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Le Japon réarme. Dernier avertissement ? — Transcript

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0:17Japan’s rearmament: a final warning?
0:20This question frames our analysis of the state of Japanese defence policy.
0:26Given Japan’s historical legacy, this question has profound implications.
0:30Is it rearmament? If so, How much and how significant?
0:33Where does Japan stand geopolitically and in the region, especially
0:36in relation to its neighbours: China, North Korea, and Russia?
0:41Finally, what is the wider resonance of this shift and what conclusions can be drawn?
0:46To answer these questions, I am pleased to welcome Fabrice Ravel back today.
0:50Hello, Fabrice. Hello, Olivier.
0:52Hello, everyone.
0:54Our theme today is both innovative and, one might say, unique
0:59for the Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique.
1:00What does ‘final warning’ mean in this context?
1:04By the end of the Battle of Midway
1:11on 7 June 1942, Japan had lost far more than four
1:15aircraft carriers—the fleet's core.
1:18It lost more than a single battle.
1:21It lost more than the initiative.
1:24Japan had already lost the war.
1:26Japan had already lost the war a mere six months after it began with
1:31the attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941.
1:36Yet the Japanese people knew nothing by the summer of 1942.
1:43Firstly, the Japanese government exerted every effort to conceal this singularly
1:48unpalatable truth. Furthermore, the populace remained lulled by
1:54a relentless stream of good news. From January to June 1942,
2:00news bulletins sang the praises of
2:04an Imperial Army that swept from victory to victory, conquest to conquest,
2:10and appeared to be utterly invincible.
2:15At this juncture, let’s pause and focus our minds
2:20to imagine a young boy wandering
2:25through the gardens, hurrying each morning to witness
2:31a magnificent spectacle: Japan’s legendary ‘Zero’ fighters,
2:37taking off at daybreak. They were the very emblem
2:43of a Conquering Japan and a profound source of inspiration for him.
2:49Every morning, after watching them in amazement,
2:54he returned to his youthful play, especially a model of an Imperial Navy plane that his
3:01elder brother, who was a pilot, had carved for him.
3:06He had already decided his path:
3:10One day, he would also be a daring pilot in the Imperial
3:14Japanese Air Force —a modern-day samurai.
3:19He lived in Hiroshima.
3:22Today, the sole testament to this boy’s existence is a shadow
3:27etched for eternity upon the ruins of a city wall. At the instant
3:32of the blast, the light was of such searing intensity that his
3:38pulverised form was effectively sketched onto
3:43the stone in that instant: the
3:46shadows of Hiroshima.
3:50For days, a silent Hiroshima was isolated
3:53and severed from the world.
3:57The American pilot reportedly said: My God! What have we done?
4:04Every year on
4:086 August, a minute’s silence and
4:13the resonance of a bell beckon us to remember
4:17this singular moment for eternity.
4:22We should thus re-examine the question of Japan’s rearmament from this
4:29vantage point; for in such
4:33a harrowing context, the issue assumes a most singular meaning.
4:38We see clearly how this event —a global cataclysm
4:43that scarred the conscience of mankind— profoundly wounded Japan
4:47and forged a relationship with the military and war
4:53that was no longer that of the Japanese Empire.
4:57To speak of rearmament today is to acknowledge
5:01the long era of disarmament that followed the
5:06Second World War.
5:07That is a most astute observation.
5:10Indeed, to truly fathom the magnitude and the symbolic weight of Japan’s rearmament,
5:15I believe it was indispensable to situate it within the
5:20perspective we have just explored.
5:22Moreover, a very significant process of demilitarisation took place during
5:27the post-war period.
5:29This is perhaps the point I shall stress most forcefully, so that we may fully
5:34grasp the magnitude of this swing towards remilitarisation.
5:38The 1889 Constitution was repealed and replaced by a
5:43Basic Law, which is equivalent to a constitution.
5:46Article 9 of this law is monumental: In it, Japan renounced war and the very right
5:54of the state to engage in military action.
5:58Let us pause here, because the weight of this fact bears repeating:
6:04this is the only moment in history where a nation has voluntarily
6:07renounced war.
6:09Here we see a resolve that is, in my view, proportional to
6:16the sheer magnitude of the trauma we have forced ourselves to re-evaluate.
6:23This article of its Constitution does not
6:27merely renounce war; it goes further, formally
6:31renouncing the very idea of having Japan establish
6:35any sort of land, naval, or air forces.
