PORFIRIO DÍAZ: El Dictador que Construyó México… y lo Condenó — Transcript
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- 0:00His name was Porfirio Díaz, and what
- 0:03happened during the 34 years he ruled
- 0:05Mexico was not simply a dictatorship.
- 0:09It was something more difficult to
- 0:11understand and even harder to judge. It
- 0:14was the story of a country that changed
- 0:17radically, modernizing its streets,
- 0:19railways, banks, and image to the world
- 0:21, while millions of Mexicans lived in
- 0:24conditions of misery, dispossession,
- 0:26and forced silence. It was the story of
- 0:30a soldier who became a statesman, a war
- 0:33hero who turned into a tyrant, a man
- 0:35who loved Mexico in his own way, but
- 0:37who ended up destroying exactly what he
- 0:39claimed to defend. This is the story of
- 0:43Porfirio Díaz, of the period that
- 0:45bears his name, and of the question
- 0:47that still has no simple answer. Was he
- 0:50the man Mexico needed, or was he the
- 0:52man Mexico could not afford to have?
- 0:55The answer, like almost everything in
- 0:58this country's history, does not fit
- 1:00into a single version. We must delve
- 1:03deep into it, without easy prejudices,
- 1:06to understand why the Porfiriato
- 1:08remains one of the most debated,
- 1:11admired, and hated episodes in Mexico's
- 1:14national memory. To understand Porfirio
- 1:17Díaz, one must first understand the
- 1:19Mexico he was born into, a Mexico that
- 1:21lacked everything we take for granted
- 1:23today. Porfirio Díaz was born on
- 1:26September 15, 1830, in the city of
- 1:29Oaxaca, into a humble family of mixed
- 1:31heritage with Mixtec roots. His father
- 1:36died when he was just 3 years old, and
- 1:38his mother raised him in austere
- 1:40conditions, without great resources, in
- 1:42a provincial city that little resembled
- 1:44the nation's capital. It was a Mexico
- 1:49of internal wars, constant military
- 1:51uprisings, and generals who seized
- 1:53power by force only to lose it the same
- 1:56way. It was a Mexico that had gone
- 2:00through dozens of presidents in just
- 2:02two decades, where no government could
- 2:04consolidate, where foreign debt crushed
- 2:07the country, and where foreign powers
- 2:09looked with greed at the natural
- 2:11resources and institutional weakness of
- 2:14a nation that still didn't know what it
- 2:16wanted to be. That chaos was the air
- 2:20Porfirio Díaz breathed throughout his
- 2:23childhood and youth. And that chaos is
- 2:26precisely what shaped his understanding
- 2:29of power—not as something abstract,
- 2:31but as something concrete, urgent, and
- 2:34necessary for survival. From a very
- 2:38young age, he understood that in Mexico
- 2:41, ideas without force were useless, and
- 2:43force without ideas was not enough. The
- 2:47combination of both would be the
- 2:49formula that, decades later, would lead
- 2:51him to the highest seat of power.
- 2:53Díaz's early life was marked by two
- 2:56major influences that would eventually
- 2:58clash violently. The first was the law.
- 3:03He studied at the Institute of Arts and
- 3:05Sciences of Oaxaca, where his teacher
- 3:07was none other than Benito Juárez, the
- 3:09man who would later become both his
- 3:11model and his obstacle. Díaz admired
- 3:15Juárez, at least at first. He shared
- 3:19his humble origins, Oaxacan pride, and
- 3:21faith in the Republic as a system of
- 3:24government. But Díaz was never truly a
- 3:28man of laws; he was a man of action.
- 3:32The second great influence was war.
- 3:35Mexico in the 1840s and 50s was a
- 3:38permanent battlefield. First, the U.S.
- 3:43invasion from 1846 to 1848, which
- 3:48stripped the country of more than half
- 3:50of its territory. Then the Reform War,
- 3:53the bloody conflict between liberals
- 3:55and conservatives that pitted Mexicans
- 3:57against Mexicans for three years. And
- 4:00finally, the French intervention and
- 4:03Maximilian's empire, the attempt to
- 4:05turn Mexico into a monarchy under
- 4:08European tutelage. In all these wars,
- 4:11Porfirio Díaz fought, not from afar,
- 4:14not as a desk strategist, but in the
- 4:17field with rifle and saber, leading
- 4:20troops, resisting sieges, and
- 4:22organizing guerrillas. He earned his
- 4:25promotions one by one, with real blood,
- 4:28not with surnames or political
- 4:30connections. When Mexico needed
- 4:34soldiers who knew how to fight, Díaz
- 4:36was there, and that military trajectory
- 4:39would give him a legitimacy no pure
- 4:41politician could dispute. The Battle of
- 4:44May 5, 1862, in Puebla was the moment
- 4:49Porfirio Díaz became more than just a
- 4:51competent soldier. It was the moment he
- 4:55began to become a symbol. General
- 4:58Charles de Lorencez's French troops
- 5:00advanced on Puebla, convinced that the
- 5:03Mexican resistance would collapse in a
- 5:05matter of hours. France had one of the
- 5:09most powerful armies in the world.
- 5:12Mexico was a country devastated by
- 5:13years of civil war, with a government
- 5:15lacking resources and a poorly equipped
- 5:17army. No one expected that battle to
- 5:21end as it did, but there was Porfirio
- 5:23Díaz in command. 10. When the French
- 5:55troops tried to flank the Mexican
- 5:57positions, it was Díaz who
- 5:59counterattacked, who advanced when
- 6:01everyone expected him to retreat, who
- 6:03turned a desperate defense into an
- 6:05offensive strike that left the French
- 6:07confused and finally retreating from
- 6:09the field. The victory was not decisive
- 6:13. The conflict would continue for years
- 6:16and the French would eventually take
- 6:19Puebla. But May 5th remained etched in
- 6:22the national memory as the day Mexico
- 6:25proved to the world it would not
- 6:27surrender easily. And in that memory,
- 6:31the name of Porfirio Díaz shone with a
- 6:33clarity that no other officer of his
- 6:36generation possessed. A hero had been
- 6:39born. What no one could know at the
- 6:43time is that this same hero would,
- 6:45decades later, be the cause of the
- 6:47bloodiest revolution Mexico had ever
- 6:49seen. The French intervention ended
- 6:53with the defeat of Maximilian's empire
- 6:55and the restoration of the Republic
- 6:57under Benito Juárez in 1867. Mexico
- 7:02had survived. It had expelled European
- 7:06troops, executed the Austrian emperor
- 7:08at the Hill of the Bells, and regained
- 7:11its sovereignty. It was an
- 7:13extraordinary achievement. But the
- 7:15country that emerged from that conflict
- 7:18was shattered. The government's coffers
- 7:21were empty, roads destroyed, haciendas
- 7:24razed, and the social fabric torn by
- 7:26years of war. And in that context of
- 7:29difficult and painful reconstruction,
- 7:32the first serious tensions between
- 7:34Porfirio Díaz and Benito Juárez began
- 7:36to emerge. Díaz had been one of the
- 7:39great heroes of the resistance against
- 7:41the French. He had won crucial battles,
- 7:45liberated cities, and demonstrated a
- 7:47military prowess on the field that few
- 7:50could match. And yet, when the war
- 7:53ended, he found himself in an
- 7:55uncomfortable position. Juárez was the
- 7:58president, the civil symbol of the
- 8:00Republic, the man who had kept the
- 8:03legitimate government alive, even in
- 8:05its darkest moments. And Juárez did
- 8:08not fully trust military men with too
- 8:10much power and too much popularity. The
- 8:13tension between them grew. Díaz ran
- 8:17for president in 1867 and lost. He ran
- 8:22again in 1871 and lost once more.
- 8:27Frustration began to mount, and when
- 8:30Juárez died in 1872, he was replaced
- 8:34by Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, another
- 8:37civil politician who was also unwilling
- 8:39to clear the path for Díaz to reach
- 8:41power through elections. Porfirio
- 8:44Díaz's patience had a limit, and that
- 8:47limit was about to be reached. In 1876,
- 8:52Porfirio Díaz made a decision that
- 8:54would define not only his life, but
- 8:56that of all of Mexico for the following
- 8:59decades. He decided to revolt. The Plan
- 9:03of Tuxtepec was the document that
- 9:05justified his armed uprising against
- 9:07the government of Lerdo de Tejada. In
- 9:10that plan, Díaz proclaimed the
- 9:12principle of no-reelection as the
- 9:14central banner of his cause. It was
- 9:17ironic, and history would remember it
- 9:19with bitterness. The man who took up
- 9:21arms under the banner of no-reelection
- 9:24would be the most reelected president
- 9:26in all of Mexico's history. But at that
- 9:29moment, the plan worked. Díaz managed
- 9:32to mobilize military forces, attract
- 9:35dissatisfied sectors of the army and
- 9:37the political class, and militarily
- 9:39defeat the government troops. The
- 9:42Battle of Tecoac in November 1876 was
- 9:46the decisive blow. Lerdo de Tejada's
- 9:50forces were defeated. The president
- 9:52abandoned the country and Porfirio
- 9:54Díaz entered Mexico City as the
- 9:56strongman no one could ignore anymore.
