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Kinlaw Lectures 21-26 — Transcript

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0:01today we begin our study of ethics and
0:04first with Aristotle's
0:07ethics Aristotle's Noman ethics were
0:11delivered as
0:13lectures um originally and here he lays
0:17out his conception of the moral
0:21life
0:23Aristotle's ethics has often been
0:26referred to as a as virtue ethics
0:30or an Ethics that focuses on character
0:33now what we have in mind here is in in
0:38contrast to the way in which a lot of
0:41contemporary ethics is
0:43understood uh on the one hand you
0:47have um utilitarian ethics now the
0:52utilitarian as we will see with Mill
0:55starts out by defining the good in other
0:59words you understand the good before you
1:04carve out an understanding of what is
1:06right or wrong the good is defined in
1:10terms of let's say happiness and then
1:14what is right is that which to the best
1:19of your knowledge
1:21promotes or maximizes the
1:25good
1:27here we have the view that this
1:30significance or the moral quality of an
1:32action is determined by its results its
1:36consequences does it produce the most
1:39good does it produce the greatest
1:41happiness for the greatest number of
1:44people on the other hand we could have a
1:47Content based ethic that is an ethic
1:49from Duty and you judge the morality of
1:53an action by the principle that the
1:57person used or the agent used in acting
2:02and in deciding to do what she
2:05does does
2:06she act on a principle of Duty or does
2:11she do what she does for some other
2:16reason now here we have a focus
2:20on not the action and not the principle
2:25on which the action is performed not the
2:28consequences of the action or the
2:31principle on which the action is formed
2:33but rather on the person who performs
2:37the action on the quality of the
2:40individual his or her overall
2:45character now and therefore we have this
2:48a it's often referred to today as virtue
2:53ethics that focuses on patterns of
2:56behavior
2:58dispositions car displayed character
3:01traits that are a part of the agent
3:06herself now
3:08Aristotle's act uh ethics has been the
3:11inspiration a sort of Revival of
3:14Aristotle's ethics has been inspiration
3:17for what we today refer to as virtue
3:22ethics now to start with Aristotle's
3:24view is
3:26teleological that is it
3:30he talks about actions as always aiming
3:34toward some end or good some tellos
3:38thology spelled t l e o l o g y from the
3:43Greek word Telos or end
3:47goal all actions aim towards some end or
3:52goal and some actions are subordinate to
3:55others to the extent that the
3:58subordinate Goods
4:00serve as means to other
4:04ends for instance the study of anatomy
4:08and physiology may be considered
4:11something good but it might be
4:13considered primarily for some people as
4:16a good that is undertaken as a means to
4:21a more important good or end namely
4:25becoming a proficient physician
4:31now
4:32Aristotle interestingly defines
4:36politics in the very second section of
4:39book one of AR of his ethics interesting
4:43that he talks here about politics but he
4:45understands politics quite differently
4:48from the way in which we do today
4:51Aristotle defines Politics as the
4:54science of the good of
4:58humanity this is a good and and when he
5:01talks about good here this is a good
5:04that is
5:05desired for its own sake desired in
5:09itself and it's the primary good to
5:12which all other Goods or all
5:16individuals all of the goods are related
5:18and all individuals should
5:23Aspire it is as he says a master art or
5:27a master science
5:30because politics directs and supervises
5:33the practice of all the other Sciences
5:36to serve the ultimate end of human
5:40actions and human
5:43Endeavors in this sense politics is a
5:46master art or Tech as the Greeks would
5:50say which directs Human Action toward
5:54this ultimate
5:56end now note that Aristotle takes it as
6:01self-evident that the aim or good for
6:04the state exceeds the aim or
6:08end of a single individual this
6:12distinguishes him from from from many of
6:15us and form particularly uh what we
6:19might call American
6:21individualism
6:22Aristotle sees an individual not as a
6:26distinct isolated discret individual but
6:30someone whose life is always not only
6:33formed and shaped by but very much a
6:37part of something higher and more
6:40important than that individual namely
6:43one's citizenship in a state but the end
6:47of
6:48Politics as he understands
6:51it is not to have theoretical knowledge
6:55but the end is
6:58action therefore when he talks about
7:01rationality he's going to talk about
7:03practical
7:04rationality not that not that which has
7:08theoretical re theoretical knowledge as
7:11its product and goal but rather
7:14appropriate Human
7:17Action so this is why he would say that
7:20young very young people the youth are
7:22not proper
7:24students for the study of politics
7:27because they lack life
7:29experience and this is why we'll let see
7:32too that Aristotle would take children
7:35not to be
7:37virtuous as we'll see why because they
7:40do not have the appropriate life
7:43experience nor have they had the time to
7:47develop their character to practice the
7:51virtues and have the virtues instilled
7:53in the way in which they behave simply
7:56by being virtuous
8:00now the good to
8:02which politics or political
8:06science aims that is the highest good
8:10that is achievable by action is
8:15happiness
8:17now happiness is a
8:21translation of the Greek word
8:24udonia e d a m o n I a
8:32udonia actually this translation as
8:37happiness is perhaps not the best
8:43translation because it gets associated
8:46with modern forms of
8:49utilitarianism and even Hedonism in
