Nixon Orders the CIA to Block the FBI — Transcript
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- 0:00June 23rd, 1972. The morning after the
- 0:03Watergate break-in, Richard Nixon walked
- 0:06into the Oval Office and sat down with
- 0:08his Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman. The
- 0:11tape was already running. What you're
- 0:13about to hear is not speculation. It's
- 0:15not a theory. It's a verbatim exchange
- 0:18from a declassified White House tape, a
- 0:20recording Nixon himself didn't know
- 0:22would survive. A conversation that 2
- 0:24years later became known as the smoking
- 0:27gun. Nixon's voice on that tape is calm,
- 0:30almost bored. He isn't ranting. He isn't
- 0:33panicking. He's planning. He tells
- 0:36Haldeman to call the CIA to have the CIA
- 0:39tell the FBI to back off, to claim the
- 0:42Watergate investigation was touching
- 0:44sensitive intelligence operations.
- 0:47>> There was a major break in the Watergate
- 0:49trial today. On this day of sentencing,
- 0:51one of the defendants, James McCord,
- 0:53promised to reveal hidden details about
- 0:56the bugging of the Democratic
- 0:57headquarters.
- 0:58>> Which it wasn't. He wanted the Bureau
- 1:00strangled before it got started. But
- 1:03that's only the beginning, because
- 1:04somewhere in those early days of the
- 1:06cover-up, a decision was made that went
- 1:09beyond obstruction. Evidence would have
- 1:12to disappear. Not buried in a vault
- 1:15somewhere. Not locked in a government
- 1:17archive, in a fireplace in Connecticut
- 1:20by the acting director of the Federal
- 1:22Bureau of Investigation. The story of
- 1:25how that happened, who gave the order,
- 1:27who carried it out, and what it cost is
- 1:30one of the most documented abuses of
- 1:33executive power in American history.
- 1:36And it is still not as well known as it
- 1:38should be.
- 1:40This is that story.
- 1:42>> I made my mistakes.
- 1:44But in all of my years of public life,
- 1:47I have never profited, never profited
- 1:50from public service. I've earned every
- 1:52cent.
- 1:53And in all of my years of public life,
- 1:56I have never obstructed justice.
- 1:58And I think too that I can say
- 2:01that in my years of public life
- 2:03that I welcome this kind of examination
- 2:05because people have got to know whether
- 2:07or not their president is a crook.
- 2:09Well, I'm not a crook.
- 2:11>> Part one, context and key players.
- 2:15To understand what happened in the
- 2:17winter of 1972,
- 2:19you have to understand the men who made
- 2:21it happen.
- 2:22Not as historical footnotes, as people.
- 2:26L. Patrick Gray had spent his career
- 2:29wanting to matter.
- 2:31He was a Navy submarine commander, a
- 2:33Yale Law graduate, a loyalist Republican
- 2:37who had worked for Nixon since 1969.
- 2:41When J. Edgar Hoover died in May 1972,
- 2:45after 48 years running the FBI,
- 2:49Nixon needed a replacement he could
- 2:51trust, not someone independent, someone
- 2:54his.
- 2:56Gray fit the profile.
- 2:58He had no prior FBI experience, which
- 3:01was exactly the point.
- 3:03He was appointed acting director in May
- 3:051972.
- 3:08The Senate confirmation hearings were
- 3:09scheduled for the following year.
- 3:12And between those two dates,
- 3:14Watergate exploded.
- 3:17John Dean was the White House counsel,
- 3:1933 years old, precise, meticulous,
- 3:24the kind of lawyer who wrote everything
- 3:26down and then wished he hadn't. He was
- 3:29the coordinator of the cover-up in its
- 3:31early phase.
- 3:34The man who ran communications between
- 3:36the White House and the people getting
- 3:38nervous.
- 3:39When he later testified before the
- 3:41Senate, he did not protect anyone.
- 3:44He told them everything.
- 3:47John Ehrlichman was Nixon's chief
- 3:49domestic policy adviser, former Seattle
- 3:53zoning attorney.
- 3:54He had a gift for making things happen
- 3:56quietly.
- 3:57He was one of the men who gave Gray his
- 3:59instructions.
