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Por ESTO NADIE puede ARREGLAR al Real Madrid — Transcript

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0:00Just two years ago, talking about a
0:02structural crisis at Real Madrid would
0:03have seemed almost absurd. In 2024, the
0:06team was coming off winning both La
0:07Liga and the Champions League. They had
0:11even finished 10 points ahead of
0:12Barcelona, scored 87 goals in the
0:14league, and conceded only 26. In Europe
0:18, moreover, they completed the entire
0:19Champions League campaign without
0:21losing a single match. They eliminated
0:23Manchester City and Bayern, ultimately
0:24lifting the title against Borussia
0:26Dortmund at Wembley. Vinicius was in
0:28one of the best moments of his career.
0:30Bellingham had exploded onto the scene
0:31since his arrival. Carvajal was
0:32decisive in the final and Toni Kroos
0:34continued to control the tempo of the
0:36matches. It seemed like the beginning
0:38of another dominant era, but it ended
0:40up being almost the opposite. Since
0:44that moment, Real Madrid began changing
0:46many things without managing to recover
0:47that same feeling. Kroos retired,
0:50Mbappé arrived, then came more
0:52signings, more defenders, fullbacks,
0:54attackers, and new coaches too. The
0:56club invested around 167 million euros
0:59in 2025 and nearly another 225 million
1:02in 2026. We are talking about a Real
1:05Madrid that hasn't stood still; they've
1:07spent, changed pieces, and tried to
1:09rebuild practically every line. And yet
1:11, two years later, the question remains
1:13the same. Why does this team still give
1:15the impression of breaking down when a
1:16match gets complicated? The start of
1:18the 26-27 season has set off the alarms
1:20once again. After seven league
1:22matchdays, Real Madrid had won five
1:23games and lost two, taking 15 points
1:25out of a possible 21. It’s not a
1:28disastrous start if looked at in
1:29isolation, but the problem appears when
1:31comparing it to Barcelona, which has
1:33seven wins in seven games and a
1:35six-point lead while still in September
1:36. And there is still one statistic that
1:38makes this difference even more evident
1:40. While Barcelona has a goal difference
1:42of plus 24, Real Madrid is at plus 10.
1:44It doesn’t mean the league is over,
1:46it means something more worrying. After
1:48everything Madrid has changed over the
1:50last few years, they find themselves
1:51chasing the same rival again almost
1:53from the start, and it’s not just a
1:54matter of points. Betis already managed
1:57to beat them 1-0, Atlético did it
1:59again in the derby, and against Elche,
2:02who at the time were at the bottom of
2:04the table, Real Madrid went 2-0 up,
2:06allowed an equalizer, and needed an
2:08added-time goal to escape with a 3-2
2:10win. They are different games, but they
2:13leave the same feeling. When a match
2:15doesn't go exactly as Real Madrid wants
2:17, the team really struggles to regain
2:19control of it. And this is probably the
2:21most important part of this whole story
2:23, because Real Madrid still has plenty
2:25of talent to decide matches with an
2:26individual play. Mbappé can invent a
2:28goal, Vinicius can break a defense with
2:31a single run. Bellingham can carry the
2:33ball 30 meters. Arda can find a pass
2:35that no one else has seen. But the
2:37problem arises when none of those
2:39actions come, when they face an
2:41organized team that gives away no space
2:43and forces Real Madrid to build the
2:45play. That is exactly where the cracks
2:46appear. And what is surprising is that
2:48we are not talking about something that
2:49started with Mourinho. Carlo Ancelotti
2:51already suffered that loss of control.
2:53Then Xabi Alonso arrived with the idea
2:54of introducing more pressure, more
2:56structure, and a more refined system.
2:59And for a while it seemed he could
3:00change the dynamic, but the same
3:02symptoms eventually returned. Then
3:04Arbeloa arrived precisely for knowing
3:06the club and the locker room, and now
3:08Mourinho appears as a different
3:09solution: more authority, more
3:11experience, and a much more pragmatic
3:13idea. Four coaches with very different
3:16profiles, yet the same problems keep
3:18appearing, which forces us to look
3:20beyond the bench; because if the coach
3:22changes and the team ends up falling in
3:24the same way, maybe the problem isn't
3:26just who manages Real Madrid, but how
3:28the team itself is built. Perhaps they
3:32have tried to fix every crack by adding
3:34more talent when all that was missing
3:35was something different: clear roles,
3:37balance, and players who could make all
3:39those pieces fit together. The best
3:41example is what happened after 2024.
3:45Real Madrid lost Toni Kroos and,
3:46instead of replacing exactly what Kroos
3:48did, they kept accumulating players
3:50with other virtues: more physicality,
3:52more speed, more arrival, more
3:53defensive capacity, and more attacking
3:55flair. But that doesn't necessarily
3:58mean more control, and that could be
4:00the root of everything, because the
4:022024 Real Madrid could suffer, play
4:04poorly during phases of a match, or
4:05even be dominated, but they had players
4:07capable of changing the rhythm,
4:09bringing the team together, and
4:10deciding when to accelerate and when to
4:12slow the game down. The current Madrid
4:16might even have more individual talent
4:18in some positions, but often it seems
4:20much less connected. That is why this
4:22video is not about looking for a single
4:23culprit. It is not simply about saying
4:25that Mbappé is the problem, or that
4:27Vinicius should be out of the starting
4:2911, or that Mourinho is finished, as I
4:30have been hearing a lot lately, and not
4:32even that everything would be fixed by
4:34signing a new midfielder. Over these 10
4:36parts, we are going to break down, one
4:38by one, all the recurring problems. The
4:41lack of control in the middle, the few
4:43movements off the ball, the
4:45difficulties pressing, the huge gaps
4:47between lines, the defensive work of
4:49the attackers, and the roles of
4:50Bellingham, Valverde, and Tchouaméni.
4:53Because the big question is no longer
4:55whether Real Madrid has good players. I
4:57think that is beyond debate. The
4:58question is much more uncomfortable.
5:01How can one of the best squads in the
5:02world continue to look, too many times,
5:04like a group of great footballers
5:06instead of a great team? And to
5:09understand it, we must start with the
5:10player whose absence is still felt even
5:12two years after he left: Toni Kroos. If
5:17there is one absence that still
5:19explains a good part of Real Madrid's
5:20current problems, that absence is Toni
5:22Kroos '. And not because the team
5:25hasn't signed midfielders since he left
5:27, but because the club replaced players
5:29without exactly replacing the function
5:31he fulfilled. Kroos wasn't just a
5:35footballer who passed the ball; he was
5:36the player who organized the match,
5:38received under pressure, shifted play
5:40from one side to the other, decided
5:41when to accelerate, when to slow down,
5:43and above all, gave meaning to what was
5:45happening around him. Real Madrid could
5:48be suffering, they could have the
5:50opponent pinned back, and Kroos almost
5:52always found a clean exit. That type of
5:54control cannot be replaced solely with
5:56physicality, legs, or individual
5:57quality. Camavinga arrived young and
5:59with an enormous capacity to carry the
6:01ball and recover it. Tchouaméni
6:02brought power, anticipation, and
6:04defensive presence. Valverde could
6:06cover ground like almost no one else.
