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Meta-Ethics: Realism, Anti-Realism, Non-Cognitivism, Error Theory, etc. (Moral Philosophy Episode 4) — Transcript

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0:00So today we're talking about meta
0:02ethics. Now meta ethics differs from
0:04normative ethics uh like the previous
0:07videos because normative e normative
0:10ethics uh kind of just takes it for
0:12granted that good and bad exist and then
0:15tries to come up with definitions that
0:17fit our intuitions about what's good and
0:19bad. you know, you just take it for
0:22granted that, you know, beating up a
0:26child for no reason is a bad thing to
0:29do. And then you want a theory that fits
0:31your intuitions that that's a bad thing
0:33to do. But metaeththics kind of zooms
0:37out and questions what, if anything,
0:40good and bad actually are. So there's
0:44kind of two broad questions to this
0:46topic. The first question, the
0:49psychological question is what do people
0:51mean when they say moral judgments like
0:54stealing is wrong? Are they literally
0:56describing the world like how someone
0:59would
1:00describe grass as being
1:02green? Or are they instead expressing
1:05perhaps a feeling of emotion that's
1:08neither true or false? And this is the
1:10debate between cognitivism and
1:11non-cognitivism.
1:13Then the second question is the
1:15metaphysical question of whether good
1:17and bad and right and wrong whether
1:19these properties are real mind
1:22independent objective properties that
1:24exist out there in the world are good
1:26and
1:30bad. So these two questions give rise to
1:33two broad categories. You've got realism
1:36versus anti-realism on the metaphysical
1:38question and then you've got cognitivism
1:40versus non-cognitivism on the
1:42psychological question. But it gets a
1:45bit more complicated than that because
1:47you've also got a bunch of uh more
1:49specific theories that fall within these
1:51categories. And so yeah, it's another
1:54one of those topics that has a lot of
1:56definitions. But I do think once you get
1:59over the dry terminology, it is perhaps
2:03the more interesting question in moral
2:06philosophy because the question
2:08is, you know, does morality even exist
2:12or is it all just a madeup lie?
2:14[Music]
2:34Right. So like I mentioned at a high
2:37level meta ethics has two main
2:39questions. So the metaphysical question
2:42is about whether mind independent moral
2:45properties and facts exist. So this is
2:49the debate between moral realism and
2:51moral
2:52anti-realism. If you watch the uh
2:55knowledge from perception video, realism
2:57in the context of moral realism means
2:59the same thing as it did in that video.
3:02Direct realism is as the name implies a
3:05realist theory. In other words, direct
3:07realists believe that objects such as
3:09tables and chairs and the road exist
3:12independently of our mind. And
3:15similarly, moral realists agree that
3:18moral properties exist mind
3:20independently objectively out there in
3:22the world. So according to moral realism
3:27uh stealing has the property of
3:30wrongness similar to how the Eiffel
3:33Tower has the property of being 330 m
3:36tall. The moral properties are real
3:40objective properties of the world like
3:43height or squareness
3:47or I don't
3:49know being
3:52jagged. When I've defined moral realism
3:55before as the belief that mind
3:57independent moral properties and facts
3:59exist, people in the comments often like
4:01to correct me and say, "You mean stance
4:05independent rather than mind
4:06independent, but we'll get to that." So,
4:09basically, moral realism is the view
4:11that good and bad are objective
4:14properties of the world, like being 10 m
4:17tall or
4:18whatever. And moral anti-realism is just
4:21the rejection of this claim. But it gets
4:23more complicated than that because
4:25within moral realism, you've also got
4:27the debate about what kind of properties
4:30moral properties are. But we'll get to
4:32that. Anyway, that's the metaphysical
4:35question, but you've also got the
4:36psychological question of uh what people
4:39mean when they make moral judgments such
4:41as stealing is wrong. And this is the
4:43debate between cognitivism and
4:45non-cognitivism.
4:47So, cognitivism says a moral judgment
4:50like stealing is wrong is literally true
4:53or false. It's a description or a belief
4:56in the same way that grass is green or
4:58grass is red. Grass is green is a true
5:01belief. Grass is green, red is a false
5:03belief, but they're both descriptions or
5:06beliefs that are capable of being true
5:08or false. And that's how cognitivism
5:11analyzes stealing is wrong. It's a
5:14description like you know this water is
5:17wet truth apt is what I'm saying. Then
5:21the opposing view is
5:23non-cognitivism. So
5:26non-cognitivism says that moral
5:28judgments are not truth that they're not
5:31descriptions or beliefs and so are
5:32neither true or false.
5:35Uh I'll talk more perhaps about some
5:37specific examples, but perhaps the most
5:40obvious form of non-cognitivism is
5:43emotivism. So if you think about when
5:46the referee gives a bad decision in a
5:50game of football or whatever and the
5:51crowd all starts
5:55booing, that expression is neither true
5:58or false. And so equality emotivism,
6:01stealing is wrong means something more
6:03like that. Again, boo, not true or
6:06false. So, you can think of these as two
6:08separate debates. You've got realism
6:10versus anti-realism on the metaphysical
6:13debate, and then you've got cognitivism
6:15versus non-cognitivism on the
6:17psychological debate. But there is a bit
6:20of overlap between these various
6:23debates. For
6:25example, if non-cognitivism is true,
6:30then anti-realism is true.
6:33But it doesn't always overlap perfectly
6:35because if anti-realism is true, that
6:38doesn't necessarily mean non-cognitivism
6:40is
6:40true. And as if that wasn't complicated
6:44enough, you've also got more specific
6:47theories that fall under these various
6:50categories. So you've
6:52got naturalism, non-naturalism, error
6:56theory, prescriptivism, emotivism.
