YouTube2Text

LES EMIRATS ARABES UNIS ET LEUR RÔLE DANS LA DÉSTABILISATION DES PAYS — Transcript

by AL24news - قناة الجزائر الدولية · 1,909 words · 304 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

Full transcript

  1. 0:07The rupture of diplomatic relations
  2. 0:09between Algeria and the UAE
  3. 0:11demonstrates that the Algerian
  4. 0:13president, through this decision, has
  5. 0:15brought to light the role of this small
  6. 0:17state that remains determined to sow
  7. 0:19trouble in the region. This is what
  8. 0:23Andreas Krieg, a political risk analyst
  9. 0:25specializing in the MENA region, wrote
  10. 0:27in Middle East Eye. We will attempt to
  11. 0:31analyze this malicious role that the
  12. 0:33Emirates are adopting today within
  13. 0:35their own neighborhood, but also beyond
  14. 0:37, particularly in Africa. For this,
  15. 0:40Bassam Laroussi is our guest on "Face
  16. 0:42à Face." Bassam, hello. And thank you
  17. 0:46for the invitation. So, you are a
  18. 0:48strategic analyst and a doctor of
  19. 0:50international law, joining us via
  20. 0:52duplex from Paris. First, the Emirates,
  21. 0:56so as we know, the rupture of
  22. 0:59diplomatic relations between Algeria
  23. 1:02and the UAE. Let us recall that in the
  24. 1:0670s, just after the creation by Sheikh
  25. 1:09Zayed, its foreign policy was based on
  26. 1:12sincere cooperation and unity among all
  27. 1:15Arab countries. But half a century
  28. 1:18later, everything has changed. Uh, the
  29. 1:21foreign policy has become aggressive
  30. 1:23and interventionist. How do you explain
  31. 1:26this shift? Indeed, we have observed
  32. 1:32for a number of years a shift toward an
  33. 1:34offensive strategy that directly
  34. 1:36threatens the security of a number of
  35. 1:38states in the region, whether in the
  36. 1:40Middle East or on the African continent
  37. 1:42. And we see that there is an axis, in
  38. 1:46reality, that is being formed between.
  39. 1:48Notably since the normalization of
  40. 1:50relations between Abu Dhabi and Israel
  41. 1:52within the framework of the Abraham
  42. 1:54Accords and. There is an axis being
  43. 1:56formed between Tel Aviv, Abu Dhabi, and
  44. 1:59Rabat, also on the African continent,
  45. 2:02and. This strategy, at least that of
  46. 2:04Abu Dhabi, aims notably to exploit the
  47. 2:07natural resources of a number of states
  48. 2:09. And to destabilize these states, and.
  49. 2:12We see this destabilizing presence in
  50. 2:15Yemen, since. The Emiratis support the
  51. 2:18secessionists in the south of the
  52. 2:20country. Which was, moreover, a cause
  53. 2:23of tensions, a serious tension with
  54. 2:25Saudi Arabia. We see this same strategy
  55. 2:29as well in Sudan today. If you will
  56. 2:33allow, how can we explain this change
  57. 2:35in Abu Dhabi's strategy in recent years
  58. 2:38? What happened between the policy of
  59. 2:42before and that adopted today? We had a
  60. 2:47change at the head of the state between
  61. 2:49the founder and today we have Mohamed
  62. 2:51bin Zayed, MBZ. So there is a change of
  63. 2:55strategy on that level. There are also
  64. 2:58the upheavals that the Arab world has
  65. 3:01experienced in recent years. Notably
  66. 3:03with the fall of a certain number of
  67. 3:05states. And I think that was a window
  68. 3:07of opportunity. That was taken into
  69. 3:09account by the officials. To try to
  70. 3:12extend their influence in the region
  71. 3:14first. And more globally afterward, in
  72. 3:16other environments. Afterwards. Indeed,
  73. 3:19there is the financial windfall at
  74. 3:21their disposal that can facilitate this
  75. 3:23interference, in any case in a number
  76. 3:25of states, and support a certain number
  77. 3:27of actors and groups that will defend
  78. 3:29their interests, even if it
  79. 3:30destabilizes the states in question. So