- 10:00He took power de facto, organized
- 10:02elections, and was proclaimed president
- 10:05. It was the beginning of what history
- 10:07would call the Porfiriato. Although in
- 10:10that first term Díaz complied with
- 10:12non-reelection and handed power to
- 10:14Manuel González in 1880. That gesture
- 10:17of apparent constitutional respect was
- 10:20nothing more than a waiting period. In
- 10:221884, Díaz returned to the presidency
- 10:27and this time he would not let it go.
- 10:31The Mexico he knew, the Mexico he knew,
- 10:34the Mexico he knew, the Mexico he knew,
- 10:37the convulsed and unstable Mexico of
- 10:39his entire life, was about to undergo a
- 10:42brutal, costly, and lasting
- 10:44transformation. To govern a country
- 10:48that had been unable to remain stable
- 10:50for decades, Díaz designed a power
- 10:53system that did not exist in any
- 10:55political theory book, but worked with
- 10:58brutal efficiency for over 30 years.
- 11:01That system had several fundamental
- 11:04pillars that are necessary to
- 11:05understand how a single man could hold
- 11:08power for so long without anyone
- 11:10managing to overthrow him by force. The
- 11:14first was control of the army. Díaz
- 11:17knew better than anyone from his own
- 11:20experience that in Mexico real power
- 11:22lay in the arms. He purged the army of
- 11:25rivals, promoted loyal generals, and
- 11:27assigned strategic commands to men who
- 11:30owed him their careers and positions.
- 11:33He did not tolerate any military man
- 11:34accumulating too much regional power
- 11:36without his explicit approval. The
- 11:38second pillar was the control of local
- 11:41bosses. Mexico was a huge and
- 11:43geographically fragmented country. It
- 11:46was impossible to govern it solely from
- 11:48the capital. Díaz understood this and
- 11:51built a network of regional political
- 11:53chiefs who managed their territories
- 11:55with an iron fist in exchange for
- 11:56absolute loyalty to the center. Those
- 12:00political chiefs were judges, police,
- 12:02and governors at the same time, and
- 12:04their local power was immense. The
- 12:08third pillar was the press. Díaz did
- 12:12not eliminate all critical press from
- 12:14day one, but he gradually tamed it
- 12:17through subsidies, pressure, threats,
- 12:19and when necessary, prison or exile for
- 12:22journalists who insisted on bothering
- 12:25the regime. The information that
- 12:29circulated in Mexico was largely
- 12:31information that the government
- 12:33tolerated, and that control of the
- 12:35narrative was fundamental to sustaining
- 12:37the image of an indispensable ruler.
- 12:39The fourth great pillar of Díaz's
- 12:42system was foreign policy and foreign
- 12:44investment. Díaz understood very early
- 12:47on that Mexico could not modernize on
- 12:49its own. The country lacked sufficient
- 12:53capital, it lacked technology, and it
- 12:55lacked the minimum infrastructure that
- 12:57a modern state required. So he opened
- 13:01the doors to foreign investors in a way
- 13:04no Mexican government had done before
- 13:06on that scale. English, French,
- 13:09American, and German capital began to
- 13:12flow into Mexico. Railroads were built,
- 13:16crossing the territory from north to
- 13:18south and east to west. Mines were
- 13:21opened, ports were modernized, power
- 13:24plants were installed, telegraph lines
- 13:26were laid, the banking system was
- 13:29organized, and avenues in the capital
- 13:31were paved. The Mexico that Díaz
- 13:35presented to the outside world was the
- 13:37image of a nation in full
- 13:39transformation, orderly, secure for
- 13:41business, and capable of fulfilling its
- 13:43international contracts. And in many
- 13:47respects, that image was not entirely
- 13:49false. The economy grew, exports
- 13:53increased, investment arrived, and
- 13:55cities changed their face, but this
- 13:58development model had an enormous cost
- 14:01that did not appear in official
- 14:03newspapers or government speeches. The
- 14:08concessions granted to foreign
- 14:09companies were in many cases
- 14:11disproportionate. Mexico's natural
- 14:14resources were exploited under
- 14:16conditions that favored foreign
- 14:18investors far more than the country
- 14:20itself. And the benefits of economic
- 14:24growth did not reach the population
- 14:26equitably; they reached the elites, the
- 14:29foreigners, and those well-connected to
- 14:32the regime. For the rest, very little
- 14:35or nothing trickled down. Mexico City
- 14:38during the Porfiriato underwent one of
- 14:40the most radical urban transformations
- 14:43in Latin American history. Díaz wanted
- 14:46the capital to be a showcase of
- 14:48modernity, a demonstration that Mexico
- 14:50was a civilized country, comparable to
- 14:52the great European capitals. And in
- 14:56that sense, the result was visually
- 14:58spectacular. The Palace of Fine Arts
- 15:01was built, one of the most beautiful
- 15:03buildings in the Americas. The Paseo de
- 15:06la Reforma was laid out, the grand
- 15:08avenue that still defines the heart of
- 15:10the city today. Theaters, museums,
- 15:14hospitals, medical schools, and
- 15:16scientific institutes were built.
- 15:20Electric lighting was installed on the
- 15:22main streets. Streetcars arrived, and
- 15:26automobiles followed. The aristocrats
- 15:29and the Mexican upper class lived in a
- 15:32world of luxury and elegance that had
- 15:34nothing to envy from Paris or Madrid.
- 15:38The halls of Chapultepec Castle, where
- 15:40Díaz lived and governed, were the
- 15:42setting for banquets, diplomatic
- 15:44receptions, and celebrations that
- 15:46projected the image of a prosperous and
- 15:49stable Mexico. The centennial of
- 15:53independence in 1910 was the great
- 15:55party of that official Mexico, a
- 15:57monumental display of infrastructure,
- 15:59culture, and diplomacy that sought to
- 16:01show the entire world that the nation
- 16:03had matured. It was the most expensive
- 16:07and elaborate celebration the country
- 16:09had ever organized. And it was also,
- 16:12without anyone clearly knowing it at
- 16:15the time, the last great party of a
- 16:17regime that was about to collapse,
- 16:19because while the capital shone, in the
- 16:21Mexican countryside, an explosion was
- 16:23building that no parade could contain
- 16:26anymore. The Mexican countryside was
- 16:29the dark side of Porfirian modernity,
- 16:31and that was no minor detail. The vast
- 16:35majority of Mexicans lived in rural
- 16:37areas, worked the land, and depended on
- 16:40agrarian structures that the regime not
- 16:42only failed to reform, but in many
- 16:44cases made significantly worse. The "
- 16:48Baldíos"(Wasteland) Law, applied
- 16:50during the Porfiriato, allowed vast
- 16:53tracts of land, which indigenous
- 16:55communities and peasants had worked for
- 16:57generations, to be declared empty land
- 17:00and awarded to surveying companies or
- 17:02politically connected landowners.
- 17:06Entire villages lost their land without
- 17:08any real compensation. The haciendas
- 17:11grew to reach dimensions that were
- 17:14absurd. There were owners who possessed
- 17:17territories larger than some European
- 17:20countries, and the peasants who worked
- 17:23those haciendas did so in conditions of
- 17:26permanent debt, tied to the "tiendas de
- 17:29raya," where the boss controlled both
- 17:31wages and the prices of basic goods. It
- 17:35was a system that reproduced poverty
- 17:37from generation to generation with no
- 17:39possible escape. The Yaqui communities
- 17:42in Sonora were stripped of their land,
- 17:44and when they resisted, the army
- 17:47repressed them with extreme violence.
- 17:50Men, women, and children were deported
- 17:52to Yucatán, where they died of disease
- 17:55and exhaustion in the henequen
- 17:58plantations. That was also the
- 18:01Porfiriato. That was also part of the
- 18:03modernity that Díaz boasted about to
- 18:05the world. And that quiet suffering
- 18:08accumulated over decades would be the
- 18:11gunpowder that ignited the revolution.
- 18:14To maintain the order that made that
- 18:16development model possible, the Díaz
- 18:18regime built an apparatus of control
- 18:20and repression that left little room
- 18:22for dissent. The "Acordada" and later
- 18:27the "Rurales" were security forces that
- 18:29operated in the countryside with
- 18:31considerable autonomy and harshness.