6:40In this regard, we should also note that in 1954, Japan only authorised
6:47self-defence forces.
6:49It is already clear: these are not military units; they are forces.
6:54And they are not military; they are self-defence forces.
6:57Allow me to add one point to reinforce the understanding
7:02of this uniqueness.
7:04It is clear it was the Americans —within a Cold War context requiring
7:07rearmament against the Soviet Bloc—
7:12who pushed Japan to maintain a minimum of combat forces to
7:17relieve them, even as they were just coming out of the Korean War.
7:21This is the very centre of the Asia-Pacific.
7:24There is one final, essential point:
7:27this demilitarisation would be mirrored over
7:34generations by a population shifting
7:38towards a genuine pacifism —one all the more justified
7:48and likely to endure.
7:50It is clear from these factors that
7:53Japan’s demilitarisation was uniquely profound.
7:57Indeed, I would suggest that never in human history has a country relinquished
8:04its military function to such an extent.
8:06Today, we are no longer in that situation.
8:09Indeed, we have clearly moved beyond that.
8:12Two dynamics now confirm
8:17a powerful and pronounced pendulum swing.
8:22It is essential to weigh these factors
8:27to assess the current momentum accurately,
8:32as this phenomenon remains
8:34somewhat obscure—especially, I would venture,
8:40for Western European nations.
8:41The first of these dynamics is clearly military.
8:44Regarding the military dynamic, there has been
8:49a considerable increase in Japanese forces, both in their
8:57initial establishment and their subsequent evolution.
9:00Paradoxically, this change is not primarily
9:03reflected in the number of troops.
9:06Within this military dynamic, some observers will
9:10certainly check the most official documents for the actual state of
9:15Japan’s forces.
9:16—specifically the 2024 Military Balance.
9:20I am referring particularly to the 2024 Military Balance, as it is
9:24the version we shall use in a few moments; the 2025 version
9:28adds little, and this one remains one of the most recent for putting
9:32this dynamic into perspective.
9:33This report shows a headcount of Japanese forces at roughly 250,000.
9:39Naturally, one might easily
9:44nuance these comments, arguing that
9:50250,000 men out of a population of 123 million people
9:54remains a very low ratio.
9:57Yet, there is a dynamic to consider
10:01above all else: Japan is consenting
10:05to make a considerable effort financially, and I’ve chosen
10:09my words carefully: ‘consenting’ and ‘considerable effort’.
10:14Why?
10:15Because in 2023, spending for
10:19its self-defence forces reached roughly $49 billion,
10:27placing Japan —to give our audience
10:32a more global perspective— roughly ninth among the
10:37world’s highest spenders.
10:39I should specify that I am excluding Ukraine and Russia, which have been
10:44at war since 24 February 2022. Determining accurate figures for these
10:49countries is complicated because they are actually engaged in war and there’s a lack of
10:54readily available data. Furthermore, we should be
11:00precise about which expenditures are
11:04included in such calculations.
11:05With these two nations deliberately left out
11:08of the equation, Japan’s 2023 budget stands as
11:12roughly the ninth largest.
11:15This represents approximately 1% of the
11:192023 Gross Domestic Product; while instinctively associated with Japan,
11:25it is relatively modest when held against the famous 2% threshold.
11:33However, what is truly striking is
11:36the 2025 decision: by 2027,
11:41nearly two years ahead of schedule for
11:47such vast, long-term programmes, Japan will raise
11:52its investment to 2% of GDP.
11:57This implies a budget so substantial that,
12:03if confirmed, Japan would have the third-largest military
12:10expenditure on earth; though we must weigh the percentage
12:13of the GDP against what it signifies in absolute terms,
12:20given the nation's profound wealth.
12:22Given Japan’s financial might, we are clearly discussing
12:26a truly massive investment.
12:28This leap to third place is quite startling when
12:32we recall the unique constraints we discussed earlier.
12:37Yet, beyond this significant financial surge, another
12:40factor corroborates the current dynamic:
12:44what goals is Japan pursuing with these investments?
12:49Only by seeing how Japan uses this additional windfall
12:54can we grasp its intent.
12:57Japan is buying drones and radars; it plans to acquire far more fighter
13:03jets and interceptors. It’s also in the process of purchasing American Tomahawks, which is
13:08a crucial point we’ll come back to—and it is
13:11completely renovating its frigates.
13:13Looking at the scale of the hardware involved, the significance becomes clear.