6:59So, like I said, there's a lot of
7:01terminology, but I'll put on the screen
7:04a table, which I think is the easiest
7:08way to represent this
7:12information. Anyway, that's a highlevel
7:15overview of the topic. Cognitivism
7:18versus non-cognitivism is about what
7:20people mean when they say stealing is
7:22wrong. And realism versus anti-realism,
7:25which is where we're going to start, is
7:27about whether moral properties like good
7:29and bad exist mind independently,
7:32objectively out there in the
7:39world. So again, moral realism is the
7:42view that mind independent moral
7:44properties and facts exist. that good
7:47and bad are real objective properties of
7:50things in the same way that being blue
7:52or being 10 meters tall are real
7:55objective properties of things out there
7:56in the world that good and bad are every
7:59bit as objective and real as these other
8:02properties.
8:04And all moral realist theories are also
8:08cognitivist theories. Because if good
8:10and bad are real properties that actions
8:13can have,
8:15then stealing is wrong for example is
8:18true if the act of stealing has this
8:22objective property of wrongness. But
8:24let's not worry too much about
8:26cognitivism for the time being. So all
8:28moral realists agree that moral
8:30properties exist mind independently.
8:33that good and bad are just as real as
8:36properties like height or shape or
8:39color. But within moral realism, there's
8:42a disagreement about what kind of
8:44properties moral properties are. Moral
8:46naturalism says that moral properties
8:49are natural properties, whereas moral
8:51non-naturalism says that moral
8:53properties are non-natural properties.
9:00The exact definition of natural
9:01properties uh like all definitions in
9:04meta ethics and philosophy is
9:06contentious but GE Moore characterizes
9:10natural properties as observable
9:13measurable um quantifiable properties
9:16that you can touch.
9:17So the roundness of this tennis ball or
9:20its you know bounciness
9:25uh these are natural properties because
9:27you can observe them and measure them.
9:29And so moral naturalism says that moral
9:31properties are like the properties of
9:33the tennis ball that good and bad are
9:37physical
9:39observable natural properties.
9:42Basically, probably the most obvious
9:44example of moral naturalism would be
9:47utilitarianism. So, if you watch the
9:50utilitarianism video, you'll remember
9:52that hedonistic utilitarianism reduces
9:55the moral property of good to pleasure
9:59and it reduces the moral property of bad
10:01to. In other words, that what good and
10:04bad are are happiness or unhappiness,
10:08pleasure and pain.
10:10And there's nothing spooky or
10:13supernatural about pleasure and pain.
10:16You know, you experience these uh
10:19sensations or emotions all the time. And
10:22so if good and bad reduced to pleasure
10:26and pain as hedonistic utilitarianism
10:28claims, then naturalism is correct
10:31because
10:32good is a natural property of happiness
10:36and bad is the natural property of
10:38unhappiness. if that makes sense. Uh
10:41just in case you were thinking this, I
10:43think utilitarianism is maybe the reason
10:46why people always correct me and say
10:50moral realism says that moral properties
10:53are stance independent rather than mind
10:55independent because I guess pleasure and
10:58pain are not mind independent properties
11:01strictly speaking, but they're stance
11:04independent. But
11:07whatever. Anyway, utilitarianism, it's
11:10typically understood metaethically as a
11:13naturalist theory because if good
11:16reduces to pleasure, then good reduces
11:20to a natural property because pleasure
11:22is at least in theory a measurable and
11:26quantifiable, observable thing. There's
11:29nothing spooky or non-natural about
11:31pleasure. And Mill, John Stewart Mill,
11:36gives a kind of metaethical argument for
11:40utilitarianism in his essay,
11:42utilitarianism. But the exact
11:45metaethical interpretation of Mill's
11:47argument here is a bit contentious. But
11:50as always, I'll link the uh original
11:53essay down below for you to read it
11:54yourself. But the gist of Mill's proof
11:57of utilitarianism is that the only proof
12:00that something is desirable is that
12:02people desire it in the same way that
12:04the only proof that something is visible
12:05is that people can see it. And so the
12:08general happiness is desirable because
12:10each person desires their own happiness.
12:12And this desiraability of the general
12:14happiness is all the proof the case of
12:17that happiness is a good thing. other
12:19things we might assign value to like
12:21truth, virtue, money, fame, or dignity.
12:25We value these things because they make
12:27us happy. They're part of what happiness
12:29is to us. And so, not only is happiness
12:32a good thing, it is the only good
12:36thing. So, basically, questions about
12:38what's good can be boiled down to
12:40questions about happiness. And so if
12:42Mill's proof of utilitarianism here is
12:45successful, then he's proved that moral
12:47naturalism is correct because happiness
12:49is a natural property. It's observable,
12:53you know, to some extent measurable.
12:55It's not spooky or supernatural like a
12:58ghost for example. And
12:59so yeah, if Mill's argument here
13:02succeeds, then he succeeded in proving
13:04moral naturalism is correct. But I'm not
13:07100% sure that Mill was arguing
13:11metaethically for moral naturalism
13:13because I don't think the term moral
13:15naturalism even existed in Mill's day.
13:18But this is certainly how GE Moore
13:21interprets Mill's argument here. Moore
13:24interprets Mill as uh making a kind of
13:26reduction of good to the natural
13:29property of happiness or pleasure. A bit
13:32like perhaps how water can be reduced to
13:35H2O. And Moore rejects Mill's reductive
13:39approach here. Moore rejects the notion
13:42that moral properties like good and bad
13:45can be reduced to natural properties.
13:47And so Moore instead argues for moral
13:50non-naturalism.
13:55So moral naturalism says that moral
13:57properties like good and bad can be
13:59reduced to simpler natural properties
14:01like pleasure and pain in the case of
14:04utilitarianism. That moral properties
14:06are natural properties like yellowess or
14:10roundness. But non-naturalism disagrees.
