LES EMIRATS ARABES UNIS ET LEUR RÔLE DANS LA DÉSTABILISATION DES PAYS — Transcript
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- 0:07The rupture of diplomatic relations
- 0:09between Algeria and the UAE
- 0:11demonstrates that the Algerian
- 0:13president, through this decision, has
- 0:15brought to light the role of this small
- 0:17state that remains determined to sow
- 0:19trouble in the region. This is what
- 0:23Andreas Krieg, a political risk analyst
- 0:25specializing in the MENA region, wrote
- 0:27in Middle East Eye. We will attempt to
- 0:31analyze this malicious role that the
- 0:33Emirates are adopting today within
- 0:35their own neighborhood, but also beyond
- 0:37, particularly in Africa. For this,
- 0:40Bassam Laroussi is our guest on "Face
- 0:42à Face." Bassam, hello. And thank you
- 0:46for the invitation. So, you are a
- 0:48strategic analyst and a doctor of
- 0:50international law, joining us via
- 0:52duplex from Paris. First, the Emirates,
- 0:56so as we know, the rupture of
- 0:59diplomatic relations between Algeria
- 1:02and the UAE. Let us recall that in the
- 1:0670s, just after the creation by Sheikh
- 1:09Zayed, its foreign policy was based on
- 1:12sincere cooperation and unity among all
- 1:15Arab countries. But half a century
- 1:18later, everything has changed. Uh, the
- 1:21foreign policy has become aggressive
- 1:23and interventionist. How do you explain
- 1:26this shift? Indeed, we have observed
- 1:32for a number of years a shift toward an
- 1:34offensive strategy that directly
- 1:36threatens the security of a number of
- 1:38states in the region, whether in the
- 1:40Middle East or on the African continent
- 1:42. And we see that there is an axis, in
- 1:46reality, that is being formed between.
- 1:48Notably since the normalization of
- 1:50relations between Abu Dhabi and Israel
- 1:52within the framework of the Abraham
- 1:54Accords and. There is an axis being
- 1:56formed between Tel Aviv, Abu Dhabi, and
- 1:59Rabat, also on the African continent,
- 2:02and. This strategy, at least that of
- 2:04Abu Dhabi, aims notably to exploit the
- 2:07natural resources of a number of states
- 2:09. And to destabilize these states, and.
- 2:12We see this destabilizing presence in
- 2:15Yemen, since. The Emiratis support the
- 2:18secessionists in the south of the
- 2:20country. Which was, moreover, a cause
- 2:23of tensions, a serious tension with
- 2:25Saudi Arabia. We see this same strategy
- 2:29as well in Sudan today. If you will
- 2:33allow, how can we explain this change
- 2:35in Abu Dhabi's strategy in recent years
- 2:38? What happened between the policy of
- 2:42before and that adopted today? We had a
- 2:47change at the head of the state between
- 2:49the founder and today we have Mohamed
- 2:51bin Zayed, MBZ. So there is a change of
- 2:55strategy on that level. There are also
- 2:58the upheavals that the Arab world has
- 3:01experienced in recent years. Notably
- 3:03with the fall of a certain number of
- 3:05states. And I think that was a window
- 3:07of opportunity. That was taken into
- 3:09account by the officials. To try to
- 3:12extend their influence in the region
- 3:14first. And more globally afterward, in
- 3:16other environments. Afterwards. Indeed,
- 3:19there is the financial windfall at
- 3:21their disposal that can facilitate this
- 3:23interference, in any case in a number
- 3:25of states, and support a certain number
- 3:27of actors and groups that will defend
- 3:29their interests, even if it
- 3:30destabilizes the states in question. So
- 3:34, as you said, this interventionism in
- 3:37several countries, we can cite Libya,
- 3:39Mali, Sudan, Somalia as well, and
- 3:41several countries in the Sahel. Why
- 3:45these countries...why do the Emirates
- 3:48seek to intervene in sometimes distant
- 3:50lands and in countries with which they
- 3:53do not even share a meter of border?
- 3:57What drives the Emiratis today is a
- 3:59global vision to extend their influence
- 4:02over all territories where they can
- 4:05find local support, and this, as I said
- 4:08, happens through the financial
- 4:10windfall at their disposal. The
- 4:14interests are also...there are energy
- 4:16interests. The control of strategic
- 4:18corridors. When we look at the south of
- 4:20Yemen, it is direct control over the
- 4:22Bab el-Mandeb, which is in the news
- 4:24today with the offensive, and they are,
- 4:27by the way, in confrontation with the
- 4:29Emirates in the area indirectly. There
- 4:32is, as I said, the control of energy
- 4:35resources, oil, gas, and gold mines.