  80. 3:34, as you said, this interventionism in
  81. 3:37several countries, we can cite Libya,
  82. 3:39Mali, Sudan, Somalia as well, and
  83. 3:41several countries in the Sahel. Why
  84. 3:45these countries...why do the Emirates
  85. 3:48seek to intervene in sometimes distant
  86. 3:50lands and in countries with which they
  87. 3:53do not even share a meter of border?
  88. 3:57What drives the Emiratis today is a
  89. 3:59global vision to extend their influence
  90. 4:02over all territories where they can
  91. 4:05find local support, and this, as I said
  92. 4:08, happens through the financial
  93. 4:10windfall at their disposal. The
  94. 4:14interests are also...there are energy
  95. 4:16interests. The control of strategic
  96. 4:18corridors. When we look at the south of
  97. 4:20Yemen, it is direct control over the
  98. 4:22Bab el-Mandeb, which is in the news
  99. 4:24today with the offensive, and they are,
  100. 4:27by the way, in confrontation with the
  101. 4:29Emirates in the area indirectly. There
  102. 4:32is, as I said, the control of energy
  103. 4:35resources, oil, gas, and gold mines.
  104. 4:38Let us not forget that regarding Mali
  105. 4:40and Sudan, there is significant gold
  106. 4:41trafficking. Furthermore, a few months
  107. 4:45ago, there was an official, a retired
  108. 4:47Emirati general, who had been kidnapped
  109. 4:49by terrorist groups, and the Emiratis
  110. 4:51paid a 50 million dollar ransom to free
  111. 4:53him. And so we see that paying this
  112. 4:57type of ransom is also indirect funding
  113. 4:59of terrorism, which directly threatens
  114. 5:01the security of the states in the
  115. 5:03region, and notably Algeria, which is
  116. 5:05part of this strategic zone, the Sahel.
  117. 5:10There is a desire...there is also a
  118. 5:12desire for destabilization behind it.
  119. 5:16Yes, regarding a certain number of
  120. 5:18countries that indeed have an
  121. 5:19independent policy that does not fit, I
  122. 5:21would say, into the framework desired
  123. 5:23by a certain number of states. As I
  124. 5:26said, there is an axis today that is
  125. 5:28forming, notably between Tel Aviv and
  126. 5:30the Emirates. In this context, indeed,
  127. 5:33the Algerian policy, which is known for
  128. 5:36its independence—a doctrine linked to
  129. 5:38its war of independence, of respect for
  130. 5:40the sovereignty of states, of
  131. 5:42non-interference—can indeed pose a
  132. 5:44problem for a certain number of states.
  133. 5:47We can see objectively that there is a
  134. 5:50kind of encirclement, or at least a
  135. 5:52desire to encircle Algeria by creating
  136. 5:54a number of flashpoints around its
  137. 5:57borders. You mentioned that the
  138. 6:00Emiratis provide direct support to
  139. 6:02Field Marshal Haftar, and we know that
  140. 6:04the latter has had very complex
  141. 6:06relations with Algeria, even making
  142. 6:08threatening remarks. We also see this
  143. 6:11interference in northern Mali. And
  144. 6:14lately, the authorities in Niger
  145. 6:16indicated that regarding the mutiny,
  146. 6:18there were strong suspicions of the
  147. 6:19involvement of a number of states,
  148. 6:21potentially including the Emirates. And
  149. 6:24so, we see this interference taking a
  150. 6:27multifaceted form. And not to mention
  151. 6:29the support for Moroccan policy,
  152. 6:32particularly in relation to Western
  153. 6:34Sahara. Yes. Well, a non-self-governing
  154. 6:36territory according to the United
  155. 6:38Nations, in which a referendum on
  156. 6:40self-determination must be organized.
  157. 6:42And one final point. There were also
  158. 6:44some very important revelations. which
  159. 6:46were made last July by a group of
  160. 6:48independent journalists. who indicated
  161. 6:51that the Emiratis had played a very
