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LIVE: US Senate committee hears testimony from Boeing whistleblower on safety culture report — Transcript

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0:00because of incidents that have occurred
0:03since then,
0:05most recently the Alaska Airlines panel
0:07blowout.
0:09We know it was empty because the FAA
0:11itself
0:13audited Boeing's production and
0:15manufacturing and in March concluded,
0:17quote,
0:19"Non-compliance issue in Boeing's
0:21manufacturing process control, parts
0:24handling and storage and product
0:26control," end quote,
0:28were prevalent.
0:31I want to welcome particularly Sam
0:33Salehpour,
0:34who came to us
0:37because of the gravity
0:38of his concerns and because of what
0:41happened to him when he tried to raise
0:44these concerns to Boeing's management,
0:47not once,
0:49twice,
0:51but consistently and constantly over a
0:53period of years.
0:56And as a result, he was isolated,
0:59transferred, even threatened
1:01for refusing to stay silent. What Boeing
1:04did was, in effect,
1:06try to silence him,
1:08conceal and cover up the facts that he
1:11was trying to bring to their attention
1:13about basic defects in manufacturing,
1:16the failure to properly
1:19fuse
1:21fuselage parts,
1:23the kind of concerns that led to
1:27the blowout of that panel on the Alaska
1:30Airlines flight.
1:32In the wake of the 737 Max crashes, many
1:36current and former Boeing and FAA
1:38officials, like Ed Pierson and Joe
1:41Jacobson,
1:42both of whom are with us today, came
1:45forward to raise those kinds of concern
1:48about safety culture at Boeing.
1:51And tragically, last month, John
1:53Barnett, a former Boeing quality control
1:56manager in South Carolina,
1:58who became a whistleblower,
2:01committed suicide
2:03after alleging that managers had been
2:04pressuring workers not to document
2:07defects and properly address safety
2:09risks.
2:11Since this
2:13hearing was announced,
2:16our subcommittee has received outreach
2:18from other individuals affiliated with
2:20Boeing
2:22who have contacted us to voice their
2:25concerns.
2:27For example, a Boeing, a former Boeing
2:29South Carolina manager, wrote to us with
2:32examples of what he described as, quote,
2:36"Culture of shortcuts, pressure and
2:39hostility,"
2:40af- that he experienced while working at
2:43Boeing between 2009 and 2020.
2:47Another Boeing mechanic,
2:49who asked to remain anonymous,
2:52wrote to us and said, quote,
2:55"The Boeing South Carolina plant was run
2:57by a good old boy network that played by
3:00their own rules. When we raised concerns
3:03that the work was not in accordance with
3:04the process and procedures, we were
3:07ordered to just do it
3:09and told there were hundreds of others
3:12waiting in line
3:14outside the gate wanting our jobs."
3:19I'm going to ask, without objection,
3:20that these two letters be
3:23entered into the record.
3:26The outreach that we've received,
3:29important and serious contacts with
3:32substantive information,
3:35in just the last few days, suggests that
3:37there may be others out there who live
3:39in fear,
3:40like Mr. Salehpour,
3:43like John Barnett.
3:46At the And they have witnessed the
3:48shortcuts
3:50or defects that could lead to the next
3:53tragedy.
3:56And
3:57their coming forward may help prevent
3:59it.
4:01To Mr. Salehpour,
4:03to Mr. Pierson, to Mr. Jacobson, and
4:06others who have come forward and will
4:09come forward in the future, I just want
4:12to say thank you.
4:14Thank you for your courage.
4:17Thank you for
4:18speaking truth to power
4:21in the best sense of that word. Thank
4:24you for
4:26facing down
4:28one of the most powerful companies in
4:30the world.
4:34We intend to uncover
4:36what has enabled the culture
4:39of safety disregard
4:42to exist
4:44so that we can change it for good.
4:48To create a genuine and comprehensive
4:50culture of safety, Boeing must create
4:52workplace conditions where everyone
4:54feels comfortable reporting quality and
4:57safety concerns, even in situations
5:00where concerns to be turn out to be
5:01unfounded,
5:04even where
5:05the complaints are mistaken.
5:08Boeing's culture
5:09must be one
5:12where employees are encouraged
5:16to speak up.
5:19Boeing is fortunate to have one of the
5:22most skilled,
5:26competent, honest, dedicated work forces
5:29in the world.
5:32The United States is fortunate to have
5:34them working at Boeing.
5:38They deserve to be rewarded,
5:40not punished,
5:42for doing their job properly and
5:44speaking up
5:46when it's appropriate.
5:50Fortunately for Boeing and for
5:52passengers around the world, this moment
5:54of reckoning and the changes that must
5:55follow can still happen before
5:59any more lives are lost.
6:01Our committee has initiated a bipartisan
6:05inquiry.
6:06We expect both Boeing and the FAA to
6:09fully cooperate
6:11and appear before our committee.
6:14Today's hearing, as I mentioned earlier,
6:16is the first of several we intend to
6:18hold
6:19to get to the bottom of Boeing's broken
6:22safety culture.
6:24We expect Boeing CEO
6:26to appear before us to tell the American
6:28people why the promises made 5 years ago
6:31by this company
6:33have not been fulfilled.
6:37I don't want anyone to mistake our
6:39objectives here.
6:41Our goal is
6:43not to drive Boeing to fail, in fact,
6:45just the opposite.
6:47We want and need Boeing to succeed.
6:52It is a company that once was preeminent
6:55in engineering and safety.
6:58We want to restore the luster of that
7:02reputation
7:04and its business, which have been so
7:06sadly battered.
7:09Boeing's workers remain as skilled and
7:11talented as ever,
7:12and I'd be remiss if I didn't recognize
7:14that many of these workers are
7:15represented by unions,
7:18like the International Association of
7:19Machinists and Aerospace Workers and the
7:22Society of Professional Engineering
7:23Employees in Aerospace, and they have
7:26helped to protect a number of their
7:30employees against retaliation and
7:33reprisal.
7:36We want Boeing to learn from its
7:38mistakes
7:40and be accountable.
7:42We want the Department of Justice
7:44to take this evidence and other facts
7:47that it has
7:48obtained
7:50to examine the deferred prosecution
7:52agreement,
7:54whether the conditions of that agreement
7:55have been violated,
7:57whether criminal prosecution is
7:58appropriate.
8:00I'm not jumping to conclusions. I'm a
8:03former prosecutor. I know that
8:05investigations have to proceed carefully
8:09and methodically.
8:10But these investigations are important
8:13to accountability.
8:15Again,
8:16thank you to the witnesses for
8:19being here today,
8:21and I turn now to the ranking member.
8:24Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um I also want
8:26to start by thanking our witnesses. Your
8:28courage in coming forward as
8:29whistleblowers,
8:30um I I want to
8:33underscore what you did say, that this
8:35this is a We we all want Boeing to
8:37succeed.
8:38Uh I would ask that my
8:40uh written opening statement be entered
8:41in the record. Um
8:44Prior to this hearing, I I talked to
8:45stakeholders. I talked to airlines, your
8:48Boeing's customers. I talked to Boeing
8:50representatives. Um
8:52It was a overall theme that everybody
8:55wants Boeing to succeed. We need them to
8:57succeed because, as a traveling public,
9:00we want to feel safe in the air.
9:03And I I think I entered this
9:04investigation
9:07acknowledging the fact that airline
9:09travel is still probably the safest way
9:10to travel. It's what I keep telling
9:13myself when I when I hop on a airplane,
9:15and even when I hop on a 737 Max,
9:18it's been taken care of.
9:20Um
9:21We need more whistleblowers.
9:24Not only in Boeing, but we need them in
9:26the airline, in their maintenance
9:27departments. We need whistleblowers from
9:29the FAA.
9:31This is a very complex
9:34business.
9:36They're complex products.
9:38It's a complex problem.
9:40And so,
9:41I appreciate this hearing. I I'm a
9:43little concerned. What I What I don't
9:44want this committee to do is scare the
9:47you know what out of the American
9:48public.
9:50In the end, I want the public to be
9:52confident in getting on an airplane and
9:55and uh
9:57uh experiencing air travel,
9:59but I have to admit
10:02this testimony is more than troubling.
10:06And as I was reading the testimony last
10:08night, as I've read more things this
10:10morning, as a matter of fact, I'm I'm
10:11going to enter an article that I was
10:13given to you this morning written in on
10:15April 3rd in City Journal.
10:18Uh the title is an insider explains what
10:19has gone disastrously wrong with Boeing.
10:22Um
10:26we have to be concerned
10:29about what's happening.
10:30And we've got to get to the bottom of
10:31this. This this going to take a lot of
10:33work. This can take a lot of
10:34investigation. And
10:36And again, we need we need to hold these
10:37hearings, but we need to do the detailed
10:40work and we need more information. We
10:42need people coming forward on all sides,
10:44okay?
10:45Uh but but I do want to just quote from
10:47this article.
10:49Um
10:50it's it's an interview with an insider,
10:53a whistleblower that's not coming
10:54public, but he tells a story of an elite
10:56disfunc of elite dysfunction, financial
10:59abstraction, and DEI bureaucracy that
11:01has poisoned the culture, creating a
11:03sense of profound alienation between the
11:05people who occupy the executive suite
11:07and those who build airplanes.
11:10Uh goes on, "Right now, we have an
11:11executive council running the company,
11:13Boeing,
11:14that is all outsiders. The current CEO
11:16was a General Electric guy,
11:18as is the CEO CFO who we brought in.
11:21We have a completely new HR leader with
11:23no background at Boeing.
11:24The head of our commercial airplanes
11:26unit in Seattle, who was fired last
11:27week, was one of the last engineers in
11:30the executive council.
11:31The headquarters in Arlington is empty.
11:33Nobody lives there. This is an empty
11:35executive suite. The CEO lives in New
11:38Hampshire. The CFO lives in Connecticut.
11:40The head HR lives in Orlando.
11:43We just instituted a policy that
11:45everyone has to come to work 5 days a
11:46week except
11:48the executive council, which can use
11:50private jets to travel to meetings. And
11:52that is the story. It's a company that
11:53is under caretakers.
11:55It's not under owners and it's not under
11:57people who love airlines.
11:59In this business, the workforce knows if
12:01you love the thing you are building or
12:02if it's just another set of assets to
12:04you. At some point, you cannot recover
12:06that process
12:08uh or recover with that with process.
12:12You cannot recover with process what you
12:14have lost with love.
12:16And I think it's it's probably the most
12:17important story of all. There's no
12:19visible center of the company and the
12:20people are wondering what they're
12:22connected to. Now again, I read this
12:24this morning after having read the
12:26troubling testimony.
12:28Um
12:30there's some real problems with Boeing
12:31that need to be fixed. And I'm not
12:32exactly sure how they're going to get
12:34fixed, but again, this this
12:35investigation has to include not only
12:37Boeing,
12:39it's got to include
12:41how airlines
12:43maintain Boeing products, but it's also
12:45got to look at the FAA
12:47and and government and you know, where
12:49we have where government has potentially
12:51uh dropped the ball as well. So again,
12:53this is going to be this has to be a
12:55detailed investigation and the end
12:58result has to be toward helping Boeing
13:01succeed by exposing the truth. So again,
13:03I I I appreciate the hearing um and I'm
13:06looking forward to the witnesses and
13:07again, thank them for their
13:08participation.
13:11Thank you very much, Senator Johnson. I
13:13think you've heard
13:15bipartisan accord on the direction we're
13:17going to take and I want to introduce
13:19the witnesses for today's hearing.
13:22Uh Sam Salehpour,
13:24current quality engineer at Boeing, is
13:28a
13:29person with four decades of aerospace
13:33experience, including work as an
13:35aerospace engineer for a NASA contractor
13:38and 17 years as an engineer at Boeing.