6:09They all had very important virtues,
6:11but none were exactly what Kroos
6:13offered. Real Madrid rejuvenated the
6:16midfield, gained energy, range, and
6:18offensive capacity, but lost a clear
6:20reference point to manage matches. And
6:23that began to be noticed especially
6:25when facing an opponent that didn't
6:27allow them to run, because when Real
6:29Madrid finds space, Mbappé, Vinícius,
6:32Bellingham, or even Valverde himself
6:34can do a lot, a lot of damage. The
6:37problem arises when facing an organized
6:38block, when there is little space
6:40between the lines, and when it's time
6:41to move the opponent from side to side
6:43until finding a crack. There, the team
6:46often seems perhaps too direct. The
6:49club itself ended up understanding that
6:51something was missing, and that's why
6:53the search for Rodri appeared, a
6:55profile much closer to that figure
6:56capable of receiving, organizing, and
6:58giving sense to the midfield. But Rodri
7:01ended up going to Barcelona, and that
7:03move also makes it clear that inside
7:05Real Madrid, they knew that this void
7:07still existed. Later came Bernardo
7:10Silva, who did bring more associative
7:12capacity and interior creativity. But
7:14even with Bernardo, the problem doesn't
7:16disappear completely, because the
7:18midfielder with the ball also needs the
7:20rest of the team to help him. And this
7:23is where the second part of the problem
7:24begins. People sometimes talk about
7:26Real Madrid as if everything could be
7:28solved by signing a great playmaker,
7:30but if that player looks up and has
7:32three or four teammates ahead waiting
7:34for the ball at their feet, his job
7:36remains very difficult. That is exactly
7:38what often happens with this team.
7:42Valverde receives, Tchouaméni receives
7:43, Bernardo receives, and ahead appear
7:45Mbappé, Vinicius, and Bellingham, but
7:47they are too static, and this doesn't
7:49mean they stand still all game, but
7:50that there is a lack of coordinated
7:52movements to make passing easier. One
7:55drops back, but no one occupies the
7:56space they leave behind. One comes to
7:58support, but there is no run behind.
7:59One receives between the lines, but the
8:01others just wait. Thus, even an elite
8:03midfielder ends up playing in the most
8:05predictable way. That is why the
8:07problem cannot be reduced to "they're
8:09missing a Kroos." I mean, of course
8:11they lack a player with that kind of
8:12control, but they also need to build a
8:14context where that player can make the
8:16rest function. A very clear example is
8:18comparing what happens when Barcelona
8:20has the ball. One attacker drops,
8:22another attacks the back line, another
8:23switches zones. Pedri can receive and,
8:25upon looking up, have several options.
8:28The opponent has to decide who to
8:29follow. If they jump on one, another
8:31appears. If they protect one zone,
8:33another is freed up. And at Real Madrid
8:35, this happens much less frequently,
8:37and when movements are so predictable,
8:38the opponent can defend much more
8:40comfortably; they don't need to chase
8:42constantly, they can maintain their
8:43block, close interior zones, and wait
8:45for the ball to end up at the feet of
8:47one of the attackers. So, Real Madrid
8:50is left with two options: attempt an
8:52individual action or play backward.
8:54This is one of the reasons why the team
8:56can look very powerful against rivals
8:58who leave space, and much more
8:59uncomfortable when they have to
9:00dominate for long periods. The solution
9:03, therefore, cannot just be signing
9:04another man. Ancelotti needs to build
9:07mechanisms around the midfield. If
9:09Tchouaméni receives, someone has to
9:10get closer and another has to move away
9:12. If Bernardo drops to help Bellingham,
9:15he can occupy a higher zone. If Mbappé
9:18comes to receive, someone has to
9:19immediately attack the space he just
9:21vacated. These are simple movements to
9:24understand, but difficult to automate.
9:26And that is where training comes in.
9:27The best teams do not depend on every
9:29player improvising constantly. They
9:31have repetitive patterns. The players
9:34know what usually happens when someone
9:36moves to a certain zone. They don't
9:37need to look at each other for 5
9:39seconds to decide. They already know
9:40what the next option is. The current
9:42Real Madrid still often gives the
9:43opposite impression. There is a lot of
9:46talent, but each player seems to have
9:47to solve too many things on their own,
9:49which ends up hurting even the
9:50midfielders. Valverde ends up running
9:53to cover gaps. Tchouaméni has to leave
9:55his zone. Bellingham drops too deep to
9:57help with the buildup or in defense,
9:58and the more work they do outside their
10:00main role, the less presence they truly
10:02have where they can make a difference.
10:04Because of this, regaining control of
10:07the midfield doesn't just mean finding
10:09a new Kroos; it means rebuilding a team
10:11around a clear idea: who initiates, who
10:13offers support, who breaks lines, who
10:15occupies spaces, and who sets the tempo
10:17. If Mourinho achieves that,
10:20Tchouaméni will look better, Valverde
10:22will look better, Bellingham will have
10:23more options, and the forwards will
10:25receive the ball in more favorable
10:27situations. But for that to happen, the
10:30problem right in front of them must be
10:32solved, because a midfielder can have
10:33all the quality in the world, but if he
10:35looks up and nobody moves, the pass
10:37never appears. And that is precisely
10:40the next big problem for this Real
10:42Madrid: everything that happens when
10:43their stars don't have the ball. The
10:47problem in Real Madrid's midfield
10:49doesn't end with who receives the ball.
10:51In fact, it often starts right after,
10:54because you can have Bellingham,
10:56Valverde, or Tchouaméni ready to build
10:58the play, but if the players up top
11:00barely move when they look up, any
11:02midfielder looks much worse than they
11:04really are. And this is one of the
11:06things that happens most often in the
11:08current Real Madrid. When the team is
11:10in possession, too many players wait
11:12for the ball at their feet. Vinicius
11:13wants to receive in a specific zone,
11:15Mbappé drops into another very similar
11:17zone. Bellingham appears between the
11:20lines, but often those movements are
11:21not connected to each other. There is
11:23no one coming short while another goes
11:25long. There is no run that forces the
11:26opposing center-back to turn around.
11:28There is no player dragging a marker to
11:30free up another. And if no one forces
11:32the opponent to make decisions,
11:33defending becomes much simpler. That
11:36explains why Real Madrid can look
11:38spectacular when they have space ahead,
11:40yet suffer greatly when they have to
11:42attack a team that is well-organized.
11:45If the opponent pushes their lines up,
11:47they leave space in behind and allow
11:48Mbappé or Vinicius to run. Real Madrid
11:50can destroy you in seconds, but when
11:52the opponent packs their lines and
11:54forces them to build up, the team loses
11:55one of its greatest weapons. That’s
11:58when passes to feet, individual
11:59dribbles, and attempts to break down a
12:01static defense appear, and that’s
12:03where the attack becomes much more
12:04predictable. The matches against Inter
12:06and Atlético clearly illustrate that
12:08problem. In both cases, Real Madrid was
12:10unable to settle for long periods near
12:12the opponent's area and move them
12:13around until spaces were found. They
12:15could have phases with the ball, they
12:17could generate some transitions, and
12:19they could create danger thanks to the
12:21quality of their players, but they
12:22couldn't manage to truly pin the rival
12:24back. And that is important because
12:26dominating doesn't just mean having
12:28more possession. Dominating also means
12:31forcing the other team to defend closer
12:33and closer to their goal, making them
12:35chase the ball, constantly changing
12:36their defensive markers, and generating
12:38new passing lanes every few seconds.
12:41And Real Madrid often doesn't do that.
12:43If an attacker receives the ball at
12:45their feet, passes it back, and remains
12:47in the same spot, the opponent
12:48practically doesn't have to readjust.
12:50If Mbappé drops deep, but no one
12:52attacks the space he just left, his
12:54movement loses much of its effect. If
12:56Bellingham comes back to help with the
12:58build-up, but no teammate occupies his
13:00more advanced position, Real Madrid
13:02gains a short pass but loses a lot of
13:04presence up top. The reality is that
13:06everything is connected. That’s why
13:09comparing them to Barcelona helps
13:10understand the difference; not because
13:12their style must be copied exactly, but
13:14because their players constantly
13:15generate new solutions around the ball.
13:18One drops deep, another breaks forward,
13:20one switches flanks, a fourth appears
13:22between center-back and fullback. The
13:24ball carrier is never seeing the exact
13:25same picture, and that’s what makes
13:27defending against a mobile team so
13:29difficult. Raphinha can start out wide
13:31and finish inside the box. Pedri can
13:33receive deep and appear seconds later
13:35near the edge of the area. A winger can
13:37drop back while another player fills
13:38their space. The opponent has to
13:40continually decide whether to track
13:42those runs or, alternatively, hold
13:44their position. Every decision can open
13:46a crack for Real Madrid to exploit.