14:14So non-naturalism is still a realist
14:16theory. Non-naturalism still agrees that
14:18moral properties like good and bad exist
14:20and they exist objectively mind
14:23independently. But non-naturalism says
14:25that moral properties can't be reduced
14:27to anything simpler. That non that moral
14:31properties are simple and unanalyzable.
14:34And so this is how G Moore characterizes
14:38moral properties. He says they are
14:40simple unanalyzable that good and bad
14:43can't be reduced to anything simpler. So
14:46Moore gives the example of a horse to
14:48illustrate the difference. You can break
14:50the idea of a horse down into simpler
14:52properties and qualities. It might have
14:54brown fur, a tail, four legs, and so on.
14:58But eventually you'll reach a point
14:59where these qualities like color can't
15:01be reduced to anything simpler. So he
15:03gives the example of the color yellow to
15:05illustrate what happens once you reach
15:07these basic properties. Although this
15:09example maybe confuses things a bit
15:11because
15:12yellow is a natural property. Um, but
15:17anyway, uh, Moore's point here is that
15:19you can't explain what yellow is by
15:22reducing it to something simpler. Like
15:24if somebody doesn't already know what
15:26yellow is, you can't explain to them
15:28what yellow is by reducing the color
15:30yellow down into something simpler.
15:34You know, you could talk about uh
15:35wavelengths of light, for example, and
15:38these are definitely correlated with our
15:40experience of seeing yellow, but if
15:42somebody doesn't know, if someone
15:44doesn't have the concept of the
15:45experience of yellow, then this isn't
15:47going to do anything to help them
15:49understand what yellow is. So yellow is
15:52a basic property like you can't reduce
15:54it to anything simpler. And Moore says
15:57it's a similar thing with good. So it
16:00may be true says more that all things
16:02which are good are also something else
16:04just as it is true that all things which
16:06are yellow produce a certain kind of
16:07vibration in the light but this doesn't
16:10prove that good is the same thing as the
16:13effect it produces. In the same way it
16:16doesn't prove that yellow is the same
16:17thing as the wavelengths of light. In
16:20other words, even if it's true that
16:22everything that's good produces
16:24happiness and everything that produces
16:25happiness is good, that doesn't prove
16:28that goodness and happiness are the same
16:31thing. To think otherwise says more. To
16:34think that we can provide a definition
16:35of good by appealing to what's common to
16:38all good things commits the naturalistic
16:41fallacy according to Moore. So Moore
16:44says that any attempt to reduce moral
16:46properties to simpler properties like
16:48this to simpler properties like pleasure
16:50for example in the case of
16:51utilitarianism commits this naturalistic
16:54fallacy that even if moral properties
16:56like goodness are correlated with
16:59natural properties like pleasure it's a
17:01fallacy to think that this proves that
17:03the goodness the moral properties are
17:05the same things as these natural
17:07properties. There's a lot more to
17:09Moore's argument than I've talked about
17:11here, but we'll be here all day if I uh
17:14carry on down the Principia ethic
17:17avenue. So perhaps we'll talk about the
17:19open question argument and concepts and
17:22properties another day. But Moore's
17:24point is essentially that moral
17:26properties again can't be reduced to
17:28anything simpler. That moral properties
17:30like good and bad are real, but they are
17:33basic. Uh they can't be reduced to
17:35anything simpler.
17:38But Moore's non-naturalism potentially
17:40raises an epistemological issue. If you
17:44remember, we defined natural properties
17:46as properties that are observable,
17:48detectable by the senses, measurable,
17:50and so on. But if moral properties are
17:54non-natural, so they're not empirically
17:56observable, then we might ask, well, how
17:59do we know about these moral properties?
18:02How do we know stealing is wrong, for
18:03example, if wrongness isn't a natural
18:06property that can be observed and
18:09measured? So, Moore's response to this
18:11epistemological question is
18:14intuitionism. Moore says, we have this a
18:16priori, if you remember that term from
18:18the rationalism versus empiricism video,
18:21a priori knowledge is knowledge that can
18:24be gained without any experience of the
18:26world outside of our minds. If you need
18:29help remembering this term, the clue is
18:31kind of in the name, a priori means
18:34prior to experience. We have this a
18:38priori faculty of moral intuition that
18:41enables us to grasp intuitively uh for
18:45example that stealing is wrong. So moral
18:47intuitions like this are not something
18:49that can be proved by evidence or even
18:51proved deductively via reason. They're
18:54just recognized as self-evidently true
18:56by this faculty of moral intuition.
18:59Moore says there is no proper evidence
19:01or reason that can be provided for moral
19:03facts except the fact itself. It is
19:05untrue because it is untrue and there is
19:08no other reason. But I declare it untrue
19:10because its untruth is evident to me and
19:12I hold that this is sufficient reason
19:14for my
19:19assertion. So that was moral realism.
19:22The view that mind independent moral
19:24properties and facts exist and both
19:28moral naturalism and moral
19:29non-naturalism agree on moral realism.
19:32They agree that moral properties and
19:34facts exist, that good and bad are real
19:37properties and that there are moral
19:39facts like stealing is bad. They just
19:42disagree about the nature of these
19:43properties. Moral naturalism says bad is
19:46a can be reduced to a natural property.
19:49Whereas moral non-naturalism says that
19:51bad or good cannot be reduced to
19:54anything simpler. So both naturalism and
19:57non-naturalism agree on moral realism.
20:00They agree that mind independent moral
20:02properties exist. And so the opposing
20:05view is moral anti-realism. And this is
20:08the view that mind independent moral
20:10properties don't exist.