8:52which we would understand happiness in
8:54terms of pleasure but this is not what
8:58Aristotle has in mind
9:01udonia could be translated also as
9:06flourishing a life that
9:09flourishes and of course what we have in
9:12mind by flourishing is certainly not
9:17Financial well-being or
9:20success a much richer
9:24concept now obviously there there can be
9:27different views of view
9:31damonia on the one
9:33hand different views of Happiness
9:36suggest different types of life in
9:40Pursuit of
9:41Happiness in other
9:43words how you understand udonia will
9:48determine the type of life you will
9:52pursue for instance a life
9:56of pleasure or enjoy
9:59joyment could be an understanding of
10:04udonia or
10:06happiness with pleasure and enjoyment
10:11being one's conception of
10:14Happiness this is a life that Aristotle
10:18contended was followed by the masses of
10:22people and despite its pursuit in some
10:25very high
10:27places this life is more suitable to the
10:31Beast to
10:34animals in this sense we might say that
10:38for the
10:41masses happiness consists in the
10:44conventional values of
10:47attaining wealth pleasure
10:52honor now
10:54secondly we might refer to UD Dion or or
10:59happiness as pursued within Civic life
11:03or political life that is pursued by
11:07those who have more refinement than the
11:10masses and whose aim or end is
11:15honor but we have to be careful here
11:19because honor might be considered to be
11:21far too
11:23superficial that
11:25is emonia is not something that can be
11:29easily attained or easily
11:34conferred possessing
11:36virtue is not adequate as we'll see from
11:41Aristotle possessing virtue should not
11:44be understood in the passive
11:47sense possessing virtue should be
11:50understood as something one has achieved
11:53and one continues to develop in an
11:56ongoing way so when he talks about
12:01political life he
12:03means you dionio are
12:07happiness as the pursuit and exercise of
12:11the primary
12:14virtues particularly The Virtue the the
12:17the social virtues which of course as we
12:20know for the Greeks was
12:23Justice moderation or
12:26Temperance wisdom courage primarily
12:31those four we could include piety as
12:34well but what for us are the four four
12:38of the seven cardinal virtues come from
12:41the Greek virtues of Justice
12:44Temperance
12:46wisdom
12:48and
12:49courage add to those love power uh
12:54excuse me add to those uh the three
12:58virtues
12:59from 1 Corinthians 13 and we have our
13:04seven cardinal
13:07virtues but Aristotle is talking about
13:11being a good
13:13citizen he's talking about the exer the
13:16the virtues you would exercise in Civic
13:19life as being a contributing and
13:23honorable citizen within your state your
13:28country which of course for Aristotle
13:31was
13:32Athens and
13:34thirdly we can understand happiness or
13:37udonia as a life of
13:42contemplation as we'll see this is the
13:44exercise of theoretical
13:47reason we have to develop into good
13:52practical reasoners good practitioners
13:56of practical rationality and in order to
14:00pursue social virtues that undergird a
14:05good flourishing happy life within the
14:09state a life of civic
14:13virtue but the but the udonia understood
14:18as happiness equals contemplation a life
14:23of
14:24contemplation is that the pursuit of
14:26pure theoretical knowledge
14:29specifically knowledge of the ultimate
14:32principles on which the world operates
14:36the ultimate principles of
14:39things sort of what we might today refer
14:41to as metaphysical
14:44knowledge now as we'll see Aristotle
14:47obviously places high regard
14:51for udonia as pursued within Civic life
14:56because he
14:57spends books 1
15:00through nine of the
15:03ethics in unpacking the components of
15:07social virtues happiness in the second
15:11sense of a life of civic virtue and only
15:15in book 10 does he come to look at the
15:19life of contemplation which he will make
15:21clear is a life that could is pursued
15:25only by a small number of people
15:33now Aristotle maintains that happiness
15:37is the ultimate end or ultimate good of
15:42humanity now it's the nature of
15:46happiness is it the good or is it a
15:51good now the good in any
15:55art any craft any discipline
15:59is that for which everything that is
16:02done in that art or that discipline is
16:07done and of course the good differs in
16:11the different actions that are pursued
16:14in the different
16:17Techni to use the plural of Aristotle's
16:21term Tech which from which we get our
16:24word
16:25technique the good differs in different
16:29actions pursued toward the goals of that
16:33particular art that particular craft or
16:38discipline for instance
16:41medicine is
16:43pursued for the purpose of Health
16:47Medicine everything that is done in
16:50medicine supposedly is
16:54done for that for Which medicine is PR
16:58practiced namely the promotion of
17:01Health military strategy everything done
17:04in that is done for the purpose of
17:08ensuring Victory on the
17:12battlefield so the good in
17:14medicine is that for Which medicine is
17:17practiced namely Health in military
17:22strategy
17:23Victory and in this
17:26case medicine is done
17:29for the sake of Health military strategy
17:34for the sake
17:36of Victory this for the sake of relation
17:41is what guides one's practice of
17:44medicine or one's practice
17:48of military
17:50strategy the for the sake of Rel uh
17:53relation answers the question what is
17:56the good in any
17:59craft or discipline what is the good in
18:02medicine what is that for Which medicine
18:05is practice namely
18:15health so any end to which one does
18:19something is an end that can be achieved
18:22by
18:23action this is the
18:25stress now the ultimate good has