13:41In his role at Boeing, he monitors
13:44production,
13:45analyzes defects, and develops
13:47strategies to prevent
13:50the kinds of incidents that we've seen
13:52from reoccurring. Mr. Salehpour has come
13:55forward
13:56to our subcommittee
13:58after documenting years of safety
14:00concerns while working on the 777
14:03and the 787 aircraft.
14:06Ed Pierson,
14:07executive director of the Foundation for
14:09Aviation Safety and a former Boeing
14:12manager.
14:13Mr. Pierson is a
14:15former senior manager and the current
14:18executive director of the Foundation for
14:21Aviation Safety. He spent 10 years at
14:24Boeing and oversaw teams who
14:26manufactured Boeing's 737 Max airplanes.
14:30Prior to joining
14:32Boeing, Mr. Pierson spent over 30 years
14:35in the United States Navy. I believe
14:37you're a graduate of the Naval Academy.
14:40Joe Jacobson,
14:43Mr. Jacobson is a safety and aerospace
14:46engineer who spent more than 25 years
14:49at the
14:50FAA.
14:53He retired in 2021. Prior to joining the
14:56FAA, he was an engineer at Boeing for 11
14:58years. He now serves as a techno advisor
15:02to the Foundation for Aviation Safety.
15:05Dr. Shawn
15:07Pruchnicki.
15:10Uh he has a PhD. He's a professional
15:13practice assistant professor for
15:16integrated systems engineering
15:18at Ohio State
15:20University.
15:22Uh
15:22he is also an aviation
15:25safety consultant. He has served as an
15:28aviation accident investigator and he's
15:31a former commercial airline pilot.
15:35Uh as is our custom, I will
15:38uh swear you in and then we'll hear your
15:41individual testimony. If you would
15:43please rise.
15:48Do you swear that the testimony you're
15:49about to give is the truth, the whole
15:51truth, and nothing but the truth, so
15:53help you God?
15:55Thank you.
15:58Mr. Salehpour, uh you may begin. Thank
16:01you.
16:04Chairman Blumenauer, Ranking Member
16:06Johnson, and the honorable members of
16:08the subcommittee, thank you for
16:10convening this hearing. My name is Sam
16:13Salehpour and I'm a quality engineer at
16:15the Boeing.
16:16I have over 40 years of
16:19I have over 40 years of experience
16:22as an engineer.
16:23I'm not here today because I want to be
16:25here. I'm here today because I felt that
16:28I must come forward because I do not
16:30want to see another 787 I do not want to
16:34see 787 or 777 crash.
16:37I have serious concerns about the safety
16:39of the 787 and 777 aircraft and I'm
16:43willing to take on professional risk to
16:45talk about them.
16:47First, little little bit about me. I
16:49came to United States in 1973 and got a
16:52mechanical engineering degree from
16:54University of Missouri, where Senator
16:56Hawley is from. After that, I worked in
16:59for companies that they were involved in
17:01space shuttle. I had a friend engineer
17:04that worked on the space shuttle. He was
17:05always complaining about the quality of
17:08the O-rings that we had in the
17:11the space shuttle solid rocket boosters.
17:13He was scared that they might not they
17:15might fail. He raised his concerns and
17:18he was heard and uh he wasn't heard and
17:22uh
17:22seven brave astronauts,
17:25including the teacher in space, died
17:27when the Challenger O-rings ultimately
17:30failed, just as he predicted. At the
17:34moment, I know that if I were ever in a
17:37similar situation, I would have to come
17:39up and speak up. I have analyzed
17:42Boeing's own data to conclude that the
17:45company is taking manufacturing
17:47shortcuts on the 787 program that may
17:50significantly reduce
17:52the
17:53airplane's safety
17:55and the life cycle. Since 2013,
17:58there have been serious issues on the
18:00787 program not properly closing
18:03thousands of gaps in its assembly of the
18:05fuselage on major joints. Boeing's
18:08standard says that these joint these
18:10gaps must be closed, usually by a small
18:13shim or filler called a shim when they
18:16exceed 5,000 of an inch. This seems very
18:20small. Boeing's PR team like to call it
18:24the width of a human hair. When you are
18:26operating at 35,000 ft, details
18:30are that the size of a human hair can be
18:33a matter of life and death.
18:35In a rush to address the its bottlenecks
18:38in production, Boeing hid problems,
18:41pushing pieces together with excessive
18:43force to make them appear that the gaps
18:46don't exist even though they exist. The
18:48gap didn't actually go away and this may
18:51result in premature fatigue failure.
18:54Effectively, they are putting out
18:55defective airplanes.
18:57I respectably
18:59I I repeatedly produced reports for my
19:02supervisors and Boeing management
19:04demonstrating that the gaps in the 787
19:07not being properly measured or shimmed
19:09in two major joints of the 787.
19:12Evaluating from Boeing from the 29
19:15inspected airplane data, I found gaps
19:19exceeding the specification that were
19:21not properly addressed 98.7%
19:25of the time. I want to repeat that.
19:2798.7%
19:29of the time, the gaps that they were
19:31supposed to be shimmed, they were not
19:32shimmed.
19:33The other issue that I found, when you
19:36have these gaps, you and you drill
19:39through them, you get some debris in the
19:41stack-ups. This is known to be a
19:44problem, you know, not a good thing for
19:46the airplanes by Boeing, but Boeing data
19:49also, you know, from the inspection of
19:51the data shows that the debris ended up
19:54in the gaps 80% of the time. Again, you
19:58know, you have
19:59debris in the
20:00gaps 80% of the time. I want to make
20:03clear that I have raised these issues
20:06over 3 years. I was ignored. I was told
20:09not to create not to create delays. I
20:11was told frankly to shut up. At one
20:14point, Boeing management got sick of me
20:16and raising these issues and moved me
20:18out of the 787 program into the 777
20:22program. On the 777 program, I found
20:25problems. Again, I found that Boeing has
20:28started a new process to build the
20:30airplane without taking into the
20:32consideration of the design of the
20:34airplane and how the airplane was
20:36designed. As a result, I witnessed
20:38severe misalignment when the planes were
20:42assembled. Boeing manufacturing used
20:44unmeasured and unlimited amount of force
20:48to correct the misalignment. And this
20:51also weakened the weakens the airplane
20:53in the long run. I literally saw people
20:56jumping on the pieces of the airplane to
20:58get them to aligned. I call it the
21:00Tarzan effect. Among other improper
21:03methods. Again, I raised concerns
21:06internally. I was sidelined. I was told
21:09to shut up. I received physical threats.
21:12My my my my boss said, "I would have
21:15killed someone who said what you said in
21:17a meeting." And then this is not a
21:21safety culture when you get threatened
21:22by bringing issues of safety concerns.
21:25I hope that your work on this issue
21:28signals to Boeing that they must make
21:32real changes and get back to building
21:34the airplane safely. I'll be more than
21:36happy to answer your questions.
21:39Thank you very much, Mr. Salpour. Mr.
21:41Pierson.
21:45Chair Blumenthal, ranking member
21:47Johnson, distinguished members of the
21:49committee, good morning.
21:50Thank you for inviting me today. My name
21:52is Ed Pierson.
21:54My father was a Washington D.C. homicide
21:56detective and my mom was a nurse.
21:59I learned the importance of telling the
22:00truth from them, my teachers and
22:03coaches.
22:04And this was reinforced at the Naval
22:05Academy.
22:07The military, like all high-hazard jobs,
22:09demands that people tell the truth and
22:11admit their mistakes because if you
22:13don't, people will die.
22:15Since the first Boeing Max airplane
22:17crash, I've spent every day
22:19thinking about the victims, their
22:21families, and the millions of people
22:22that fly Boeing airplanes.
22:24I've done everything I can to continue
22:26telling the world the Max airplane is
22:28still unsafe and to alert authorities to
22:31Boeing's dangerous manufacturing.
22:34I'm here today to share four key
22:36messages. First, the manufacturing
22:38conditions that led to the two 737 Max
22:40disasters also led to the Alaskan
22:42accident blowout accident and these
22:45conditions continue.
22:47In 2019, I testified as a Boeing
22:50whistleblower. I had previously warned
22:52the 737 general manager
22:54before the Max crash to shut down the
22:56factory.
22:58I also warned Boeing's general counsels,
23:00the CEO, and the board of directors
23:01before the second crash to shut it down.
23:04They ignored my warnings.
23:06During my 2019 testimony, I described
23:09the chaotic manufacturing, the
23:10dysfunctional safety culture, and the
23:12horrible job government authorities were
23:14doing investigating the two crashes. The
23:16world is shocked to learn about Boeing's
23:18current production quality issues. I'm
23:20not surprised because nothing changed
23:22after the two crashes. There was no
23:24accountability. Not a single person from
23:26Boeing went to jail. Hundreds of people
23:29died and there's been no justice. Unless
23:32action is taken and leaders are held
23:34accountable, every person stepping
23:36aboard a Boeing airplane is at risk.
23:39Government authorities ignored Boeing's
23:41manufacturing problems until the Alaska
23:42accident. Passengers shouldn't have to
23:44rely on whistleblowers to provide the
23:46truth. They should be able to get on
23:48airplanes and not have to worry about
23:50what model it is, whether it was
23:51designed and manufactured to the highest
23:53of standards, whether the airline is
23:55operating and maintaining it properly,
23:57or whether government agencies
23:59are providing proper oversight.
24:02FAA, DOT, and NTSB leaders NTSB leaders
24:05frequently state our aviation system is
24:07the gold standard.
24:08There's a reason commercial aviation has
24:11been historically safe and that's
24:12because people worked extremely hard for
24:14decades to keep them safe. They told the
24:16truth. They admitted their mistakes and
24:19they didn't downplay safety incidents.
24:23These agencies have become lazy,
24:24complacent, and reactive. The
24:26deterioration has been occurring over
24:28several years. My second point is the
24:30gold standard is now fool's gold
24:33cuz the only thing that is more
24:35dangerous than a dangerous environment
24:37is the illusion of a safe environment.
24:40Two brand new airplanes crashed after
24:42exhibiting production-related electrical
24:44and electronic defects within their
24:45first month of operation and the NTSB
24:47did not investigate the factory. The
24:49evidence indicates the Max crashes were
24:51triggered by manufacturing defects, not
24:54MCAS software. The NTSB is investigating
24:57the factory now. However, the reality is
24:59the NTSB is overly dependent on Boeing
25:01and the FAA to provide technical
25:03assistance in their accident
25:04investigations. They are not an
25:06independent investigative authority.
25:09There is an inherent conflict of
25:10interest. The Department of
25:12Transportation has been completely
25:14useless in helping the FAA do their
25:15jobs.
25:16They have continued to take a hands-off
25:18approach this entire matter. My third
25:20point is if the leaders of those
25:23government authorities
25:25or get government agencies had done
25:26their jobs, investigators would have
25:28uncovered a mountain of important
25:29information. The FAA would have known
25:31Boeing's production processes were a
25:32mess and the safety culture was
25:34terrible. The FAA could have prevented
25:36an ever-increasing list of production
25:38quality defects. Instead, they're
25:40surprised each time it occurs, showing
25:42how ineffective and reactive their
25:43oversight has become. Just last month,
25:46the FAA reported on uncommanded rolls of
25:49Max airplanes due to wiring that is
25:51being chafed. Boeing and the FAA have
25:53known about these manufacturing defects
25:55for more than 2 years and did not inform
25:57the public about this potentially
25:59catastrophic condition.
26:01There are also Canadian reports of new
26:02Max airplanes with chafed wire bundles
26:05containing burn marks and evidence of
26:07electrical arcing.