- 18:34The unwritten order that was repeated
- 18:36was clear. Kill them while it's hot.
- 18:40That is to say, prisoners who tried to
- 18:42escape or were considered dangerous
- 18:44could be executed without any formal
- 18:46judicial process. The "ley fuga"(flight
- 18:50law) was a documented practice widely
- 18:52used during the Porfiriato. The
- 18:55detainee was set free at the exact
- 18:57moment their captors needed to justify
- 18:59their death. It was a mechanism of
- 19:02elimination that did not even require a
- 19:04formal conviction. The press that tried
- 19:07to denounce these abuses faced serious
- 19:09consequences. Journalists like Daniel
- 19:13Cabrera, founder of the satirical
- 19:15newspaper El Hijo del Ahuizote, were
- 19:17repeatedly imprisoned for publishing
- 19:19criticisms of the regime. Others opted
- 19:23for exile. Some simply went silent.
- 19:27Independent journalism existed in
- 19:29Mexico during the Porfiriato, but it
- 19:31survived in precarious conditions,
- 19:33always under the threat that an
- 19:35uncomfortable article could lead to the
- 19:38Belén prison or some regional dungeon.
- 19:41And yet, despite all that pressure, the
- 19:44discontent did not disappear. It
- 19:47accumulated beneath the surface in
- 19:49private conversations, in clandestine
- 19:51meetings, and in the political clubs
- 19:54that began to proliferate in the final
- 19:56years of the regime. Díaz could
- 19:59silence public voices, but he could not
- 20:02erase the causes that produced them.
- 20:05One of the most interesting and
- 20:07contradictory aspects of Díaz as a
- 20:09ruler is his relationship with the
- 20:10Catholic Church. During the Reform War,
- 20:15Díaz had fought on the liberal side,
- 20:17the faction that promoted the Reform
- 20:19Laws and the separation of Church and
- 20:21State, which expropriated
- 20:23ecclesiastical assets and stripped the
- 20:25Church of control over civil registries
- 20:27and cemeteries. He was, in principle, a
- 20:31man of anticlerical tradition, but once
- 20:34in power, Díaz adopted a stance of
- 20:36pragmatic tolerance toward the Church
- 20:39that contrasted sharply with the
- 20:41secular spirit of the 1857 Constitution
- 20:43. The Reform Laws remained on the books
- 20:49, but they were not strictly enforced.
- 20:53The Church regained its presence, built
- 20:55schools, opened convents, and organized
- 20:57massive processions that would have
- 20:59been impossible decades earlier.
- 21:03Bishops frequented the halls of power.
- 21:06The Archbishop of Mexico attended the
- 21:08regime’s official events. Díaz
- 21:12understood that the Church was an
- 21:13enormous social force in a deeply
- 21:15Catholic country and that confronting
- 21:17it was unnecessary and politically
- 21:19costly. The coexistence was mutually
- 21:23convenient. The Church did not
- 21:26criticize the regime, and the regime
- 21:28did not enforce the anticlerical laws.
- 21:31It was an informal but effective
- 21:32arrangement. That same arrangement
- 21:35would generate serious problems decades
- 21:37later, when post-revolutionary
- 21:39governments tried to return to the
- 21:41secular path with a radicalism the
- 21:43Church was no longer willing to accept.
- 21:48The tensions that the Porfiriato left
- 21:51incubated between the State and the
- 21:52Church would eventually explode into
- 21:55the Cristero War. The figure of the "
- 21:57scientists"—the*científicos*—is
- 21:58inseparable from any serious analysis
- 22:00of the Porfiriato. They were not
- 22:02scientists in the sense of laboratory
- 22:04work or basic research. They were a
- 22:07group of technocrats, economists,
- 22:08lawyers, and positivist intellectuals
- 22:10who held the most important positions
- 22:12in Díaz’s government and designed
- 22:14the regime’s economic and social
- 22:16policy. Figures like José Ives
- 22:20Limantour, the powerful Secretary of
- 22:22the Treasury, or Francisco Bulnes, the
- 22:24group’s intellectual, represented a
- 22:27worldview based on the thought of
- 22:29Auguste Comte: the idea that society
- 22:31should be ordered and governed by
- 22:33rational experts, and that progress was
- 22:35the inevitable destiny of nations that
- 22:37applied science to public
- 22:39administration. The problem was that
- 22:44this positivism had a deeply elitist
- 22:46and racist dimension that directly
- 22:48affected policy toward indigenous and
- 22:51peasant communities. The scientists
- 22:55believed with intellectual sincerity,
- 22:57but with devastating arrogance, that
- 23:00the Mexican working classes were not
- 23:02ready for democracy, that they needed
- 23:05to be guided, civilized, and integrated
- 23:07into modernity from above. That
- 23:11ideology justified the dispossession of
- 23:14land, the repression of popular
- 23:15resistance, and the systematic
- 23:17exclusion of the majority from the
- 23:19benefits of growth. The scientists
- 23:23built the intellectual scaffolding of
- 23:26the Porfiriato, and when that
- 23:27scaffolding collapsed, they fell with
- 23:30it without any of them fully
- 23:31understanding why the world they had
- 23:34built with such effort had failed to
- 23:36survive. The 1908 Díaz-Creelman
- 23:40interview was one of those moments when
- 23:43history turns unexpectedly based on
- 23:45words spoken at the wrong time. James
- 23:49Creelman was an American journalist who
- 23:52published an extensive interview with
- 23:54Porfirio Díaz in Pearson's Magazine.
- 23:58In that interview, the Mexican
- 24:00president stated something no one
- 24:02expected to hear from him: that Mexico
- 24:04was finally ready for democracy, that
- 24:06he would welcome the formation of
- 24:08opposition parties, and that if a
- 24:10legitimate candidate emerged, he would
- 24:12not hinder their path to power. It was
- 24:16an astonishing declaration. Díaz had
- 24:20spent more than two decades crushing
- 24:21any form of real opposition. What led
- 24:24him to say that? Interpretations vary.
- 24:28Some historians maintain that Díaz
- 24:30calculated that no one would take the
- 24:32offer seriously; that it was a public
- 24:34relations gesture for the outside world
- 24:36to calm international criticism about
- 24:38the nature of his regime. Others
- 24:41believe he genuinely thought about
- 24:43retiring, that at nearly 80 years old
- 24:45he felt the weight of age and was
- 24:47seeking a dignified exit. But
- 24:50regardless of Díaz's intentions, the
- 24:52effect of those words in Mexico was
- 24:54explosive. Hundreds of political clubs
- 24:58began to form throughout the country.
- 25:01The opposition emerged from the shadows
- 25:04, and a man from a wealthy family in
- 25:06northern Mexico, educated in Europe and
- 25:09the United States, began to write a
- 25:11book that would change everything. That
- 25:15man was named Francisco I. Madero, and
- 25:18his book, "The Presidential Succession
- 25:20in 1910," was the spark the Porfiriato
- 25:22did not know how to extinguish.
- 25:25Francisco Madero was an unlikely
- 25:27character as a revolutionary leader. He
- 25:31was rich, a spiritualist, a vegetarian,
- 25:33short, had a high-pitched voice, and an
- 25:36uninspiring appearance. At first glance
- 25:39, it was an unlikely image for the man
- 25:41who would overthrow one of the
- 25:43longest-serving dictators in the
- 25:44Americas. But Madero had something that
- 25:48proved to be much more powerful than
- 25:50appearance: an absolutely sincere moral
- 25:52conviction. He believed that democracy
- 25:55was not a luxury, but an urgent
- 25:57necessity. He believed Mexico deserved
- 26:00free elections. He believed Porfirio
- 26:03Díaz had betrayed the very principles
- 26:05he proclaimed upon coming to power, and
- 26:08he communicated that conviction with an
- 26:10energy and authenticity that won him
- 26:13followers across the country, from
- 26:15Sonora to Yucatán. His 1910
- 26:18presidential campaign was something
- 26:21Mexico hadn't seen in decades. Real
- 26:25crowds gathering, public debates, a
- 26:27concrete political alternative to the
- 26:29established regime. Díaz's government
- 26:33watched at first with a certain
- 26:35condescension, then with discomfort,
- 26:37then with fear. When Madero's
- 26:41popularity became evident, the regime
- 26:43responded the only way it knew how to
- 26:45respond to threats. It had him arrested
- 26:48. Madero was imprisoned in San Luis
- 26:52Potosí on fabricated charges. The
- 26:56elections were held with him in prison,
- 26:59and Díaz was reelected once again with
- 27:02the results everyone expected in a
- 27:05system where there was no real free
- 27:07vote. But that time, imprisoning Madero
- 27:11didn't silence the problem; it
- 27:13multiplied it. Madero managed to escape
- 27:16prison and cross the border into the
- 27:18United States. From San Antonio, Texas,
- 27:22he launched the Plan of San Luis, the
- 27:24document calling on the Mexican people
- 27:26to take up arms on November 20, 1910,
- 27:29against the regime of Porfirio Díaz.
