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Lawrence Lessig Interviews Edward Snowden — Transcript

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0:00okay so welcome to a very different kind
0:02of Edmund J saffra Lab lecture it's not
0:06a lecture it's an interview and it's not
0:08an interview with a person here it's a
0:10person who is many miles from here
0:12although the precise location will not
0:14be known um I interview with Edward
0:18Snowden um many times people say this is
0:21a person who needs no introduction this
0:23person needs no introduction and he will
0:25have no direct introduction there will
0:27be a lot of information about him that
0:30will come out through a series of
0:32questions that I'll be asking him and
0:34he'll be answering we've taken the
0:36liberty of asking you to submit
0:38questions I've spent more time than U my
0:42family thinks I should have trying to
0:44integrate uh those questions into my own
0:47set of questions and what we'll do is be
0:49conducting the interview via Google uh
0:53hangout um uh for about the next hour at
0:56least um I ask you to silence your
1:00phones this is obviously being recorded
1:02and
1:03broadcast um and uh with no further Ado
1:06what we'll do is we'll hope the
1:09technology brings Edward Snowden to the
1:15screen there he is Edward
1:17Snowden hi
1:19[Music]
1:26everybody thank you very much for the
1:28invitations
1:29[Applause]
1:31I haven't prepared any remarks but I
1:33think we're going to cover a lot of very
1:35critical issues and and difficult
1:37questions that don't really have a
1:39proper answer so uh if there's anything
1:42uh that that you'd like to ask uh
1:44Professor I'd invite you to begin great
1:46thank you um and let's just start a
1:50little bit from the personal um
1:52obviously this room and people online
1:55are going to be filled with people who
1:56know everything there is to know about
1:58you um but what I've often been struck
2:00by is the number of people who have no
2:03clear sense of who you are and what your
2:06values were as you came to work with the
2:09NSA and as you came to do the um the
2:12work you did by exposing the NSA so I
2:15wonder if you just give us a sense of
2:16your own personal background your own
2:19ideological background as it might
2:20relate to
2:21this I come from a uh a government
2:25family you know my my my grandfather was
2:27in the military my father was in the
2:28military my mother still works for the
2:30government my sister works for the
2:31government uh and I worked for the
2:33government I was a staff officer uh for
2:36the Central Intelligence Agency I had
2:38signed up to join the US military in the
2:40wake of the uh September 11th attacks I
2:43actually signed up for the invasion of
2:44Iraq because I believe that
2:46fundamentally our government um had
2:48Noble intents and it did good things and
2:51it did them for the right reasons uh
2:54what I was not aware of and I've I've
2:56grown to become a little more
2:57sophisticated in this is that while the
2:59people in government largely are exactly
3:02that they're good people trying to do
3:03good things for the right reasons uh
3:06there is a culture that sort of pervades
3:08the upper levels of government the
3:10senior officials uh political
3:13appointees that have basically uh become
3:16less accountable to the public that they
3:19serve and because of that we see that
3:21politics and policies uh irrevocably
3:25sort of irresistibly they gravitate
3:28towards the uh prerogatives of
3:31individuals uh of these officials of an
3:33elected and unelected class of
3:37bureaucrats that can sort of degrade the
3:40quality of government that we as
3:41individuals enjoy so as I went through
3:43my time in the uh the classified world
3:46the intelligence Community as we call it
3:48uh and I moved from the Central
3:50Intelligence Agency to the National
3:51Security Agency I worked on both the
3:54public sides and the private sides as a
3:56contractor working for private companies
3:58but at a government desk in government
4:00facilities using government equipment uh
4:03and working on government programs and
4:04taking tasking from government
4:06employees
4:08uh I I gained an increasingly
4:12concerning understanding of what happens
4:15on the broad scale what the results of
4:18all these individual
4:20decisions uh
4:21are and that's generally that when
4:25decisions are made in the dark uh the
4:27quality of those decisions is r produced
4:30now that's not to say that we need to
4:32know every decision that the government
4:33makes you know who's under investigation
4:35what this particular program does but we
4:38do have to have a general understanding
4:39of the the policies and the powers
4:43broadly that a government claims if it's
4:45going to be using them in our name as
4:47well as being using them against us uh
4:51and ultimately uh toward the end of my
4:53tenure at the NSA I discovered that
4:56there were programs of mass surveillance
4:59that were happening uh Beyond any
5:02possible statutory Authority because
5:03these things were constitutionally
5:05prohibited uh and I saw that there were
5:09these were things that never should have
5:10happened uh they were initially
5:12authorized in the Bush
5:15Administration and that uh that
5:17Administration actually was fully aware
5:20uh in their own classified opinions in
5:21the inspector General's report that
5:23those programs had no statutory basis
5:26and so we saw developments where they
5:28were trying to authorize these under the
5:29president's Powers you know he was
5:31saying Article 2 powers where basically
5:32the President says we're at War I can do
5:35basically whatever I want um now that
5:38may sound like a great idea uh and be an
5:42important power in times of Total War in
5:44times of existential threat uh but we
5:46don't have OTS in the harbor we don't
5:49have you know foreign armies marching on
5:51American soil we haven't seen Total War
5:54policies in the United States uh since
5:56World War II and so we have to ask why
5:59why were these decisions being made uh
6:01why was the public not allowed to
6:03participate in the debate and why is it
6:05that even within the separate branches
6:07of government uh officials were not
6:10aware of this U within the executive
6:12branch you know in the intelligence
6:13Community many of my co-workers uh who
6:15also had top secret clearances high
6:17level access uh were unaware that these
6:19things were going on the vast majority
6:22of Congress had no idea that these
6:23programs have been instituted or were
6:25being maintained uh even those on the
6:28intelligence Community uh intelligence
6:30committees in both the Senate and the
6:32house were not fully briefed only the
6:34gang of eight that'd be the the the
6:37chairs the ranking members and then the
6:40uh majority minority leaders for both
6:42houses uh are briefed on so-called
6:45covert action programs and things like
6:47that exceptionally compartmented
6:49programs uh and the courts had
6:53increasingly in in the wake of the post
6:56911 period uh become reluctant to
6:59scrutinize any decisions or programs
7:02that were um constitutionally
7:05questionable saying that they lacked the
7:07expertise or the positioning or uh what
7:10It ultimately boiled down to was the uh
7:13political
7:14willingness to confront difficult
7:17questions to which there may or may not
7:18be right answers once they're right and
7:21wrong um so this led me to stand up and
7:25say something about it and I worked with
7:26American journalists and American news
7:28outlets um to to make sure that the
7:30public had an ability to make decisions
7:31about where the lines in these programs
7:33should be drawn uh many people are
7:35familiar with the story since then it's
7:36still ongoing the reporting continues um
7:40but the ultimate basis is are that many
7:42people consider the last year's
7:44surveillance of unconstitutional
7:46activity at the NSA and so on and so
7:48forth uh to be ultimately about
7:50surveillance and mass surveillance and
7:52that is a critical issue and it's the
7:54one with which I'm most familiar and I I
7:57saw the greatest wrongdoing however it's
7:59important to be aware that uh the
8:02reality that mass surveillance
8:05illustrates is that we have agencies
8:08that are working on their own
8:09authorities they're working on their own