26:08Routine Excuse me. Boeing routinely
26:10states that their airplanes meet or
26:12exceed all safety standards. This is
26:14untrue
26:16and misrepresents the safety of the
26:17airplanes. The company illegally removed
26:19thousands of quality control inspections
26:21on individual airplanes without the
26:23FAA's knowledge and without the
26:25knowledge of the airlines. Although many
26:27of these inspections have been
26:28reinstated, hundreds of airplanes have
26:30left Boeing factories without those
26:32thousands of inspections. My last point
26:34is the Department of Justice and FBI
26:36relied on the slanted results
26:38of the first Max accident investigation
26:40to develop an illegal and unjust
26:42deferred prosecution agreement. The NTSB
26:45chair reiterated to Congress last week
26:47that Boeing has said there are no
26:49records documenting the removal of the
26:51Alaska Airlines door. I'm not going to
26:53sugarcoat this. This is a criminal
26:55cover-up. Records do in fact exist. I
26:58know this because I've personally passed
26:59them to the FBI.
27:01A few A 5-minute testimony is not nearly
27:04enough time to explain how insidious the
27:06story is. Boeing's corporate leaders
27:08continue to conceal the truth. They
27:10continue to mislead and deceive the
27:12public about the safety of the planes.
27:14That is the safety culture at the top of
27:15the Boeing company right now. The good
27:17news is
27:18the employees of Boeing and these
27:20agencies can overcome poor leadership.
27:22We need them to be successful. They are
27:24highly capable. They need to be
27:25supported and encouraged and these
27:27problems are fixable.
27:29But it starts with telling the truth.
27:32Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Pierson. Mr.
27:34Jacobson.
27:36Thank you, Senators. Um my name is Joe
27:38Jacobson. I'm an aerospace engineer with
27:41almost 40 years of experience. I worked
27:43for Boeing from 1984 to 1995 on the 767
27:48and 777 programs.
27:50From 1995 to 2021, I worked in aircraft
27:53certification at the FAA.
27:55I retired from the FAA in 2021 and have
27:58been volunteering as an independent
28:00aviation safety advocate since, mostly
28:03in support of the ET302 families.
28:06On November 6th, 2018, a week after the
28:10Lion Air 610 crash,
28:12I received an email from a colleague
28:14asking if we had done any issue papers
28:17on MCAS. This was the first day that I
28:20heard about MCAS. The next day, although
28:22not assigned to the crash investigation,
28:25I received an email from a colleague at
28:26the FAA
28:28which contained flight data recorder
28:29information from the Lion Air crash.
28:32It was immediately obvious to me that
28:35the 737 Max had a serious design flaw. I
28:38saw that the horizontal stabilizer was
28:40repeatedly moving at a high rate because
28:43of a faulty angle of attack input. I
28:45guessed that a software error was
28:47responsible. A few days later, I was
28:50shocked to discover that the airplane
28:51was purposely designed and certified to
28:54use just one AoA input for this
28:56flight-critical function.
28:59When the House report was released in
29:01September of 2020, I finally understood
29:04why I hadn't known about MCAS. Boeing
29:07meeting minutes from June 2013 recorded
29:10the reason saying,
29:12"If we emphasize MCAS is a new function,
29:16there may be a greater certification and
29:18training impact."
29:21Boeing intentionally hid the design from
29:23FAA engineers and airline pilots.
29:26Had we known, at least a half dozen
29:28experienced FAA engineers in Seattle in
29:31the Seattle office would have
29:33immediately rejected the original MCAS
29:35design.
29:37Boeing concealment led to two crashes
29:40and 346 deaths.
29:43After working on the recertification of
29:45the Max after the second crash, I sent a
29:47letter to the parents of Sammy Stumo
29:50shortly before my retirement in March of
29:522021.
29:54I saw their anger and grief and wanted
29:56them to know the true story and not the
29:58false narrative
30:00presented by Boeing and FAA.
30:03Over the last 3 years, Sammy's parents
30:06have connected me with many other crash
30:08families. I frequently communicate with
30:11the devastated people
30:13who have lost loved ones in the ET302
30:16crash.
30:17I've heard many inspiring stories about
30:20those who were lost.
30:21Stories about Samya, Mick, Camille,
30:24Melvin, Bennett, Danielle, Graziella,
30:27and others.
30:28The recertification of the Max has been
30:31characterized as the most comprehensive
30:33in the history of aviation.
30:35This is also a false narrative.
30:40During the recertification
30:42of the Max, FAA leadership supported
30:45Boeing's effort to narrow the scope to
30:47primarily focus on MCAS. MCAS was a mess
30:51for sure, but other critical items were
30:54off the re-examination table.
30:57The Max crew alerting system doesn't
30:59meet current design requirements and by
31:01my count, the old standard has
31:02contributed to eight fatal crashes of
31:06Boeing aircraft and 885 deaths since
31:091996.
31:12Despite this dismal safety record, in
31:14July 2022,
31:17Boeing Chief Safety Officer Mike Delaney
31:20stated, "I personally have no belief
31:23that there's any value in changing the
31:25737."
31:27CEO Dave Calhoun lobbied further and
31:30said, "This is a risk I'm willing to
31:32take. If I lose the fight, I lose the
31:35fight."
31:36Boeing lobbying efforts ultimately
31:38succeeded.
31:41The grandfathered design of this Max
31:43leaves many vulnerabilities.
31:45When combined with the failure to
31:47investigate the manufacturing chaos
31:49identified nearly 6 years ago by Ed
31:51Pierson,
31:52this has led to a predictable
31:55but still shocking list of unsafe
31:57conditions.
31:59I've spent almost 40 years studying and
32:01trying to eliminate aviation accidents.
32:06Ignoring problems, taking shortcuts, and
32:09deceiving the public
32:10just leads to more crashes.
32:13I'm testifying today out of my great
32:15love and respect for the crash family
32:17members that I know.
32:19Michael, Nadia, Nisha, Catherine, Ike,
32:22Chris, Javier, and others don't want
32:25this to happen to anyone else.
32:28I also have children and grandchildren.
32:31Let's work together to fix this now.
32:34Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Pierson.
32:37Mr. Prigogine, Professor.
32:39Professor.
32:42Chairman Bartholomew, Ranking Member
32:44Johnson, and members of the committee,
32:45good morning and thank you for the
32:46opportunity to testify today. I'm an
32:49Assistant Professor in both Integrated
32:50Systems Engineering and the Center for
32:52Aviation Studies at The Ohio State
32:54University. Prior to teaching at Ohio
32:56State, I was an airline pilot. During my
32:59time teaching at the university, I
33:00earned my PhD in Cognitive Systems
33:02Engineering.
33:04Although there have been slight
33:05variations in the exact definition, one
33:08has been
33:09safety culture, one that has been used
33:11for years, decades even, are shared
33:15beliefs, assumptions, and norms which
33:17may govern organizational
33:19decision-making as well as individual
33:21and group attitudes about safety. An
33:24incorrect understanding of safety
33:26culture is that it is commonly referred
33:28to as a single concept, but rather it
33:31consists of four individual specific
33:34components, whereas each one provides
33:36its own unique actions to the overall
33:38concept of safety culture. And without
33:41one of these, the element and structure
33:43of culture will fall apart. As such,
33:46each serves the greater goal of
33:48providing a robust, effective, and
33:51well-proven safety tool for all
33:53high-risk industries, especially given
33:56its proven value in aerospace
33:58industries. It should be made clear if
34:00this cultural concept is not only for
34:03airline operations, but rather any
34:05aerospace operation where risk of injury
34:08or death is a possibility to employees
34:12and/or customer after product delivery.
34:15This is extremely important in
34:17determining an organization's overall
34:19safety culture as they are all as they
34:22all complement each other. To be
34:24successful, organizations may not simply
34:27choose simply one or two of these
34:29components because they are less
34:31expensive or more manageable. In
34:34addition, in aerospace, not following
34:36all four components of a safety culture
34:39or just the ones that have less impact,
34:42thus to appear to regulators or
34:43shareholders that they are being
34:45responsive, finally, and expeditious is
34:49not acceptable. This type of action will
34:52produce a non-viable, misleading, and
34:56potentially dangerous safety culture
34:58that will teeter on failure and provide
35:01a false sense of security.
35:06Let me be clear. When you try to
35:09increase productivity
35:11without the needed resources and being
35:14guided by poor management with only
35:17financial focus
35:19and the lack of assembly line
35:21inspectors, you are always borrowing
35:24from safety. You cannot have both.
35:28And case in point, this is where we see
35:31events like the door blowout with Alaska
35:33Airlines.
35:35NASA learned the hard way many a decades
35:38ago and other organizations, aerospace
35:40organizations,
35:41have as well. With their new plan to
35:44operate when they decided they were
35:46going to operate faster, better, and
35:47cheaper, and it failed horribly. They
35:50learned that you can only have two of
35:52the three, never all three at the same
35:54time, or accidents will happen.
35:58When we examine these four components
36:02what constructs a safety culture, it
36:04appears that Boeing has none of them
36:06under control and there is no evidence
36:09that this trend is in fact reversing.
36:12This was discussed at the Huntington
36:14Beach conference in February of 2023,
36:17which I attended, but there does not
36:19appear to be any evidence of such
36:21changes to any of the components
36:24on the horizon as a string of alarming
36:27events continue to unfold.
36:30In the safety engineering work, we call
36:33these precursors to accidents and I have
36:35never in my decades of aerospace safety
36:38work seen so many continuing to arrive
36:42one after another.
36:45Where is the safety accountability
36:49all the way to the CEO where
36:53they
36:55discuss safety in addition to the money
36:58problems. All the way to the top. Some
37:01of these companies profess to practice,
37:03yet never seem to do that. All safety
37:07cultures, both
37:08those that have and profess to have a
37:11good safety culture and SMS programs,
37:14were developed by the FAA guidance how
37:16to do that. At Boeing, is there safety
37:19accountability all the way to the top?
37:22This was discussed after the previous
37:24accidents, but where's the evidence for
37:26that? In closing, you would think that
37:29there would have been made clear after
37:31having been directly responsible for two
37:33air carrier fatal accidents that at its
37:36core causation was 100% about money and
37:40about sneaking through the certification
37:42process and automation-related component
37:45component that killed 346
37:47people over money.
37:50And yet, we still have no proof that
37:52these programs have even entered the
37:54lexicon of Boeing aircraft despite the
37:57hollow comments to the contrary at the
37:59Huntington Beach safety conference. So,
38:01it leaves me to wonder, have we even
38:03gone backwards at Boeing? The Alaska
38:05Airlines event strongly supports that.
38:08My final comment is I have always felt
38:12as an accident investigator for over 20
38:14years and have always said that with
38:16these accidents, maybe the upper
38:18management should actually go to these
38:20accident scenes and witness what they
38:23look like as as the rest of us do.
38:26Thank you for your time. Thank you,
38:27Professor Prigogine.
38:39I would be happy to talk to you after
38:41this hearing is done.
38:44If you
38:48I want to spare you being removed and
38:51just tell you that we will be happy to
38:53take those documents and meet with you
38:56privately.
38:58And we welcome your being here. We also
39:00welcome the presence of
39:04Chris and Clariss Moore
39:06whose daughter Danielle
39:09died in the Ethiopia Airlines crash.
39:14They remind us that
39:17the
39:18seemingly abstract, even antiseptic,
39:21setting of this hearing
39:23belies the fact that
39:26there are real people
39:28who perished in those two crashes. There
39:31are real people at risk
39:34getting on airlines right now. No reason
39:37to panic, but a reason for deep concern.
39:41And we thank everyone who may have
39:43documents or information to bring to our
39:45attention. We thank you.
39:47Uh
39:48Professor Brzezinski,
39:51what
39:52keeps ringing in my ears is that phrase,
39:55"100% about money."
39:58My understanding about what happened
40:00here is that Boeing
40:02sought to produce more airplanes more
40:05quickly
40:07without the necessary testing,
40:09inspections, and then sought to conceal
40:14and cover up
40:16what it knew was happening. Is that
40:19align with your view of the fact here?
40:21Absolutely. That's That in fact is part
40:23of it because those things are
40:25expensive. And And And there's more to
40:28it. There There's other things that go
40:29into that process. One of the biggest is
40:33the inspectors.
40:34Cutting back and getting rid of your
40:36inspector
40:38um staff that looks at all the parts to
40:41make sure that these things are
40:42assembled correctly. We saw this with
40:44the accident with the Alaska accident.