- 27:32The chosen date was no accident; it was
- 27:35an invitation to revolution in the most
- 27:37literal sense of the word. And although
- 27:40the initial call had a more timid
- 27:42response than Madero expected, in the
- 27:44following weeks and months, something
- 27:46began to move in Mexico that could no
- 27:49longer be stopped. In Chihuahua, a
- 27:52former bandit turned guerrilla named
- 27:54Doroteo Arango, better known as Pancho
- 27:57Villa, began organizing irregular
- 28:00forces with surprising speed and
- 28:02ferocity. In Morelos, a farmer named
- 28:05Emiliano Zapata led agrarian
- 28:07communities that had been waiting years
- 28:10for someone to return the lands that
- 28:12had been taken from them. In Sonora, in
- 28:16Coahuila, and in other parts of the
- 28:18north, men who had never had anything
- 28:21to lose began to take up arms. Díaz's
- 28:25Federal Army, which on paper seemed a
- 28:27formidable force, proved in the field
- 28:30to be an old, corrupt, poorly paid, and
- 28:32poorly motivated institution. Its
- 28:36soldiers weren't fighting for a cause;
- 28:39they fought because they had no other
- 28:41choice. The revolutionaries, however,
- 28:45did have a cause, and that asymmetry of
- 28:49motivation proved to be decisive. In
- 28:53May 1911, revolutionary forces took
- 28:55Ciudad Juárez, the main point of entry
- 28:58on the northern border. The regime
- 29:02staggered; the fall of Ciudad Juárez
- 29:05in May 1911 was the psychological blow
- 29:08that definitively broke the illusion of
- 29:10the Porfiriato's invincibility. The
- 29:13most important border city in the north
- 29:15had fallen into the hands of the
- 29:17revolutionaries in a battle the
- 29:19government could not, or did not know
- 29:21how to, win. The news spread across all
- 29:25of Mexico with the speed of the
- 29:27telegraph, and what followed was an
- 29:29avalanche. More cities began to fall,
- 29:32more soldiers deserted, and more
- 29:34politicians who had remained silent
- 29:36until then began to distance themselves
- 29:39from the regime. The "Científicos"
- 29:42panicked. The landowners began to weigh
- 29:45their options. Foreign diplomats sent
- 29:48worried reports back to their capitals.
- 29:51At Chapultepec Castle, Porfirio Díaz,
- 29:54now 80 years old, suffered from a
- 29:56severe dental infection that caused him
- 29:59constant pain. He faced the reality
- 30:02that the world he had built over
- 30:05decades was falling apart. Negotiations
- 30:09began. The Treaty of Ciudad Juárez,
- 30:12signed in May 1911, established the
- 30:15terms of the transition. Díaz would
- 30:19resign from the presidency. An interim
- 30:21government would be guaranteed and free
- 30:24elections would be called. On May 25,
- 30:271911, Porfirio Díaz signed his
- 30:30resignation. He did so in silence, with
- 30:35the cold dignity of someone who had
- 30:37accepted defeat without showing it
- 30:38openly. That same night, a crowd
- 30:42gathered in front of the National
- 30:44Palace to celebrate. Some threw stones
- 30:47at government buildings, and Díaz,
- 30:49from somewhere in the city, heard the
- 30:52noise of a Mexico that wanted him out.
- 30:55Porfirio Díaz's final journey through
- 30:57Mexico is one of those historical
- 30:59moments with the density of a novel.
- 31:03After signing his resignation, the
- 31:05former president boarded a train for
- 31:08Veracruz. The route that train traveled
- 31:12was for Díaz a kind of silent
- 31:14inventory of everything he had built:
- 31:16the railways crossing the country, the
- 31:19bridges, the stations, the
- 31:20infrastructure that had emerged during
- 31:23his government, and also the gazes of
- 31:25the people in the towns he passed
- 31:27through. In some places, there were
- 31:31still people who greeted him. In others
- 31:34, the silence was absolute. On May 31,
- 31:371911, Porfirio Díaz embarked at the
- 31:40port of Veracruz, aboard the German
- 31:42steamer Ipiranga. He was accompanied by
- 31:46his wife, Carmen Romero Rubio, some
- 31:48family members, and a small group of
- 31:50close collaborators. As the ship moved
- 31:53away from the coast, Mexico was left
- 31:55behind. Days before departing, it is
- 31:58said that Díaz uttered a phrase that
- 32:00has been quoted, questioned, and
- 32:02reinterpreted for over 100 years. "
- 32:05Madero has unleashed a tiger; let us
- 32:07see if he can control it." The exact
- 32:10authenticity of that phrase is disputed
- 32:12by historians, but regardless of
- 32:14whether he said it in those exact words
- 32:16, it captured an intuition that time
- 32:18would prove to be correct. The
- 32:21revolution that had toppled his regime
- 32:24was a force that no one would be able
- 32:26to control easily. Mexico was heading
- 32:29toward a decade of civil war that would
- 32:30cost hundreds of thousands of lives.
- 32:33Díaz knew it. And even if the quote is
- 32:36apocryphal, it is at least historically
- 32:38just. Porfirio Díaz's exile began in
- 32:41Paris, the city that had always
- 32:44represented for him the model of
- 32:46civilization and modernity he wanted to
- 32:48build in Mexico. He settled into an
- 32:52elegant apartment in the Champs-
- 32:54Élysées neighborhood, surrounded by a
- 32:56few loyal Mexicans who had also left
- 32:58the country, receiving visits from
- 33:00diplomats, journalists, and curious
- 33:03onlookers who wanted to see up close
- 33:05the man who had ruled Mexico for over
- 33:0730 years. Physically he remained
- 33:11impressive, tall with a military
- 33:13bearing and the steady gaze of someone
- 33:15who had commanded armies. But defeat
- 33:19was there, beneath that composure, in
- 33:21the silences, in the way he sometimes
- 33:23asked for news from Mexico with a
- 33:25mixture of anguish and wounded pride.
- 33:29The news arriving from his country was
- 33:31getting worse. Madero governed in
- 33:34conditions of increasing chaos. The
- 33:36Zapatistas had not laid down their arms
- 33:38because the promises regarding land
- 33:40were not being fulfilled. Pancho Villa
- 33:43operated in the north with an autonomy
- 33:45that the central government could not
- 33:47control. And in 1913, General
- 33:49Victoriano Huerta, with the tacit
- 33:52support of US Ambassador Henry Lane
- 33:54Wilson, betrayed and ordered the
- 33:56assassination of Madero in what became
- 33:59known as the Tragic Ten Days. Mexico
- 34:02was falling into the abyss. Díaz, in
- 34:06his Parisian exile, followed these
- 34:08events with a mixture of sensations
- 34:10that his biographers have tried to
- 34:11decipher without reaching a clear
- 34:13consensus. He felt guilt, sadness,
- 34:17justification, indifference. He did not
- 34:21leave the answer written clearly, and
- 34:23perhaps he did not have it himself.
- 34:25There is a question that inevitably
- 34:28appears in any analysis of the
- 34:29Porfiriato and has divided historians
- 34:32for more than a century. Was Porfirio
- 34:35Díaz a brutal dictator or a necessary
- 34:37modernizer? And the honest answer is
- 34:40that he was both things at the same
- 34:42time, albeit in proportions and with
- 34:44consequences that cannot be ignored.
- 34:47The argument in his favor is real and
- 34:49documented. Before the Porfiriato,
- 34:52Mexico was a country that could not
- 34:54guarantee even basic order or
- 34:56governmental continuity. Internal wars
- 35:00were constant, the foreign debt was
- 35:03unpayable, banditry dominated the roads
- 35:06, and infrastructure was practically
- 35:09nonexistent. Díaz managed to stabilize
- 35:12all of that. He managed to get Mexico
- 35:15international credit for the first time
- 35:17. He managed to have railroads cross
- 35:20the country, connecting regions that
- 35:22previously lived completely isolated.
- 35:25He managed to make exports grow, banks
- 35:28function, and cities modernize. That is
- 35:32why his defenders, who have always
- 35:34existed, argue that without that period
- 35:36of forced order, Mexico would not have
- 35:38been able to build the foundations for
- 35:40any later modernity. The argument
- 35:43against him is equally real and
- 35:45well-documented. That order cost
- 35:48millions of people their freedom, their
- 35:50land, and in many cases, their lives.
