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PORFIRIO DÍAZ: El Dictador que Construyó México… y lo Condenó — Transcript

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  1. 0:00His name was Porfirio Díaz, and what
  2. 0:03happened during the 34 years he ruled
  3. 0:05Mexico was not simply a dictatorship.
  4. 0:09It was something more difficult to
  5. 0:11understand and even harder to judge. It
  6. 0:14was the story of a country that changed
  7. 0:17radically, modernizing its streets,
  8. 0:19railways, banks, and image to the world
  9. 0:21, while millions of Mexicans lived in
  10. 0:24conditions of misery, dispossession,
  11. 0:26and forced silence. It was the story of
  12. 0:30a soldier who became a statesman, a war
  13. 0:33hero who turned into a tyrant, a man
  14. 0:35who loved Mexico in his own way, but
  15. 0:37who ended up destroying exactly what he
  16. 0:39claimed to defend. This is the story of
  17. 0:43Porfirio Díaz, of the period that
  18. 0:45bears his name, and of the question
  19. 0:47that still has no simple answer. Was he
  20. 0:50the man Mexico needed, or was he the
  21. 0:52man Mexico could not afford to have?
  22. 0:55The answer, like almost everything in
  23. 0:58this country's history, does not fit
  24. 1:00into a single version. We must delve
  25. 1:03deep into it, without easy prejudices,
  26. 1:06to understand why the Porfiriato
  27. 1:08remains one of the most debated,
  28. 1:11admired, and hated episodes in Mexico's
  29. 1:14national memory. To understand Porfirio
  30. 1:17Díaz, one must first understand the
  31. 1:19Mexico he was born into, a Mexico that
  32. 1:21lacked everything we take for granted
  33. 1:23today. Porfirio Díaz was born on
  34. 1:26September 15, 1830, in the city of
  35. 1:29Oaxaca, into a humble family of mixed
  36. 1:31heritage with Mixtec roots. His father
  37. 1:36died when he was just 3 years old, and
  38. 1:38his mother raised him in austere
  39. 1:40conditions, without great resources, in
  40. 1:42a provincial city that little resembled
  41. 1:44the nation's capital. It was a Mexico
  42. 1:49of internal wars, constant military
  43. 1:51uprisings, and generals who seized
  44. 1:53power by force only to lose it the same
  45. 1:56way. It was a Mexico that had gone
  46. 2:00through dozens of presidents in just
  47. 2:02two decades, where no government could
  48. 2:04consolidate, where foreign debt crushed
  49. 2:07the country, and where foreign powers
  50. 2:09looked with greed at the natural
  51. 2:11resources and institutional weakness of
  52. 2:14a nation that still didn't know what it
  53. 2:16wanted to be. That chaos was the air
  54. 2:20Porfirio Díaz breathed throughout his
  55. 2:23childhood and youth. And that chaos is
  56. 2:26precisely what shaped his understanding
  57. 2:29of power—not as something abstract,
  58. 2:31but as something concrete, urgent, and
  59. 2:34necessary for survival. From a very
  60. 2:38young age, he understood that in Mexico
  61. 2:41, ideas without force were useless, and
  62. 2:43force without ideas was not enough. The
  63. 2:47combination of both would be the
  64. 2:49formula that, decades later, would lead
  65. 2:51him to the highest seat of power.
  66. 2:53Díaz's early life was marked by two
  67. 2:56major influences that would eventually
  68. 2:58clash violently. The first was the law.
  69. 3:03He studied at the Institute of Arts and
  70. 3:05Sciences of Oaxaca, where his teacher
  71. 3:07was none other than Benito Juárez, the
  72. 3:09man who would later become both his
  73. 3:11model and his obstacle. Díaz admired
  74. 3:15Juárez, at least at first. He shared
  75. 3:19his humble origins, Oaxacan pride, and
  76. 3:21faith in the Republic as a system of
  77. 3:24government. But Díaz was never truly a
  78. 3:28man of laws; he was a man of action.
  79. 3:32The second great influence was war.
  80. 3:35Mexico in the 1840s and 50s was a
  81. 3:38permanent battlefield. First, the U.S.
  82. 3:43invasion from 1846 to 1848, which
  83. 3:48stripped the country of more than half
  84. 3:50of its territory. Then the Reform War,
  85. 3:53the bloody conflict between liberals
  86. 3:55and conservatives that pitted Mexicans
  87. 3:57against Mexicans for three years. And
  88. 4:00finally, the French intervention and
  89. 4:03Maximilian's empire, the attempt to
  90. 4:05turn Mexico into a monarchy under
  91. 4:08European tutelage. In all these wars,
  92. 4:11Porfirio Díaz fought, not from afar,
  93. 4:14not as a desk strategist, but in the
  94. 4:17field with rifle and saber, leading
  95. 4:20troops, resisting sieges, and
  96. 4:22organizing guerrillas. He earned his
  97. 4:25promotions one by one, with real blood,
  98. 4:28not with surnames or political
  99. 4:30connections. When Mexico needed
  100. 4:34soldiers who knew how to fight, Díaz
  101. 4:36was there, and that military trajectory
  102. 4:39would give him a legitimacy no pure
  103. 4:41politician could dispute. The Battle of
  104. 4:44May 5, 1862, in Puebla was the moment
  105. 4:49Porfirio Díaz became more than just a
  106. 4:51competent soldier. It was the moment he
  107. 4:55began to become a symbol. General
  108. 4:58Charles de Lorencez's French troops
  109. 5:00advanced on Puebla, convinced that the
  110. 5:03Mexican resistance would collapse in a
  111. 5:05matter of hours. France had one of the
  112. 5:09most powerful armies in the world.
  113. 5:12Mexico was a country devastated by
  114. 5:13years of civil war, with a government
  115. 5:15lacking resources and a poorly equipped
  116. 5:17army. No one expected that battle to
  117. 5:21end as it did, but there was Porfirio
  118. 5:23Díaz in command. 10. When the French
  119. 5:55troops tried to flank the Mexican
  120. 5:57positions, it was Díaz who
  121. 5:59counterattacked, who advanced when
  122. 6:01everyone expected him to retreat, who
  123. 6:03turned a desperate defense into an
  124. 6:05offensive strike that left the French
  125. 6:07confused and finally retreating from
  126. 6:09the field. The victory was not decisive
  127. 6:13. The conflict would continue for years
  128. 6:16and the French would eventually take
  129. 6:19Puebla. But May 5th remained etched in
  130. 6:22the national memory as the day Mexico
  131. 6:25proved to the world it would not
  132. 6:27surrender easily. And in that memory,
  133. 6:31the name of Porfirio Díaz shone with a
  134. 6:33clarity that no other officer of his
  135. 6:36generation possessed. A hero had been
  136. 6:39born. What no one could know at the
  137. 6:43time is that this same hero would,
  138. 6:45decades later, be the cause of the
  139. 6:47bloodiest revolution Mexico had ever
  140. 6:49seen. The French intervention ended
  141. 6:53with the defeat of Maximilian's empire
  142. 6:55and the restoration of the Republic
  143. 6:57under Benito Juárez in 1867. Mexico
  144. 7:02had survived. It had expelled European
  145. 7:06troops, executed the Austrian emperor
  146. 7:08at the Hill of the Bells, and regained
  147. 7:11its sovereignty. It was an
  148. 7:13extraordinary achievement. But the
  149. 7:15country that emerged from that conflict
  150. 7:18was shattered. The government's coffers
  151. 7:21were empty, roads destroyed, haciendas
  152. 7:24razed, and the social fabric torn by
  153. 7:26years of war. And in that context of
  154. 7:29difficult and painful reconstruction,
  155. 7:32the first serious tensions between
  156. 7:34Porfirio Díaz and Benito Juárez began
  157. 7:36to emerge. Díaz had been one of the
  158. 7:39great heroes of the resistance against
  159. 7:41the French. He had won crucial battles,
  160. 7:45liberated cities, and demonstrated a
  161. 7:47military prowess on the field that few
  162. 7:50could match. And yet, when the war
  163. 7:53ended, he found himself in an
  164. 7:55uncomfortable position. Juárez was the
  165. 7:58president, the civil symbol of the
  166. 8:00Republic, the man who had kept the
  167. 8:03legitimate government alive, even in
  168. 8:05its darkest moments. And Juárez did
  169. 8:08not fully trust military men with too
  170. 8:10much power and too much popularity. The
  171. 8:13tension between them grew. Díaz ran
  172. 8:17for president in 1867 and lost. He ran
  173. 8:22again in 1871 and lost once more.
  174. 8:27Frustration began to mount, and when
  175. 8:30Juárez died in 1872, he was replaced
  176. 8:34by Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, another
  177. 8:37civil politician who was also unwilling
  178. 8:39to clear the path for Díaz to reach
  179. 8:41power through elections. Porfirio
  180. 8:44Díaz's patience had a limit, and that
  181. 8:47limit was about to be reached. In 1876,
  182. 8:52Porfirio Díaz made a decision that
  183. 8:54would define not only his life, but
  184. 8:56that of all of Mexico for the following
  185. 8:59decades. He decided to revolt. The Plan
  186. 9:03of Tuxtepec was the document that
  187. 9:05justified his armed uprising against
  188. 9:07the government of Lerdo de Tejada. In
  189. 9:10that plan, Díaz proclaimed the
  190. 9:12principle of no-reelection as the
  191. 9:14central banner of his cause. It was
  192. 9:17ironic, and history would remember it
  193. 9:19with bitterness. The man who took up
  194. 9:21arms under the banner of no-reelection
  195. 9:24would be the most reelected president
  196. 9:26in all of Mexico's history. But at that
  197. 9:29moment, the plan worked. Díaz managed
  198. 9:32to mobilize military forces, attract
  199. 9:35dissatisfied sectors of the army and
  200. 9:37the political class, and militarily
  201. 9:39defeat the government troops. The
  202. 9:42Battle of Tecoac in November 1876 was
  203. 9:46the decisive blow. Lerdo de Tejada's
  204. 9:50forces were defeated. The president
  205. 9:52abandoned the country and Porfirio
  206. 9:54Díaz entered Mexico City as the
  207. 9:56strongman no one could ignore anymore.