8:11sort of uh institutional momentum to
8:14implement programs without oversight uh
8:17creating these things behind closed
8:18doors without the awareness of the
8:20public that are actually changing the
8:22boundaries of the rights that we enjoy
8:24as free people and a free Society um we
8:27have lost in many ways the freedom to
8:29associate without judgment in the United
8:31States because of the metadata program
8:33that's really an associational tracking
8:35program uh when we have everyone's call
8:37records we know who everyone's friends
8:39are we know who they contact we know
8:41what they do we know when they travel we
8:43know where they go uh we know how long
8:45they're there uh it's there are speech
8:47implications to this um there are
8:50obviously privacy implications to this
8:53uh and there is a very strong argument
8:56to be made that even if we as a society
8:59believe that these these powers and
9:00authorities would be valuable that we
9:03could not Institute them through statute
9:06regardless that they simply would be
9:07unconstitutional in any form uh absent
9:10an amendment and we see this uh
9:12happening and being upheld even through
9:14International laws decisions uh very
9:16recently uh two or three days ago the uh
9:20United Nations special RoR on countering
9:23terrorism and uh protecting human rights
9:26uh delivered a report that have been of
9:28the works for I believe several years uh
9:30that found that mass surveillance
9:32programs violate the uh obligations of
9:35states that the United States and the
9:37United Kingdom and other many of our
9:39other allies have agreed to under the
9:41international Covenant on civil and
9:43political rights the
9:44iccpr um as well as and this wasn't
9:47mentioned specifically but the very same
9:49um right that he was uh highlighting in
9:51this report uh was an obligation we had
9:55agreed to under the universal
9:57Declaration of Human Rights you know
9:59some 50 uh years back uh and that's
10:02article 12 and that's that we all have a
10:04right to uh privacy to be free from
10:07unjustified unreasonable intrusions into
10:09our lives and we have this of course
10:11under our own Fourth Amendment so when
10:14it came to my story uh and how I came
10:17forward it was not that I saw a
10:19particular program and I had an axe to
10:21grind um it was that broadly I was
10:25witness to massive violations of our
10:28constitution that they were happening in
10:30secret and that they were happening as a
10:32result of a broad breakdown throughout
10:36the branches of government and this is
10:37the key because when there's a problem
10:40in a single agency when there's a
10:41problem in a single Branch uh we tend to
10:45be self-correcting that's what checks
10:46and balances are for but the question of
10:49whistleblowing of when to stand up is
10:53really one of do those checks and
10:55balances still function can you report
10:58uh these issues within a system to a
11:00certain Branch to a certain organization
11:02to a certain office and actually see uh
11:05those abuses and those policies
11:07corrected and in this case uh they were
11:10not we saw um that both the courts uh
11:14the Congress and the executive had all
11:16failed in different um different
11:18portions of these uh these programs and
11:20protecting our rights and I think we'll
11:22cover that a little more detail later
11:24but did that answer your question yes so
11:26what's striking about the position
11:28you've described both here and also in
11:31in the interviews that have been that
11:33you've given is how relatively limited
11:36it is for its justification of stepping
11:39forth with this kind of Civil
11:41Disobedience I mean in particular you've
11:43said um that the problem you had with
11:47what in fact happened is primarily the
11:49problem of democratic accountability you
11:51said quote it's not my role to make that
11:54choice the choice whether the NSA
11:55engages in those activities or not uh
11:58instead of for the American people quote
12:01I don't intend to destroy those systems
12:03but to allow the public to decide
12:05whether they should go on so the key
12:07that you're emphasizing is that we had a
12:10we had a process we had a system of
12:12government that wasn't allowing the
12:13public to even know about the issues
12:16that the uh NSA was engaging in and and
12:18that's the primary justification you
12:21have for stepping forward and obviously
12:23violating the law in order to make it
12:26public right ultimately it comes down to
12:29a question of uh you know people argue
12:33about what is a whistleblower I tried to
12:35raise uh my concerns internally uh they
12:38got nowhere other individuals who had
12:40done the same thing whether they're
12:41Thomas Drake Bill Binny um Kirk weeby Ed
12:45Lumis uh Diane roor who even went to
12:48Congress um all of these individuals uh
12:51raised similar concerns and yet the
12:53issues were not corrected and were not
12:55addressed and that's again because of
12:56the over classification issues um have
12:59been described in the way that these
13:00processes have inevitably become more
13:02cumbersome and less effective over time
13:05to the point where they're eventually
13:06broken I think the the ultimate Mark of
13:10a
13:12whistleblower is when it comes to
13:14motivations are they standing up um to
13:18change something directly to sort of uh
13:22have a partisan effect um sort of the
13:25deep throat thing where they're trying
13:26to you know get their boss fired so they
13:27can move into the next job um that's not
13:31uh that's not whistleblowing I think
13:32under anyone's definition but really it
13:34comes down to when I stepped up it was
13:36not to dictate outcomes and I I think
13:40that's ultimately the the the mark there
13:43it's about allowing the public a chance
13:46to participate in Democratic processes
13:49in order to play their part in uh
13:52determining the outcome the reality is
13:55since
13:56uh since we saw the birth of sort of
13:59this unitary executive Theory uh in the
14:01White House and and throughout American
14:03governance um the government has the
14:08public has lost their seat at the table
14:10of government we're being increasingly
14:12left out of critical discussions about
14:15the policies and the direction that we
14:18want to steer our society toward they're
14:20being made in our name without our
14:22awareness and without our consent but in
14:25a Democratic Republic you know the
14:26government draws its legit
14:30from the consent of the people and
14:32everybody who's involved in any kind of
14:33research knows that you know consent is
14:36not meaningful if it's not informed and
14:38that's what was lacking so when I think
14:40about the question of um you know how do
14:43you see uh how do you find the line the
14:47point of justification by which you can
14:49stand up go to the press and this is
14:51another key distinction is I didn't
14:53publish any of these materials I've
14:55never published a single story on the
14:57NSA uh myself uh because everyone has
15:00biases right and even though I have an
15:02expert understanding of these programs
15:04I've worked with them personally I know
15:06uh the authorities they operate under
15:07how they're used uh again I had the
15:09ability to look at anybody's email that
15:11was being ingested under these programs
15:13um whether that was intercepted
15:15domestically or overseas I had the
15:16authorities to work at
15:18both um but
15:22uh but I didn't try to push my agenda
15:28onto the public because I don't think
15:29that would be proper and I think many
15:30other whistleblowers do the same thing
15:32that's why we go to the press the Press
15:36is a critical part of American society
15:39it's a part of our constitutional system
15:40that's why we have the person Moon um
15:44and it's really not the role of an
15:46individual such as myself to say what
15:48the public should and should not know
15:50but by working in partnership with the
15:52Free Press we can allow institutions
15:56that exist to make these sort of
15:58determinations
15:59to then sit down with the government
16:01present their evidence for why this is
16:03in the public interest the government
16:05can make a counter case and say why this
16:07may cause some harm that may have been
16:09missed or misunderstood uh or the value
16:11of these programs misinterpreted by the