- 35:52It was an order imposed through blood
- 35:54and repression. It was a form of
- 35:56development that benefited a minority
- 35:58while excluding the majority. And it
- 36:01was a system that, by its very nature,
- 36:03sowed the seeds of its own violent
- 36:06destruction. Both things are true, and
- 36:09that unresolved tension is part of why
- 36:12the debate over Díaz still hasn't
- 36:14ended. In the final years of the
- 36:17Porfiriato, as the regime began to show
- 36:19its first visible cracks, critical
- 36:21voices emerged from within the very
- 36:23intellectual elite that had sustained
- 36:25the system for decades. One of the most
- 36:29important was that of the Flores Magón
- 36:31brothers, Ricardo and Enrique, founders
- 36:34of the Mexican Liberal Party and the
- 36:36newspaper Regeneración. From exile in
- 36:39the United States, the Flores Magón
- 36:41brothers published devastating
- 36:43critiques of the Díaz regime that
- 36:45circulated clandestinely in Mexico.
- 36:48They passed from hand to hand, reaching
- 36:50working-class and peasant communities
- 36:52that had no access to any other
- 36:54critical press. The Mexican Liberal
- 36:57Party was much more radical than
- 36:59Maderismo. It was not content with
- 37:01merely asking for electoral democracy.
- 37:03It demanded land for peasants, rights
- 37:06for workers, secular education, and a
- 37:09limited workday. Their 1906 platform
- 37:12anticipated several important points
- 37:15found in the 1917 Constitution, but
- 37:18beyond political programs, what the
- 37:20Flores Magón brothers did was simple
- 37:23and powerful. They told people in clear
- 37:27and direct language that the suffering
- 37:30they lived through was not natural, not
- 37:32inevitable, and not fair; that they had
- 37:34a right to more; and that the regime
- 37:36oppressing them was not eternal. That
- 37:40seemingly simple idea was actually
- 37:43explosive in a country where official
- 37:45discourse insisted that the Porfirian
- 37:47order was the only alternative to chaos
- 37:50. When Madero arrived with his
- 37:54democratic message, he found the ground
- 37:56already partially prepared by that
- 37:57underground work of critical awareness.
- 38:00The question regarding the role of the
- 38:02United States in the fall of the
- 38:04Porfiriato is one of the most complex
- 38:07and least resolved of that period. The
- 38:09relationship between Díaz and the
- 38:11government in Washington was, for the
- 38:13majority of the Porfiriato,
- 38:15extraordinarily cordial. The flow of
- 38:17American capital into Mexico during
- 38:20those years was massive. Railroad,
- 38:23mining, agricultural, and oil companies
- 38:26of North American origin operated in
- 38:28Mexico under very favorable conditions.
- 38:32It is estimated that by 1910, U.S.
- 38:34citizens owned more land in Mexico than
- 38:38Mexicans themselves. That economic
- 38:41penetration was enormous and generated
- 38:44tensions that Díaz managed with
- 38:46diplomatic skill, always ensuring no
- 38:49foreign investor became too dominant.
- 38:53When the Díaz administration began
- 38:55favoring European investors, especially
- 38:58the British, as a way to balance U.S.
- 39:01influence, relations with Washington
- 39:03cooled noticeably. Some historians
- 39:07maintain that this diplomatic
- 39:09reorientation contributed to the
- 39:11William Howard Taft administration
- 39:14seeing less urgency in intervening to
- 39:16support Díaz when the revolution began
- 39:19. The U.S. government did not actively
- 39:23support the revolutionaries, but it did
- 39:25not do enough to stop them when it had
- 39:28the chance. It turned a blind eye to
- 39:31the arms trafficking toward rebel
- 39:33groups in the north. It allowed
- 39:36revolutionary leaders to operate with
- 39:38relative freedom from U.S. territory.
- 39:42That strategic ambiguity was, according
- 39:44to various interpretations, part of the
- 39:47context that allowed the anti-Díaz
- 39:49movement to grow as quickly as it did.
- 39:53The working conditions of Mexican
- 39:55laborers during the Porfiriato were a
- 39:58direct reflection of a regime's
- 40:00priorities that favored economic growth
- 40:02over public welfare. In the northern
- 40:07mines, workers labored in extremely
- 40:09dangerous conditions, with 12-hour or
- 40:12longer shifts, miserable wages, and no
- 40:14significant legal protection in case of
- 40:17accident or illness. On the henequen
- 40:22plantations of Yucatán, the workers,
- 40:24many of them Yaqui indigenous people
- 40:27forcibly deported from Sonora, lived in
- 40:29conditions that several foreign
- 40:31observers of the time openly compared
- 40:34to slavery. In the textile plants in
- 40:38the center of the country, workers
- 40:40began to organize and protest, and the
- 40:42government responded with a harshness
- 40:44that admitted no negotiation. The 1906
- 40:48Cananea strike in the copper mines of
- 40:51northern Sonora was one of the most
- 40:53revealing episodes of that policy. The
- 40:57workers demanded equal pay with the
- 41:00American employees of the same company
- 41:03who earned double for the same work.
- 41:06The government did not negotiate; it
- 41:08suppressed. The Rurales and the army
- 41:11intervened. There were deaths. The
- 41:15leaders of the movement were imprisoned
- 41:18. The 1907 Río Blanco strike in the
- 41:21textile factories of Veracruz ended in
- 41:24an equally bloody manner. Dozens of
- 41:27workers died in the clashes with law
- 41:30enforcement. Those episodes were not
- 41:33forgotten. They remained etched in the
- 41:36memory of the Mexican working class and
- 41:39fueled the discontent that would
- 41:40eventually turn many workers into
- 41:42sympathizers or combatants of the
- 41:44revolution. One of the themes that
- 41:48simplistic analyses of the Porfiriato
- 41:50often overlook is the cultural
- 41:52dimension of the period, because while
- 41:54the regime was repressing political and
- 41:57social dissent, it built a cultural,
- 41:59scientific, and intellectual production
- 42:01of enormous richness. that it would be
- 42:04unfair to ignore. Educational
- 42:07institutions multiplied. The National
- 42:10University, which had been closed for
- 42:13decades, was reopened in 1910. Museums,
- 42:17libraries, observatories, and research
- 42:21institutes flourished. The National
- 42:24Museum of Anthropology, in its
- 42:26Porfirian version, began to develop the
- 42:28systematic study of pre-Hispanic
- 42:30cultures. Writers like Manuel
- 42:34Gutiérrez Nájera, Amado Nervo, and
- 42:36Manuel José Othón developed
- 42:38high-quality modernist literature that
- 42:40connected Mexico to the international
- 42:42literary trends of the time. Painting,
- 42:47music, and architecture experienced
- 42:49periods of creative intensity. The San
- 42:53Carlos Academy trained several
- 42:55generations of artists. Philosophical
- 42:59thought flourished in the intellectual
- 43:01circles of the capital, and all that
- 43:03did not disappear with the fall of the
- 43:05regime. It was part of the cultural
- 43:09legacy upon which post-revolutionary
- 43:11generations built their own cultural
- 43:13project, sometimes accepting it,
- 43:15sometimes rejecting it, but always in
- 43:17relation to it. The Porfiriato produced
- 43:21a culture that had its own
- 43:23contradictions, its own elites, and its
- 43:26own silences. But it was real and
- 43:28significant. Denying that would be as
- 43:31biased as celebrating it without
- 43:33context. Porfirio Díaz's relationship
- 43:36with his own image was one of the most
- 43:38calculated and deliberate aspects of
- 43:40his government. Díaz understood the
- 43:44power of visual representation in an
- 43:46era when photography was still a
- 43:49relatively new technology with enormous
- 43:52impact. Official photos of Díaz always
- 43:55showed him looking impeccable. The
- 43:58uniform full of decorations, the
- 44:00upright posture, the steady gaze, the
- 44:03perfectly trimmed mustache. It was the
- 44:06image of a man of authority, someone
- 44:08who embodied the order and seriousness
- 44:10of the state. But beyond photography,
- 44:14Díaz cultivated his image through a
- 44:16very careful biographical narrative. He
- 44:19presented himself as the soldier who
- 44:22had saved Mexico from the French, as
- 44:24the statesman who had brought stability
- 44:26to the country after decades of chaos,
- 44:28as the severe but necessary father of a
- 44:30still-young nation. That narrative was
- 44:35partially true and partially
- 44:37constructed. His symbolic gestures were
- 44:40precisely measured. The May 5th
- 44:43commemorations always included
- 44:44references to his personal role in the
- 44:47battle. His public appearances were
- 44:50staged to convey an image of health,
- 44:52vigor, and dominance that, in his final
- 44:55years of government, no longer fully
- 44:57matched reality. When photographs began
- 45:01to circulate in his final years showing
- 45:04an aged man, nearly an octogenarian,
- 45:06with evident difficulty moving. It was
- 45:10a psychological blow to the regime. The
- 45:14image of invincibility was beginning to
- 45:16crack. And in a system built partly on
- 45:21personal authority, that fissure was
- 45:23more serious than it seemed. There is
- 45:26one aspect of the Porfiriato that is
- 45:28often relegated to the margins of
- 45:30official history, yet had enormous
- 45:32consequences. The policy of promoting
- 45:35foreign immigration and the idea of "
- 45:38whitening" the Mexican population.