18:29finality about it that is in Aristotle's
18:33words we call final without
18:37qualification that which is always
18:39desirable in itself and never for the
18:43sake of anything else end of quote so we
18:47can understand ends or goals in three
18:51ways there can be ends that we take to
18:54be purely instrumental purely a means to
18:57a further
18:59end let's suppose that you are
19:02someone who simply
19:05despises the weight
19:08room you do not like lifting weights it
19:11is torturous to you it is there are few
19:15things that you would uh prefer less to
19:18do than working out in the wait room
19:22however let's suppose that you were a
19:24basketball player and that you are quite
19:27aware that unless you commit yourself to
19:30the wait room you will never be able
19:34to to
19:36perform at a significantly high level
19:41others will be much stronger than you
19:44and your defense will not be as
19:46effective you will have difficulty
19:49finishing when you take the ball to the
19:51basket and you get bumped by others you
19:54will have difficulty block boxing out on
19:56defense and keeping and someone from
20:00moving around you or pushing you around
20:02with their body when you're trying to
20:04get a rebound in general you will
20:07realize that for you to be the best
20:10basketball player you can be you are
20:13going to need to hit the weight room so
20:16for you lifting weights is has value it
20:20is an end solely for something else you
20:26do not take it to have any inic value it
20:29is an instrument or a means to a further
20:32end that is getting strong so you can be
20:37a more capable basketball player now
20:41secondly we could take certain things to
20:43have intrinsic value these could be
20:47things that are valuable in and of
20:49themselves and also
20:52valuable as a means to some further end
20:56and this is the way we could understand
20:58understand the
20:59virtues the
21:01virtues uh are properly chosen because
21:05they have intrinsic
21:07value courage is something that is
21:10intrinsically good it is good in and of
21:13it of
21:14itself possessing courage is something
21:17whose value lies simply in the courage
21:20one
21:23has pursuing justice has value simply in
21:29the the uh becoming a just
21:32person at the same time these virtues
21:36are
21:37instrumental they are good for the sake
21:40of something else that is different from
21:42them
21:44namely they are good for the purpose of
21:48having
21:50developing a life of
21:53udonia of
21:56Happiness so you choose
21:59virtues because you judge them to be
22:02good in good in and of good in and of
22:05themselves but you also choose them as a
22:08pathway to a life of
22:10Happiness now there
22:13are there is another way in which we
22:16could understand an end that is an end
22:20that is intrinsically good intrinsically
22:24valuable valuable in and of itself
22:28good in and of itself but
22:31never seen
22:35as an instrument to some further and
22:40different good that's why in this case
22:43we say that it is a good that is good in
22:46and of
22:47itself and yet
22:50final having some finality about it
22:53being unsurpassable not being pursued
22:56for anything further further Beyond
22:59itself and this Aristotle understands to
23:03be
23:06happiness
23:07now
23:09happiness uh Aristotle understands to be
23:13selfs sufficient this is a part of its
23:17finality this means that by
23:21itself udonia or happiness makes life
23:26desirable and note
23:31complete the good that happiness
23:34possesses is transcendent in the sense
23:37that it is not simply one good among
23:43others and such that additional lesser
23:48Goods could add to its in goodness or
23:51increase its
23:53goodness it is
23:55complete it has finality
23:58you cannot add anything to udonia or
24:02happiness any lesser Goods that would in
24:06any way
24:07complete or extend expand add
24:13to happiness or udonia it is Final in
24:17complete it is
24:19self-sufficient so we can say that
24:21happiness for
24:23Aristotle is
24:26final and complete it is
24:32self-sufficient and it is the ultimate
24:35end of action so we could say that
24:39happiness is the final
24:41self-sufficient end of all
24:45action now note this com this quote on
24:49self-sufficiency regarding
24:51self-sufficiency and again I am going to
24:53use the page numbers in the volume in uh
24:56the page numbers in the the margin in in
24:59case you use you are using a different
25:02translation and volume from the one that
25:06I suggested to be ordered for the
25:10course this is from
25:131097 b as in boy lines 14 through 20
25:201097 B lines 14 through
25:2420 Aristotle writes the self-sufficiency
25:29we Define as that which when taken by
25:33itself makes life Cho choiceworthy
25:37and in need of nothing such we think
25:41happiness to be further more it is the
25:45most cho cho Choice worthy of all
25:48without being counted in addition being
25:52counted in addition it is obviously more
25:54choiceworthy when taken with the least
25:57of goods for what is added on is an
26:00increase of goods and of goods the
26:03greater is always more choiceworthy let
26:06me repeat
26:08this the self-sufficient we Define is
26:11that which when taken by itself makes
26:13life choiceworthy and in need of nothing
26:17such we think happiness to
26:20be
26:22furthermore it is the most Cho
26:25choiceworthy of all with without being
26:28counted in
26:30addition being counted in
26:33addition it is obviously more Cho
26:36choiceworthy when taken with the least
26:38of goods for what is added on is an
26:40increase of goods and of the goods the
26:43greater is always the more choiceworthy
26:46now we want to to see here that a
26:50distinction can be made a distinction on
26:53how to to