  208. 10:00He took power de facto, organized
  209. 10:02elections, and was proclaimed president
  210. 10:05. It was the beginning of what history
  211. 10:07would call the Porfiriato. Although in
  212. 10:10that first term Díaz complied with
  213. 10:12non-reelection and handed power to
  214. 10:14Manuel González in 1880. That gesture
  215. 10:17of apparent constitutional respect was
  216. 10:20nothing more than a waiting period. In
  217. 10:221884, Díaz returned to the presidency
  218. 10:27and this time he would not let it go.
  219. 10:31The Mexico he knew, the Mexico he knew,
  220. 10:34the Mexico he knew, the Mexico he knew,
  221. 10:37the convulsed and unstable Mexico of
  222. 10:39his entire life, was about to undergo a
  223. 10:42brutal, costly, and lasting
  224. 10:44transformation. To govern a country
  225. 10:48that had been unable to remain stable
  226. 10:50for decades, Díaz designed a power
  227. 10:53system that did not exist in any
  228. 10:55political theory book, but worked with
  229. 10:58brutal efficiency for over 30 years.
  230. 11:01That system had several fundamental
  231. 11:04pillars that are necessary to
  232. 11:05understand how a single man could hold
  233. 11:08power for so long without anyone
  234. 11:10managing to overthrow him by force. The
  235. 11:14first was control of the army. Díaz
  236. 11:17knew better than anyone from his own
  237. 11:20experience that in Mexico real power
  238. 11:22lay in the arms. He purged the army of
  239. 11:25rivals, promoted loyal generals, and
  240. 11:27assigned strategic commands to men who
  241. 11:30owed him their careers and positions.
  242. 11:33He did not tolerate any military man
  243. 11:34accumulating too much regional power
  244. 11:36without his explicit approval. The
  245. 11:38second pillar was the control of local
  246. 11:41bosses. Mexico was a huge and
  247. 11:43geographically fragmented country. It
  248. 11:46was impossible to govern it solely from
  249. 11:48the capital. Díaz understood this and
  250. 11:51built a network of regional political
  251. 11:53chiefs who managed their territories
  252. 11:55with an iron fist in exchange for
  253. 11:56absolute loyalty to the center. Those
  254. 12:00political chiefs were judges, police,
  255. 12:02and governors at the same time, and
  256. 12:04their local power was immense. The
  257. 12:08third pillar was the press. Díaz did
  258. 12:12not eliminate all critical press from
  259. 12:14day one, but he gradually tamed it
  260. 12:17through subsidies, pressure, threats,
  261. 12:19and when necessary, prison or exile for
  262. 12:22journalists who insisted on bothering
  263. 12:25the regime. The information that
  264. 12:29circulated in Mexico was largely
  265. 12:31information that the government
  266. 12:33tolerated, and that control of the
  267. 12:35narrative was fundamental to sustaining
  268. 12:37the image of an indispensable ruler.
  269. 12:39The fourth great pillar of Díaz's
  270. 12:42system was foreign policy and foreign
  271. 12:44investment. Díaz understood very early
  272. 12:47on that Mexico could not modernize on
  273. 12:49its own. The country lacked sufficient
  274. 12:53capital, it lacked technology, and it
  275. 12:55lacked the minimum infrastructure that
  276. 12:57a modern state required. So he opened
  277. 13:01the doors to foreign investors in a way
  278. 13:04no Mexican government had done before
  279. 13:06on that scale. English, French,
  280. 13:09American, and German capital began to
  281. 13:12flow into Mexico. Railroads were built,
  282. 13:16crossing the territory from north to
  283. 13:18south and east to west. Mines were
  284. 13:21opened, ports were modernized, power
  285. 13:24plants were installed, telegraph lines
  286. 13:26were laid, the banking system was
  287. 13:29organized, and avenues in the capital
  288. 13:31were paved. The Mexico that Díaz
  289. 13:35presented to the outside world was the
  290. 13:37image of a nation in full
  291. 13:39transformation, orderly, secure for
  292. 13:41business, and capable of fulfilling its
  293. 13:43international contracts. And in many
  294. 13:47respects, that image was not entirely
  295. 13:49false. The economy grew, exports
  296. 13:53increased, investment arrived, and
  297. 13:55cities changed their face, but this
  298. 13:58development model had an enormous cost
  299. 14:01that did not appear in official
  300. 14:03newspapers or government speeches. The
  301. 14:08concessions granted to foreign
  302. 14:09companies were in many cases
  303. 14:11disproportionate. Mexico's natural
  304. 14:14resources were exploited under
  305. 14:16conditions that favored foreign
  306. 14:18investors far more than the country
  307. 14:20itself. And the benefits of economic
  308. 14:24growth did not reach the population
  309. 14:26equitably; they reached the elites, the
  310. 14:29foreigners, and those well-connected to
  311. 14:32the regime. For the rest, very little
  312. 14:35or nothing trickled down. Mexico City
  313. 14:38during the Porfiriato underwent one of
  314. 14:40the most radical urban transformations
  315. 14:43in Latin American history. Díaz wanted
  316. 14:46the capital to be a showcase of
  317. 14:48modernity, a demonstration that Mexico
  318. 14:50was a civilized country, comparable to
  319. 14:52the great European capitals. And in
  320. 14:56that sense, the result was visually
  321. 14:58spectacular. The Palace of Fine Arts
  322. 15:01was built, one of the most beautiful
  323. 15:03buildings in the Americas. The Paseo de
  324. 15:06la Reforma was laid out, the grand
  325. 15:08avenue that still defines the heart of
  326. 15:10the city today. Theaters, museums,
  327. 15:14hospitals, medical schools, and
  328. 15:16scientific institutes were built.
  329. 15:20Electric lighting was installed on the
  330. 15:22main streets. Streetcars arrived, and
  331. 15:26automobiles followed. The aristocrats
  332. 15:29and the Mexican upper class lived in a
  333. 15:32world of luxury and elegance that had
  334. 15:34nothing to envy from Paris or Madrid.
  335. 15:38The halls of Chapultepec Castle, where
  336. 15:40Díaz lived and governed, were the
  337. 15:42setting for banquets, diplomatic
  338. 15:44receptions, and celebrations that
  339. 15:46projected the image of a prosperous and
  340. 15:49stable Mexico. The centennial of
  341. 15:53independence in 1910 was the great
  342. 15:55party of that official Mexico, a
  343. 15:57monumental display of infrastructure,
  344. 15:59culture, and diplomacy that sought to
  345. 16:01show the entire world that the nation
  346. 16:03had matured. It was the most expensive
  347. 16:07and elaborate celebration the country
  348. 16:09had ever organized. And it was also,
  349. 16:12without anyone clearly knowing it at
  350. 16:15the time, the last great party of a
  351. 16:17regime that was about to collapse,
  352. 16:19because while the capital shone, in the
  353. 16:21Mexican countryside, an explosion was
  354. 16:23building that no parade could contain
  355. 16:26anymore. The Mexican countryside was
  356. 16:29the dark side of Porfirian modernity,
  357. 16:31and that was no minor detail. The vast
  358. 16:35majority of Mexicans lived in rural
  359. 16:37areas, worked the land, and depended on
  360. 16:40agrarian structures that the regime not
  361. 16:42only failed to reform, but in many
  362. 16:44cases made significantly worse. The "
  363. 16:48Baldíos"(Wasteland) Law, applied
  364. 16:50during the Porfiriato, allowed vast
  365. 16:53tracts of land, which indigenous
  366. 16:55communities and peasants had worked for
  367. 16:57generations, to be declared empty land
  368. 17:00and awarded to surveying companies or
  369. 17:02politically connected landowners.
  370. 17:06Entire villages lost their land without
  371. 17:08any real compensation. The haciendas
  372. 17:11grew to reach dimensions that were
  373. 17:14absurd. There were owners who possessed
  374. 17:17territories larger than some European
  375. 17:20countries, and the peasants who worked
  376. 17:23those haciendas did so in conditions of
  377. 17:26permanent debt, tied to the "tiendas de
  378. 17:29raya," where the boss controlled both
  379. 17:31wages and the prices of basic goods. It
  380. 17:35was a system that reproduced poverty
  381. 17:37from generation to generation with no
  382. 17:39possible escape. The Yaqui communities
  383. 17:42in Sonora were stripped of their land,
  384. 17:44and when they resisted, the army
  385. 17:47repressed them with extreme violence.
  386. 17:50Men, women, and children were deported
  387. 17:52to Yucatán, where they died of disease
  388. 17:55and exhaustion in the henequen
  389. 17:58plantations. That was also the
  390. 18:01Porfiriato. That was also part of the
  391. 18:03modernity that Díaz boasted about to
  392. 18:05the world. And that quiet suffering
  393. 18:08accumulated over decades would be the
  394. 18:11gunpowder that ignited the revolution.
  395. 18:14To maintain the order that made that
  396. 18:16development model possible, the Díaz
  397. 18:18regime built an apparatus of control
  398. 18:20and repression that left little room
  399. 18:22for dissent. The "Acordada" and later
  400. 18:27the "Rurales" were security forces that
  401. 18:29operated in the countryside with
  402. 18:31considerable autonomy and harshness.
  403. 18:34The unwritten order that was repeated
  404. 18:36was clear. Kill them while it's hot.