20:17So moral anti-realism is just the
20:19rejection of moral realism. So where
20:23moral realism says that good and bad
20:25exist, moral anti-realism says these
20:28properties don't exist, at least not
20:30mind
20:31independently. So moral anti-realism is
20:35the view that mind independent moral
20:37properties and facts don't exist. Now,
20:39there's a lot of different theories that
20:41fall under the umbrella of anti-realism,
20:44but I think the most important
20:46distinction is between error theory and
20:52non-cognitivism. So, so far we've
20:54assumed a cognitivist interpretation of
20:56moral language. We've assumed that moral
20:59judgments like stealing is wrong are
21:01literal descriptions or beliefs that are
21:03capable of being true or false. So both
21:07moral naturalism and moral
21:08non-naturalism agreed on this. They just
21:10disagree about the kind of properties
21:13that make this uh description true or
21:15false. For naturalism, stealing is wrong
21:18is true if wrongness uh if stealing has
21:21this natural property of wrongness.
21:23Whereas for non-naturalism, stealing is
21:25wrong is true if it has this non-natural
21:28property of wrongness. So both
21:30non-naturalism and naturalism agree on
21:33cognitivism.
21:35But non-cognitivism says that moral
21:37judgments like stealing is wrong are not
21:40descriptions or beliefs. And so they're
21:42neither true or false. Now on the face
21:45of it, this can be quite
21:46counterintuitive because if you look at
21:48the grammatical structure of the
21:50sentence uh stealing is wrong, it has
21:53the same structure as uh other
21:56descriptions like grass is green or
21:59water is wet. But non-cognitivism says
22:04uh this similarity is only superficial
22:07and that what moral judgments really
22:09mean is something non-cognitive that
22:12stealing is wrong is not a description
22:14or a belief and so it's neither true or
22:16false. So you might be wondering well
22:19what does a sentence that's neither true
22:21or false look like? So let me give you
22:24some examples. In fact, I already gave
22:26the example, didn't I, of when the crowd
22:29booze at a football match, that sentence
22:32boo is, it's not even a sentence, but
22:34you know what I'm saying. That's that
22:36utterance boo is neither true or false.
22:40Likewise, uh when the team scores a goal
22:43and the crowd shouts hooray, hurray is
22:47is not true or false either. It's just
22:49an expression of positive emotion.
22:52Likewise, uh, shut the door or go over
22:56there or do your homework. These are
22:59instructions. You know, it's not like
23:00shut the door is either true or false.
23:04So, these are you can think of these as
23:06like non-cognitive expressions. Boo,
23:09hooray, shut the door, go over there.
23:12These sentences are neither true or
23:14false. So there's different types of
23:17non-cognitivism such as emotivism and
23:20prescriptivism. So prescriptivism for
23:22example says that what stealing is wrong
23:25really means is something more like the
23:27shut the door example. The stealing is
23:30wrong means something like don't steal.
23:32It's an instruction. And this
23:34instruction again it's neither true or
23:36false. It's not like shut the door or
23:40don't steal or go over there. These
23:42kinds of sentences are just
23:44instructions. they're neither true or
23:46false. And so this is how
23:47prescriptivism, which is a form of
23:49non-cognitivism, analyzes moral
23:51judgments. But perhaps the most obvious
23:53form of non-cognitivism is emotivism. So
23:58I think emotivism is sometimes called
24:00boo theory. And I think this is a good
24:02way of summarizing the theory. So
24:05according to emotivism,
24:07uh stealing is wrong is like saying boo.
24:11It's expressing emotional disapproval at
24:14the act of stealing or you know giving
24:18money to charity is good is like the
24:21crowd shouting hoay when their team
24:23scores. And so boo and hurray these
24:27expressions of uh negative and positive
24:29emotions
24:31respectively. These expressions are
24:34neither true or false. And so if
24:36stealing is wrong just means boo
24:39stealing, then stealing is wrong is not
24:42a description or a belief. And so it's
24:44neither true or false. Anyway, I don't
24:47want to get too bogged down in the
24:49specific forms of non-cognitivism. But
24:52the point is that all forms of
24:54non-cognitivism say that stealing is
24:56wrong, is not a description or a belief,
24:58and so is neither true or false. And
25:02this makes non-cognitivism a form of
25:04anti-realism. Because if you're not
25:06describing properties in the external
25:09world, then you don't need a property of
25:11wrongness to make this description true
25:13or false because it's not a description
25:15in the first place, if that makes sense.
25:24So, David Hume was an emotivist or at
25:27least he would have been an emotivist if
25:29the term emotivism existed back in his
25:32day. Because in treaties of human
25:35nature, Hume says morality is not an
25:39object of reason. Take any action
25:41allowed to be vicious. Willful murder
25:43for example. Examine it in all its
25:45lights and see if you can find that
25:46matter of fact or real existence which
25:48you call vice. In whichever way you take
25:51it, you find only certain passions,
25:53motives, valitions, and thoughts. There
25:56is no other matter of fact in the case.
25:59The vice entirely escapes you as long as
26:01you consider the object. You never can
26:04find it till you turn your affection
26:05into your own breast and find a
26:07sentiment of disapprobation which arises
26:09in you towards this action. Here is a
26:11matter of fact, but is the object of
26:13feeling, not of reason. It lies in
26:16yourself and not in the object. Vice and
26:19virtue, therefore, may be compared to
26:21sounds, colors, heat, and cold, which
26:23according to modern philosophy are not
26:25qualities of objects, but perceptions in
26:27the
26:28mind. In other words, there's nothing in
26:31the act of murder itself that we can
26:33identify as wrongness. The vice entirely
26:37escapes you as long as you consider the
26:39objects, I assume. Instead, the only
26:43wrongness we can find is a subjective
26:46feeling. uh this feeling of disapproval
26:49and not something mind
26:51independent. So one way you can argue
26:53for emotivism or non-cognitivism is with
26:56Hume's fork if you remember that from
26:58the rationalism versus empiricism video.
