer uh to the lesser degree
2:33:40so uh
2:33:43I would say that we felt that uh
2:33:47although they were outspoken
2:33:50we listened to their reasons
2:33:53uh more than the than the intensity
2:33:57and the reasons boil down to the things
2:33:59that I said the reason was the
2:34:02uncertainty about the the rapidity with
2:34:05which that primary would move
2:34:08so
2:34:09um did Mr Russell participate in the
2:34:13conversation either on the telecon with
2:34:16NASA or in the caucus
2:34:19Ross line that followed
2:34:22yes he he participated in the in the
2:34:26both discussions my recollection what
2:34:29were his views as far as you can
2:34:31reconstruct them
2:34:34I felt that uh
2:34:36he
2:34:38had the similar uh thoughts that we did
2:34:43that he had the concern about the
2:34:44uncertainty but beyond that uh
2:34:50I would say that he was if anything
2:34:52neutral that he was he was providing all
2:34:56the information and was having some
2:34:58difficulty as were the rest of us trying
2:35:00to get to get a decision in which we had
2:35:02confidence now during the telecon was
2:35:06NASA
2:35:07uh and during the private caucus offline
2:35:12did anybody either at NASA or at
2:35:15firecrawl
2:35:18mentioned the change in the critical
2:35:20items list to criticality one
2:35:23no sir that was not discussed
2:35:28but that was not an issue at that point
2:35:34a question about the temperatures you
2:35:38said that you decided that 29 degrees
2:35:40was safe to launch the discussion result
2:35:44in some lower temperature limits below
2:35:46which you would have not have
2:35:48recommended a launch
2:35:52I'm sorry you're saying would we you're
2:35:55you're ultimate recommendation to NASA
2:35:58was that it was safe to launch and I
2:36:00believe the predicted temperature of the
2:36:02O-rings was 29 degrees that's correct
2:36:04did your discussion uh result in the
2:36:08establishment of a temperature below
2:36:10which it would not have been safe to
2:36:12Launch
2:36:14no we didn't uh we didn't pursue it
2:36:16below that I think that that the initial
2:36:20concern when we had heard 18 degrees and
2:36:22we were thinking that the O-ring might
2:36:24be that cold
2:36:26that's that's how all the discussion got
2:36:29started and and there was a lot of
2:36:31apprehension at 18 degrees
2:36:33and then later found it was going to be
2:36:35somewhat warmer than that but we didn't
2:36:37uh pursue the idea of getting any colder
2:36:41than 29 degrees
2:36:43well you know how critical was this if
2:36:45the temperature turned out to be 28
2:36:47degrees would this have made a big
2:36:48difference
2:36:49the recommendation was based on a
2:36:51prediction of course that was only
2:36:53prediction at the time
2:36:59and I would have thought that the
2:37:01recommendation would have been more
2:37:03specific so that uh depending on the
2:37:06exact conditions which prevailed when
2:37:08the launch occurred the recommendation
2:37:10would have been one which could have
2:37:11been used to make a decision
2:37:14[Applause]
2:37:15well I can't argue with that reasoning
2:37:18we just simply didn't address we
2:37:21we were addressing that the specific
2:37:24condition and uh not looking for uh for
2:37:27a threshold but usually engineering
2:37:30decisions and calculations are pretty
2:37:32exact calculations and you usually have
2:37:35a very specific number that's why there
2:37:37are launch criteria and those numbers
2:37:39are specific numbers they're not ranges
2:37:42and here evidently you had a range but
2:37:45you didn't even specify what that range
2:37:47was wasn't that rather unusual
2:37:49[Applause]
2:37:52yes I would say that was the fact that
2:37:55we were focused on that at one point and
2:37:58uh that's what we were addressing
2:37:59normally
2:38:02uh if you were earlier
2:38:06preparing for another lunch or something
2:38:08if the question came much up you would
2:38:10in fact tend to bracket it we were we
2:38:13were faced with this we felt a specific
2:38:15condition here
2:38:17and that's the reason we addressed it
2:38:19that way so you didn't feel
2:38:20uncomfortable with this position
2:38:23I didn't I felt that after we had had
2:38:27hashed it out and understood it that uh
2:38:31we the uh inability to precisely
2:38:35quantify the movement of that primary
2:38:39o-ring was the concern that we had
2:38:43but and and that's that's the additional
2:38:46knowledge that I would like to have had
2:38:49but I felt that with what the things
2:38:52that I've already pointed out that we
2:38:54were we had a reasonable basis for a
2:38:58feeling it was a fight it's amazing you
2:39:01you used the word uncertainty four or
2:39:03five times now in the last five minutes
2:39:05and now you just had the inability to
2:39:07quantify this thing that was the best
2:39:09thing you had going for you you know
2:39:11every launch has a risk uh but you you
2:39:13take that risk because something must be
2:39:15achieved what was driving here what was
2:39:18to be achieved that uh caused you to go
2:39:22well uh why wouldn't you wait a day
2:39:28well I it as far as waiting a day is
2:39:31concerned we wouldn't have gained any
2:39:33more information uh but you know to
2:39:36gained temperature you had them true
2:39:38that's true and uh
2:39:41we we had to decide whether we felt that
2:39:44it was safe to fly a 29 in order to
2:39:47respond to the question should we fly
2:39:51that's that was what we were that was a
2:39:54question that we were trying to answer
2:40:01in responding to the General's question
2:40:04uh about the the use of the word
2:40:07inconclusive and uncertainty in your
2:40:09hope
2:40:10a presentation here today uh you're
2:40:13basing your decisions on inconclusive
2:40:15and uncertain information yet my
2:40:18understanding of NASA's flight
2:40:19philosophy is that decisions to go or no
2:40:23go are based on certainties and
2:40:25conclusions
2:40:26uh when did this change in philosophy uh
2:40:30affect your operations
2:40:34well I would I have to respond I think
2:40:37it's the case of degree of uncertainty
2:40:39either or
2:40:40there's always any degree of uncertainty
2:40:43before you launch
2:40:51case in the design and
2:40:54testing and so forth of the the whole
2:40:57system there have to be some
2:40:58uncertainties it's it's a question of
2:41:01degree and uh
2:41:04but it seems to me there was a high
2:41:05degree of uncertainty in your
2:41:07calculations here well there was
2:41:11regarding to your own testimony well
2:41:14that's that of course is the is the the
2:41:17point that we were we were struggling
2:41:19with that night was what degree of
2:41:21uncertainty is there
2:41:23and uh the area was uncertainty was the
2:41:26moving of that primary o-ring well how
2:41:29would you characterize it as a high
2:41:31degree a low degree or a medium degree
2:41:33of uncertainty
2:41:36as far as the probability of of seeding
2:41:40is concerned I thought there was a low
2:41:42degree of uncertainty
2:41:43[Music]
2:41:47Mr kilmister when he wrote the cell
2:41:49facts that capture data not conclusive
2:41:52on predicting primary o-ring Blow by
2:41:56isn't that a
2:41:57not a very serious statement just saying
2:42:01that it was not conclusive isn't that
2:42:04another way saying that
2:42:05there might be a conclusion that there
2:42:07was going to be primary o-ring before
2:42:09well we what we did was say since it
2:42:13wasn't conclusive we were going to
2:42:15assume that it would have a negative
2:42:17effect that's the way we approached it
2:42:19in other words this is a statement
2:42:21saying we expect the primary holding
2:42:23Blow by we said
2:42:25we said we can't tell how much effect
2:42:28the temperature is going to have so we
2:42:31better look
2:42:32at what can happen if in fact it does so
2:42:37if that's the case then Dr Rice
2:42:40question is most relevant because the
2:42:42critical items listed that you cannot
2:42:44rely on this redundancy if you're
2:42:47predicting there's a possibility of
2:42:49primary o-ring Blow by
2:42:51you're violating the critical items to
2:42:55list
2:42:58well and we weren't predicting it but we
2:43:01were saying because we weren't able to
2:43:04be certain
2:43:05that the situation we were faced with is
2:43:07we have had
2:43:09Obi on earlier flights
2:43:12we had not had any uh reason to believe
2:43:18that we couldn't experience it again
2:43:21at any temperature
2:43:24that's where we were right then
2:43:28and so we we had to say that we can
2:43:31experience Blow by because we had
2:43:34experienced it and we had not yet been
2:43:37able to figure out what to do to prevent
2:43:40it
2:43:41so we we knew that it could happen and
2:43:45so we had to say
2:43:46what's the probability but even given a
2:43:50low probability we still had to think
2:43:53what's it going to mean if it does
2:43:56and that's what we we endeavored to do
2:43:59is to think what does it mean if it does
2:44:00even if it's a low probability but I
2:44:03don't want to continue the argument
2:44:05seems to me though that the critical
2:44:06items list says if that's the case
2:44:09is going to result in the catastrophe
2:44:12because there is no redundancy that was
2:44:14the finding as I understand it am I
2:44:17correct that Christ
2:44:21that just reading the critical items
2:44:24list
2:44:25um what it says is that it's the primary
2:44:28o-ring
2:44:29which is a criticality one
2:44:31not a criticality one r
2:44:33ather if you just read it in that that
2:44:36sense yes but if you if you know how we
2:44:40generated which was that it was not
2:44:43redundant full-time that it was only
2:44:46redundant during the ignition transient
2:44:49and then it was non-redone once the
2:44:51joint opened up and we knew that
2:44:54we understood that and uh
2:44:57that entered our that did enter our
2:44:59thinking
2:45:00in that
2:45:02discussing this idea that the secondary
2:45:05seal which will seat the principle is
2:45:08that it's located in the correct place
2:45:10because of it crusher put on during
2:45:13making a check which is two days or so
2:45:16before launch
2:45:18after the check has been made in the VAB
2:45:21building this
2:45:22machine is put on a carrier and carried
2:45:26and jiggled and so forth all the way out
2:45:28to the site stands there for two days
2:45:31and has rained upon and we have found in
2:45:33other cases that water gets into the
2:45:35seal
2:45:36did you consider it any when you were
2:45:39discussing these the probability or the
2:45:41possibility that it all is jiggling and
2:45:43then the water inside there freezing
2:45:45making ice that it could have displaced
2:45:47the secondary seal and that your
2:45:50idea that the secondary steel isn't
2:45:52exactly the right place and Will seat
2:45:53immediately during that short Transit
2:45:56might have even more uncertainty were
2:45:58you considering that those possibilities
2:46:00well we were not considering the
2:46:02possibility of ice in the in the joint
2:46:08um
2:46:09they we did not discuss the the
2:46:13potential for how much the O-ring might
2:46:16move uh as a point of of rolling it out
2:46:19although I think the feeling is that
2:46:21that's pretty stiff going but doesn't
2:46:23see any real movement but we did not
2:46:25consider the possibility of ice in the
2:46:27joint
2:46:29interruption
2:46:32approaches to Performance
2:46:35expansions envelope expansions in case
2:46:38of airplanes or component performance
2:46:41envelope expansions normally take the
2:46:45position well I flown in these places
2:46:46and based on that and my analysis of
2:46:50results of those flights I would be
2:46:52willing to go this much farther for the
2:46:55next case
2:46:57but yet your your Engineering Group said
2:47:00they wouldn't be willing to go outside
2:47:02their existing experience race or
2:47:05recommended that they not originally and
2:47:07later you said well we'll go this much
2:47:09more
2:47:13was there a
2:47:14before the fact
2:47:16any evidence or any attempt let's say to
2:47:21provide a level of expansion which the
2:47:26company could stand behind
2:47:28well there was work underway to get a
2:47:31better understanding of all overall
2:47:33performance to that joint defective
2:47:35rotation and effects of cancer that that
2:47:38was the program that was uh kicked off
2:47:42after the August
2:47:44meeting at headquarters where all of the
2:47:47joint designs and performance was
2:47:49reviewed
2:47:51then there was a program plan put
2:47:53together to look at ways to improve the
2:47:57performance and to get a more Fuller
2:48:01understanding that was underway but we
2:48:05didn't have the data the reasons that
2:48:07they didn't exist after you've flown as
2:48:10you say 144 joints or whatever could you
2:48:14attribute that to some uh some reason
2:48:16was it
2:48:18that you weren't interested or didn't
2:48:20think it was important or that you
2:48:23didn't have the resources or how would
2:48:25you characterize the fact that you were
2:48:26only as far as long as you were
2:48:29well
2:48:31it expanded along a fairly long period
2:48:34of time but there had been
2:48:36a fairly long period where we had made
2:48:40some improvements
2:48:41in the layup of the putty
2:48:44we didn't put some controls on the time
2:48:47it could be exposed and that sort of
2:48:48thing we've tried to make some changes
2:48:50that were not
2:48:52a risk of uh of going the wrong
2:48:56direction but we had high confidence
2:48:59we're going in the right direction and
2:49:01we had to have we're having a long
2:49:03period of not having any any erosion or
2:49:06Bovi
2:49:08inside of that in the middle of that
2:49:11period in the August
2:49:14time period we still concluded that we
2:49:17needed to proceed with an aggressive
2:49:20effort
2:49:21so there was a I say a little colon tug
2:49:24there in that at that time the
2:49:26performance was running pretty well but
2:49:28at the same time they now said we needed
2:49:30to get on with some improvements and we
2:49:33were searching from improvements that we
2:49:36could could prove out without running
2:49:38any any risks on the flight
2:49:42Mr McDonald
2:49:45stated that he did feel some pressure in
2:49:49this meeting and uh
2:49:53would you characterize your own feelings
2:49:56about pressure that may have influenced
2:49:59the decision process in any way
2:50:03I thought a lot about that and uh
2:50:07and there was some pressure but I
2:50:09believe it's in the in the range of what
2:50:12we abnormally encounter there's a
2:50:15whenever we're taking a position
2:50:18of NASA tests us on that position
2:50:22explain it justify it that sort of thing
2:50:25and that's the way I perceived we were
2:50:29being tested is how supportive uh how
2:50:33well can we justify our position
2:50:36and uh so we responded in that fashion
2:50:40now
2:50:43I can say I guess that I I get pressures
2:50:48in a lot of cases for a lot of decisions
2:50:50not just from NASA but from any people I
2:50:54deal with my boss and so forth and I
2:50:56think that I'm able to
2:50:58treat that properly and make the Sound
2:51:02Decision uh independent of that
2:51:05well let me be more specific to follow
2:51:07up
2:51:10do you do you think uh schedule pressure
2:51:14or cost pressure had significant
2:51:16influences on in this instance
2:51:19[Music]
2:51:20cost pressure definitely was had no
2:51:23bearing on it
2:51:25from a schedule standpoint we we take a
2:51:29lot of pride in the fact that we
2:51:30supported all of the launches to date
2:51:34and if there was any pressure we wanted
2:51:37to we wanted to continue to do the job
2:51:40we had been doing
2:51:41and that that kind of situation exists
2:51:45every time we happen to say are we ready
2:51:49to fly or are we not and we want to be
2:51:51ready to fly but we want to make sure
2:51:52it's safe
2:51:57anybody get in touch with you any calls
2:51:59of any kind urging you to go ahead with
2:52:01this launch
2:52:02no sir as far as you know where any such
2:52:05calls made to anybody in Cycles
2:52:08that's my knowledge there were none the
2:52:10only conversations we had were the ones
2:52:13on the net that have already been
2:52:14reported just one other question
2:52:19did you realize in particularly a view
2:52:21of Mr Hardy's point that they wouldn't
2:52:23launch unless you agreed
2:52:26you fully realize that in effect you
2:52:29were making the decision to launch you
2:52:31and your colleague
2:52:33yes sir
2:52:37I had 200 brief questions just like the
2:52:41return to your analysis of the data
2:52:43during your uh half an hour uh caucus uh
2:52:48in regard to the uh imprecision or
2:52:52uncertainty of the data is it not the
2:52:54case that the largest amount of blow by
2:52:57was associated with the coldest launch
2:52:59and that point was made by some of the
2:53:01engineers in the discussion why did you
2:53:04not consider that conclusive well
2:53:08we did consider but we we didn't
2:53:10consider conclusive simply because we'd
2:53:12had Bovi at the at the warmer
2:53:14temperature and we have erosion at
2:53:16varying temperatures but the largest
2:53:18amount of blowby was at the lowest
2:53:20temperature right right actually the
2:53:22erosion is is more of a concern than the
2:53:25Blow Bar in fact let's let's turn to the
2:53:27erosion uh Mr McDonald just stated that
2:53:30there was a case uh earlier in which uh
2:53:35the primary o-ring on the motor seal was
2:53:39on the
2:53:41lowest seal was eroded and only the
2:53:45secondary o-ring prevented a burn
2:53:46through and since you could not really
2:53:49rely on the secondary O-ring for the
2:53:51other seals was that not also a very
2:53:54significant parameter I noticed that is
2:53:56not mentioned at all in your analysis of
2:54:00your half an hour caucus
2:54:04well first we were we were considering
2:54:07the The Joint seal and uh as Mr McDonald
2:54:11pointed out we had concluded that uh the
2:54:16the most likely cause of the nozzle
2:54:19problem nozzle joint problem was the
2:54:21fact that we had tested in a low
2:54:23pressure and probably had not had a seal
2:54:26of the primary we had not confirmed that
2:54:28seal and we'd subsequently gone to a
2:54:32higher pressure the 200 PSI to be sure
2:54:35that the seals were proper rather than
2:54:39be matched by the putting what we found
2:54:41was that at the lower pressures down to
2:54:44100 PSI the putty could actually hold
2:54:48the pressure and so you weren't certain
2:54:50that the primary was seating
2:54:53so we had to go to the higher pressure
2:54:55which we knew the putty would not hold
2:54:57and with that we could be sure the
2:54:59O-ring was seating
2:55:01so our feeling on the nozzle joint was
2:55:04that that problem had been a product of
2:55:06not having properly a proper ceiling
2:55:09primary o-ring and it hadn't been tested
2:55:12adequately because it was masked by the
2:55:15putty but was that incident discussed
2:55:17during this half an hour caucus it was
2:55:19not discussed uh no sir we were we were
2:55:22talking about the joint it was of course
2:55:24known by everyone that that had occurred
2:55:28information can you recall any previous
2:55:31occasion when you're
2:55:33uh
2:55:35at least preliminary advice to NASA had
2:55:38been not to launch and they wish to go
2:55:41ahead of the launch
2:55:43no sir I do not
2:55:46was there any comment made during these
2:55:48conversations that you've described with
2:55:51NASA that this is a very unusual
2:55:53situation
2:55:56did anyone for example say that it's odd
2:55:58that the shoe is on this foot
2:56:02no not in that fashion no it was a
2:56:07the situation
2:56:09I felt sure future was clear because the
2:56:13conversations that have gone on in the
2:56:15discussions by all the people about how
2:56:18they felt and the data they had was all
2:56:21on the net so it was understood
2:56:23where we were coming from