  405. 18:40That is to say, prisoners who tried to
  406. 18:42escape or were considered dangerous
  407. 18:44could be executed without any formal
  408. 18:46judicial process. The "ley fuga"(flight
  409. 18:50law) was a documented practice widely
  410. 18:52used during the Porfiriato. The
  411. 18:55detainee was set free at the exact
  412. 18:57moment their captors needed to justify
  413. 18:59their death. It was a mechanism of
  414. 19:02elimination that did not even require a
  415. 19:04formal conviction. The press that tried
  416. 19:07to denounce these abuses faced serious
  417. 19:09consequences. Journalists like Daniel
  418. 19:13Cabrera, founder of the satirical
  419. 19:15newspaper El Hijo del Ahuizote, were
  420. 19:17repeatedly imprisoned for publishing
  421. 19:19criticisms of the regime. Others opted
  422. 19:23for exile. Some simply went silent.
  423. 19:27Independent journalism existed in
  424. 19:29Mexico during the Porfiriato, but it
  425. 19:31survived in precarious conditions,
  426. 19:33always under the threat that an
  427. 19:35uncomfortable article could lead to the
  428. 19:38Belén prison or some regional dungeon.
  429. 19:41And yet, despite all that pressure, the
  430. 19:44discontent did not disappear. It
  431. 19:47accumulated beneath the surface in
  432. 19:49private conversations, in clandestine
  433. 19:51meetings, and in the political clubs
  434. 19:54that began to proliferate in the final
  435. 19:56years of the regime. Díaz could
  436. 19:59silence public voices, but he could not
  437. 20:02erase the causes that produced them.
  438. 20:05One of the most interesting and
  439. 20:07contradictory aspects of Díaz as a
  440. 20:09ruler is his relationship with the
  441. 20:10Catholic Church. During the Reform War,
  442. 20:15Díaz had fought on the liberal side,
  443. 20:17the faction that promoted the Reform
  444. 20:19Laws and the separation of Church and
  445. 20:21State, which expropriated
  446. 20:23ecclesiastical assets and stripped the
  447. 20:25Church of control over civil registries
  448. 20:27and cemeteries. He was, in principle, a
  449. 20:31man of anticlerical tradition, but once
  450. 20:34in power, Díaz adopted a stance of
  451. 20:36pragmatic tolerance toward the Church
  452. 20:39that contrasted sharply with the
  453. 20:41secular spirit of the 1857 Constitution
  454. 20:43. The Reform Laws remained on the books
  455. 20:49, but they were not strictly enforced.
  456. 20:53The Church regained its presence, built
  457. 20:55schools, opened convents, and organized
  458. 20:57massive processions that would have
  459. 20:59been impossible decades earlier.
  460. 21:03Bishops frequented the halls of power.
  461. 21:06The Archbishop of Mexico attended the
  462. 21:08regime’s official events. Díaz
  463. 21:12understood that the Church was an
  464. 21:13enormous social force in a deeply
  465. 21:15Catholic country and that confronting
  466. 21:17it was unnecessary and politically
  467. 21:19costly. The coexistence was mutually
  468. 21:23convenient. The Church did not
  469. 21:26criticize the regime, and the regime
  470. 21:28did not enforce the anticlerical laws.
  471. 21:31It was an informal but effective
  472. 21:32arrangement. That same arrangement
  473. 21:35would generate serious problems decades
  474. 21:37later, when post-revolutionary
  475. 21:39governments tried to return to the
  476. 21:41secular path with a radicalism the
  477. 21:43Church was no longer willing to accept.
  478. 21:48The tensions that the Porfiriato left
  479. 21:51incubated between the State and the
  480. 21:52Church would eventually explode into
  481. 21:55the Cristero War. The figure of the "
  482. 21:57scientists"—the*científicos*—is
  483. 21:58inseparable from any serious analysis
  484. 22:00of the Porfiriato. They were not
  485. 22:02scientists in the sense of laboratory
  486. 22:04work or basic research. They were a
  487. 22:07group of technocrats, economists,
  488. 22:08lawyers, and positivist intellectuals
  489. 22:10who held the most important positions
  490. 22:12in Díaz’s government and designed
  491. 22:14the regime’s economic and social
  492. 22:16policy. Figures like José Ives
  493. 22:20Limantour, the powerful Secretary of
  494. 22:22the Treasury, or Francisco Bulnes, the
  495. 22:24group’s intellectual, represented a
  496. 22:27worldview based on the thought of
  497. 22:29Auguste Comte: the idea that society
  498. 22:31should be ordered and governed by
  499. 22:33rational experts, and that progress was
  500. 22:35the inevitable destiny of nations that
  501. 22:37applied science to public
  502. 22:39administration. The problem was that
  503. 22:44this positivism had a deeply elitist
  504. 22:46and racist dimension that directly
  505. 22:48affected policy toward indigenous and
  506. 22:51peasant communities. The scientists
  507. 22:55believed with intellectual sincerity,
  508. 22:57but with devastating arrogance, that
  509. 23:00the Mexican working classes were not
  510. 23:02ready for democracy, that they needed
  511. 23:05to be guided, civilized, and integrated
  512. 23:07into modernity from above. That
  513. 23:11ideology justified the dispossession of
  514. 23:14land, the repression of popular
  515. 23:15resistance, and the systematic
  516. 23:17exclusion of the majority from the
  517. 23:19benefits of growth. The scientists
  518. 23:23built the intellectual scaffolding of
  519. 23:26the Porfiriato, and when that
  520. 23:27scaffolding collapsed, they fell with
  521. 23:30it without any of them fully
  522. 23:31understanding why the world they had
  523. 23:34built with such effort had failed to
  524. 23:36survive. The 1908 Díaz-Creelman
  525. 23:40interview was one of those moments when
  526. 23:43history turns unexpectedly based on
  527. 23:45words spoken at the wrong time. James
  528. 23:49Creelman was an American journalist who
  529. 23:52published an extensive interview with
  530. 23:54Porfirio Díaz in Pearson's Magazine.
  531. 23:58In that interview, the Mexican
  532. 24:00president stated something no one
  533. 24:02expected to hear from him: that Mexico
  534. 24:04was finally ready for democracy, that
  535. 24:06he would welcome the formation of
  536. 24:08opposition parties, and that if a
  537. 24:10legitimate candidate emerged, he would
  538. 24:12not hinder their path to power. It was
  539. 24:16an astonishing declaration. Díaz had
  540. 24:20spent more than two decades crushing
  541. 24:21any form of real opposition. What led
  542. 24:24him to say that? Interpretations vary.
  543. 24:28Some historians maintain that Díaz
  544. 24:30calculated that no one would take the
  545. 24:32offer seriously; that it was a public
  546. 24:34relations gesture for the outside world
  547. 24:36to calm international criticism about
  548. 24:38the nature of his regime. Others
  549. 24:41believe he genuinely thought about
  550. 24:43retiring, that at nearly 80 years old
  551. 24:45he felt the weight of age and was
  552. 24:47seeking a dignified exit. But
  553. 24:50regardless of Díaz's intentions, the
  554. 24:52effect of those words in Mexico was
  555. 24:54explosive. Hundreds of political clubs
  556. 24:58began to form throughout the country.
  557. 25:01The opposition emerged from the shadows
  558. 25:04, and a man from a wealthy family in
  559. 25:06northern Mexico, educated in Europe and
  560. 25:09the United States, began to write a
  561. 25:11book that would change everything. That
  562. 25:15man was named Francisco I. Madero, and
  563. 25:18his book, "The Presidential Succession
  564. 25:20in 1910," was the spark the Porfiriato
  565. 25:22did not know how to extinguish.
  566. 25:25Francisco Madero was an unlikely
  567. 25:27character as a revolutionary leader. He
  568. 25:31was rich, a spiritualist, a vegetarian,
  569. 25:33short, had a high-pitched voice, and an
  570. 25:36uninspiring appearance. At first glance
  571. 25:39, it was an unlikely image for the man
  572. 25:41who would overthrow one of the
  573. 25:43longest-serving dictators in the
  574. 25:44Americas. But Madero had something that
  575. 25:48proved to be much more powerful than
  576. 25:50appearance: an absolutely sincere moral
  577. 25:52conviction. He believed that democracy
  578. 25:55was not a luxury, but an urgent
  579. 25:57necessity. He believed Mexico deserved
  580. 26:00free elections. He believed Porfirio
  581. 26:03Díaz had betrayed the very principles
  582. 26:05he proclaimed upon coming to power, and
  583. 26:08he communicated that conviction with an
  584. 26:10energy and authenticity that won him
  585. 26:13followers across the country, from
  586. 26:15Sonora to Yucatán. His 1910
  587. 26:18presidential campaign was something
  588. 26:21Mexico hadn't seen in decades. Real
  589. 26:25crowds gathering, public debates, a
  590. 26:27concrete political alternative to the
  591. 26:29established regime. Díaz's government
  592. 26:33watched at first with a certain
  593. 26:35condescension, then with discomfort,
  594. 26:37then with fear. When Madero's
  595. 26:41popularity became evident, the regime
  596. 26:43responded the only way it knew how to
  597. 26:45respond to threats. It had him arrested
  598. 26:48. Madero was imprisoned in San Luis
  599. 26:52Potosí on fabricated charges. The
  600. 26:56elections were held with him in prison,
  601. 26:59and Díaz was reelected once again with
  602. 27:02the results everyone expected in a
  603. 27:05system where there was no real free
  604. 27:07vote. But that time, imprisoning Madero
  605. 27:11didn't silence the problem; it
  606. 27:13multiplied it. Madero managed to escape
  607. 27:16prison and cross the border into the
  608. 27:18United States. From San Antonio, Texas,
  609. 27:22he launched the Plan of San Luis, the
  610. 27:24document calling on the Mexican people
  611. 27:26to take up arms on November 20, 1910,
  612. 27:29against the regime of Porfirio Díaz.