13:47Instead, too many plays end up offering
13:49the opponent much simpler defensive
13:51assignments. Mbappé, Vinícius, and
13:53Bellingham are extraordinary players
13:55with the ball, but precisely for that
13:57reason, they need to receive it in
13:58conditions where they can do damage,
14:00not always surrounded by two defenders
14:02and standing still. And here, a
14:04striking statistic also appears. Real
14:05Madrid ranks as the team in the league
14:07that covers the fewest kilometers,
14:09while Barcelona appears among those
14:10that cover the most. And this doesn't
14:12automatically mean that running more is
14:14playing better. That would be too
14:16simple. There are teams that cover many
14:18kilometers because they spend much of
14:20the match chasing the ball. But in this
14:22case, the data aligns with what we see.
14:23Barcelona constantly moves its players
14:26around the pressure. Madrid has much
14:29more static phases, and moving to offer
14:31a pass, breaking into space, swapping
14:33positions, or supporting a play also
14:35adds up the kilometers. Not all running
14:37is for defending. In fact, one of the
14:39most important solutions for Mourinho
14:41might lie precisely there. Getting his
14:43attackers to run more when Real Madrid
14:45has the ball. Not necessarily faster,
14:48but more intelligently. If Vinicius
14:50comes inside, someone must occupy the
14:51wing. If Mbappé drops back, Bellingham
14:54can attack the box. If Bellingham
14:56approaches the midfield, one of the
14:58wingers must take advantage of the
14:59space he leaves. If Bernardo receives
15:02between the lines, he immediately needs
15:04a run ahead and another support option
15:06behind. That is how automatisms are
15:08built. It's not about turning players
15:11into robots, it's about having a
15:12collective reaction to every movement,
15:14because right now too many plays seem
15:16to depend on the same question: what
15:18can this player invent? And great teams
15:21work in a different way. The question,
15:23instead, should be: what movement will
15:25trigger the next one? That is, probably
15:28, one of the biggest tasks Mourinho has
15:30: getting Real Madrid's talent to stop
15:32living in separate actions and start
15:34connecting. Because as long as players
15:37keep waiting too much for the ball at
15:39their feet, any midfielder will have
15:40few options, any opposing defense will
15:42be able to maintain its structure, and
15:44Real Madrid will continue to need a
15:46star to break the game open on their
15:48own. And if the problem with the ball
15:50is that many players don't move enough,
15:52there is an even more dangerous
15:53consequence when the ball is lost. That
15:55those same attackers who don't generate
15:57enough offensive movements also have an
16:00enormous responsibility in the first
16:02second of defense. Another of Real
16:06Madrid's big problems appears when we
16:08try to answer a question that on paper
16:10should be simple: where does each star
16:12play? Because Real Madrid has players
16:15like Mbappé, Vinicius, Bellingham,
16:17Rodrygo, Güler, or even Brahim,
16:18players with enough quality to decide
16:20any match, but when you start placing
16:22their ideal positions on the field, too
16:24many overlaps appear. Mbappé feels
16:27especially comfortable attacking from
16:29the left toward the center. Vinicius
16:31needs that same exact sector to receive
16:33, take on defenders, and accelerate.
16:35Bellingham also tends to appear in
16:37interior zones near the box. Arda needs
16:39freedom between the lines, and when
16:41several players need similar spaces to
16:43offer their best version, the coach has
16:45to make decisions. That was one of Xabi
16:48Alonso's biggest problems. He arrived
16:50at Real Madrid after building an
16:52extremely recognizable team at
16:53Leverkusen, with a very clear structure
16:56, movements, and positions. However,
16:58when he got to Real Madrid, he used 15
17:00different formations in 19 league
17:02matches. And that doesn't seem like the
17:04behavior of a coach who doesn't know
17:05what he wants. It seems more like the
17:08consequence of constantly trying to fit
17:10together pieces that don't quite
17:11combine naturally. Because Leverkusen
17:14had players adapted to an idea. At Real
17:16Madrid, on the other hand, it happens
17:18almost in reverse. You have
17:19extraordinary players and then you have
17:21to invent an idea that allows you to
17:23fit them all in. And this nuance
17:24changes things significantly. The most
17:26obvious example is Vinicius and Mbappé
17:28. For a long time, a very simple image
17:30has been used to explain the problem.
17:32Their heat maps appear in similar zones
17:34and therefore they get in each other's
17:36way. And the truth is that this needs
17:38certain nuances. The fact that they
17:39both appear on the left many times
17:41doesn't necessarily mean they are
17:43occupying exactly the same space at the
17:45same time. When Mbappé drifts wide,
17:47Vinicius can tuck inside. Conversely,
17:48when Vinicius receives out wide,
17:50Mbappé can appear closer to the box.
17:52The real problem isn't that they are
17:54both physically in the same spot. The
17:55problem is that both find many of their
17:57best actions starting from very similar
17:59areas. And when you have two stars who
18:01prefer to start from the left, someone
18:03has to start giving in. And there,
18:05Mourinho has several possibilities. One
18:07is to keep Mbappé as a striker, but
18:09give him the freedom to drift toward
18:10that flank. While Vinicius alternates
18:13in more interior positions. Another
18:15would be to use Mbappé directly from
18:17the left in certain matches, taking
18:18advantage of his speed and his ability
18:20to attack inside. Although I must say
18:22that, personally, I don't see Mbappé
18:24on the left; this isn't FIFA. But then
18:25another question arises: what do you do
18:27with Vinicius? This debate also exists
18:29because his start to the season hasn't
18:30been particularly brilliant. In fact,
18:32there is a possibility that Mourinho
18:34makes a tough decision regarding him,
18:35leaving him out of the starting 11 in
18:37certain games. But if this were to
18:38happen, it wouldn't mean that Vinicius
18:40has stopped being important. It would
18:42mean that, for the first time, the
18:44lineup would be built by thinking first
18:45about the collective functioning and
18:47then about the hierarchy. And making
18:50this change would be something huge,
18:51because for years Real Madrid has tried
18:53to put its best players together and
18:54then find a solution around them. But
18:57maybe Mourinho needs to do the exact
18:58opposite: decide what structure the
19:00team needs and then choose which
19:02players fit best within it. And even
19:04seeing Vinicius's level this season, it
19:05doesn't mean that taking him out of the
19:07starting 11 will make them play better,
19:09but simply that right now, he might not
19:10be ready to start. And mind you, I’ve
19:12been an ultra-fan of Vinicius forever.
19:13I would start him in every match, but
19:15if he isn't playing well, maybe he
19:16needs to be taken out of the 11 for
19:17Real Madrid to improve. And that’s
19:19exactly where Diomande comes in, a
19:20player who can offer something that is
19:22very valuable right now. A real threat
19:24on the right side. If Mbappé or
19:26Vinicius draw opponents to the left,
19:27having an aggressive player attacking
19:29the opposite wing can open up the pitch
19:31significantly. And then there’s Arda
19:33Güler, probably one of the players who
19:35complicates any experiment the most.
19:38Although if you play Mbappé on the
19:39left, Diomande on the right, and
19:41Bellingham near the box during the
19:42match, you still have to find a
19:43suitable spot for Arda. One possibility
19:46would be to use him as an attacking
19:48midfielder behind the forwards. Another
19:50would be to have him start from a more
19:51interior position, but then the number
19:53of players wanting to receive in
19:54central zones increases even more. And
19:56this is where Bellingham comes in. His
19:58first season at Real Madrid showed that
20:00he can appear much higher up than a
20:02midfielder normally would. He has a
20:04knack for goal, knows how to attack the
20:06box, and understands very well when to
20:07show up near the striker. On the
20:09whiteboard, it might look strange, but
20:11within a match, it can happen quite
20:13naturally. Real Madrid doesn't need its
20:15players to stay glued to one position
20:18for 90 minutes. What it needs is for
20:20those exchanges to make some sense. If
20:22Mbappé leaves the center, someone must
20:24occupy it. If Bellingham gets to the
20:26box, another midfielder has to provide
20:28balance behind him. If Diomande
20:30maintains width on the right, the
20:32full-back doesn't always need to push
20:34up to the same area. This kind of
20:36distribution can solve several problems
20:38at once, but it requires one thing that
20:40is probably more important than any
20:42formation: accepting that not everyone
20:44can do exactly what they like most.