40:46the lessons here is that shortchanging
40:49safety
40:50with shortcuts is short-sighted.
40:53I want to ask uh Mr. Sallapour uh for
41:00many of us who may not understand the
41:01technology or the
41:03mechanics here,
41:05uh my understanding of your testimony is
41:07that Boeing in effect
41:09fastened parts of the fuselage
41:12together using force rather than proper
41:17shimming
41:18and thereby created a severe risk that
41:22use over time
41:24and fatigue of the parts and fasteners
41:29would create risks to safety. Is that
41:31roughly correct?
41:33Yes, sir. I think they have used They
41:35are using significant excessive force to
41:39squash the gaps before you measure it.
41:42If you squashing the gap before you
41:44measure it, you know, you don't know
41:47what you getting because the purpose of
41:48that is to measure the gap in its free
41:51state. When you squash that with
41:53excessive force, basically you're
41:55getting false information. If you get
41:58the gap measured falsely, you are not
42:00going to shim it properly and it's a
42:02danger to the airplane. It's very very
42:05important. Boeing has put out reports
42:08that they say that they can lose
42:12almost 80% of the airplane life cycle if
42:16we don't follow these
42:18protocols, which it is the proper
42:20shimming, you know, measuring the gap,
42:23you know, debarring
42:24One One remedy Yeah. or one precaution
42:28would be proper testing.
42:31Has Boeing ever shown you
42:34conclusive testing results that would
42:36dispel your concerns?
42:38No, sir. First of all, the the testing
42:40that we talking about, I have never seen
42:42it, any of the information. The second
42:45is the airplane is the king. The numbers
42:48that you get from the actual airplanes,
42:50regardless of what the testing done,
42:53that should be considered. And my data
42:55that I was using in my assessment is
42:58from the 29 airplane that it was
43:00inspected.
43:02Mr. Pierson and Mr. Jacobson, you have
43:05very extensive experience with Boeing.
43:07Will their safety do
43:09the allegations that Mr. Sallapour has
43:13brought to our attention surprise you in
43:15light of your experience?
43:16Well, I just want to say that I can't
43:18obviously technically um
43:20you know, say that what he's saying is
43:21absolutely right. I just don't know
43:23that, but I will say that that this the
43:25uh problem that he's describing where
43:27he's trying to
43:28uh get information and he's basically
43:30being told, you know, basically shut up,
43:33don't worry about it. You know, he's
43:34he's obviously making an effort, a long
43:36effort to try to get to the truth and
43:39what should happen is somebody should
43:40say, "Here's the data. Here's the
43:41information." He shouldn't have to wait
43:44until
43:45becoming a whistleblower to get that
43:46information.
43:48Mr. Uh Jacobson, uh you worked at the
43:51FAA for
43:52quite a while.
43:54Mr. Pierson
43:55and as well Mr. Sallapour
43:59have been critical, as many of us have
44:02been, of the FAA. Uh in fact, Mr.
44:06Pierson has brought to the attention of
44:08federal authorities information about
44:11the potential failings of those
44:13investigative steps by federal agencies.
44:17Uh do you think just assigning more
44:19inspectors
44:20to Boeing from the FAA is a sufficient
44:25solution?
44:27Well, certainly um having more uh
44:29inspectors is helpful in certain
44:31circumstances. I think um
44:34in the in the Renton factory, having
44:36more inspectors, uh more of an on-site
44:38presence is very important. Uh but the
44:41attitude needs to change. Um the
44:43attitude right now is Boeing dictates to
44:46the FAA, uh tells the FAA what they will
44:49do, what they will accept, and that
44:51needs to change. Uh the FAA needs to be
44:54a regulator.
44:55Uh they need to do their job and that
44:58and that's the missing piece right now.
45:00Would it be fair to say that the FAA has
45:02been too captive to Boeing? They They
45:04absolutely have been too captive to
45:06Boeing. Um
45:07and and that is
45:10one of the one of the big problems that
45:11I've seen even when we were trying to
45:13recertify the 737 Max,
45:17um
45:18Boeing would try and focus the attention
45:20on certain things like MCAS to the
45:23exclusion of other
45:25uh parts of the airplane or the design
45:28or the manufacturing that needed to be
45:30investigated and and Boeing or and the
45:33FAA went along with that at high levels.
45:36They went along with that, you know, the
45:39the redirect from from the Boeing
45:41company.
45:43Uh Mr. Sallapour, I
45:46showed you earlier a photograph of a
45:49tire wheel from your car.
45:52Uh that bolt was inserted by someone as
45:56a threat or perhaps as a risk to you.
45:58Yes, I was losing just air on my tire
46:01and I bring it somewhere and they say,
46:02"Hey, you have a nail in tire." That's
46:04about 1 month old
46:06tire. So, I brought it back to the shop
46:09that they fixed it and they fixed it. I
46:12went to pick it up and the gentleman
46:14told me that, "You know, this nail was
46:17not picked up through normal driving,
46:20you know." I didn't know anything about
46:22that. He's the one who brought it to my
46:24attention. And I came home and I had to
46:26go all the way back there to get the
46:28tire to just save the tire. It was like
46:3125-mile drive, but anyway, but the
46:33bottom line is that yes, the nail was
46:36inserted in there. I believe it happened
46:38at work. I have no proof of that.
46:42You mentioned also a threat to your
46:44physical safety, someone saying
46:47Yeah, someone Someone told me they're
46:49going to kill They would have killed
46:50someone like me if you said something,
46:52what you said, so.
46:54Uh the FAA issued an absolutely scathing
46:58report
47:00about Boeing and Boeing has said that
47:03it's developing an action plan. Uh
47:07I'd like to ask you, Mr. Pierson, should
47:10we rely on Boeing
47:12to
47:13in effect develop its own action plan,
47:18evaluate itself, and go on about its
47:20business, or do we need continuing
47:22investigation? We absolutely need
47:24continuing investigation and honestly,
47:26I'm so tired of hearing about plans. We
47:28need action and and you know,
47:30you can plan all day long, but if you
47:32don't actually carry through with it,
47:34doesn't matter. You'd like to see
47:35action. Yes, sir.
47:37I think that's
47:39one of the common themes here. We need
47:41action, not just more talk. I'm going to
47:44uh yield at this point. We're observing
47:46a 7-minute round and um we're going to
47:50try to stick to it. Uh Senator Johnson.
47:52So, let me point out I think the
47:55800-lb gorilla in the room is the
47:57tremendous pressure
47:59society-wide
48:01to keep these planes flying.
48:04Mhm. I mean, if we were to literally
48:05ground stop 737s,
48:08what what would what would happen to our
48:10economy? That's again, that's why we
48:13don't even like contemplating that
48:14reality, but I want to start focusing on
48:16the 737 because that's the one issue.
48:18You got the 787 and then you have the
48:19the subcontractors from my standpoint,
48:21the three, and then the overall culture
48:23of of Boeing.
48:25But there's a discrepancy between uh our
48:27two witnesses here. Mr. Pierson, you're
48:30you're
48:31you were saying that it's it was a
48:32manufacturing defect
48:34and Mr. Jacobson, you're focusing on the
48:36MCAS, which is what the public was all
48:38told. It was that control system.
48:41And with with only a single indicator
48:43that if that went defective,
48:45uh so again, that that was the story
48:47told. What is the truth?
48:49And Mr. We'll start with you, Mr.
48:50Jacobson.
48:52Um the truth is it's it's more than one
48:54thing, right? It's It's the entire
48:56system. You have to look at
48:58manufacturing, you have to look at um
49:01also at the design. Um since the Max has
49:05gone back into service, this is the list
49:08of manufacturing These are unsafe
49:10conditions that are identified by the
49:12FAA in the manufacturing area. Um engine
49:16anti-ice, exhaust duct duct fasteners,
49:19compromised sealant adhesion within the
49:21center fuel tank, loose bolts in the
49:23rudder assembly, stuck rudder pedals,
49:26misinstalled electrical wire wire
49:29bundles in the wing spoilers, and then
49:31of course the door blowout was also a
49:33manufacturing defect. So, we have a long
49:36list of unsafe conditions for
49:38manufacturing defects. We also have a
49:40long list, equally long list of design
49:42defects. So, what that tells me is
49:45it's a company-wide problem. It's not
49:48So, the the Max was taken out of service
49:50for how long? A long period of time,
49:51right? 20 months. 20 20 months. And
49:54again, the public I was certainly
49:56hoping, assuming that
49:58that 20 months they were able to correct
50:00those defects. But they did install more
50:03of the indicators, right? So, they
50:06somewhat fixed that problem. I mean, are
50:07all these other problems completely
50:09unaddressed, not fixed?
50:11there were many problems that were
50:12unaddressed. The crew alerting system is
50:15is the big one. That one was not
50:18addressed. That contributed to the
50:20crashes. The pilots had a lot of false
50:23indications going off, which delays
50:26their response. And they're trying to
50:27figure out what's going on. Um in the
50:30meantime, you know, um
50:33the stabilizer is running and the nose
50:36is running down. So,
50:38um it's it's a combination of things
50:41that need to be addressed. What what did
50:43the pilots have to say about this? I
50:44mean, one of my things that comfort me
50:46is that, you know, pilots are concerned
50:48about safety. They they do some safety
50:51checks even before they get on the
50:52airplane. But they're the ones that have
50:53to fly these things.
50:55What do pilots have to say about the 737
50:57Max right now?
50:59Well, um
51:01you know, I I've heard some reports. Um
51:04you know, Dennis Tajer has been very
51:05vocal. He's an American Airlines Max
51:08pilot.
51:09Uh also works with us at the Foundation
51:11for Aviation Safety. He's been very
51:13vocal about the shortcomings of the Max.
51:16Um Does he fly them? He does. And he's
51:19still flies them. He still flies them.
51:21And he says, "Why is Boeing putting all
51:24these extra hazards into my cockpit? Uh
51:27it's a big enough job to to fly this
51:30airplane and take care of the passengers
51:32in the back. I don't need extra problems
51:35to be dealing with like manufacturing
51:37defects, design defects. And they're one
51:40after another. There's a long list that
51:42I've put in my Mr. Pearson, do you have
51:44anything to add to that on the 737?
51:47No, I I totally agree with Mr. Jacobson.
51:49Um you know, when they investigated the
51:52accidents, they narrowly scoped it and
51:54they kept it very tight. And as an
51:56example of that, um when the plane was
51:58returned to service, the Max airplanes
52:00were returned to service,
52:01they um said that they fixed the MCAS
52:04software and they provided the pilots
52:05the training that they needed.
52:07And then they said, "We fixed some
52:09wiring."
52:10Um but it was unrelated to the
52:11accidents.
52:13Well, a couple months ago we we found
52:15the service bulletin that was sent out
52:17to the airlines to fix some wiring.
52:20That document was 343 pages long.
52:24It identified at least 12 areas on the
52:26airplane that had improper electrical
52:29insulation.
52:31And I will tell you that when those
52:33planes are being built, we were having
52:35repeat problems getting our functional
52:37testing done correctly.
52:39And this is something that we continued
52:41to push and push and push the planes out
52:43the door. And we were having difficulty
52:45getting our aircraft systems testing.
52:46What people don't know
52:48and I'll just give you a couple of
52:49examples very quickly is in the Lion
52:51airplane, that sensor, that angle of
52:53attack sensor was removed the day
52:55before,
52:56replaced with the refurbished sensor. On
52:58the next flight, the plane almost
52:59crashed. On the next flight, it did
53:01crash. When that plane hit the ocean, it
53:03went right to into the seawall. They
53:05never recovered that sensor that was
53:07just installed. But they had the
53:08original Boeing installed sensor and
53:10they tested that sensor and it had an
53:13open circuit in it. It had evidence of
53:15arcing and burn marks. And so, that um
53:18that is an example. And then this in the
53:21I'm just pointing that out that this is
53:23Again, that's getting the level of
53:24detail right now I don't have the time.