  162. 6:53significant role. in financing the
  163. 6:55purchase by Morocco of the Pegasus
  164. 6:57spyware. which had been used by the
  165. 7:00Moroccan authorities. to spy on a
  166. 7:02number of European states, as well as
  167. 7:04Algeria. You mentioned Morocco; are we
  168. 7:08facing a new axis of evil, and here I
  169. 7:10am referring to the Emirates, Israel,
  170. 7:13and Morocco? Are we not facing a new
  171. 7:18international danger? There is indeed
  172. 7:22an axis that has been taking shape
  173. 7:24since the implementation and, in any
  174. 7:26case, the signing of the Abraham
  175. 7:27Accords. And we see that this axis is
  176. 7:31very clearly visible between, as we
  177. 7:32just said, Abu Dhabi and Rabat. And
  178. 7:35within the framework of this axis's
  179. 7:38strategy, naturally, Algeria's position
  180. 7:41contradicts the latter's interests. And
  181. 7:44so it has. every interest in trying to
  182. 7:45encircle. or at least to destabilize a
  183. 7:48country like Algeria. which also
  184. 7:50explains the measures recently taken by
  185. 7:52the Algerian authorities. whether it be
  186. 7:55through the sending of military
  187. 7:57aircraft to Niger. at the request of
  188. 8:00the Nigerien authorities. So it is a
  189. 8:02strong signal sent to the outside world
  190. 8:04that Algeria is also capable of
  191. 8:05deploying abroad and defending its
  192. 8:07interests and the interests of its
  193. 8:09allies in the zone. And not forgetting
  194. 8:13the fact that, outside of this example
  195. 8:16linked to Niger, Algeria made the
  196. 8:17decision to break its diplomatic
  197. 8:19relations with the Emirates after a
  198. 8:21number of warnings, because this is a
  199. 8:23crisis that has been going on for a
  200. 8:25number of years. I mean, this outcome
  201. 8:29comes as no surprise to observers of
  202. 8:31this crisis. It is merely the result of
  203. 8:34a series of what I would call acts
  204. 8:36considered hostile by Algiers, adopted
  205. 8:38by the Emirates in recent years. Still
  206. 8:42regarding Israel, still regarding the
  207. 8:44Zionist entity, if you permit me Bassim
  208. 8:47, can we clearly say that the Emirates
  209. 8:49are becoming the instrument of the
  210. 8:51Zionist entity by subcontracting
  211. 8:53politically and militarily in Africa?
  212. 8:58In any case, there is a de facto
  213. 9:00alliance that we observe daily, first
  214. 9:02and foremost on the Palestinian file.
  215. 9:06Recently, there were even revelations
  216. 9:08by the Israeli press that MBZ had
  217. 9:10contacted Netanyahu to warn him of the
  218. 9:13October 7th attacks by Hamas. So we see
  219. 9:17that there is strong security
  220. 9:18cooperation between the two states.
  221. 9:21Beyond that, on the African continent,
  222. 9:23indeed, we see what is happening in
  223. 9:25Somalia. This desire to create a puppet
  224. 9:28state, which is Somaliland, to
  225. 9:30ultimately guarantee Israeli interests.
  226. 9:35But also because that will allow them
  227. 9:37to have a subservient state that has a
  228. 9:39maritime frontage directly on a
  229. 9:41strategic zone. Other examples, whether
  230. 9:47it be Sudan, the Western Sahara, or
  231. 9:49Niger. The place of the Emirates within
  232. 9:54the Gulf Cooperation Council. Following
  233. 9:57several attempts at destabilization,
  234. 9:59there have been numerous provocations.
  235. 10:02We might cite the attempted overthrow
  236. 10:04of the government in Qatar. The
  237. 10:07interference in the Saudi perimeter in
  238. 10:09Yemen. Cold relations with Oman and
  239. 10:12Kuwait. Why, in your opinion, does Abu
  240. 10:16Dhabi seek to even undermine the
  241. 10:18foundations that more or less unite the
  242. 10:20Gulf countries? I think it is a sense
  243. 10:24of omnipotence. And this alliance,
  244. 10:26indeed, with Israel, from their point