26:55interpret what arist how Aristotle
26:58understands the way in which
27:01goods are associated with the
27:05Constitution or the nature of udonia or
27:08happiness and we want to suggest that
27:12one interpretation is to be accepted and
27:15the other rejected now the
27:19distinction
27:21a happiness consists in all the
27:25intrinsic Goods okay this is
27:28interpretation a happiness consists in
27:32all the intrinsic Goods this is what we
27:35might call the inclusive
27:40view
27:42B happiness contains all intrinsic
27:48Goods B interpretation number B
27:53happiness contains all intrinsic Goods
27:57examp example physical Pleasures friends
28:01Health honor as subordinate subordinate
28:04Goods pronote happiness but this is not
28:09that in which happiness
28:13consists B maintains that happiness is
28:17the end for which all other ends are
28:21desired and it consists in
28:25virtuous and ethical activ ity it
28:28consists in
28:31excellence not a composite of all
28:35intrinsic
28:38Goods that is one can be happy with
28:41lesser Goods such as honor and
28:45health now the the idea is to go with
28:50interpretation number B precisely
28:54because if you have less wealth less L
28:57health or less honor you can still be
29:00happy although on the inclusive view
29:03this would not be the case note in book
29:07one section 10 Aristotle states that
29:11since
29:12activities form the character of Life
29:17the truly good and wise person will
29:20never be miserable because she will
29:23always bear life becomingly
29:28this strongly suggests that Aristotle
29:30does not
29:32mean uh to say that happiness consists
29:37in all the intrinsic Goods you do not
29:40have to have wealth and only and in
29:43order to have a flourishing
29:49life rather happiness is the end for
29:52which all other ends are desires and
29:55what it consists in
29:58is ethical activity a virtuous activity
30:04the pursuit of
30:07Excellence a life of disciplined civic
30:13virtue
30:15now note
30:18also that Aristotle argues in section 7
30:22of book
30:24one that happiness is
30:28the proper function of humankind in fact
30:32he
30:33defines happiness as the proper function
30:36of humankind this is what we refer to as
30:40His function argument and this is what
30:44we need to pay close attention to in the
30:47third part of this
30:51lecture When we arrive at section seven
30:54of book
30:56one we have what is often been referred
30:59to as Aristotle's function
31:03argument because it ties happiness to a
31:08particular function of human being in
31:12other words as we'll see a flourishing
31:15life is a life that we could say is a
31:20life in which one we might say humans
31:23well in other words a life in which one
31:28functions well in the way in which
31:31humans are designed to
31:34function so here we have happiness
31:37defined by
31:39Aristotle in terms of an analysis of the
31:43proper function of
31:47humankind in other words we're going to
31:50explicate
31:51happiness in terms of an analysis of
31:54what is the proper function of a human
31:58being
32:00now let's note that the good of a person
32:05lies in an activity or a function now
32:10notice something specific about this
32:13Aristotle as we have seen so far now
32:18focuses on the activities function in
32:21the sense of
32:24acting
32:26performing
32:27Aristotle is not talking about the
32:31possession of
32:33virtue simply as possession as if you
32:38simply have something that you might not
32:40have acquired yourself or you might not
32:44have cultivated
32:46yourself rather he is talking about the
32:49use of virtue doing virtuous things
32:54virtuous activity
32:57as we will see in the next lecture
33:01virtues are patterns of behavior
33:04dispositions to per perform certain acts
33:08to act in certain ways that one has
33:11cultivated over a period of time so
33:14virtue for Aristotle is always going to
33:17be something that is an
33:19achievement that is going to take time
33:22and practice to cultivate possessing ver
33:27virtue is the result of an ongoing
33:31practice of virtue as we will
33:34see but the good of a person lies in
33:39activity or
33:42function that is the good of a
33:46dancer lies in the activity or
33:51function of a Dancer the good of a
33:54carpenter or the good of a musician in
33:56the same way it lies in the proper
34:01activity or the proper function
34:03associated with being a carpenter or
34:07being a
34:09musician now what is the proper function
34:12of human beings well what is distinctive
34:17about human beings humankind is distinct
34:22in its
34:24rationality we are rational beings
34:27after all
34:29Aristotle defines human beings as
34:33rational
34:36animals living thing literally as living
34:40things possessing reason or
34:44language in this case zon echon logone
34:49and logone
34:52the objective form of the word
34:57logos is can be translated either as
35:01reason or
35:03word so human being is distinct by means
35:08of logos that
35:11is human kind
35:15has within him or her a rational
35:19principle and can act according to a
35:24rational principle or
35:27logos so the good of
35:31humankind is good and Noble performance
35:36of
35:37action of actions that Accord with a
35:40rational principle note that a good
35:43again the good of humankind is going to
35:46be the good and new and Noble
35:50performance of actions that Accord with
35:53a rational
35:54principle human good is thus an activity
35:59of the soul that displays
36:03Excellence or virtue and as we'll see
36:07the word for virtue can also be
36:10translated as
36:12Excellence human good is thus the
36:14activity of the soul that displays act
36:18that displays Excellence because any
36:21action performed according to reason or
36:24a rational principle will display a
36:28proper
36:30excellence and we
