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Moby Prince: Una tragedia mai chiarita — Transcript

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0:06Dear children, pay a visit to
0:08Washington after a long with the doors
0:18that are destined. Power, this power is
0:21only that of Do not be afraid. Allow
0:27Christ to speak to man regarding kings
0:30and especially of the people.
0:42April 10, 1991, 10:00 PM. A ferry
0:45leaves the port and shortly after
0:47departure enters the belly of an oil
0:48tanker at anchor. Immediate tragedy, an
0:51inferno of flames, smoke, and oil.
0:54After the collision, no rescue attempts
0:56to find the ferry, despite it circling,
0:58engulfed in flames, right in front of
0:59the port. And so 140 people die. The
1:03crew of the oil tanker, however, is
1:04saved in its entirety. A government
1:07minister, the morning after the
1:08collision, speaks immediately of human
1:10error.
1:11Unfortunately, human error, human error
1:13. Human error.
1:14The harbor master of very thick fog.
1:17A very thick fog. A very thick fog. A
1:20very thick fog.
1:22For their part, newspapers and TV
1:24stations couldn't wait to jump on the
1:25scoop. On the ferry, instead of
1:27steering the ship, they were all
1:28watching Barcelona and Juve on TV.
1:31At the time of the tragedy, soccer
1:33matches were on; at that hour,
1:34Wednesday evening, Barcelona vs.
1:36Juventus was playing, and this might
1:38have caused a general distraction that,
1:40unfortunately, was paid for with their
1:42lives by many.
1:44Fog, human error, and the crew watching
1:46the Cup match. The memory is all there,
1:49carved in stone, crystallized in the
1:51minds of us all. But yes, certainly, I
1:54remember perfectly. It was the fog, and
1:56then the captain was watching the match
1:58with the whole crew.
1:59Thanks, very fast Goikoetxea from
2:00Salinas. Goikoetxea again. He shoots,
2:02the goal. 140 dead, and this is the
2:07toll of the Moby Prince tragedy, the
2:10ferry that, on the evening of April 10,
2:12'91, just after leaving the port of
2:15Livorno, collided with the Agip Abruzzo
2:17oil tanker and caught fire. A tragedy
2:21that, in reality, has never been fully
2:24clarified. Looking closely, in fact,
2:27reading the testimonies and court
2:30documents to the end, as we have done,
2:32the numbers don't add up. What really
2:36happened that night in the port of
2:39Livorno? How is it possible that the
2:42captain and the crew of the Moby Prince
2:45didn't see an oil tanker as tall as a
2:47five-story building? Was everyone on
2:52the ferry really distracted watching
2:55the match, and was there really fog
2:58that night or not? This is the verdict
3:13of the Florence Court at the appeal
3:15trial of February 5, 1999. Fog is
3:18mentioned on almost every page of the
3:20verdict. Banks of fog and streaks of
3:23fog. On page 5. The bank was shaped
3:25like a cloud, on page 64. It looked
3:28like smoke, so much so that page 64
3:30casts doubt on whether it was fog.
3:32Certainly, the fog that night was
3:34strange, back on page 64. And so,
3:36gleaning through it. But then we
3:40encounter this sentence: "On the tanker
3:41, there was a bank of fog that left the
3:43other anchored ships fully visible, as
3:45if this fog, besides having the
3:47appearance of wisps that were hard to
3:48perceive and cloud-shaped, had chosen
3:50to settle in the entire roadstead only
3:52on the tanker. So, that evening the
3:55tanker had a bank of fog all to itself,
3:57exclusive and custom-made, 300 meters
4:00long and five stories high. In short,
4:03according to the verdict, that evening
4:05in the Livorno roadstead, there was a
4:07strange fog. A fog, the verdict says on
4:11page 63, confirmed by too many
4:14testimonies, too detailed to
4:16hypothesize that all the witnesses are
4:19lying. But what was strange about that
4:23fog? And did all the witnesses really
4:27claim to have seen that fog? Romeo
4:30Ricci, maritime lookout, on duty at the
4:32port entrance on the evening of April
4:3410, '91.
4:35At that moment, I would like to preface
4:38that there was decent visibility, and
4:41so from here I could see both the AGIP
4:43Abruzzo and all the other ships in the
4:46roadstead.
4:48Federico Sgherri, the harbor pilot who
4:50accompanied the Moby Prince on its last
4:52departure, the night of the tragedy.
4:54But the visibility of the anchored
4:58ships was normal, and the AGIP with its
5:01lights was illuminated.
5:04For the harbor pilot, too, visibility
5:06was excellent. Massimo Vernace, a
5:08sailor at the Livorno Naval Academy,
5:10was on guard duty at the academy pier
5:11right in front of the roadstead. I
5:14remember observing the tanker and I am
5:16certain there was absolutely no fog.
5:19They don't see fog in the roadstead
5:21that night of the collision. A police
5:22chief assistant from his home at the
5:24port, Professor Bergonzi, and Mrs.
5:26Paterni walking on the promenade.
5:29My dog jumped onto this part of the
5:31beach, so I was attracted, I turned
5:33toward the sea, and at that point I saw
5:36this enormous illuminated ship,
5:42but also an Alitalia pilot flying over
5:44the scene moments after the accident.
5:46The first rescuers heading out to sea
5:48immediately after the collision don't
5:50see any fog either. Cesare Gentile,
5:52captain of the Finance Police. There
5:55was an impressive clarity. The sea was
5:57very calm and without fog. Domenico
6:00Mattera, captain of the tugboat Tito
6:02Neri VII. At the port exit, visibility
6:06was good, then suddenly it dropped to
6:07near zero because of what I assume was
6:09smoke. In fact, it wasn't fresh like
6:12fog, and my throat was burning. Smoke.
6:15The ruptured tanker, the oil spilled
6:17into the sea, the sea in flames. There
6:19was truly a lot of smoke that evening,
6:21so thick and dense it burned the throat
6:22. But smoke is not fog, or at least it
6:25shouldn't be. But let's recall the
6:27words of the verdict. The fog that
6:29evening had an appearance similar to
6:31smoke. Fog, the verdict insists, and it
6:34throws names onto the table. Melis,
6:37Cannavina, Termes, Olivieri, and Rolla
6:39say so. So let's read the deposition of
6:42Paolo Termes, an officer at the Naval
6:44Academy. I never had the feeling that
6:48there was any fog. And furthermore,
6:50Roger Olivieri, also an officer at the
6:53Academy at the time. I absolutely did
6:55not see fog at sea that evening.