27:01But rather than talk about Hume's fork,
27:03I'm instead going to talk about AJA's
27:06verification principle which is
27:08basically exactly the same argument but
27:10with different terms.
27:12So where Hume says there are two
27:16judgments of reason i.e. two types of
27:18cognitive judgments relations of ideas
27:20and matters of fact as says there are
27:23only two meaningful and in this context
27:26there's only two
27:29cognitive types of sentence. They are
27:32analytic truths. So analytic
27:34propositions are propositions that are
27:37true in virtue of what the words mean.
27:40true by definition. So another example
27:43of an analytic proposition would be
27:45something like all triangles have three
27:48sides because that's just what the word
27:50triangle means. Three-sided shape and
27:53propositions that are empirically
27:55verifiable and this is known as vera's
27:57verification principle. So if we apply
28:00the verification principle to a moral
28:03judgment like stealing is wrong. It's
28:06not like stealing is wrong. Firstly,
28:08stealing is wrong is not an analytic
28:10truth. It's not true by definition.
28:12There's no logical contradiction in the
28:15idea of stealing is not wrong. It's not
28:18like a four-sided triangle or a married
28:21bachelor. And so moral judgments are not
28:23analytic truths in a terminology or
28:27relations of ideas in Hume's
28:29terminology.
28:31So the
28:34next prong of the fork or prong of the
28:38verification principle depending on
28:40which one you go
28:41with says uh our moral
28:46judgments. So the other option is
28:48empirically verifiable and a says that
28:52uh stealing is wrong and other moral
28:54judgments are not empirically verifiable
28:56either. It's not like you can do an
28:58experiment to measure the wrongness or
29:01quantify it. Uh and Hume would say
29:05stealing is wrong is not a matter of
29:08fact either for the reasons mentioned
29:09previously. There's no objective fact of
29:12the matter only an internal feeling. So
29:16the long and short of it is a
29:18verification principle says there's only
29:21two types of
29:23cognitive/meful statements. analytic
29:26truths and truths that are empirically
29:28verifiable. And given that moral
29:30judgments are not analytic truths, nor
29:33are they empirically verifiable, it
29:35follows that according to the
29:37verification principle, moral judgments
29:40are not cognitive statements at all.
29:42They are neither true or false. They're,
29:46you know what I'm
29:54saying? Humeachi gives a bunch of other
29:56arguments for emotivism which are quite
29:59interesting but again I think this video
30:03is already complicated enough with all
30:05the definitions. So uh perhaps I'll do a
30:09further video on the is or gap
30:12the moral judgments motivate action
30:15argument. I think there's probably some
30:17more as well. But yeah, that was
30:25emotivism. So, as mentioned,
30:27non-cognitivism is anti-realist because
30:30if moral judgments are not trying to
30:33describe uh properties in the external
30:36world in the first place, then you don't
30:38need these properties to make these
30:40descriptions true or false. And maybe
30:43this non-cognitivist interpretation of
30:46moral judgments works if you look at
30:48stealing is wrong in isolation. But as
30:51an argument against
30:53non-cognitivism, we can point to
30:55examples where moral judgments are
30:58embedded in contexts like uh arguments.
31:02So this is probably one of those ones.
31:04If I show it on screen, it'll probably
31:05be more clear. So according to
31:08emotivism, eating animals is wrong means
31:11boo eating animals. But this analysis
31:15kind of doesn't make sense if you look
31:17at a situation where the same moral
31:19judgment is embedded in an argument like
31:22if eating animals is wrong then you
31:25should be a vegetarian. There's nothing
31:27kind of weird about these statements.
31:29People make arguments like this all the
31:31time. But that sentence kind of only
31:33makes sense if the moral judgment is
31:36intended as the kind of uh proposition
31:39that can be true or false. I'm saying if
31:42it is true that eating animals is wrong
31:44then you should be a vegetarian. Or if
31:48we take the emotivist interpretation the
31:51argument kind of loses all meaning like
31:54if boo eating animals then you should be
31:58a vegetarian. That doesn't make sense.
32:00And so moral reasoning arguments like
32:03this when moral judgments are embedded
32:05in conditional statements only seem to
32:08make sense if moral judgments are
32:10intended as truth at descriptions or
32:13beliefs. Basically, if you look at
32:16situations where people embed moral
32:19judgments in arguments or moral
32:22disagreement, when people are having
32:24debates about what's right or wrong,
32:26emotivism and non-cognitivism makes a
32:29lot less sense. It's like if it was just
32:33ultimately a subjective, you know,
32:34morality was all just about subjective
32:36feelings, then why would people bother
32:38to write, you know, why would Kant write
32:42page after page trying to convince you
32:44that the categorical imperative was
32:46correct if it was ultimately just, you
32:49know, boo for telling lies or whatever
32:51the example is. So non-cognitivism makes
32:55a lot less sense when you look at moral
32:58reasoning, moral arguments like
33:06this. So that argument where moral
33:08judgments are embedded in conditional
33:11statements as an argument for
33:12cognitivism is known as the frager ge
33:15embedding problem. And JL Mackey who's
33:19the error theory guy gives his own
33:22examples uh arguing for cognitivism in
33:26ethics inventing right and wrong. So uh
33:29Macki Mackey gives the example I think
33:31of somebody who's been offered a job
33:34engaging in research to do with chemical
33:37weapons.