- 45:41Inspired by racial theories circulating
- 45:44in Europe and the United States in the
- 45:46late 19th century, many members of the
- 45:48Porfirian elite believed Mexico needed
- 45:51to attract European immigrants to
- 45:53improve the race. And to contribute
- 45:56industry and modernity. Efforts were
- 46:00made to attract Italian, Spanish,
- 46:02German, and other immigrant colonists.
- 46:06In some regions of the country,
- 46:08immigrant colonies were established,
- 46:10receiving land and government support.
- 46:14These very lands, in many cases, had
- 46:16previously belonged to indigenous
- 46:18communities or Mexican peasants
- 46:19dispossessed under the Vacant Lands Act
- 46:22. A brutal contradiction. The regime
- 46:26promoted the arrival of foreigners
- 46:28while expelling or marginalizing the
- 46:30original inhabitants of those lands.
- 46:33And the ideology underlying that policy
- 46:36was openly racist. It viewed the poor
- 46:39indigenous and mestizo population as an
- 46:42obstacle to progress, not as subjects
- 46:44with rights. Justo Sierra, one of the
- 46:47Porfiriato's most brilliant
- 46:49intellectuals, tried to nuance that
- 46:51vision by advocating for popular
- 46:53education. One that would integrate
- 46:55indigenous people into modernity
- 46:57without erasing their identity. But his
- 47:00ideas lived in tension with the
- 47:02concrete practices of a regime that
- 47:04never coherently resolved the question
- 47:07of what place indigenous peoples
- 47:09occupied in the Mexico it was building.
- 47:12The military dimension of the
- 47:14Porfiriato is also more complex than it
- 47:16is usually presented. Díaz was a
- 47:19general of great tactical talent, but
- 47:21as a ruler, he understood that relying
- 47:23too much on the army was dangerous. An
- 47:26overly powerful army was an army
- 47:28capable of staging coups, so he
- 47:30designed a deliberate policy of
- 47:32relative weakening of the armed forces.
- 47:36High-ranking generals were frequently
- 47:38moved from one command to another so
- 47:40they would not accumulate regional
- 47:42loyalties. Military budgets were
- 47:45controlled, promotions depended on
- 47:48direct presidential approval, and the
- 47:50army was supplemented and, to a certain
- 47:53extent, replaced for internal control
- 47:55tasks by rural and police corps that
- 47:58answered directly to the executive
- 48:00branch. The result was an army that
- 48:04looked formidable on paper, but was
- 48:06actually corroded by decades of
- 48:07institutional stagnation. When the
- 48:11revolution arrived, that army proved to
- 48:13be much less capable than its size
- 48:15suggested. The generals were old. The
- 48:19soldiers were mostly forced recruits,
- 48:22the so-called "Leva," men who had been
- 48:24taken by force from their villages and
- 48:27had no particular motivation to fight
- 48:29with conviction. Faced with
- 48:33revolutionary guerrillas fighting for
- 48:35land, for justice, or simply to survive
- 48:38, the federal army systematically lost
- 48:40ground. That military fragility was
- 48:45largely a direct product of the very
- 48:47policies Díaz had designed to protect
- 48:49himself from the military. Oil was one
- 48:53of the most important issues with the
- 48:55most long-term consequences of the
- 48:57Porfirian period. During the last
- 49:00decades of the 19th century and the
- 49:03first years of the 20th, huge oil
- 49:05deposits were discovered in several
- 49:08regions of Mexico, especially in the
- 49:10Tampico area and the Veracruz Huasteca.
- 49:15The Díaz government granted extraction
- 49:17concessions to foreign companies,
- 49:19mainly British and American, on terms
- 49:22that, in retrospect, are astonishing
- 49:24for their generosity toward investors.
- 49:28Edward Doheny's company and Weetman
- 49:30Pearson's, known as El Águila, became
- 49:33two of the largest operators in the
- 49:36country. Mexican oil began to be
- 49:39exported and to generate significant
- 49:42revenue. But most of those profits left
- 49:45the country. Local communities where
- 49:48the wells were located lived in
- 49:50precarious conditions. Mexico's soil
- 49:54and subsoil were being exploited by
- 49:56interests that had no real obligation
- 49:59to the welfare of the population.
- 50:02Decades later, in 1938, President
- 50:07Lázaro Cárdenas would expropriate the
- 50:09oil industry on the grounds that those
- 50:11resources belonged to the nation. But
- 50:15to reach that point, Mexico had to go
- 50:18through the revolution, the 1917
- 50:20Constitution, and two more decades of
- 50:22conflict. The roots of the 1938
- 50:26expropriation lay directly in the
- 50:29concessions of the Porfiriato. And that
- 50:32legacy, that of natural resources as an
- 50:35arena of dispute between national
- 50:37sovereignty and foreign capital, is one
- 50:40of the most enduring of that entire
- 50:42period. The presidential succession was
- 50:45the problem that the Porfirian system
- 50:47never solved. Díaz built a regime
- 50:50based on his person, his authority, his
- 50:52charisma, his personal network of
- 50:54loyalties, and the fear and respect
- 50:56that his name generated. But that type
- 51:00of system has a fatal structural flaw:
- 51:02it cannot be transferred. No one else
- 51:06was Porfirio Díaz. No one else had his
- 51:09history, his military legitimacy, his
- 51:11network of relationships. And when
- 51:14Díaz aged, when it became evident that
- 51:16he would not be able to rule forever,
- 51:18the question of who would succeed him
- 51:20became the most dangerous in Mexican
- 51:22politics. The problem is that Díaz
- 51:25never prepared a succession. He did not
- 51:28train a clear successor, he did not
- 51:30build institutions that could operate
- 51:32independently of his person. The system
- 51:35was too personalistic to survive
- 51:37without him. And when the crisis of
- 51:401910 broke out, it became clear that
- 51:42there was no institutional mechanism
- 51:44capable of processing the change
- 51:46peacefully. The only language the
- 51:48system knew to resolve that question
- 51:51was force. And force is exactly what
- 51:54emerged, not in the form of an orderly
- 51:56palace coup, but in the form of a
- 51:58revolution that lasted a decade and
- 52:01cost between 1 and 2 million lives,
- 52:03according to different estimates. That
- 52:06failure in succession is perhaps the
- 52:08most serious of all the negative
- 52:10legacies of the Porfiriato, the
- 52:12inability to create institutions that
- 52:14lasted longer than one man. One of the
- 52:17liveliest debates among Mexican
- 52:19historians is that of the periodization
- 52:21of the Porfiriato and the distinction
- 52:23between its different stages. The
- 52:26entire period was not the same in
- 52:28repressive intensity, economic
- 52:30orientation, or cabinet composition.
- 52:33The first Porfiriato from 1876 to 1884
- 52:39was relatively more open and less
- 52:41consolidated. The period from 1884 to
- 52:441900 was that of the great
- 52:46consolidation of power and the
- 52:48acceleration of the outward-looking
- 52:50development model. And the last
- 52:54Porfiriato from 1900 to 1911 was that
- 52:57of the sclerosis of the system. A
- 53:01government that aged with its leader,
- 53:03that became increasingly rigid, more
- 53:05closed to renewal, and more incapable
- 53:07of responding to the tensions that were
- 53:09accumulating. The last years of Díaz
- 53:12in power are particularly revealing of
- 53:15that rigidity. The same faces in the
- 53:18cabinet, the same control mechanisms
- 53:20that no longer functioned with the same
- 53:22effectiveness. A political elite that
- 53:26had aged along with the president and
- 53:28had neither the energy nor the vision
- 53:30to adapt to a Mexico that had changed.
- 53:34When Madero arrived with his message of
- 53:37democratic renewal, he was not just
- 53:39facing a dictator, he was facing a
- 53:42complete system of interests, habits,
- 53:44structures, and loyalties that had
- 53:46become incapable of renewing themselves
- 53:49. And that type of system, when it
- 53:53starts to fall, does not reform; it
- 53:56collapses. The role of women during the
- 53:59Porfiriato is a chapter that official
- 54:01history ignored for a long time, but
- 54:04which more recent studies have begun to
- 54:06recover with greater attention. The
- 54:09legal situation of Mexican women during
- 54:12that period was one of almost total
- 54:14subordination to male power. They could
- 54:18not vote, they could not sign contracts
- 54:20without their husband's authorization,
- 54:22they could not practice most legal
- 54:24professions. And yet, within those
- 54:28enormous restrictions, some women
- 54:30managed to open up remarkable spaces.