16:14uh by the journalists uh and ultimately
16:16we can get a decision from
16:19there uh and there's a kind of
16:22accountability that's born from that uh
16:24that's lacking when it's an individual
16:26making the decisions on their own but
16:28but in your in your decision to go to
16:30the press this is a second important
16:33difference um you decided not to go to
16:36the New York Times directly uh you went
16:39to Glen Greenwald who was a very
16:43outspoken independent member of the
16:45press and he partnered and you and you
16:47went to with Laura PTO whose amazing
16:50film is coming out this week um uh and
16:53you went to the guardian um which is
16:56obviously not the American Press I and
16:59you had very that's actually not correct
17:01uh the guardian has both a US branch and
17:03a UK Branch uh they're completely
17:06separate corporate institutions and I
17:07went to the US Garden additionally it's
17:10important to remember that while Glenn
17:12and Laura are the most well-known
17:14journalists Barton Gilman of the
17:16Washington Post was actually involved
17:19and that was because there was a uh you
17:21know I made a specific determination
17:23that it would be valuable to have sort
17:25of the DC institution in the heart of
17:28our government and their press uh really
17:30have a role to play in this the reason
17:32the New York Times uh was not involved
17:35in the initial disclosures uh was
17:38because they have an Institutional
17:39history of sitting on stories of massive
17:41public importance uh simply because the
17:43government claimed that they would not
17:45be in the public interest to know uh
17:47right on the eve of uh the 2004
17:51elections it was discovered and revealed
17:53by reporter James ryen uh that the Bush
17:57Administration had authorized with
17:58without statutory Authority uh the
18:01warrantless wiretapping of everyone in
18:03the country uh and that was both based
18:05on the internet and the phones um
18:07although I don't believe he had the
18:08internet metadata program known to him
18:10at the time uh and the times I believe
18:14it was executive editor at the time I
18:16could be uh mistaken on that uh decided
18:18to sit on the
18:21story it was only uh the times did
18:24eventually break the story I believe
18:25more than a year later but that was only
18:27because the journalists who had worked
18:28the story uh James ryen who's now
18:31actually being uh they face contempt of
18:33court charges they're being prosecuted
18:36by the doj uh that journalist intended
18:39to publish a book uh to get that
18:42information to the public regardless of
18:44the newspapers position um and
18:46ultimately the newspaper had a an
18:49incredible change of heart and said hey
18:51after all this is in the public interest
18:53we should publish this end it became a
18:55massive Scandal as we all recall and the
18:57warrantless wiretapping program as it
18:59existed then was ended as a result uh so
19:03there is a real question I think uh and
19:05the times has uh they've stated that
19:07they've sort of changed their
19:08positioning they've changed their
19:09thinking and their reasoning since then
19:11uh about taking uh government claims at
19:13face
19:14value um but there is a uh there is a
19:18real
19:20question about had that Story come out
19:24uh when it was originally discovered
19:26which was right uh on the eve of an
19:28election it was about the massive
19:30violation of the American Constitution
19:33uh would that not only have had a public
19:35impact would it have had a political
19:36impact and would we have incurred the
19:39same costs that we did in the uh the
19:42second term of that administration had
19:45the public had a chance to take those
19:46programs into account those decisions
19:48into account when they cast their vote
19:50yeah so part of the dynamic of the
19:55corruption of the political
19:57process in that particular case was a
19:59Corruption of the news process where the
20:02news media is not giving the public the
20:04opportunity to to reflect on the facts
20:07that should have mattered politically um
20:09in the case of the Guardian USA I mean
20:11what I'm trying to see whether this is
20:13something that you were sensitive to
20:15Guardian USA was quite proud of the fact
20:18that it was independent of the American
20:21government because it had no access to
20:23the American government Gibson the
20:25editor put it no one takes our calls
20:27anyway so we literally have nothing to
20:28lose in terms of access which gave them
20:31the the freedom to be independent enough
20:34to stand up and very aggressively um
20:37insist that they were going to publish
20:39the Verizon story which was the first
20:41story that Glenn succeeded in getting
20:43published um in a Time Horizon that
20:45would have been unheard of had it been
20:47even the Washington Post um so once
20:50again you can think of what is it about
20:51the institutional structure of the
20:54American newspapers um that
20:56differentiates them and you know many
20:58people commented competition in the
21:00British culture among newspapers is
21:02different greater even though they don't
21:04have a first amendment protection and in
21:06the American context there's a club of a
21:09few of these powerful um papers that
21:11might make it less likely for them to be
21:14aggressive against the government um so
21:16was that a sense that you had when you
21:18began to think about this or is that
21:20just something you discovered after uh
21:22when when I thought about how to how to
21:25structure um the uh to enable the
21:29journalism as best I could uh I have no
21:33experience with the media you know I'm
21:34not a journalist I'm not an editor I
21:36can't tell them how to run or not to run
21:38their newspaper so I won't take a
21:39judgment on the the work of this
21:41newspaper that newspaper but um I will
21:44say when we look at it in terms of uh an
21:46Institutional basis the real challenge
21:49for uh the US media and whether that's
21:52TV or whether that's uh print is that it
21:55is very institutionalized it's very
21:57hierarchical it's very rigid and if one
22:01institution you know only the Washington
22:03Post had this story um they would likely
22:06be
22:07uh they would have a very difficult time
22:11in negotiating with the government U to
22:13make sure that the public did get all of
22:15the information it needed and not just
22:17the information that the government
22:19thought would be beneficial for them to
22:20know which is what we see so uh so
22:23regularly today with Anonymous officials
22:26uh you know who are basically leaking
22:27classified information classified
22:29programs on a daily basis and yet they
22:32enjoy a kind of amnesty from the white
22:34house uh because the White House
22:35appreciates the service that they're
22:37doing for them politically uh Now by
22:41allowing multiple journalistic
22:44institutions access to the same material
22:47um you are enabling uh sort of a
22:51Marketplace as a contest uh to go all of
22:54these groups will be in regular contact
22:56with the United States government and
22:58this is true for the guardian as well um
23:00The Guardian has I I know for a fact
23:02I've spoken with Alan rusbridger at the
23:04guardian um that uh they have had many
23:08many many many conversations with the
23:10United States government and UK
23:11government and so on uh about what
23:15information has no real public value but
23:18is truly harmful uh and any information
23:20like that you know uh it's it's natural
23:23that this be excised from publication um
23:26because nobody wants to cause harm to
23:28individuals right nobody wants to harm
23:30uh security but when the government
23:33draws these lines on its own without any
23:35accountability without any sort of uh
23:37quarter reviews uh they draw the lines
23:40in a in a way that is
23:43um more politically motivated than
23:46publicly motivated and that's a
23:48dangerous thing now journalists uh right
23:51or wrong they typically see themselves
23:54as champions of the public and because
23:56that they have a motivation they have a
23:58self-image uh which directs them to try
24:01to safeguard the public interest uh not
24:04just against their own decisions and
24:06their own proclivities and their own
24:07biases but against the government
24:09themselves and we have to have that you