  613. 27:32The chosen date was no accident; it was
  614. 27:35an invitation to revolution in the most
  615. 27:37literal sense of the word. And although
  616. 27:40the initial call had a more timid
  617. 27:42response than Madero expected, in the
  618. 27:44following weeks and months, something
  619. 27:46began to move in Mexico that could no
  620. 27:49longer be stopped. In Chihuahua, a
  621. 27:52former bandit turned guerrilla named
  622. 27:54Doroteo Arango, better known as Pancho
  623. 27:57Villa, began organizing irregular
  624. 28:00forces with surprising speed and
  625. 28:02ferocity. In Morelos, a farmer named
  626. 28:05Emiliano Zapata led agrarian
  627. 28:07communities that had been waiting years
  628. 28:10for someone to return the lands that
  629. 28:12had been taken from them. In Sonora, in
  630. 28:16Coahuila, and in other parts of the
  631. 28:18north, men who had never had anything
  632. 28:21to lose began to take up arms. Díaz's
  633. 28:25Federal Army, which on paper seemed a
  634. 28:27formidable force, proved in the field
  635. 28:30to be an old, corrupt, poorly paid, and
  636. 28:32poorly motivated institution. Its
  637. 28:36soldiers weren't fighting for a cause;
  638. 28:39they fought because they had no other
  639. 28:41choice. The revolutionaries, however,
  640. 28:45did have a cause, and that asymmetry of
  641. 28:49motivation proved to be decisive. In
  642. 28:53May 1911, revolutionary forces took
  643. 28:55Ciudad Juárez, the main point of entry
  644. 28:58on the northern border. The regime
  645. 29:02staggered; the fall of Ciudad Juárez
  646. 29:05in May 1911 was the psychological blow
  647. 29:08that definitively broke the illusion of
  648. 29:10the Porfiriato's invincibility. The
  649. 29:13most important border city in the north
  650. 29:15had fallen into the hands of the
  651. 29:17revolutionaries in a battle the
  652. 29:19government could not, or did not know
  653. 29:21how to, win. The news spread across all
  654. 29:25of Mexico with the speed of the
  655. 29:27telegraph, and what followed was an
  656. 29:29avalanche. More cities began to fall,
  657. 29:32more soldiers deserted, and more
  658. 29:34politicians who had remained silent
  659. 29:36until then began to distance themselves
  660. 29:39from the regime. The "Científicos"
  661. 29:42panicked. The landowners began to weigh
  662. 29:45their options. Foreign diplomats sent
  663. 29:48worried reports back to their capitals.
  664. 29:51At Chapultepec Castle, Porfirio Díaz,
  665. 29:54now 80 years old, suffered from a
  666. 29:56severe dental infection that caused him
  667. 29:59constant pain. He faced the reality
  668. 30:02that the world he had built over
  669. 30:05decades was falling apart. Negotiations
  670. 30:09began. The Treaty of Ciudad Juárez,
  671. 30:12signed in May 1911, established the
  672. 30:15terms of the transition. Díaz would
  673. 30:19resign from the presidency. An interim
  674. 30:21government would be guaranteed and free
  675. 30:24elections would be called. On May 25,
  676. 30:271911, Porfirio Díaz signed his
  677. 30:30resignation. He did so in silence, with
  678. 30:35the cold dignity of someone who had
  679. 30:37accepted defeat without showing it
  680. 30:38openly. That same night, a crowd
  681. 30:42gathered in front of the National
  682. 30:44Palace to celebrate. Some threw stones
  683. 30:47at government buildings, and Díaz,
  684. 30:49from somewhere in the city, heard the
  685. 30:52noise of a Mexico that wanted him out.
  686. 30:55Porfirio Díaz's final journey through
  687. 30:57Mexico is one of those historical
  688. 30:59moments with the density of a novel.
  689. 31:03After signing his resignation, the
  690. 31:05former president boarded a train for
  691. 31:08Veracruz. The route that train traveled
  692. 31:12was for Díaz a kind of silent
  693. 31:14inventory of everything he had built:
  694. 31:16the railways crossing the country, the
  695. 31:19bridges, the stations, the
  696. 31:20infrastructure that had emerged during
  697. 31:23his government, and also the gazes of
  698. 31:25the people in the towns he passed
  699. 31:27through. In some places, there were
  700. 31:31still people who greeted him. In others
  701. 31:34, the silence was absolute. On May 31,
  702. 31:371911, Porfirio Díaz embarked at the
  703. 31:40port of Veracruz, aboard the German
  704. 31:42steamer Ipiranga. He was accompanied by
  705. 31:46his wife, Carmen Romero Rubio, some
  706. 31:48family members, and a small group of
  707. 31:50close collaborators. As the ship moved
  708. 31:53away from the coast, Mexico was left
  709. 31:55behind. Days before departing, it is
  710. 31:58said that Díaz uttered a phrase that
  711. 32:00has been quoted, questioned, and
  712. 32:02reinterpreted for over 100 years. "
  713. 32:05Madero has unleashed a tiger; let us
  714. 32:07see if he can control it." The exact
  715. 32:10authenticity of that phrase is disputed
  716. 32:12by historians, but regardless of
  717. 32:14whether he said it in those exact words
  718. 32:16, it captured an intuition that time
  719. 32:18would prove to be correct. The
  720. 32:21revolution that had toppled his regime
  721. 32:24was a force that no one would be able
  722. 32:26to control easily. Mexico was heading
  723. 32:29toward a decade of civil war that would
  724. 32:30cost hundreds of thousands of lives.
  725. 32:33Díaz knew it. And even if the quote is
  726. 32:36apocryphal, it is at least historically
  727. 32:38just. Porfirio Díaz's exile began in
  728. 32:41Paris, the city that had always
  729. 32:44represented for him the model of
  730. 32:46civilization and modernity he wanted to
  731. 32:48build in Mexico. He settled into an
  732. 32:52elegant apartment in the Champs-
  733. 32:54Élysées neighborhood, surrounded by a
  734. 32:56few loyal Mexicans who had also left
  735. 32:58the country, receiving visits from
  736. 33:00diplomats, journalists, and curious
  737. 33:03onlookers who wanted to see up close
  738. 33:05the man who had ruled Mexico for over
  739. 33:0730 years. Physically he remained
  740. 33:11impressive, tall with a military
  741. 33:13bearing and the steady gaze of someone
  742. 33:15who had commanded armies. But defeat
  743. 33:19was there, beneath that composure, in
  744. 33:21the silences, in the way he sometimes
  745. 33:23asked for news from Mexico with a
  746. 33:25mixture of anguish and wounded pride.
  747. 33:29The news arriving from his country was
  748. 33:31getting worse. Madero governed in
  749. 33:34conditions of increasing chaos. The
  750. 33:36Zapatistas had not laid down their arms
  751. 33:38because the promises regarding land
  752. 33:40were not being fulfilled. Pancho Villa
  753. 33:43operated in the north with an autonomy
  754. 33:45that the central government could not
  755. 33:47control. And in 1913, General
  756. 33:49Victoriano Huerta, with the tacit
  757. 33:52support of US Ambassador Henry Lane
  758. 33:54Wilson, betrayed and ordered the
  759. 33:56assassination of Madero in what became
  760. 33:59known as the Tragic Ten Days. Mexico
  761. 34:02was falling into the abyss. Díaz, in
  762. 34:06his Parisian exile, followed these
  763. 34:08events with a mixture of sensations
  764. 34:10that his biographers have tried to
  765. 34:11decipher without reaching a clear
  766. 34:13consensus. He felt guilt, sadness,
  767. 34:17justification, indifference. He did not
  768. 34:21leave the answer written clearly, and
  769. 34:23perhaps he did not have it himself.
  770. 34:25There is a question that inevitably
  771. 34:28appears in any analysis of the
  772. 34:29Porfiriato and has divided historians
  773. 34:32for more than a century. Was Porfirio
  774. 34:35Díaz a brutal dictator or a necessary
  775. 34:37modernizer? And the honest answer is
  776. 34:40that he was both things at the same
  777. 34:42time, albeit in proportions and with
  778. 34:44consequences that cannot be ignored.
  779. 34:47The argument in his favor is real and
  780. 34:49documented. Before the Porfiriato,
  781. 34:52Mexico was a country that could not
  782. 34:54guarantee even basic order or
  783. 34:56governmental continuity. Internal wars
  784. 35:00were constant, the foreign debt was
  785. 35:03unpayable, banditry dominated the roads
  786. 35:06, and infrastructure was practically
  787. 35:09nonexistent. Díaz managed to stabilize
  788. 35:12all of that. He managed to get Mexico
  789. 35:15international credit for the first time
  790. 35:17. He managed to have railroads cross
  791. 35:20the country, connecting regions that
  792. 35:22previously lived completely isolated.
  793. 35:25He managed to make exports grow, banks
  794. 35:28function, and cities modernize. That is
  795. 35:32why his defenders, who have always
  796. 35:34existed, argue that without that period
  797. 35:36of forced order, Mexico would not have
  798. 35:38been able to build the foundations for
  799. 35:40any later modernity. The argument
  800. 35:43against him is equally real and
  801. 35:45well-documented. That order cost
  802. 35:48millions of people their freedom, their
  803. 35:50land, and in many cases, their lives.
  804. 35:52It was an order imposed through blood
  805. 35:54and repression. It was a form of
  806. 35:56development that benefited a minority
  807. 35:58while excluding the majority. And it
  808. 36:01was a system that, by its very nature,
  809. 36:03sowed the seeds of its own violent
  810. 36:06destruction. Both things are true, and
  811. 36:09that unresolved tension is part of why
  812. 36:12the debate over Díaz still hasn't
  813. 36:14ended. In the final years of the
  814. 36:17Porfiriato, as the regime began to show
  815. 36:19its first visible cracks, critical
  816. 36:21voices emerged from within the very
  817. 36:23intellectual elite that had sustained
  818. 36:25the system for decades. One of the most
  819. 36:29important was that of the Flores Magón
  820. 36:31brothers, Ricardo and Enrique, founders
  821. 36:34of the Mexican Liberal Party and the
  822. 36:36newspaper Regeneración. From exile in
  823. 36:39the United States, the Flores Magón
  824. 36:41brothers published devastating
  825. 36:43critiques of the Díaz regime that
  826. 36:45circulated clandestinely in Mexico.