- 54:35Laureana W. González founded in 1887
- 54:37the magazine Violetas del Anáhuac, a
- 54:40publication dedicated exclusively to
- 54:42topics of interest to women that
- 54:44included reflections on education,
- 54:47rights, and literature. The first women
- 54:51who graduated in medicine or pharmacy
- 54:53in Mexico did so during the Porfiriato,
- 54:56facing resistance, but also finding
- 54:59unexpected support in some enlightened
- 55:01circles. In the realm of primary
- 55:05education, female teachers became a key
- 55:07presence in the public schools that the
- 55:09regime built as part of its
- 55:11modernization project. And in the
- 55:15working world, women in textile
- 55:17factories and workshops actively
- 55:19participated in the strikes and protest
- 55:21movements of the early 20th century.
- 55:25The revolution that overthrew Díaz
- 55:27would not immediately or satisfactorily
- 55:29resolve the situation of Mexican women.
- 55:33But those who took part in it—the
- 55:35female soldiers, nurses, messengers,
- 55:38and organizers—were already marked by
- 55:41decades of tensions accumulated during
- 55:43the Porfiriato. The Porfiriato’s
- 55:46educational system was one of the
- 55:49regime’s great bets and also one of
- 55:51its greatest contradictions. He and his
- 55:55collaborators, influenced by Comtian
- 55:57positivism, firmly believed that
- 55:59education was the fundamental tool to
- 56:02modernize the country. Justo Sierra,
- 56:05the great Secretary of Public
- 56:07Instruction of that era, was the
- 56:09architect of an enormously ambitious
- 56:11educational reform. Building primary
- 56:14schools throughout the country,
- 56:16training teachers in normal schools,
- 56:19and creating a secular, free, and
- 56:21compulsory education. In numerical
- 56:25terms, the advances were real. The
- 56:28number of schools grew significantly.
- 56:31The literacy rate, although still low
- 56:34in absolute terms, increased during the
- 56:37Porfiriato. The National University was
- 56:40refounded in 1910. The schools of
- 56:43medicine, engineering, law, and fine
- 56:45arts were consolidated, but the
- 56:48contradiction was enormous. That same
- 56:51regime building schools was the one
- 56:53repressing workers, dispossessing
- 56:56peasants, and silencing the press. And
- 56:59the reach of those schools was unequal.
- 57:02They reached cities and mestizo
- 57:04communities more easily than the
- 57:06indigenous communities in remote areas.
- 57:10The education promoted by the
- 57:12Porfiriato was also, in its design,
- 57:14oriented toward integrating Mexicans
- 57:17into a national project that defined
- 57:19progress in terms that excluded many
- 57:21ways of life and culture that did not
- 57:24fit the European and positivist mold
- 57:26the regime admired. In the Mexico of
- 57:30the final years of the Porfiriato,
- 57:32discontent did not only come from
- 57:34landless peasants or rightless workers.
- 57:38It also came from within the regional
- 57:40elite of landowners and merchants in
- 57:43the north who felt the regime
- 57:44systematically favored certain groups
- 57:47with preferential access to central
- 57:49power. The case of Coahuila is
- 57:53revealing. The Madero family was one of
- 57:56the wealthiest and most influential in
- 57:58the north of the country, with
- 58:00businesses in mining, banking,
- 58:01haciendas, and trade. They weren't poor
- 58:06or marginalized, but they felt
- 58:08government concessions favored groups
- 58:10closest to Díaz’s inner circle, that
- 58:12the system was opaque, arbitrary, and
- 58:14that there was no way to participate in
- 58:17it without completely submitting to the
- 58:19president's will. That sense of
- 58:23exclusion within the elite itself was a
- 58:25factor that many analyses of the
- 58:27Porfiriato underestimate. The
- 58:29revolution wasn't just an uprising from
- 58:32those below; it was also, in its
- 58:34initial phase, a rebellion of elite
- 58:36sectors that had lost patience with a
- 58:38system that wouldn't reform. That
- 58:42alliance between different classes with
- 58:44different grievances was paradoxically
- 58:46both the strength and the weakness of
- 58:48the revolutionary movement. It united
- 58:52very different people to topple Díaz,
- 58:54but that same diversity of interests
- 58:56would cause the revolution to fragment
- 58:58violently once the common goal
- 59:00disappeared. Díaz's return to the
- 59:04forefront of public discussion is a
- 59:05phenomenon that has repeated itself
- 59:07several times in Mexico’s
- 59:09post-revolutionary history. There were
- 59:12moments, especially during periods of
- 59:15instability or conservative nostalgia,
- 59:17when some sectors of Mexican society
- 59:20began to reconsider the Porfiriato with
- 59:22a more benevolent gaze. The recurring
- 59:25argument is always the same. Under
- 59:28Díaz, Mexico had order. Under Díaz,
- 59:31the economy grew; under Díaz, there
- 59:34was safety on the roads. That argument
- 59:38isn't entirely false, but it omits the
- 59:40human cost of that order, the violence
- 59:42that sustained it, and the exclusion of
- 59:44millions that made it possible. More
- 59:47serious historiography has attempted to
- 59:50move beyond that simple dichotomy of
- 59:52hero or villain. The works of Friedrich
- 59:55Katz, Paul Garner, Alan Knight, and
- 59:57other historians have built a more
- 59:59nuanced image of the Porfiriato that
- 1:00:02recognizes both its real achievements
- 1:00:04and its documented crimes. But that
- 1:00:08academic complexity rarely finds an
- 1:00:09echo in public debate, where the
- 1:00:11temptation of simplification remains
- 1:00:13very strong. In moments when Mexico
- 1:00:17suffers from insecurity, corruption, or
- 1:00:19economic crisis, the Porfiriato
- 1:00:21reappears like a kind of nostalgic
- 1:00:23ghost in the national conversation. It
- 1:00:27is a phenomenon that says a lot about
- 1:00:28the frustrations of the present and
- 1:00:30perhaps a little less about the
- 1:00:31historical reality of the past.
- 1:00:34Porfirio Díaz's death occurred on July
- 1:00:372, 1915, in Paris. He was 84 years old.
- 1:00:41What France was experiencing at that
- 1:00:44moment was the First World War. The
- 1:00:46trenches were just a few hours from the
- 1:00:48capital. The continent was bleeding out
- 1:00:51in one of the most destructive
- 1:00:53conflicts in modern history. Mexico,
- 1:00:55meanwhile, was experiencing the deepest
- 1:00:58chaos of the entire revolution. Zapata
- 1:01:01in the south, Villa in the north,
- 1:01:03Carranza and Obregón fighting to
- 1:01:05consolidate power. Destroyed cities,
- 1:01:09famine, epidemics. Díaz died in exile,
- 1:01:13far from the land he had ruled for over
- 1:01:16three decades, never setting foot on it
- 1:01:18again after his departure in 1911. His
- 1:01:23remains were buried in the Montparnasse
- 1:01:25cemetery in Paris, where they remain to
- 1:01:28this day. For decades, his remains did
- 1:01:31not return to Mexico. That fact,
- 1:01:34seemingly symbolic, actually says a lot
- 1:01:37. No Mexican government after the
- 1:01:40revolution was willing to bear the
- 1:01:42political cost of receiving the man the
- 1:01:45revolution had overthrown. The
- 1:01:48post-revolutionary state built its
- 1:01:51legitimacy precisely on the narrative
- 1:01:53of having ended the Porfiriato.
- 1:01:57Accepting his remains would have
- 1:01:59complicated that narrative, and
- 1:02:01foundational state narratives are hard
- 1:02:03to complicate without consequences.
- 1:02:07Díaz's bones remain in Paris, in that
- 1:02:09quiet cemetery in the 14th
- 1:02:11arrondissement, thousands of miles from
- 1:02:13the country he marked with his presence
- 1:02:16for an entire era. The impact of the
- 1:02:19Porfiriato on Mexico's infrastructure
- 1:02:21was undeniable and far-reaching.