36:32add human good is thus the activity of
36:36soul that displays excellence and that
36:40does so in a complete
36:44life notice Aristotle here is talking
36:49about the whole of one's life as he
36:53understands it a virtuous or or a
36:58flourishing life a life of happiness is
37:01one that can only be measured at the end
37:04of that
37:07life has this individual lived a
37:12flourishing life you judge it only when
37:15the life is
37:18complete so happiness obviously does
37:21require some external
37:24Goods I mean unless one is properly
37:27equipped one cannot perform Noble
37:33acts it's easy to see that if if I have
37:37to spend all of my time and all of my
37:42energy
37:44simply for
37:47subsistence I would not have the
37:50opportunity to contribute to the Civic
37:54life of my community
37:57obviously if all of my energy would be
38:01devoted solely to
38:03survival I would not have the
38:05opportunity to do noble things to
38:09contribute
38:12to the life of my fellow
38:15citizens but generally happiness is an
38:19activity of the soul that displays
38:22Excellence that is
38:24virtue and that does so in a complete
38:29life now note
38:33here virtuous
38:35activities are understood to have some
38:38permanence about them well why so well
38:41simply
38:43because they
38:45are developed cultivated patterns of
38:49behavior that have been cultivated over
38:52a period of
38:54time they suggest
38:57a way in which one lives how one
39:01understands what one is to do in one's
39:04life these activities are what one
39:08does and what one does determines the
39:11character of one's
39:13life so a happy person a person who has
39:19a flourishing life can never really be
39:22miserable cuz that person will not do
39:27ignoble and vicious
39:31things but the person will always do
39:34best with what life offers offers so
39:39perhaps the person may not The Virtuous
39:42person may not be blessed but the person
39:46will certainly not be
39:50miserable so Aristotle sums up in
39:53section 10 by saying that the happy
39:58person is one who
40:00is active in accordance with complete
40:05virtue and is s sufficiently equipped
40:09with external
40:11Goods not for some chance period but
40:16throughout a complete
40:20life
40:22now happiness thus for Aristotle is a
40:26first principle because we do everything
40:29we do everything else for the sake of a
40:34flourishing life of or a happy life or a
40:38life of
40:39udonia so in section 13 Aristotle can
40:43say that happiness is an activity of the
40:47soul in accordance with perfect
40:51virtue and here he he outlines the parts
40:55of the Soul
40:57and this to some extent follows what we
41:00find in
41:02Plato there's the vegetated part of the
41:05soul that which simply is that part of
41:09oneself
41:11that
41:13concerns simply the principle of growth
41:16and nutrition that is simply
41:21the preservation of one's physical
41:25well-being
41:27secondly there is the appetitive part of
41:29the soul the appetites in other words
41:33passions and
41:35desires now Aristotle
41:38describes the appative part of the Soul
41:41as a
41:43logos he puts a that is nonrational
41:49the desires are not by in in and of
41:52themselves rational neither are the
41:55passion
41:58but they are capable of logos that means
42:02even though the desires and emotions are
42:05not rational they are capable of being
42:09of obeying or being directed by a
42:12rational principle or
42:15logos and then there's the third part of
42:17the Soul which is one's rational
42:21capacity so similar to Plato the soul is
42:25functioning well well when the desires
42:28are properly channeled and directed by
42:32the rational part of the Soul which aims
42:35at moderation a middle course nothing in
42:40the Extreme as we will see when we look
42:44at Aristotle's conception of virtue
42:51specifically we now turn to the second
42:55lecture lecture 22 overall I think on
42:59Aristotle's
43:01ethics in this lecture we will focus on
43:04the nature of virtue and say at least in
43:08a preliminary way something about a
43:10virtuous person then we will have to
43:13discuss the nature of
43:16actions that is taken up in book three
43:19before Aristotle begins to describe in
43:23Grand detail sometimes excruciating
43:26detail the nature of the various
43:30virtues in that book three we will have
43:34to take up the nature of actions
43:36distinguishing voluntary from actions
43:39performed by coercion and saying little
43:42a little bit
43:43about uh what
43:47constitutes the way in which we evaluate
43:50an
43:52action
43:53now ethics for aristot model is
43:57described from the very beginning in
44:00terms of
44:02virtue that is in terms of moral
44:06Excellence the Greek word for virtue is
44:10r in
44:12English a r e t
44:17AR the word can be
44:21translated equally well as
44:25excellence
44:27so in a sense if the motto of McMurray
44:34University that is
44:37cultivating Leadership Excellence and
44:40virtue if we will were to follow the
44:44Greek View or the Greek meaning of the
44:48terms obviously excellence and virtue
44:51would be redundant but of course we have
44:56something different in mind than the
44:59Greek conception of virtue or Excellence
45:03when we use the term excellent in our
45:06motto or at least I I presume that we
45:11do
45:13now
45:15emologic that is the source of the word
45:18the etm
45:21theologically the word Virtue comes from
45:25habit
45:26or for us
45:30ethos now note a person for Aristotle is
45:34certainly not born ethical this makes
45:37sense from what we've already suggested
45:40if a virtue is a
45:44cultivated and uh pattern of action that
45:48in a certain sense as a result of an
45:53achievement we are not born ethic iCal
45:56no nor do virtues arise in US
46:02naturally if we were naturally virtuous