20:46Mbappé might have to play some matches
20:48more centrally than he would like.
20:50Vinicius might have to accept having
20:52fewer minutes at the start or playing
20:54in slightly different positions.
20:55Bellingham might need to leave certain
20:58areas to occupy others. Arda might have
21:00to participate from a different
21:01position depending on the opponent,
21:03although Arda is the one moved around
21:04the most, and that is precisely what
21:05building a team is. But the problem
21:08isn't having too many stars; the
21:10problem appears when every star needs
21:12the team to fully adapt to them. And
21:14Mourinho now has an opportunity that
21:16other coaches didn't quite manage to
21:17take advantage of. To stop looking for
21:20a formation that fits everyone in and
21:21start looking for a formation that
21:23allows Real Madrid to function. But
21:25that decision has an inevitable
21:26consequence. If some players are going
21:28to lose freedom on the ball, they are
21:30also going to have to take on much more
21:32responsibility when Real Madrid loses
21:34it. And that is where we get into an
21:36even more delicate problem: how much do
21:38Vinicius and Mbappé actually defend?
21:42If there is a point where the debate
21:44about Vinicius and Mbappé stops being
21:46a matter of positions and starts
21:47becoming a collective problem, it is
21:49exactly when Real Madrid loses the ball
21:51. Because it is one thing to argue
21:53about whether Mbappé should play
21:55inside or from the left, if Vinicius
21:56needs more freedom, or even if
21:58Bellingham needs to appear closer to
21:59the box. And it is quite another thing
22:02to ask what happens in the exact second
22:03when the attack ends and the defense
22:05begins. That is where Real Madrid has a
22:07big problem. Modern football demands
22:09that practically everyone participates
22:11in the initial reaction after losing
22:12possession, and this does not mean a
22:14forward has to chase the opposing
22:15full-back for 90 minutes. It means that
22:17when the ball is lost, the team needs
22:19an immediate and certainly coordinated
22:21response. And this does not always
22:23happen at Real Madrid. Vinicius and
22:24Mbappé are two of the most dangerous
22:26players in the world when they find
22:28space. That is why Real Madrid often
22:30accepts that they spend less energy in
22:32certain phases to try to decide things
22:34up front later on. The problem is that
22:36one exception can work. Two, however,
22:38are much harder to hide. If Mbappé
22:41doesn't pounce quickly on the first
22:43pass and Vinicius doesn't manage to
22:44cover his zone either, the opponent can
22:46beat the first line too easily. Then,
22:48the midfield has to scramble backward.
22:51The full-backs start defending
22:53outnumbered situations and the
22:54center-backs hesitate between stepping
22:55up or dropping back. An action that
22:58seems to start with a forward not
23:00pressing ends up disrupting the rest of
23:02the players. The example of Cucurella
23:03helps a lot to understand this. Over
23:05several matches he has been singled out
23:07because his flank has suffered a lot,
23:09but often the problem starts a few
23:10meters ahead. If Vinicius tracks back
23:12late, the opponent can generate a
23:14two-on-one on that side. Cucurella has
23:16to decide whether to step up to the
23:17player with the ball or protect the one
23:19appearing out wide. If he steps out, he
23:20leaves space behind, and if he waits,
23:22he allows them to advance. Then he has
23:24to abandon the center to go and help
23:25him. And as soon as Tchouaméni steps
23:27out, another space opens up inside. In
23:29the end, the fullback appears in the
23:31snapshot of the problem, but the play
23:33was already broken long before the ball
23:35reached him. And this explains why
23:37simply changing the fullback wouldn't
23:39solve much. Real Madrid already
23:41suffered similar situations with other
23:43players on that flank. If the winger's
23:45help doesn't arrive and the midfielder
23:47has to constantly shift, any fullback
23:48is going to look more vulnerable than
23:50they actually are. And this connects
23:52directly to Mbappé. His goal-scoring
23:55numbers may be extraordinary, yet a
23:56debate about his collective impact
23:58remains. Scoring two goals is very
24:00important, but if the team concedes
24:02three because they defensively lose
24:04players in every transition, the
24:05analysis cannot be limited to counting
24:07goals. It’s not about blaming Mbappé
24:10for every goal conceded, but about
24:11understanding that the forward is also
24:12part of that defensive structure. The
24:15attacker is often the first one who
24:17decides where the opponent can play. If
24:19Mbappé directs the pressure well, he
24:21can force the center-back to play
24:22toward the wing. If Vinicius correctly
24:24closes off the next line, the opponent
24:26can be left without an easy outlet.
24:28Then, Valverde or Tchouaméni can
24:30anticipate and recover the ball much
24:31further up the pitch. But if that first
24:33movement doesn't exist, everything that
24:35follows becomes much more complicated.
24:37Here, the comparison with Raphinha is
24:39very useful. Raphinha can appear
24:41practically as a striker when Barcelona
24:43attacks and, seconds later, be one of
24:45the first players to run to recover the
24:47ball again. It’s not important just
24:50because he runs a lot. What’s
24:52important is that his effort allows the
24:54team to maintain a very aggressive
24:56structure. If the forwards press, the
24:58midfield can advance, and if the
25:00midfield advances, the defense can push
25:02up. And if everyone moves up together,
25:04the space available to the opponent is
25:05significantly reduced. This is exactly
25:07what Real Madrid needs to improve
25:09because right now, Bellingham ends up
25:10paying for many of those deficiencies.
25:13Jude drops back to help the fullback,
25:15covers an outlet, chases a second ball,
25:16or tries to correct a late press; and
25:18every time he does that work, Real
25:20Madrid loses Bellingham in that other
25:22zone. He cannot be protecting the flank
25:25and at the same time be prepared to
25:26arrive in the box. Nor can he correct
25:29the forwards' pressure and appear five
25:31seconds later as an offensive support.
25:33That is why the solution shouldn't be
25:35asking for even more effort from
25:36Bellingham, Valverde, or Tchouaméni.
25:38The simplest solution is to distribute
25:40the effort. Ancelotti needs to
25:42establish a simple rule. When Real
25:44Madrid loses the ball, everyone has a
25:46responsibility. It can make a
25:48difference if Mbappé doesn't need to
25:50cover the exact same ground as Valverde
25:52; Vinicius doesn't have to become a
25:53fullback, but they must participate in
25:55the initial action to allow the team to
25:57reorganize. 5 meters well-covered
26:00immediately after losing the ball can
26:02save a 40-meter run later. Furthermore,
26:05there is an important offensive
26:06consequence. The better a team recovers
26:08the ball, the better attacks it can
26:09generate. If Real Madrid steals the
26:11ball near the opponent's box, Mbappé
26:12and Vinicius will receive it against
26:14disorganized defenses. In other words,
26:15working more without the ball can end
26:17up helping them score more. That is why
26:19this debate should not be framed as
26:21talent versus sacrifice. There is no
26:22need to choose between Mbappé scoring
26:24or defending. The idea is to build a
26:25system where his defensive work allows
26:27him to receive the ball later in better
26:29conditions. Because Real Madrid doesn't
26:32need 11 players running aimlessly, it
26:33needs 11 players reacting together, and
26:35as long as the front line doesn't do
26:36its part, the rest of the team will
26:38continue to suffer the same domino
26:39effect. The fullback steps out, the
26:42pivot leaves his zone, the center-backs
26:44drop back, and the team splits. And
26:46that leads us directly to the next
26:47problem, because when the initial
26:49pressure fails, the defense has to
26:50decide whether to push up or drop back.