33:39So Mackey says if you're kind of
33:42ethically conflicted on whether you
33:44should take this job, you don't kind of
33:47search like how do I feel about chemical
33:49weapons. You want to know is it
33:51objectively right to engage in research
33:54to do with chemical weapons. So not only
33:57in the philosophical context with K but
33:59also in the ordinary context it seems
34:02that we do use moral judgments um we see
34:05them as truth apt descriptions or
34:08beliefs and we want to know whether you
34:10know stealing is wrong is literally true
34:12or false. So what's all this got to do
34:15with moral anti-realism? Well JL Mackey
34:18is still an anti-realist. He believes
34:21that mind independent moral properties
34:23and facts don't exist. But he's also a
34:27cognitivist. So he believes that
34:28stealing is wrong is a description or a
34:31belief. It's
34:32truth. But and this is what error theory
34:35says because wrongness and all these
34:38other moral properties don't exist
34:40because anti-realism is true. Then
34:43although stealing is wrong is truth apt.
34:46It's supposed to be a description or a
34:48belief. it's always going to be a false
34:50belief because the property of wrongness
34:53doesn't exist. So, the other day I
34:56thought of what I think is a good
34:58analogy to illustrate what error theory
35:01says. So, I was thinking about um I've
35:04been watching a lot of videos on psychic
35:06powers and I think there might be
35:09something to it, but for the sake of
35:10argument, let's say that psychic powers
35:12don't exist. So if the property of being
35:16psychic doesn't exist, that there's no
35:18such thing as psychic powers, then any
35:21statement like Jenny is a psychic or
35:24John is a psychic, these sentences are
35:27always going to be false because the
35:28property of being psychic doesn't exist.
35:31And so similarly, if wrongness and
35:35rightness and goodness and badness, if
35:38these mind independent moral properties
35:40don't exist, then any sentence that uh
35:45attributes these properties to actions
35:47like stealing is wrong. These sentences
35:50are always going to be false because the
35:52property contained within that sentence
35:54doesn't exist. If that makes sense. So
35:57error theory is cognitivism plus moral
36:00anti-realism. And Mackey gives a bunch
36:03of again really good arguments for moral
36:06anti-realism in ethics inventing right
36:09and wrong. But the main one I'm going to
36:12focus on is Mackey's arguments from
36:14queerness.
36:18Come on, stop being so
36:20childish. So Mackey's argument from
36:23queerness has two parts. There's the
36:25metaphysical queerness and the epistemic
36:28queerness. So metaphysical querness
36:31means Mackey says that moral properties
36:34would be completely unlike any other uh
36:37properties we know of. So Mackey says
36:40moral properties would be metaphysically
36:42queer because you know goodness if
36:45something had the property of goodness
36:46it would be like
36:49the object itself would be telling you
36:52to do this thing. He says, "An objective
36:56good would be sought by anyone who is
36:58acquainted with it. Not because of any
37:00contingent fact that this person or
37:01every person is so constituted that he
37:04desires this end, but just because the
37:06end has to be pursuedness somehow built
37:08into it. Similarly, if there were
37:11objective principles of right and wrong,
37:13any wrong possible course of action
37:15would have not to be done this somehow
37:17built into it." So what I think Mackey
37:21is getting at here is that if you know
37:24stealing for stealing to have the
37:26property of wrongness for wrongness to
37:28be this mind independent property that
37:30exists objectively then there'd be kind
37:32of something within the physical act of
37:35stealing that's like saying don't do
37:37this. And if that doesn't make sense as
37:40an idea if that sounds weird then that's
37:43kind of Macky's whole point. Like it's
37:45not clear how a physical action or you
37:48know the atoms could be like saying you
37:51know don't do this thing like a person
37:54can say don't do that but it's not like
37:56a objective property could tell you that
38:00you shouldn't do something. So Mackey
38:02says that moral properties like
38:05wrongness, rightness, goodness and
38:07badness. They would be very strange.
38:11It'd be very hard to make sense of how
38:12these properties would work
38:13metaphysically because it would be like
38:16the object or the physical stuff itself
38:20would be saying do this and do that. And
38:24that's generally not how physical, you
38:27know, it's just a weird idea basically,
38:30isn't it? It's metaphysically queer.
38:35So that's metaphysical queerness that if
38:38moral properties were to exist then you
38:41know the world would constantly be
38:42telling you do this and do that and
38:44that's just a weird idea. Then the
38:47second part of the argument from
38:49queerness is the epistemic queerness. So
38:53Mackey says that even if we were to
38:55accept that metaphysically these moral
38:58properties of good and bad could exist,
39:01it'd be a complete mystery how we would
39:04know about them. It'd be a complete
39:05mystery how we would know that stealing
39:07is wrong, for example, or stealing is
39:10bad. So the epistemic queerness argument
39:14kind of relates back to Moore's
39:16intuitionism, if you remember from a few
39:19moments ago. The problem there was if
39:22moral properties like goodness and
39:24badness are these non-natural properties
39:26that can't be detected by the senses and
39:28can't be empirically observed then how
39:31do we know that stealing is wrong for
39:33example if wrongness is this non-natural
39:36property well mo's answer is that we
39:39have this a priori faculty of intuition
39:42but Mackey calls this a lame answer I
39:46think that's a direct quote that doesn't
39:48really explain
39:50anything. So because of this
39:52metaphysical and epistemic queerness,
39:55Mackey says we should reject the
39:57existence of mind independent moral
40:00properties. In other words, we should
40:02reject moral realism and accept moral
40:05anti-realism as the correct metaphysical
40:08picture of morality.
40:14So that was error theory and
40:17non-cognitivism. And while they disagree
40:20on the psychological question of whether
40:23moral judgments like stealing is wrong
40:25are truth, they both agree on moral
40:28anti-realism. The view that mind
40:30independent moral properties and facts
40:32don't exist. So we're next going to
40:34discuss a few potential issues for moral
40:37anti-realism, whether it be
40:39non-cognitivism or error theory.