46:05we could never from habit or cult cult
46:11cultivation habit of
46:14acting do anything contrary to our
46:17nature if we were naturally virtuous we
46:21would always behave virtuously we would
46:24never engage or IND in or indulge vices
46:28or behave
46:32viciously rather instead of saying that
46:36we are born ethical or somehow the
46:39virtues rise in US
46:41naturally rather we are adapted in such
46:46a
46:47way that we can
46:49acquire
46:52virtues that is we can acquire develop
46:56and perfect them by habit now when we
47:01use the term habit here we do not use it
47:05of course in the way in which we
47:07sometimes use Habit to refer to
47:09something that is quirky about someone a
47:12strange habit or an annoying habit like
47:16somebody who constantly
47:18Taps
47:20uh a table with his or her Knuckles or a
47:25person who
47:26who constantly bites her nails or Worse
47:32the person who picks his or her nose in
47:36public we are talking about Habit in the
47:40sense of developing
47:42virtues in such a way that this becomes
47:45simply something that we readily do it
47:49becomes how we are disposed to act it
47:53becomes a part of us
47:56we cultivate a virtue to the extent that
48:00we behave
48:03naturally in a virtuous way but behaving
48:07naturally is the result of a long period
48:11of
48:11cultivation in which we have done
48:14virtuous things so we become
48:18virtuous by doing virtuous things if we
48:22want to be virtuous we have to do
48:27virtuous
48:28things so in a sense to be is to
48:35do the state of the Soul such as courage
48:38for
48:39instance becomes a psychological state
48:44in a person by that person doing
48:47courageous
48:49Deeds we describe Jones as a courageous
48:54person and we say that he possesses
49:00courage well this becomes a part of who
49:04he
49:06is precisely because over a period of
49:11time Jones has behaved
49:14courageously he has developed in himself
49:17the
49:18disposition to behave bravely or
49:22courageously
49:24when it was required of him to do
49:28so who or what we are is the result of
49:33what we have done or what we are
49:40doing and this this is why we can
49:43understand Aristotle's ethics to be a
49:45character-based
49:49ethics we want to measure the degree to
49:52which a person's ethical we look at who
49:56he is who she is who that person has
50:02become what that person has done to
50:06become the type of person that she or he
50:12is in this
50:14sense we're talking about a character
50:18formed by a consistent ongoing pattern
50:23of action and beh
50:27behavior that is
50:30virtue and virtue and action in this way
50:34are mutually
50:38empowering what do we mean by that well
50:41consider this it's really
50:45straightforward I can stand firm in the
50:48faith if I stand firm in the face of
50:51what is
50:53fearful I become a little more
50:57courageous I produce in me
51:01courage
51:03and this courage which I have now added
51:08to my character this a bit of Courage
51:11that I've been produced in me enables me
51:14to stand firm in the face of what is
51:17fearful the next
51:20time again note this is part of what
51:23we're talking about when we refer to
51:26virtues as being
51:28cultivated and they're being mutually
51:32empowering
51:35obviously if I am
51:38going when
51:41I do something
51:44courageous I then add to my capacity to
51:49be courageous the next time why
51:53because courage
51:55has become a little bit more a part of
51:59Who I Am by my being courageous in this
52:06particular
52:07instance consider this
52:10analogy let's suppose that
52:14Jones is already a really good fastball
52:19hitter I I mean you throw Jones a fast
52:22ball he's going to hit for average and
52:25he's going to hit for power but Jones
52:28has a little bit of Cur of trouble with
52:33the
52:34curveball
52:37now all pitchers know this and Jones is
52:42in the off season he's preparing for the
52:45next baseball season and he wants to do
52:48something
52:51about his vulnerability to a good
52:54curveball
52:56Because unless a pitcher Gets behind in
52:58the count and is having trouble with his
53:01curveball that day Jones isn't going to
53:04see any fast
53:06balls so what does Jones do of course he
53:09practices and he practices and he
53:10practices hitting the
53:12curveball and as Jones starts the new
53:16season every time that that Jones hits
53:20the curveball well not necessarily
53:23getting a base hit but he hits the ball
53:27hard maybe he maybe he takes one to the
53:30warning track on the day in which the
53:32wind's blowing in maybe he takes the P
53:36the third baseman's head off but the
53:37third
53:39baseman is able to
53:43make a good catch to Rob let's say Jones
53:48of a
53:50double since he's hit the ball pretty
53:52hard but every time Jones
53:56successfully hits the
53:58curveball Jones hitting the curveball
54:02becomes a little bit
54:04more apart of who Jones is as a
54:08hitter he becomes a good curveball
54:12hitter or at least an adequate curveball
54:17hitter how by successfully hitting the
54:23curveball and the more he successfully
54:26when he successfully hits the
54:28curveball that not only gives him
54:31confidence but it
54:33also enables him more effectively to hit
54:38the curveball in the
54:39future let's say it may have been part
54:42of his hitting mechanics that he had to
54:45work on he instills more in himself
54:48those mechanics each time he hits the
54:51curveball
54:53successfully will contri contribute to
54:55his ability to hit it successfully the
54:59next time this is what we mean by saying
55:02that virtue and action are mutually
55:08empowering in other words what is taking
55:12place in virtue is a
55:15sign that there is now a
55:19disposition toward virtue that is being