13:19It’s clear that we’re looking at
13:24a suite of military capabilities indicating that Japan is seeking
13:29to fully restore its military footprint,
13:33ensuring operational readiness across all land, sea, and air components.
13:39This first dynamic is arguably quite telling,
13:44but there is also a second factor
13:50that further corroborates and perhaps can even amplify
13:55the current trajectory we are examining.
13:57Clearly, such a transition would necessitate a fundamental shift in mindset.
14:01While the 1970s were characterised by
14:04Japanese pacifism, it is evident today that the Japanese government has
14:09moved away from its former strategic posture.
14:12This shift is both clear and pronounced.
14:16If you’ll indulge me, I want to dig into a bit of Clausewitz to help us get
14:20a handle on what’s actually happening here. His most
14:25famous line is constantly trotted out but usually
14:29mangled in translation. It should be:
14:32War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by other means.
14:38Let’s consider what this means.
14:40Perhaps some will find it interesting to revisit our session on him,
14:45which is among our most important, as it is foundational to geopolitical strategy.
14:49The keyword is ‘continuation’, which means an extension of policy and the
14:54subordination of military issues to political authority.
14:59Why such a preamble?
15:01If we take a magnifying glass to analyse Japanese politics
15:05over the last twenty years,
15:11we would see a definitive move towards
15:15Japanese remilitarisation.
15:18A key transitional period
15:22occurred during the 2010s, specifically under the premiership
15:26of Shinzo Abe between 2012 and 2020.
15:35Central to this era was the concept used across Japan
15:38known as ‘normalisation’.
15:41This choice of terminology is noteworthy, warranting a
15:44brief etymological—perhaps even psychoanalytical—
15:48examination of what such an admission implies.
15:50Normalisation, by its very definition, signifies a return to the norm.
15:56This suggests that the prior situation was not
16:01so normal after all— that it was an exception which was bound to end
16:09sooner or later. There is an
16:11implication here that this status was imposed upon them, but now that
16:15they have regained the capacity of a normal state, they are reassuming
16:19their military strength.
16:21I believe this concept of ‘normalisation’ is vital.
16:24Similarly, the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security
16:30reveals a perceived need for
16:33a new legal footing, even while
16:36Article 9 of the Basic Law
16:40remains stubbornly unamended.
16:43The name of the game now is flexible interpretation—stretching
16:47the meaning as far as it'll go.
16:49We are entering a realm of linguistic gymnastics—a play of syntax—
16:55that forces us to reconfigure our perceptions.
17:02The core argument is that
17:04Japan is entirely within its rights to exercise self-defence.
17:12But there is a further extension: not only is
17:15self-defence legitimate, but it may even justify
17:20the projection of forces abroad, provided
17:28such projection better ensures the security of self-defence.
17:35To call this a broad interpretation is actually putting it
17:39rather mildly.
17:41The momentum is clearly growing;
17:45the latest Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi,
17:49gave a speech on 7 November 2025 that did more than just confirm this trend
17:58—she pushed it much further. She moved beyond mere confirmation of
18:06existing trends, explicitly stating that Japan’s strategic
18:11outlook now includes the deployment of
18:15troops to defend Taiwan against Chinese intervention. By naming
18:22specific countries, she framed this not just as a right, but as an obligation.
18:27To conclude, a comprehensive political realignment
18:32is taking place, which corroborates our initial thesis.
18:38This military shift seems to be both validated
18:40and intensified by a corresponding political transformation.
18:45Consequently, we are observing a Japan that is, de facto,
18:52undergoing complete remilitarisation.
18:54These things seem very clear to me.
18:56Indeed, we should understand this within a
18:59broader geopolitical and regional context—the very one you began to
19:02describe with your mention of China.
19:04There is China, but also Russia and North Korea.
19:06These factors explain the Japanese dynamic.
19:11To comprehend the unfolding situation, it is necessary to
19:18acknowledge these factors, which, as we’ve seen, are indisputably
19:21driving the dynamic.
19:23It is certainly appropriate, as a classic exercise in
19:26geopolitics, to re-examine Japan within its immediate environment
19:31and geographical context.
19:33Indeed, when we examine a map of Asia-Pacific
19:37and focus on Japan—as you can see from this map
19:42on the screen— it should
19:44become clear that among the neighbouring states, three in particular
19:50hold considerable geopolitical interest.
19:53Firstly, there is China, which you have just noted, followed by
20:00Russia and North Korea.