24:11know the work of Journalism the work of
24:13the press is challenging the government
24:17for control of information and we Lo
24:19when we lose that we'll be in a much
24:21poorer Society for that and I think the
24:23last uh the last year's Revelations are
24:27a good example of the fact that the
24:28public still does uh recognize that this
24:32kind of reporting this kind of
24:33adversarial
24:34investigation uh is incredibly important
24:38to the quality of our government and the
24:39quality of our society and that's the
24:41reason that it won the public or the uh
24:43Pulitzer Prize for public service that
24:45was shared by The Washington Post in the
24:47guardian for that
24:48reporting yeah so but even so even in
24:51that context though you um made a pretty
24:54strong distinction between people who
24:56would leak in the context of for example
24:58CIA activities and people would leak in
25:02the context of what you had done so so
25:04this is again a narrower conception of
25:08of what you think the the appropriate
25:10role for a whistleblower is because you
25:12had a much more visceral sense of the
25:16risks that would come out by by
25:18releasing information about the CIA
25:21right that that's correct I had access
25:22to the the the Personnel records the
25:25social security numbers the names and
25:27sometimes even the address addresses of
25:29everyone who worked in the intelligence
25:31Community these are shared databases
25:32that someone with my clearance has had
25:34access to uh because I actually had a
25:36level of access that was greater than
25:38typical top secret I had what was called
25:40privileged access or pbac uh that means
25:43when somebody like the uh the director
25:45of the CIA or the NSA he wants some
25:48information he wants some report he
25:49can't get it himself because he doesn't
25:51know where it is he doesn't understand
25:52these things um you know he has to ask
25:55someone an office manager they ask
25:56someone else but then there are
25:58ultimately individuals who have access
26:00to everything so if I had wanted to
26:02cause harm if I had wanted to you know
26:04reveal everything uh certainly that was
26:07that was possible but as you said when
26:09you think about public interest
26:10determinations when you think about what
26:13we should know versus legitimate Secrets
26:16um there is a line to be drawn and so uh
26:19what I tried to do was I tried to ensure
26:21that only information that would be uh
26:23necessary for the reporting was made
26:25available to journalists working in the
26:27public interest um I required that they
26:30all agree to although you know there's
26:32no way I can enforce that I required
26:34they all agree not to place any
26:37individual uh or program at un at to
26:40unnecessary risk not to expose them to
26:43unnecessary risk or uh needless harm and
26:47to make sure that the only stories they
26:49published uh were ones for which they
26:51had a clear public interest
26:53justification uh and based on that I
26:55could make sure that even though you
26:57know I agreed that this information was
26:59important or this information was
27:01noteworthy or this would be required on
27:03background for journalists to be able to
27:05make those determinations and to
27:07understand not just the bad things about
27:09these programs but the good things so
27:11they could draw an accurate
27:13conclusion but to make sure that my
27:15biases alone were not being represented
27:18and to make sure that the public was
27:19served by removing myself from the
27:22actual determination publication
27:24process okay so let's talk a little bit
27:27about
27:29um let's talk a little bit about the the
27:32nature of the harm that you're worried
27:36about um I was struck given my own uh
27:40work with the wonderful way in which you
27:44reuse um the Jefferson
27:48quote uh Glen Greenwald brought this out
27:51it's a it's a really wonderful example
27:53of the way you think about the nature of
27:55this problem so Jefferson said in
27:57questions of
27:58power let no more be heard of confidence
28:01in men but bind him down from Mischief
28:04by the chains of the
28:06Constitution and you would remix that by
28:10saying let us speak no more of faith in
28:13man but bind him down from Mischief by
28:15the chains of
28:17cryptography so the intuition here is
28:20that we can use physics as opposed to
28:22lawyers to enforce the understandings or
28:26the rules um and that's a central
28:29conception of what you think the
28:31appropriate response to these invasive
28:33Technologies is is that fair right uh
28:36what we saw was back when the founders
28:37were considering how to draw the lines
28:39around our government um its powers its
28:42authorities and how to
28:44enumerate uh you know what privileges it
28:46would have um they they tried very
28:49carefully to say you know this is within
28:51the the the purview of the federal
28:53government this will be left to the
28:55states and this will be left to the
28:56public um and the list of public rights
28:59should be much greater than the list of
29:01government rights but what we see
29:03inexorably and this is not unique to the
29:05United States and neither is the problem
29:07of mass surveillance and that's key um
29:09this is not just about the National
29:11Security Agency and this is not just
29:13about our allies this is also about our
29:14adversaries the world is changing these
29:16Technologies are here um we need to
29:19think about how to correct and address
29:20uh these
29:21issues um but ultimately they tried to
29:25uh they tried to combat the the problems
29:30of the natural Corruption of power over
29:34time by creating subsets of individuals
29:37sort of Institutions within the
29:38institution uh that would compete
29:41against each other for power and
29:42privilege and because of that they would
29:43sort of check each other and we' have a
29:45level of reasonableness in society now
29:47what we've seen is that even uh even
29:49while that's a great idea and it's well
29:51intended and it's work very well for us
29:53um over time over the span of hundreds
29:55of years uh you still get people who uh
30:00they try to find the ideal move in in
30:03Game Theory terms they try to uh reach
30:05the uh the Nash equilibrium where
30:07they're always acting to the maximum
30:10point of their own
30:11self-interest and when that happens not
30:14just as members of this institution
30:16within an institution not just as you
30:17know a person within a branch of
30:19government but when they begin to view
30:21themselves as a class a political class
30:23the Elite Class um the value of those
30:27safeguards breaks down because they no
30:29longer see themselves as member of the
30:31public they see themselves as member of
30:33a class as a member of a class now
30:36because of the advances and achievements
30:38we've had in terms of technology and
30:40Society we're beginning to see the dawn
30:42of a new kind of thinking around this uh
30:44which is what I was uh thinking about
30:46when I discussed that and that was not
30:48you know an original thought of myself
30:50um this is something that many people in
30:53The Cypher Punk uh movement uh other
30:56individuals within the NSA such as Bill
30:58bny um who tried to create a program
31:00where the things that the NSA was
31:02intercepting would be encrypted as soon
31:05as they were intercepted so the NSA
31:06could not read them and the only people
31:08who could decrypt them were actually the
31:10courts so the courts that issued the
31:12orders would then provide the NSA with
31:14the actual physical capability to read
31:16the interception as kind of a safeguard
31:19uh that's Superior to law um and that's
31:22that's the idea is when institutions
31:25fail when laws fail natural laws persist
31:29and technology is increasingly providing
31:31us for Ability the ability to encode our
31:35rights not just into our laws but into
31:38our systems so when you know the failure
31:41of black letters on a page becomes
31:43apparent we still have the fail safe of
31:46our technological systems the the
31:48systems that we surround ourselves and
31:49rely upon every day and I think that's a
31:53that's an issue that we will be
31:54confronting more and more in the future
31:57so then let's just think about though
31:59that in the context of the balance