2:56:28one question from
2:56:29uh
2:56:31in
2:56:33the analysis to get ready for launch
2:56:36there was this one statement that uh
2:56:40temperature concerns were maybe fuzzy
2:56:43because there was a blow-by or erosion
2:56:46at a 53 degree launch but there is also
2:56:49one at 75 degrees
2:56:52I'm just
2:56:54wondering whether getting a blow-by
2:56:58erosion at a very good warm temperature
2:57:00where everything could be working quite
2:57:02well wouldn't that raise concerns that
2:57:04maybe the system was running um
2:57:07quite largely and then maybe temperature
2:57:10would really put it in a submarginal
2:57:12condition
2:57:14that's one question the other one I have
2:57:16is in this package you gave us it looks
2:57:19as you proceed through the checks of the
2:57:22um
2:57:24Motors more erosion
2:57:27and blow by
2:57:29was occurring more recently than in
2:57:31earlier times and the design changes
2:57:34like the reduction of the structural
2:57:37strength of the motors of the of the um
2:57:40of the other cases the increase of the
2:57:42thrust
2:57:44was there a concern that I call that
2:57:46perhaps as time was going on and the
2:57:49system was asking to perform better that
2:57:52perhaps the seal was getting in more
2:57:54trouble I'm just trying to understand
2:57:55was there that concern or uh were you
2:57:58becoming more relaxed
2:58:00[Music]
2:58:01um
2:58:02I I would say when we put it all
2:58:05together in August
2:58:08we
2:58:09we indicated that we had a concern and
2:58:13that we needed to work on an improvement
2:58:16we also in that summary said that we
2:58:20felt that it was safe to continue to fly
2:58:23as long as we had proper conditions that
2:58:26is the 200 PSI leak test of proper
2:58:29assembly and that sort of thing so we
2:58:32were we we endeavored to summarize where
2:58:36we were
2:58:37in that August meeting because we looked
2:58:39at all three joints we looked at the
2:58:41field joints looked at the nozzle joint
2:58:44and we looked at the igniter joint we
2:58:46looked at all our history
2:58:47and quoting the history that you have
2:58:50here
2:58:51and uh made our assessment and
2:58:54identified that we
2:58:56ought to proceed in an orderly fashion
2:58:58but aggressively to to make an
2:59:01improvement in the joint well in in the
2:59:03August meeting then were there some
2:59:06ground rules
2:59:07lay down
2:59:09like like good inspections and the other
2:59:13conditions to keep flying yes
2:59:19what are do we have a record of what
2:59:22those holidays it's in the august 19
2:59:25briefing that we have provided copies to
2:59:28the commission on
2:59:29and it's it's uh maybe everything on
2:59:32temperature
2:59:34no uh in fact in the copies that we
2:59:38provided we also put in a February 10th
2:59:42set of pages
2:59:44uh reflecting the uh things that had
2:59:48happened since and in there we said that
2:59:51that's the condition that we should have
2:59:52as long as the blue pages are they not
2:59:54correct right
2:59:57that's cute
3:00:00Mason in in testimony that the committee
3:00:03has received an executive session and
3:00:04also in personal notes made available
3:00:07who characterizes telling
3:00:10Mr Lund in this caucus to take off his
3:00:12engineering had improvements management
3:00:14hat as part of that final management
3:00:16caucus
3:00:18in fact in your notes here from your
3:00:20your presentation from your charts
3:00:23you indicate that you
3:00:25have asked them to exercise best
3:00:27judgment and make management
3:00:28recommendation
3:00:30now since Mr Lund was your vice
3:00:32president of engineering
3:00:34and since he presented the charts and
3:00:36the recommendations not to launch
3:00:38outside your ex experience today
3:00:41that is below a temperature of 53
3:00:43degrees for the O-rings
3:00:44in the previous 845 Eastern Standard
3:00:47Time teleconference what did you have in
3:00:50mind when you asked him to take off his
3:00:52engineering hat and put on his
3:00:54management hat I had in mind the fact
3:00:57that we had identified that we could not
3:01:01quantify the movement of that Prime of
3:01:06the time for movement of their primary
3:01:07we couldn't we didn't have the data to
3:01:10do that and therefore it was going to
3:01:12take a judgment rather than a precise
3:01:15engineering calculation in order to
3:01:17conclude what we needed to conclude
3:01:22what triggered the caucus that phone
3:01:24call asked for according to testimony
3:01:26was the fact that NASA had expressed
3:01:28surprise concern about the impact of
3:01:31such a recommendation of not launching
3:01:33below a 53 degree Fahrenheit temperature
3:01:35for the O-ring and particularly impact
3:01:38on schedule
3:01:39during the 30-minute caucus was there
3:01:41any part of your discussion that
3:01:43addressed that impact on schedule and
3:01:46what that meant to Firefall any
3:01:48management concern on that
3:01:50well when you say what what triggers the
3:01:53caucus uh was not this expression of
3:01:57concern in fact there's a bit of irony
3:02:00but they that from my viewpoint the
3:02:02primary trigger was Mr McDonald's
3:02:05comment about the fact that the
3:02:06secondary was in the in a
3:02:09preferred position and that's the point
3:02:12that we had not actively considered in
3:02:15our previous discussion
3:02:18but what's the answer to the question
3:02:19though I thought we had previous
3:02:21testimonies that's what triggered it
3:02:22regardless of what triggered it
3:02:24considering those concerns were
3:02:26expressed was there discussion and a
3:02:28sign called caucus with respect to
3:02:30schedule and the impact of sticking to a
3:02:3253 degree Fahrenheit temperature is a
3:02:34launch condition and what that meant no
3:02:38there was not no discussion of
3:02:39scheduling oh we simply addressed the
3:02:41the issue of flight safety Mr Mason
3:02:45Wendy to Lund
3:02:47and
3:02:49tell them in effect the takeoff is
3:02:51engineering head and put on his
3:02:53management hat
3:02:55wasn't that pressure on your part to a
3:02:59subordinate that he should change his
3:03:01mind
3:03:03well I hope not but it could be
3:03:06interpreted that way
3:03:08but so any other
3:03:10uh that's the journey we reconvene at
3:03:13one o'clock and three two o'clock excuse
3:03:15me and uh we plan to have Mr Bush away
3:03:20Mr Thompson Mr Lund after lunch
3:03:27[Music]
3:03:54[Music]
3:04:15thank you
3:04:18in that case
3:04:22[Music]
3:04:31virtually grab some ghettos just move a
3:04:34mic over so you each have a microphone
3:04:42[Music]
3:04:47okay the commission come to order please
3:04:52[Music]
3:05:03[Music]
3:05:12they're now present employed by Point
3:05:15Cycles yes I am and how long have you
3:05:18been employed by the approximately five
3:05:19and a half years how many five and a
3:05:22half years and what's your present
3:05:23position
3:05:25I'm a senior scientist it's my title I'm
3:05:28basically a staff member to the manager
3:05:30of Applied mechanics
3:05:32and what kind of work have you been
3:05:34doing for the last five years
3:05:36I have been involved in the joints I
3:05:39have gone down to the cape and taken a
3:05:42significant amount of inspections of the
3:05:44solid rocket boosters as they've come
3:05:46back from flights
3:05:48I reported on that information and that
3:05:50information has been used in the
3:05:51flavoring is reviews for the next flight
3:05:54I've also participated in some of the
3:05:56structural analysis
3:05:59also was one of the primary directors of
3:06:03the refurbishment specification on the
3:06:05cases themselves particularly in the
3:06:07area of the of the joints
3:06:10I have given made a videotape and have
3:06:13given a presentation
3:06:15at our plant also at Vandenberg in a KSC
3:06:19concerning the inspection
3:06:20characteristics of the joint surfaces
3:06:23themselves
3:06:24I have been appointed as a member of the
3:06:28special steel task force that was
3:06:30initiated last August and I'm in that
3:06:33position currently
3:06:35you've been described
3:06:37in previous testimony is
3:06:40either the leading or a-leading
3:06:44expert on the subject of seals and
3:06:46joints and the booster rocket uh
3:06:50have an idea that Mr Thompson works with
3:06:54you in this connection uh Arnie used to
3:06:57be my supervisor I used to work at the
3:06:58end of approximately two years ago
3:07:00and uh I went out of that capacity it's
3:07:04like I said about two years ago Mr
3:07:06Thompson you want to give a little
3:07:08background of your own experience how
3:07:10long have you been with cycle been a
3:07:12cycle 21 years how many 31 21 years 21
3:07:15years and during that time well what's
3:07:18your present uh I'm supervisor for
3:07:21structures design for rocket motor cases
3:07:25metallic rocket motor cases
3:07:28how many men work for you now about 25
3:07:31people and are they mostly engineers
3:07:35yes sir
3:07:37[Music]
3:07:40and have you had extensive experience in
3:07:43the connection with the the
3:07:45solid fuel booster rocket and the in the
3:07:49O-rings and the seals that we've been
3:07:51talking about
3:07:52yes I would say so I've been involved
3:07:55for about seven or eight years in the
3:07:58case program I first came into it uh
3:08:02right after the first hydroproof of the
3:08:04cylindrical section
3:08:09usually do you have Engineers working
3:08:11for you or with you no I'm strictly in a
3:08:14staff position at this present time
3:08:19how do you want to go back a little bit
3:08:21you've been doing some extra work in
3:08:23connection with the uh with the sales
3:08:26and the O-rings you want to describe
3:08:29that as a result of my involvement in
3:08:34Hardware inspections after the kit after
3:08:36the vehicles had flown at Kennedy I got
3:08:41involved
3:08:42quite heavily in some of the flight
3:08:44Readiness reviews that
3:08:47presented problem areas with the seals
3:08:49namely the erosion that was going on
3:08:51we're going to move the microphone just
3:08:53a little bit closer please good you know
3:08:57I I was involved in going down to the
3:08:59cape
3:09:00and inspecting the hardware after it
3:09:02flew and any of the hardware that
3:09:06experience problems with the seals
3:09:07namely erosion I was also involved in
3:09:10the preparation sometimes the
3:09:11presentations in Flight Readiness
3:09:13reviews along with Al McDonald
3:09:17so that you have have made some of the
3:09:20actual inspections that we've been
3:09:22talking about this morning in connection
3:09:23with erosion and blow-wise and so forth
3:09:25I was the person that was there when SRM
3:09:2915 was disassembled I was the person
3:09:32that inspected those joints and reported
3:09:34on those joints took the samples of the
3:09:37blackened grease characterized the
3:09:39degrees of Arc that the black and Greece
3:09:42existed directed The photographs taken
3:09:44of the joint took the samples for
3:09:47chemical analysis back to Morton's I
3:09:49called for analysis of what the
3:09:51blackened condition actually was and
3:09:54then prepared the presentation to give
3:09:56to Marshall on the condition of those
3:09:59joints
3:10:01so you've had as much first-hand
3:10:03experience as probably anybody else in
3:10:05the field that's correct
3:10:12um
3:10:13perhaps you could characterize for
3:10:17the concern
3:10:21and activities that went on with respect
3:10:25to the joints starting back in the time
3:10:28before the August of 85 times or
3:10:31whatever before that work where you
3:10:33should start
3:10:35um yeah just
3:10:37along about uh
3:10:40srm8 thereabouts I could be off a
3:10:43vehicle or two either way
3:10:45uh we had previously to that experienced
3:10:50putty going around the end of the
3:10:53crevice
3:10:54and up to the primary o-ring and
3:10:57actually sometimes into the groove
3:10:59and there was some concern expressed
3:11:01about that situation because the putty
3:11:04has a asbestos filler in it which is a
3:11:07fiber store
3:11:09concern was that the fibers might
3:11:13interfere with the ceiling capability of
3:11:16the O-ring
3:11:17therefore a change was made
3:11:20to lay up the putty in a little bit
3:11:23different character on the end of the
3:11:25clevis leg such that when you made it
3:11:28you would not see that characteristic
3:11:30amount of putty down there next to the
3:11:32O-ring and by observation that intent
3:11:35was successful because from that time on
3:11:38I never saw putty past the chamber on
3:11:41the end of the clevis leg and never
3:11:43around the corner on the radio surface
3:11:45and down towards the seal
3:11:47then
3:11:49we would report on the erosion
3:11:52characteristics
3:11:55on the fields as we observed them like I
3:11:57said we photographed them
3:11:59we documented the degree of our of any
3:12:02of the damage both heat affected and
3:12:04erosion the erosion generally is a very
3:12:06localized
3:12:09removal of the material in the O-rings
3:12:11and it it goes some distance
3:12:14longitudinally as the charge explained
3:12:16that you have
3:12:18and we would report on that and that
3:12:20became a
3:12:22focal point
3:12:23for discussion as a problem area for the
3:12:26next flight Readiness review
3:12:27so basically that was my my task at that
3:12:32time
3:12:32who was there uh
3:12:36an increase in concern in the mid 85 as
3:12:41a result of the observations that you
3:12:44and others have made yes if they're in
3:12:4615 actually increase their concern
3:12:48because that was the first time we had
3:12:51actually penetrated a primary o-ring on
3:12:53a field joint with heart gas and we had
3:12:57a witness of that event because the
3:12:59grease between the O-rings was blackened
3:13:03just like coal for those Arc lengths
3:13:05that were described in the charts and
3:13:07that was so much more significant than
3:13:09it had ever been seen before on any Blow
3:13:12by on any joint when was that flight
3:13:14that was a year ago last January and the
3:13:18reason it was so vivid in my mind is
3:13:19because I was at the cape prior to the
3:13:22launch
3:13:23giving the presentation to approximately
3:13:25130 people at the launch facility on the
3:13:29inspection techniques on the joint to be
3:13:31used to ensure that any defects which
3:13:34had been removed from the joint were
3:13:36removed in a manner such that the
3:13:38transition on the defect was very smooth
3:13:41so that the elastomeric condition of the
3:13:43O-ring could actually get into those
3:13:45imperfections
3:13:46because it had been smooth out and being
3:13:49elastomer it would do just that
3:13:51and uh I remember the watching the
3:13:54launch in the launch I went out of the
3:13:56VAB
3:13:58and it was a afternoon launch my
3:14:01recollection is sometime between one and
3:14:02two o'clock in the afternoon I'm not
3:14:04sure
3:14:05but it was reasonably uh cool but yet I
3:14:09went out without a suit Coke
3:14:11uh during the presentation of that
3:14:15vehicle after was inspected it was
3:14:18calculated by the folks back at the
3:14:21plant and he transferred folks that the
3:14:24seal temperature
3:14:25would have been approximately 53 degrees
3:14:28for that launch and that was part of the
3:14:30characterization of the presentation in
3:14:33the flight rate industry View for the
3:14:34next vehicle
3:14:36now
3:14:37that presentation
3:14:40was a very
3:14:41pointed discussion a very detailed
3:14:44discussion
3:14:46and quite frankly I commented to Elle
3:14:48McDonald
3:14:49once or twice that had I not been
3:14:52personally there and been personally
3:14:54witnessing what what I've seen in
3:14:56presenting what I had physically seen I
3:14:59don't think we could have been able to
3:15:00convince NASA to continue to fly
3:15:03uh I felt very strong about that fact
3:15:06because I spoke from conviction and I
3:15:09was challenged by just about everybody
3:15:11in the room
3:15:12about what I had reported and uh
3:15:16I was very grateful that I was there and
3:15:20was able to stick by my convictions
3:15:22because I had seen
3:15:23the condition of the joint Mr Rose lay
3:15:26on 51c you saw a very blackened joint uh
3:15:29two of them two of them however on 61a
3:15:31the temperature was 75 degrees and that
3:15:34has been used to uh minimize the effects
3:15:36on on 51c saying that it occurs at the
3:15:39warm temperature also would you explain
3:15:41the difference that you saw or heard of
3:15:42between the two joints yeah the
3:15:44difference the srm-22 that was used as a
3:15:48comparison basis was not one that I saw
3:15:50personally but a junior engineer or a
3:15:53younger I shouldn't say junior but a
3:15:54younger engineer who works for Arne has
3:15:57actually been at the cape and seen those
3:15:59joints I questioned him
3:16:02and ask him
3:16:03to tell me in his words what he saw
3:16:07what he told me was that he saw a light
3:16:10grayish to dark grayish splotches that
3:16:15occurred over an arc length of
3:16:16approximately 40 degrees
3:16:18then we discussed the photos he had a
3:16:20photo of that joint and I had a photo
3:16:23package of the srm15 and we put the
3:16:26photos side by side and you could see
3:16:30that the srm15 joint had coal black
3:16:35color where we had photographed it and
3:16:38the joint was as he described it was not
3:16:40coal black it was significantly lighter
3:16:43and a little bit splotchy the
3:16:45splotchiness wasn't so definitive but
3:16:47that's how we defined it to me now on
3:16:49that basis
3:16:51I concluded and so presented the night
3:16:53before the launch that that was
3:16:55extremely significant it was very
3:16:58significant because it was telling us
3:16:59that temperature was indeed a
3:17:01discriminator and that although I
3:17:03couldn't quantify
3:17:05what that discriminator was
3:17:07from a actual threshold standpoint in
3:17:11other words I couldn't say you can Fly
3:17:13Above This temperature you can fly you
3:17:15can't fly below this temperature I
3:17:16couldn't do that I didn't know of
3:17:17anybody that could do that with the data
3:17:19we had at the time but I was extremely
3:17:21concerned and my concern ran deeper than
3:17:24enter M15 it ran as a result of the SRM
3:17:2816 nozzle
3:17:30which the primary nozzle was compromised
3:17:33and we presented that as having never
3:17:36sealed and as having happened in the
3:17:39ignition transient uh in in launching
3:17:42that that vehicle now
3:17:45that was characterized as a seal that
3:17:48never sealed because it either was not
3:17:50properly leak checked because of what
3:17:52was explained before I shouldn't say not
3:17:55properly checked but it was leak checked
3:17:56at 100 PSI which we knew we had data
3:17:59that said that putty could mask the leak
3:18:01check at that level
3:18:04we also postulated that maybe there was
3:18:06nothing wrong with the leak check and
3:18:07maybe in the transfer of the O-ring in
3:18:09the groove it had simply ridden up on a
3:18:12piece of contamination and never did
3:18:13seal but the fact was that now you
3:18:16introduced another phenomena you have
3:18:18impingement erosion and bypass erosion
3:18:21and the O-ring material gets removed
3:18:25from the cross-section of the O-ring
3:18:26much much faster when you have bypass
3:18:28erosion or blow-bias people have been
3:18:30terming it we usually use the
3:18:32characteristic blowbyte and turn to
3:18:35Define gas past it and we use
3:18:39the other term to indicate that that
3:18:42we're eroding at the same time so you
3:18:45can have blow-by without erosion you can
3:18:47have blow-by with erosion now I don't
3:18:50remember the temperature of that
3:18:51particular vehicle but that turned the
3:18:54gain up very very high on the seal
3:18:56problem extremely high in my mind we
3:19:00were you know just playing with a
3:19:02dangerous situation
3:19:04so
3:19:07if you've seen the packages that I've