- 1:02:24Railroads are perhaps the most cited
- 1:02:26example. At the start of Díaz's regime
- 1:02:30, Mexico had barely 700 km of railway
- 1:02:32tracks. By the end of the Porfiriato,
- 1:02:36that figure had grown to more than
- 1:02:3819,000 km. That railway network
- 1:02:41connected regions that had previously
- 1:02:43lived in almost complete isolation. It
- 1:02:45brought local markets closer to the
- 1:02:47national and international market. It
- 1:02:50allowed for the export of raw materials
- 1:02:52on a scale that was previously
- 1:02:54impossible. It made the mobilization of
- 1:02:57troops possible at a speed that changed
- 1:02:59the very nature of military conflicts
- 1:03:01in the country. But the Porfiriato's
- 1:03:04railway network also had a
- 1:03:06characteristic that revealed its
- 1:03:08priorities. It was fundamentally
- 1:03:11designed to connect production centers
- 1:03:14with export ports, not to integrate the
- 1:03:16national territory organically. It was
- 1:03:21infrastructure in the service of an
- 1:03:23export economy, not internal
- 1:03:25development, and was built largely with
- 1:03:28foreign capital and specialized labor,
- 1:03:30leaving very little of that technical
- 1:03:33and economic knowledge in Mexico. Those
- 1:03:37railroads served the revolution as well
- 1:03:39. Along those same tracks, the armies
- 1:03:42of Villa and Zapata traveled,
- 1:03:43transporting troops, weapons, and
- 1:03:45supplies. The infrastructure that Díaz
- 1:03:49built for progress was also the
- 1:03:51infrastructure the revolution used to
- 1:03:53topple his regime. There is a
- 1:03:56historical irony in that which is
- 1:03:58difficult to ignore. The regional
- 1:04:00dimension of the Porfiriato is
- 1:04:02essential to understand both its
- 1:04:04functioning and its contradictions.
- 1:04:07Mexico was not a homogeneous country
- 1:04:10during that era, nor was Díaz's regime
- 1:04:12experienced the same way everywhere. In
- 1:04:16the north, where the mining and
- 1:04:18agricultural economy was more
- 1:04:20integrated into the U.S. market and
- 1:04:22where a middle and working class
- 1:04:24existed with more education and
- 1:04:26mobility. Tensions with Porfirian
- 1:04:29centralism were particularly acute. In
- 1:04:34the south, especially in Morelos, the
- 1:04:36dispossession of land from indigenous
- 1:04:38and peasant communities in favor of
- 1:04:40sugar plantations was so systematic and
- 1:04:43brutal that it sparked a resistance
- 1:04:45movement that would end up being one of
- 1:04:47the most important of the 20th century.
- 1:04:52of the 20th century. In the case of
- 1:04:56henequen. in Yucatán. The henequen
- 1:05:04economy generated enormous wealth for a
- 1:05:06small local elite known as the "
- 1:05:08henequen kings," while Mayan workers
- 1:05:10lived in conditions of servitude. In
- 1:05:13Oaxaca, paradoxically Díaz's
- 1:05:16birthplace, regional caciquismo
- 1:05:18reproduced the same dynamics of
- 1:05:20exclusion and control that existed in
- 1:05:22the rest of the country. Each region
- 1:05:26had its own Porfiriato history, its own
- 1:05:28set of grievances and beneficiaries.
- 1:05:32And when the revolution arrived, each
- 1:05:35region experienced it differently as
- 1:05:37well, with varying intensities, local
- 1:05:40causes, distinct leaders, and different
- 1:05:42consequences. The Porfiriato was a
- 1:05:47national regime, but its effects were
- 1:05:50profoundly local. The legal and
- 1:05:53institutional legacy of the Porfiriato
- 1:05:55is a topic that requires careful
- 1:05:57analysis. During those decades, Mexico
- 1:06:00built or reformed many of the
- 1:06:01institutions that are taken for granted
- 1:06:04today. The banking system, the civil
- 1:06:08registry, modernized commercial and
- 1:06:10civil codes, international treaties
- 1:06:12that regularized foreign debt, and the
- 1:06:15customs system. Those institutional
- 1:06:19reforms were real and had lasting
- 1:06:21effects, but they also came at a cost.
- 1:06:25Many of those institutions were
- 1:06:27designed to favor groups with capital,
- 1:06:29legal access, and political connections
- 1:06:32. The legal system of the Porfiriato
- 1:06:35was formally modern, but in practice,
- 1:06:37it functioned as an instrument for the
- 1:06:40dominant groups. Peasants without
- 1:06:43property titles, indigenous people who
- 1:06:46held communal lands but no individual
- 1:06:48documents, and workers without formal
- 1:06:50contracts. All of them were at a huge
- 1:06:54disadvantage within that supposedly
- 1:06:57modern legal system. The 1917
- 1:07:00Constitution, which emerged directly
- 1:07:03from the revolution, tried to resolve
- 1:07:06those contradictions with new social
- 1:07:08guarantees, land rights, labor rights,
- 1:07:11and the nation's original ownership of
- 1:07:14subsoil resources. But those
- 1:07:17constitutional guarantees also took
- 1:07:19decades to translate into concrete
- 1:07:21reality for millions of Mexicans. The
- 1:07:24path between legal text and real life
- 1:07:27has always been longer and harder to
- 1:07:29travel in Mexico than the documents
- 1:07:31suggest. The historiography of the
- 1:07:34Porfiriato has gone through several
- 1:07:36distinct phases that reflect the
- 1:07:38political and ideological changes in
- 1:07:40Mexico throughout the 20th century,
- 1:07:42during the decades immediately
- 1:07:44following the revolution. The official
- 1:07:47narrative was one of almost total
- 1:07:49condemnation. The Porfiriato was the
- 1:07:51dark dictatorship that the revolution
- 1:07:54had come to redeem. Textbooks, murals,
- 1:07:57and official speeches constructed an
- 1:08:00image of Díaz as the villain in a
- 1:08:02story of national salvation. That
- 1:08:05narrative had a clear political
- 1:08:07function: to legitimize the
- 1:08:08post-revolutionary State as the natural
- 1:08:10successor of the popular struggle. With
- 1:08:13the passage of time, especially
- 1:08:15starting in the 60s and 70s, historians
- 1:08:18began to question that simple narrative
- 1:08:20. More rigorous research showed that
- 1:08:24the Porfiriato had had real
- 1:08:26achievements, that the revolution had
- 1:08:28not been as clean or as popular as the
- 1:08:31official account suggested, and that
- 1:08:33Mexico's history could not be reduced
- 1:08:35to a fight between good and evil. In
- 1:08:39recent decades, the debate has become
- 1:08:41even more sophisticated. Studies of
- 1:08:45regional history, analyses of the
- 1:08:47living conditions of different social
- 1:08:49groups, the history of women, of
- 1:08:51indigenous people, of workers, have
- 1:08:53added layers of complexity that make
- 1:08:56any simple judgment about that period
- 1:08:58impossible. Today, the most serious
- 1:09:02historians agree that the Porfiriato
- 1:09:04was one of the most complex and
- 1:09:06decisive periods in all of Mexican
- 1:09:09history and that understanding it well
- 1:09:11requires exactly that. Complexity, not
- 1:09:15simplification. There is one question
- 1:09:18that historians have raised repeatedly.
- 1:09:21Could the Porfiriato have reformed
- 1:09:23itself from within? Was there any path
- 1:09:26in which the regime could have adapted
- 1:09:29to the new realities of early 20
- 1:09:32th-century Mexico, without ending in a
- 1:09:35violent revolution? Some historians
- 1:09:38maintain that it could, that there were
- 1:09:40reformist forces within the system that
- 1:09:43, if given more space, could have
- 1:09:45pushed for a more gradual and less
- 1:09:47costly transition. Justo Sierra, for
- 1:09:51example, was a man of genuinely liberal
- 1:09:53ideas who, within the system, tried to
- 1:09:56push for more inclusive education and
- 1:09:58greater political openness. Díaz
- 1:10:02himself, according to some
- 1:10:03interpretations of the Creelman
- 1:10:05interview, might have been willing to
- 1:10:07transition if it had been presented to
- 1:10:10him in the right way. But other
- 1:10:13historians argue that the system's
- 1:10:15logic made that reform impossible. The
- 1:10:18regime depended too much on exclusion,
- 1:10:21control, and personal centralization to
- 1:10:23be able to reform itself without
- 1:10:25collapsing. Every democratizing
- 1:10:28concession would have been interpreted
- 1:10:31as weakness, would have encouraged
- 1:10:33others to ask for more, and the domino
- 1:10:36effect would have been exactly what
- 1:10:38happened anyway, only faster. There is
- 1:10:42no way to know with certainty which of
- 1:10:44these interpretations is correct.
- 1:10:48History has no way to go back to test
- 1:10:50alternative scenarios, but the question
- 1:10:53remains relevant because it touches on
- 1:10:55something that goes beyond the
- 1:10:57Porfiriato: the question of whether
- 1:10:59authoritarian systems can reform
- 1:11:01themselves or if authoritarianism can
- 1:11:03only end in one way. Yeah.
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