55:24acquired as Jones becomes a more
55:28effective curveball
55:31hitter this his hitting the curveball
55:35successfully particularly let's say in
55:37an important late inning
55:41situation with runners in scoring
55:45position this becomes a sign that Jones
55:48is gradually
55:50becoming an Adept or at least an
55:54adequate curve ball
55:56hitter the same with
55:59virtue what is taking place is a sign
56:04that Jones is developing the
56:08disposition toward
56:10virtue that virtue is gradually being
56:16acquired
56:19now let's
56:21pause before we go to the next part of
56:26this
56:28lecture given Aristotle's understanding
56:31of virtue as a pattern of cultivate as a
56:35cultivated pattern of
56:39behavior the development of a
56:41disposition to behave in certain ways it
56:44is not surprising that he will highlight
56:48the importance of moral
56:53education
56:56the states of
56:58character that
57:00correspond
57:01[Music]
57:02to certain patterns of
57:06activity certain patterns of behavior
57:09that is states of character that we
57:12could call virtues that correspond to
57:15certain ways or dispos ways of acting or
57:19dispositions to
57:20act is what the stress is upon and it's
57:24crucial that we
57:26form certain habits or dispositions
57:30within the youth so that they will enter
57:34adulthood prepared
57:38to pursue
57:42virtue this seems to make good
57:45sense how do we and and we do this
57:48mostly in everyday life now what do we
57:51do we not only try
57:53to teach children the difference between
57:58good and bad between right and wrong but
58:01we try to raise them in such a way that
58:06they will begin to develop the
58:10disposition to behave right in a right
58:14way to do the right thing this is what
58:17we understand we say we teach them right
58:21from wrong we do not simply enable them
58:25to distinguish what is right from what
58:27is wrong but we try to to get to to
58:31begin to cultivate in them and for them
58:35to cultivate in
58:38themselves the
58:41motivation to do the right thing and
58:44therefore so they will
58:46gradually develop a
58:49disposition to do the right thing so
58:52doing the right thing will become a part
58:55of their everyday
58:57Behavior now there are three objects of
59:01choice and three objects of avoidance
59:05this is unsurprising given what we've
59:07discussed about the nature of the Soul
59:10one can choose what is
59:13Noble one can choose what is
59:16advantageous one can choose what is
59:19Pleasant in fact this might go back to
59:22certain conceptions of a happy life life
59:25that one might
59:26pursue so one can choose what is Noble
59:29one can choose what is
59:32advantageous one can choose what is
59:34Pleasant I can choose that which
59:37gratifies me what gives me
59:41pleasure or what avoids pain I can
59:45choose that to which that which is to my
59:48best advantage that to which that is
59:51that which is in my rational
59:53self-interest that which is going to be
59:56most beneficial to
59:57me and I can choose that which is Noble
1:00:02that which is
1:00:04virtuous now I can also I also have
1:00:08things I should avoid I should avoid
1:00:11behavior that is
1:00:13base I should avoid behavior that is
1:00:16injurious and I should avoid behavior
1:00:18that is
1:00:19painful and it's clear I can I'm going
1:00:22to most likely want to avoid what is
1:00:25very unpleasant what is painful to me
1:00:29corresponding to looking out for what is
1:00:31in my best
1:00:33interest I want to avoid that which will
1:00:37injure me that which will be harmful to
1:00:41me or that which would be detrimental to
1:00:43my best
1:00:45self-interest and also want to avoid
1:00:48that which is
1:00:49base that which is in principle
1:00:53unethical that which is not indicative
1:00:57of a respectable honorable
1:01:01person now the good
1:01:03person is the person who is going to act
1:01:08properly in relation to these
1:01:11things that is the person who is going
1:01:14to act properly in relation to what is
1:01:17Noble what is advantageous and what is
1:01:20pleasant when one
1:01:23chooses the good person is going to take
1:01:27what is properly choiceworthy
1:01:29with respect to what is Pleasant what is
1:01:34advantageous and what is Noble the good
1:01:38person will also act properly in her
1:01:43avoidance of what is painful what is
1:01:47injurious or what is contrary to her
1:01:52best interest and what is simply
1:01:57base this is going to be especially
1:02:01so with regard to
1:02:03pleasure because pleasure is so
1:02:07pervasive in our
1:02:10actions now the theme is to properly
1:02:14feel delight and properly feel
1:02:20pain so that
1:02:22one who use
1:02:25uses pain and pleasure properly uses
1:02:30pain and pleasure well will generally be
1:02:35a good person and what will you find is
1:02:39this is what what Aristotle is is Sugg
1:02:41is is intimating here something he will
1:02:44develop further this acting properly in
1:02:50uh in a in terms of what is choice
1:02:54choiceworthy Noble advantageous Pleasant
1:02:57or what should be avoided base injury
1:03:01injures and painful is associated with
1:03:07the pursuance of a
1:03:10mean a middle
1:03:12position and specifically let's say with
1:03:16the virtue of temperance or
1:03:20moderation
1:03:22now let us focus on the requirements for
1:03:25virtuous action these are important and
1:03:29we must we need to break them down
1:03:33carefully
1:03:38first to do something virtuous or vert
1:03:42to to um act
1:03:45virtuously the agent must have
1:03:48knowledge this seems Seems clear in
1:03:52other words she must know what she's
1:03:55doing what she is doing must in some way
1:03:59be pursued for some particular intent
1:04:04that she has in mind in other in other
1:04:07words her action must be described as