20:02I would further suggest that the notable aspect of the three countries
20:07mentioned is that China—in a manner that is
20:11becoming increasingly conspicuous and tense—is persistently
20:18asserting its territorial claims, specifically over Taiwan.
20:23That represents an initial cause for concern.
20:26Regarding Russia, one need only recall the war
20:28with Ukraine since 24 February 2022 to appreciate the complexity of
20:33the situation involving such a neighbour.
20:37Finally, there is North Korea, which has remained
20:41technically at war with South Korea for 72 years
20:47at the time of this recording.
20:48This is a point of frequent misunderstanding among observers.
20:55While an armistice was indeed signed, we should bear in
20:59mind that this represented only a temporary cessation of hostilities
21:05but did not end the war.
21:06As a result, we are looking at a state that is evidently capable of
21:12situating Japan within a deeply unsettled
21:16strategic perspective.
21:18Furthermore, there is a second point warranting emphasis
21:22within our current analytical framework.
21:25What is this second point?
21:27What particular tensions might Japan have with each
21:30of these countries?
21:32A clearer understanding of these
21:37frictions may help explain the genuine apprehension felt by Japan.
21:44Let’s begin with North Korea.
21:46It is evident that North Korea’s possession of
21:49nuclear weaponry and its
21:53frequent missile testing have subjected Japan
21:57to the unsettling experience of projectiles traversing
22:04its sovereign airspace, missiles flying overhead even during
22:11routine exercises.
22:13Such developments are hardly reassuring when considering the
22:17geographical proximity and the underlying ballistic implications.
22:22Furthermore, Japan’s prompt condemnation of
22:26Russia's invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated tensions
22:31with Moscow, intensifying a sense of
22:38animosity rooted in
22:43the unresolved dispute over the northern Kuril Islands,
22:48which was a point of contention between Japan and the USSR,
22:55and now Russia, since 1945.
22:59Regarding relations with China,
23:01the situation is increasingly noteworthy due to the status of several islands,
23:09namely the Senkakus, which are currently under Japanese administration, though
23:15explicitly contested by China.
23:18Let’s return to a work we’ve cited once or twice by Jean-Pierre Cabestan:
23:21Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace.
23:28Chapter 5 (page 201 in the French version)
23:34is entirely
23:36devoted to the tensions between Japan and China.
23:40The title says it all: War Risks over the Senkaku
23:45(Diaoyu) Islands. This highlights a deteriorating situation with
23:52a grim drift toward armed conflict.
23:56We might add another wrinkle to the story —one that is rather telling of just how
24:00deep the fault lines run.
24:03The simple fact is that Beijing rejects the Japanese name, and prefers its own.
24:08It’s more than a squabble over semantics. In geopolitics,
24:11this sort of head-butting over the names of cities or regions
24:17stems from a legitimate desire to demonstrate that the
24:21country contesting authority possesses the arguments
24:27—or perhaps the sophistry—capable of a long-term challenge to political power.
24:32We are clearly witnessing a state of ‘friction’, to use Clausewitz’s term.
24:37There’s one final case that illustrates this point.
24:44The landmass involved is admittedly small: Yonaguni Island.
24:51In fact, what really lays bare the scale of the current
24:56friction between Beijing and Tokyo
24:58involves the 2,000 kilometres between Tokyo and this island, whose closest
25:05point is 108 kilometres from Taiwan.
25:08Taking that into account, one can see that
25:12the geopolitical atmosphere surrounding
25:16Japan is remarkably claustrophobic —anxiety-inducing, even.
25:25That goes some way toward explaining the sudden shift in perspectives.
25:30That moves things beyond a purely regional issue now; there is a third party
25:33looming over Japan and the region at large.
25:36We should also acknowledge that this power is there.
25:40Lo and behold:
25:42the United States.
25:44Make no mistake: the waters we’re
25:48navigating are risky.
25:51A few points should suffice to convince us that
25:57the perspective and current line of reasoning
26:00truly hold water, we need only look at a few key facts.
26:07First, the military cooperation treaty that
26:12the USA and Japan signed in 1960.
26:15It is important to recall this, as the
26:20United States clearly came to view Japan not as
26:27a defeated enemy, but as a reliable partner that Washington
26:30could count on in future conflicts.
26:34In line with this law, or, in fact, this treaty,
26:39what else should we consider?
26:42The American contingent currently numbers
26:45around 60,000 troops.