32:00between surveillance and privacy we
32:03talked a little bit about this when we
32:05uh talked in advance of this
32:08conversation um Benny's idea of
32:10imagining a technology that would
32:13protect the product of the
32:16surveillance so that the root concern
32:19that many people have about Mass
32:21surveillance that you have government
32:23agents who are basically rooting around
32:25in people's private lives would be
32:27removed D Again by technology by
32:29cryptography that wouldn't be possible
32:32and so that the surveillance system that
32:34were that was designed the way you just
32:36described would produce a whole bunch of
32:38data that would only ever be usable if
32:42there were proper authorization to use
32:44it but even thata enforement process
32:47yeah but even that idea you have a
32:49concern about you think that doesn't
32:51respect privacy enough so what is the
32:53sense of privacy that's invaded if
32:56nobody can actually get access access to
32:58the private data unless there really is
33:00a good legitimate personalized claim for
33:03why they should have access to it well
33:06that that's because uh at least in the
33:08United States we have a fourth uh Fourth
33:10Amendment prohibition not just against
33:12unreasonable search which is what Binny
33:15was protecting against but also against
33:17unreasonable seizure in the first place
33:19and that's what that system does not
33:21protect against and this is a critical
33:23distinction that uh is missed in much of
33:25the debate uh is that it's not simply a
33:28violation of the fourth amendment to
33:29search this information but to seize it
33:32without specific justification without
33:34some sort of showing a probable cause to
33:36do so in the first place um because what
33:39we're doing is we're uh compiling what
33:42academics have referred to as a database
33:44of Ruin um when you collect everything
33:47on everyone as a matter of course uh
33:52the the um temptation to abuse that
33:56database the temptation to access that
33:59information to use it in new ways in
34:01response to new threats um particularly
34:04in secret is simply too great to be
34:07ignored and this is this is one of the
34:09reasons that we have the prohibition
34:11against unreasonable seizure uh we don't
34:14say you know the police can go and
34:15search through all of our houses uh take
34:17everything that they want um but then
34:19simply not use it uh or you know just
34:22make a note of everything that's in our
34:24house but not take it um because it's
34:27that
34:28uh that
34:30reduction uh in Liberty that reduction
34:32in our freedom that reduction in our
34:35power relative to our state uh that is
34:38the real concern uh because when we
34:41enable uh a government an institution a
34:45uh a state whether it's here or anywhere
34:48else in the world to claim these
34:50incredible Powers um even if they're
34:54being used uh properly as a result of
34:57policy we have to remember that policy
35:00is a very weak protection and I believe
35:03the Supreme Court and Riley actually
35:04made a statement about this uh I I'll
35:07have to defer members of the audience
35:08for the exact quote um but uh the idea
35:12is that we did not fight a revolution
35:15for the benefit of policy protections we
35:18don't need to justify why we need our
35:21rights I don't need to say why I have or
35:23why I need to be able to hide something
35:25I don't need to say I have something to
35:27hide or I don't have something to hide
35:29it's incumbent on the government to make
35:31a showing of why it has a not just a
35:35desire to that a requirement to infringe
35:38upon our rights infringe upon our lead
35:40uh infringe upon our liberties infringe
35:43upon our private
35:45domain uh in order to sort through our
35:47things and that matters whether it's our
35:48homes that matters whether it's the
35:50content of our Communications or the
35:52metadata which is uh you know all of our
35:54associations our our travels where we're
35:57at for how long that sort of thing
36:00um policy as a protection we we need to
36:03remember that policy is a one-way
36:05ratchet that only loosens over time you
36:08know the government never places
36:09additional restrictions on itself um
36:13unprovoked uh so we we may have a public
36:16debate and say all right we've
36:17instituted this program we'll seize the
36:19communications of everyone in the
36:20country we'll seize the communications
36:22of everyone around the world but we'll
36:24only search them upon these bases uh but
36:27we're going to compile this gigantic
36:29database that lasts for 5 years based on
36:31current policy current policy for
36:33retention at NSA today is 5 years uh and
36:35you can wave that to be longer um but
36:38the question is how do we know when that
36:39change is particularly when it's
36:41classified particularly when it's not
36:42being briefed the majority of Congress
36:45uh and particularly when we look at
36:46things such as the intelligence
36:47committees uh that Reed twice as much
36:50twice as many campaign donations
36:52relative to the other members of
36:54Congress from intelligence contractors
36:56from defense
36:58contractors uh we begin to see a sort of
37:00regulatory
37:01capture that excuses agencies programs
37:05and policies from accountability on a
37:07very large and alarming basis and so for
37:11me the way we prevent these abuses from
37:14occurring is we go look we have these
37:16rights for a reason and if we are going
37:19to change the boundaries of our rights
37:22that's a public decision that's not a
37:23decision for some official sitting
37:25behind a closed door somewhere um that's
37:27something that we have to arrive on we
37:29have to have Broad Social approval of it
37:31and we have to agree that these things
37:32are necessary and that hasn't
37:34happened right but if it happens in the
37:37way that you described if you had this
37:39broad public conversation and the public
37:41basically said well we like the idea of
37:44being able to trace back to find the
37:46criminal um the terrorist or the
37:48criminal we like that idea but we also
37:50like snowden's idea or Benny's idea that
37:54all of that data should be protected not
37:57through through policy but through
37:59physics through cryptography um and so
38:01we created a process put this Fourth
38:04Amendment aside for a second because it
38:06turns out it's more complicated than
38:08than this makes it sound but just
38:09bracket it there's a process that said
38:12we would encrypt and protect so there's
38:15a database that you could only get
38:17access to if you could crack and maybe
38:19you're the only person in the world who
38:20could crack it let's just assume that
38:22for a second um you you still seem to
38:25have some trouble with the idea of this
38:28data being out there this retrospective
38:31data being out there and what
38:33independent of the Fourth Amendment of
38:34the framers just what is the problem
38:36what's the problem with that ultimately
38:38it comes down to it's a violation of our
38:40natural rights right these are inherent
38:42rights that cannot be voted Away by the
38:44majority I sort of explain and
38:47illustrate the concept previously
38:49because that's the government's uh sort
38:50of claim that's their position I want to
38:52be fair to it but when I look at it
38:54these are rights that are inherent to
38:56our nature you know the reason we have
38:58rights is their protection against the
39:00majority it's to make sure that these
39:02kind of programs can't be voted in in a
39:04moment of panic uh that will pass like
39:07it always does um and revoke rights that
39:10are necessary even if those rights are
39:12only valued by a small portion of
39:14society because when when you live um in
39:18a liberal Society of vice and
39:21authoritarian Society you have to have
39:24respect not only for the majority's
39:26wishes but the minorities lights um and
39:28and so we talk about uh why is it not
39:31okay to intercept everything store it as
39:34long as we're encrypting it and and
39:36filtering it through in a in a processed
39:38way
39:40um first off it's because it's not
39:43necessary um in the wake of these
39:45programs uh the president appointed a
39:48panel of uh friendlies you know people
39:50who are all incentivized to exonerate