3:19:09turned in and you've probably read the
3:19:12memo that I wrote and expressed the
3:19:15concern I had to make absolutely sure in
3:19:18in everybody's mind that management was
3:19:21aware of my concerns saying that I was
3:19:24one of the fellas that was most
3:19:26involved with that particular situation
3:19:30coming in
3:19:33since you're on the task force uh yes
3:19:36[Music]
3:19:38tell us the history of the establishment
3:19:40of that task force and what they were
3:19:41charged to do we were charged
3:19:44to look at alternate designs
3:19:48in the joint
3:19:51Upstream of the O-rings themselves and
3:19:54to also look at the seal design as it
3:19:57relates to the secondary seal
3:20:00and that was to try to come up with
3:20:03something that would replace the putty
3:20:04would be of a vented design and assure
3:20:07that we got gas pressurization to the
3:20:10seal the primary seal also look at an
3:20:13alternative secondary steel design which
3:20:17would indeed follow the gap opening of
3:20:20the metal Parts such that should a
3:20:23primary o-ring be compromised in any
3:20:25manner that the secondary seal would be
3:20:28in a position because it was in contact
3:20:30with both sides of the middle parts to
3:20:32be pressurized pressure actuated and
3:20:35cause the seal to to be affected and
3:20:38that was the primary task of this team
3:20:40to what extent were temperature
3:20:42considerations involved in the work of
3:20:44the to the extent that we had run tests
3:20:47or Harney actually had them run at the
3:20:49lab but I was aware of them we had run
3:20:51tests on o-ring resiliency
3:20:54you know and from the team standpoint we
3:20:57cease to talk about an O-ring and
3:20:59started to talk about seal because some
3:21:02of the seals under investigation are not
3:21:04O-rings they are cross-sections that
3:21:06have metallic leaf springs in them such
3:21:09that you will get a mechanical assist to
3:21:12force the elastomer to remaining contact
3:21:14such that if you did violate a primary
3:21:17seal you would be capable of
3:21:18pressurization
3:21:20so with that information we were looking
3:21:23at the whole regime we were trying to
3:21:26get
3:21:27resiliency data run at the plant since
3:21:30last October which I mentioned in my
3:21:32statement and also that night mentioned
3:21:35over the over the phone and we had
3:21:38trouble because we kept having machine
3:21:39breakdowns we kept having priority
3:21:42problems and here we were you know three
3:21:44months later and we still didn't have
3:21:45the data necessary to us to to pursue it
3:21:50even further so that night we presented
3:21:53the information on the basis of what we
3:21:55knew and what we knew and I feel very
3:21:58strong about it is that we had a problem
3:22:01with temperature and it was away from
3:22:03the direction of goodness and that's my
3:22:04phrase because I can't quantify it but I
3:22:07always use that it's away from the
3:22:08direction of goodness and we had run
3:22:11tests to show that the Seal never lifted
3:22:13off
3:22:14in a resiliency test at 100 degrees
3:22:16Fahrenheit
3:22:18we had a data point that night that
3:22:20showed that the seal lifted off in the
3:22:23in the ignition cycle for two and a half
3:22:26seconds or 2.4 seconds at room
3:22:28temperature 75 degrees we showed that it
3:22:31lifted off and remained lifted off for
3:22:35an excess of 10 minutes because we
3:22:37stopped the test at 10 minutes at 50
3:22:38degrees now with that testing that was
3:22:41run initially I through my concern and
3:22:45the joints that I had witnessed had
3:22:48asked them to please run one more and
3:22:50that was to back off
3:22:53the instrument machine platens that had
3:22:55compressed the seal ten thousandths of
3:22:58an inch
3:22:59and see what happens and they did that
3:23:01and it remained seated that was my
3:23:04comfort zone I am the one that made the
3:23:06chart that Elle McDonald presented at
3:23:09Washington in August which said that if
3:23:12you go from zero to 170 milliseconds you
3:23:15have a high probability of a good
3:23:17secondary seal if you go from 170 to 330
3:23:22milliseconds you have a reduced
3:23:24probability of a secondary seal and if
3:23:27you go beyond that point to full
3:23:28pressurization you most assuredly might
3:23:31not have a secondary seal now that was
3:23:34based on the information that I had at
3:23:36the time and I just went in and
3:23:38estimated those from a pressure Trace
3:23:40pressure time trace and made that
3:23:42judgment and that was the basis of my
3:23:46concern and that was also the basis of
3:23:49continuing to fly because it happens
3:23:51either it happens or it doesn't happen
3:23:53right at the very first threshold of the
3:23:56ignition Transit thank you Mr Thompson
3:23:59uh you're uh in your group uh were any
3:24:04of you or any of your people working
3:24:06this problem as well or aware of this
3:24:08yes sir we were right after the January
3:24:12uh witness of SRM 15 and the disastrous
3:24:17effects and my judgment on the ill ring
3:24:18situation and seeing lots of soot in
3:24:22both the primary O-rings of the field
3:24:25joints and between primary in turkey and
3:24:27the field joints and the nozzle it
3:24:30appeared to me that some additional
3:24:32tests need to be run and as Roger has
3:24:35mentioned the resilience test was one of
3:24:37the first because then if we're getting
3:24:39so blow by by the primary o-ring we'd
3:24:43better be checking and making sure that
3:24:44our secondary is in in good good shape
3:24:48so we devised the task to squeeze the
3:24:50no-ring down a nominal amount and then
3:24:52come up at about four inches per minute
3:24:57in an instron machine and uh I'd like to
3:25:00quantify that just a little bit
3:25:03because if one looks at the rate at
3:25:07which these surfaces separate it's a
3:25:09non-linear function
3:25:10it has kind of a toe line at first and
3:25:13then has a fairly High rate over an
3:25:15inflection point and then kind of comes
3:25:17over the top
3:25:18and uh the if one takes a secret from
3:25:22Time Zero to the soft point which is
3:25:25about uh oh forty forty two thousandths
3:25:29at uh six tenths of a second that secant
3:25:33was on the order of 3.2 inches per
3:25:36minute
3:25:37and the tests that we had run up to this
3:25:40point including the night that we were
3:25:41discussing this was two inches per
3:25:43minute
3:25:44and additionally the concern is if one
3:25:47looks at the steeper slope after you
3:25:49come off the toe through the inflection
3:25:51point
3:25:52that that slope is on the order of 10
3:25:55inches per minute
3:25:56so what it means to me and I hope to
3:25:59others is that it's a very very high
3:26:01rate shortly after that comes off on the
3:26:05order of 100 to 200 milliseconds
3:26:07so the message I believe and I tried to
3:26:10convey
3:26:11was that for 100 milliseconds to 200
3:26:15milliseconds Rogers indicated 170. you
3:26:19really probably do have a pretty good
3:26:20chance for a seal thereafter you do not
3:26:24and so to further answer the question
3:26:26and hope I'm not too long is that blow
3:26:29by of course was an issue and so uh I
3:26:32set up a series of tests to try and
3:26:35determine the factors that affect World
3:26:38by such as squeeze such as temperature
3:26:40and in fact trying to attempt to measure
3:26:43the blow-by using argon at first and
3:26:46then subsequently changed to Freon
3:26:48because it's a better Witness
3:26:51a question about the these tests
3:26:55uh to measure the rate of a gap opening
3:26:59if that's a proper term was this on a uh
3:27:02an actual set of Hardware or was it a
3:27:05test vehicle and how would tolerances
3:27:08influence that could you get quite a
3:27:10varied uh
3:27:12answer depending on whether you had a
3:27:14tight joint or whether you had a system
3:27:17that was uh close to the other end of
3:27:19the tolerance
3:27:21yes sir what we did recognizing this is
3:27:24first of all it was a bench test it was
3:27:26a three inch piece of o-ring
3:27:29in fact two inch two inch piece of
3:27:31o-ring that was squeezed to about a
3:27:34nominal squeeze which is like forty
3:27:36thousands many of our joints have about
3:27:39that squeeze the particular one in
3:27:41question uh in the incident was thirty
3:27:44five thousand thirty seven thousands
3:27:46and so we just merely would give it the
3:27:48squeeze and then back off at the
3:27:50simulated rate
3:27:52that uh we could do on the instron
3:27:55machine
3:27:57well the
3:27:59um results an actual flight Hardware
3:28:01then depending on uh the various
3:28:04production runs on the cases yes sir we
3:28:07do in fact if you have additional
3:28:10squeeze you not only have the two
3:28:13surfaces the one surface pushing off but
3:28:16if it's a lot of squeeze in a small
3:28:18o-ring Groove the side surface of the
3:28:22O-ring probably can always help I can
3:28:24also help and that gives you additional
3:28:26energy to help it respond
3:28:28well what about the other direction
3:28:30where the tolerances are on the other
3:28:32side
3:28:33we investigated tolerances and gaps
3:28:37and we have set up a matrix that to do
3:28:40that very thing this was kind of a
3:28:42preliminary test we had run
3:28:44and as Roger mentioned we have refined
3:28:47the test and not and have some results
3:28:49now but after the fact
3:28:51and the test included squeeze included
3:28:55temperature and also the variable rate
3:28:57that we think we really have in the
3:28:59motor we have simulated that by input
3:29:02using a function generator as an input
3:29:04to the instron machine so that we could
3:29:07generate the actual motion as we saw it
3:29:10but with the fact that the testing is is
3:29:13somewhat late
3:29:14[Music]
3:29:16and then that there's a lot of variables
3:29:19and there's been a lot of commentary on
3:29:22temperature
3:29:23um
3:29:24couldn't you uh come up with a situation
3:29:26where temperature and tolerances uh
3:29:29could develop a a sub marginal joint and
3:29:33that of the 144 cases uh now that have
3:29:37been fired you could run the gamut from
3:29:39having very good ones the very bad ones
3:29:42yes sir we could we ran as I say uh just
3:29:45a preliminary run that showed the uh
3:29:47that it was a problem but
3:29:50would would all the parties be aware
3:29:53that you could have wild variations and
3:29:56then couldn't this develop quite a
3:29:58concern on everybody's part that the
3:30:00system was uh pretty tender
3:30:03my feeling the system was tender and
3:30:06this was the reason I objected the night
3:30:07that was the point we tried to make that
3:30:09night
3:30:10is because we didn't have sufficient
3:30:12data my question gets around to
3:30:16why wouldn't everybody have that feeling
3:30:18that uh the situation was uh very tender
3:30:21and uh why wouldn't everybody develop a
3:30:24feeling of great concern about them
3:30:27by that means develop a very very
3:30:29conservative attitude towards
3:30:31approaching a launch
3:30:33that's what we thought happened when the
3:30:35original conclusions and recommendations
3:30:37were made because they were quite
3:30:39inconsistent quite consistent with what
3:30:41we had presented prior to the meeting
3:30:43and prior to making the charts
3:30:47come to the the night of the launch and
3:30:49the launch itself or the decisions a
3:30:51little while but I'd like to go back
3:30:52just a minute to some of the background
3:30:54before we get to that point to show your
3:30:57concern has expressed to management I
3:31:01have here a letter which appears to be
3:31:03one signed by you dated July 31st 1985
3:31:08and I'll ask Dr Keel
3:31:10to give it to you
3:31:14[Applause]
3:31:15uh and I gather from the files that we
3:31:19received from you you wrote a series of
3:31:22letters for memos to I guess memos is a
3:31:25better way to describe it those are
3:31:26activity reports yes
3:31:28um expressing your concern about this
3:31:31problem of the sales and the O-rings and
3:31:34so forth I would ask you if you don't
3:31:36mind to read that memorandum data July
3:31:3831st which you wrote to doctor to RK
3:31:42Lund who's vice president of engineering
3:31:44yes would you mind yeah this letter is
3:31:48written to ensure
3:31:50that management is fully aware of the
3:31:53seriousness of the current o-ring
3:31:55erosion problem in the SRM joints from
3:31:58an engineering standpoint
3:32:00so mistakenly accepted position on the
3:32:02joint problem was to fly without fear of
3:32:05failure and to run a series of design
3:32:07evaluations which would ultimately lead
3:32:10to a solution or at least a significant
3:32:13reduction of the erosion problem
3:32:15this position is now drastically changed
3:32:18as a result of the srm-16a nozzle joint
3:32:22erosion which eroded a secondary o-ring
3:32:25with a primary o-ring never ceiling
3:32:28if the same scenario should occur in a
3:32:30field joint parentheses and it could
3:32:34then close parentheses then it is a jump
3:32:37ball is the success or failure of the
3:32:40joint because the secondary o-ring
3:32:42cannot respond to the clevis opening
3:32:44rate and may not be capable of
3:32:46pressurization
3:32:48the result would be a catastrophe of the
3:32:51highest order Dash loss of human life
3:32:55an unofficial team parentheses a memo
3:32:59defining the team and its purpose was
3:33:01never published close parentheses with
3:33:04leader was formed on 19 July 1985.
3:33:08and was tasked with solving the problem
3:33:10for both the short and the long term
3:33:13this unofficial team is essentially
3:33:15non-existent at this time
3:33:18in my opinion the fee must be officially
3:33:21given the responsibility and the
3:33:23authority to execute the work that needs
3:33:26to be done on a non-interference basis
3:33:29parentheses full-time assignment until
3:33:31completed close parentheses
3:33:34[Applause]
3:33:37it is my honest and very real fear that
3:33:41if we do not take immediate action to
3:33:43dedicate a team to solve the problem
3:33:46with the field joint having the number
3:33:48one priority then we stand in Jeopardy
3:33:51of losing a flight along with all the
3:33:53launch pad facilities then I signed it
3:33:56and the manager that I work for count
3:33:58assigned it as concurred
3:34:02thank you
3:34:03I assume Mr Thompson you agree with the
3:34:05contents of that memorandum absolutely
3:34:07yes
3:34:10um the left commission has any further
3:34:12questions I'd like now to go to the uh
3:34:16January 27th and January 28th to
3:34:20ask you Mr fuchsia to uh describe in
3:34:25your own words your first involvement in
3:34:29those discussions and uh uh what was
3:34:33said who took part in your position and
3:34:36later on uh your position
3:34:39okay
3:34:40my foreign
3:34:45you did make notes
3:34:47on the 27th about the events of that
3:34:51time yes I did I made a map of the
3:34:54meeting you made the math but on the
3:34:55same day yeah and then I made a few more
3:34:57notes on the on the day of the launch
3:35:00yeah prior to the launch and then I made
3:35:02a short entry after the launch but the
3:35:05the notes on the 27th and the 28th were
3:35:08made on those days yes they were and the
3:35:11other the the last one was made after
3:35:13the accident that's correct uh in your
3:35:16discussion you may refer to those notes
3:35:18and we if you have no objection may make
3:35:20them public I uh kind of just
3:35:23paraphraged them and made them on three
3:35:24by five cards but I think they
3:35:26essentially have the content of what's
3:35:28in those notes
3:35:30uh my first knowledge about any consent
3:35:33any temperature concern on the launch
3:35:35was approximately 1 pm that on the 27th
3:35:39of January
3:35:41there was a preliminary meeting held to
3:35:43discuss the concern at the low
3:35:46temperature for resiliency
3:35:48football by
3:35:50previous launch and static test
3:35:52temperatures
3:35:54and there were several
3:35:56well there were quite a few people in
3:35:58that meeting most of whom were engineers
3:36:00some were program management I don't
3:36:01remember the names honestly
3:36:03uh anyways that meeting concluded with
3:36:07the
3:36:08tempo that there was a valid concern for
3:36:12temperature low temperature
3:36:15also heard sometime afterwards that it
3:36:18had been cold for several days
3:36:21and what really impressed me about this
3:36:23piece of information was that it was
3:36:26opposite what srm15 has experienced
3:36:30and that concerned me because when I got
3:36:33off the plane a year ago last January
3:36:36for the SRM 15 launch
3:36:39it was very cold like 17 or 18 degrees
3:36:42when I got off the airplane at Orlando
3:36:44the next few days although it remained
3:36:47cold it it got warmer and by launch time
3:36:51like I said it was probably in the 60s
3:36:53but it did get warmer now what was
3:36:55concerning me about this piece of
3:36:57information was it was the reverse it
3:37:00had been cold for several days and it
3:37:01was getting colder
3:37:04and that's why I noted that because that
3:37:07just turned the gain up on my concern
3:37:09because it was away from goodness again
3:37:12SRM 15 that I'm referring to was the
3:37:14coldest launch up to that point in time
3:37:17okay I felt we were very successful in
3:37:19convincing Engineering Management of the
3:37:21problem
3:37:24by now we heard that the overnight low
3:37:26was predicted to be 18 degrees
3:37:28Fahrenheit
3:37:31and again my concern deepen because what
3:37:34I just spoke it was going in the wrong
3:37:36direction from the past experience base
3:37:39a telecon was set up with Marshall space
3:37:42flight center and Kennedy Space Center
3:37:45to present data over our concern about
3:37:48the low temperature now there had been
3:37:50some meetings in between and quite
3:37:51frankly I'm almost a total blank because
3:37:55I was down in my office I ran a
3:37:57calculation that showed that the O-ring
3:38:01shrinkage due to low temperature and
3:38:03dropping from 75 degrees to 25 degrees
3:38:06it was just a rough number was three
3:38:09thousandths of an inch and that was due
3:38:11to both the shrinkage on the diameter
3:38:13and the effective temperature stretching
3:38:16it around its circumference and thus
3:38:18causing the diameter to shrink down
3:38:19again there was roughly a 50 50 split in
3:38:22those numbers but the bottom line was it
3:38:24was about three thousandths of an inch
3:38:26okay that shows me that squeeze wasn't
3:38:30really in effect
3:38:31squeeze was not an issue it never has
3:38:33been an issue with me because if you
3:38:35look at all the eroded O-rings they
3:38:37don't correlate with squeeze the O-rings
3:38:39that you would expect to be eroded are
3:38:41those that have the lowest squeeze and
3:38:42that's not the case so squeeze was never
3:38:44an issue but I ran the number anyways to
3:38:46assure myself that it was okay which it
3:38:48was
3:38:49okay the telecon data and I must
3:38:51emphasize this we had very little time
3:38:53to prepare data for that telecom when it
3:38:57was decided in a group in our conference
3:38:59room that we would take a systematic
3:39:02approach and sign certain individuals
3:39:04certain tasks to prepare we all Scurry
3:39:07to our individual locations and prepared
3:39:09that information on a timely manner
3:39:11that's why the charts for the most part
3:39:12are hand printed or handwritten because
3:39:15we didn't have time to get them even
3:39:16typed
3:39:18uh each person during a telecon
3:39:21presented their own charts
3:39:24just for the record I presented charts
3:39:262-1
3:39:282-2
3:39:29-3 and I also presented 3-1 which I did
3:39:33not prepare but which was
3:39:35sequence right after the one that I did
3:39:37and I was asked just to present it which
3:39:38I did I presented 4-1 and 5-1