  827. 36:48They passed from hand to hand, reaching
  828. 36:50working-class and peasant communities
  829. 36:52that had no access to any other
  830. 36:54critical press. The Mexican Liberal
  831. 36:57Party was much more radical than
  832. 36:59Maderismo. It was not content with
  833. 37:01merely asking for electoral democracy.
  834. 37:03It demanded land for peasants, rights
  835. 37:06for workers, secular education, and a
  836. 37:09limited workday. Their 1906 platform
  837. 37:12anticipated several important points
  838. 37:15found in the 1917 Constitution, but
  839. 37:18beyond political programs, what the
  840. 37:20Flores Magón brothers did was simple
  841. 37:23and powerful. They told people in clear
  842. 37:27and direct language that the suffering
  843. 37:30they lived through was not natural, not
  844. 37:32inevitable, and not fair; that they had
  845. 37:34a right to more; and that the regime
  846. 37:36oppressing them was not eternal. That
  847. 37:40seemingly simple idea was actually
  848. 37:43explosive in a country where official
  849. 37:45discourse insisted that the Porfirian
  850. 37:47order was the only alternative to chaos
  851. 37:50. When Madero arrived with his
  852. 37:54democratic message, he found the ground
  853. 37:56already partially prepared by that
  854. 37:57underground work of critical awareness.
  855. 38:00The question regarding the role of the
  856. 38:02United States in the fall of the
  857. 38:04Porfiriato is one of the most complex
  858. 38:07and least resolved of that period. The
  859. 38:09relationship between Díaz and the
  860. 38:11government in Washington was, for the
  861. 38:13majority of the Porfiriato,
  862. 38:15extraordinarily cordial. The flow of
  863. 38:17American capital into Mexico during
  864. 38:20those years was massive. Railroad,
  865. 38:23mining, agricultural, and oil companies
  866. 38:26of North American origin operated in
  867. 38:28Mexico under very favorable conditions.
  868. 38:32It is estimated that by 1910, U.S.
  869. 38:34citizens owned more land in Mexico than
  870. 38:38Mexicans themselves. That economic
  871. 38:41penetration was enormous and generated
  872. 38:44tensions that Díaz managed with
  873. 38:46diplomatic skill, always ensuring no
  874. 38:49foreign investor became too dominant.
  875. 38:53When the Díaz administration began
  876. 38:55favoring European investors, especially
  877. 38:58the British, as a way to balance U.S.
  878. 39:01influence, relations with Washington
  879. 39:03cooled noticeably. Some historians
  880. 39:07maintain that this diplomatic
  881. 39:09reorientation contributed to the
  882. 39:11William Howard Taft administration
  883. 39:14seeing less urgency in intervening to
  884. 39:16support Díaz when the revolution began
  885. 39:19. The U.S. government did not actively
  886. 39:23support the revolutionaries, but it did
  887. 39:25not do enough to stop them when it had
  888. 39:28the chance. It turned a blind eye to
  889. 39:31the arms trafficking toward rebel
  890. 39:33groups in the north. It allowed
  891. 39:36revolutionary leaders to operate with
  892. 39:38relative freedom from U.S. territory.
  893. 39:42That strategic ambiguity was, according
  894. 39:44to various interpretations, part of the
  895. 39:47context that allowed the anti-Díaz
  896. 39:49movement to grow as quickly as it did.
  897. 39:53The working conditions of Mexican
  898. 39:55laborers during the Porfiriato were a
  899. 39:58direct reflection of a regime's
  900. 40:00priorities that favored economic growth
  901. 40:02over public welfare. In the northern
  902. 40:07mines, workers labored in extremely
  903. 40:09dangerous conditions, with 12-hour or
  904. 40:12longer shifts, miserable wages, and no
  905. 40:14significant legal protection in case of
  906. 40:17accident or illness. On the henequen
  907. 40:22plantations of Yucatán, the workers,
  908. 40:24many of them Yaqui indigenous people
  909. 40:27forcibly deported from Sonora, lived in
  910. 40:29conditions that several foreign
  911. 40:31observers of the time openly compared
  912. 40:34to slavery. In the textile plants in
  913. 40:38the center of the country, workers
  914. 40:40began to organize and protest, and the
  915. 40:42government responded with a harshness
  916. 40:44that admitted no negotiation. The 1906
  917. 40:48Cananea strike in the copper mines of
  918. 40:51northern Sonora was one of the most
  919. 40:53revealing episodes of that policy. The
  920. 40:57workers demanded equal pay with the
  921. 41:00American employees of the same company
  922. 41:03who earned double for the same work.
  923. 41:06The government did not negotiate; it
  924. 41:08suppressed. The Rurales and the army
  925. 41:11intervened. There were deaths. The
  926. 41:15leaders of the movement were imprisoned
  927. 41:18. The 1907 Río Blanco strike in the
  928. 41:21textile factories of Veracruz ended in
  929. 41:24an equally bloody manner. Dozens of
  930. 41:27workers died in the clashes with law
  931. 41:30enforcement. Those episodes were not
  932. 41:33forgotten. They remained etched in the
  933. 41:36memory of the Mexican working class and
  934. 41:39fueled the discontent that would
  935. 41:40eventually turn many workers into
  936. 41:42sympathizers or combatants of the
  937. 41:44revolution. One of the themes that
  938. 41:48simplistic analyses of the Porfiriato
  939. 41:50often overlook is the cultural
  940. 41:52dimension of the period, because while
  941. 41:54the regime was repressing political and
  942. 41:57social dissent, it built a cultural,
  943. 41:59scientific, and intellectual production
  944. 42:01of enormous richness. that it would be
  945. 42:04unfair to ignore. Educational
  946. 42:07institutions multiplied. The National
  947. 42:10University, which had been closed for
  948. 42:13decades, was reopened in 1910. Museums,
  949. 42:17libraries, observatories, and research
  950. 42:21institutes flourished. The National
  951. 42:24Museum of Anthropology, in its
  952. 42:26Porfirian version, began to develop the
  953. 42:28systematic study of pre-Hispanic
  954. 42:30cultures. Writers like Manuel
  955. 42:34Gutiérrez Nájera, Amado Nervo, and
  956. 42:36Manuel José Othón developed
  957. 42:38high-quality modernist literature that
  958. 42:40connected Mexico to the international
  959. 42:42literary trends of the time. Painting,
  960. 42:47music, and architecture experienced
  961. 42:49periods of creative intensity. The San
  962. 42:53Carlos Academy trained several
  963. 42:55generations of artists. Philosophical
  964. 42:59thought flourished in the intellectual
  965. 43:01circles of the capital, and all that
  966. 43:03did not disappear with the fall of the
  967. 43:05regime. It was part of the cultural
  968. 43:09legacy upon which post-revolutionary
  969. 43:11generations built their own cultural
  970. 43:13project, sometimes accepting it,
  971. 43:15sometimes rejecting it, but always in
  972. 43:17relation to it. The Porfiriato produced
  973. 43:21a culture that had its own
  974. 43:23contradictions, its own elites, and its
  975. 43:26own silences. But it was real and
  976. 43:28significant. Denying that would be as
  977. 43:31biased as celebrating it without
  978. 43:33context. Porfirio Díaz's relationship
  979. 43:36with his own image was one of the most
  980. 43:38calculated and deliberate aspects of
  981. 43:40his government. Díaz understood the
  982. 43:44power of visual representation in an
  983. 43:46era when photography was still a
  984. 43:49relatively new technology with enormous
  985. 43:52impact. Official photos of Díaz always
  986. 43:55showed him looking impeccable. The
  987. 43:58uniform full of decorations, the
  988. 44:00upright posture, the steady gaze, the
  989. 44:03perfectly trimmed mustache. It was the
  990. 44:06image of a man of authority, someone
  991. 44:08who embodied the order and seriousness
  992. 44:10of the state. But beyond photography,
  993. 44:14Díaz cultivated his image through a
  994. 44:16very careful biographical narrative. He
  995. 44:19presented himself as the soldier who
  996. 44:22had saved Mexico from the French, as
  997. 44:24the statesman who had brought stability
  998. 44:26to the country after decades of chaos,
  999. 44:28as the severe but necessary father of a
  1000. 44:30still-young nation. That narrative was
  1001. 44:35partially true and partially
  1002. 44:37constructed. His symbolic gestures were
  1003. 44:40precisely measured. The May 5th
  1004. 44:43commemorations always included
  1005. 44:44references to his personal role in the
  1006. 44:47battle. His public appearances were
  1007. 44:50staged to convey an image of health,
  1008. 44:52vigor, and dominance that, in his final
  1009. 44:55years of government, no longer fully
  1010. 44:57matched reality. When photographs began
  1011. 45:01to circulate in his final years showing
  1012. 45:04an aged man, nearly an octogenarian,
  1013. 45:06with evident difficulty moving. It was
  1014. 45:10a psychological blow to the regime. The
  1015. 45:14image of invincibility was beginning to
  1016. 45:16crack. And in a system built partly on
  1017. 45:21personal authority, that fissure was
  1018. 45:23more serious than it seemed. There is
  1019. 45:26one aspect of the Porfiriato that is
  1020. 45:28often relegated to the margins of
  1021. 45:30official history, yet had enormous
  1022. 45:32consequences. The policy of promoting
  1023. 45:35foreign immigration and the idea of "
  1024. 45:38whitening" the Mexican population.
  1025. 45:41Inspired by racial theories circulating
  1026. 45:44in Europe and the United States in the
  1027. 45:46late 19th century, many members of the
  1028. 45:48Porfirian elite believed Mexico needed
  1029. 45:51to attract European immigrants to
  1030. 45:53improve the race. And to contribute
  1031. 45:56industry and modernity. Efforts were
  1032. 46:00made to attract Italian, Spanish,
  1033. 46:02German, and other immigrant colonists.