53:25I appreciate that. Um
53:28Again, I'll I'll I'll keep This shows
53:31you, Mr. Chairman, why we need to get
53:32the airlines in here.
53:34Whether they want to or not, they have
53:35to come in here and talk about what
53:36they're doing in response to these
53:39technical bulletins. We need to get
53:40pilots in here.
53:41We need We need to talk to pilots cuz
53:43from my standpoint, they're almost the
53:44last line of defense
53:47in terms of safety from from the flying
53:49public cuz they're on that plane. I
53:50would never get on a plane that's
53:52autonomous. Never.
53:54Sen- Senator, I just I echo what you're
53:55saying, but I think we also need to
53:57broaden that aperture. We need to talk
53:58to the mechanics and the technicians and
54:00all those individuals. No, again,
54:02as you as you said in your testimony,
54:03five five minutes testimony doesn't even
54:05even begin to scratch the surface.
54:07Hour and a half hearing doesn't even
54:08begin to scratch surface. This That's
54:10what I said. This needs to be an
54:11in-depth investigation. There's a lot of
54:14elements to this thing. Uh
54:16In preparing for this, I I I did listen
54:18to one NBC news report.
54:20And the
54:22This is on the 787 on this gap. And they
54:25they were reporting that that Boeing had
54:27apparently stress tested a plane 165,000
54:30takeoffs and landings, which is three
54:32times the normal life.
54:34They inspected 689 of the 1,100 planes
54:37that are in service, zero evidence of
54:39fatigue.
54:41So,
54:42how am I supposed to interpret that?
54:44Well, I think Boeing tries to put the a
54:46lot of misinformation out there. The
54:49problem is that 165,000 was on the
54:51original
54:53airplane. It did not see the excessive
54:55forces that we're talking about. If you
54:57haven't done the excessive force on
54:59those plane, they just thrown that out
55:01there to muddy up the water so that
55:03information is so clogged up that they
55:07are not You know, they're saying they
55:08done 40,000 tests or whatever. You know,
55:11did they put the information out there
55:14under what circumstances, what
55:15airplanes, what was the situation? None
55:19of that is shared. I have asked Mrs.
55:22Fall, you know, Lisa Fall that it was on
55:25that thing 2 months ago or 3 months ago
55:27when I met her. I said, "Hey, you know,
55:30I'm going to complain I'm complaining to
55:31her about the 787." She said, "I'll have
55:34somebody get you the information. You
55:36probably haven't seen the information."
55:37I have not seen any information
55:39whatsoever. As a matter of fact, you
55:41know, like they're just throwing that
55:43stuff. If you want to change the
55:45information like the 165,000,
55:48then you need to rerun that test with
55:50165,000
55:52with the new excessive force
55:54and show that it's good. You got to show
55:57you Well, just one one quick question
55:58for Mr. Pearson. You said you had
56:01delivered records to the FBI. First of
56:03all, how did you how did you
56:05uh
56:05obtain those records? And have you heard
56:08back from the FBI?
56:10The records were sent to me. Um
56:12and
56:13From a internal whistleblower? From an
56:15internal whistleblower. And I provided
56:17those records to the FBI. And again, you
56:19know, for the last couple months there's
56:21been, you know, talk that there's
56:23there's no records. And that's obviously
56:24not
56:25on the Alaskan Airline This is on the
56:26Alaskan Airlines. That Boeing apparently
56:28overwrote the video that would have
56:30shown
56:32Again, I've talked to Boeing. They said
56:33that's just a normal 30-day cycle and
56:35it's mainly it's not really the video's
56:38not there to document the maintenance,
56:40but it's really document other things
56:42potentially, but it's overwritten
56:43regularly.
56:44Yeah, I'm talking about the actual
56:45documentation that they've been saying
56:47is not been available. It is available.
56:49in the FBI
56:50And and it has been available for
56:51months. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
56:56Thanks, uh Senator Johnson. We're going
56:57to go to uh Senator Marshall and Senator
57:00Hassan and Senator Hawley.
57:03Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
57:06Mr. Salehpour, you've described several
57:08significant events since you came
57:11forward with your claims. One was the
57:12nail in the tire. You described your
57:14life was being threatened.
57:16Do you feel that this style of
57:17retaliation against you has been part of
57:19Boeing's efforts to silence and prevent
57:22you from sharing your story?
57:25I think the retaliation somebody even
57:27was calling me on my personal phone.
57:30You know, time after time. You know,
57:32this is my personal phone. You know, and
57:34What were they saying or Well, my boss
57:37was calling me there and for 40 minutes
57:40he kind of berated me and chewed me out.
57:42I have a work phone he that he can use,
57:46but he's calling you on your personal
57:48phone. And they remind me of, you know,
57:51people who they stalk people or
57:53something like that. They call you on
57:54your personal phone to let you know that
57:56they know where you live, they know
57:58where you are, and they can hurt you.
58:00And you know, after the threats and
58:02after this, you know, it's like, you
58:04know, it really scares me.
58:06Believe me. But I am at peace.
58:09You know, if something happens to me, I
58:11am at peace because I feel like by
58:13coming forward, I will be saving a lot
58:16of lives and I'm at peace. Whatever
58:18happens, it happens.
58:20Well, we certainly do appreciate you you
58:22coming forward and and certainly the
58:24brave and and courage it takes for all
58:26of you to do this.
58:28Do you think that there was a culture of
58:30retaliation against whistleblowers at
58:33Boeing?
58:35It
58:36Absolutely. And also there's a culture
58:39of
58:41when you address the quality issues, and
58:44that's all I have done. I haven't made
58:46it personal. All I've done is said,
58:48"Hey, you know, we are not measuring the
58:50gaps properly. We are not shimming the
58:52gaps properly."
58:54Then, you know, you get threat
58:55threatened and this and that. All I'm
58:57trying to say is the system needs to be
59:00changed.
59:01Do you still have your job?
59:02I have my job. The only reason I have my
59:05job because I had my attorneys, we filed
59:08for the whistleblower system before I
59:11spoke up this time. What's it like when
59:13you go back to work?
59:16Well, last time, if you can think of it,
59:20I went to a meeting on the 777 and I
59:22brought up my concern in that meeting to
59:25say that the way we're building that
59:27airplane, it does not correlate to what
59:30the design of the airplane is. because
59:33of that we are resulting in a lot of
59:35misfares, you know,
59:38misfares and a lot of problems. You
59:41know, after 300 plus airplanes, we
59:43should be able to make that airplane and
59:46my boss sent somebody to the meeting,
59:48pulled me out of the meeting and
59:52called me on the phone and says I threw
59:54the person under the bus by asking the
59:57question what are we doing to make our
59:59design compatible with our build system
1:00:02to overcome these,
1:00:04you know, mislocated holes and this and
1:00:06that. And then he says what was uh my
1:00:09intention,
1:00:10you know, and really berated me and a
1:00:14week later he was going to talk about
1:00:16that again. I thought, you know, it's
1:00:18it's resolved, but the very week later
1:00:20he was talking to me about that. You
1:00:22know, why should you even be
1:00:25prosecuted for something that, you know,
1:00:28all you're doing is saying, "Hey, the
1:00:30design that we used to have, we went to
1:00:32determine the assembly is not working.
1:00:35What can we do? Have you guys thought
1:00:37about anything to bring that so that
1:00:39they are compatible?" So, you your
1:00:41intention was to build a safe airplane.
1:00:43Absolutely.
1:00:45Not with force. I I want to try to
1:00:47understand this. Diagram that you all
1:00:49supplied is this is a Boeing 777. And
1:00:53you're talking about where these joints
1:00:55come together. I'm talking about the one
1:00:58on the foot most forward between Yeah,
1:01:00right there, and one in the aft. That's
1:01:03the 4143 No, the one this way this way,
1:01:05right?
1:01:07That's the 4143. It's a major joint and
1:01:11then one on the aft. Instead of
1:01:13shimming, they're basically just using
1:01:15force to bring them together. You're not
1:01:17concerned that it hurts the composite.
1:01:19Well, it it just violates every one of
1:01:23our common practices because you don't
1:01:27force the stuff together because when
1:01:29you force stuff together, you increase
1:01:31the stress concentration on that. If you
1:01:34think think of
1:01:35paperclip, if you bend it back and
1:01:38forth, after a little while it breaks.
1:01:41You know, speaking of of action, that's
1:01:42what I want to talk next about is is
1:01:43action. I'm not sure if any of you are
1:01:46familiar with NIAR at Wichita State
1:01:48University, the National Institute of
1:01:50Aviation Research. They specialize in
1:01:52aerospace R&D including composite
1:01:55advanced materials and they do wind
1:01:58tunnel wind tunnel testing where they
1:02:00would take an entire wing and entire
1:02:01fuselage from a plane like this and
1:02:04stress test it. Uh Mr. Jacobson, would
1:02:07you do you feel like that type of stress
1:02:08test I want to get the we we have
1:02:10different opinions, but that's where I
1:02:12would have confidence and America would
1:02:14have confidence if there was stress
1:02:15testing, take some of these randomly and
1:02:17and do that stress testing or maybe it's
1:02:19already been done, I don't know.
1:02:21Well, I'm not a structure specialist, um
1:02:23so I I can't really comment on the on
1:02:26the details of any of those sort of
1:02:29you know, hypotheticals,
1:02:32but I mean in general
1:02:34all of this there's there's design, then
1:02:37there's testing, there's there's quite a
1:02:39process and you can't violate any part
1:02:42of that process. If you violate
1:02:45Okay, thank I'm sorry about that. Is
1:02:46anybody else familiar with NIAR and that
1:02:48type of stress testing where you put
1:02:49them in do wind tunnel testing
1:02:51on these? I I just think that that's the
1:02:52action that I would have confidence in
1:02:54as a scientist who have tested thousands
1:02:57of jets and airplanes
1:02:59and are experts in composite to see
1:03:00exactly if this is a a challenge or not.
1:03:03I think that would be a great a great
1:03:06answer to this question. That's action.
1:03:08Go ahead, Mr. Salapour. One one thing
1:03:10that I want to, you know, the issue that
1:03:12we're talking about is pressurizing the
1:03:15fuselage from the inside. You know, when
1:03:18you pressurize and depressurize,
1:03:20basically, you know, that's we call it
1:03:22flight cycle. Every time you go up and
1:03:24you come down, that's one flight cycle.
1:03:26I feel that we can reproduce that at
1:03:27NIAR. So, I think it's a great great
1:03:29point though. And lastly, my last
1:03:31question is
1:03:33it feels like the FAA and the DOT has
1:03:35dropped the ball as well here though.
1:03:38Mr. Pierson, go ahead.
1:03:41And then this is the action. I'm sorry,
1:03:43that it was the DOT and the and the FAA.
1:03:46Yeah, 100%. I mean, people don't
1:03:48understand the FAA is a subordinate
1:03:49agency to the Department of
1:03:51Transportation and as the FAA has been
1:03:53struggling with revolving leadership and
1:03:55everything else, there's been numerous
1:03:57opportunities for the Department of
1:03:59Transportation to get involved and
1:04:01engaged. And what we've seen from them
1:04:02is nothing. They just kind of
1:04:05are on the sidelines. So, to me the
1:04:06action would be to ask the staff to sit
1:04:08down with the FAA and the DOT and the
1:04:11people and and and send type of report.
1:04:14We can't bring them in here for another
1:04:156-hour hearing, but I would love to see
1:04:18a little bit more report on on how they
1:04:19would defend themselves. Thank you, Mr.
1:04:21Chairman. Senator, if I could just add,
1:04:23I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt,
1:04:24but
1:04:25we met with the head of the FAA and the
1:04:28and the deputy of secretary of
1:04:30transportation in March 8th. Our
1:04:32foundation did and we met with them and
1:04:34we went through 35
1:04:37problems and we made recommendations to
1:04:39each one and we said we offered to
1:04:40assist whatever we could cuz we want
1:04:42them to be successful,
1:04:43but they need to get in the game. That's
1:04:45all I can tell you.