3:39:42[Applause]
3:39:44I expressed deep concern about launching
3:39:47at low temperature
3:39:49I presented
3:39:51chart 2-1 with emphasis now 2-1
3:39:55if you want to see it I have it but
3:39:57basically that was the chart that
3:39:59summarized the primary concerns and that
3:40:02was the chart that I pulled right out of
3:40:04the Washington presentation without
3:40:05changing one word of it because it was
3:40:07still applicable
3:40:08and IT addresses the highest concern of
3:40:11the field joint in both the ignition
3:40:13transient condition and the steady state
3:40:16condition and it really sets down the
3:40:19rationale for why we were continuing to
3:40:21fly basically
3:40:23if erosion penetrates the primary o-ring
3:40:26seal
3:40:27it's a high probability of no secondary
3:40:29seal capability in a steady steady state
3:40:31condition
3:40:33and I had two sub bullets under that
3:40:34which stated bench testing showed o-ring
3:40:37not capable of maintaining contact with
3:40:40metal Parts gap opening rate to maximum
3:40:43operating pressure
3:40:45and none about which stated bench
3:40:48testing showed capability to maintain
3:40:50o-ring contact during initial phase
3:40:53parentheses 0 to 170 milliseconds of
3:40:56transient that was my comfort basis of
3:41:00continuing to fly into normal
3:41:01circumstances normal being within the
3:41:04database we had
3:41:08[Music]
3:41:11a shark
3:41:12about the changing of the timing
3:41:14function
3:41:16of the O-ring as it attempted to seal
3:41:19I was concerned that we may go from that
3:41:22first beginning region into that
3:41:24intermediate region from 0 to 170 being
3:41:27the first region and 170 to 330 being
3:41:30the intermediate region where we didn't
3:41:32have a high probability of sealing or
3:41:34seating
3:41:36I didn't present it chart 2-2
3:41:40with added concerns relating to the
3:41:42timing function
3:41:43and basically on that chart
3:41:46I started off talking about lower
3:41:49temperatures and current database
3:41:50results in changing the primary o-ring
3:41:52ceiling timing function
3:41:54and I discussed the srm-15 observations
3:41:57namely the 15a motor had 80 degrees Arc
3:42:02of black grease between the O-rings and
3:42:04make no mistake about it when I say
3:42:06black I mean black just like coal it was
3:42:09jet black
3:42:10in SRM 15b at 110 degrees Arc of black
3:42:15grease between the O-rings
3:42:17we would have raw o-ring squeeze through
3:42:20the low temperature which I calculated
3:42:21earlier in the day
3:42:23we would have higher o-ring Shore
3:42:25hardness and that is the characteristics
3:42:28similar to a hardness test that's done
3:42:30on metal except it has a different Anvil
3:42:33size and when you press against the
3:42:35elastomeric material that is the measure
3:42:37of how far a standard size Anvil will go
3:42:40in to the particular what you asked them
3:42:43right it gives you a measure of relative
3:42:45hardness of the substance
3:42:47now that would be harder and what that
3:42:50really means basically is that the
3:42:52harder the material is it would be
3:42:54likened to trying to shove a brick into
3:42:56a crack versus a sponge that's a good
3:43:00analogy for purposes of this discussion
3:43:03I also mentioned that thicker grease as
3:43:06a result of lower temperatures would
3:43:08have a higher viscosity it wouldn't be
3:43:09as slick and slippery as it would be at
3:43:11room temperature so it would be a little
3:43:13bit more difficult to move across it
3:43:16we would have higher o-ring pressure
3:43:19actuation time in my opinion and that's
3:43:21what I presented if action time and
3:43:23these are the two these are the seven
3:43:26substance of what I just presented if
3:43:28action time increases
3:43:30then the threshold of secondary steel
3:43:32pressurization capability is approached
3:43:35that was my fear
3:43:37if the threshold is reached
3:43:39then secondary seal may not be capable
3:43:42of being pressurized and that was the
3:43:44bottom line of everything that has been
3:43:46presented up to that point
3:43:50[Music]
3:43:52issue with you
3:43:54not well yeah I'm coming to that uh
3:44:00I also showed a chart of the joint with
3:44:02an exaggerated cross-section to show the
3:44:05seal lifted off which has been shown to
3:44:08everybody
3:44:09uh I was at yeah at that point in time I
3:44:12was asked to quantify my concerns
3:44:16and I said I couldn't
3:44:18I couldn't quantify it
3:44:20I had no data to quantify it but I did
3:44:23say I knew that it was away from
3:44:25goodness in the current database
3:44:28someone in the net commented that we had
3:44:30football by
3:44:32on answer M22 which was launched at 75
3:44:35degrees I don't remember who made the
3:44:36comment but that's where the first
3:44:37comment came in about the disparity
3:44:41between my conclusion and The observed
3:44:44data because
3:44:45srm-22 had Blow by at essentially a room
3:44:49temperature launch
3:44:50I then said that aftern-15 had much more
3:44:53blow-by indication
3:44:55and that it was indeed telling us that
3:44:57lower temperature was a factor
3:44:59this was supported by inspection of
3:45:01flown Hardware by myself
3:45:04I was asked again
3:45:07for data to support my claim and I said
3:45:09I have none
3:45:10other than what is being presented but
3:45:12and I had been trying to get resiliency
3:45:15data Arnie and I both since last October
3:45:18and that statement was mentioned on the
3:45:20net
3:45:22others in the room presented their
3:45:24charts and the main Telecom session
3:45:27concluded with Bob one who was our vice
3:45:30president of engineering
3:45:32presenting his conclusions and
3:45:34recommendations tracks which were based
3:45:36on our data input up to that point
3:45:40this is on the telecon we're not pleased
3:45:43with the conclusions and the
3:45:45recommendations what was the conclusion
3:45:47the conclusions were that we should not
3:45:49fly outside of our database which was 53
3:45:52degrees
3:45:53those are the conclusions
3:45:55and we were quite pleased because we
3:45:58knew in advance having participated in
3:45:59the preparation what the conclusions
3:46:01were and we felt very comfortable with
3:46:03that
3:46:04instead of that conclusion uh Mr Bob
3:46:07Lund right he he had prepared those
3:46:09charts he had uh input from other people
3:46:13but he had actually physically prepared
3:46:14the charts and he prepared them
3:46:17uh it was about that time
3:46:20did Mr hardy from Marshall was asked
3:46:24what he thought about the MTI
3:46:26recommendation
3:46:27and he said he was appalled at the MTI
3:46:31decision
3:46:33Mr hardy was also asked
3:46:36about launching and he said no not at
3:46:40the contractor recommended not launching
3:46:42he would not go against the contractor
3:46:43and launch
3:46:45there was a short discussion that ensued
3:46:47about temperature not being a
3:46:49discriminator between SRM 15 and 22.
3:46:53and shortly after I believe it was Mr
3:46:55kilmensa asked
3:46:58uh if he would excuse me I'm getting
3:47:00confused here Mr kilman so was asked by
3:47:04NASA if he would launch and he said no
3:47:06because the engineering recommendation
3:47:08was not to Launch
3:47:11MTI management then asked for a
3:47:14five-minute caucus I'm not sure exactly
3:47:15who asked for that but it was asked in
3:47:18such a manner that I remember it was
3:47:19asked for a five-minute caucus which we
3:47:21put on the line on mute and went offline
3:47:24with the rest of the net
3:47:26[Music]
3:47:28at the time that you made the recommend
3:47:30Eric YSI call major recommendation not
3:47:32to launch was that unanimous
3:47:34recommendation as far as you know yes
3:47:37I've got to make something clear I have
3:47:39been distressed by the things that have
3:47:41been pairing in the paper
3:47:43and things that have been said in
3:47:44general and uh
3:47:46there was never one positive pro-launch
3:47:49statement ever made
3:47:52by anybody
3:47:56thank you
3:47:58there have been some feelings since then
3:48:00that folks have expressed that they
3:48:03would support the decision but there was
3:48:05not one positive statement for launch
3:48:07ever made in that room
3:48:13here
3:48:16is that your recollection too
3:48:19Mr Thompson yes yes particularly in the
3:48:22caucus I think Roger and I were the only
3:48:24one that only people that expressed our
3:48:26views
3:48:27but nope
3:48:30you should proceed with a launch at that
3:48:32time
3:48:33not amongst the people that I was able
3:48:35to hear
3:48:37hey uh you said there was some confusion
3:48:40in your mind as to Mr McDonald's
3:48:42position at that time he came out with a
3:48:44comment about the secondary ring ceiling
3:48:46that you should consider that that's
3:48:47correct when Alfred came on the line and
3:48:50explained the situation about the
3:48:52primary and secondary o-ring and how the
3:48:53secondary o-ring was in position I had a
3:48:56flash of confusion in my mind as to what
3:49:00he was saying but I having worked on the
3:49:03SRM 15 presentation in the SRM 16
3:49:06presentation
3:49:07realized exactly what he was trying to
3:49:09say but I did have that tinge at the
3:49:10beginning so there was definite
3:49:13misunderstanding about Al's statement
3:49:15there's no question in my mind because I
3:49:16had it and I was probably close to that
3:49:18joint than most anybody else and and I
3:49:21had that change and I so stated that to
3:49:23you
3:49:26okay the uh
3:49:29caucus was started by Mr Mason stating
3:49:31that a management decision was necessary
3:49:35those of us who opposed to the launch
3:49:37continue to speak out and I'm
3:49:39specifically speaking of Mr Thompson and
3:49:41myself because in my recollection he and
3:49:44I were the only ones that vigorously
3:49:46continue to oppose the launch
3:49:48and we were attempting to go back and
3:49:51re-review
3:49:52and try to make clear what we were
3:49:54trying to get across and we couldn't
3:49:56understand why it was going to be
3:49:59reversed
3:50:01so
3:50:02we spoke out
3:50:05and tried to explain once again the
3:50:07effects and low temperature
3:50:09Arnie actually got up from his position
3:50:11which was down the table walked up the
3:50:13table put a Quad Pad down in front of
3:50:17the table in front of the management
3:50:20folks and tried to sketch out once again
3:50:23what his concern was with the joint
3:50:26and when he realized he wasn't getting
3:50:28through
3:50:31he just stopped
3:50:33I tried one more time with the photos I
3:50:36grabbed the photos and I went up and
3:50:38discussed the photos once again and
3:50:40tried to make the point that it was my
3:50:41opinion from actual observations that
3:50:44temperature was indeed a discriminator
3:50:46and we should not ignore the physical
3:50:49evidence that we had observed
3:50:54and again I brought to the point that
3:50:57srm15 at 110 degree Arc of black grease
3:51:00while srm-22 had a relatively different
3:51:04amount which was less and wasn't quite
3:51:06as black
3:51:08I also stopped when it was a parent that
3:51:10I couldn't get anybody to listen
3:51:12at this point did anyone else speak up
3:51:15in favor of the launch or no sir
3:51:19no sir no one said anything to my
3:51:21recollection nobody said word it was
3:51:24then being discussed amongst the
3:51:27management folks
3:51:30after Arnie and I had our last day Mr
3:51:33Mason said we have to make a management
3:51:35decision
3:51:36he turned to Bob one and asked him to
3:51:38take off his engineering hat and put on
3:51:41his management hat
3:51:43from this point on management formulated
3:51:45the points to base their decision on
3:51:48there was never one comment in favor as
3:51:50I've said uh of launching by any
3:51:54engineer or other non-management person
3:51:56in the room
3:51:57before or after the caucus
3:52:02I was not even asked to participate in
3:52:05giving any input to the final decision
3:52:07chart
3:52:10so I'm back on the net
3:52:12with the final chart or final chart
3:52:15which was the rationale full launching
3:52:18and that was presented by Mr kilminster
3:52:21it was a handwritten on a notepad and he
3:52:24read from that Notepad
3:52:26I did not agree with some of the
3:52:28statements that were being made to
3:52:29support the decision
3:52:31I was never asked
3:52:33all pulled
3:52:34and it was clearly a management decision
3:52:37from that point
3:52:39I must emphasize I had my say and I
3:52:43never take
3:52:44any management right
3:52:46to take the input of an engineer and
3:52:48then make a decision based on that input
3:52:50and I truly believe that I've worked at
3:52:52a lot of companies and that's been done
3:52:55from time to time and I truly believe
3:52:57that so
3:52:58there was no point in me doing anything
3:53:00any further and I had already attempted
3:53:02to do
3:53:04I did not see the final version of the
3:53:06chart until the next day I just heard it
3:53:09read
3:53:10I left the room feeling badly defeated
3:53:12but I felt I really did all I could to
3:53:14stop the launch
3:53:18I felt personally
3:53:20the management was under a lot of
3:53:21pressure to Launch
3:53:23and they made a very tough decision but
3:53:25I didn't agree with it
3:53:29one of my colleagues that was in the
3:53:31meeting
3:53:32summed it up best
3:53:35this was a meeting where the
3:53:38determination was to Launch
3:53:40and it was up to us to prove beyond a
3:53:42shadow of a doubt that it was not safe
3:53:45to do so
3:53:47this is in total rebirth
3:53:50to what the position usually is in a
3:53:52pre-flight conversation or flight rate
3:53:55in this review it's usually exactly
3:53:56opposite then
3:53:59do you know the source of the pressure
3:54:00on management that you alluded to
3:54:03well the the comments made over the net
3:54:06uh is what I felt I can't speak for them
3:54:09but I felt it I felt it I felt the tone
3:54:12of the meeting exactly as I summed up
3:54:14that we were having we were being put in
3:54:16a position to prove that we should not
3:54:19launch rather than be put in the
3:54:21position and prove that we had enough
3:54:23data to Launch and I felt that very real
3:54:26these were the comments from the NASA if
3:54:29people at Marshall and at KSC yes
3:54:34you're trying to read
3:54:37would fail
3:54:38that's right and of course you couldn't
3:54:40because as a matter of fact it didn't
3:54:42that is five of them didn't and only one
3:54:44of them did and therefore had you proven
3:54:46that they were off that they were fair
3:54:48you would have found yourself Incorrect
3:54:49and on the criticism because five of
3:54:52them didn't fail that's right I was very
3:54:54very concerned that the cold
3:54:56temperatures would change that timing
3:54:57and put us in another regime and that
3:55:00was the whole basis of my fighting that
3:55:02night
3:55:04that's right
3:55:06to a point that they were intolerable
3:55:07that's right
3:55:09DeBarge away your correspondence in the
3:55:12summer of 85
3:55:13indicates that uh
3:55:16the heightened sensitivity of the O-ring
3:55:19problem at fire coil
3:55:22was really initiated by heightened
3:55:24sensitivity about it at NASA
3:55:27and
3:55:30for example references made to the the
3:55:34problem that is escalated so badly in
3:55:37the eyes of everyone especially our
3:55:39customer NASA
3:55:41well was any
3:55:43mention made during the telecon net with
3:55:48NASA the evening of January 27th of the
3:55:52uh how the NASA View
3:55:55had moved from this heightened
3:55:57sensitivity to the O-ring problem to the
3:56:00position that they were now putting
3:56:02forward at the uh January 27th telecon
3:56:06no that wasn't mentioned but in fact
3:56:09they they were just as concerned as we
3:56:11how counterparts that we worked with
3:56:13that they were right on top of this
3:56:16steel task force team with us and we had
3:56:19status reviews
3:56:21uh going on all the time in fact when
3:56:24any time we'd hit a situation where they
3:56:27felt we weren't going quick enough we
3:56:30ended up having a visit and they would
3:56:32just be there and watch over our
3:56:34shoulders and make darn sure that we
3:56:36were proceeding in a timely manner so
3:56:38that to me told me that they were just
3:56:40as concerned about it as we were
3:56:43supposed
3:56:46[Music]
3:56:47team that was set up he alluded to it in
3:56:51your letter of 31 July and you asked
3:56:55that that team the uh reconstituted and
3:56:58made more urgent did that happen
3:57:00in a way I was on that team uh don
3:57:04Kettner headed to team up
3:57:06I was a member
3:57:08Brian Russell was a member
3:57:14of the master members
3:57:16oh they had a counterpart team yes they
3:57:19had a members of their team our main
3:57:20interface was with a gentleman called
3:57:22the Jerry peoples and Ron McIntosh but
3:57:25they had their folks involved also you
3:57:28had meetings uh with representatives
3:57:31from both yes we did NASA and and fire
3:57:33call yes we did when we outlined a plan
3:57:35on how we were going to proceed to fix
3:57:38this problem they were part and parcel
3:57:40to that plan now this is the team that
3:57:42involved a number of solutions uh to uh
3:57:46this problem some of which have already
3:57:48been publicized
3:57:50that is correct and uh some of those
3:57:53Solutions were short-term Solutions and
3:57:55others were a long-term solution we
3:57:57categorized them at least I did in in
3:57:59all my notes as short-term Solutions
3:58:01medium-term Solutions and long-term
3:58:04Solutions and to give you a flavor for
3:58:06what put what in what category was I
3:58:09considered a short-term solution for
3:58:12instance a 292 diameter o-ring which
3:58:14would have afforded us twelve
3:58:15thousandths more squeeze and still not
3:58:18have an overfilled condition in the
3:58:19groove with the elastomeric material
3:58:21also couple that with Selective shimming
3:58:24that would make the tang and clevis more
3:58:27concentric to one another and take as
3:58:29much of the free volume gap on the
3:58:31outside away to make sure that we were
3:58:34putting more and more squeeze on the
3:58:35O-ring and less and less chance for The
3:58:38Gap to open up to uh the rate that it's
3:58:41opening did uh do you have some estimate
3:58:44of how long the short-term solutions
3:58:46would have taken yeah we had
3:58:49tested assembly tested a 292 o-ring in a
3:58:53qm in in some uh static motor joints uh
3:58:57gives me some inert motor joints put
3:59:00them together and found that we had a
3:59:03good success with that they are
3:59:05currently installed in the F2 field
3:59:08joints of the qm5 test motor that was
3:59:10ready to fly uh fire about uh two weeks
3:59:13ago at our plant so we had made that
3:59:17progress and we were well on our way to
3:59:19showing that those seals will work in a
3:59:22joint I must emphasize that the qm5
3:59:26motor is a film along case motor and it
3:59:28is a joint with a capture feature on it
3:59:30that doesn't have the gap opening but
3:59:31the major issue on a 295 on 292 o-ring
3:59:36was the assembly characteristics of it
3:59:38and we were getting like twelve
3:59:40thousandths in each squeeze for free
3:59:41basically that was a short-term issue
3:59:43that we could Implement as quick as
3:59:45possible was it did the team report on a
3:59:48regular basis to vote NASA and fire coal
3:59:50management we had status report with the
3:59:54Marshall Folks at regular intervals and
3:59:57we had a Friday teleconference at midday
4:00:01and Status the proceedings of that
4:00:04previous week with him
4:00:06so everyone in the telecon on January
4:00:0827th was aware of the work of this team
4:00:10the solutions that it proposed I don't
4:00:13know that everyone was but there were a
4:00:16number of people that weren't yes I
4:00:17don't know if I cannot make this