- 4:01And one of the men who later claimed he
- 4:03had said nothing of the kind.
- 4:06H.R. Haldeman was the chief of staff,
- 4:09a former advertising executive,
- 4:12controlled access to Nixon like a gate.
- 4:16He was on the June 23rd tape,
- 4:19the one that ended the presidency.
- 4:22These are the four men at the center of
- 4:24what happened to those FBI files.
- 4:27Each of them, in their own way,
- 4:30was calculating the same thing.
- 4:32How much they could admit,
- 4:34how much they could deny,
- 4:36and whether the story would hold.
- 4:39And then, there was Howard Hunt.
- 4:43E.
- 4:44Howard Hunt was a former CIA officer who
- 4:47had been working as a White House
- 4:49consultant.
- 4:50He was one of the men who had organized
- 4:52the Watergate break-in.
- 4:54When the burglars were arrested, Hunt's
- 4:56name surfaced within hours.
- 4:59And Hunt had a safe in his White House
- 5:01office.
- 5:03What was in that safe would change
- 5:04everything.
- 5:06Part two, the order. The June 23rd tape.
- 5:11Six days after the Watergate break-in,
- 5:14the White House taping system captured
- 5:16what historians would later call the
- 5:18most damaging 64 words in American
- 5:22political history.
- 5:24Nixon tells Haldeman to contact CIA
- 5:27Deputy Director Vernon Walters. The
- 5:30instruction, as documented in the
- 5:32declassified transcript, is direct. Have
- 5:35Walters call FBI Acting Director Gray
- 5:39and tell him to and these are the words
- 5:41from the tape
- 5:43stay the hell out of the Watergate case
- 5:46on the grounds that it would open up the
- 5:48whole Bay of Pigs thing.
- 5:50There was no CIA operation threatened by
- 5:53the Watergate investigation. Nixon knew
- 5:56that. The CIA knew that.
- 5:59What Nixon was doing was using the
- 6:01apparatus of one intelligence agency to
- 6:04shut down the investigation of another.
- 6:07He was using the national security
- 6:09infrastructure of the United States as a
- 6:12personal cover-up tool.
- 6:15Walters met with Gray on June 23rd. He
- 6:18passed along the message.
- 6:20Gray, by his own later account, was
- 6:23suspicious.
- 6:24But, he complied.
- 6:26The investigation slowed.
- 6:29Think about that for a moment. The
- 6:30acting director of the FBI,
- 6:33the agency investigating a crime
- 6:35committed by the president's own
- 6:37reelection campaign,
- 6:39receives a call from the CIA deputy
- 6:42director telling him to back off, and he
- 6:45does.
- 6:47The Hunt materials.
- 6:50The day after the break-in, White House
- 6:52aide John Dean was directed to go
- 6:54through Howard Hunt's safe in his
- 6:57Executive Office Building office.
- 6:59What he found there was extraordinary.
- 7:02According to Dean's sworn Senate
- 7:04testimony, the safe contained classified
- 7:07State Department cables.
- 7:10Cables that Hunt had apparently altered
- 7:12or fabricated to implicate President
- 7:14Kennedy in the 1963
- 7:17assassination of South Vietnam's
- 7:19President Diem.
- 7:21There were documents related to the 1971
- 7:24Pentagon Papers investigation.
- 7:27There was Hunt's address book containing
- 7:29names of CIA contacts. There was a
- 7:32handgun.
- 7:33Dean testified that he understood
- 7:35immediately
- 7:37these materials could not go through
- 7:39normal evidence channels.
- 7:41They could not be turned over to
- 7:43investigators without explaining why a
- 7:45White House consultant had classified
- 7:48fabricated intelligence documents in a
- 7:51safe two blocks from the Oval Office.
- 7:54According to Dean's testimony, he gave
- 7:56the files to Gray in two meetings in
- 7:59late June, 1972.
- 8:03He told Gray they were politically
- 8:04sensitive.
- 8:06That they had nothing to do with
- 8:07Watergate, but should never see the
- 8:09light of day.
- 8:11Dean testified that he told Gray the
- 8:13documents were dynamite that should
- 8:15never be seen.
- 8:16Gray took them.
- 8:18He put them in a desk drawer in his
- 8:20Connecticut home.