6:58Therefore, many witnesses say that
7:00there was no fog in the Livorno
7:03roadstead that evening, and the first
7:05responders who headed out to sea toward
7:08the Agip Abruzzo, already in flames,
7:11confirm this as well. But that evening,
7:14another tanker, the Agip Abruzzo's
7:16sister ship, the Agip Napoli, was also
7:18anchored in the Livorno roadstead. This
7:22is the recording of the radio
7:24conversation between the ship's captain
7:27, Cannavina, and the Livorno Port
7:30Authority. The collision between the
7:33Moby Prince and the Agip Abruzzo
7:35happened just a few minutes ago.
7:38But evidently, you still haven't
7:39understood the gravity of the situation
7:41? Because I am at a mile and a half,
7:42and I am seeing what is happening there
7:43. Uh, the ship is completely on fire.
7:46Captain Cannavina is therefore anchored
7:49a mile and a half away. And he can see
7:53the burning Agip Abruzzo perfectly well
7:55, which, however, blocks his view of
7:57the Moby Prince, also already in flames
8:00, and from the tone of his words, it is
8:03perfectly clear that despite the
8:05distance, Cannavina is fully capable of
8:07assessing the gravity of the situation.
8:11Yet, according to the verdict, he too
8:14is among those who would claim that
8:16there was fog. In reality, there is
8:21testimony that allows us to have the
8:24final word on this matter. Speaking is
8:28the captain of the Agip Abruzzo himself
8:31, Renato Superina. It is 10:30 PM and
8:3510 seconds on channel 16. Captain
8:39Superina asks for help via radio. The
8:42collision with the Moby Prince has just
8:45occurred. The Viareggio Port Authority
8:48responds to him.
8:50Are you the ones calling about a fire
8:51on board? This is Compamare Viareggio.
8:53Change to the Livorno roadstead.
8:56Livorno roadstead. Livorno can see us,
8:59they can see us with their own eyes.
9:01Livorno can see us! The radio operator
9:03of the Agip Abruzzo shouts. It is clear
9:06there is no fog, and furthermore he
9:07adds:" Agip Abruzzo, fire on board,
9:10just come outside, you can see the
9:12flames,
9:13come outside and you can see us. "It
9:15couldn't be clearer, but there is
9:17evidence that eliminates any doubt. TG1
9:20shows it three days after the collision
9:22.
9:23Let's go now to Florence, where our
9:25colleague Mammoliti should have a
9:26recording from a ham radio operator at
9:28the time of the tragedy. The quality of
9:31the recording is poor, but one thing is
9:34clear: from the reflection of the
9:36flames on the sea's surface, you can
9:38tell there is no fog between the
9:40burning tanker and the amateur operator
9:42, a conclusion the Rai journalist also
9:44reaches. In the meantime, one thing is
9:46perfectly clear: there is no fog at the
9:48moment of the accident.
9:49But then, if it seemed obvious to
9:51everyone just two days after the
9:53tragedy that there was no fog? Why? Why
9:57did the investigation first, and the
10:00ruling later, insist on fog at all
10:03costs? Why? And the fog serves to
10:06explain the collision. Everything
10:09revolves around the fog, but this
10:10explanation absolutely does not hold up
10:12. And all ships are equipped with radar
10:15on board. If a ferry were to crash into
10:17one of the many ships anchored in a
10:20harbor roadstead every time there was
10:22fog, well, port navigation in our
10:24country would be a daily war bulletin.
10:27Radars are meant for exactly this, and
10:29the Moby Prince had three radars
10:30installed on board, and one was turned
10:32on and working perfectly. The harbor
10:36pilot Sgherri says and testifies to it:
10:38when he boards, he sees Captain Chessa,
10:40as meticulous and attentive as ever,
10:42actually turning on the radar and
10:44setting the monitor system, so the fog
10:46hypothesis doesn't hold up, even if the
10:48public prosecutor's experts arrive at a
10:51curious conclusion. They say there was
10:54fog, but that the ferry's bridge was
10:56likely not monitoring the radar screen.
10:59And so we arrive at another hypothesis.
11:02There was fog, the radar was on, but no
11:04one was watching it, and after all,
11:07every crew member of the Moby Prince
11:09died. Therefore, no one can confirm or
11:14deny it. But in the meantime, who was
11:17Ugo Chessa, the captain of the Moby
11:20Prince who has the radar on in the fog
11:22and doesn't look at it? Chessa was
11:25universally recognized as the best
11:27officer in the Onorato fleet,
11:29D'Ambrosio, hearing cited on pages 16
11:31and 21. He was considered the best
11:34captain in terms of seriousness and
11:35strictness. He was the most
11:36professional, the most serious, the
11:38strictest, and the most prepared.
11:39Langella, hearing 1915, page 61. In
11:44short, a captain of great experience,
11:47very strict and very serious, a captain
11:50who, according to the ruling, would
11:52have navigated his ship, the Moby
11:54Prince, through a crowded roadstead
11:57that night, covered in fog with the
11:59radar on, without even glancing at it.
12:03But how is it possible that it really
12:05went that way? This is the answer given
12:08by the ruling. It is plausible to
12:11attribute to the Moby Prince captain
12:13the imprudence of an expert, not
12:15inexperience; he was certainly deceived
12:17by the highly unusual form of the fog
12:20which, as has been noted many times,
12:22affected the tanker but left the rest
12:24of the harbor reasonably visible. This
12:27circumstance can also explain the
12:29failure to rely on the radar, which in
12:30all probability was switched on and
12:32functioning. One mainly relied on the
12:35radar in case of fog, and that evening
12:37the fog was barely noticeable.
12:39Therefore, the captain made a mistake,
12:41not out of inexperience, but out of the
12:42imprudence of being too experienced.
12:43And the radar, which was not off—for
12:45if it had been off it would have
12:46explained the cause of the collision—
12:48no, the radar was actually on and
12:49functioning. But no one looks at it,
12:51because you look at the radar if there
12:53is fog, and the fog that evening was
12:54almost invisible. At this point, it is
12:56logic itself that does not add up.
12:59In short, a challenge to the most
13:01elementary common sense. And so, to try
13:04to understand more, we must start over;
13:06we must really start again from what
13:08was happening that evening in the
13:10Livorno roadstead, and the starting
13:12point of our investigation can be two
13:15documents. On one hand, the maritime
13:19observer's logbook, almost a snapshot
13:21capturing the situation in the Livorno
13:24roadstead at 10:00 PM on Wednesday,
13:26April 10, 1991. On the other, a letter,
13:31a letter with the letterhead of the
13:33Department of Defense, Military Traffic
13:35Management Command, Terminal Battalion
13:37Italy.