4:00:18statement that everybody that was on a
4:00:20telecom knew about that for instance I
4:00:22had never
4:00:23heard Cecil Houston's name before I
4:00:25didn't know that he was a marshall type
4:00:27until I heard on a telecon afterwards
4:00:30that he was down at KFC I had not met
4:00:32that gentleman so I don't know if he
4:00:34knew it or not and I don't know if some
4:00:36of the other folks knew but there were
4:00:38enough folks on that telecon that knew
4:00:40uh what the status was what about Mr
4:00:42Mallory Mr hardy do you know if they
4:00:44knew
4:00:45I I don't have sure knowledge of that no
4:00:47I don't know
4:00:52that's your question which comes up
4:00:55later and go back to the earlier time
4:00:58when you're worrying about these things
4:01:01and I would like to know
4:01:02whether already you felt that there was
4:01:05a serious problem in flying even at 53
4:01:08degrees for the following logic is
4:01:11possible perhaps and you'd correct me
4:01:14if the
4:01:16primary ring with the start to erode and
4:01:20with the take enough time to erode that
4:01:22it takes the pressure goes up to 600 PSI
4:01:25or so
4:01:26then if there's joint rotation from the
4:01:29result of that the secondary seal May
4:01:31Fail if the erosion would get all the
4:01:33way through the primary
4:01:36uh
4:01:38seal the erosion got through a third of
4:01:42the way of the primary seal in fact in
4:01:4515c now I you feel that you understand
4:01:48the process of erosion well enough to
4:01:51know
4:01:51that it was unlikely to go three times
4:01:54as far yeah I think we need to clarify
4:01:57one thing
4:01:58one third of the seal was not eroded
4:02:01one-third of the allowable erosion
4:02:04number occurred and and you really have
4:02:07to clarify that because we're talking
4:02:08about a seal diameter that's 280 in
4:02:10diameter okay and we really eroded about
4:02:1532 thousandths of an inch on srm15 and
4:02:18the factor of three is being used
4:02:20against sub-scale data which show that
4:02:22we were able to seal an eroded seal on a
4:02:27subscale rig that had 10 inch diameter
4:02:29seals
4:02:30that up to an eighth of an inch then we
4:02:34had a window where we failed the seal
4:02:36and then we had another one up to I
4:02:39believe it was 145 or 147 thousandths of
4:02:42an inch that also sealed now the
4:02:45analysis from the gas Dynamic standpoint
4:02:48which is out of my area had been
4:02:50conducted and they found an excellent
4:02:52math model of that erosion process and
4:02:56it correlated extremely well with this
4:02:59subscale test data which had been run
4:03:01about a year before and there were 27
4:03:04tests that were characterized that
4:03:06erosion they ran most of them at three
4:03:10seconds and then they my recollection is
4:03:12there was one or two five second tests
4:03:14and one or two uh 20 some odd second
4:03:17tests to show that it was indeed as
4:03:20ignition transient and what was what
4:03:22that test was all about
4:03:24was they had a metal orifice with a
4:03:27rectangular orifice that was 40 000 wide
4:03:30and had different characteristic Heights
4:03:33and they ran a parametric study using
4:03:35those those tests that test rig and
4:03:38determined what the erosion rate or not
4:03:41the rate but the erosion depth was as a
4:03:43function of the orifice size then the
4:03:46math model was made and characterized
4:03:49that and my recollection is they were
4:03:50within 12 percent of all the test data
4:03:53and they were very pleased that the
4:03:56characterization analytically of what
4:03:57was going on so from an erosion
4:04:00standpoint I think it is fair to say
4:04:02that
4:04:04there was indeed sufficient margin but
4:04:07that was not the issue erosion was not
4:04:09the issue what was the issue is can you
4:04:12stand a longer period of time in an
4:04:15attempt to seal before the erosion each
4:04:17you alive and you don't have a sale
4:04:19period because once you get flow you
4:04:22have two types of erosions you have blow
4:04:24by erosion and impingement erosion the
4:04:2727 test characterized impingement
4:04:29erosion only there were no blowbys in
4:04:32that end and I might say too we ran
4:04:34tests on that same rig with out an
4:04:37orifice
4:04:38and pressurize it exactly the same way
4:04:40on an unprotected o-ring and there was
4:04:43not even a Sheen missing on the O-ring
4:04:45so the analysis characterized that very
4:04:49well and they understood it very well
4:04:51what it is it's a volume feeling problem
4:04:55as a function of time
4:04:57the higher the volume the more the time
4:04:59the hot gas flows if you have a Blow by
4:05:02through the putty
4:05:03that will enable you to get erosion and
4:05:06and I I felt very confident they had a
4:05:09good analytical handle on that
4:05:11thank you I have another question on the
4:05:14other side now
4:05:15which is the Blow by early on that is in
4:05:20the first whatever you call it 170
4:05:22milliseconds yes
4:05:24during which it was supposed
4:05:27that the secondary ring would be close
4:05:29enough to the right place to be sealed
4:05:31if
4:05:33but when now I'm going to talk about the
4:05:36lower temperature
4:05:37under those circumstances
4:05:40where the thing is standing around and
4:05:42has no resilience
4:05:44and in fact when the engine goes off it
4:05:48swings or it twines back and forth and
4:05:51there are various stresses that have
4:05:53been there since the time that the
4:05:55ring has been pushed into place by the
4:05:57test after which I now discover was 28
4:06:00days earlier not just three days right
4:06:03isn't it possible that the
4:06:06that the secondary has gotten squozed or
4:06:09squeezed to smaller size and it's
4:06:12that it should be and then when it bends
4:06:15back it leaves a hole that there's no
4:06:17170 milliseconds at all
4:06:21that it's already too small because it
4:06:24has so zero so low and resilience time
4:06:27it takes so long for it to respond after
4:06:30it's been squeezed that is possible uh I
4:06:33had done a series of tests relating
4:06:36clevis opening problems back about three
4:06:38years ago where we had experienced a
4:06:41phenomena where the crevice was opening
4:06:43up oh maybe three to five thousandths of
4:06:46an inch over its original manufacture
4:06:47dimensions
4:06:49and we try to run that down and pin that
4:06:52down as to where that came from
4:06:54in the attempt to do that I ran a series
4:06:58of tests which took an empty cylinder
4:07:01segment and I actually
4:07:04characterized when it was round what
4:07:07happened to the clevis when I ovalized
4:07:10the case what happened to the clevis
4:07:12when I took the case and put shims
4:07:15underneath the longitudinal Direction
4:07:17what happened to the clevis and
4:07:19characteristically with very large
4:07:21numbers like when I ovalize it to a
4:07:24value of approximately an inch I could
4:07:26only affect the clevis gap opening say
4:07:28several thousandths of an inch and and
4:07:31so even though you get motion it was not
4:07:35characterized as a major motion relative
4:07:38to the squeeze that we had but in
4:07:40reference the temperature which is what
4:07:42you're talking about yes you could very
4:07:43well have had that situation
4:07:46unfortunately we've had some data on of
4:07:50students we had some data you probably
4:07:53know our experience with water
4:07:56accumulating in the field joint while
4:07:58it's standing out there on the stack
4:08:01um
4:08:01the uh as Dr Freeman pointed out uh 51
4:08:06else stood out there for 28 days during
4:08:08which there were some heavy uh rainstorm
4:08:11wind driven rain what would the effect
4:08:14and then we also had cold temperatures
4:08:15the the night before and and a couple
4:08:18nights earlier what would be the effect
4:08:21if water accumulated in the field joint
4:08:23and then froze during these hard freezes
4:08:26well first of all I had no prior
4:08:31pre-launch knowledge of that occurring
4:08:35I had since found out that there was a
4:08:38vehicle that they changed out one of the
4:08:39segments and when they pulled the pin
4:08:41water poured out of the joint uh did not
4:08:44know that prior to the launch
4:08:46we had been looking at that since the
4:08:48incident and actually run a test in the
4:08:51effect on on the actual opening of the
4:08:54clevis the actually spreading of the of
4:08:56the clevis itself was almost
4:08:57unmeasurable and and we attribute that
4:09:01I I guess to the fact that you cannot
4:09:05fill the joint the fight by
4:09:08configuration all the way up to the
4:09:10secondary O-rings now if you postulate
4:09:12that there was enough grease in there
4:09:15and you actually moved the grease with
4:09:18the ice then you could move the O-ring
4:09:20but there has been that speculation at
4:09:22this point it looks from the design
4:09:25configuration of the joint that if you
4:09:27fill the joint with water it still have
4:09:28an air column that would probably be on
4:09:31the order of 5 8 to 7 10 of an inch high
4:09:33and you would simply compress the air
4:09:35column and it appeared like you wouldn't
4:09:37be able to generate enough pressure to
4:09:39transfer the ring but in all thin it's
4:09:41with running tests to find that out we
4:09:43haven't completed them yet I should say
4:09:45Marshall Mr Marshall yes
4:09:48the U.S uh fire called the design of the
4:09:53joint for these srms was developed no I
4:09:57was not but you were there when srm8 was
4:10:00fired were you not yes I was there when
4:10:02srm1 was fired can you account for what
4:10:06appears to be a concentration of of uh
4:10:10erosion and blow-by cases in these
4:10:13O-rings following srm8 as opposed to
4:10:17prior to srna that had been a topic in
4:10:20much discussion over the years and there
4:10:22was a party change the original party
4:10:24was a Randolph putty and then they
4:10:27simply stopped making it uh no excuse me
4:10:30not Randolph Phil O'Brien excuse me and
4:10:33they simply stopped making it and then
4:10:35we switched to a Randolph putty and that
4:10:38is a simultaneous general area of time
4:10:41sequence with the change in the layup of
4:10:43the party to bring it back around from
4:10:46the edge of the clevis so that we were
4:10:49sure there wasn't anybody down by the
4:10:50O-ring and but that hasn't fully tied
4:10:54together either because the first
4:10:55erosion that was ever indicated to my
4:10:57knowledge was on srm2 or scs2 the second
4:11:00flight in fact the second flight had the
4:11:03most erosion yeah of any of the O-rings
4:11:06on the field in the field Giant so we've
4:11:09been struggling with that because the
4:11:11data appears just totally random if you
4:11:13look at the degree locations if you look
4:11:15at the temperatures if you look at the
4:11:18it's random in in regards to erosion per
4:11:21se
4:11:23call when the
4:11:25critical items list was amended in
4:11:28December 82 to make it a uh crit one
4:11:32instead of the crit one R I was at that
4:11:34call at that time but you know I don't
4:11:36even know what a Cil is oh I see I I I'm
4:11:39hearing all this for the first time I I
4:11:42just don't know thank you
4:11:47from your point of view uh in the
4:11:49Engineering Group
4:11:52did you feel that uh perhaps
4:11:57[Music]
4:11:58particular constraints needed to be
4:12:00established on the operation of the the
4:12:04motor in a case and its joints that
4:12:07hadn't been and for example temperature
4:12:10related or other uh other function
4:12:12related and was that passed up the line
4:12:16yes I did I feel impressed to
4:12:20um back in the times of sts-1 which is
4:12:23structural test article sta one
4:12:25structural test article we discovered
4:12:28that the joint was opening up rather
4:12:30than closing as our original analysis
4:12:31indicated
4:12:33and its actors quite a bit is up to I
4:12:35think fifty thousand fifty two thousands
4:12:37at that time for the primary o-ring at
4:12:39that point at that same meeting we went
4:12:42to Marshall discussed the problem and we
4:12:44also indicated in fact I think it was
4:12:46made it indicated that the secondary
4:12:48o-ring and certain uh worst on worse
4:12:50conditions uh pressurized even without
4:12:53uh resilience considered could be could
4:12:57be open could be non-contact with the
4:13:00adjoining surface
4:13:02and so we have been working with these
4:13:04problems uh for the last several years
4:13:07and of course you can immediately see
4:13:09are responsible throughout your end
4:13:11myself
4:13:12uh we know that we need elastomeric seal
4:13:15very badly more so than in many
4:13:18hydraulic applications because if you
4:13:20look at a
4:13:21uh the usual uh probably a dynamic seal
4:13:25but nonetheless the requirements for a
4:13:2870 dromeda Arena 1000 PSI people want to
4:13:32talk about six or seven thousands and
4:13:34now we're talking about that type of
4:13:37clearance to start with but coupled with
4:13:40another fifty thousands of motion and so
4:13:43it's elastomeric uh problem of the the
4:13:46first order in my judgment
4:13:48and uh what's required is the
4:13:50viscoelastic type of phenomena and we
4:13:53all know that if any viscoelastic
4:13:54material is very temperature sensitive
4:13:58well did did you infect or do you know
4:14:01of specific recommendations being made
4:14:03with respect to establishing limitations
4:14:06of any type on on yeah yes sir uh
4:14:09several changes were made we looked at
4:14:11the O-ring tolerances we looked at the
4:14:14Orient Groove tolerances
4:14:16we looked and we decreased and uh on the
4:14:20side of goodness as Roger would say uh
4:14:23all of those things in addition to that
4:14:26the the shim we call it a centering
4:14:28strip at that time was twenty thousands
4:14:31we replaced that with a a a
4:14:35m-type clip that goes over the pins in
4:14:38that uh in that area and increase that
4:14:40to 32 thousands
4:14:43and these are some of the things we've
4:14:45made an attempt to make the joint better
4:14:49from where it was originally and it's
4:14:51all the recommendations that you made to
4:14:53your knowledge were accepted and
4:14:55implemented uh no sir not all of them
4:14:58were made uh recently and as late as
4:15:02August of 82 I wrote a memo to my
4:15:05management project engineering
4:15:08indicated that we should stop Flying
4:15:11until such Point as we could double The
4:15:14Squeeze on the O-rings
4:15:15what was the date of that about the 22nd
4:15:18of August what is it 85 to 82 I think 85
4:15:23yes 85 I'm sorry and my recommendation
4:15:26there was to uh double the uh I went
4:15:30through an example in the memo I think
4:15:33it was srm20
4:15:35where if we went to the shim that Mr
4:15:38Beaujolais has indicated a full shim
4:15:42which is about a 55 000 shim versus a uh
4:15:4732 000 shim coupled with a
4:15:51292 o-ring which is about the largest
4:15:54o-ring we can get in there with
4:15:55confidence that we're not going to Nick
4:15:57it when we assemble that this would
4:16:00about double The Squeeze on the O-ring
4:16:02which we felt was an important thing to
4:16:04do
4:16:05and I realized at that point that the
4:16:08O-ring committee that has been
4:16:11dispatched to discover these things has
4:16:14in fact discussed that but it was my
4:16:17view that we needed to get it into the
4:16:20flights right away for any
4:16:22recommendation
4:16:23respect to a temperature of the seal
4:16:26area at lunch
4:16:28to your knowledge not at that time but
4:16:31uh the one that's one of the reasons is
4:16:33if you get additional squeeze on it
4:16:35particularly the secondary and the
4:16:37primary the primary will have a better
4:16:39chance of seating we think with
4:16:41additional squeeze and the secondary
4:16:43will get more help from the sidewalls of
4:16:46the O-ring Groove and help its
4:16:48resiliency problem
4:16:49and we know that additional squeeze also
4:16:52helps in extending the time that the
4:16:55O-ring is in contact with the seal
4:17:00all right and largely mentioned the
4:17:02capture rangefield
4:17:04as having been included excuse me in one
4:17:07of the tests at what point if ever was a
4:17:11capture ring uh seriously considered for
4:17:14adoption as I understand it and
4:17:17appreciate your comment on this the
4:17:18capture ring is a flange which is
4:17:22intended to arrest the opening up of the
4:17:25two seal area the area of the two Fields
4:17:30but when was that first seriously
4:17:32considered or has it been seriously
4:17:34concerned or for production when it was
4:17:36first brought to my attention was in a
4:17:39the design of the filament wow case I
4:17:42believe someone from Marshall suggested
4:17:45it in the adapters for the filament
4:17:47wound case and roughly I think two and a
4:17:49half or three years ago
4:17:51and it seemed like a good idea because
4:17:54what it does it holds that inside flange
4:17:57in against the tang and our finite
4:18:00element analysis indicate that instead
4:18:03of opening on the order of 50 000 it
4:18:06cuts it down to five or six thousands
4:18:08which is in the direction that uh we
4:18:10need to be going that is considered an
4:18:13option uh
4:18:15yes sir it particularly has come to
4:18:18recent attention because of the heads up
4:18:20program where we have discussed uh
4:18:23higher pressure going up to 11 10
4:18:25pressure
4:18:27Mr Thompson could you uh tell us what
4:18:29happened to those recommendations you
4:18:31made in August of 1982
4:18:3485 of any Apartments
4:18:37were they ever implemented no sir they
4:18:39were not
4:18:41you don't have any idea why and why not
4:18:44or did you ever receive a reply back
4:18:47from management
4:18:49to explain but the person that I wrote
4:18:52it to directly involved in management
4:18:54have since transferred down into my
4:18:56group again
4:18:58so that may have been part of the
4:19:00problem but it uh management uh was
4:19:03aware of it because of questions I and
4:19:06feedback that I received from it but you
4:19:08got no formal response for management
4:19:09that is correct
4:19:11on the uh capture flange I have a couple
4:19:14more questions uh
4:19:17[Applause]
4:19:19sometime I take it the installation of
4:19:22the flying is an integral part of the
4:19:24case is that correct
4:19:26yes sir it's part of the tang and as it
4:19:29comes in engages first on a tapered
4:19:32basis and then it comes into a
4:19:34cylindrical basis
4:19:36sorry please go ahead at first it was
4:19:39attempted to have two tapers fit but the
4:19:43tolerances became very unreasonable so
4:19:45we would engage first on two tapered
4:19:47surfaces and then come into cylindrical
4:19:50engagement where we could maintain the
4:19:52same type of tolerances that we have on
4:19:54the ceiling joint and
4:19:56does that involve or would that involve
4:19:58a change in the forging process with
4:20:01manufacturing process or the forging
4:20:03Billet yes sir the inside bark on the
4:20:05forging was not quite sufficient every
4:20:09time assure that we'd be able to find a
4:20:10fork I want to change that magnitude uh
4:20:14been practical for your company to
4:20:17undertake without the concurrence and
4:20:19authorization from NASA
4:20:22well I think that would take a high
4:20:24cooperation between ourselves and NASA
4:20:26it is quite a large undertaking of
4:20:28course uh well could you clarify for me
4:20:32uh if that in fact has been undertaken
4:20:35and what the first implementation dates
4:20:37were or might be obviously it wasn't on
4:20:40the 51l
4:20:42I think that it's indicated to me that
4:20:45on a a general effort that it was on the
4:20:48order of 18 months but on a on a basis
4:20:51of an extremely uh large effort a
4:20:56wartime effort I think was the word that
4:20:57was used it could be made available in
4:21:0012 to 13 months well are any under