- 8:22There they stayed.
- 8:23For six months.
- 8:25The pressure on Gray.
- 8:28Throughout the fall of 1972, Gray was
- 8:31navigating two worlds simultaneously. In
- 8:34public, he was running the FBI and
- 8:38overseeing, in theory, a Watergate
- 8:41investigation that his own agency was
- 8:44conducting.
- 8:45In private, he was receiving guidance
- 8:48from John Dean and John Ehrlichman that
- 8:50he would later describe as highly
- 8:52suspicious.
- 8:54Gray testified before the Senate
- 8:56Judiciary Committee in 1973 that Dean
- 8:59had sat in on FBI interviews of White
- 9:02House staff.
- 9:03A significant breach of standard
- 9:05investigative protocol and one Gray
- 9:08allowed.
- 9:10He testified that he had shared raw FBI
- 9:13investigative files with Dean.
- 9:15Another breach.
- 9:17When senators pressed him on why, Gray
- 9:20struggled to explain.
- 9:22The answer, reading between the lines of
- 9:24his testimony, is simple.
- 9:27He didn't know how to say no to the
- 9:29White House.
- 9:32Ehrlichman, for his part, would later
- 9:34claim he never told Gray to do anything
- 9:36improper.
- 9:38Dean's testimony contradicted that.
- 9:41The Senate Committee found Dean's
- 9:43account more credible.
- 9:46Gray was caught between his
- 9:47institutional role and his political
- 9:50loyalties.
- 9:51He had spent his career trying to get
- 9:53close to power.
- 9:56Now the power was asking him to protect
- 9:58it.
- 9:59And he did not have the independence
- 10:02or perhaps the courage
- 10:04to refuse.
- 10:06Gray burns the documents.
- 10:09In late December 1972, L. Patrick Gray
- 10:13drove to his home in Stonington,
- 10:15Connecticut.
- 10:16According to his own later account,
- 10:18given in federal court proceedings in
- 10:202005,
- 10:22more than three decades after the fact,
- 10:25he took the two folders Dean had given
- 10:27him and put them in the fireplace.
- 10:30He burned them along with the Christmas
- 10:32wrapping paper.
- 10:34In his memoir, published in 2008,
- 10:38Gray wrote that he knew the documents
- 10:40were politically sensitive.
- 10:42He wrote that he had been told they were
- 10:44unrelated to Watergate.
- 10:47He wrote that he had accepted those
- 10:48representations without verification.
- 10:51And then he burned them.
- 10:54The FBI had been investigating the
- 10:56Watergate break-in for 6 months.
- 10:59The acting director of that FBI had just
- 11:02incinerated documents that came from the
- 11:05office of one of the prime suspects.
- 11:07Gray would later say he didn't know the
- 11:09full nature of what he destroyed.
- 11:12That is technically possible.
- 11:15What is not possible is that he believed
- 11:18his actions were normal.
- 11:21He put those documents in a fireplace in
- 11:23his home.
- 11:25Not in a document shredder at Bureau
- 11:27headquarters.
- 11:28Not through any official records
- 11:30disposal process.
- 11:31In his home fireplace in December with
- 11:35the Christmas trash.
- 11:37Part three,
- 11:39the unraveling the cover-up began to
- 11:41collapse in the way cover-ups always do.
- 11:44Not all at once, but by accumulation.
- 11:48Each new revelation pulling on a thread
- 11:51that shouldn't have been there.
- 11:53In January 1973, the Watergate burglars
- 11:57were convicted. One of them, James
- 12:00McCord, wrote a letter to Judge John
- 12:03Sirica claiming there had been political
- 12:05pressure to stay silent.
- 12:07That letter broke the dam.
- 12:10In March 1973, L. Patrick Gray appeared
- 12:13before the Senate Judiciary Committee
- 12:15for his confirmation hearings as
- 12:17permanent FBI director.
- 12:20What followed was a disaster for the
- 12:23White House.
- 12:24Under questioning from Senator Robert
- 12:26Byrd and others, Gray admitted he had
- 12:29allowed John Dean to sit in on FBI
- 12:32witness interviews.
- 12:34He admitted he had shared FBI files with
- 12:36Dean.