26:53And right now, Real Madrid seems not to
26:55be completely convinced of either. Real
27:00Madrid has a problem that is especially
27:02clear when it tries to defend by
27:04pressing forward: it can't quite decide
27:06if it wants to press higher up or
27:07protect itself further back. And when a
27:10team hesitates between the two, it
27:12usually ends up doing neither well. The
27:14idea of pressing high seems logical.
27:16Real Madrid has fast, strong players
27:18capable of recovering the ball near the
27:21rival area. If they manage to steal it
27:23high up, Mbappé, Vinicius, Bellingham,
27:24or even Brahim can attack a
27:26disorganized defense. The problem
27:28arises when that pressure is not
27:30coordinated. If the forward jumps but
27:32the winger doesn't follow, the opponent
27:34finds an exit. If the midfielder moves
27:36forward but the defense doesn't push up
27:38, a huge space appears behind them. And
27:40if the defense drops back because it
27:42fears the first line will be broken,
27:43the team stretches even further. And
27:45this is exactly what is happening many
27:47times. The center-backs seem to have a
27:49constant doubt. They know the team
27:51wants to recover the ball high up, but
27:53also that the initial pressure isn't
27:55always reliable. So, they don't quite
27:57push forward with determination, but
27:58rather stay halfway, waiting to see
28:00what happens. And that second of
28:02hesitation is enough to break the whole
28:04structure, because the midfield may
28:05have indeed jumped. Bellingham may be
28:08higher up. Chaí can pressure a rival.
28:11Valverde can join the press, but if the
28:13defensive line doesn't move up with
28:15them, the opponent receives the ball in
28:17between and has plenty of room to turn.
28:20That's where Real Madrid stops being a
28:21single block. It turns into several
28:23separate lines defending different
28:25situations at the same time. That is
28:27why the big problem isn't simply that
28:29Real Madrid defends poorly, the problem
28:31is they don't always defend together.
28:33Flix's Barcelona serves once again as a
28:35contrast because their defensive line
28:37plays very high for a reason. They
28:39don't do it only because their
28:41center-backs are fast or because they
28:42want to take risks. They do it because
28:44the whole team tries to shrink the
28:45field. The forwards press, the
28:47midfielders move up, and the defense
28:49follows. If the opponent tries to play
28:51out, every pass is made with less space
28:53and less time. At Real Madrid, however,
28:56the pressure often starts up top, but
28:58the last line doesn't fully believe in
29:00it. And it's easy to see why. If
29:02Mbappé is late, or if Vinicius doesn't
29:03cover his zone, or if the midfield
29:05doesn't block the next passing lane,
29:07pushing the center-backs up means
29:09leaving a lot of open ground behind
29:10them, and no defender wants to live in
29:12that situation constantly. This is why
29:14they start to drop back. The problem is
29:16that the more they drop back, the more
29:18distance they leave with the
29:19midfielders, and the more distance
29:20there is between the defense and the
29:22midfield, the easier it becomes for the
29:23opponent to find players between the
29:25lines. Then the vicious cycle begins.
29:27The defense doesn't push up because
29:28they don't trust the pressure. The
29:30pressure works worse because the
29:31defense doesn't push up, the opponent
29:33finds space, and Real Madrid has to run
29:35backward. Every time this happens, the
29:37next play is defended with even more
29:39fear. This helps explain why players
29:41used to defending aggressively in other
29:44teams can look very different when they
29:46arrive at Real Madrid. Dinhausen has
29:48played in contexts where he could set
29:49up very high. Kucure is used to
29:51occupying aggressive zones. Danfris can
29:54practically become a winger, but if the
29:56entire block doesn't support him, those
29:59traits stop being an advantage and
30:01become a risk. You can't ask a
30:03full-back to push up 30 meters if no
30:05one is protecting his back afterward.
30:07You also can't ask a center-back to
30:08step into midfield if he knows the
30:10opposing striker can receive the ball
30:11cleanly behind the initial pressure.
30:13That is why Mourinho has to make a
30:15decision. Either Madrid truly becomes a
30:17high-pressing team or they accept that,
30:19for certain matches, they need to
30:21defend more compactly a few meters
30:22further back. And both options can work
30:25. What definitely doesn't work is
30:27staying exactly in the middle. If you
30:29decide to press high, everyone has to
30:30take on the risk. Mbappé must guide
30:33the exit, the wingers have to close off
30:35lanes, the midfield has to push up, and
30:37the center-backs have to play near the
30:39halfway line. If one fails, the whole
30:41idea starts to fall apart. The other
30:43possibility is much more pragmatic.
30:46Mourinho can bring the team into a
30:47mid-block, reduce the space between
30:48defense and midfield, and force the
30:50rival to advance into areas where Real
30:51Madrid is ready to steal the ball. Then
30:54, with Mbappé, Vinicius, or Diomande,
30:56attack the appearing spaces quickly.
30:58This would sacrifice part of the high
31:00press, but it could give the team
31:01something it needs right now. Security.
31:03The derby showed to what extent that
31:05security can disappear. When Real
31:07Madrid went down to 10 men, they had to
31:09reorganize quickly. A well-drilled team
31:11can lose a player and still have a
31:12recognizable structure. Two lines
31:14closer together, fewer risks, and a
31:16clear idea of how to exit, but Real
31:18Madrid couldn't manage it. It ended up
31:20generating barely 0.32 expected goals
31:23all match, the club's lowest figure in
31:26a league game since February 2015. The
31:28red card explains a part, but it
31:30doesn't explain why the team was unable
31:32to construct a collective response. And
31:34this is the real problem. When
31:36something breaks the initial plan,
31:38Madrid still relies too much on
31:39individual solutions, and Mourinho
31:41needs to achieve exactly the opposite:
31:43for the team to know what to do even
31:45when the game changes. Because
31:47defending well doesn't mean putting
31:49more players back, but rather that
31:51everyone is separated by a few meters,
31:53knowing when to advance, when to wait,
31:54and which space belongs to whom. If
31:57Mourinho manages to reduce those
31:59distances, he will also make
32:00Tchouaméni, Valverde, and Bellingham
32:02better, because right now they are the
32:04ones who have to run to close the holes
32:06left between one line and the other.
32:08And that is precisely the next problem.
32:11Why is a midfield built around such
32:13physical players still unable to
32:14control everything happening around
32:16them? Real Madrid's next big problem is
32:21in an area that on paper should be one
32:23of their greatest strengths: the
32:24midfield. Tchouaméni, Valverde, and
32:27Bellingham have enormous physical
32:29conditions; they can run, recover, and
32:31cover a lot of ground. The problem is
32:33that precisely because they are so
32:35complete, the team ends up using them
32:36to constantly put out fires. And when a
32:39midfielder has to do three jobs at once
32:41, they end up doing all three jobs
32:43worse. Valverde is probably the best
32:45example. Over the last few years, he
32:47has played as an interior, winger,
32:49central midfielder, or even a
32:50right-back in important matches. And
32:53this speaks very well of him because it
32:54shows he can adapt to almost any role.
32:57But it also says something very
32:58concerning about the team. Every time a
33:00hole appears, the solution ends up
33:02being to send Valverde there. If there
33:04is a lack of balance on the right,
33:05Valverde drops back. If the fullback
33:07needs help, Valverde appears. If the
33:09team loses energy in the center,
33:10Valverde runs. And if a different
33:12position needs covering, he is again
33:14the first to be moved, and that turns
33:16one of the team's best midfielders into
33:17a sort of permanent patch. The problem
33:20is that while Valverde is fixing one
33:22thing, Real Madrid loses everything he
33:24could be doing elsewhere. The same
33:26happens with Bellingham. He has arrival
33:28, ball-carrying ability, the capacity
33:29to receive between the lines, and an
33:31enormous ease for appearing near the
33:33box. His first season at Real Madrid
33:35showed he can make a difference
33:37arriving from behind, but now he often
33:39ends up dropping too far from the goal.