13:40To whom it may concern? Notice is
13:42hereby given that the below-indicated
13:44vessels are transporting material owned
13:46by the government of the United States
13:48of America destined for the USAN base
13:50of Camp Darby, Tombolo, Pisa. The
13:52vessels are under the direct control of
13:55the USA Department of Defense,
13:56militarized, and therefore exempt from
13:58any taxes or inspection visits on board
14:00. Cape Breton, USA flag; EFDIM Junior,
14:04Greek; Gallant 2, Panamanian; sincerely
14:07. The date is March 15, 1991. The
14:12presence of these ships is explained by
14:14Camp Darby. Camp Darby is a huge
14:16US-NATO military base at the gates of
14:17Livorno. By doing some research, it
14:19turns out that these ships were used in
14:21the first Gulf War. The war ended
14:24precisely on March 27, 1991, and the
14:26Americans began to leave Iraq. That
14:29evening of April 10, the material owned
14:31by the US government transported by the
14:33militarized ships in the Livorno
14:35roadstead was nothing but weapons and
14:37explosives used in the Gulf War.
14:40Material, the letter specifies, outside
14:42the control of Italian authorities.
14:44Thus, from the logbook, we see that
14:46effectively on the evening of April 9,
14:48the three militarized American ships
14:50with their dangerous cargo were quietly
14:52anchored off Livorno. But by scrolling
14:54through the logbook, we find other
14:55names. We check and see that there are
14:58at least four other ships present in
15:00the Livorno roadstead linked to
15:02American army transports: the Cape
15:04Zeros, the Cape Fluttery, the Cape
15:07Farwell, and the Margaret Likes. In
15:10fact, one of these, even though
15:11dangerous cargo handling was prohibited
15:13at night, is seen by a witness carrying
15:15out unloading operations. Guardia di
15:17Finanza Captain Cesare Gentile, hearing
15:20of May 15, 1996. It was a very clear
15:25day. I confirmed the position of the
15:27various ships in the roadstead. I saw a
15:28boat to the north that was loading
15:30weapons. To the north, there was a
15:33large, illuminated ship that was the
15:34one loading the weapons.
15:37Near Livorno, at Camp Darby, there is
15:39one of the largest NATO military bases
15:41in Italy. There is nothing strange,
15:44therefore, about the fact that American
15:46militarized ships cruise in the Livorno
15:49roadstead. What is strange, and what no
15:53one had ever said before the testimony
15:56of Cesare Gentile, a captain in the
15:58Guardia di Finanza, is that at least
16:01one of these ships was loading and
16:04unloading weapons and explosives from
16:06the Gulf War at night, just a stone's
16:09throw from the ferry routes. Captain
16:14Gentile had duly reported all of this
16:17in his report on April 11, the day
16:20after the Moby Prince tragedy. And yet,
16:24and yet during the investigation, no
16:27one ever questioned Captain Gentile,
16:30but that night in the roadstead there
16:33were not only American ships.
16:35Scrolling through the list of ships
16:37present in the port of Livorno that
16:39evening of April 10, another discovery
16:41is made. The name is 21 October 2. The
16:45ship is not one that goes unnoticed, or
16:48perhaps it did, at least back then,
16:50because in 1991 the 21 October 2
16:52appeared to be only a fishing boat, a
16:54flagship freezer trawler of a small
16:56fleet of fishing boats donated by
16:58Italian cooperation to Somalia to help
17:00it in the trade and export of fish. The
17:04fish was that caught in Somali waters,
17:05which the 21 October 2 was supposed to
17:07unload in the port of Gaeta. But the
17:10ship is rarely seen in Gaeta,
17:12not quite every 2-3 months, every 5-6
17:15months.
17:16And by checking the movements of the 21
17:18October 2 through the Lloyd’s of
17:19London register, one sees that the
17:21ports visited by the 21 October have
17:23little to do with the fish trade.
17:25Tripoli in Lebanon, Beirut, Ireland,
17:27Iran. One of its favorite ports was
17:29Livorno, where the 21 October often
17:31remained for months. Official
17:33explanation: repairs. When three years
17:37later, in '94, in the midst of the
17:38Somali war, journalist Ilaria Alpi goes
17:40to snoop around the activities of this
17:42flotilla, suspecting arms trafficking
17:44in the aftermath of an interview with
17:46the Sultan of Bosaso who had just
17:47seized one of the ships. Alpi and
17:50cameraman Robatin are massacred aboard
17:52a Jeep in the center of Mogadishu. In
17:56short, the 21 October 2, which after
17:58Ilaria Alpi's death would become part
18:01of judicial and parliamentary inquiries
18:03into cooperation, was in the port of
18:05Livorno on the evening of April 10, '91
18:07, officially for repairs. A ship, a
18:11factory trawler, you know, one of those
18:14factory trawlers. A new ship had just
18:17come to do
18:20repairs.
18:21And in fact, the shipping register
18:24shows it moored at the non-operational
18:26Magnali Pier in Livorno. But, but a
18:30barge—perhaps the one some would
18:31accuse of cutting off the Moby's path
18:33on the night of the collision.
18:36This barge was a barge that caused the
18:38damage, you understand? But at that
18:41moment
18:42And instead, at that moment, it’s a
18:43quiet port,
18:44it was refueling. This ship here had
18:47finished its bunker.
18:48The 21, the 21.
18:49Yes, I think the 21 October. Yes.
18:52Why would a ship in for repairs need to
18:54take on fuel? Especially since a
18:56witness saw the non-operational pier
18:58where the 21 October was officially
19:00docked on the evening of the 10th, the
19:02night of the collision, as empty.
19:04Susanna Bonomi, wife of a Port
19:06Authority officer, has windows that
19:08look directly out onto the pier.
19:10Counselor, do you remember if, before
19:12going to bed that night, you happened
19:14to observe what was on the pier?
19:16Witness. I was pulling down the
19:19shutters; there was nothing there
19:20because I could see, I was facing the
19:22pier and there were no ships. Counselor
19:24. And what did you see in the morning?
19:27Witness. In the morning, there was a
19:30ship.
19:31So, according to a witness, that ship,
19:33the 21 October, which was supposed to
19:36be at the pier awaiting repairs, had
19:38refueled and was sailing in the
19:40roadstead. Yet another oddity in a
19:44night full of mysteries, and we are at
19:47about 10:00 PM. The Moby is about to
19:50leave the pier at the port of Livorno.