- 12:38The hearings became a live demonstration
- 12:39of how thoroughly the FBI's independence
- 12:42had been compromised.
- 12:44Gray tried to explain his actions. He
- 12:46said he had trusted the White House.
- 12:49He said he had no reason to doubt what
- 12:51Dean told him.
- 12:52He said he had acted in good faith.
- 12:55The senators were not persuaded. The
- 12:58hearings were suspended.
- 13:00Gray's nomination was effectively dead.
- 13:03On April 27th, 1973, Gray resigned.
- 13:08That same day, he told investigators he
- 13:10had destroyed documents from Howard
- 13:12Hunt's safe.
- 13:14It was the first time he had admitted it
- 13:15publicly.
- 13:17Two months later, John Dean sat down
- 13:20before the Senate Select Committee on
- 13:21presidential campaign activities and
- 13:24delivered his testimony.
- 13:26It lasted for 5 days. Dean named names.
- 13:30He described conversations.
- 13:32He laid out the architecture of the
- 13:34cover-up in detail.
- 13:36The meetings with Nixon,
- 13:38the discussions about executive clemency
- 13:40for the burglars,
- 13:41the payments of hush money,
- 13:43and the role of the FBI director in
- 13:46receiving and destroying materials from
- 13:48Hunt's safe.
- 13:50He said he had told Gray the documents
- 13:51were political dynamite and should never
- 13:54see the light of day.
- 13:56He said Gray understood what that meant.
- 13:59A month after Dean's testimony, White
- 14:02House aide Alexander Butterfield
- 14:04revealed what no one outside the inner
- 14:06circle had known.
- 14:08The Oval Office had an automated taping
- 14:11system.
- 14:12Every conversation recorded.
- 14:15Everything.
- 14:16The battle over those tapes consumed the
- 14:18next year.
- 14:20Nixon fired the special prosecutor
- 14:22rather than hand them over.
- 14:24The Saturday Night Massacre.
- 14:27Congress issued subpoenas.
- 14:30Nixon's lawyers fought in court, and
- 14:32then on August 5th, 1974,
- 14:36the White House released the transcripts
- 14:38it had been told by the Supreme Court to
- 14:41release.
- 14:42One of those transcripts was from June
- 14:4423rd, 1972.
- 14:48Three days later, Richard Nixon
- 14:51announced his resignation.
- 14:53L. Patrick Gray was not done with the
- 14:56legal system.
- 14:58In 1977, he pleaded guilty to one count
- 15:02related to the illegal searches
- 15:04conducted during the Watergate
- 15:05investigation,
- 15:07not directly to burning the documents,
- 15:10though the document destruction remained
- 15:12part of the prosecution's evidence.
- 15:14He was sentenced to time served and a
- 15:17fine. He never went to prison.
- 15:20In 2005, Fairchild Semiconductor
- 15:23Aristotelis Onassis Federal charges
- 15:25relating to the document destruction
- 15:27were revived under a new legal theory,
- 15:30then dropped when a judge ruled the
- 15:31statute of limitations had expired.
- 15:34Gray died in 2005,
- 15:37shortly before the case was formally
- 15:39closed.
- 15:41He had lived with what he did for 33
- 15:43years. Part four,
- 15:45what it means.
- 15:47Here's the question the historical
- 15:49record forces you to sit with.
- 15:52Not, did Nixon obstruct justice?
- 15:55That was established at the time and
- 15:57confirmed by the tapes. Not,
- 15:59did Gray make bad decisions? He admitted
- 16:02as much in sworn testimony and in his
- 16:06own memoir.
- 16:07The question is this,
- 16:09how did it get this far?
- 16:12How did a sitting president instruct his
- 16:14chief of staff to enlist the CIA in
- 16:17blocking an FBI investigation?
- 16:20And have that instruction as a
- 16:22legitimate request?
- 16:24How did the acting director of the FBI
- 16:27accept fabricated intelligence documents
- 16:30from a White House lawyer,
- 16:32put them in a drawer for six months, and
- 16:34then burn them without triggering a
- 16:37single institutional alarm?
- 16:40The answer is not complicated, which is
- 16:42what makes it disturbing.