39:52these programs they had full access to
39:54classified information uh and
39:56interestingly they found that mass
39:58surveillance particularly in the case of
39:59the 215 um phone metadata programs uh
40:03although it actually collects more than
40:04just phone metadata um that Authority
40:07had never stopped a single imminent
40:09attack in the United States uh none of
40:11the information had been shown to have
40:13any unique and concrete value and of the
40:16information that they did find even if
40:18it was nice to have uh they found that
40:20it was available through other means
40:21traditional means such as corridors and
40:23that's the real key when I think about
40:25what I saw and what alarmed me during my
40:29time at the NSA and CIA it was that we
40:32had pivoted we had changed from focusing
40:35on traditional methods of surveillance
40:37uh which first off is not using foreign
40:39intelligence capabilities for law
40:41enforcement means and it's important to
40:43remember that terrorism is a law
40:44enforcement problem at its core um is
40:48that
40:50uh sorry I
40:53uh I I got lost there
40:57could you remind me of what I just
41:00said yeah you you were describing the
41:02way in which um this Mass versus
41:05targeted surveillance that's where it
41:06was I apologize uh got a really poor
41:09working memory um we have uh the
41:13traditional methods of surveillance
41:14which are targeted surveillance and they
41:16are effective and this is key even when
41:18the target has incredible uh security
41:21measures in place even when they use
41:23encryption whether that's transport
41:25level security uh I.E the communication
41:28in transit you know who they're calling
41:29is protected uh or whether it's data at
41:33rest encryption which is you know the
41:34contents of their phone are protected uh
41:37I working at the NSA when I was focusing
41:39on on targeting Chinese hackers um would
41:42be able to hack hackers you know we
41:45would be able to penetrate their methods
41:47and this is for everybody around the
41:48world not just a hacker in this place or
41:50the other um because systems are
41:52fundamentally insecure and this is the
41:54same as law enforcement Powers we've had
41:56for for Generations and taking down
41:57organized crime uh you know the the mob
42:01um uh domestic terrorists and things
42:04like that you go to a judge and you say
42:08we have probable cause to suspect that
42:10this person is involved in some kind of
42:11serious wrongdoing some kind of criminal
42:13activity please allow us to exercise
42:16these lawful powers in pursuit of this
42:17Target and after the judge approved that
42:20basically anything goes I mean the FBI
42:23hacks people now they hack people the
42:25FBI does it every day even on Sunday is
42:27uh we get into their computers and if
42:29they have encrypted uh encrypted
42:30material we simply steal the key because
42:34the fundamental reality of encryption uh
42:36when we think about how this works is
42:38the person who is using the encrypted
42:40data right if I encrypt something I
42:42can't read it either unless the key is
42:45input at some point you know when you
42:46turn on your phone and you're looking at
42:48uh you know if your phone is encrypted
42:50locally and you're looking at pictures
42:52you know your selfies on it if those
42:54selfies are visible to you it's because
42:56they're being decrypted otherwise it
42:58would look like white noise it would
42:59look like garbage um so what this means
43:02is that even heavily protected heavily
43:04encrypted Communications are vulnerable
43:07to traditional means of investigation
43:09and this is what the real challenge uh
43:11between what happened before and what's
43:13happening now is and how we find our way
43:15out of this and how we avoid the mass
43:18you know let's surveil entire
43:19populations as as opposed to targeted
43:22individuals is um rather than saying
43:26let's monitor the communications of
43:28everyone in the United States because we
43:31want to be able to do pre-criminal
43:33investigation and that's an incredible
43:35departure from the traditional mod
43:36pre-criminal investigation where we're
43:37doing retrospective searching into
43:40evidence that we collected against you
43:43before you did anything wrong before you
43:45were suspected of any wrongdoing you
43:46know why you were just an innocent and
43:48instead go we suspect this person on the
43:50base of this Association on the basis of
43:53this activity on the basis of being uh
43:55you know witnessed the scene of this
43:57crime uh we have probable cause for
44:00surveilling them
44:02specifically and not only uh is that
44:05effective and we know it's effective
44:07because we do it every day um it's
44:09rights respecting because you've got the
44:12Restraint of the courts um you have
44:14policy Protections in place and it's
44:16done on a basis that is necessary and
44:19proportionate to the threat that's being
44:21faced um you know it's not necessary as
44:24we've seen from the White House's own
44:26review to collect the communications of
44:28everyone in the country this has been
44:29going on for more than a decade now it's
44:32never stopped an attack it's never been
44:33shown to be necessary and yet we've been
44:36doing it uh so the question is do we
44:39need to continue to do that when it's
44:41not been shown to have value we do know
44:43it has huge costs and I you know there
44:47there's no um no fundamental way to
44:50prove a negative or anything here but uh
44:53I would POS it from my own experience
44:55using these tools because I I use Mass
44:58Vance Tools in my work every day at the
44:59NSA in Hawaii um that we miss attacks we
45:05miss leads and investigations fail
45:08because when the government is doing
45:10what it's called Uh collected all
45:13investigation where we're you know
45:15watching Everybody we're not seeing
45:18anything with specificity because it's
45:20impossible to to keep an eye on all of
45:22your targets when you're constantly
45:24dumping more hay on top of them a good
45:26example of this is actually the Boston
45:28Marathon bombings um the s brothers were
45:33pointed out to us by the Russian
45:35intelligence Services the FBI was tipped
45:37off about that they only performed a
45:39cursory investigation and you know
45:42that's because of resource constraints
45:43and things like that uh they said you
45:45know we didn't have enough to go after
45:46these guys all the way but the reality
45:48is we knew who these guys were we knew
45:50they were associated with extremism in
45:52advance of the attacks but we didn't
45:53follow up we didn't really watch these
45:54guys and the question is why and I
45:57believe the reality of that is because
45:59we do have finite resources and the
46:01question is should we be spending $1
46:02billion a year on mass surveillance
46:05programs at the NSA um to the extent
46:09that we no longer have effective means
46:12of traditional targeted surveillance
46:15we're watching everybody that we have no
46:17reason to be watching simply because it
46:19may have
46:20value at the expense of being able to
46:23watch specific people for which we have
46:25a specific cause for investigating them
46:28and that's something that we need to
46:29look carefully at how to balance so one
46:31consequence of everything you've
46:33described is its effect on the effect on
46:35privacy another consequence that you've
46:38talked about is the way in which the
46:41government's intervention into
46:43Technologies and work with technology
46:45companies has rendered um commercial
46:47entities more vulnerable more vulnerable
46:49to International hacking themselves I
46:51wonder as you reflect on that you know
46:55to what extent do you think that's a
46:56significant can concern that commercial
46:58interest ought to be bringing to the
46:59government as an independent reason to
47:02cut back on this kind of
47:04intervention so the vulnerability of uh
47:07systems and services to mass
47:09surveillance is a big thing um it's a a
47:11big danger competitively uh particularly
47:14if it is policy based uh as opposed to
47:16technologically based because if these
47:18authorities are being drawn from
47:19National laws suddenly nobody trusts
47:22American products and services anymore
47:23we have you know we have uh we have
47:25prism we have basically backdoor