40:42So these issues for anti-realism are
40:45effectively arguments for moral realism
40:48because if anti-realism is false then
40:51realism is true and vice versa if
40:52realism is false then anti-realism is
40:55true. So the first potential issue for
40:59moral anti-realism is that it can't
41:01account for moral
41:03progress. So moral progress is the
41:06improvement in our moral standards and
41:09values over time. So for example, the
41:12moral realist might argue
41:14that the improvement in our values since
41:17the time of Plato, for example, where
41:19keeping slaves was considered morally
41:21acceptable versus the present day where
41:25keeping slaves is considered morally
41:27wrong. The moral realist might argue
41:29that that's an example of moral
41:31progress. But of course, if anti-realism
41:35is true, then there can't be any moral
41:38progress because there's no such thing
41:40as objective values. There's no
41:42objective standard by which we could say
41:45the standards of Plato's day are any
41:48worse than the standards of the modern
41:50day. And so to summarize the argument,
41:54the realist might argue that if
41:56anti-realism is true, then there can't
41:59be moral progress. But there has been
42:02moral progress, the realist says. And so
42:05anti-realism must be
42:08false. However, I think this argument
42:10commits the fallacy of begging the
42:13question. And I think this is how
42:14anti-realism would respond. So begging
42:17the question is also known as circular
42:19reasoning. And it's when you assume the
42:22conclusion in your premises. So the
42:26anti-realist could say in assuming that
42:29there has been moral progress, the
42:32realist is assuming that moral
42:34properties and facts exist. It's
42:36assuming that there is an objective
42:37standard against which we can say there
42:39has been moral progress. But of course
42:42this is the very thing we're trying to
42:44argue for. This is the very thing that's
42:45up for debate. And so to assume there's
42:48been moral progress is to assume that
42:51mind independent moral properties and
42:52facts exist. In other words, to assume
42:55that moral progress exists is to assume
42:58that moral realism is true. But again,
43:00that's the very thing that we're trying
43:02to prove. It's like assuming moral
43:05realism is true. To prove moral realism
43:08is true. And that is a facious argument.
43:12Again, it commits this fallacy of
43:14begging the
43:18question. Perhaps a stronger argument
43:21against moral anti-realism is that it
43:24leads to moral nihilism. It leads us to
43:27rejecting all moral values
43:30whatsoever. Because again, if moral
43:33anti-realism is true and there's no such
43:36thing as objective moral properties,
43:38then there's nothing objectively wrong
43:40with stealing, lying, and killing.
43:45And so if anti-realism is true, then
43:48there's no real reason, you know, why
43:50you shouldn't go on a murderous rampage
43:53or whatever, steal from everybody
43:55because there's no moral values. There's
43:59no objective moral values. And so
44:00there's no standard by which you can say
44:02that behavior is
44:05wrong. And yeah, this issue maybe is
44:08kind of hard for moral anti-realism to
44:11respond to. Like I don't think it's I
44:15can't imagine how anti-realism
44:18could defend saying that stealing and
44:21killing and so on are objectively wrong
44:23given that the whole point of the theory
44:25is that there are no such thing as
44:28objective moral properties and facts.
44:30But whether it really would lead
44:33to, you know, GTA in real life is maybe
44:37up for debate
44:38because I was thinking if, you know, if
44:42I could convince you right now that
44:44moral anti-realism is true and there's
44:47no such thing as mind independent moral
44:49properties and facts, would you be like,
44:52"Oh, great. Finally, I can do all the
44:55stealing and killing I've secretly
44:57always wanted to
44:59do. Like, I don't know about you, but
45:02yeah, if I was convinced of moral
45:04anti-realism, I'd probably just carry on
45:07as I always have done because, you know,
45:09I don't want to steal or kill people or
45:14whatever. But the problem perhaps still
45:18remains that it is very hard to defend
45:21any sort of behavior over the other if
45:22anti-realism is true. And so yeah, maybe
45:25it does lead to moral
45:29nihilism. But yeah, maybe the
45:32anti-realist could just bite the bullet
45:34and be like, "Yeah, deal with it.
45:37There's no objective moral values." Like
45:40just because you don't want just because
45:43you want there to be objective moral
45:45values, it doesn't prove that
45:47anti-realism is false. That's just
45:51wishful thinking. So yeah, I don't
45:53really see any way how anti-realism
45:56could really defend one course of action
45:58over the other.
46:00But that doesn't necessarily prove that
46:03anti-realism is false, I
46:06suppose.
46:12Anyway, so meta ethics is a huge topic
46:15with uh far more to it than we discussed
46:18today. Not only more theories but also a
46:21load more arguments. But hopefully that
46:24gave you a general overview of the
46:26topic. So to summarize what we talked
46:29about. So the most important question is
46:32whether mind independent moral
46:34properties and facts exist. And this is
46:36the metaphysical debate between moral
46:39realism and moral anti-realism. So moral
46:42realism says that moral properties like
46:45good and bad do exist objectively mind
46:48independently out there in the world.
46:51Whereas moral anti-realism says these
46:53properties don't exist. But within moral
46:56realism you've got the debate between
46:58moral naturalism and moral
47:00non-naturalism. And this is the debate
47:02about what kind of properties these mind
47:04independent moral properties are. So
47:07moral naturalism says that moral
47:09properties are natural properties that
47:11something like good or bad could be
47:13reduced to a simpler property that can
47:15be observed and measured. In contrast,
47:18moral non-naturalism says that moral
47:21properties like good and bad, while
47:23they're still real and mind independent,
47:26can't be reduced to anything simpler. So
47:28those are the two moral realist
47:30theories. However, the moral
47:33anti-realists say that mind independent
47:35moral properties don't exist. And within
47:38moral anti-realism, you've got the
47:40debate between error theory and
47:43non-cognitivism. So error theory, like
47:45the two realist theories, is a
47:47cognitivist theory. In other words,
47:50error theory says that moral judgments
47:53like stealing is wrong are literal
47:56descriptions or beliefs. And so they are
47:58truth apt. In other words, stealing is
48:00wrong is capable of being true or false.