26:48To put that into perspective, it is the single largest
26:51concentration of American forces anywhere on the globe outside
26:57of the continental United States.
26:59That should give a fairly clear picture of just how high the stakes are for Washington.
27:05What’s more, let’s deliberately choose a date not so
27:08distant in the past, since 2016, there were no fewer
27:12than 16 US bases in Japan.
27:13Yes, 16.
27:15We can clearly see that the United States claims
27:21a major role and has significant aspirations in the region. This was
27:26confirmed by Donald Trump during his visit to Japan
27:31in the latter half of 2025, where he assured the Japanese of his full support.
27:38It is rare for Donald Trump to offer such unconditional
27:42backing; many other countries
27:45would certainly welcome the chance to rely on that level of support.
27:51Therefore, what we’re laying bear here
27:56effectively rounds off the case for Japan’s remilitarisation. Moreover,
28:01it is doing so with the approval of a former adversary, who became its protector
28:08and now acts as its ally.
28:09The demonstration is now firmly on the table.
28:14With the groundwork laid, I’ll return to the question I posed
28:18at the beginning: Is this the final warning?
28:22We began in 1942, but now I’ll ask the question for 2025.
28:28And you were quite right to point out that 'final warning' does have
28:35a rather ominous ring to it.
28:38That’s exactly how I’d like that to be understood and intended.
28:42I also think we should use the plural form,
28:45since there are at least two different ways to interpret
28:50the phrase ‘final warning’.
28:54If you'll bear with me, I’ll address them
28:58one by one.
29:01The first is fairly self-evident:
29:05it’s a warning that the Asia-Pacific has become
29:10the most dangerous corner of the globe.
29:15Given the numerous issues at stake and
29:21the powerful actors involved, we are clearly
29:25facing a challenging situation.
29:27You’ll recall, that we actually flagged this years ago.
29:32Back in early 2021, we ran a session
29:38with a title that rather hit the nail on the head:
29:43'The Taiwan Strait: The Balkans of the 21st Century?’
29:51We used that rather surprising analogy to show that we were at
29:56a spot where, in the context of 2025—the 21st century—
30:01one might find the triggers for a war that military leaders today
30:09describe as ‘high intensity’, though we’d prefer
30:13the term ‘generalised war’.
30:15Simply look at the cast of characters to see why:
30:19North Korea, Russia, China and the USA.
30:24It goes without saying that the prospect of an actual military clash would be harrowing,
30:30and thus: a final warning.
30:32We have to tread very carefully here; the situation is,
30:39quite frankly, explosive.
30:41But there is a second warning to consider, and this one has a much
30:45broader, global reach.
30:47It extends well beyond the immediate boundaries
30:53of the Asia-Pacific.
30:56And who, you might ask, is the target of this final warning?
31:03The Europeans.
31:06It’s aimed straight at Europe.
31:08The crux of the matter is this: you have a country that went further
31:14than any other to outlaw war, to strike it from the record
31:23entirely. Now it’s being hemmed in by the return of geopolitics,
31:30a trend we’ve seen since the Cold War ended, and a
31:33topic we’ve tackled often at Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique.
31:39For a country like Japan, which may be viewed
31:45as a martyr of the Second World War regarding the event mentioned,
31:49to feel compelled to remilitarise is
31:54in my view, a clear sign that the Europeans must
32:00agree to transform their worldview,
32:04their understanding of their global role,
32:08and the perspectives they need to evolve.
32:11That reconnects with our discussion on Clausewitz and that Forum des Humanités session
32:16to which you so kindly invited me as a guest, Olivier.
32:20It was, if I recall, entitled Thinking about War,
32:24where we noted that thinking about war is
32:27perhaps the surest way of preventing it.
32:32To conclude this session,
32:36I am drawn to reflect upon Raymon Aron’s
32:41famous barb, which he was inclined to attribute,
32:45not altogether kindly, to his contemporaries. This
32:51barb actually targeted someone specific. This quote is essentially:
33:00His misfortune or tragedy is that he forgot that history is tragic.
33:05And he was targeting someone in particular, believe me.
33:10I think that Europeans should recall this phrase to safeguard their future.
33:17Well, Fabrice, since you haven't named the mysterious target of Raymond Aron’s famous
33:22words, perhaps our audience knows who it is and will tell us in the Comments section.
33:28Thank you for tuning in for this Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique.
33:32I’ll see you right back here for the next episode very soon.

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