19:53Livorno Port, it’s 10:00 PM, a clear
19:56April evening. The Moby Prince has just
20:00loaded 76 passengers, a few cars, and
20:02some trucks. The crew consists of 65
20:05men. On the bridge, besides Captain
20:08Chessa, the second officer, the
20:10helmsman, and the harbor pilot, Captain
20:12Sgherri, are present. At 10:03 PM,
20:14Captain Ugo Chessa orders to cast off
20:17the moorings. Destination: Olbia,
20:19Sardinia. At 10:10 PM, the exit
20:22maneuver is complete, and the harbor
20:23pilot leaves the ferry. At 10:14 PM,
20:26Moby Prince calls the Port Authority
20:28via radio.
20:32Good evening, Moby Prince. before at
20:361:00 PM
20:381:00 PM
20:39And at 10:14 PM, it is the shipping
20:42monitor that sees the Moby passing by
20:44as it exits. I saw the ship leave at
20:4710:14 PM, and at that moment, I
20:49communicated the departure to the Port
20:51Authority. We are 5 minutes away from
20:54the collision.
20:55We are 5 minutes away, therefore, from
20:57the collision between the Moby Prince
20:59and the Agip Abruzzo. Here is Pietro
21:01Riccardi, author along with Michele
21:03Buono of this investigation for us.
21:06Pietro, so what is the situation, the
21:08scene in the roadstead of Livorno on
21:10the evening of April 10, 1991? Well,
21:14the Moby Prince has just left the port
21:16of Livorno and this is the situation of
21:18the roadstead in front of it. To the
21:21north, it sees a group of ships, among
21:22which there are some American
21:24militarized ships. The Moby Prince must
21:27travel around this anchorage ban zone,
21:29head out to sea, and then steer south
21:32towards Sardinia, where it is headed.
21:35Therefore, the group of ships relevant
21:37to the Moby Prince for the purposes of
21:39the collision are those anchored to the
21:41south. There is a tanker, the Napoli,
21:44there are two American militarized
21:46ships, and finally, there is the most
21:48important ship, the Agip Abruzzo, the
21:50one the Moby Prince will collide with.
21:53But there will be many controversies
21:55and contradictions in this trial
21:56regarding the position of the Agip
21:58Abruzzo.
21:59Let's look for the position assumed by
22:00the judgment. It is this: 43 ° 29 '60"
22:05and 10 ° 15' 90 ". These are the
22:09geographic coordinates. The position,
22:11the judgment says, is the one recorded
22:13on April 12 by the Italian military
22:15ship Libra, that is, two days after the
22:18collision. Why is the position from two
22:21days later taken, when the Agip Abruzzo
22:23had not moved, according to the report
22:24of the engineer Pompiglio, who
22:26describes the moments after the
22:28collision as follows? We activated the
22:30main engine. A few moments later, the
22:32captain asked if the ship was ready to
22:34move. I immediately confirmed. After a
22:36few moments, the engine was started
22:38forward. The first time moving forward
22:40for 10 minutes. The second, I couldn't
22:43say.
22:44The Agip Abruzzo's engineer therefore
22:46declares that after the impact with the
22:49Moby Prince, the tanker moved. But then
22:52why? Why is the official position of
22:55the Agip Abruzzo in the investigation
22:57the one recorded 2 days after the
22:59collision? Why did no one take into
23:02account the position given by the
23:05ship's captain at the moment of impact?
23:08This is the original voice recording of
23:11Captain Superina giving the position of
23:13the Agip Abruzzo at the moment of the
23:15collision with the Moby Prince.
23:1945 ° south of the...exact position.
23:25Quick, I am...
23:27Well, let's equip ourselves with a
23:28nautical chart and calculate the point.
23:31Here it is. Now let's calculate the
23:33point accepted as valid in the trial.
23:35It is this. They do not coincide. And
23:38there is a detail. These jagged lines
23:40that enclose a zone. We read" anchorage
23:43and fishing prohibited. "The official
23:46point is just outside. The one shouted
23:49by Superina to the rescuers and
23:50recorded on tape by Livorno Radio is
23:52inside the prohibited zone. Let's try
23:54to verify other testimonies. According
23:57to the maritime signal station, the
23:58Agip Abruzzo was inside the prohibited
24:00zone. The pilot of flight AZ421 landing
24:03at Pisa also reports to the control
24:05tower at 10:40 PM that he is directly
24:08over the collision point. The position
24:11of the Agip Abruzzo is inside the
24:132202-230 cone off the coast of Livorno.
24:17We see another surprise here. This is
24:22actually the position provided by the
24:24other tanker on radar, the Agip Napoli.
24:27A position detected by radar, Captain
24:29Cannavina says, about 2.35 miles from
24:31the green light at 71 °. Once again
24:35inside the no-anchorage zone, once
24:37again a different position. Captain
24:41Cannavina is the same man who shouted
24:42over the radio that he was a mile and a
24:44half from the Agip Abruzzo and saw all
24:46the fire, despite the strange fog that,
24:48according to the verdict, was
24:49imperceptible. This is too much.
24:52Cannavina will disappear from the trial
24:54, officially unable to attend due to
24:55work, and his statements will be
24:57filtered by the SNAM press office.
24:59Superina himself, captain of the Agip
25:01Abruzzo, after his initial indication
25:03during the rescue, will give three
25:05other positions. 43 degrees 29 minutes
25:10North. 43 degrees 9 minutes North, 10
25:16degrees 16 minutes East. 21027, can you
25:25find us? I repeat, 43 degrees 2.8
25:30minutes North. Longitude.
25:3410.
25:3615.3.
25:37I have received.
25:39three. So, one here, one here, and one
25:42here. This time outside the
25:45no-anchorage cone. A real mess, there
25:47is no doubt about that. Who is lying?
25:50What are they trying to hide by
25:51changing the position of the Agip
25:52Abruzzo? Who was this unidentified
25:55military ship that suddenly appeared
25:56two days later to establish the
25:58position of the Agip Abruzzo? According
26:02to the appellate verdict, and I quote
26:04verbatim from page 69, there are no
26:07precise findings regarding the position
26:09of the Agip Abruzzo before the
26:11collision, but in reality, the doubts
26:14concern not only the position of the
26:16Agip Abruzzo but also the orientation
26:19of the ship; that is, which way was the
26:21tanker's bow pointing? Was it facing
26:25north or south? The answer is once
26:28again in the words of the tanker's
26:30captain, Renato Superina. We are
26:34sounding it, we are sounding it, it's
26:35just that our bow is pointing south, so
26:37you probably can't hear it.