48:04However, where moral naturalism and
48:06moral non-naturalism agree that stealing
48:08is wrong can be true, in the case of
48:11naturalism, it's true if it has this
48:12natural property of wrongness, whereas
48:14non-naturalism says stealing is wrong is
48:16true if it has this non-natural property
48:18of wrongness. Error theory says moral
48:21properties don't exist. And so although
48:24stealing is wrong is intended as a truth
48:27apt description or belief, it's always
48:30going to be a false belief because the
48:31moral properties don't exist. That
48:34stealing is wrong is false because
48:35wrongness doesn't exist or stealing is
48:38good is false because goodness doesn't
48:40exist. However, non-cognitivist theories
48:43reject this interpretation of moral
48:45language. Non-cognitivism says stealing
48:48is wrong and these other moral judgments
48:50are never intended to be truth apt
48:53descriptions or beliefs. So for example,
48:56emotivism says that what people really
48:58mean when they say stealing is wrong is
49:00something like boo stealing. It's an
49:03expression of emotion and this
49:05expression is neither true or false. or
49:09prescriptivism, which is another form of
49:11non-cognitivism, says that stealing is
49:13wrong. Really means something like don't
49:16steal. It's an instruction. And don't
49:18steal is neither true or false. As well,
49:21we also went over a few arguments for
49:23and against these various theories, but
49:25it gets complicated really quickly
49:27because of how the various theories and
49:30categories relate to each other. Like
49:32you can argue for moral anti-realism by
49:35using Hume's fork to prove that
49:37non-cognitivism is correct. But if you
49:40argue for cognitivism, that doesn't
49:43prove realism is correct. If that makes
49:44sense. Or if you could prove that moral
49:47naturalism is correct, then you'd prove
49:49that moral realism is correct. But if
49:51you prove that moral naturalism is
49:53false, that doesn't necessarily prove
49:56that realism is false because there's
49:58still non-naturalism.
50:11So that's about it for meta ethics and
50:13with it the moral philosophy topic.
50:16So the next few videos we're going to be
50:19moving on to the metaphysics of God. So
50:23this is uh arguments for God's
50:25existence, arguments against God's
50:28existence, um the concept of God,
50:31religious language, stuff like that. So
50:34all that remains for this video is the
50:37books and references.
50:39So as always, you can get my book. It
50:43contains uh the meta ethics topic broken
50:46down as we did it today. realism and
50:49anti-realism, cognitivism and
50:52non-cognitivism, as well as these five
50:54specific theories of naturalism,
50:56non-naturalism,
50:58error theory, emotivism, and
50:59prescriptivism. So, I do think if you
51:03are new to meta ethics, an overview is
51:07probably the place to start
51:09because there's just so much to this
51:11topic. And if you start by reading, you
51:14know, Principia Ethica, then you're
51:16going to be kind of lost at sea. You
51:18need to have the kind of big picture
51:20before you fill in the details. So, you
51:23can get my book and I'll also link the
51:25page on my website that talks about meta
51:27ethics because um that covers all the
51:30arguments we went over today plus a
51:33bunch more. But if you did want to
51:35engage with some primary sources, then
51:39John Stewart Mill's essay
51:41utilitarianism. Um, this is more an
51:45argument for utilitarianism as a
51:47normative ethical theory. But this essay
51:50does contain Mills proof of
51:52utilitarianism which they always put
51:55proof in inverted commas. But
51:59uh like I said Mills proof of
52:01utilitarianism is often interpreted as a
52:04sort of metaethical argument for
52:06utilitarianism and so by extension moral
52:09naturalism. So you can get
52:11utilitarianism by John Stewart Mill.
52:14Then for non-naturalism you can get G. E
52:17Moore's Principia Ethica the
52:19groundbreaking classic of 20th century
52:22ethical theory. And this book contains
52:27the naturalistic fallacy argument. We
52:29talked about uh Moore's intuitionism,
52:32the epistemological part of
52:35non-naturalism. Um and also a bunch of
52:38other stuff we didn't talk about today
52:39such as the open question
52:42argument. So you can get Principia
52:46Ethica. Then for emotivism we've got
52:51language, truth and logic by AJ Aya. Um
52:56this is a everyone who studied
52:58philosophy has read this book. Um it's a
53:01classic of logical positivism and the
53:04verification principle comes up all the
53:06time. Not particularly
53:09long, somewhat accessible, covers a lot
53:11of topics.
53:14Um, so you can get that for
53:16emotivism. And then I also mentioned in
53:20the emotivism bit David Hume's treaties
53:23of human nature. Now uh although the
53:26term emotivism didn't exist in Hume's
53:28day like I said Hume does provide a
53:31bunch of arguments that could be used to
53:32support emotivism. So you've got Hume's
53:35fork as we talked about a bit today but
53:38you've also got the isort gap. um Hume's
53:42argument that moral judgments motivate
53:44action, which we didn't talk about
53:46today. And then for
53:50error theory, you've got Mackey's ethics
53:53inventing right and wrong. Um this is
53:57where the argument from queerness comes
54:00from. And uh a bunch of other good
54:04arguments like he talks a bit about
54:06cognitivism, which again is half of
54:08error theory. and also his argument from
54:11relativity which is on my website but we
54:13didn't talk it about it today and it's
54:15uh another interesting argument for
54:18anti-realism. So ethics inventing right
54:21and wrong by JL
54:23Mackey. They all get a thumbs up. I'm in
54:25a I'm in a generous mood today. All
54:27these books get a a thumbs up from
54:30me. But yeah, that's about it for this
54:33video. So uh thank you so much as always
54:36for watching. I hope you enjoyed it and
54:39I will see you in the next one.

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