33:42He drops to close down a flank, helps a
33:44fullback, corrects a press that another
33:46player missed, chases a second ball,
33:47and then tries to get forward when Real
33:49Madrid recovers possession. And
33:51obviously, it is impossible to be
33:53everywhere at once. And the more
33:54defensive work he does outside his zone
33:56, the less he appears where he can
33:58truly do damage. That is one of the
34:00problems. The hardest-working players
34:02end up paying for those who participate
34:04the least. Instead of using Bellingham
34:07to enhance his virtues, the team often
34:08uses him to cover up the weaknesses of
34:10others. And then we reach Tchouaméni.
34:14The Frenchman has perfect conditions to
34:15protect the center, win duels, and
34:17anticipate, but the double pivot he
34:19often forms with Valverde can end up
34:21being too flat. Both have the
34:23physicality, both can cover ground,
34:25both can recover the ball, but when the
34:27team is stretched too thin, not even
34:28two players like that can cover
34:30everything. This is really the
34:33important detail. It doesn't matter how
34:35much you run if you have to defend an
34:36enormous amount of field every time the
34:38opponent beats the first press. You can
34:40get there once or twice, but sooner or
34:41later someone appears free. That is why
34:43Tchouaméni often seems forced to leave
34:45his zone. If he helps on the left, he
34:47leaves a space inside. If he stays
34:49protecting the center, the fullback can
34:51be left exposed. If he advances to
34:53press, he leaves space behind. And once
34:55again, the same idea appears. Whatever
34:57he does, there is another zone left
34:58uncovered. And that is why perhaps the
35:01debate shouldn't be whether he is good
35:03enough, but whether the context is
35:04allowing him to play his best. One
35:06possibility would be to use him perhaps
35:09as a single pivot, and this might sound
35:11riskier, but it isn't necessarily so.
35:14If he has central midfielders around
35:15him who track back to help, wingers who
35:17work hard, and a defense that plays
35:19closer, Tchouaméni could control a
35:20smaller zone and have clearer
35:21references. On the other hand, when he
35:24plays in a double pivot but the team
35:26remains disjointed, the presence of
35:28another midfielder doesn't
35:29automatically solve the problem,
35:30because two poorly protected players
35:32remain poorly protected. And this is
35:34where a possible solution for Mourinho
35:36comes in. Instead of thinking first
35:38about how many midfielders to field, he
35:40should think about the exact role each
35:41one has. Tchouaméni can be the player
35:44who guards the team's back. Valverde
35:46can act as an interior, with the
35:48freedom to go back and forth, but
35:49without having to constantly turn into
35:51a full-back. Bellingham should appear
35:53further up, near the areas where he can
35:55receive, drive, and reach the box. And
35:57Brahim or Arda can help connect the
35:59play on the inside. And this would
36:02allow each player to do fewer things,
36:04but do those things much better,
36:06because right now Real Madrid falls too
36:08short. When they try to cover up top,
36:10they leave gaps at the back. The thing
36:11is, when Bellingham drops back to
36:12correct, he loses offensive presence.
36:14When Valverde moves wide to help the
36:15full-back, there is a lack of someone
36:17inside. When Tchouaméni leaves the
36:19center to cover a flank, a space
36:21appears right in front of the
36:22center-backs, and obviously, it's
36:24impossible to maintain balance like
36:26that for 90 minutes. The solution
36:28doesn't consist of asking them to run
36:29even more. It is probably just the
36:31opposite. We must ensure they have to
36:33run less to fix mistakes. A
36:35well-positioned team allows players to
36:37arrive sooner without needing to cover
36:39more ground. If the distances are small
36:42and everyone knows where they should be
36:43, Tchouaméni doesn't need to chase
36:45someone for 20 meters. Valverde
36:48wouldn't have to appear in three
36:49different positions and Bellingham
36:50wouldn't need to drop to the full-back
36:52spot to fix a play, and this would also
36:54allow us to see a much more dangerous
36:55version of all three. Valverde would
36:59have more energy to break forward,
37:00Bellingham would reach the box more
37:02often, and even Tchouaméni could focus
37:04on recovering and giving continuity to
37:06the play, because Real Madrid's
37:08midfield doesn't need more individual
37:10effort, it needs fewer emergencies.
37:13This forces Mourinho once again to make
37:15an important decision: to stop using
37:17his midfielders as a solution for the
37:19team's problems and start building a
37:20structure that also helps them. But
37:23there is an even more uncomfortable
37:25question. If four different coaches
37:28have ended up facing very, very similar
37:30problems, to what extent can Mourinho
37:32fix that solely with a tactical board?
37:35Because perhaps the next obstacle isn't
37:37tactical anymore; perhaps it’s about
37:39who truly holds the power to make
37:41decisions within Real Madrid. If there
37:45is one thing that makes the situation
37:47at Real Madrid especially concerning,
37:48it’s that the problem hasn't
37:50disappeared by changing the coach. And
37:52we aren't talking about similar coaches
37:54, but rather profiles that are quite
37:56distinct, with very different ideas and
37:57opposite ways of managing a locker room
37:59. Ancelotti represented experience,
38:02calmness, and a way of governing the
38:04team based on trust. Xabi Alonso
38:06arrived with a much more structured
38:07proposal and a more distinct identity.
38:10Arbeloa appeared as an insider, someone
38:12who knew the club and the locker room,
38:14and Mourinho arrived as an authority
38:15figure to specifically impose order
38:17where previous coaches had failed to
38:19stabilize the team. Four different
38:22solutions to a problem that, to this
38:24day, keeps coming back. And this forces
38:26us to ask an uncomfortable question. If
38:28you change the coach and the team
38:30continues to fall in a very similar way
38:31, to what extent was the coach really
38:33the main problem? Xabi Alonso is
38:36probably the best example. He arrived
38:38after building a recognizable team in
38:40Leverkusen with a clear idea and a
38:41well-worked structure, but at Real
38:43Madrid, he ended up constantly changing
38:45the formation and adapting week after
38:47week. And as we’ve said, that doesn't
38:49fit the image of a coach who arrives to
38:51impose a single system. It fits much
38:53better with someone trying to find a
38:55way to fit in all the best players you
38:56have without breaking the balance. And
38:59then the problem of hierarchies
39:00appeared. In a Clásico at the
39:02Bernabéu, Xabi Alonso substituted
39:04Vinicius in the second half while Real
39:06Madrid was winning—on paper, a
39:07completely normal decision. The problem
39:09was everything that came after.
39:11Vinicius didn't stay on the bench; he
39:13went straight to the tunnel and took
39:15his anger over the decision inside the
39:17club. Days later, he publicly
39:19apologized to his teammates, the club,
39:21and the fans, but in this statement, he
39:23did not mention the coach. And this
39:26detail is important not because it
39:27alone proves that Vinicius had more
39:29power than Xabi, but because it shows
39:31the environment in which a coach has to
39:33make decisions. If taking off a star
39:35during a game you are winning becomes a
39:37huge conflict, any coach knows that
39:39every substitution has a cost that goes
39:41beyond football. Xavi was fired months
39:44later after losing the Super Cup to
39:45Barcelona, and honestly, we cannot
39:47reduce his departure to just that
39:49episode because Xavi Alonso was also
39:51having poor results and the season had
39:53lost a lot of stability. But that
39:55episode helps to understand part of the
39:57problem. At Real Madrid, some sporting
39:59decisions can immediately turn into
40:01political decisions. Then Arbeloa
40:04arrived, and the theory seemed
40:05completely different. If there was
40:08already a system-based coach who hadn't
40:10quite clicked with the locker room,
40:12perhaps the solution was someone who
40:13knew the club, the players, and
40:15everything surrounding the team
40:16perfectly. Arbeloa was exactly that. He
40:20had been a Real Madrid player and had
40:21been within the club's structure for
40:23years, but he still couldn't prevent
40:24problems from appearing. The team was
40:27eliminated from the Copa del Rey
40:28against Albacete, a second-division
40:30team, just a few days after his arrival
40:32. Later on, the locker room itself also
40:35experienced certain internal tensions,
40:37and at the end of that season, Arbeloa
40:38also left. In other words, the problem
40:41was solved neither by the external
40:43coach who wanted to impose a structure,
40:45nor by the internal coach who knew the
40:46house perfectly. That is why Mourinho
40:49represents the third attempt. If the
40:50system didn't work and closeness didn't
40:52either, the next idea was to establish
40:54authority. Mourinho arrives with a
40:56reputation built precisely around that.