1:04:46Thank you.
1:04:48Thank you, Senator Marshall. I might
1:04:51just point out we've been in touch with
1:04:53the FAA. We hope that they will appear
1:04:56at a hearing as well and they've issued
1:05:00a scathing
1:05:02report detailing the findings of an
1:05:05expert panel review
1:05:06of Boeing's
1:05:08management practices.
1:05:11The panel found, for example, quote, a
1:05:13lack of awareness of safety-related
1:05:15metrics at all levels of the
1:05:18organization,
1:05:20end quote. So, I'm hoping that the FAA
1:05:24will
1:05:27be
1:05:28cooperative and aggressive in our
1:05:30continuing investigation as well.
1:05:34Senator Hassan.
1:05:35Well, thank you
1:05:37very much, Chair Blumenthal and Ranking
1:05:39Member Johnson
1:05:41for holding the hearing today. Thank you
1:05:43to all of our witnesses for appearing
1:05:45today as well as your commitment to
1:05:48aviation safety and protecting the
1:05:50public.
1:05:51To Chris and Clarice Moore,
1:05:54thank you for being here. I am so sorry
1:05:56for your loss.
1:05:58The picture of your daughter
1:06:00is a
1:06:01reminder of the reason we're here today
1:06:04and why aviation safety is so important.
1:06:07So, thank you for being here.
1:06:10And to Mr. Salapour, you mentioned in
1:06:12your testimony, as I understand it, that
1:06:15the Challenger disaster was a wake-up
1:06:17call
1:06:18and an example of why safety is so
1:06:20important. The teacher who was lost in
1:06:23that disaster was Christa McAuliffe from
1:06:25Concord, New Hampshire and her loss is
1:06:27still felt today as is her example.
1:06:30So,
1:06:31thank you for
1:06:34invoking her memory today.
1:06:36And I wanted to start with a question to
1:06:38you, Mr. Salapour, and apologies if some
1:06:40of this has been covered because we are
1:06:43in and out, but
1:06:45as a whistleblower, you raised two
1:06:47safety concerns regarding quality
1:06:49controls during the manufacturing and
1:06:52assembly process. Can you describe the
1:06:56internal Boeing culture around reporting
1:06:59safety and quality concerns?
1:07:03Right now, basically, you know, I have
1:07:05very
1:07:07I guess negative
1:07:10attitude towards the quality concern.
1:07:13You know, when I bring something to my
1:07:15boss to say, you know, we have problems
1:07:17with this and he prevents me from even
1:07:20documenting and prevents me from even
1:07:23sending the information to the SMEs, you
1:07:27know, the subject matters experts, to me
1:07:30that's a problem. You know, a quality
1:07:32manager telling you not to write your
1:07:36concerns and not to send it to the
1:07:39you know, the subject matter expert to
1:07:41just let's say, you know, I I don't know
1:07:43for sure. You know, they they close a
1:07:46gap of like
1:07:473/4 of an inch without shim. You know,
1:07:49that's concerning. Our rules are 010.
1:07:54So, I said, you know, I want to write
1:07:55that, but don't send it. So, not only
1:07:58were you discouraged and really told not
1:08:01to document it, what's your impression
1:08:03of how comfortable other Boeing
1:08:05personnel are with raising their
1:08:07concerns to management both before and
1:08:09after you came forward? Well, I think
1:08:11it's very negative. It's it's really
1:08:14they think that, you know, like we had
1:08:16situation where they had debris in the
1:08:20in the gap and my my friend put some
1:08:22inspections in there and then the boss
1:08:25was telling him that, you know, are you
1:08:28trying to stop the production? You know,
1:08:31those are significant problems that, you
1:08:33know, if you don't inspect, you have to
1:08:37inspect to get a good quality airplanes
1:08:39out. And what I'm trying to say is the
1:08:42attitude at Boeing from the highest
1:08:45level is just to push the defective
1:08:48parts regardless of what it is,
1:08:50unfortunately. So, what you're really
1:08:52saying is if so
1:08:54from the top down, people are
1:08:56discouraged from coming forward
1:08:58and so people are quite reluctant
1:09:01to come forward in this culture.
1:09:03Absolutely. And you know, the fact that
1:09:05I asked for the data from I just
1:09:08I complained to Mrs. Fall, you know, and
1:09:11she said she'll have somebody send me
1:09:13the information on 787. To this date, I
1:09:16haven't received any. Okay. So,
1:09:19another question for you, sir. In 2020,
1:09:21Congress reformed safety and
1:09:22certification requirements for aircraft
1:09:25manufacturers following the 737 Max
1:09:28disasters. What was your experience with
1:09:31how those reforms were implemented and
1:09:33whether Boeing appropriately followed
1:09:35them?
1:09:36My personal opinion from what I've seen
1:09:38from bottom up has been nothing. Okay.
1:09:41And Mr. Jacobson, as a former FAA
1:09:44official, do you have any thoughts about
1:09:46how effective that agency was in
1:09:48implementing and overseeing those
1:09:50reforms?
1:09:52The attitude from day one was was not
1:09:55good at upper levels of the FAA. The
1:09:58message that I heard right after AXA was
1:10:01passed was uh we're already doing all of
1:10:03this.
1:10:04So, that's the wrong attitude from day
1:10:06one. Mhm. And then what I saw I tracked
1:10:10a lot of the implementation of AXA
1:10:13um working with Senator Cantwell's
1:10:15office and what I saw there was
1:10:19um
1:10:20kind of a half-hearted um look at all of
1:10:23these recommendations and and
1:10:25requirements. Um they tended to lump
1:10:28them all together Yeah. and called them
1:10:31work streams and said we've got that
1:10:32covered. That's in this work stream or
1:10:34that work stream. And instead of taking
1:10:37each individual
1:10:39provision very seriously and attacking
1:10:42them that that was not the attitude.
1:10:44Thank you.
1:10:45Uh this is a question to both Mr.
1:10:47Pearson and then again to Mr. Jacobson.
1:10:50You both raised concerns about the 737
1:10:53Max. One of you directly with Boeing and
1:10:55the other with the FAA. Given the safety
1:10:57failures that have led us to this
1:10:59hearing, how can Congress better empower
1:11:01whistleblowers, protect them from
1:11:03retaliation, and reestablish a willing
1:11:06adherence to safety standards? So, we'll
1:11:08start with you, Mr. Pearson.
1:11:10As I said, Senator, um
1:11:12you know, we really shouldn't have to
1:11:14rely on whistleblowers, but with that
1:11:15said, I think that all these um programs
1:11:19need to have much more
1:11:21oversight because what happens for
1:11:23example at right now if a Boeing
1:11:24employee wants to submit a whistleblower
1:11:26report to the FAA,
1:11:28they submit a hotline report. And those
1:11:30hotline reports go in and then it could
1:11:32take months potentially for them to
1:11:34investigate it. And sometimes we've been
1:11:36told that um they don't employees don't
1:11:38really know what happened. And so, I
1:11:40think that there's a lot more it needs
1:11:41to be a lot more attention. And and
1:11:43again, I I think what we need to talk
1:11:45about is leadership at all levels. Uh
1:11:47not just at the senior level, but even
1:11:49at the very front line level,
1:11:51we need to treat people with respect and
1:11:52we need to value these employees. And I
1:11:54think that will help a long way. I I
1:11:56think we're not providing enough
1:11:57training to these employees. I know that
1:11:59in the factory and we're putting it
1:12:01individuals in responsible jobs and they
1:12:03need a lot more training and I think
1:12:05that will help a long way uh preventing
1:12:07having to use whistleblowers. Thank you,
1:12:08Mr. Jacobson.
1:12:11Yeah, I'm hopeful that um Mr. Whitaker,
1:12:13the new FAA administrator, will
1:12:16will really take on the challenge of
1:12:18changing the culture at the FAA so that
1:12:21FAA is back to doing their job as a
1:12:23regulator. Um if if they just rubber
1:12:26stamp everything that the you know, the
1:12:29manufacturers do, then it's really um
1:12:32they're not doing anything useful. And
1:12:35so, we need to get back to them doing a
1:12:37useful job as regulators. Thank you for
1:12:40that and um Dr. Pushniky, I have a
1:12:43question for you, but I am out of time,
1:12:45so I will submit it for the record. I'm
1:12:46just really looking for your
1:12:47recommendations about how to eliminate
1:12:50these grave safety risks. So, we'll
1:12:51submit that for the record. Thank you.
1:12:53Thanks, Senator Hassan. Senator
1:12:54Hollingsworth. Thank you very much, Mr.
1:12:56Chairman. Thanks for convening this
1:12:57hearing. Thanks to each of the witnesses
1:12:58for being here. Mr. Salehpour, let me
1:13:00just start with you.
1:13:01I just want to back up and make sure I
1:13:03understand your testimony cuz it seems
1:13:05extraordinary to me. And I'm reading the
1:13:07letters that you've submitted from your
1:13:09attorney when you first contacted uh the
1:13:12FAA when you contacted the committee.
1:13:14So, my understanding is you worked on
1:13:16both the 787 and the 777, correct?
1:13:20Yes, sir. And you identified major
1:13:22safety concerns with both of these
1:13:25lines, is that And you identified you
1:13:27identified these to your superiors. Yes,
1:13:30sir. I have written
1:13:32many memos time after time that we have
1:13:36we can provide. Over a period of years,
1:13:38I think.
1:13:38Uh yeah, this is like 3 years. For the
1:13:40777 I mean 787, it's been 3 years of
1:13:44effort. And so, your concerns how who
1:13:47knew about your concerns? How far up the
1:13:48the chain do you know that they went?
1:13:50I have gone as high as Mark Stockton and
1:13:53Lisa Fahl.
1:13:54Who's the vice president?
1:13:56The vice president of the company?
1:13:58Yes. So, they they were and are aware of
1:14:01of these major safety concerns. And this
1:14:03is what this is what you do for a
1:14:04living. I mean, you're you're an
1:14:05engineer, right? I mean, this I'm an
1:14:07engineer. I went to quality about 3 4
1:14:10years ago. And when you put your quality
1:14:12hat, we are the eyes and ears of the
1:14:15public
1:14:16for the safety of the airplane. That's
1:14:18how I feel about our job. And so, I have
1:14:22you know, when I see concerning
1:14:24information or concerning uh
1:14:28uh
1:14:29let's say production issues, then it is
1:14:33our responsibility
1:14:35to make sure that you know, if we are
1:14:37causing the airplane to have increased
1:14:40risk factors, our job is to eliminate
1:14:43those risk factors. And are these planes
1:14:46safe?
1:14:47Right now, I would not you know, it's
1:14:49like a earthquake. You know, if the big
1:14:52earthquake is coming, but when when that
1:14:55hits, the building that you know, you
1:14:57let's say if you're talking of a
1:14:58building, have to be prepared to
1:15:01accommodate that type of a let's say
1:15:03shake up. You know, it has to be built
1:15:05properly. Right now, from what I've
1:15:07seen, the airplanes are not being built
1:15:10per spec and per requirement.
1:15:12So, you your testimony is the 787 line
1:15:15and the 777
1:15:17the 777 line are are you think are not
1:15:20are not safe.
1:15:21they are doing stuff that increases the
1:15:24risk factors. Okay? When you increase
1:15:26the risk factors, you know, it's not
1:15:29just one. You are doing stress
1:15:31concentrations that those stress
1:15:33concentrations like you know, breaking a
1:15:35paper clip, you know, you do it once or
1:15:38twice, it doesn't break, but it breaks
1:15:39at sometime. As the plane gets older,
1:15:42you know, all of these things that you
1:15:44know, you took
1:15:45you know, you said it's not a safety
1:15:47issue, it becomes a safety issue.
1:15:49And the company's response to you was to
1:15:51threaten you?