  1034. 46:06In some regions of the country,
  1035. 46:08immigrant colonies were established,
  1036. 46:10receiving land and government support.
  1037. 46:14These very lands, in many cases, had
  1038. 46:16previously belonged to indigenous
  1039. 46:18communities or Mexican peasants
  1040. 46:19dispossessed under the Vacant Lands Act
  1041. 46:22. A brutal contradiction. The regime
  1042. 46:26promoted the arrival of foreigners
  1043. 46:28while expelling or marginalizing the
  1044. 46:30original inhabitants of those lands.
  1045. 46:33And the ideology underlying that policy
  1046. 46:36was openly racist. It viewed the poor
  1047. 46:39indigenous and mestizo population as an
  1048. 46:42obstacle to progress, not as subjects
  1049. 46:44with rights. Justo Sierra, one of the
  1050. 46:47Porfiriato's most brilliant
  1051. 46:49intellectuals, tried to nuance that
  1052. 46:51vision by advocating for popular
  1053. 46:53education. One that would integrate
  1054. 46:55indigenous people into modernity
  1055. 46:57without erasing their identity. But his
  1056. 47:00ideas lived in tension with the
  1057. 47:02concrete practices of a regime that
  1058. 47:04never coherently resolved the question
  1059. 47:07of what place indigenous peoples
  1060. 47:09occupied in the Mexico it was building.
  1061. 47:12The military dimension of the
  1062. 47:14Porfiriato is also more complex than it
  1063. 47:16is usually presented. Díaz was a
  1064. 47:19general of great tactical talent, but
  1065. 47:21as a ruler, he understood that relying
  1066. 47:23too much on the army was dangerous. An
  1067. 47:26overly powerful army was an army
  1068. 47:28capable of staging coups, so he
  1069. 47:30designed a deliberate policy of
  1070. 47:32relative weakening of the armed forces.
  1071. 47:36High-ranking generals were frequently
  1072. 47:38moved from one command to another so
  1073. 47:40they would not accumulate regional
  1074. 47:42loyalties. Military budgets were
  1075. 47:45controlled, promotions depended on
  1076. 47:48direct presidential approval, and the
  1077. 47:50army was supplemented and, to a certain
  1078. 47:53extent, replaced for internal control
  1079. 47:55tasks by rural and police corps that
  1080. 47:58answered directly to the executive
  1081. 48:00branch. The result was an army that
  1082. 48:04looked formidable on paper, but was
  1083. 48:06actually corroded by decades of
  1084. 48:07institutional stagnation. When the
  1085. 48:11revolution arrived, that army proved to
  1086. 48:13be much less capable than its size
  1087. 48:15suggested. The generals were old. The
  1088. 48:19soldiers were mostly forced recruits,
  1089. 48:22the so-called "Leva," men who had been
  1090. 48:24taken by force from their villages and
  1091. 48:27had no particular motivation to fight
  1092. 48:29with conviction. Faced with
  1093. 48:33revolutionary guerrillas fighting for
  1094. 48:35land, for justice, or simply to survive
  1095. 48:38, the federal army systematically lost
  1096. 48:40ground. That military fragility was
  1097. 48:45largely a direct product of the very
  1098. 48:47policies Díaz had designed to protect
  1099. 48:49himself from the military. Oil was one
  1100. 48:53of the most important issues with the
  1101. 48:55most long-term consequences of the
  1102. 48:57Porfirian period. During the last
  1103. 49:00decades of the 19th century and the
  1104. 49:03first years of the 20th, huge oil
  1105. 49:05deposits were discovered in several
  1106. 49:08regions of Mexico, especially in the
  1107. 49:10Tampico area and the Veracruz Huasteca.
  1108. 49:15The Díaz government granted extraction
  1109. 49:17concessions to foreign companies,
  1110. 49:19mainly British and American, on terms
  1111. 49:22that, in retrospect, are astonishing
  1112. 49:24for their generosity toward investors.
  1113. 49:28Edward Doheny's company and Weetman
  1114. 49:30Pearson's, known as El Águila, became
  1115. 49:33two of the largest operators in the
  1116. 49:36country. Mexican oil began to be
  1117. 49:39exported and to generate significant
  1118. 49:42revenue. But most of those profits left
  1119. 49:45the country. Local communities where
  1120. 49:48the wells were located lived in
  1121. 49:50precarious conditions. Mexico's soil
  1122. 49:54and subsoil were being exploited by
  1123. 49:56interests that had no real obligation
  1124. 49:59to the welfare of the population.
  1125. 50:02Decades later, in 1938, President
  1126. 50:07Lázaro Cárdenas would expropriate the
  1127. 50:09oil industry on the grounds that those
  1128. 50:11resources belonged to the nation. But
  1129. 50:15to reach that point, Mexico had to go
  1130. 50:18through the revolution, the 1917
  1131. 50:20Constitution, and two more decades of
  1132. 50:22conflict. The roots of the 1938
  1133. 50:26expropriation lay directly in the
  1134. 50:29concessions of the Porfiriato. And that
  1135. 50:32legacy, that of natural resources as an
  1136. 50:35arena of dispute between national
  1137. 50:37sovereignty and foreign capital, is one
  1138. 50:40of the most enduring of that entire
  1139. 50:42period. The presidential succession was
  1140. 50:45the problem that the Porfirian system
  1141. 50:47never solved. Díaz built a regime
  1142. 50:50based on his person, his authority, his
  1143. 50:52charisma, his personal network of
  1144. 50:54loyalties, and the fear and respect
  1145. 50:56that his name generated. But that type
  1146. 51:00of system has a fatal structural flaw:
  1147. 51:02it cannot be transferred. No one else
  1148. 51:06was Porfirio Díaz. No one else had his
  1149. 51:09history, his military legitimacy, his
  1150. 51:11network of relationships. And when
  1151. 51:14Díaz aged, when it became evident that
  1152. 51:16he would not be able to rule forever,
  1153. 51:18the question of who would succeed him
  1154. 51:20became the most dangerous in Mexican
  1155. 51:22politics. The problem is that Díaz
  1156. 51:25never prepared a succession. He did not
  1157. 51:28train a clear successor, he did not
  1158. 51:30build institutions that could operate
  1159. 51:32independently of his person. The system
  1160. 51:35was too personalistic to survive
  1161. 51:37without him. And when the crisis of
  1162. 51:401910 broke out, it became clear that
  1163. 51:42there was no institutional mechanism
  1164. 51:44capable of processing the change
  1165. 51:46peacefully. The only language the
  1166. 51:48system knew to resolve that question
  1167. 51:51was force. And force is exactly what
  1168. 51:54emerged, not in the form of an orderly
  1169. 51:56palace coup, but in the form of a
  1170. 51:58revolution that lasted a decade and
  1171. 52:01cost between 1 and 2 million lives,
  1172. 52:03according to different estimates. That
  1173. 52:06failure in succession is perhaps the
  1174. 52:08most serious of all the negative
  1175. 52:10legacies of the Porfiriato, the
  1176. 52:12inability to create institutions that
  1177. 52:14lasted longer than one man. One of the
  1178. 52:17liveliest debates among Mexican
  1179. 52:19historians is that of the periodization
  1180. 52:21of the Porfiriato and the distinction
  1181. 52:23between its different stages. The
  1182. 52:26entire period was not the same in
  1183. 52:28repressive intensity, economic
  1184. 52:30orientation, or cabinet composition.
  1185. 52:33The first Porfiriato from 1876 to 1884
  1186. 52:39was relatively more open and less
  1187. 52:41consolidated. The period from 1884 to
  1188. 52:441900 was that of the great
  1189. 52:46consolidation of power and the
  1190. 52:48acceleration of the outward-looking
  1191. 52:50development model. And the last
  1192. 52:54Porfiriato from 1900 to 1911 was that
  1193. 52:57of the sclerosis of the system. A
  1194. 53:01government that aged with its leader,
  1195. 53:03that became increasingly rigid, more
  1196. 53:05closed to renewal, and more incapable
  1197. 53:07of responding to the tensions that were
  1198. 53:09accumulating. The last years of Díaz
  1199. 53:12in power are particularly revealing of
  1200. 53:15that rigidity. The same faces in the
  1201. 53:18cabinet, the same control mechanisms
  1202. 53:20that no longer functioned with the same
  1203. 53:22effectiveness. A political elite that
  1204. 53:26had aged along with the president and
  1205. 53:28had neither the energy nor the vision
  1206. 53:30to adapt to a Mexico that had changed.
  1207. 53:34When Madero arrived with his message of
  1208. 53:37democratic renewal, he was not just
  1209. 53:39facing a dictator, he was facing a
  1210. 53:42complete system of interests, habits,
  1211. 53:44structures, and loyalties that had
  1212. 53:46become incapable of renewing themselves
  1213. 53:49. And that type of system, when it
  1214. 53:53starts to fall, does not reform; it
  1215. 53:56collapses. The role of women during the
  1216. 53:59Porfiriato is a chapter that official
  1217. 54:01history ignored for a long time, but
  1218. 54:04which more recent studies have begun to
  1219. 54:06recover with greater attention. The
  1220. 54:09legal situation of Mexican women during
  1221. 54:12that period was one of almost total
  1222. 54:14subordination to male power. They could
  1223. 54:18not vote, they could not sign contracts
  1224. 54:20without their husband's authorization,
  1225. 54:22they could not practice most legal
  1226. 54:24professions. And yet, within those
  1227. 54:28enormous restrictions, some women
  1228. 54:30managed to open up remarkable spaces.