26:39Superina's sentence is directed at the
26:42rescuers at sea immediately after the
26:44collision, who, blinded by the smoke,
26:46cannot see the burning tanker and ask
26:48the captain to sound the siren. Piero,
26:52but why is the orientation of the Agip
26:54Abruzzo's bow so important? The
26:58orientation of the Agip Abruzzo's bow,
27:00the tanker that the Moby Prince will
27:02collide with, is important to
27:04understand the dynamics of the
27:06collision. We must keep in mind that
27:09the side of the tanker that the Moby
27:11Prince will hit is the starboard side.
27:14Therefore, if the tanker's bow is
27:16facing north, that is, if the starboard
27:19side, the side of the collision, is
27:21facing Livorno, towards the side where
27:23the Moby Prince is approaching, the
27:25dynamics are clear. But if the bow, as
27:30Captain Superina says and as we hear on
27:33channel 16 during the chaotic moments
27:35of the collision, if the tanker's bow
27:38was facing south, well, things get
27:41complicated; because either we can
27:43assume the tanker was moving, or it
27:46could mean that the Moby Prince, for
27:49some mysterious reason, was turning
27:51back toward the port. But the
27:56orientation of the bow is just one of
27:58the many mysteries of the AGIP Abruzzo.
28:02In fact, after the collision, the hatch
28:05of one of the tanks, tank number 6, was
28:07found open with a hose—essentially a
28:10pipe—immersed in the tank and
28:12half-charred at the end. What does this
28:17mean for the tank? What is the meaning
28:20of this hose, this half-charred pipe?
28:24AGIP officials would maintain that
28:27shortly before the collision, the AGIP
28:30Abruzzo had pumped all the water and
28:33residual oil from the ship's bilge into
28:36that tank. But maritime registry
28:40records show that a barge, a small
28:43tanker, had been authorized to conduct
28:47bunkering, meaning refueling operations
28:50for both the AGIP Napoli and the AGIP
28:54Abruzzo. And these are the depositions
28:57of the witnesses who saw the AGIP
29:00Abruzzo shortly before the collision
29:03with the Moby Prince. One could see
29:06reddish glows, some sporadic
29:09intermittent light, lights that,
29:11moreover, as we have already reported
29:14elsewhere, were certainly not
29:19artificial lights, such as lamps or
29:20things of that nature. Around 9: 30–9
29:23: 45 PM, a reddish-orange glow was
29:25observed in the stern section. I cannot
29:28assert it was a fire, even though it
29:30looked like one to me. Olivieri. Around
29:3410:10 PM, we were walking. At one point
29:38, our attention was drawn by two
29:39glimmers like small flames, Bergonzi.
29:43Glows, flames, little fires—a series
29:46of witnesses, in short, sees something
29:48on the AGIP that looks very much like a
29:50fire. But pay attention, these
29:54testimonies refer to at least 15
29:56minutes before the collision with the
29:59Moby Prince, and indeed, this is also
30:01specified in the statements. While we
30:05were observing this strange phenomenon
30:07on that ship, we also saw the ferry,
30:09the Moby, leaving the port of Livorno.
30:11So the witnesses see the tanker's
30:14lights go out.
30:16While I was looking at this ship with
30:18these two little flames, there was a
30:20complete blackout
30:22and what the court ruling describes as
30:25fog. The whitish cloud seemed like
30:28steam to me, caused by an attempt to
30:29extinguish the flames. Termes.
30:33Paolo Termes, I remind you, is a Naval
30:35officer stationed at the Naval Academy
30:37in Livorno, and therefore a qualified
30:39and reliable witness. But then, if that
30:43reddish glow really was a fire, what
30:47was happening on board the AGIP Abruzzo
30:50? And what does the tanker's logbook
30:56say about this?
30:58And here we touch upon another mystery
31:00surrounding the tanker. After the
31:02collision, while abandoning the tanker,
31:04Captain Superina left the logbook
31:06behind on the ship, the one that
31:08essentially records the entire life of
31:09the vessel. For three long days, no one
31:12looked for it. Port authorities,
31:14investigators, the magistrate. On the
31:16third day, a fire broke out on the
31:18bridge and the forgotten logbook went
31:20up in smoke. Now, nothing more can be
31:23reconstructed about the tanker except
31:25through the personal memories of those
31:27who were on board, first and foremost
31:29the tanker's captain, Renato Superina.
31:31Let’s read from his deposition on
31:34April 13, 1991, two days after the
31:36collision. No one had noticed the ferry
31:39approaching because the radar was not
31:41turned on. The radar was not on, says
31:45Superina. Yet, among the archived
31:47footage, we found a fragment of an
31:49interview with Superina himself, the
31:51night of the collision, just as he got
31:52off the pier:
31:55and the third officer already had the
31:57radars running, everything, and saw
31:59this ship coming right at us, and then
32:01at the last moment, well, he thought it
32:03would turn, you know. Captain
32:06Superina’s words leave no room for
32:08doubt. The third officer in command of
32:11the Agip Abruzzo had the radar on and
32:13saw the Moby Prince approaching on a
32:16collision course. But what you just
32:21heard is from an interview Superina
32:24gave to a local Tuscan station,
32:26Telegranducato, which we later included
32:29in an episode of Mix many years ago. It
32:35is the only statement in which the
32:38captain of the Agip Abruzzo admits that
32:41the radar was on. In fact, the
32:45tanker’s third officer was found
32:48guilty of keeping the radar off despite
32:51the strange, unpredictable fog
32:54surrounding the Agip Abruzzo, and the
32:57statute of limitations expired. As for
33:02Superina, his case was dismissed during
33:04the investigation. But let's return to
33:08that evening of April 10th aboard the
33:11Moby Prince.
33:13It is 10:23 PM and 14 seconds. There
33:16are 2 minutes left until the collision.
33:18The voice of the Moby radiotelegrapher
33:20reappears on Channel 16. An important
33:23detail. No one whose voice left a trace
33:25on Channel 16 that evening knew they
33:28were being recorded. Normally, Channel
33:3016 is not recorded, but the Livorno
33:32Radio station was running an
33:33experimental project. Moby from Livorno
33:36, let's try Channel 61, but it's very
33:38faint. Uh,
33:41this is Moby's last communication
33:43before the collision. The radio signal
33:46is extremely weak, the modulation
33:48almost zero. In Livorno, you can hear
33:51conversations between French ships off
33:53the distant coast of Corsica loud and
33:55clear, while Moby, which is in the
33:57roadstead, a stone's throw away, cannot
33:59be heard. What happened to Moby's radio
34:02? Another detail: the body of the Moby
34:05Prince radio operator was not found in
34:07the radio room, meaning he wasn't at
34:09his station during the collision;
34:11otherwise, his body would have been
34:13found crushed under the radio equipment
34:15that collapsed upon impact. Where had
34:17the radio officer gone? Why had he left
34:20his post, and was this departure linked
34:23to the radio not working?