41:00Tough decisions, high demands,
41:01discipline, and the ability to manage
41:03very complicated locker rooms. And he
41:06also knows perfectly well what it means
41:08to confront a star at Real Madrid. In
41:10his first stint, he already experienced
41:12a huge conflict when he left Iker
41:13Casillas out and opted for Diego López
41:15. The locker room was divided, part of
41:17the stadium turned against him, and
41:18Mourinho ended up leaving the club at
41:19the end of that season. That is why
41:22they now know better than anyone what
41:23it can cost to challenge a hierarchy.
41:25And that is where the big question
41:27arises. Does Mourinho have real freedom
41:29to do so? Because it is one thing to
41:32hire Mourinho to try to impose
41:33authority and quite another to back him
41:35when that authority affects an
41:37important player. If he decides to
41:40bench Vinicius for a month because he
41:42believes the team works better that way
41:43, will the club accept the noise? If he
41:46considers that Mbappé has to take on a
41:48different role, will he have the room
41:49to demand it? If another star has to
41:52lose minutes, will the backing hold
41:53firm when the criticism arrives? That
41:56is where a large part of this project
41:58may be decided, because if the coach
42:00can only change the tactics but cannot
42:01touch the hierarchies, his real margin
42:03for maneuver is much smaller than it
42:05seems. The thing is, Real Madrid can
42:08change coaches over and over again, but
42:10if the squad and the internal rules
42:11remain the same, every manager ends up
42:13running into very similar limits.
42:17Mourinho can change the system, demand
42:19more intensity, modify the press, play
42:20Tchouaméni alone, push Bellingham
42:22further up, or use Mbappé from a
42:24different area; but if there comes a
42:26time when the best tactical decision is
42:28to bench a star, he needs to know he
42:30can do so without automatically risking
42:32his project, because that might be the
42:33step that none of the previous coaches
42:35could fully complete. And if Mourinho
42:39can't do it either, then Real Madrid
42:41won't have a coaching problem, they
42:42will have an authority problem, which
42:44brings us to the next part, because if
42:46the club really decides to give him
42:48that power, the question is no longer
42:49who should play. And the question
42:52becomes what kind of team can Mourinho
42:55build right now with the pieces he has.
43:00If Mourinho truly has the freedom to
43:02tinker with the team, then the next
43:03question is quite simple. What can he
43:06do right now? Because it is one thing
43:08to talk about the ideal Real Madrid,
43:10which could be built in two seasons,
43:12and something very different to solve
43:13the problems it has today. And there,
43:16Mourinho will probably have to be more
43:18pragmatic than romantic. This Real
43:20Madrid has one very clear
43:21characteristic. When it finds space, it
43:23can be devastating. Mbappé is one of
43:25the most dangerous players in the world
43:27when attacking open space. Vinícius
43:29too. Diomandé can do a lot of damage
43:30from the right wing. Bellingham has a
43:33huge capacity to cover ground and
43:34arrive from deep. Valverde can carry
43:36the ball and break lines, and Bernardo
43:38Silva can connect all of that with more
43:40composure. In other words, Real Madrid
43:42has perfect weapons to do damage when
43:44the game opens up. So, perhaps the
43:46first step shouldn't be to immediately
43:48try to turn the team into a possession
43:50machine. Perhaps the first step is to
43:52enhance what they already do well.
43:54Mourinho can build a more compact Real
43:56Madrid, protect the center better,
43:58defend a few meters deeper, and then
43:59attack with great speed upon recovering
44:01the ball. And this doesn't mean locking
44:04themselves in at all; it means choosing
44:05better where you want to win the ball
44:07back. There is a huge difference
44:08between defending deep because you have
44:10no other choice and defending in a
44:11block prepared to launch an attack.
44:14Mourinho has built teams like that
44:16throughout his career, teams that don't
44:18need 65%possession to control what
44:19happens, because controlling a game
44:21doesn't always mean having the ball
44:23more. You can also control where the
44:26opponent plays from, which area you
44:27force them to advance into, and what
44:29happens when you win it back. This
44:31could be the starting point. If Real
44:33Madrid defends with lines close
44:34together, Tchouaméni will have less
44:36ground to cover. Valverde will be able
44:38to anticipate much more. Bellingham
44:40wouldn't have to constantly chase
44:42players away from his zone, and the
44:43center-backs could defend with less
44:45space behind them. And the fact is,
44:47when the recovery comes, the advantages
44:49will appear. Mbappé and Vinicius
44:50wouldn't always have to receive the
44:52ball with a set defense in front of
44:53them. They could attack opponents who
44:55are still open after having tried to
44:57push forward. And that is exactly where
44:59they are much more dangerous. In fact,
45:02this Real Madrid has enough fast
45:03players with individual quality to
45:05become one of the most dangerous
45:07transition teams in Europe. But there
45:09is a small problem. This model can work
45:12very well in certain matches,
45:14especially in Champions League games.
45:16In a European knockout tie, you don't
45:18need to dominate for 90 minutes to win.
45:20You can defend well, wait for the right
45:22moment, and decide the match in
45:23practically three actions. Mourinho
45:26knows these types of matches perfectly,
45:27but a full season demands something
45:29more, because in La Liga there will be
45:31many rivals who don't want to attack
45:32Real Madrid, teams that will simply
45:34hand them the ball, and there you can't
45:35wait for a transition because it's just
45:37never going to come. That is the limit
45:39of pragmatism. It can be an immediate
45:42solution, but it cannot become the only
45:44solution. That is why Mourinho needs to
45:46build two versions of the same team,
45:48one for open games and another for
45:49matches where Real Madrid has to take
45:51the initiative. In the first one, the
45:53goal should be very clear: a compact
45:55block, recovery, and speed. In the
45:58second, all the things we discussed
46:00before come into play: more
46:01off-the-ball movement, more players
46:03interchanging positions, more support
46:05around the ball carrier, fewer attacks
46:07where everything depends on a dribble
46:09or individual action, and Mourinho
46:11doesn't need to use the exact same
46:13setup for both situations. He can play
46:16with a double pivot whenever he wants
46:17to protect himself better. He can use
46:19Tchouaméni as a lone defensive
46:20midfielder when he needs to put more
46:21players ahead of the ball. He can move
46:24Bellingham closer to the box in games
46:25where the opponent defends deep, he can
46:27use Bernardo Silva himself to have more
46:29control, and he can widen the pitch
46:31with Diomande when the rival clogs up
46:32the middle too much. The important
46:35thing isn't sticking to one formation;
46:37the important thing is that every
46:38formation has an idea behind it, and
46:40this was one of the problems of
46:41previous stages: changing the setup
46:43because something was failing, but
46:44without exactly fixing what was failing
46:46. Mourinho needs every modification to
46:49have a clear reason. If he plays with a
46:51double pivot, it must be because he
46:53wants to protect a specific area. If he
46:55uses a 4-3-3, it must be because he
46:56wants to improve the build-up and have
46:58more presence inside. If Bellingham
47:00plays further up, someone has to be
47:02there to occupy the space he leaves
47:03behind. And if Mbappé drifts to the
47:05left, another player must attack the
47:07center. Nothing can happen in isolation
47:10, but there is also a physical aspect,
47:12and that is that this first season
47:13might just be a season of putting out
47:15fires, not because Real Madrid can
47:17afford to throw away a year, but
47:19because completely transforming how a
47:21team plays takes time. You can
47:23introduce a defensive structure
47:25relatively quickly; you can also make
47:27the team more compact. You can define
47:29who presses and who holds back, but
47:31creating complex offensive patterns
47:33takes a bit longer. That is why the
47:35most logical path might be to start by
47:37securing a solid foundation. The first
47:38step is to stop falling apart, then
47:40start to dominate certain matches. If
47:42Mourinho tries to do everything at once
47:44, he risks falling short yet again. A
47:47team that wants to press high but
47:48doesn't get there, that wants to have
47:50the ball but doesn't move, that wants
47:51to defend better in the back but leaves
47:53too much space. I mean, basically what
47:55we have seen so far. That is why
47:56pragmatism could be his best ally
47:58during the first few months, not
47:59because it is the definitive version of
48:01Real Madrid, but because it can give
48:03him time to build it. First, turn the
48:05team into something stable and make it
48:08more complete. Because Mourinho does
48:10have the tools—I mean, he has speed,
48:12physicality, quality, experience, and a
48:14squad full of players capable of
48:15deciding games. What he doesn't have
48:18yet is an identity that survives when
48:19those individual talents don't show up.