1:15:54Threaten you, sidelined you,
1:15:57you know, transfer you. You raised
1:15:59concerns about the 787 and so, they
1:16:01transferred you transferred you to the
1:16:02777, right?
1:16:04Well, in yes. Initially, they just cut
1:16:06me off of all the meetings. They took my
1:16:08name out. And then so, I was just doing
1:16:10nothing. I wasn't informed of what. Then
1:16:13they transferred me. And they do it
1:16:14pretty stealthy. Oh, we have a job over
1:16:17here. We want you go over there. So,
1:16:18they move you down there and you know, I
1:16:21come from like 40 years of engineering
1:16:23background. So, when I see pro and I've
1:16:25taken a lot of stress class stress
1:16:28classes, even though I'm not an
1:16:30specialist on that, but when there's a
1:16:32problematic area that you see, you can
1:16:35recognize. So, they I just want to make
1:16:37sure I get the sequence right. So, you
1:16:39raise these concerns you get on the 787
1:16:41you get transferred transferred over to
1:16:42the 777. You raise the concerns there.
1:16:45They ignore it in both that they they
1:16:47haven't addressed any of these concerns.
1:16:48Is that your testimony? Yes, sir. And at
1:16:50one point at some point they start to
1:16:52threaten you. You're talking about your
1:16:54your boss calling you on your personal
1:16:55phone and and berating you. And when did
1:16:57that start?
1:16:58Well, that started right after when I
1:17:01said, you know, we have made over 300
1:17:03plus airplanes, we still don't know how
1:17:05to put the load and cell. What what I
1:17:08mean by that, you know, if you're
1:17:09building a airplane, I mean, building a
1:17:11house, it's like you know, putting the
1:17:13foundation. You know, we have made over
1:17:16300 airplanes, we still changing our
1:17:19process like build the foundation to put
1:17:23the airplanes. We are struggling with
1:17:25that because they have changed the
1:17:27process, you know, from stable to
1:17:29unstable situation. They're not building
1:17:32to the same datums that we were
1:17:33building. So, you're causing your own
1:17:35problem, but you don't want to admit it.
1:17:37Just force fit the problem, you know,
1:17:40force fit the misaligned holes and
1:17:42everything else and move on. And that's
1:17:44what they have been doing. And that's
1:17:45what I have brought up to their
1:17:47attention. I told my boss that I said in
1:17:49the in the report, I said, we have made
1:17:51300 plus airplane. That should have been
1:17:53more than adequate for us to resolve
1:17:56these things. All the problems that
1:17:58we've had, we put band-aid over band-aid
1:18:01to resolve the problems and band-aid
1:18:03over band-aid doesn't cover it. Maybe we
1:18:05need to consider some engineering
1:18:07fundamentals with a little bit of GD&T
1:18:09to figure out what the problem is. And
1:18:12right after that, he came back to my
1:18:14desk and he he like I said, you know, he
1:18:17made the threat. And then after that, he
1:18:19says, are you in or are you out? Meaning
1:18:21what? Are you in and are you out with
1:18:23Boeing? I mean, are you going to be a
1:18:24good good citizen and keep your mouth
1:18:25shut? Was that Well, that that's how I
1:18:27can I can interpret that. He would walk
1:18:30by me and he said, you better Then he
1:18:31said, I want you write it in writing.
1:18:34Tell me are you in or are you out? Put
1:18:36it in writing whether or not you were
1:18:37going to I'm in or out and what that
1:18:40means are you going to just
1:18:43shut up? Right. That's all it takes.
1:18:45If you wanted to be in, you needed to be
1:18:47quiet. You needed to stop this, you
1:18:48know, don't don't say anything more.
1:18:50Certainly don't tell the public. That's
1:18:52how I interpreted it, but he told me to
1:18:54write it in writing. And I'm trying to
1:18:56write it and um
1:18:59there was 10 emails.
1:19:01Just because I haven't received your
1:19:03email on this. Send it to me and this
1:19:06and that.
1:19:06he's pressuring you. I mean, you got to
1:19:08pressuring you. And then his
1:19:10manipulation even got further than that,
1:19:13you know, like I'm trying to take a
1:19:15class on my own time that I have to flex
1:19:17the time, he wouldn't let me do that.
1:19:19You know, I'm trying I have a doctor's
1:19:21appointment, he cancels my doctor
1:19:23appointment at the same day. I mean, you
1:19:25know, different manipulating things to
1:19:28retaliate to make your life miserable.
1:19:31And then, you know, I started talking to
1:19:33go somewhere else, you know, I I mean,
1:19:35you know, you you you just try to escape
1:19:39from that because this is hell.
1:19:41You know, that I was subjected to. And
1:19:44then he threatens you with that and
1:19:47really with my background, you know,
1:19:49I've had some
1:19:51you know, it's it's really has made me
1:19:53where 3:00 in the morning I'm waking up
1:19:57with somebody stabbing me. You know, I'm
1:19:59still receiving psychological help to
1:20:01just get back on normal. Well, it it is
1:20:04it is an unbelievable to me
1:20:07that in the midst of this safety crisis
1:20:09at this corporation that what they're
1:20:11doing is threatening
1:20:13their own engineers whose job it is to
1:20:15help identify potential safety concerns
1:20:18and rather than saying, you know, what
1:20:20you've got a point, we need to maybe do
1:20:22something about this, they're telling
1:20:23you to hide it, they're reassigning you,
1:20:25they're threatening you, they're trying
1:20:26to shut you up. In the meantime, I
1:20:28noticed this guy Dave Calhoun, I think
1:20:30he's the CEO. I guess he's leaving at
1:20:31the end of the year. I wonder how much
1:20:33he's getting paid.
1:20:35I bet it's a lot. Yes. I bet it's a lot
1:20:37more than my paycheck. I bet it's a lot
1:20:38more than your paycheck. I bet it's a
1:20:40heck of a lot. Mr. Chairman, thank you
1:20:42for for holding this hearing. I think
1:20:44we're just scratching the surface here,
1:20:45but this is just this is extraordinary.
1:20:47It's just extraordinary. Thank you.
1:20:49I really appreciate that. Thank you.
1:20:51Giving us the opportunity. Thank you
1:20:52very much, Senator Hawley. And again, I
1:20:53just want to say
1:20:55uh I could not agree more with the
1:20:58points that were made about the need for
1:21:00continuing investigation by our
1:21:02subcommittee
1:21:04as well as by the FAA and the Department
1:21:07of Justice.
1:21:08Um
1:21:09and I'm anticipating we'll have strong
1:21:12bipartisan consensus
1:21:14about the next steps that we will take.
1:21:17But uh we're going to have a
1:21:20another round of questioning. It's going
1:21:22to be short, shorter than I would like
1:21:25because we have a
1:21:27deadline for being in our chairs in the
1:21:29United States Senate on the floor
1:21:32for a completely unrelated purpose.
1:21:35Uh
1:21:36but I want to kind of begin where the
1:21:39Senator Hawley ended.
1:21:41Mr. Salsep Mr. Salsep, uh in your
1:21:44testimony, you told us that
1:21:47since 2021, multiple colleagues have
1:21:50told you about sharing
1:21:53your concerns.
1:21:56Most of them have not come forward.
1:21:59Why?
1:22:01It's the fear. I mean, if you think of
1:22:03how much problem I have created
1:22:07you know, by coming up with my you know,
1:22:10being persistent about talking about the
1:22:12defects and everything else. Ever since
1:22:14the space shuttle O-rings, that has
1:22:16really put a mark on me. That thing
1:22:18should have not happened, but it
1:22:20happened because of the faulty
1:22:22engineering. And that's exactly what we
1:22:25have here is we have faulty engineering
1:22:27that, you know, they're trying to shove
1:22:29on our throats to just say, "Hey, you
1:22:31know, whatever we do, it's okay." From
1:22:34one side, they put reports that it says
1:22:37it's not okay. From other side, when
1:22:39they violated, they try to while
1:22:41white wash the influence and become
1:22:45white washing the ceiling.
1:22:47the spec to say it's not important for
1:22:50the spec, you know, the spec if you
1:22:52don't meet it, it's not that big of a
1:22:53deal. Let's just push the airplanes out.
1:22:55And then the the the attitude of the
1:22:59people for like I said, you know, not
1:23:03being receptive
1:23:05you know, because of the threats or
1:23:07anything else. But that's because of
1:23:08that people haven't come forward.
1:23:11You know, you've been very careful
1:23:14in the way that you have phrased the
1:23:18potential danger here. You talk about
1:23:20the increased risk. Yes.
1:23:24One could compare it to
1:23:28something a little bit like Russian
1:23:29roulette. We never know exactly when
1:23:32it's going to happen. when or where or
1:23:35how it's going to happen, but fatigue
1:23:38building
1:23:40and the
1:23:42potential vulnerability of that fuselage
1:23:44to
1:23:45tearing apart
1:23:48is a risk that has been increased.
1:23:50And it's a risk that
1:23:53should never have been increased.
1:23:55Absolutely.
1:23:55And yet these processes are continuing,
1:23:58are they not? Yes, sir. From what I
1:24:00know, it's continuing and right now
1:24:02Boeing is coming back and really
1:24:06remember, whatever they put out there,
1:24:07they say that, you know, everything is
1:24:09okay because they never learn from their
1:24:11mistakes. That's what the really
1:24:14significant thing that I want to take
1:24:15from this is that they never learn. You
1:24:18know, it's like a lie. When you say one
1:24:20lie, you have to lie 10 more times to
1:24:22cover that lie. You know,
1:24:24hey, we made a mistake, let's correct it
1:24:27and move on, but that's not what's
1:24:28happening.
1:24:29Um you referred to
1:24:31numerous memos that you've written.
1:24:33Uh I have one of them which is a
1:24:372021 memo. Uh the
1:24:40recipient of it has been
1:24:43deleted.
1:24:45But the memo
1:24:47speaks volumes in my view. And one
1:24:50part of it, one sentence, I think is
1:24:53kind of a coda for
1:24:55the lesson that
1:24:57Boeing should have learned. And I'm
1:24:59quoting
1:25:00kicking me out of the program
1:25:03because I am raising safety concerns
1:25:07over the unintended consequences of the
1:25:09increased fit up forces
1:25:12and potential escapements as a result
1:25:15does not help
1:25:17anybody.
1:25:19It does not help
1:25:21anybody. It doesn't help Boeing.
1:25:24No.
1:25:25At all.
1:25:27And
1:25:29again, this
1:25:31focus on stock price
1:25:33on quarterly profit
1:25:36on
1:25:38money
1:25:39over safety
1:25:42is a bad investment.
1:25:44It is malpractice
1:25:48beyond simply a broken self safety
1:25:52culture.
1:25:53Uh the the expert panel of the FAA
1:25:57said something that I thought was uh
1:25:59pretty telling. Quote, "A safety culture
1:26:02is not something that springs up
1:26:05ready-made
1:26:06from near-death
1:26:08experience. Rather, it emerges gradually
1:26:12from the persistent and successful
1:26:14application of practical and
1:26:17down-to-earth
1:26:18measures
1:26:19like
1:26:21giving you a bonus
1:26:24for your courage
1:26:25and your insights rather than
1:26:28in effect
1:26:30threatening and penalizing you. Yes,
1:26:32sir. Dr. Prouchandy, am I
1:26:35correct in that kind of observation
1:26:38about safety culture that it has to be
1:26:41the result of persistent step-by-step
1:26:44down-to-earth
1:26:46actions by management that is really
1:26:48committed
1:26:49to safety, not just
1:26:52in word, but indeed. And it has to put
1:26:54its money where its mouth is.