34:26Just before the collision on the Moby
34:29Prince, something very strange was
34:31happening, and the proof lies in those
34:34carbonized bodies found aboard the
34:36ferry. None of the autopsy reports show
34:41fractures or trauma resulting from a
34:44traumatic event, like a collision. It's
34:49almost as if everyone on board,
34:51wherever they were, was, let's say,
34:54ready and prepared for the impact,
34:56which was massive and dramatic, yet
34:59caused no injuries to those people at
35:02that moment. Second point: almost all
35:05the bodies of the passengers and crew,
35:07about a hundred of them, were found
35:09inside the bow lounge, the deluxe
35:11lounge. This means they had been
35:14diverted there to a safe area, found
35:17all together with their luggage, fully
35:20dressed, and wearing life jackets.
35:23Another element is that no one was
35:25found in the bow bar lounge where, it
35:27is confirmed, there were many people at
35:30the start, during the first few minutes
35:32of the voyage, watching the soccer
35:34match, the famous Juventus-Barcelona
35:36cup game. That lounge was also empty,
35:40so there was, as it were, a situation
35:42where passengers and crew were gathered
35:45in the lounge before the subsequent
35:48collision with the tanker.
35:50Let's go back to the radio operator who
35:52leaves the radio room. Where does he go
35:54? He goes to the bridge, to the command
35:56deck, next to the captain. In fact,
35:59emergency procedures on a ship require
36:01the radio operator to rush to the
36:02captain to receive direct orders. The
36:06proof is the Moby Prince Mayday, the
36:08distress call, which was sent from the
36:10portable VHF on the bridge. Moby Prince
36:15here. We are in a collision. We have
36:20been in a collision.
36:25Therefore, from aboard the Moby Prince,
36:28they could not communicate either with
36:30the ship's radio or with the portable
36:33VHF. But why couldn't the radios
36:35communicate? And why didn't the Moby
36:39Prince's radar, which was on, send an
36:42acoustic signal warning of the imminent
36:45danger of collision? Let's go back,
36:48then, to those audio recordings. After
36:52that confused Mayday, the distress
36:54signal, voices from French ships can be
36:57heard. Then, suddenly, the agitated
37:01voice of Renato Superina breaks in, who
37:04I recall was the captain of the Agip
37:07Abruzzo. Agip Abruzzo captain here.
37:16We are on fire. We are on fire. A ship
37:19hit us.
37:21A ship hit us, says Captain Superina of
37:23the Agip Abruzzo. But when they ask him
37:26which ship hit them, he will say:" It
37:29looks like a small tanker that hit us.
37:31"
37:32This matter of the colliding tanker
37:34will come back. Agip Abruzzo on fire.
37:38We have Iranian Light, Iranian Light
37:39Crude Oil, but we don't know the tanker
37:41that hit us. What does Bordock have?
37:45Captain Superina is certain, his
37:48message is very clear: the Agip Abruzzo
37:52was hit by a tanker, but a tanker is a
37:55much smaller vessel than a ferry,
37:59roughly 60-70 meters long compared to
38:02the 120 of the Moby Prince, and above
38:05all, it is much lower, like a car
38:08compared to a bus. So how is it
38:12possible to confuse a ferry with a
38:15tanker? But let's go back then to the
38:18dramatic plea from the captain of the
38:21Agip Abruzzo.
38:23The ship that hit us is also on fire,
38:24but I don't know where it is. I don't
38:26know. Be careful not to mistake her for
38:28us." Do not mistake her for us, "says
38:32the captain of the AGIP. Superina knows
38:35it's on fire, he says so himself; he
38:37saw it, therefore, yet he begs the
38:38rescuers to go to him. But the rescue
38:41efforts, the rescue efforts are a sore
38:42chapter in this whole ugly story. Two
38:45tugboats, a Finance Guard patrol boat,
38:47a Coast Guard boat, and a fire brigade
38:49boat depart immediately. Even small
38:51mooring boats head out. What is missing
38:54is a command, a coordination. Everyone
38:56does what they can on their own
38:58initiative. But who was supposed to
38:59give an order? The commander of the
39:01port of Livorno is Admiral Albanese. At
39:0411:08:48 PM, this communication is
39:06heard on channel 16. 250, come
39:08alongside the quay in front of the Port
39:11Authority to pick up the commander.
39:13Roger, we're on it.
39:16The commander is Admiral Albanese, who
39:18indeed boards the patrol boat 250 and
39:20disappears into the sea. From that
39:23moment on, his voice will never be
39:25heard on the rescue channel giving an
39:27order. Where did the port commander go?
39:30What did he do during those dramatic
39:32hours when 140 people on board a
39:34scheduled ferry were dying in port
39:35waters, burned alive, suffocated by
39:37smoke? Why didn't he give an order?
39:42Suffice it to say, the answer that
39:43Commander Albanese gives to the
39:45ministerial commission of inquiry." The
39:47officer from the operations center was
39:50giving these instructions to these
39:52vessels and I assented, in the sense
39:54that it was right to do so. "
39:56Yes. The port commander limits himself
39:58to listening to the radio and has
39:59nothing better to say, so he stays
40:01quiet. Why does no one look for Moby?
40:05It wasn't difficult to imagine that the
40:06only ship which, due to its route and
40:08schedule, could have been at the
40:09collision site was the Moby Prince.
40:11Easy, and yet, no one looks for it. To
40:14tell the truth," no one "isn't exactly
40:16correct. Two mooring men, Walter Mattei
40:18and Mauro Valli, spot the ferry
40:20drifting and on fire. They approach and
40:22notice the cabin boy, Bertran, clinging
40:24to the stern railing. They tell him to
40:27jump. Bertran refuses, he is afraid,
40:29and it's his first time at sea; the
40:31water is pitch black until, exhausted,
40:33he jumps.
40:35We have picked up a survivor. He says
40:37there are still people on the ship.
40:39The mooring man's voice is agitated,
40:41but clear. The survivor says there are
40:43still people on the ship to be saved. A
40:45few moments later he repeats it, but
40:47adds a detail. We have already picked
40:50up the survivor. Now we have a CP
40:52telling us to wait as well. A CP is a
40:55Coast Guard patrol boat. The mooring
40:58men's words are heavy as a stone. The
41:00CP is hesitating. More than a reproach,
41:02it sounds like an accusation. In short,
41:04the Moby is on fire, people are burning
41:06, dying, and they are doing nothing.