47:27authorities to go into Google and
47:29Facebook and apple and so on and so
47:31forth under uh the FIS amendments 702
47:34Authority which does not require a
47:36warrant mind you um and they can rifle
47:39through the communications of people
47:41using these Services uh why why would an
47:45individual trust a bank that steals from
47:47them uh similarly why would anybody
47:49trust a phone that spies on them if a
47:52German wants to buy a phone are they
47:53going to buy an American phone with a
47:55back door or are they going to buy a
47:56Korean phone that surveillance free
47:58because they know that's a competitive
48:00Advantage um that's that's something we
48:02need to be able to confront more broadly
48:04uh how do we secure this how do we make
48:07sure that our our technical products and
48:09services are robust and resilient
48:11against government intrusions not just
48:14from our own government uh because by
48:15and large our government does uh play by
48:18pretty decent rules um but how do we
48:20protect them against adversaries how do
48:22we protect them against the most aoran
48:24states in the world and the only way to
48:26do that is to ensure that we
48:28fundamentally appros any policies or any
48:32kind of dictates that compromise the
48:34security of our devices that compromise
48:37the security of our services um it's
48:40it's talked about recently the
48:41government the FBI is pursuing back
48:43doors into our our personal devices you
48:46know they want to be able to spy on your
48:47phone as as long as they say you know
48:49we've got a reason we have some process
48:51that allow us to do it but the reality
48:53is once you bake a back door into
48:55something um you can't control who walks
48:58through it uh the NSA has done this for
49:01ages where we exploit back doors built
49:03into Communications built into systems
49:05by other countries for these same
49:07reasons uh we do it for our own reasons
49:09you know the FBI builds back doors and
49:11for a lawful purpose the uh NSA uses
49:14them for foreign intelligence purposes
49:15so on so forth and this is also there's
49:18this is not um this is not theoretical
49:21these are things that have already
49:22happened if you got phones out there um
49:24you know you can Google uh the Athens
49:26Affair which is a wiretapping instance I
49:29believe Circa the uh the Greek Olympics
49:32um where basically the entire government
49:34of the country their highest level
49:36officials uh were unlawfully wiretapped
49:39by unknown parties uh using lawful
49:43intercept capabilities that were built
49:44into the Telecommunications devices uh
49:47in place at that country and that's
49:49really the danger um by enabling this
49:53sort of surveillance we're actually
49:55weakening the security for a massive
49:57Factor uh of of individuals we're we're
50:01basically uh compromising the security
50:03of society for the benefit of an agency
50:07and you know there there there can be
50:09reasonable disagreement about where we
50:10draw the lines and where this should
50:11happen but the real question is you know
50:14how many phones has the NSA or have the
50:17FBI seized that they were unable to
50:19break the encryption on they actually
50:21provide accounts for these I think
50:23there's one from a couple years back
50:25that shows they've only ever been a
50:26unable to break uh a couple phones
50:28something like three or four and it
50:29wasn't relevant to the case uh I think
50:32meanwhile they seiz tons of phones that
50:34are encrypted uh but they are able to
50:36get around so really is this the problem
50:39that it's
50:40claimed uh compared to the pro the uh
50:44protection that encryption that uh that
50:48basically good cyber security practices
50:50provide to a society if we have secure
50:53Services if we have secure products and
50:55we have a National competitive Advantage
50:58globally uh we have a robust and
51:00thriving technical sector um that's
51:02providing jobs it's providing taxes it's
51:04providing economic growth uh that's
51:07creating a more enlightened Society here
51:09you know we the tax revenues based on
51:11that can can result in a more fair uh
51:15more fair living condition for everyone
51:17within it uh we are also safer we have a
51:20better respect for our rights and we're
51:21better protected against basic crimes if
51:23you lose a phone and that phone is not
51:25encrypted whoever finds that phone now
51:27has access to everything in your life um
51:29and that's not even talking about you
51:31know the NSA that's not talking about
51:32intelligence agencies that's just
51:34talking about the guy in the corner if
51:35your phone is encrypted that information
51:38still belongs to you uh and that's
51:40really what we need to think about do we
51:42want to have control over our private
51:45lives do we want to have control over
51:47our associations over our ideas and over
51:50our effects or do we want to foro these
51:53things can we forgo these things things
51:57in response to a limited and transient
51:59threat so when you came to the decision
52:03to become a whistleblower obviously it
52:05wasn't a decision that you could have
52:07made in a single day it must have been
52:08many months of coming around to the to
52:12the conclusion that this is something
52:14you had to do just were there moments
52:18when you concluded it was wrong you
52:20shouldn't do it and or you were afraid
52:23that if you did it certain terrible
52:24things would happen and and what were
52:26that what was that reflection like uh
52:29could this have gone in a really bad way
52:32that obviously you don't think it did or
52:34are there things about it that happen
52:35that you really regret so there there is
52:38still an active and ongoing
52:39investigation into me uh right now so
52:42I'm kind of limited in what I can
52:44discuss with specificity but I will say
52:46that yeah I of course I had second
52:48thoughts I had doubts um because I
52:50really wanted to make sure my my first
52:52principle for all of the journalists for
52:55everybody involved in this was we have
52:57to do no harm right we have to make sure
52:59that this serves the public interest um
53:02because this is an extraordinary uh
53:04extraordinary action but when I had
53:07doubts ultimately it came down to is
53:10there a means through which the system
53:13can self-correct and I came to the
53:15determination that that was uh that was
53:17not the case uh whistleblowing is
53:20ultimately it's it's the last fail safe
53:22it's the safety valve through which any
53:24organization or an institution
53:27can repair itself organically through
53:29its own personel before it becomes a
53:32failed institution before it becomes an
53:34ilber institution um and when I think
53:36about the way this uh this happened and
53:39how it shaped my own thinking I looked
53:41back on the political offense and the
53:43the health of the oversight the health
53:46of the accountability to which the
53:48intelligence community and the the
53:49National Security Agency specifically
53:51were being held and I I saw things like
53:54the uh the Supreme Court decision in
53:58amnesty versus Clapper where the ACLU
54:00argued that under the 702 surveillance
54:04Authority uh the F amendments Act of
54:062008 we were all being monitored this
54:08kind of thing was happening the Supreme
54:10Court rejected the lawsuit not on the
54:13merits but based on standing they said
54:15that we could not prove that we were
54:17being watched uh and on that basis we we
54:19couldn't challenge the policy that
54:21allowed us all to be watched um beyond
54:25that we had failures in Congress the
54:27director of national uh intelligence
54:29James Clapper under oath gave false uh
54:33false testimony to the uh intelligence
54:36committees which were charged with
54:38overseeing him and and regulating the
54:40behavior of these things uh Ron weiden
54:43famously asked him does the NSA collect
54:45any information at all on millions or
54:47hundreds of millions of Americans and he
54:49said no uh that was not true and yet we
54:53didn't know about that as the public
54:54there was no uh correct ction even days
54:57after even after he was informed that he
54:59provided false testimony and he faced no
55:02consequence which is very dangerous
55:04because people in the intelligence
55:06Community um at the senior level at the