4:21:03process of being manufactured at the
4:21:05present time with the yes I think
4:21:08several four genes have been ordered and
4:21:10I don't know if it's a full flight set
4:21:12or not I'd have to some other people
4:21:14would have to answer that I'd like to
4:21:16address that on the seal term uh Team or
4:21:19that was part of the long-term fix and
4:21:22there had been some forgings ordered and
4:21:24if the expected delivery was in a was in
4:21:28February of 1987 and that was in the
4:21:32works and that was part of the
4:21:33peripheral action if you will on a
4:21:35long-term basis of the seal tap team
4:21:37have they been tested yet no sir they
4:21:40haven't been one delivered but when is
4:21:43the test schedule well the first
4:21:45delivery was scheduled for February of
4:21:4718 of 1987 so you wouldn't be able to
4:21:49test until after the hardware was
4:21:51received
4:21:54so I'd like to ask a question about the
4:21:56putty uh do you uh or does anyone know
4:22:00what the impact of temperature is on the
4:22:04putty and the formation of slow holes
4:22:07we have a formation of bubbles
4:22:10uh we have uh interpret the first part
4:22:13before he said bubbles uh we have uh
4:22:16since then during the investigation
4:22:18which we of course didn't know at the
4:22:20time we're making this decision uh uh
4:22:23have tested buddy in a putty test
4:22:26pictures somewhat similar to what the
4:22:28motor is only instead of pressurizing
4:22:30from the outside that we usually do in
4:22:32running our
4:22:34seal pressure test we pressurized from
4:22:37the inside and in some cases on the
4:22:40worst on worst uh small clearance bases
4:22:42it held pressure for about 3 200 3200
4:22:46seconds
4:22:48I should amplify
4:22:50the night of the launch the only data we
4:22:53had in our possession on the putty was
4:22:56that we had run temperature tests down
4:22:58to 40 degrees and that was the
4:23:01characterization that determined the
4:23:03leak check pressure to ensure that the
4:23:07leak check pressure was not mapped by
4:23:09the putty and we have held up to 100 PSI
4:23:14with the putty
4:23:16pressurized through the leak check port
4:23:19and so we had temperature data at 40
4:23:21degrees on the putty at that particular
4:23:23time and and we determined that 200 PSI
4:23:27would be a conservative number it would
4:23:29bracket all the testing that had been
4:23:30done and we would have a leak check at
4:23:33200 PSI for 15 minutes with an open
4:23:36nitrogen gas fluids to ensure that the
4:23:38putty was not masking the leak in the
4:23:41O-ring and we dropped to zero
4:23:44repressurized to 50 psi and run the
4:23:47actual low pressure leak check on the
4:23:49seal 50 psi is a very severe check on an
4:23:52O-ring seal at low pressure so uh
4:23:55holding that for 10 minutes and allowing
4:23:57a one pound drop is a very very small
4:24:00leak on the order of an atomic energy
4:24:02type reactor leak there's one thing that
4:24:05disturbs me somewhat about the
4:24:07qualification test in regard to the
4:24:09putty so I understand that during a
4:24:11qualification test the putty was
4:24:14actually uh
4:24:16smoothed out or or
4:24:19there were attempts made to eliminate
4:24:23any imperfections in the putty but in
4:24:25fact during an actual launch that is not
4:24:28done so in that sense the qualification
4:24:31test did not truly simulate large
4:24:33conditions did that disturb anyone
4:24:35yes sir that's true uh it to assemble
4:24:38these motors under a horizontal
4:24:40condition with which we would do for the
4:24:42development Motors and the qualification
4:24:45Motors the motors go uh out of round
4:24:49probably more so than they do during a
4:24:51normal stacking vertical operation and
4:24:54so the putty has probably moved more
4:24:56than it would be during normal stacking
4:24:58so and probably more blow holes were
4:25:01generated and you can see we sometimes
4:25:03call them volcanoes in the putty
4:25:06you say probably
4:25:08you don't really have any any data does
4:25:11anyone or has anyone actually photograph
4:25:14the condition of the putty or examine
4:25:17the putty uh when the vertical stacking
4:25:20is done even early in the program
4:25:22I had heard that someone was lowered in
4:25:25the bolson's chair during the early
4:25:28phases of the program to examine a putty
4:25:32on a field joint that do you know
4:25:33whether that has ever occurred I don't
4:25:35have any detailed knowledge on that we
4:25:37do know that as the Tang is inserted
4:25:39into the uh clevis and the first then
4:25:43once the O-ring covers up the uh on the
4:25:47Tang the ceilings or the residual air is
4:25:49compressed and we know for a fact that
4:25:52sometimes that that air that's
4:25:54compressed will cause a blow-by just on
4:25:56Tang insertion
4:25:58but I wonder if I could go back to the
4:25:59broader broader question uh you talked
4:26:02about data that you couldn't get uh
4:26:04resources that you didn't have uh Mr
4:26:07Thompson has mentioned a letter that he
4:26:08put in August that he got no response to
4:26:10you wrote an activity report on the 4th
4:26:13of October uh the characterized some of
4:26:15this could you summarize some of the
4:26:17things you said in that that activity
4:26:18before the key points please I just got
4:26:21to check to make sure I know which one
4:26:23you're speaking of
4:26:26his title SRM seal problem task team
4:26:28status
4:26:30and it starts out with the team
4:26:31generally has been experienced in
4:26:33trouble
4:26:39was written October the 4th
4:26:41yes okay
4:26:43you want me to read it well the
4:26:44pertinent points I'd like you to make
4:26:46those points if you would
4:26:50uh
4:26:51I felt
4:26:53as I stated in my original memo before
4:26:56the team was formed
4:26:58that the only way that we could pull off
4:27:01a timely resolution to this problem was
4:27:05that people dedicated to this problem
4:27:07full time with full cooperation
4:27:10and I felt that wasn't coming
4:27:13to pass I I felt very strongly that
4:27:17we were working
4:27:19towards a solution
4:27:22in a timely manner but we were getting
4:27:26um
4:27:29okay Mr Dr kill will give it to you
4:27:33[Music]
4:27:38this is an activity report that I turned
4:27:41in
4:27:42it said SRM steel problem testing status
4:27:46the team generally has been experiencing
4:27:48trouble from the business as usual
4:27:50attitude from supporting organizations
4:27:53part of this is due to lack of
4:27:55understanding of how important this task
4:27:57team activity is and the rest is due to
4:28:00Pure operating procedure inertia which
4:28:02prevents timely results to a specific
4:28:05request
4:28:07the team met with Joe kilminster on 10
4:28:10385 to discuss this problem
4:28:14he wanted specific examples which he was
4:28:18given and he simply concluded that it
4:28:20was every team member's responsibility
4:28:22to flag problems that occurred to
4:28:25organizational supervision
4:28:27and to work to remove the roadblock by
4:28:30getting the required support to solve
4:28:32the problem
4:28:33the problem was further explained to
4:28:36require almost full-time nursing of each
4:28:39task to ensure that it is taken to
4:28:41completion by a support group
4:28:43Joe simply agreed and said we should
4:28:46then nurse every task we have
4:28:50he plain doesn't understand that there
4:28:52are not enough people to do that kind of
4:28:54nursing of each task but he doesn't seem
4:28:56to mind directing that the task
4:28:58nevertheless gets done
4:29:00for example
4:29:02the team just found out that when we
4:29:04submit a request to purchase an item
4:29:06that it goes to approximately six to
4:29:09eight people
4:29:10purchase order is written and the item
4:29:13actually ordered
4:29:15the vendors we are working with on seals
4:29:18and spacer rings have responded to our
4:29:19request in a timely manner yet we MTI do
4:29:24not get a purchase order to them in a
4:29:26timely manner
4:29:28oh Ed has been waiting for a function
4:29:30generator since 925.85
4:29:34the paperwork authorizing the purchase
4:29:36was finished by engineering on 924.85
4:29:40and placed into the system we have yet
4:29:43to receive the requested items
4:29:45the reason I made an issue of that is
4:29:48because we had heard it was on the Shelf
4:29:51down in San Diego it's simply a matter
4:29:52of
4:29:53picking it up and using it
4:29:56this type of
4:29:59example is typical and results in Lost
4:30:01resources that have been planned to do
4:30:04the test work for us in a timely manner
4:30:06I for one resent working at full
4:30:09capacity all week long
4:30:10and then being required to support
4:30:12activity on the weekend that could have
4:30:14been accomplished during the week
4:30:16I might add that even NASA perceive that
4:30:19the team is being blocked in its
4:30:20engineering efforts to accomplish its
4:30:22tasks NASA is sending an engineering
4:30:25representative to stay with us starting
4:30:27October 14th
4:30:29we feel that this is the direct result
4:30:32of their feeling that we MTI are not
4:30:35responding quickly enough on the seal
4:30:37problem
4:30:38I should add that several of the team
4:30:41members requested that we be giving a
4:30:44specific manufacturing engineer a
4:30:46quality engineer a safety engineer and
4:30:50four to six technicians to allow us to
4:30:52do our tests on a non-interference basis
4:30:55with the rest of the system
4:30:57this request was deemed not necessary
4:30:59when Joe decided the nursing of the task
4:31:01approach was directed
4:31:04finally the basic problem boils down to
4:31:07the fact
4:31:08that all MTI problems have number one
4:31:11priority and that upper management
4:31:13apparently feels that the SRM program is
4:31:16always for sure and a customer be damned
4:31:19and I signed it October for 1984-85.
4:31:25[Music]
4:31:27both
4:31:29I'm going to turn the
4:31:31subject a little bit around now to
4:31:33another aspect of it one of our
4:31:35responsibilities is to attempt to
4:31:37determine the cause or causes of the
4:31:39accident
4:31:40I guess both you gentlemen have
4:31:42suggested in these memories that if
4:31:45certain things were not done the
4:31:46catastrophe might result
4:31:48looking at the pictures that we now have
4:31:51available to us which show a black puff
4:31:55of black smoke
4:31:57during the first lists and the first
4:32:00second of the launch which was about 25
4:32:02feet high
4:32:04what is your opinion is that consistent
4:32:07with the concern that you had of that a
4:32:10catastrophe might occur in the in that
4:32:12joint okay we should back up and give
4:32:15you a little bit of background
4:32:15information first
4:32:17it was everybody's consented opinion
4:32:19including mine and I'm not a solid
4:32:21rocket mode of man I don't know anything
4:32:23about the propellants or anything like
4:32:25that
4:32:26but it was everybody's considered
4:32:27opinion that if we developed a problem
4:32:29that we'd blow it up on the pad
4:32:33and that we wouldn't have even lift off
4:32:34the pads
4:32:36uh
4:32:38there's been a lot of speculation about
4:32:40the puppet smoke it hasn't really been
4:32:42determined what it came what it is where
4:32:44it came from it for sure I mean there's
4:32:46a lot of speculation but if that was a
4:32:49joint
4:32:50then that supports the seal
4:32:53excuse me the leak seal leak Theory
4:32:56which is to say that you had a puff of
4:33:00smoke or a puff of products of
4:33:02combustion past both seals at a very
4:33:05early stage in the ignition transient
4:33:08then you sealed with whatever remaining
4:33:11material you had left in the seal and
4:33:13you can postulate this visa to the
4:33:14primary or the secondary it'll work both
4:33:16ways and then at some time later due to
4:33:19either going through a Max Q environment
4:33:21or vectoring of the nozzle that you can
4:33:25in vibration or aerodynamic forces
4:33:27whatever you want to characterize that
4:33:29there wasn't that much left and it
4:33:31spitted out at that point in time and
4:33:33started to leak again
4:33:34that has not been really determined yeah
4:33:38I was just really asking whether the
4:33:42the first buffer black spoke which has
4:33:45been described as about 25 feet high is
4:33:48not inconsistent with the theory that
4:33:51you've been concerned about that's right
4:33:54uh Mr Marshall uh you uh Mr Marshall I
4:33:57mean Mr Thompson do you agree with the
4:34:00comments that Mr Moon Julie made earlier
4:34:04about the discussions
4:34:05uh in the Telecom and other discussions
4:34:09that you engaged in
4:34:11yes sir I think I prepared to talk about
4:34:13these things but I think it's been
4:34:15mentioned and most of the points that I
4:34:17have have been brought out so why don't
4:34:19you if you like to look over your notes
4:34:21and see this anything you want to add is
4:34:23we're perfectly glad to have you go
4:34:24through the whole thing maybe you can
4:34:26glance at them and see if you want to
4:34:28add anything quickly summarize sure why
4:34:31don't you do that
4:34:32uh about 10 o'clock in the morning of
4:34:34January 27th I received a phone call
4:34:37from Mr Boyd Brenton he's project uh
4:34:40program project manager project engineer
4:34:43he called me from Marshall and told me
4:34:45about the uh the 18 degree temperature
4:34:48that was indicated that night and uh
4:34:51this particular phone call was prompted
4:34:53by Mr Larry Ware of msfc
4:34:57program manager and indicating that they
4:35:00were both both concerned about this and
4:35:02they asked me what how I felt and what
4:35:04my if I felt concerned and of course I
4:35:06told him that I did
4:35:07and it went through a series of meetings
4:35:09up through engineering throughout today
4:35:11uh ending up finally in Mr Lund's office
4:35:15and we had concluded there that we would
4:35:17not launch if the temperature were
4:35:19anything lower than 53 degrees so at
4:35:23this point I felt fairly content and we
4:35:25met back over in the uh
4:35:27engineering conference room
4:35:29we call the Nick room and prepared to
4:35:32make charts and you've heard much of
4:35:34this conversation
4:35:35and I guess the only thing I'd like to
4:35:37add to it is I also heard that
4:35:39Marshall's reaction is that they were
4:35:40appalled at our recommendation and I was
4:35:43very much surprised by this uh having
4:35:46had the experiences over the years and
4:35:48how careful and conservative these
4:35:50people are and I really admire them so I
4:35:53was extremely surprised and really not
4:35:55ready for this type of a recommendation
4:35:58and uh so I guess we had put together
4:36:01some things probably we may have put
4:36:03together some more if they had any
4:36:05anticipation that this were not going to
4:36:07be received I think we've pretty well
4:36:09got everything out on the table that uh
4:36:12that we had in mind
4:36:15and uh they indicated that the seal was
4:36:18not a function of temperature and being
4:36:22a viscoelastic seal it had to be a
4:36:24function temperature in my thinking and
4:36:27although I was not unable to explain the
4:36:29srm-22 where we've got some sit there
4:36:32also and it's supposedly a warm motor
4:36:35and during the caucus uh I've said Mr
4:36:39bosio I have mentioned something that
4:36:41I'm not used accustomed to doing and
4:36:43sitting down between two managers and
4:36:45trying one more time to explain and make
4:36:49sure that I got my thoughts across to
4:36:51them
4:36:52and uh after not completing that
4:36:55conversation but concluding that I
4:36:57probably wasn't being I was
4:37:00communicating and that may be my fault
4:37:02I'm happy they're not happy but readily
4:37:06admit that it may have been my type of
4:37:08explanation I was wasn't being uh
4:37:11getting through
4:37:14um
4:37:17I think that uh you know we had just one
4:37:20last point I think that we had seen
4:37:22erosion on srm15
4:37:25erosion but more important we have seen
4:37:27blow through
4:37:29and it was very severe we had both
4:37:31through on two field joints and in fact
4:37:34two nozzle joints also we saw soot
4:37:36between the O-rings in four places that
4:37:38I recall and that was 53 degrees and it
4:37:41was my judgment we had no
4:37:45reason to take the risk of shooting at a
4:37:49a o-ring temperature that was lower than
4:37:52the 53 degrees
4:37:54and my recommendation in some of the
4:37:57former meetings was just merely to wait
4:37:59a day
4:38:00wait at least until the afternoon and
4:38:02then depending on temperatures perhaps
4:38:04waiting another day
4:38:06and I think that concludes me can you
4:38:08remember any time in your experience of
4:38:10tackle when the Engineering Group has
4:38:13been overruled and effect by management
4:38:16nothing that comes immediately to my
4:38:18mind sir
4:38:19thank you
4:38:22the activity report of October 4 85 to
4:38:26whom was that directed
4:38:28I turn that into my immediate
4:38:30supervision for incorporation to go up
4:38:33through the flatter as it reports on a
4:38:36weekly basis
4:38:38who did you give it to what individual
4:38:40my supervisor is Jack kef I turn it into
4:38:43his secretary
4:38:45were you given an opportunity to discuss
4:38:48it in any subsequent time with anybody
4:38:50in management no sir
4:38:53[Music]
4:38:56thank you
4:39:01just to be perfectly about this uh is it
4:39:05fair to say that as Engineers you don't
4:39:08believe that you had
4:39:09data or analysis to characterize the
4:39:12performance of The Joint at a 30 degree
4:39:15temperature that's correct
4:39:17[Music]
4:39:20Julie yes yes sir
4:39:23okay thank you very much
4:39:28Well we'd ask Mr Lund Mr kiltminster and
4:39:33Brian Russell
4:39:35[Applause]
4:40:02thank you
4:40:06[Music]
4:40:08again
4:40:09[Music]
4:40:12[Applause]
4:40:19do you want to proceed and
4:40:23and to make any
4:40:27make any remarks or give any testimony
4:40:29that you'd care to and stick their line
4:40:32of the testimony we've had
4:40:34this morning and this afternoon I'm not
4:40:37sure there's anything we've been over so
4:40:39many things
4:40:42there are additional questions that
4:40:43you're going to be able to
4:40:47uh
4:40:51all right how
4:41:00I really explain the fact that you seem
4:41:05to change your mind when you change your
4:41:07hat
4:41:12I guess we got to go back a little
4:41:14further in the
4:41:15conversations on that
4:41:18we've dealt with Marshall for a long
4:41:21time and I've always been in the
4:41:22position of defending our position
4:41:26to make sure that we're ready to fly
4:41:30and I guess I didn't realize until after
4:41:32that meeting and after several days that
4:41:35we had absolutely changed in a
4:41:38from what we had been before
4:41:42that evening it was uh I guess I had
4:41:45never had those kinds of things come
4:41:47from the people at Marshall that we had
4:41:49to prove to them that we weren't ready I
4:41:52wouldn't move to a mic a little bit
4:41:53closer please okay
4:41:55so we got ourselves uh in the thought
4:41:58process that we were trying to find some
4:42:01way to prove to them that wouldn't work
4:42:02and we were unable to do that
4:42:04we couldn't prove absolutely that that
4:42:06motor wouldn't work in other words you
4:42:09had you honestly believe that you had a
4:42:11duty to prove that it wasn't that's kind
4:42:15of the mode we got ourselves into that
4:42:16evening
4:42:18is it seems like we've always been in
4:42:19the opposite mode
4:42:21I should have detected that but I did
4:42:23not but the roles kind of Switched
4:42:28so after
4:42:29making a or listening to the verbal
4:42:33presentation in the afternoon they asked
4:42:35what fire calls positional it was and I
4:42:37looked around the room and I was a
4:42:38senior person and I I said I don't want