41:09The survivor says there are still
41:11survivors left to save.
41:13The two mooring men keep calling for
41:15help. They repeat that according to the
41:19cabin boy they just rescued, Moby
41:22Prince cabin boy Alessio Bertran, there
41:24are other people on board the burning
41:27ferry to be saved, but no one moves, no
41:29one gives orders, no one intervenes.
41:34The only response from the radio is
41:36silence. Silence. This is the graphic
41:40track of Channel 16. Even to the eye,
41:42you can see enormous gaps of silence,
41:44dead calm. The Moby is burning, people
41:47on the ferry are dying, and not a
41:49single order comes from the harbor
41:52master. You can even hear someone
41:54whistling and then a heavy curse in a
41:57Apulian dialect.
42:02Hey, you on the Moby, go screw
42:04yourselves. It is a bitter and tragic
42:06comment. Hard as the truth, and at a
42:09certain point the two poor mooring men
42:10under the Moby shout, someone must
42:12answer. What happened? But from the
42:15Port Authority, nothing. Silence. Again
42:17, macabre whistling. Still silence.
42:20Then something happens. The CP232 takes
42:23on the cold and intoxicated cabin boy,
42:25but does not move. It stays on the
42:28scene for half an hour in silence. Then
42:29, on Channel 16, it asks to return to
42:31port because the cabin boy is unwell.
42:33Permission granted. Immediately after,
42:36another conversation takes place
42:37between the Port Authority and the
42:39mooring man who saved Bertran. And the
42:41survivor, did he state if others jumped
42:43into the sea or not?
42:46The survivor said everyone died burned.
42:50Strange. Just two minutes ago the
42:52mooring man was shouting the survivor
42:54says there are people to save, and now
42:56he has him saying the exact opposite.
42:58But upon closer listening, something
43:00doesn't add up. The voice is now calm,
43:02the tone devoid of passion, as if the
43:04mooring man were betraying something, a
43:06bitter pill swallowed. It is worth
43:08listening to it again. This was the
43:11tone 20 minutes earlier.
43:13The survivor tells us there are still
43:15survivors to be saved.
43:16This is after Bertran boarded the CP232
43:19, having been there for half an hour.
43:22Our man said they were all burned to
43:24death. When the patrol boat requests
43:27permission to return to port, Alessio
43:29Bertrand, the Moby Prince cabin boy,
43:32has been on board for about half an
43:34hour. So, what happened in that half
43:37hour? Why did the patrol boat hesitate
43:39in the face of the desperate plea from
43:42the two mooring men? Yet Bertrand was
43:46right: there were living people on
43:48board the Moby Prince who could have
43:50been saved. Confirmation comes from
43:53blood analysis performed on the corpses
43:56found aboard the ferry. In fact, the
44:01level of carbon monoxide found in the
44:04blood measures how long a person
44:07inhaled smoke, and in some of the Moby
44:11Prince corpses, the level is even over
44:1590%, meaning those people breathed
44:18smoke for hours and hours before dying.
44:25This is the transcript of the
44:27deposition given on May 29, 1996, by
44:30Professor Angelo Fiori, a pathologist
44:33at the Policlinico Gemelli in Rome.
44:37What do these data tell us? That a
44:40group of people didn't die in half an
44:42hour, or even an hour in my opinion,
44:44but likely lasted for several hours.
44:48What Professor Fiori says is clear, but
44:49for the experts and the court, everyone
44:51on the Moby died in a few minutes. Why?
44:54But there is a video again whose truth
44:56cannot be denied. Livorno roadstead,
44:59the morning after the collision. The
45:01Moby is still smoking. In the distance,
45:04you can see the Agip Abruzzo still in
45:05flames. A Carabinieri helicopter passes
45:08by. It is 7:30 in the morning. The Moby
45:12Prince has been hooked and is being
45:14towed into port by tugboats. The camera
45:18lens pans over the completely scorched
45:21Moby, the side, the stern. At the stern
45:25, something can be seen—a red spot.
45:29Let's go back and slow it down. The red
45:33spot is the body of a passenger. It is
45:35intact, the clothes are in place;
45:37everything around the ship is
45:38completely burned, but the body is not.
45:41It's impossible. The only explanation
45:43is that the man arrived there after the
45:45flames; he probably came from below,
45:46from inside. He remained alive all
45:48night, and then when he heard the
45:50sounds of the rescuers at daybreak, he
45:52found the strength to climb up and out
45:54onto the still-searing deck to be seen.
45:57He made it that far and then lost
45:58consciousness. Two hours later, the
46:01towed Moby arrives in port.
46:03Firefighters go on board, and this is
46:06the man in the red shirt, now charred,
46:08burned by the heat of the metal sheets.
46:12That man reached the deck of the Moby
46:15under his own power just before these
46:18shots you just saw were taken. He was
46:22still alive, and at this point, I
46:24remind you, we are the next morning, so
46:26at least 8 hours after the collision
46:28between the Moby Prince and the Agip
46:31Abruzzo. On that ferry. Therefore,
46:34there were people still alive who could
46:36have been saved. Why then did the cabin
46:40boy suddenly change his version of
46:43events? Why did the court ignore
46:47Professor Fiori's testimony,
46:49maintaining that the majority of people
46:52on board the Moby Prince died within a
46:54few minutes? But let's return on board
46:59the Moby Prince; there are 2 minutes
47:01left until the collision. The roadstead
47:05that evening was a true hub of activity
47:07, but Captain Chessa knew the port of
47:08Livorno well; he knew that everyone
47:10anchors where they want or where they
47:12can, and that night there were many
47:14ships, including the two tankers and
47:16American militarized ships full of
47:18weapons and explosives. But what
47:20alarmed Captain Chessa? Let's go back 2
47:24minutes, exactly to 10:20:10 PM. In the
47:27recording of channel 16, we come across
47:30an audio fragment.
47:34It means the passenger ship. The
47:36passenger ship. Now, the only passenger
47:38ship in the area in Livorno at that
47:40moment is the Moby Prince. Who is
47:41reporting the presence of the Moby
47:43Prince and to whom?
47:45Another mystery, in short. But on
47:48channel 16, the channel used for
47:50emergency radio communications, other
47:53interesting tracks can also be found.
47:56Time 10:25:25 PM.
48:00The fragment is short and fast. Let's
48:03try to slow it down.