- 4:38Let us not forget that regarding Mali
- 4:40and Sudan, there is significant gold
- 4:41trafficking. Furthermore, a few months
- 4:45ago, there was an official, a retired
- 4:47Emirati general, who had been kidnapped
- 4:49by terrorist groups, and the Emiratis
- 4:51paid a 50 million dollar ransom to free
- 4:53him. And so we see that paying this
- 4:57type of ransom is also indirect funding
- 4:59of terrorism, which directly threatens
- 5:01the security of the states in the
- 5:03region, and notably Algeria, which is
- 5:05part of this strategic zone, the Sahel.
- 5:10There is a desire...there is also a
- 5:12desire for destabilization behind it.
- 5:16Yes, regarding a certain number of
- 5:18countries that indeed have an
- 5:19independent policy that does not fit, I
- 5:21would say, into the framework desired
- 5:23by a certain number of states. As I
- 5:26said, there is an axis today that is
- 5:28forming, notably between Tel Aviv and
- 5:30the Emirates. In this context, indeed,
- 5:33the Algerian policy, which is known for
- 5:36its independence—a doctrine linked to
- 5:38its war of independence, of respect for
- 5:40the sovereignty of states, of
- 5:42non-interference—can indeed pose a
- 5:44problem for a certain number of states.
- 5:47We can see objectively that there is a
- 5:50kind of encirclement, or at least a
- 5:52desire to encircle Algeria by creating
- 5:54a number of flashpoints around its
- 5:57borders. You mentioned that the
- 6:00Emiratis provide direct support to
- 6:02Field Marshal Haftar, and we know that
- 6:04the latter has had very complex
- 6:06relations with Algeria, even making
- 6:08threatening remarks. We also see this
- 6:11interference in northern Mali. And
- 6:14lately, the authorities in Niger
- 6:16indicated that regarding the mutiny,
- 6:18there were strong suspicions of the
- 6:19involvement of a number of states,
- 6:21potentially including the Emirates. And
- 6:24so, we see this interference taking a
- 6:27multifaceted form. And not to mention
- 6:29the support for Moroccan policy,
- 6:32particularly in relation to Western
- 6:34Sahara. Yes. Well, a non-self-governing
- 6:36territory according to the United
- 6:38Nations, in which a referendum on
- 6:40self-determination must be organized.
- 6:42And one final point. There were also
- 6:44some very important revelations. which
- 6:46were made last July by a group of
- 6:48independent journalists. who indicated
- 6:51that the Emiratis had played a very
- 6:53significant role. in financing the
- 6:55purchase by Morocco of the Pegasus
- 6:57spyware. which had been used by the
- 7:00Moroccan authorities. to spy on a
- 7:02number of European states, as well as
- 7:04Algeria. You mentioned Morocco; are we
- 7:08facing a new axis of evil, and here I
- 7:10am referring to the Emirates, Israel,
- 7:13and Morocco? Are we not facing a new
- 7:18international danger? There is indeed
- 7:22an axis that has been taking shape
- 7:24since the implementation and, in any
- 7:26case, the signing of the Abraham
- 7:27Accords. And we see that this axis is
- 7:31very clearly visible between, as we
- 7:32just said, Abu Dhabi and Rabat. And
- 7:35within the framework of this axis's
- 7:38strategy, naturally, Algeria's position
- 7:41contradicts the latter's interests. And
- 7:44so it has. every interest in trying to
- 7:45encircle. or at least to destabilize a
- 7:48country like Algeria. which also
- 7:50explains the measures recently taken by
- 7:52the Algerian authorities. whether it be
- 7:55through the sending of military
- 7:57aircraft to Niger. at the request of
- 8:00the Nigerien authorities. So it is a
- 8:02strong signal sent to the outside world
- 8:04that Algeria is also capable of
- 8:05deploying abroad and defending its
- 8:07interests and the interests of its
- 8:09allies in the zone. And not forgetting
- 8:13the fact that, outside of this example
- 8:16linked to Niger, Algeria made the
- 8:17decision to break its diplomatic
- 8:19relations with the Emirates after a
- 8:21number of warnings, because this is a
- 8:23crisis that has been going on for a
- 8:25number of years. I mean, this outcome
- 8:29comes as no surprise to observers of
- 8:31this crisis. It is merely the result of
- 8:34a series of what I would call acts
- 8:36considered hostile by Algiers, adopted
- 8:38by the Emirates in recent years. Still
- 8:42regarding Israel, still regarding the
- 8:44Zionist entity, if you permit me Bassim
- 8:47, can we clearly say that the Emirates
- 8:49are becoming the instrument of the
- 8:51Zionist entity by subcontracting
- 8:53politically and militarily in Africa?