1:26:56No, you're exactly right. And this is
1:26:59part of the four parts of a safety
1:27:01culture that you do have these reward
1:27:03systems in place. And you are proud when
1:27:06people come forward like this. And you
1:27:09embrace that and you celebrate that. And
1:27:11there's many different ways you can do
1:27:12that. And various companies can can can
1:27:14do this. But if if I may take this time
1:27:17to just add one thing very quickly is
1:27:19one part of a healthy safety culture is
1:27:22that the accountability goes all the way
1:27:25to the top of the of the company, all
1:27:28the way to the CEO. And when I go to
1:27:31help companies
1:27:33with their safety culture problems, I I
1:27:35talk all to to to CEOs. And one of the
1:27:38questions I ask them is, "How much time
1:27:40do you spend weekly with your safety
1:27:42department?" Because different companies
1:27:44might spend time with their marketing
1:27:46people, their finance people, and and
1:27:48all their money people. And what I find
1:27:51across the board is they don't spend
1:27:53time with their safety people. Yet they
1:27:55say they're accountable and they sign
1:27:57documents they're accountable. And most
1:27:59of the time they'll tell me, "Well, my
1:28:01this person meets with them or or
1:28:03whomever." That is not accountability to
1:28:05the top. And I tell them that, "Well, if
1:28:08you have time to meet with marketing and
1:28:10your finance people, then you should
1:28:12have time to meet with your safety
1:28:14people weekly." And if I had time to
1:28:17talk to Boeing, I'd be fascinated to
1:28:19know how many times their CEO people
1:28:22actually talk to their safety people.
1:28:24That shows accountability. It would be
1:28:26an interesting answer to that question.
1:28:29So, deans of business schools across the
1:28:32country and
1:28:34CEOs of corporations big and small, are
1:28:36you listening?
1:28:37Will you take a lesson from Boeing's
1:28:39experience? Yeah, cuz if they're not
1:28:41doing this, they're wrong.
1:28:43Flat out. And we've seen this time and
1:28:44time again with accidents. And I go all
1:28:46over the world. I help companies
1:28:47straighten this out.
1:28:49It's flat out.
1:28:50I I'm going to yield to uh
1:28:53Senator Johnson. So, so let me just
1:28:55underscore, you know, from my own
1:28:56manufacturing background, I think the
1:28:58key to a safety system, quality system
1:29:00is accountability.
1:29:02You know, in my little plastics
1:29:03manufacturing plant, every roll of
1:29:04plastic that went out had the operator's
1:29:06name on the name tag on the roll tag. We
1:29:09if that was rejected, we knew exactly
1:29:11who
1:29:12produced that, who approved it. And so
1:29:14so accountability is is crucial, which
1:29:17takes me back to the
1:29:18737 Max and the deferred prosecution
1:29:22agreement. First of all, I want some
1:29:23clarity.
1:29:25Was it or was it not the the MCAS system
1:29:29that caused that crash?
1:29:33The MCAS system, Senator, was obviously
1:29:36played a significant role, so did the
1:29:37lack of pilot training, but as Mr.
1:29:39Jacobson has said, there was other
1:29:40factors and our analysis, my analysis
1:29:43shows that those airplanes also had
1:29:45manufacturing defects that triggered the
1:29:47MCAS software.
1:29:49Mr. Jacobson?
1:29:52Yeah,
1:29:52So, what were those other defects? I
1:29:53mean, was it the this the sensor? I
1:29:55mean, only having one sensor was part of
1:29:57that system though, but
1:29:59Well, the sensor, um, as as Mr. Pierson
1:30:02has talked about, the sensor showed, um,
1:30:06problems. The original sensor on the
1:30:08Lion Air airplane showed,
1:30:10uh, a lot of manufacturing defects when
1:30:12it was examined.
1:30:14Um,
1:30:14what I found curious was after the
1:30:16Ethiopian crash, they said the sensor
1:30:18was taken off by a bird.
1:30:21They had no evidence for that, none
1:30:23whatsoever, but they concluded that it
1:30:26was the bird that did it. And so, I
1:30:29I think it's much more plausible and
1:30:31likely that it was a electrical fault of
1:30:34some sort, either arcing or something
1:30:37like that. So, of of all the troubling
1:30:39testimony
1:30:41uh, that I've read here
1:30:42leading up to this hearing or I've heard
1:30:43here today,
1:30:45um, probably the most
1:30:47troubling is the fact that
1:30:49Boeing
1:30:50did not notify regulators of this
1:30:53significant change in the MCAS system. I
1:30:56mean, would you agree with that?
1:30:59I would. Um, I I think the both crashes
1:31:02would not have happened if they'd been
1:31:04fully transparent and forthcoming with
1:31:07the design, um, of
1:31:09we come back we come back to
1:31:10accountability. Yes. Has anybody been
1:31:14held accountable
1:31:16for concealing that from the FAA? I
1:31:18mean,
1:31:20300 some lives were lost again, my
1:31:22condolences to those family members of
1:31:24those
1:31:25lives were lost.
1:31:28This this was beyond negligence. This is
1:31:30an overt act.
1:31:33And nobody has been held
1:31:37accountable in any way, shape or form,
1:31:39financially, losing their job,
1:31:41criminally held liable?
1:31:47Look, we've been dancing around an issue
1:31:49here that, quite frankly,
1:31:52being a systems engineer, I design a lot
1:31:54of automation and the interaction
1:31:56between human and automation. And what
1:31:59they did is quite obvious. They snuck
1:32:02the MCAS system through the
1:32:04certification process. Period. It's that
1:32:07simple.
1:32:08Is it Is it But they did that over
1:32:09money, sir. Is that or was that
1:32:11criminal? Again, I'm not a lawyer, I'm
1:32:13not a I'm not a prosecutor. Is that Is
1:32:15that criminal? Do we have laws on the
1:32:17books that
1:32:18that type of that type of
1:32:20uh,
1:32:21I What's the right word? Not evasion. I
1:32:24mean, is that was that criminal
1:32:25behavior? Should it somebody been held
1:32:27liable criminally? I can't answer if
1:32:29that's criminal, but as a cognitive
1:32:31engineer, I can tell you and I and I and
1:32:33I know how the certification process
1:32:34works and I know how this accident
1:32:36works. They snuck it through the process
1:32:39and it was all about money. It was all
1:32:41about getting those airplanes to
1:32:42Southwest and it was all about money and
1:32:44that's why those people died. Has the
1:32:46deferred
1:32:47prosecution
1:32:49agreement been made public or is that
1:32:51sealed?
1:32:52not aware if it's been made public or
1:32:53not. It has been made public, Senator,
1:32:55and it's an absolute, um,
1:32:57probably the most embarrassing thing in
1:32:59my career I've I've seen is is how those
1:33:01families were treated and that deferred
1:33:03prosecution agreement should never have
1:33:05happened. It It was absolutely criminal
1:33:07that they did that. It was It was It was
1:33:09just heartbreaking. So, so who was in
1:33:11charge of that deferred prosecution? Who
1:33:13Who agreed to that? That's the
1:33:15Department of Justice that agreed to
1:33:17that.
1:33:18cuz I am a former United States Attorney
1:33:21and a federal prosecutor.
1:33:23Uh, the Department of Justice deferred
1:33:26prosecution agreement is public.
1:33:29In fact, I was very critical of it
1:33:31at the time it was reached.
1:33:33And I've urged since then that the
1:33:35Department of Justice
1:33:37investigate whether in fact it has been
1:33:38violated and I think the ranking member
1:33:40raises a very pertinent and important
1:33:43question.
1:33:44Uh, Mr. Pierson has raised it as well.
1:33:47He's presented evidence that the
1:33:49Department of Justice should consider
1:33:52through the FBI.
1:33:53Uh, we have brought to the Department of
1:33:55Justice's attention evidence that should
1:33:58be considered.
1:33:59Uh,
1:34:01they're going to have to make a
1:34:01judgment. We can't because we're not
1:34:03prosecutors.
1:34:05But accountability
1:34:07And that's And that is the reason I'm
1:34:09going down this line of questioning is
1:34:11accountability all along the process.
1:34:14You know, within the company, within the
1:34:16their quality system, their top
1:34:18management, but then the FAA
1:34:21and then Department of Justice when they
1:34:22see the evidence not doing anything
1:34:24about it.
1:34:25And And again, I'll I'll go back to
1:34:30the reality of the fact that we all want
1:34:33Boeing to succeed that that we don't
1:34:35want to think that there are conditions
1:34:37in these planes that should really force
1:34:40regulators to ground these planes. What
1:34:42that would do to our economy, what that
1:34:44would do to people's lives. I mean,
1:34:45that's
1:34:46It's just a reality. It's an awful It's
1:34:48an awful reality, but that's what we're
1:34:49all facing. I think that's what's
1:34:51driving the lack of accountability.
1:34:53People don't want to be held accountable
1:34:54because people don't want to take the
1:34:56actions
1:34:57that might be required here.
1:35:00I I
1:35:01I think that's just an awful reality. I
1:35:03just want to emphasize again that the
1:35:05airlines play a huge role in this,
1:35:06right? They obviously want the
1:35:07airplanes. They They need airplanes to
1:35:09do their, you know, what they want to
1:35:10do, but they have a a very much a, um,
1:35:13responsibility to make sure those planes
1:35:14are safe. I'll just give you an example.
1:35:16We did an analysis and in Alaska
1:35:19airplanes, we did it and we produced
1:35:20this public We published this thing in
1:35:21September 2023. They had 53 brand new
1:35:24Max airplanes. We found over 1,200
1:35:27aircraft system malfunction reports that
1:35:29they had submitted to the FAA, 1,200 on
1:35:3153 brand new planes within 2 years old.
1:35:34And I'm not talking tray tables or
1:35:36headrests. I'm talking the systems that
1:35:38Mr. Jacobson's been talking about. So,
1:35:40we need to make sure that those things
1:35:42are investigated and resolved and that's
1:35:44what it's supposed to be. Which is why
1:35:45I've reached out to the airlines. I've
1:35:46talked to a couple CEOs.
1:35:49Um,
1:35:50we need to talk to their pilots. We need
1:35:52to get to their mechanics. We need all
1:35:54these people talking together.
1:35:56Uh, just individual hearings aren't
1:35:57going to do I mean, this this requires a
1:35:59full-blown
1:36:01investigation with all these people
1:36:03being interviewed, uh, people feeling
1:36:05free they can come and they can come
1:36:07before us
1:36:08with whistleblower protection, either
1:36:09staying anonymous or provide whatever
1:36:11protection we can. Again, we need a lot
1:36:14of information. We need a lot of
1:36:15witnesses. We have a awful lot of
1:36:17information to uncover and discover
1:36:19here. A lot of truth to be exposed. But
1:36:21thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
1:36:22this hearing.
1:36:23Let me I just conclude and I would like
1:36:26to continue this hearing, but
1:36:28uh,
1:36:30Senator Johnson and I will be held
1:36:31accountable if we're not in our seats on
1:36:33the on the floor of the United States
1:36:35Senate uh, before 1:00 p.m.
1:36:38Uh,
1:36:39I I want to thank all of you for being
1:36:40here for all the reasons that you know
1:36:43too well. You have
1:36:45taken risks throughout your career,
1:36:47every one of you.
1:36:48Uh, I want to thank uh, my my colleague
1:36:51for
1:36:53his very
1:36:55understandably passionate
1:36:57and insightful comments, which I share
1:37:01about the need for accountability. As a
1:37:03prosecutor, accountability is about
1:37:06deterrence.
1:37:07It is about teaching lessons with real
1:37:11consequences for
1:37:13intentional
1:37:16mistakes and wrongdoing.
1:37:18And, uh, I'm hopeful that we will be in
1:37:21touch with the Department of Justice
1:37:23to indicate our interest in cooperating
1:37:26with them and in the meantime, uh, this
1:37:28record will remain open
1:37:30for 15 days for other questions that may
1:37:33be submitted in writing and also
1:37:35documents that may be submitted
1:37:37by
1:37:39others, uh, and
1:37:41we hope,
1:37:42uh, that there will be
1:37:44others who will come forward. So, uh,
1:37:47thank you all for being here today.
1:37:49This hearing is adjourned.
1:41:04Mhm.

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