4:42:40to fly looks to me the story says the 53
4:42:42degrees is about it
4:42:44and of course we requested that to go
4:42:46back and do something more
4:42:48and prepare detailed charts and to show
4:42:51that in more detail
4:42:53so we got busy then and I gave
4:42:56assignments to a dozen or so people who
4:42:58go out and generate data that would in a
4:43:00Workman like manner
4:43:02show the
4:43:04rationale show the data that we had
4:43:07so let everyone understand all the data
4:43:10and where it came from
4:43:12and we spent the next couple of hours
4:43:13beating the bushes trying to put
4:43:15together that data
4:43:18so we did that and began transmitting
4:43:21charts even late then and then went
4:43:23through that rationale and all this time
4:43:25we were preparing the day today it was
4:43:27coming in I was trying to put together
4:43:29what I was concluding out of all this
4:43:30because there was some additional data
4:43:32that was being generated
4:43:34and uh
4:43:35trying to understand and to absorb all
4:43:38of the data that was there to again see
4:43:40what my thought processes were and so we
4:43:43stood at the white board there in the
4:43:45management information center and the
4:43:46data would come in we would try and say
4:43:48now what does this tell us what does
4:43:50this tell us and put together a
4:43:51rationale for what we wanted to do
4:43:55oh it was in a in a real-time mode and
4:43:58we were trying to absorb the data and
4:44:00put together the story
4:44:02well as a result of that
4:44:04Telecom
4:44:06I gave the charts that made the
4:44:07recommendation
4:44:09that we wait until the motor got to 53
4:44:12degrees
4:44:14I didn't see anything different than I
4:44:16hadn't seen before
4:44:18and uh
4:44:20of course you've heard the story of what
4:44:21happened after that
4:44:24now let me ask a question yes
4:44:2653 degrees you've stated that you uh
4:44:31it's been often stated that the
4:44:33recommendation was just at this point in
4:44:35time to stay within your experience
4:44:36space and I find that to be a peculiar
4:44:39recommendation in the operation of any
4:44:42kind of system because normally you say
4:44:44from our experience space
4:44:47our data points our analysis and our
4:44:49extrapolation
4:44:51we're willing we would be willing at any
4:44:54time to go beyond our experience point
4:44:56out to this far as a Next Step
4:45:00and the only reason you would say I'd
4:45:02stay within my experience space is that
4:45:04you had a problem at that point that
4:45:07said you dare not go any farther because
4:45:09so could you clarify
4:45:11that it wasn't a question of uh of that
4:45:14it was the very definite question of
4:45:16conservatism
4:45:17you know this program has people on it
4:45:20so I'm very concerned about that and I
4:45:22want to make sure that if there's any
4:45:24hint of a problem that we're not
4:45:25extending that
4:45:27we didn't have any data at that point
4:45:29that would indicate that we should go
4:45:30beyond that
4:45:31now is that an answer to the question or
4:45:33do I try again
4:45:35maybe a slightly different I'm asking
4:45:39that is is
4:45:41normally when when you're trying to
4:45:44extrapolate Beyond maybe beyond your
4:45:48flight experience you rely on your
4:45:49qualification testing program and a
4:45:52system or a subsystem is qualified to
4:45:56fly within a certain regime or a certain
4:45:59envelope that would include
4:46:01environmental effects like like
4:46:03temperature
4:46:04um
4:46:05did you have any sort of uh
4:46:08qualification range on the temperature
4:46:10of the of the SRM well yeah we had
4:46:13development claw Motors that were down
4:46:15in the 40s uh as has been pointed out
4:46:18the data because of the horizontal
4:46:21assembly problems what we were trying to
4:46:22do is put them back to a condition that
4:46:25would resemble that that we would have
4:46:27in a vertical installation
4:46:29and so we'd gone in and repaired the
4:46:30putty because when you put those
4:46:31together horizontally you can't do it
4:46:34the same thing
4:46:35you can't do it the same way so although
4:46:38the intent was to put them back to the
4:46:40vertical there's some doubt that you can
4:46:42really do that adequately
4:46:45so there's always the question well this
4:46:48wasn't perfect and the answer was it was
4:46:49not
4:46:50and so my belief is that those 40 degree
4:46:55Motors you're probably valid and
4:46:56adequate
4:46:58but there's the doubt
4:47:01[Music]
4:47:03um
4:47:04or 40 degrees
4:47:06you could consider it an extraction
4:47:09taking it Taking it below what the uh
4:47:11what the motor has been qualified to I
4:47:14think one thing that we need to make
4:47:15very clear is we've talked about SRM 15
4:47:18and srm-22 being the two Motors that
4:47:20were the blow by Motors and that we
4:47:22couldn't tell because of those but we've
4:47:24got to keep in mind there were 10 Motors
4:47:26between those
4:47:27uh 30 joints between those two
4:47:30temperatures it had no Bubble at all
4:47:33so I think that as Marshall pointed out
4:47:37I think Mr boy pointed out he said you
4:47:39know the date is just not conclusive at
4:47:42all and it wasn't because we had a low
4:47:44temperature motor and a high temperature
4:47:45motor we had 10 Motors in between that
4:47:47showed nothing could I ask you a
4:47:49question on that
4:47:50in looking at uh
4:47:52the earlier data it appears there is a
4:47:56erosion and blow-by occurring more
4:47:58frequently later than sooner and Mr
4:48:01Borgia pointed out that uh during the
4:48:06year 1985 because of what he learned in
4:48:09looking at inspecting uh uh the one
4:48:12motor that he looked at he developed
4:48:15greater concern and in uh in line with
4:48:18Neil's question
4:48:21um did you want to stay with 53 rather
4:48:24than say exploring something slightly uh
4:48:26beyond that because there was a greater
4:48:28concern developing and uh this was his
4:48:32concern uh uh did you share Mr borgele's
4:48:35concern uh or just just why did you stay
4:48:39with 53 again and not say explore a
4:48:41little further
4:48:42well again the conservative aspect of
4:48:45looking at what our experience has been
4:48:47and that was the rationale that we
4:48:48presented to Marshall is stay within the
4:48:50experience band but I don't understand
4:48:52how did you view uh you mentioned 10
4:48:55Motors without uh Blow by and looking at
4:48:57the data that uh was handed out this
4:49:00morning uh there are several cases of uh
4:49:02of problems with various uh parts of the
4:49:05motors and it seemed to be more of it
4:49:07later than earlier
4:49:09we we haven't been able to identify
4:49:12those parameters that are causing that
4:49:15more
4:49:16uh pronounced effect but you look at
4:49:19that develop since you had a problem
4:49:21that was developing to a greater extent
4:49:24and you it was an unknown reason is why
4:49:26this problem would happen I can't
4:49:28understand why there wasn't a greater
4:49:30area of concern developing well there
4:49:32was and that's why we initiated all of
4:49:34this uh what are we going to do with the
4:49:36joint how are we going to investigate it
4:49:37set up a special task team I took one of
4:49:40my best supervisors gave him the task of
4:49:42doing that we signed Mr Beaujolais to
4:49:44the task team we put one of our best
4:49:45project Engineers on it
4:49:46[Applause]
4:49:48and uh
4:49:51program manager was assigned we
4:49:53implemented a full-time activity to to
4:49:55evaluate do that one more question since
4:49:59you
4:50:00your people were responsible for the
4:50:02design
4:50:03were responsible for the testing were
4:50:06responsible for the qualification when
4:50:08it came up to the point where there was
4:50:11a question of whether a lot should be
4:50:13made shouldn't um
4:50:16uh you you alone or your organization
4:50:20alone be the one that says yes or not
4:50:22and uh why would there be a question
4:50:26coming uh from NASA because of not
4:50:30having data
4:50:32as well presented whether he wanted why
4:50:35would they raise questions on your data
4:50:37and why would you respond to that
4:50:39question why didn't you just tell them
4:50:41it's our decision and this is it and not
4:50:43respond to the pressure
4:50:50as a quarterback on Monday morning
4:50:52that's probably what I should have done
4:50:54but
4:50:55you know you you work with people and
4:50:58you develop some confidence and I have
4:50:59some great confidence in those people in
4:51:01NASA we've worked with we worked with
4:51:03for a long long time in in what I think
4:51:06I've heard is that uh
4:51:09your experts who are developing a
4:51:11greater and greater concern including
4:51:14writing a rather powerfully stated memos
4:51:17and uh it's hard to understand why they
4:51:20didn't get more attention
4:51:24[Music]
4:51:30response the earlier answer about the 10
4:51:32Motors between the 53 degrees and the 75
4:51:35degrees
4:51:37well one conclusion might be from that
4:51:41database is that you shouldn't
4:51:44operate at 75 degrees or 53 degrees but
4:51:47you ought to stay within the temperature
4:51:49range of those motors which exhibited no
4:51:52erosion or Flow by uh so again I'm going
4:51:58to ask you the same question I asked
4:52:00before uh what
4:52:05what was conservative about saying 53 or
4:52:09instead of a number other than that
4:52:11which might be higher or might be lower
4:52:13depending on how you approach the
4:52:14problem trying to understand your
4:52:16thought process I guess all of the
4:52:18engineering rationale says that coal was
4:52:21probably worse the warm was probably
4:52:22better in all the physics of the
4:52:24situation as we best understood them
4:52:27so we felt that you know the
4:52:30conservative thing to do would be to
4:52:31stay warmer yeah but did you like 53
4:52:33degrees did you like the results on the
4:52:3553 degree flight
4:52:38I would rather have a motor that has no
4:52:40erosion no blow by and looks perfect at
4:52:42the end of the motor fire then then
4:52:43might not you not have taken the
4:52:45position that 57 would have been a
4:52:47better number 62 or some other room we
4:52:49have had you know Motors down in the low
4:52:5160s and I guess there's some just
4:52:54looking at my chart
4:52:57uh in the low 60s at least that were
4:53:00perfect
4:53:02it has some had some in the the lower
4:53:0550s that were not anywhere near as bad
4:53:07as the 15.
4:53:09so there's no clear dividing line at
4:53:11least there's a lot of other factors
4:53:12other than the temperature that might be
4:53:14involved is that correct that's correct
4:53:15so we don't know how we don't know how
4:53:17to know what the effect the temperature
4:53:19was
4:53:20you can ask one more question
4:53:23um
4:53:23uh you know I heard these comments that
4:53:26uh some tests look pretty good at 75 and
4:53:29others looked okay at 53
4:53:33but was the qualification testing
4:53:36thorough enough for any proper database
4:53:39to be in hand to really know what the uh
4:53:43critical variables are like the thrust
4:53:46of the motor
4:53:48the the tolerances of the metal joints
4:53:52the tolerances of the O-rings or the
4:53:54application of the putty or the
4:53:56application of the seal isn't one of
4:53:59your problems the fact that the
4:54:00qualification testing was inadequate
4:54:04it seems like the
4:54:06size of the qualification program is
4:54:10inversely proportional to the size of
4:54:12the motor
4:54:13which is called dollars and there's no
4:54:15doubt about that with small typical
4:54:17Motors It's Not Unusual to fire for many
4:54:19many many and the larger the motor than
4:54:21the smaller the qualification program
4:54:23and to get a full statistical range of
4:54:25every parameter in that motor
4:54:28I don't think there's enough money in
4:54:30the National treasury to do that
4:54:32so there's a practical limit to what you
4:54:35do go from the qualified motor and make
4:54:38changes and uh and and go into another
4:54:41area of further unknown exploration like
4:54:44reducing the strength of the uh a motor
4:54:46or increasing the thrust or changing the
4:54:49putty
4:54:51there were qualification Motors of
4:54:53course to do the strength of or the
4:54:56thickness of the case and the thrust
4:54:57change
4:54:59well worthy etiquette
4:55:03engineering opinion yes
4:55:06I have a question on
4:55:08Mr McDonald testified that he had a
4:55:11discussion I believe it was Mr Malloy
4:55:13about the meaning of the temperature
4:55:17range of 40 to 90 degrees rather reply
4:55:21just to the bulk temperature of the
4:55:22motor or whether it's applied to every
4:55:25part of the shuttle what's your
4:55:26understanding
4:55:29you would have asked me uh
4:55:31a month ago I told you the motor is 40
4:55:34to 90.
4:55:35so there's no qualification in your mind
4:55:39on the O-ring temperature
4:55:42for example the O-ring temperature could
4:55:44have been quite cold because the O-ring
4:55:46is certainly going to move in
4:55:49temperature with metal case the metal
4:55:51case could be quite a bit colder than
4:55:54the bulk temperature of the propellant
4:55:56if the weather had been cold there was
4:55:59no full-scale Motors fire below 40.
4:56:02but what I'm asking is
4:56:04did you as the supplier of the system to
4:56:09the government have a specification on
4:56:12the O-ring temperature
4:56:15or could the Oregon temperature have
4:56:16been anything
4:56:18I don't believe there is a specification
4:56:20on the O-ring temperature other than the
4:56:23material itself
4:56:25and what is that specification well it's
4:56:29a specification that says the material
4:56:31can withstand these kinds of
4:56:33environments
4:56:34but it doesn't specify the operational
4:56:37aspect
4:56:39in fact the milsomatic says specifically
4:56:42that the O-ring should be qualified for
4:56:45whatever uses they're put to
4:56:47so did you take any steps to do that is
4:56:50qualified the range of temperatures over
4:56:54which these O-rings were to be yes they
4:56:57used the development Motors were fired
4:56:59from 40 to 84 and the qualification
4:57:02motors from 45 to 83. so then 40 degrees
4:57:05was the temperature limit for the owner
4:57:09in the full-scale call program that's
4:57:11correct so when it was predicted that
4:57:14the temperature of the O-ring had
4:57:17launched 51l was going to be 29 degrees
4:57:19the O-ring was outside of the
4:57:22qualification temperatures by some 10
4:57:24degrees that's correct then how could
4:57:26you make a recommendation to launch if
4:57:28you're 10 degrees outside of your
4:57:30qualification
4:57:31our original recommendation course was
4:57:34not to launch well I understand that but
4:57:36your final recommendation was to launch
4:57:38okay what we need to do then is go
4:57:40through that rash now
4:57:45are you going to answer my question then
4:57:46at the end of this discussion hopefully
4:57:50well you want to go through now I'd be
4:57:52glad to do that
4:57:56I mean I think we've heard what
4:57:59the explanation you've given I think the
4:58:01problem we're having is
4:58:03it doesn't it's not convincing
4:58:05I mean let me if you don't mind actually
4:58:08uh
4:58:11you I assume you have great confidence
4:58:14in your engineers and Thompson the
4:58:16others
4:58:18and they're probably as well qualified
4:58:20as anybody in the country they're
4:58:21dealing with these problems or rings and
4:58:24seals and so forth
4:58:25so
4:58:27yeah
4:58:29and uh
4:58:31you had a long discussion in the Telecom
4:58:34and you decided all of you I understand
4:58:37all of you decided that for safety
4:58:40reasons you would oppose the launch
4:58:45[Music]
4:58:47NASA in one way or another made it clear
4:58:50that they who were displeased with that
4:58:53recommendation
4:58:55and I assume that you knew when you made
4:58:58the recommendation that that your
4:59:01recommendation in fact was going to
4:59:03determine whether that shuttle would be
4:59:05launched or not because
4:59:07NASA had indicated to you they would not
4:59:09fly unless they had a written report
4:59:11from high call saying you approved the
4:59:14launch
4:59:15I don't I didn't know that NASA would
4:59:17accept that you didn't know that well
4:59:20you must have known your recommendation
4:59:22was very important
4:59:23you knew that if you voted against the
4:59:26launch it would not have been launched
4:59:27didn't you well we voted prior to it and
4:59:30they didn't accept it so I I couldn't
4:59:33forecast for NASA no but you knew that
4:59:35that was the reason they asked you to
4:59:37reconsider that's why you went had the
4:59:39five-minute recess didn't you that's
4:59:41fair statement yes now knowing that
4:59:45and knowing that the the safety of the
4:59:48crew is involved
4:59:50and knowing your own people the
4:59:53engineers that you respected were still
4:59:55against the launch what was it that
4:59:58occurred in your mind that satisfied you
5:00:01to say okay let's take a chance
5:00:04well I didn't say take a chance because
5:00:06I I felt there was some rationale that
5:00:09allowed us to to go ahead
5:00:12well maybe that isn't fair then what was
5:00:14it that occurred in your mind that
5:00:16caused you to be willing to change your
5:00:19mind
5:00:20I guess one of the the big things was is
5:00:23that we really didn't know whether
5:00:24temperature was the driver or not we
5:00:26couldn't tell
5:00:28we had Hot Motors that blew by and coal
5:00:30Motors that blew by and some very near
5:00:32either end that did not the data was
5:00:35inconclusive
5:00:36so I had trouble justifying my online
5:00:39temperature is a factor
5:00:42second uh manner for just one moment uh
5:00:46Mr Beaujolais has said that the thing
5:00:48which was compelling to him was that the
5:00:51blow by on the coldest motor was much
5:00:55more severe he's emphasized how black
5:00:57was the bulldeye how large an hangover
5:00:59which occurred but three or four degrees
5:01:01above that there was Zero
5:01:03so his his discussion was not convincing
5:01:07to you well it wasn't totally convincing
5:01:09because you know at two or three degrees
5:01:11it went from very very bad to
5:01:14no problem
5:01:16[Music]
5:01:23so it's obviously a random effect it
5:01:26depends upon whether or not you're going
5:01:28to blowhole you don't get a blowhole so
5:01:30there's a bit of particular flight it
5:01:31happens at all six Fields don't get a
5:01:34block or that's no information the fact
5:01:37that as far as I can understand this it
5:01:39doesn't mean you're suddenly good
5:01:41because it worked and the next time when
5:01:43one goes off you're suddenly bad well
5:01:45it's just to me that it has to be
5:01:47understood as a probabilistic and
5:01:49confusing complicated situation that
5:01:51we're never going to be able to decide
5:01:53that they're all going to break or
5:01:55they're all not going to break it's not
5:01:56the wonderful one-horse shed and when
5:01:58you look at it that way then it's a
5:02:00question of increasing and decreasing
5:02:02probabilities that we have to consider
5:02:04rather than did it work with things that
5:02:05work and I'd like to think explain it to
5:02:08me from that point of view well the
5:02:10question still is is temperature the
5:02:12thing that caused the srn 15. you heard
5:02:15your engineers argued that there was an
5:02:17effect of temperature which looked like
5:02:19it made things worse is it not
5:02:21inconceivable that there's something
5:02:23else that sometimes produces Blow by
5:02:25that there's more than one effect and
5:02:27that the temperature could still be an
5:02:29important effect and increase the
5:02:31probability of the fact that at a high
5:02:33temperature it gets worse is there any
5:02:35evidence
5:02:36the temperature is not a important