- 8:58In any case, there is a de facto
- 9:00alliance that we observe daily, first
- 9:02and foremost on the Palestinian file.
- 9:06Recently, there were even revelations
- 9:08by the Israeli press that MBZ had
- 9:10contacted Netanyahu to warn him of the
- 9:13October 7th attacks by Hamas. So we see
- 9:17that there is strong security
- 9:18cooperation between the two states.
- 9:21Beyond that, on the African continent,
- 9:23indeed, we see what is happening in
- 9:25Somalia. This desire to create a puppet
- 9:28state, which is Somaliland, to
- 9:30ultimately guarantee Israeli interests.
- 9:35But also because that will allow them
- 9:37to have a subservient state that has a
- 9:39maritime frontage directly on a
- 9:41strategic zone. Other examples, whether
- 9:47it be Sudan, the Western Sahara, or
- 9:49Niger. The place of the Emirates within
- 9:54the Gulf Cooperation Council. Following
- 9:57several attempts at destabilization,
- 9:59there have been numerous provocations.
- 10:02We might cite the attempted overthrow
- 10:04of the government in Qatar. The
- 10:07interference in the Saudi perimeter in
- 10:09Yemen. Cold relations with Oman and
- 10:12Kuwait. Why, in your opinion, does Abu
- 10:16Dhabi seek to even undermine the
- 10:18foundations that more or less unite the
- 10:20Gulf countries? I think it is a sense
- 10:24of omnipotence. And this alliance,
- 10:26indeed, with Israel, from their point
- 10:28of view, perhaps grants them additional
- 10:30power. To pursue a hegemonic policy in
- 10:34the region. Without forgetting, indeed,
- 10:37the financial wealth at their disposal.
- 10:40And as you precisely stated, that is a
- 10:41source of tension even within the Gulf
- 10:43Cooperation Council. You cited the
- 10:45example of Qatar, but more recently
- 10:47there were strong tensions with Saudi
- 10:49Arabia—tensions, by the way, that
- 10:51could return with the current context
- 10:53of the crisis in Yemen. So that is
- 10:55something that cannot be excluded.
- 10:57Therefore, the tensions are in reality
- 10:58not limited only to Algeria. Algeria
- 11:00has just taken a firm and radical
- 11:02measure that could eventually be
- 11:05followed by other states. So we must
- 11:07not exclude such an evolution that. It
- 11:09causes a snowball effect. Because the
- 11:11criticisms regarding the interference
- 11:13and meddling of the Emiratis in the
- 11:15Arab and African zone, I would say, do
- 11:18not date from yesterday and. Many
- 11:20states We protested against these
- 11:24interferences. A development that also
- 11:26aligns with the measures adopted by
- 11:28Algiers. It is a questioning of
- 11:30diplomatic relations. Regarding the
- 11:36relations between the emirates of Dubai
- 11:38and Abu Dhabi. Mohammed bin Rashid
- 11:41often criticizes the suicidal policy of
- 11:43Mohammed bin Zayed. Can a serious
- 11:46internal conflict coupled with an
- 11:48economic crisis shake the throne in the
- 11:50Emirates? Well, I do not think we are
- 11:54currently facing such a situation, even
- 11:56though there are indeed internal
- 11:57tensions that did not start today. It
- 12:00actually started with the crisis in
- 12:03Yemen, and many emirates......within
- 12:09the federation had contested the fact
- 12:11that the majority of the soldiers sent
- 12:13were those with less political power.
- 12:17They were not necessarily those who
- 12:19came from Abu Dhabi or Dubai. So we see
- 12:22that there is first an internal tension
- 12:24regarding that, and indeed the
- 12:25interests of Dubai, for example, are
- 12:27not necessarily those of Abu Dhabi. We
- 12:30see this, moreover, in the context of
- 12:33the crisis with Iran today, because
- 12:35Dubai had excellent relations and trade
- 12:37exchanges with the Iranians, but in the
- 12:40current Middle East crisis, this is a
- 12:42source of tension. Well, thank you,
- 12:46Bassim Lar, for this insight. I remind
- 12:49you that you are a strategic analyst, a
- 12:51doctor of international law, and you
- 12:53were with us via duplex from Paris.
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