  1229. 54:35Laureana W. González founded in 1887
  1230. 54:37the magazine Violetas del Anáhuac, a
  1231. 54:40publication dedicated exclusively to
  1232. 54:42topics of interest to women that
  1233. 54:44included reflections on education,
  1234. 54:47rights, and literature. The first women
  1235. 54:51who graduated in medicine or pharmacy
  1236. 54:53in Mexico did so during the Porfiriato,
  1237. 54:56facing resistance, but also finding
  1238. 54:59unexpected support in some enlightened
  1239. 55:01circles. In the realm of primary
  1240. 55:05education, female teachers became a key
  1241. 55:07presence in the public schools that the
  1242. 55:09regime built as part of its
  1243. 55:11modernization project. And in the
  1244. 55:15working world, women in textile
  1245. 55:17factories and workshops actively
  1246. 55:19participated in the strikes and protest
  1247. 55:21movements of the early 20th century.
  1248. 55:25The revolution that overthrew Díaz
  1249. 55:27would not immediately or satisfactorily
  1250. 55:29resolve the situation of Mexican women.
  1251. 55:33But those who took part in it—the
  1252. 55:35female soldiers, nurses, messengers,
  1253. 55:38and organizers—were already marked by
  1254. 55:41decades of tensions accumulated during
  1255. 55:43the Porfiriato. The Porfiriato’s
  1256. 55:46educational system was one of the
  1257. 55:49regime’s great bets and also one of
  1258. 55:51its greatest contradictions. He and his
  1259. 55:55collaborators, influenced by Comtian
  1260. 55:57positivism, firmly believed that
  1261. 55:59education was the fundamental tool to
  1262. 56:02modernize the country. Justo Sierra,
  1263. 56:05the great Secretary of Public
  1264. 56:07Instruction of that era, was the
  1265. 56:09architect of an enormously ambitious
  1266. 56:11educational reform. Building primary
  1267. 56:14schools throughout the country,
  1268. 56:16training teachers in normal schools,
  1269. 56:19and creating a secular, free, and
  1270. 56:21compulsory education. In numerical
  1271. 56:25terms, the advances were real. The
  1272. 56:28number of schools grew significantly.
  1273. 56:31The literacy rate, although still low
  1274. 56:34in absolute terms, increased during the
  1275. 56:37Porfiriato. The National University was
  1276. 56:40refounded in 1910. The schools of
  1277. 56:43medicine, engineering, law, and fine
  1278. 56:45arts were consolidated, but the
  1279. 56:48contradiction was enormous. That same
  1280. 56:51regime building schools was the one
  1281. 56:53repressing workers, dispossessing
  1282. 56:56peasants, and silencing the press. And
  1283. 56:59the reach of those schools was unequal.
  1284. 57:02They reached cities and mestizo
  1285. 57:04communities more easily than the
  1286. 57:06indigenous communities in remote areas.
  1287. 57:10The education promoted by the
  1288. 57:12Porfiriato was also, in its design,
  1289. 57:14oriented toward integrating Mexicans
  1290. 57:17into a national project that defined
  1291. 57:19progress in terms that excluded many
  1292. 57:21ways of life and culture that did not
  1293. 57:24fit the European and positivist mold
  1294. 57:26the regime admired. In the Mexico of
  1295. 57:30the final years of the Porfiriato,
  1296. 57:32discontent did not only come from
  1297. 57:34landless peasants or rightless workers.
  1298. 57:38It also came from within the regional
  1299. 57:40elite of landowners and merchants in
  1300. 57:43the north who felt the regime
  1301. 57:44systematically favored certain groups
  1302. 57:47with preferential access to central
  1303. 57:49power. The case of Coahuila is
  1304. 57:53revealing. The Madero family was one of
  1305. 57:56the wealthiest and most influential in
  1306. 57:58the north of the country, with
  1307. 58:00businesses in mining, banking,
  1308. 58:01haciendas, and trade. They weren't poor
  1309. 58:06or marginalized, but they felt
  1310. 58:08government concessions favored groups
  1311. 58:10closest to Díaz’s inner circle, that
  1312. 58:12the system was opaque, arbitrary, and
  1313. 58:14that there was no way to participate in
  1314. 58:17it without completely submitting to the
  1315. 58:19president's will. That sense of
  1316. 58:23exclusion within the elite itself was a
  1317. 58:25factor that many analyses of the
  1318. 58:27Porfiriato underestimate. The
  1319. 58:29revolution wasn't just an uprising from
  1320. 58:32those below; it was also, in its
  1321. 58:34initial phase, a rebellion of elite
  1322. 58:36sectors that had lost patience with a
  1323. 58:38system that wouldn't reform. That
  1324. 58:42alliance between different classes with
  1325. 58:44different grievances was paradoxically
  1326. 58:46both the strength and the weakness of
  1327. 58:48the revolutionary movement. It united
  1328. 58:52very different people to topple Díaz,
  1329. 58:54but that same diversity of interests
  1330. 58:56would cause the revolution to fragment
  1331. 58:58violently once the common goal
  1332. 59:00disappeared. Díaz's return to the
  1333. 59:04forefront of public discussion is a
  1334. 59:05phenomenon that has repeated itself
  1335. 59:07several times in Mexico’s
  1336. 59:09post-revolutionary history. There were
  1337. 59:12moments, especially during periods of
  1338. 59:15instability or conservative nostalgia,
  1339. 59:17when some sectors of Mexican society
  1340. 59:20began to reconsider the Porfiriato with
  1341. 59:22a more benevolent gaze. The recurring
  1342. 59:25argument is always the same. Under
  1343. 59:28Díaz, Mexico had order. Under Díaz,
  1344. 59:31the economy grew; under Díaz, there
  1345. 59:34was safety on the roads. That argument
  1346. 59:38isn't entirely false, but it omits the
  1347. 59:40human cost of that order, the violence
  1348. 59:42that sustained it, and the exclusion of
  1349. 59:44millions that made it possible. More
  1350. 59:47serious historiography has attempted to
  1351. 59:50move beyond that simple dichotomy of
  1352. 59:52hero or villain. The works of Friedrich
  1353. 59:55Katz, Paul Garner, Alan Knight, and
  1354. 59:57other historians have built a more
  1355. 59:59nuanced image of the Porfiriato that
  1356. 1:00:02recognizes both its real achievements
  1357. 1:00:04and its documented crimes. But that
  1358. 1:00:08academic complexity rarely finds an
  1359. 1:00:09echo in public debate, where the
  1360. 1:00:11temptation of simplification remains
  1361. 1:00:13very strong. In moments when Mexico
  1362. 1:00:17suffers from insecurity, corruption, or
  1363. 1:00:19economic crisis, the Porfiriato
  1364. 1:00:21reappears like a kind of nostalgic
  1365. 1:00:23ghost in the national conversation. It
  1366. 1:00:27is a phenomenon that says a lot about
  1367. 1:00:28the frustrations of the present and
  1368. 1:00:30perhaps a little less about the
  1369. 1:00:31historical reality of the past.
  1370. 1:00:34Porfirio Díaz's death occurred on July
  1371. 1:00:372, 1915, in Paris. He was 84 years old.
  1372. 1:00:41What France was experiencing at that
  1373. 1:00:44moment was the First World War. The
  1374. 1:00:46trenches were just a few hours from the
  1375. 1:00:48capital. The continent was bleeding out
  1376. 1:00:51in one of the most destructive
  1377. 1:00:53conflicts in modern history. Mexico,
  1378. 1:00:55meanwhile, was experiencing the deepest
  1379. 1:00:58chaos of the entire revolution. Zapata
  1380. 1:01:01in the south, Villa in the north,
  1381. 1:01:03Carranza and Obregón fighting to
  1382. 1:01:05consolidate power. Destroyed cities,
  1383. 1:01:09famine, epidemics. Díaz died in exile,
  1384. 1:01:13far from the land he had ruled for over
  1385. 1:01:16three decades, never setting foot on it
  1386. 1:01:18again after his departure in 1911. His
  1387. 1:01:23remains were buried in the Montparnasse
  1388. 1:01:25cemetery in Paris, where they remain to
  1389. 1:01:28this day. For decades, his remains did
  1390. 1:01:31not return to Mexico. That fact,
  1391. 1:01:34seemingly symbolic, actually says a lot
  1392. 1:01:37. No Mexican government after the
  1393. 1:01:40revolution was willing to bear the
  1394. 1:01:42political cost of receiving the man the
  1395. 1:01:45revolution had overthrown. The
  1396. 1:01:48post-revolutionary state built its
  1397. 1:01:51legitimacy precisely on the narrative
  1398. 1:01:53of having ended the Porfiriato.
  1399. 1:01:57Accepting his remains would have
  1400. 1:01:59complicated that narrative, and
  1401. 1:02:01foundational state narratives are hard
  1402. 1:02:03to complicate without consequences.
  1403. 1:02:07Díaz's bones remain in Paris, in that
  1404. 1:02:09quiet cemetery in the 14th
  1405. 1:02:11arrondissement, thousands of miles from
  1406. 1:02:13the country he marked with his presence
  1407. 1:02:16for an entire era. The impact of the
  1408. 1:02:19Porfiriato on Mexico's infrastructure
  1409. 1:02:21was undeniable and far-reaching.