55:09uh level of positional Authority the
55:11decision makers they pay attention to
55:13these things and it creates an
55:14Institutional culture um you could argue
55:18it is corrupt uh not in a graph sense
55:21but in a uh a sense of Personality
55:25politics people can make their own
55:26decisions that are untethered from
55:27public interest because they know they
55:29will not be held to account for it uh
55:32that's dangerous and ultimately you know
55:35we had the courts we had Congress we
55:37also had the executive uh the president
55:40had campaigned to reign in these
55:41programs uh reign in these abuses and
55:43I'm not putting it just on the president
55:45himself but fundamentally I think one of
55:47the most difficult consequences Legacy
55:50issues here is that when we had evidence
55:53of criminal wrongdoing in a us
55:56Administration no one was held to
55:58account for it on the basis that we
56:00should look forward and not backward but
56:03all criminal activity all criminal
56:06investigation I'm sorry uh is
56:08retrospective we have to look backwards
56:11if we're to hold anyone to account and
56:14when that when that doesn't happen you
56:16know we have a question of how does this
56:19impact the quality of our society how
56:21does this affect the quality of our
56:23governance and how does this affect our
56:25power as a public in relation to our
56:28government and when I looked at these
56:30issues in aggregate it seemed clear to
56:32me that this was not a uh this was not
56:36something that uh you know I was making
56:38an extraordinary leap about if it was
56:41not to be me it would be someone else uh
56:46if the government did not want uh
56:48individuals such as myself to hold these
56:51ideas and to defend the Constitution
56:54against these kind of violations they
56:55would not make us swear an oath to the
56:58Constitution you know when when I took
57:00an oath at the Central Intelligence
57:01Agency that oath was to protect the
57:03Constitution against all enemies foreign
57:05and domestic and that's that's important
57:09to remember because this is critical to
57:11the quality of our governance if we only
57:13look outward um we have this sort of
57:17inevitable slide this inevitable slow
57:19corrosion where generation after
57:21generation we lose a little bit of the
57:23freedom a little bit of the Liberty that
57:24we inherited so kind of push back
57:27particularly when we try to do it
57:28carefully particularly when we try to do
57:29it in a narrow way is not dangerous to
57:33society but is in fact I think healthy
57:35for it and I was one of the individuals
57:38who I believed had the uh had the
57:41visibility into where the problems Lie
57:44by virtue of my position by virtue of my
57:45experience by virtue of my access uh to
57:48raise these issues to public awareness
57:50so I tried to do that in the most
57:51responsible way that circumstances would
57:54allow so you you um you've obviously put
57:57yourself at Great risk uh you're in a
58:00very difficult situation right now
58:02you're in Russia I I take it that was
58:04never part of the plan um to be stranded
58:07in Russia um but as as you think about
58:11Civil Disobedience and what what the
58:13ethics of Civil Disobedience should be
58:16is there a certain point at which it's
58:18appropriate to make yourself available
58:21to the ordinary criminal process um I
58:24mean we have for example my colleague
58:26benkler believes and I think this is
58:27right there ought to be something like a
58:29public accountability defense to
58:32criminal prosecutions where if what
58:33you've done is to whistleblow for the
58:35purpose of exactly as you said then you
58:38could be excused but obviously we don't
58:39have that in our law right now so I
58:41wonder as you think about it I mean it's
58:44been important that you've been outside
58:45of the control of the law for a period
58:47of time for the purpose of making this
58:50making us aware of this but I wonder
58:52whether you struggle with what the long
58:54term for Edward not is oh absolutely I
58:58mean the the ultimate uh question for me
59:01is you know have I done the right thing
59:03in the best way that I could I'm never
59:05going to be perfect I'm going to make
59:06mistakes I'm only human um I don't think
59:09I'm Superman you know I don't think I I
59:11am infallible uh and I'm sure I've made
59:14many mistakes and I volunteered to go to
59:16prison for the government um but you
59:18know they they've dismissed that they
59:20they have their uh their own agenda as
59:22far as this is concerned but you know I
59:24I won't get too far into uh uh into the
59:27brass tax of you know criminal
59:28negotiation whatnot uh I'll I'll leave
59:31that for the lawyers in the room because
59:32I'm not a lawyer but the reality is as
59:34you stated there is no due process
59:37available for whistleblowers in the
59:39intelligence Community today uh
59:42partly uh contractors as opposed to
59:44direct government employees even the
59:47process protections not statutory
59:49protections uh that uh exist for people
59:52in the intelligence Community or
59:53whistleblowers more broadly federally um
59:56are very limited when they come to
59:57private contractors in fact they don't
59:59exist uh we're Exempted from those kind
1:00:01of protections uh and when we talk about
1:00:03the law broadly um we see that the
1:00:06Espionage Act which is intended for the
1:00:08prosecution of spies is being
1:00:10increasingly leveraged uh to be used as
1:00:13sort of a bludgeon against public
1:00:15interest journalistic sources and
1:00:17whistleblowers and that's a real danger
1:00:19to society because as you said there is
1:00:21no you're banned you're prohibited from
1:00:23making a public interest defense you're
1:00:26banned from arguing to the jury that you
1:00:28tried to do these things for the right
1:00:30reasons whether or not they agree and
1:00:32when we think about the fact that we
1:00:33have closed Court processes where they
1:00:35limit the arguments that you can make
1:00:37you limit the kind of programs and uh
1:00:39evidence that you can present to the
1:00:41jury as a defendant uh and you limit
1:00:44even the arguments that they can make
1:00:46for regarding what their motivations
1:00:48were you have to go is this still um a a
1:00:52law that is again consistent with not
1:00:55just our cont Constitution and do
1:00:56process protections and the basic ideas
1:00:58of fairness and Justice um but is it
1:01:01consistent with our values as a society
1:01:04and is it consistent with our need for a
1:01:06free press because when anybody who acts
1:01:08as a journalistic source does so at the
1:01:12at their own Peril of 10 years or more
1:01:14in prison what impact does that have on
1:01:17society and uh again I don't want to
1:01:20presume to say where the law should be
1:01:22drawn because obviously I have uh I have
1:01:24a conflict of interest and biases
1:01:26incumbent there but I do think it's
1:01:28reasonable to say that there is no
1:01:31reason the defendants should be
1:01:33prohibited from making a public interest
1:01:34argument before a jury uh when their
1:01:36actions were clearly intended uh on the
1:01:40basis of serving the public
1:01:43interest so I'm grateful for the time
1:01:46you've given us um I'm just going to
1:01:48close with one last question from moib
1:01:50moib Assan hoodies or suits Edward
1:01:54Snowden
1:01:56you know I I have to I have to say I
1:01:58love that person for asking uh thank you
1:02:00very much because you know I'm I'm not a
1:02:04commentator I'm not a
1:02:06uh I'm not a talking head I'm not a
1:02:09media guy I'm not polished I suck at
1:02:10this stuff honestly I am a hoodie guy I
1:02:13wore hoodies at work at the NSA my
1:02:15lawyer and everybody around me advises
1:02:17me that I have to wear a suit just
1:02:18because it's what people do um but yeah
1:02:21you know just just for you I'm get rid
1:02:23of the suit because that's uh that's not
1:02:25me
1:02:26but
1:02:27um it's uh it's a hoodies hoodies all
1:02:30the way thing and I hope by the time I
1:02:33die and the Next Generation has
1:02:34inherited the Earth we don't even have
1:02:36suits anymore they're just gone for
1:02:38us so please join me in thanking Edward
1:02:41seron for taking this
1:02:49time thank you very

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