  245. 10:28of view, perhaps grants them additional
  246. 10:30power. To pursue a hegemonic policy in
  247. 10:34the region. Without forgetting, indeed,
  248. 10:37the financial wealth at their disposal.
  249. 10:40And as you precisely stated, that is a
  250. 10:41source of tension even within the Gulf
  251. 10:43Cooperation Council. You cited the
  252. 10:45example of Qatar, but more recently
  253. 10:47there were strong tensions with Saudi
  254. 10:49Arabia—tensions, by the way, that
  255. 10:51could return with the current context
  256. 10:53of the crisis in Yemen. So that is
  257. 10:55something that cannot be excluded.
  258. 10:57Therefore, the tensions are in reality
  259. 10:58not limited only to Algeria. Algeria
  260. 11:00has just taken a firm and radical
  261. 11:02measure that could eventually be
  262. 11:05followed by other states. So we must
  263. 11:07not exclude such an evolution that. It
  264. 11:09causes a snowball effect. Because the
  265. 11:11criticisms regarding the interference
  266. 11:13and meddling of the Emiratis in the
  267. 11:15Arab and African zone, I would say, do
  268. 11:18not date from yesterday and. Many
  269. 11:20states We protested against these
  270. 11:24interferences. A development that also
  271. 11:26aligns with the measures adopted by
  272. 11:28Algiers. It is a questioning of
  273. 11:30diplomatic relations. Regarding the
  274. 11:36relations between the emirates of Dubai
  275. 11:38and Abu Dhabi. Mohammed bin Rashid
  276. 11:41often criticizes the suicidal policy of
  277. 11:43Mohammed bin Zayed. Can a serious
  278. 11:46internal conflict coupled with an
  279. 11:48economic crisis shake the throne in the
  280. 11:50Emirates? Well, I do not think we are
  281. 11:54currently facing such a situation, even
  282. 11:56though there are indeed internal
  283. 11:57tensions that did not start today. It
  284. 12:00actually started with the crisis in
  285. 12:03Yemen, and many emirates......within
  286. 12:09the federation had contested the fact
  287. 12:11that the majority of the soldiers sent
  288. 12:13were those with less political power.
  289. 12:17They were not necessarily those who
  290. 12:19came from Abu Dhabi or Dubai. So we see
  291. 12:22that there is first an internal tension
  292. 12:24regarding that, and indeed the
  293. 12:25interests of Dubai, for example, are
  294. 12:27not necessarily those of Abu Dhabi. We
  295. 12:30see this, moreover, in the context of
  296. 12:33the crisis with Iran today, because
  297. 12:35Dubai had excellent relations and trade
  298. 12:37exchanges with the Iranians, but in the
  299. 12:40current Middle East crisis, this is a
  300. 12:42source of tension. Well, thank you,
  301. 12:46Bassim Lar, for this insight. I remind
  302. 12:49you that you are a strategic analyst, a
  303. 12:51doctor of international law, and you
  304. 12:53were with us via duplex from Paris.

About this transcript

This page contains the full transcript of LES EMIRATS ARABES UNIS ET LEUR RÔLE DANS LA DÉSTABILISATION DES PAYS by AL24news - قناة الجزائر الدولية, generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 1,909 words across 304 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.

What you can do with it

Use the transcript to take notes, quote the speaker, build a study guide, generate a summary with ChatGPT or Claude via the YouTube Summary tool, or export it as a timed subtitle file with YouTube to SRT. You can also re-open it in the transcriber to choose a caption track available on the video.

Free YouTube transcript tool

YouTube2Text is a free YouTube transcript generator — no signup, no daily limit. Paste any YouTube link and get the full transcript instantly, with timestamps, click-to-jump, caption language selection, AI prompts for ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, and exports to TXT, SRT, VTT, or Markdown.