- 16:44Gray was a political appointee who had
- 16:47no prior FBI experience and owed his
- 16:50position entirely to Nixon's favor. He
- 16:54had no institutional base within the
- 16:56bureau. He had no allies who would
- 16:59protect him if he pushed back.
- 17:02His entire identity at that moment was
- 17:05tied to White House approval.
- 17:08When Dean and Ehrlichman told him things
- 17:10were sensitive and needed to stay quiet,
- 17:13he didn't ask who authorized that
- 17:15guidance.
- 17:17He didn't consult the Attorney General.
- 17:19He didn't call the Inspector General.
- 17:22He accepted the instruction and
- 17:24complied.
- 17:26That is what institutional capture looks
- 17:28like from the inside.
- 17:31It doesn't feel like corruption to the
- 17:33person doing it.
- 17:34It feels like loyalty.
- 17:36It feels like discretion.
- 17:38It feels like being part of a team.
- 17:41And then
- 17:43one day you're burning documents in your
- 17:45Connecticut fireplace
- 17:47in December.
- 17:49And 30 years later you're writing a
- 17:51memoir trying to explain why.
- 17:55The post-Watergate reforms were real.
- 17:58The Ethics in Government Act, the
- 18:00Inspector General Act,
- 18:02the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
- 18:03Court,
- 18:04the Special Counsel statute.
- 18:07Legislators in 1974 and 1978 understood
- 18:11that Watergate had exposed structural
- 18:13vulnerabilities.
- 18:15And they tried to address them.
- 18:18But statutes are not the same as
- 18:20independence.
- 18:22The independence of law enforcement from
- 18:24political pressure is not
- 18:26self-executing.
- 18:27It depends on individuals choosing
- 18:30institutional loyalty over personal
- 18:33loyalty.
- 18:34Even when that choice is costly. Gray
- 18:37chose wrong.
- 18:39Not because he was uniquely corrupt, but
- 18:41because the system placed him in a
- 18:43position where the wrong choice looked
- 18:45like the safe one.
- 18:47Whether the safeguards built after
- 18:49Watergate are strong enough,
- 18:51whether an acting FBI director today
- 18:54could be similarly leveraged by a White
- 18:57House seeking to obstruct a federal
- 18:59investigation
- 19:01is a question the documented record of
- 19:03this episode does not answer.
- 19:05What the record does tell you is that it
- 19:08happened once.
- 19:09That the men involved were senior
- 19:11government officials who swore oaths,
- 19:15that the institutional protections in
- 19:17place in 1972 were insufficient to stop
- 19:21it. That's not history. That's a
- 19:24warning.
- 19:25L. Patrick Gray spent the last years of
- 19:28his life writing a memoir. He called it
- 19:31In Nixon's Web. He completed it just
- 19:34before he died in 2005.
- 19:36His son Ed finished it and published it
- 19:39in 2008.
- 19:41In it, Gray wrote that he had been
- 19:43deceived
- 19:45by Dean, by Ehrlichman, by the White
- 19:48House,
- 19:50that the documents he burned were
- 19:51described to him as having no connection
- 19:53to Watergate,
- 19:56that he had no reason to believe
- 19:57otherwise.
- 19:59Maybe that's true.
- 20:01Maybe Gray genuinely didn't know what he
- 20:03was destroying. But here is what the
- 20:05record shows.
- 20:07He didn't ask.
- 20:09He accepted the representations of men
- 20:11he knew had interests in what happened
- 20:13to those documents. He burned them in
- 20:16his home fireplace.
- 20:18And then he stayed silent for 5 months
- 20:21before admitting it.
- 20:23The Watergate cover-up required a lot of
- 20:26people to do a lot of small things
- 20:27wrong, not one big dramatic betrayal,
- 20:32a hundred small compliance decisions,
- 20:35each of them individually explainable,
- 20:37collectively catastrophic.
- 20:40The sources for this documentary are
- 20:42listed in the description below,
- 20:45including the declassified June 23rd
- 20:47tape transcript, John Dean's Senate
- 20:50testimony, Gray's own confirmation
- 20:53hearing record, and his published
- 20:55memoir.
- 20:56History doesn't require embellishment.
- 20:59Read it yourself.
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