  1410. 1:02:24Railroads are perhaps the most cited
  1411. 1:02:26example. At the start of Díaz's regime
  1412. 1:02:30, Mexico had barely 700 km of railway
  1413. 1:02:32tracks. By the end of the Porfiriato,
  1414. 1:02:36that figure had grown to more than
  1415. 1:02:3819,000 km. That railway network
  1416. 1:02:41connected regions that had previously
  1417. 1:02:43lived in almost complete isolation. It
  1418. 1:02:45brought local markets closer to the
  1419. 1:02:47national and international market. It
  1420. 1:02:50allowed for the export of raw materials
  1421. 1:02:52on a scale that was previously
  1422. 1:02:54impossible. It made the mobilization of
  1423. 1:02:57troops possible at a speed that changed
  1424. 1:02:59the very nature of military conflicts
  1425. 1:03:01in the country. But the Porfiriato's
  1426. 1:03:04railway network also had a
  1427. 1:03:06characteristic that revealed its
  1428. 1:03:08priorities. It was fundamentally
  1429. 1:03:11designed to connect production centers
  1430. 1:03:14with export ports, not to integrate the
  1431. 1:03:16national territory organically. It was
  1432. 1:03:21infrastructure in the service of an
  1433. 1:03:23export economy, not internal
  1434. 1:03:25development, and was built largely with
  1435. 1:03:28foreign capital and specialized labor,
  1436. 1:03:30leaving very little of that technical
  1437. 1:03:33and economic knowledge in Mexico. Those
  1438. 1:03:37railroads served the revolution as well
  1439. 1:03:39. Along those same tracks, the armies
  1440. 1:03:42of Villa and Zapata traveled,
  1441. 1:03:43transporting troops, weapons, and
  1442. 1:03:45supplies. The infrastructure that Díaz
  1443. 1:03:49built for progress was also the
  1444. 1:03:51infrastructure the revolution used to
  1445. 1:03:53topple his regime. There is a
  1446. 1:03:56historical irony in that which is
  1447. 1:03:58difficult to ignore. The regional
  1448. 1:04:00dimension of the Porfiriato is
  1449. 1:04:02essential to understand both its
  1450. 1:04:04functioning and its contradictions.
  1451. 1:04:07Mexico was not a homogeneous country
  1452. 1:04:10during that era, nor was Díaz's regime
  1453. 1:04:12experienced the same way everywhere. In
  1454. 1:04:16the north, where the mining and
  1455. 1:04:18agricultural economy was more
  1456. 1:04:20integrated into the U.S. market and
  1457. 1:04:22where a middle and working class
  1458. 1:04:24existed with more education and
  1459. 1:04:26mobility. Tensions with Porfirian
  1460. 1:04:29centralism were particularly acute. In
  1461. 1:04:34the south, especially in Morelos, the
  1462. 1:04:36dispossession of land from indigenous
  1463. 1:04:38and peasant communities in favor of
  1464. 1:04:40sugar plantations was so systematic and
  1465. 1:04:43brutal that it sparked a resistance
  1466. 1:04:45movement that would end up being one of
  1467. 1:04:47the most important of the 20th century.
  1468. 1:04:52of the 20th century. In the case of
  1469. 1:04:56henequen. in Yucatán. The henequen
  1470. 1:05:04economy generated enormous wealth for a
  1471. 1:05:06small local elite known as the "
  1472. 1:05:08henequen kings," while Mayan workers
  1473. 1:05:10lived in conditions of servitude. In
  1474. 1:05:13Oaxaca, paradoxically Díaz's
  1475. 1:05:16birthplace, regional caciquismo
  1476. 1:05:18reproduced the same dynamics of
  1477. 1:05:20exclusion and control that existed in
  1478. 1:05:22the rest of the country. Each region
  1479. 1:05:26had its own Porfiriato history, its own
  1480. 1:05:28set of grievances and beneficiaries.
  1481. 1:05:32And when the revolution arrived, each
  1482. 1:05:35region experienced it differently as
  1483. 1:05:37well, with varying intensities, local
  1484. 1:05:40causes, distinct leaders, and different
  1485. 1:05:42consequences. The Porfiriato was a
  1486. 1:05:47national regime, but its effects were
  1487. 1:05:50profoundly local. The legal and
  1488. 1:05:53institutional legacy of the Porfiriato
  1489. 1:05:55is a topic that requires careful
  1490. 1:05:57analysis. During those decades, Mexico
  1491. 1:06:00built or reformed many of the
  1492. 1:06:01institutions that are taken for granted
  1493. 1:06:04today. The banking system, the civil
  1494. 1:06:08registry, modernized commercial and
  1495. 1:06:10civil codes, international treaties
  1496. 1:06:12that regularized foreign debt, and the
  1497. 1:06:15customs system. Those institutional
  1498. 1:06:19reforms were real and had lasting
  1499. 1:06:21effects, but they also came at a cost.
  1500. 1:06:25Many of those institutions were
  1501. 1:06:27designed to favor groups with capital,
  1502. 1:06:29legal access, and political connections
  1503. 1:06:32. The legal system of the Porfiriato
  1504. 1:06:35was formally modern, but in practice,
  1505. 1:06:37it functioned as an instrument for the
  1506. 1:06:40dominant groups. Peasants without
  1507. 1:06:43property titles, indigenous people who
  1508. 1:06:46held communal lands but no individual
  1509. 1:06:48documents, and workers without formal
  1510. 1:06:50contracts. All of them were at a huge
  1511. 1:06:54disadvantage within that supposedly
  1512. 1:06:57modern legal system. The 1917
  1513. 1:07:00Constitution, which emerged directly
  1514. 1:07:03from the revolution, tried to resolve
  1515. 1:07:06those contradictions with new social
  1516. 1:07:08guarantees, land rights, labor rights,
  1517. 1:07:11and the nation's original ownership of
  1518. 1:07:14subsoil resources. But those
  1519. 1:07:17constitutional guarantees also took
  1520. 1:07:19decades to translate into concrete
  1521. 1:07:21reality for millions of Mexicans. The
  1522. 1:07:24path between legal text and real life
  1523. 1:07:27has always been longer and harder to
  1524. 1:07:29travel in Mexico than the documents
  1525. 1:07:31suggest. The historiography of the
  1526. 1:07:34Porfiriato has gone through several
  1527. 1:07:36distinct phases that reflect the
  1528. 1:07:38political and ideological changes in
  1529. 1:07:40Mexico throughout the 20th century,
  1530. 1:07:42during the decades immediately
  1531. 1:07:44following the revolution. The official
  1532. 1:07:47narrative was one of almost total
  1533. 1:07:49condemnation. The Porfiriato was the
  1534. 1:07:51dark dictatorship that the revolution
  1535. 1:07:54had come to redeem. Textbooks, murals,
  1536. 1:07:57and official speeches constructed an
  1537. 1:08:00image of Díaz as the villain in a
  1538. 1:08:02story of national salvation. That
  1539. 1:08:05narrative had a clear political
  1540. 1:08:07function: to legitimize the
  1541. 1:08:08post-revolutionary State as the natural
  1542. 1:08:10successor of the popular struggle. With
  1543. 1:08:13the passage of time, especially
  1544. 1:08:15starting in the 60s and 70s, historians
  1545. 1:08:18began to question that simple narrative
  1546. 1:08:20. More rigorous research showed that
  1547. 1:08:24the Porfiriato had had real
  1548. 1:08:26achievements, that the revolution had
  1549. 1:08:28not been as clean or as popular as the
  1550. 1:08:31official account suggested, and that
  1551. 1:08:33Mexico's history could not be reduced
  1552. 1:08:35to a fight between good and evil. In
  1553. 1:08:39recent decades, the debate has become
  1554. 1:08:41even more sophisticated. Studies of
  1555. 1:08:45regional history, analyses of the
  1556. 1:08:47living conditions of different social
  1557. 1:08:49groups, the history of women, of
  1558. 1:08:51indigenous people, of workers, have
  1559. 1:08:53added layers of complexity that make
  1560. 1:08:56any simple judgment about that period
  1561. 1:08:58impossible. Today, the most serious
  1562. 1:09:02historians agree that the Porfiriato
  1563. 1:09:04was one of the most complex and
  1564. 1:09:06decisive periods in all of Mexican
  1565. 1:09:09history and that understanding it well
  1566. 1:09:11requires exactly that. Complexity, not
  1567. 1:09:15simplification. There is one question
  1568. 1:09:18that historians have raised repeatedly.
  1569. 1:09:21Could the Porfiriato have reformed
  1570. 1:09:23itself from within? Was there any path
  1571. 1:09:26in which the regime could have adapted
  1572. 1:09:29to the new realities of early 20
  1573. 1:09:32th-century Mexico, without ending in a
  1574. 1:09:35violent revolution? Some historians
  1575. 1:09:38maintain that it could, that there were
  1576. 1:09:40reformist forces within the system that
  1577. 1:09:43, if given more space, could have
  1578. 1:09:45pushed for a more gradual and less
  1579. 1:09:47costly transition. Justo Sierra, for
  1580. 1:09:51example, was a man of genuinely liberal
  1581. 1:09:53ideas who, within the system, tried to
  1582. 1:09:56push for more inclusive education and
  1583. 1:09:58greater political openness. Díaz
  1584. 1:10:02himself, according to some
  1585. 1:10:03interpretations of the Creelman
  1586. 1:10:05interview, might have been willing to
  1587. 1:10:07transition if it had been presented to
  1588. 1:10:10him in the right way. But other
  1589. 1:10:13historians argue that the system's
  1590. 1:10:15logic made that reform impossible. The
  1591. 1:10:18regime depended too much on exclusion,
  1592. 1:10:21control, and personal centralization to
  1593. 1:10:23be able to reform itself without
  1594. 1:10:25collapsing. Every democratizing
  1595. 1:10:28concession would have been interpreted
  1596. 1:10:31as weakness, would have encouraged
  1597. 1:10:33others to ask for more, and the domino
  1598. 1:10:36effect would have been exactly what
  1599. 1:10:38happened anyway, only faster. There is
  1600. 1:10:42no way to know with certainty which of
  1601. 1:10:44these interpretations is correct.
  1602. 1:10:48History has no way to go back to test
  1603. 1:10:50alternative scenarios, but the question
  1604. 1:10:53remains relevant because it touches on
  1605. 1:10:55something that goes beyond the
  1606. 1:10:57Porfiriato: the question of whether
  1607. 1:10:59authoritarian systems can reform
  1608. 1:11:01themselves or if authoritarianism can
  1609. 1:11:03only end in one way. Yeah.

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