48:22And that is the final frontier, because
48:24fixing the press, positioning the
48:25midfield better, or changing a
48:27formation might improve Real Madrid,
48:28but none of those solutions will be
48:30definitive if the team keeps
48:31functioning as 11 isolated players.
48:34True reconstruction begins when
48:36everyone accepts the same idea, and
48:37this would be the final part: how to
48:39turn a squad full of stars into a real
48:41team. And at the end of the day, after
48:45these 10 points, all of Real Madrid's
48:47problems end up leading to the same
48:48place. It is not that there is a lack
48:50of talent, but a lack of turning that
48:52talent into a team, giving it shape,
48:54because Real Madrid has forwards
48:55capable of deciding games, midfielders
48:57with physicality and quality, top-level
48:59defenders, and a goalkeeper who for
49:00years has saved situations that seemed
49:02impossible. It has speed, experience,
49:04youth, and a squad built to compete for
49:06everything, but a squad doesn't win on
49:08its own. And this is precisely what
49:10they have been demonstrating for the
49:11last few seasons. When the game opens
49:13up, when spaces appear, and when any of
49:15their stars can invent an individual
49:17play, Real Madrid remains extremely
49:19dangerous. Mbappé can score, Vinicius
49:22can break a defense, Bellingham can
49:23emerge from behind, Valverde can run
49:25half the pitch, and Bernardo can find a
49:26pass. The problem arises when none of
49:29those moments occur. That is where you
49:31need mechanisms. You need to know who
49:34is in charge with the ball, who offers
49:35support, who breaks into space, who
49:37protects against a turnover, who jumps
49:39to press, and who covers the back. And
49:42above all, you need everyone to accept
49:44that their role within the team may not
49:47be exactly what suits them best
49:48individually. This is probably
49:50Mourinho’s biggest challenge, because
49:52many of the solutions we have discussed
49:54in this video are not complicated to
49:56understand. Moving more without the
49:58ball, reducing distances, pressing
50:00together, defending with everyone,
50:02giving a clear reference in midfield,
50:04freeing Bellingham from tasks that
50:06shouldn't be his, stopping the use of
50:08Valverde as a patch for every problem,
50:10and ensuring Tchouaméni has less space
50:12to defend. All of this seems quite
50:15logical. The hard part is getting 11
50:17players to do it at the same time for
50:1990 minutes. And it's even harder when
50:22some of those players are superstars,
50:24because building a great team means
50:25someone has to yield. If Mbappé drifts
50:28to the left, someone else has to attack
50:29the center. If Vinicius is not in his
50:31best form, perhaps he needs to come off
50:33early or even start a match on the
50:35bench. If Bellingham can do more damage
50:37near the box, he cannot spend the match
50:39fixing defensive problems on the wing.
50:41And if Mourinho believes a formation
50:42works better without one of the big
50:44names, the club must allow him to test
50:46it, and that is where the institutional
50:48part of the problem appears. A coach
50:51can draw any system on a chalkboard,
50:52but if he lacks the freedom to make
50:54tough decisions, that system becomes
50:56compromised before even reaching the
50:58pitch. Real Madrid itself has changed
51:01coaches several times trying to find a
51:02different answer. It has tried
51:04experience, structure, knowledge of the
51:06house, and now authority. But if the
51:09internal rules remain the same, the
51:10outcome may repeat itself. Because of
51:13this, giving Mourinho power should not
51:15simply mean letting him choose the
51:16lineup. It means backing him when the
51:19lineup upsets someone, which will
51:21happen. It means accepting that a star
51:23might lose minutes. It means putting
51:25collective performance above the name.
51:27And it also means giving him time. Not
51:30because Real Madrid can afford a season
51:31without competing, but because creating
51:33automatisms, changing habits, and
51:34rebuilding an identity does not happen
51:36in 4 weeks. The club's own historical
51:38example proves that talent and
51:40structure can coexist. Real Madrid,
51:42which won three consecutive Champions
51:43Leagues, was full of stars. Cristiano
51:46Ronaldo, Benzema, Modric, Kroos, Bale,
51:48Ramos, Marcelo, Casemiro. It was hardly
51:52a team without egos or big names, but
51:53everyone was very clear about their
51:55roles on the pitch. Kroos was in charge
51:58of organizing, Modric connected,
52:00Casemiro protected the midfield,
52:02Benzema did a lot of work around
52:04Cristiano, and Cristiano was the great
52:06finisher, but there was also a very
52:08strong competitive hierarchy on the
52:09field. Everyone understood what the
52:13team needed, and this is what the
52:14current Real Madrid still needs to
52:16recover. It doesn't need to copy that
52:19brand of football; it needs to recover
52:20that feeling that the pieces complement
52:22each other, because now the opposite
52:24happens too often. If Bellingham drops
52:26back, they are lacking up top. If
52:27Bellingham helps out wide, they are
52:28lacking inside. If Tchouaméni comes
52:30out, a gap appears. If Vinicius and
52:31Mbappé wait, the opponent can advance.
52:34That is the definition of a structure
52:36that relies too much on compensations,
52:38and no team can live forever by
52:39compensating. The real solution would
52:42be for each player to have to do less,
52:44but to do it within a much clearer
52:46structure: for Mbappé not to have to
52:48create every goal because the team
52:50generates chances; for Bellingham not
52:52to have to save every transition; for
52:54Valverde not to have to play in four
52:56different positions; and for Courtois
52:58not to have to turn chaos into an
53:00impossible save every weekend. That is
53:03where a great squad becomes a great
53:05team. Mourinho can start the process by
53:08being pragmatic, he can tighten the
53:10lines, he can defend better and boost
53:12transitions better. Later he can add
53:15offensive mechanisms, movements,
53:17pressing, more control, but it all ends
53:19up depending on one condition: that the
53:21players themselves believe in the same
53:23idea. Because if everyone keeps trying
53:26to solve their own game, we will see
53:27exactly the same thing for a long time.
53:30The coach will change, the formation
53:32will change, another millionaire
53:33signing will arrive, and perhaps even
53:34that midfielder everyone is talking
53:36about will come. But the problem will
53:38remain underneath, and that is probably
53:40the most uncomfortable conclusion of
53:41all. Real Madrid is not far from being
53:43dominant again because it lacks great
53:45players. It is far because it still
53:48hasn't managed to get those great
53:49players to function as one, to function
53:51as a team. This is Mourinho's real job.
53:55It is not to find another star, nor is
53:57it to invent a miracle formation, but
53:59to get one of the best squads in the
54:01world to stop looking like 11
54:03individual solutions and finally start
54:05looking like a team. P.

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