48:07Who is that ship? someone asks in
48:09Italian. 8 seconds later, Moby will hit
48:13the tanker head-on. But one of the most
48:18interesting audio tracks can be heard
48:20at 10:49:07 PM, about 24 minutes after
48:23the collision between Moby and the
48:25tanker. The message is in English. This
48:36is Teresa to Ship 1 in the Livorno
48:38roadstead. I'm leaving. I'm leaving.
48:40Teresa is certainly a code name because
48:42, after searches, there is no ship
48:44named Teresa that was cruising in the
48:46Tyrrhenian those days. So, an
48:48unidentified ship addressing Ship 1,
48:50another clearly coded ship name. Who
48:53was Ship 1? Who was Teresa, who leaves
48:56in a great hurry after the collision
48:57without even waiting for an answer?
49:00That evening in the roadstead, there
49:02was a great unjustified and unexplained
49:05traffic of faceless and unidentified
49:07ships, but they were real and concrete,
49:09tracked by some radar recordings and
49:11some testimonies. There is a trace, an
49:15actual trace of a vessel proceeding at
49:18high speed on a 67 ° heading, which is
49:20a potential collision course for ships
49:23exiting the port that evening. Then
49:26this trace is lost. And there are other
49:29memories, testimonies brought to the
49:31trial. There is the testimony of Walter
49:33Mattei, a mooring man and the person
49:35who saved Alessio Bertran, the cabin
49:37boy who survived the Moby Prince. Well,
49:40Mattei remembers and states at the
49:42trial that next to the burning Agip
49:44Abruzzo there was a barge, a strange
49:46low vessel completely illuminated in
49:48red, stopped and motionless as if to
49:50avoid being noticed by the rescue boats
49:52that were arriving. And then there is
49:55the testimony of Engineer Pompido, the
49:57chief engineer of the tanker Agip
49:59Abruzzo, who after the collision sees a
50:02large deep-sea fishing boat pass at a
50:04short distance from the tanker, a
50:06fishing boat on fire, a white fishing
50:08boat. And then the crew of the tugboat
50:11Tito Neri II, who, while trying to
50:13reach the burning tanker in the
50:16roadstead, are almost hit by a white
50:18fishing boat that cuts them off and
50:20flees. This is also a curious thing;
50:23where an accident occurs, vessels
50:24usually rush to provide help. Instead,
50:27that evening, at the point where the
50:29Moby Prince collided with the tanker,
50:31there were numerous, too many vessels
50:33fleeing, nameless vessels.
50:35But that evening in the Livorno
50:37roadstead, at the moment of the
50:38collision, there were not only
50:40mysterious and unidentified ships.
50:42At a certain point, there was a
50:44helicopter up there. I said the only
50:47thing I said. I cannot tell him, I also
50:50told the magistrate, if it came from...
50:52surely it did not come from land, in
50:53the sense that it did not cross over
50:55our heads going toward the sea, and not
50:57even, you know? Coming from behind us.
51:01Nothing, we just saw that at a certain
51:03point it was up there, right there
51:05nearby. This is the ship and it, and it
51:07was here.
51:08A helicopter that was also seen by a
51:10soldier on guard at the Naval Academy,
51:11Massimo Vernace. I think that about
51:14half an hour after the collision, a
51:15helicopter passed by. And the port
51:18lookout, Romeo Ricci, also speaks of a
51:20helicopter. I don't know what type of
51:22helicopter it was, but something was
51:24there. You could really hear the rumble
51:27because when it passes here, this
51:29structure vibrates a lot and it was, it
51:31was there.
51:33The investigation would confirm that no
51:36Italian helicopter flew over the Moby
51:38Prince disaster area. So then? So who
51:42was that helicopter? But there is one
51:45more document we want to show you. It
51:48is November 30, 1992. A year and a half
51:53has passed since the Moby Prince
51:55tragedy. An anonymous voice calls the
51:58Livorno broadcaster Telegranducato. He
52:02identifies himself as a civilian who
52:04works on the computer system of the
52:06NATO base at Camp Darby in Pisa.
52:09Good evening. I can even say it, anyway
52:13I don't think they will recognize me. I
52:16work at Camp Darby and I am in charge
52:18of the computers. That evening, some
52:22military and civilian colleagues
52:23started laughing when they said they
52:25were blaming the fog, because there was
52:27no fog that night, except for some
52:28smoke screens. When the military is
52:31involved, it's a bit complicated, you
52:33understand? But let me ask you just one
52:36thing, I don't know if you can answer
52:38me, but is there something the military
52:41knows that perhaps the judiciary or
52:43even the public doesn't know, something
52:45particularly significant? We detected
52:48everything. So
52:49how could the American satellites have
52:51detected it? We detected everything,
52:54unlike Ustica, this is a different
52:56matter, there's a lot of confusion here
52:57. But you see, this story is different
53:01because we were close, and you
53:04understand, we were too close to the
53:07place where it happened, so the naval
53:10radar tracks from that evening exist.
53:13So
53:15the radar tracks from that evening do
53:17exist. We recorded everything. This
53:21testimony must naturally be taken for
53:23what it is: an anonymous voice claiming
53:25to have evidence of something that is
53:27not specified and remains unclear. The
53:31only certain thing, however, is that
53:34for the 140 deaths of the Moby Prince,
53:38only the third officer of the Agip
53:41Abruzzo was found guilty for not
53:44keeping the tanker's radar on. However,
53:48the statute of limitations for the
53:50crime expired. SNAM, the shipping
53:53company of the Agip Abruzzo, was
53:55ordered to pay damages to the victims '
53:58families. And yet, and yet, there
54:02remain many, too many questions about
54:04the Moby Prince tragedy. Who were all
54:08those ships that were never identified?
54:12What were they doing in the Livorno
54:14roadstead? Where did the fishing boat
54:1921 Otto go that night? Why did it
54:23refuel if it was officially under
54:26repair? Why did no one look for the
54:30Moby Prince for hours, even though it
54:32was on fire in front of the port of
54:34Livorno? Was there an explosion on the
54:38Moby, and if so, what was its origin?
54:42Why weren't the rescue efforts
54:44coordinated? Where was the Agip Abruzzo
54:48really? Why did the tanker's captain
54:51give contradictory information about
54:54the ship's position and the orientation
54:56of its bow? Why was the Agip Abruzzo's
55:01logbook left on the bridge and allowed
55:04to burn three days later? Why did many
55:09witnesses lie? Why is it impossible to
55:13reach the truth about the death of 140
55:16people?

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