5:02:38matter just because at some high
5:02:40temperature you have an accident well
5:02:43there's as you point out there are many
5:02:44variables in the thing and it wasn't
5:02:46clear the temperature was the effect
5:02:49it was logically from the point of view
5:02:51of the engineers they were explaining
5:02:53why the temperature would have an
5:02:54Effectiveness in the in the when you
5:02:56don't have any data you have to use
5:02:58reason okay and they were giving reasons
5:03:00that's right and that's what we did is
5:03:03we included in our rationale the fact
5:03:05that sure enough the temperature could
5:03:07be in effect
5:03:08okay it wasn't clear but we said we will
5:03:10consider that to be so
5:03:12I I have great difficulty with this
5:03:16unusual practice when there's any uh a
5:03:21real doubt about flight safety for this
5:03:24aircraft or whatever you simply don't
5:03:26and it seems to me this is a reverse and
5:03:29I I just have great difficulty
5:03:31understanding the question that's been
5:03:34asked before that is understanding any
5:03:36answer I just haven't heard it as to why
5:03:38if there is doubt in your mind why you
5:03:41went ahead why you change your mind I
5:03:44just don't understand it I appreciate
5:03:46very much if you could explain that
5:03:50he signed the Halifax and we've we've
5:03:54asked us to learn a lot of questions and
5:03:56I think maybe a fairness to Mr one Mr
5:03:58can you uh
5:04:01uh
5:04:03attempt to explain to the commission
5:04:06so why
5:04:08I guess you changed your mind too didn't
5:04:11you yes sir based on the uh discussion
5:04:14that we had in the rationale that was
5:04:17developed so how can you say you changed
5:04:19your mind when you say capture data not
5:04:21conclusive on predicting primary o-ring
5:04:24Boulevard
5:04:26did you have a feeling you had to prove
5:04:28that it was
5:04:30uh the burden of proof was I knew to
5:04:34show that it wasn't safe no I think we
5:04:37were asked to re-look at the data which
5:04:39we did but what could you tell me what
5:04:41data was that you looked at that was
5:04:43different from the data you looked at
5:04:44first
5:04:45there was one piece of data that we
5:04:47looked at which has been discussed
5:04:49before that was the erosion parameter
5:04:52and the factor of three but my
5:04:55evaluation was is that the only new
5:04:58piece of data that's really the only new
5:05:00piece of data that we had not previously
5:05:02discussed on the telephone
5:05:05but I think that the data that we did
5:05:08show
5:05:09the fact that we had subscale tests
5:05:11uh at 30 degrees showing no blow by was
5:05:15an indicator
5:05:17we as Mr Lund pointed out had other
5:05:20flight Motors at temperatures between
5:05:22the two in question that is 75 degrees
5:05:25and 53 degrees overring temperatures
5:05:27that had shown no blow by
5:05:30and we had static test Motors at
5:05:33temperatures lower than 53 degrees that
5:05:35had no bull buy now I'd like to discuss
5:05:37that just a moment could you
5:05:39particularly though point out the new
5:05:41data because the purposes we understand
5:05:44it for the recess was to it was to find
5:05:48out if there was any new data
5:05:50however you just have to change your
5:05:53mind based on the data you had
5:05:56one piece of data that was new in our
5:05:59discussion
5:06:00was that if we did have blow by past the
5:06:04primary o-ring
5:06:06as it was being positioned to seal and
5:06:09recognizing the fact that the cold
5:06:12temperatures could cause that timing
5:06:13function to extend
5:06:16then we had an opportunity perhaps of
5:06:20having some erosion occur
5:06:22we looked at the erosion that had
5:06:24occurred on 51 Charlie
5:06:27and compared that to the data that we
5:06:29had developed both from cold
5:06:32hydraulic oil testing and from hot
5:06:36subscale testing that indicated we that
5:06:39that very polite had a safety factor of
5:06:42three
5:06:43over what would have to have happened
5:06:46in order to get to an area of
5:06:49questionable ceiling capability
5:06:52and with that information in mind then
5:06:55and also the fact that we had had some
5:06:59analytical work done earlier to develop
5:07:02the limiting erosion parameters on
5:07:06O-rings
5:07:07uh led me to believe that we were ha we
5:07:11were in the condition of having a safe
5:07:13position for recommending a flight the
5:07:15positive erosion excuse me how come that
5:07:18data wasn't available the first time how
5:07:20did it happen to show up at the recess
5:07:22well it was just a matter of a
5:07:25discussion that we had while we had the
5:07:28recess
5:07:29when we said that well if indeed the
5:07:33temperature is going to cause a longer
5:07:35time for the primary function primary
5:07:37o-ring to function
5:07:39and there is the possibility of
5:07:40additional erosion
5:07:43then where do we stand relative to 51c
5:07:46and how much more margin did that
5:07:49exhibit so you really had the data there
5:07:51before yes you had to analyze it in
5:07:53other words it was not new data just say
5:07:56that you hadn't properly analyzed right
5:07:58I was stated that we hadn't uh prepared
5:08:00or discussed on the earlier telecon
5:08:03earlier portion of the time that was
5:08:04through an oversight
5:08:07um well I don't know if there's an
5:08:08oversight for uh just another piece of
5:08:10data that we were searching for in order
5:08:13to establish our positions
5:08:17[Music]
5:08:18of three over the 51c
5:08:22erosion problem
5:08:26how were you how were you attempting to
5:08:29analyze how the timing function would
5:08:31change
5:08:34and how much erosion that could possibly
5:08:36give you on on 51l only on a subjective
5:08:40basis that
5:08:42if as has been stated the timing
5:08:45function under cold condition was to
5:08:47extend and if what was observed under 51
5:08:50C uh not only the blow by but the
5:08:54erosion were combined then we developed
5:08:58the rationale about that safety factor
5:09:00of three
5:09:01humans feeling of pressure being put on
5:09:04You by NASA or you just calmly uh
5:09:08reassessing
5:09:10uh and I felt that the pressure that was
5:09:12put on us was to go back and look at the
5:09:15data look at the detailed information
5:09:17that had been presented to see if there
5:09:20was something that we were seeing that
5:09:23we were not representing on the phone
5:09:25you didn't feel that they were trying to
5:09:27get you to change your mind I did not
5:09:29feel a significant amount of pressure in
5:09:32that regard
5:09:34Spencer
5:09:36have you had an opportunity to look at
5:09:38the
5:09:39correspondence of Mr Beaujolais written
5:09:42in the Summer and Autumn of 85
5:09:45no I have none
5:09:53they're both nice
5:09:54to you
5:09:5531 August 31 July rather you receive
5:09:59that in in Reddit I presume yes we took
5:10:02immediate action on that and we
5:10:03established the O-ring task team within
5:10:05a week or so of that memo did you pass
5:10:08along Mr Beaujolais concerns to uh
5:10:11anyone at NASA
5:10:13thank you
5:10:15the normal process of that sort of
5:10:17information is through the project
5:10:18office and Mr McDonald and so on were on
5:10:22that that would be their task well then
5:10:25you're saying that it would have been Mr
5:10:27McDonald's responsibility to alert NASA
5:10:30that the key engineer on a catastrophe
5:10:33was possible I think NASA understood
5:10:35that clearly and we have been working
5:10:37with him since that time on this whole
5:10:39problem I'm not asking that I'm asking
5:10:41whether as a result of Mr bolsheva's
5:10:44memo to you
5:10:45you or Mr McDonald or anyone else at
5:10:48Firefall alerted NASA to the concerns of
5:10:52this key engineer
5:10:55I did not call anyone at Nasa
5:10:57specifically but I saw that they were
5:10:58alerted because of their immediate
5:11:00response in working with us
5:11:02are you aware of their having heard that
5:11:06a potential catastrophe was possible
5:11:17I like that a couple of questions about
5:11:21the temperature if I may a sequence of
5:11:24questions
5:11:25uh you say that on this 40 to 90 degree
5:11:29launch or certification criteria is this
5:11:32a cold soap as far as this uh some other
5:11:36kind of a temperature and the 40 to 90
5:11:40degrees is a mean bulk temperature of
5:11:42the propellant which means to me that we
5:11:45could have a motor that where the
5:11:47propellant grain was soaked out to 40
5:11:50degrees or conversely propellant grain
5:11:53was soaked out to 90 degrees what's the
5:11:55time constant on this case plus the
5:11:58insulator and so forth and to get to a
5:12:01equilibrium bulk temperature
5:12:04uh and we ran some calculations based on
5:12:07equilibrium at the cape and I believe
5:12:10it's about 30 days so that it's possible
5:12:13to be exposed to a cold temperature and
5:12:16have sharp temperature gradients within
5:12:18the propellant or the insulator and and
5:12:22so part of it would be at a temperature
5:12:24for outside of what you think would be
5:12:27appropriate and the rest of them will
5:12:30still be warmer shall we say yes but I
5:12:33think that is limited by the other
5:12:35requirements which uh was spelled out in
5:12:38a level two document that said 31
5:12:40degrees to 99 degrees
5:12:43is it possible that some of it could be
5:12:45at 26 degrees and other at 55 degrees
5:12:50uh considering again it's 21 to 30-day
5:12:54transient to get to the ball temperature
5:12:56that's not the way I would read the the
5:12:59combined two specifications or two
5:13:02requirements is it possible that there
5:13:05is a difference between the behavior of
5:13:07the subscale motors at some temperature
5:13:09and the behavior of the large Motors at
5:13:12the same temperature if one was in
5:13:14thermal equilibrium and the other was in
5:13:16some sort of a non-uniform temperature
5:13:18distribution yes I would expect there
5:13:20could be some differences so there may
5:13:22be some doubt in your mind about how
5:13:24exactly to apply the subscale motor data
5:13:27and within the framework of a
5:13:29large-scale motor if you will offer the
5:13:31temperature temperature transient yes
5:13:33sir all right thank you Russell
5:13:38[Music]
5:13:40when I was talking with you a few days
5:13:42ago at your plant I think I'm correct in
5:13:45recalling that one of you told me that
5:13:47if the temperature at the cape on the
5:13:52day of launch have been in the 9 to 10
5:13:55degrees above zero
5:13:57Fahrenheit range there would be no
5:14:00question but that you would have stuck
5:14:02to a no launch position am I right in
5:14:04that recollection that's right there's
5:14:06many many things in the motor head that
5:14:08would be concerned so so you did
5:14:09recognize that temperature was a
5:14:12discriminator yes in an absolute sense
5:14:14the only question was what the margin
5:14:16was below 53 degrees that's correct
5:14:21um
5:14:22were you
5:14:24acquainted at all with this
5:14:26correspondence which I assume you have a
5:14:28chance to read if Mr Beaujolais written
5:14:31in the
5:14:32Summer and Autumn of 85
5:14:34it seems to say that
5:14:37management does not have an adequately
5:14:40heightened
5:14:41sense of the urgency of the work to be
5:14:44done on the O-ring problem
5:14:46the seal problem
5:14:48I my question is were you aware of that
5:14:52feeling on his part at the time
5:14:55and did it cause you concern and what if
5:14:58anything
5:14:59did you do about it we had I didn't meet
5:15:02with Mr Bosley I met with Don Kettner
5:15:04who is the task team leader he made
5:15:07recommendations to us and I think we
5:15:09followed those recommendations and did
5:15:11everything we could to help them with
5:15:12them now they're undoubtedly are things
5:15:14that were bugging them that they didn't
5:15:16bring to my attention that I didn't do
5:15:17anything about because they didn't know
5:15:18about them
5:15:19but when they came and Don Kenner
5:15:23particularly we worked very hard with
5:15:24him to try and establish and take
5:15:26corrective action as needed thank you
5:15:31[Music]
5:15:32I'm sure that all of you and everybody
5:15:35associated with shuttle knew that it was
5:15:38NASA's intention to fly
5:15:40on a very rapid time schedule throughout
5:15:43the year or build up to the point of the
5:15:45and that they would have to launch on
5:15:47winter mornings and other time did in
5:15:51the process of eval evaluating the the
5:15:54information brought to you did you at
5:15:56any time suggest to NASA that the launch
5:16:00it launch commit criteria the lcc's or
5:16:04other rules may be uh
5:16:08insufficiently constraining and if you
5:16:10ought to establish rules with respect to
5:16:12the SRM that kept you one either within
5:16:16your experience base your qual test or
5:16:18your extrapolations we did not uh Mr
5:16:22McDonald evidently had some discussions
5:16:24with him on that line
5:16:27thank you sir
5:16:30thanks for Mr Russell
5:16:33[Applause]
5:16:33um
5:16:34perhaps you would give us your
5:16:37recollection of the thought process
5:16:39followed in your mind
5:16:41uh in the change of position between the
5:16:47view presented in the Telecom that fire
5:16:50coil was opposed to a launch and the
5:16:53subsequent conclusion of the caucus
5:16:55within the company
5:16:58I uh
5:17:00I was part of the overall days efforts
5:17:03that started off pretty early as has
5:17:05been mentioned and and as the day
5:17:09developed uh pretty much agreed with the
5:17:11recommendations and as ours our
5:17:13presentation was made on the charts the
5:17:16subsequent answers that came back you've
5:17:19asked others if if they felt pressure
5:17:22and undue pressure and and
5:17:25I felt some pressure with some of the
5:17:27comments I thought our rationale was was
5:17:30reasonable I've seen many instances in
5:17:33the past where we have used previous
5:17:37limits for data on on putty that I'm
5:17:40familiar with and other raw materials
5:17:42for example that we do not exceed are
5:17:44experience based in the usage of these
5:17:46materials and so I felt that this was
5:17:49the proper thing to do albeit our 53
5:17:51degree experience that has been
5:17:53mentioned uh wasn't desirable but we had
5:17:57deemed it acceptable at that time and
5:18:01the statements that seem to me to
5:18:05to uh
5:18:07to put pressure or at least to to make
5:18:10me feel the pressure were the uh the
5:18:14responses of of being appalled at our
5:18:16recommendations
5:18:17uh the responses of when we should
5:18:21launch how long do we have to wait April
5:18:23and and also there was an argument about
5:18:26what sort of rationale we could have for
5:18:2853 degrees and Mr Armstrong made the
5:18:30point that that what temperature could
5:18:32we make a a strong statement on and the
5:18:35data was uh couldn't tell us which
5:18:39temperature other than 53 degrees which
5:18:41had been our previously
5:18:43uh most successful low temperature and
5:18:47so I I felt some pressure based on those
5:18:49comments I'd like to add that my feeling
5:18:51is as uh I believe it was Mr Malloy and
5:18:55this is Again by voice recognition but
5:18:57after we had made our recommendation
5:18:58initially
5:19:00he
5:19:01he
5:19:03for about five minutes and explained in
5:19:05his mind uh why the data really didn't
5:19:08add up to the conclusions that we had
5:19:10made and I'll have to admit at that time
5:19:13that it was a very logical presentation
5:19:16uh that he had made and then there was
5:19:18talk back and forth as to what the data
5:19:20really meant and this has been mentioned
5:19:22here there in the caucus they're they're
5:19:26weren't any new data uh brought up that
5:19:29I recognized we pretty much talked over
5:19:32the same types of of things and and my
5:19:35feeling of it was is
5:19:37what uh some of us were understanding
5:19:39and what others were understanding and
5:19:41feeling important didn't really agree I
5:19:44didn't make I think I can only recall
5:19:47making one comment in the caucus uh I
5:19:50can't even remember what that was and it
5:19:52was very brief and I I don't think made
5:19:54a big impact at all and the reason that
5:19:57I didn't make so many comments despite
5:19:58what I I felt was that Roger and Arnie
5:20:03were were making the points to the best
5:20:05that they could and I couldn't see a way
5:20:06of making them any better
5:20:08so
5:20:10um
5:20:11we got to a point in the caucus where Mr
5:20:15Mason said and rightfully so we're we're
5:20:17covering the same information we're not
5:20:19talking about anything new here and it's
5:20:21time for a decision
5:20:23and uh
5:20:25I
5:20:26I may depend in my position to to feel
5:20:29pressure more so I know these other
5:20:31gentlemen have many pressures from all
5:20:34sides and so I can't really speak to
5:20:36them but I felt pressure that we were
5:20:40and I don't know if if Roger was
5:20:42referring to me in his testimony but he
5:20:44could have been because I had the
5:20:46feeling that we were in it or it was a
5:20:48distinct feeling that we were in the
5:20:50position of having to prove it was
5:20:52unsafe instead of the other way around
5:20:53which uh was a totally new experience
5:20:57and I believe I made that statement
5:20:59afterward I know I did when I went home
5:21:01and talked about it with my wife
5:21:04but here again I
5:21:09it's I think it's impossible for me to
5:21:11say what might have swung the decision
5:21:13but I I felt in my mind that that once
5:21:16we had done our very best to explain why
5:21:17we were concerned and we meaning those
5:21:20in the camp who who really felt strongly
5:21:23about the recommendation of 53 degrees
5:21:26uh uh the decision was was to be made
5:21:30and and a poll was was then taken and I
5:21:34remember distinctly at the time whether
5:21:36I would have the the courage if I asked
5:21:38and I thought I might be
5:21:40um
5:21:41what I would do and whether I would be
5:21:43alone I didn't think I'd be alone but I
5:21:45was wondering if I'd have the courage I
5:21:47remember that distinctly to stand up and
5:21:49say no uh however uh
5:21:52we were not asked as uh as the
5:21:55engineering people it was a a management
5:21:59decision that the vice president's level
5:22:01and they had heard all that that they
5:22:03could hear and
5:22:05and uh I I felt there was nothing more
5:22:08to say uh that we could change anything
5:22:11and also felt in my mind that I didn't
5:22:14see and I I believe I mentioned this to
5:22:16you last week that I I didn't see a
5:22:18dangerous concern I knew we were
5:22:21entering into increased risk
5:22:24and I
5:22:26I didn't feel comfortable doing that I
5:22:28was nervous you asked how I slept that
5:22:30night and I I said I thought I slept
5:22:32okay my wife differed with that as I
5:22:34talked with her after that but uh there
5:22:37there wasn't nervousness there that we
5:22:39were increasing the risk and I believe
5:22:40all of us knew that uh
5:22:43that if
5:22:45if it were increased to the level of an
5:22:48O-ring burn through what the
5:22:49consequences would be and I don't think
5:22:51there's any question anyone's mind about
5:22:53that uh I I don't know if I've answered
5:22:57the question I guess your original
5:22:57question was what I thought was in the
5:22:59thought process but that was what was in
5:23:02my thoughts
5:23:03thank you very much
5:23:06I think we'd like to adjourn for today
5:23:08do either of you a gentleman School Mr
5:23:11Mr Lund have any pressures outside
5:23:14pressures anybody call you anybody
5:23:16suggest you
5:23:17should vote to launch anything of that
5:23:20kind at all the commission should know
5:23:21about either one of us no sir
5:23:24okay thanks very much we'll address
5:23:26today
5:23:33friends
5:23:37[Applause]
5:24:15[Applause]

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