1:04:11intentional
1:04:12action we cannot uh we we we do not tend
1:04:17to regard virtuous action as action that
1:04:21someone performed unknowingly
1:04:25uh again this brings up the issue of
1:04:28luck or moral luck you're not going to
1:04:33praise me for doing something that would
1:04:36be described as
1:04:37virtuous something praised here if it is
1:04:42purely a matter of
1:04:44luck or good fortune that I
1:04:48have do I have performed a good deed in
1:04:54other words it's not luck in the sense
1:04:57that I did not know what I was doing or
1:05:00I wasn't aware of what I was doing as
1:05:05being something good or
1:05:07virtuous that is not going to be
1:05:11praiseworthy
1:05:14action so an agent must have
1:05:17knowledge she must know what she is
1:05:22doing also the person must choose the
1:05:26action and choose the actions for their
1:05:30own
1:05:32sakes in other words we're not going to
1:05:36praise me for something that I have been
1:05:39coed into
1:05:42doing if I have been forced to do
1:05:45something I might very well have done
1:05:48the right
1:05:49thing I might very well have done
1:05:52something good but I have
1:05:56not chosen the action myself I was
1:06:00forced to do
1:06:02it obviously a little kid is not going
1:06:05to be rewarded for cleaning his room if
1:06:11his mom or his dad or both have
1:06:14literally forced him to do
1:06:17it in this sense we we would not say
1:06:21that his cleaning his room is something
1:06:25that he has actually achieved there's
1:06:27not really achievement here he has
1:06:30completed the task of cleaning his room
1:06:34but we not we don't say that it's an
1:06:36achievement because he was forced to do
1:06:39it so in both cases let's keep in mind
1:06:42that an agent must have
1:06:44knowledge and secondly so far she must
1:06:48choose her actions and choose them for
1:06:51their own
1:06:52sakes has to be consistent with the idea
1:06:56that what she is doing is actually
1:06:58something she's
1:07:00achieved and obviously if I do something
1:07:04unknowingly we're not going to really
1:07:07say that it is a an achievement on my
1:07:10part at least not The Virtuous part of
1:07:15it now
1:07:17so the requirements for virtuous
1:07:21action the agent must have
1:07:25knowledge and she must choose her
1:07:27actions and choose them for their own
1:07:30sakes now here she cannot choose them
1:07:35for the purpose of getting something
1:07:37else different from those
1:07:41actions those actions have to be
1:07:44considered intrinsically
1:07:46good they cannot simply be used as
1:07:50instruments to get to get the agent
1:07:53something else
1:07:55in other words it can't be the case that
1:07:58the
1:08:00agent has a friendly
1:08:04disposition toward those people who are
1:08:08less
1:08:10fortunate simply for the purpose
1:08:15of gaining political OB
1:08:19office the person must
1:08:22choose being well disposed to toward
1:08:25those less fortunate because this is
1:08:28something good and VA valuable and
1:08:31desirable for its own
1:08:34sake and
1:08:36thirdly an action must proceed from a
1:08:41firm and unchangeable
1:08:44character now this is an
1:08:47important
1:08:49requirement again the action must
1:08:53proceed from a firm and unchangeable
1:08:57character note that in doing just note
1:09:00that doing just acts is therefore
1:09:04necessary for becoming a just person but
1:09:08it's not by itself sufficient for
1:09:13becoming a just
1:09:15person in other words to become a just
1:09:18person it is
1:09:20necessary that I do just just things
1:09:25doing just things is a necessary
1:09:28requirement for becoming a just person
1:09:31but it's not a sufficient condition or
1:09:34requirement doing just things alone will
1:09:38not make me a just
1:09:42person well why not well this seems to
1:09:45be fairly
1:09:47obvious let's suppose that I am a
1:09:52business person
1:09:54and that I have been operating a
1:09:56business let's say in the Dallas
1:09:59area for a a good number of years well
1:10:04let's make it something smaller than
1:10:06that no we we'll say in the Dallas area
1:10:08for a num for for a number of
1:10:11years I have developed over that period
1:10:14of time a certain
1:10:16reputation as a businessman both in
1:10:19terms of of My
1:10:22Success my
1:10:25astuteness in business and also my rep
1:10:29reputation for business ethics which
1:10:32gets at the issue of
1:10:34Justice now let's suppose that I have
1:10:38over a period of a couple of
1:10:42decades I am now in my
1:10:4640s several years after college I
1:10:49started a I I went into business started
1:10:51a business and then that I now have a
1:10:54track record as a business person and I
1:10:58have a good track record of treating
1:11:01people
1:11:02justly of fair and honest business
1:11:07practices so let's suppose though that
1:11:11since I was in my 20s that I have wanted
1:11:15to run for public
1:11:17office and I thought the best way to do
1:11:20that particularly let's say a little
1:11:22higher public office
1:11:24office I want to run for
1:11:27Congress and let's suppose that I S I
1:11:31intend to use my reputation as a
1:11:36businessman as a as something to
1:11:39highlight in my
1:11:41campaign now in this case I have
1:11:46consistently been
1:11:49acted justly in my business dealings
1:11:53with others others but let's say that
1:11:56that just behavior that those sound
1:12:01business practices that my business
1:12:05ethics has been
1:12:07motivated
1:12:09entirely and in a secretive
1:12:12Way by my desire to present a certain
1:12:17image as a
1:12:19businessman no
1:12:22doubt as an honest
1:12:25businessman and I've promoted myself in
1:12:28this way for campaign
1:12:31purposes in other words my
1:12:35motivation for Sound
1:12:39business
1:12:41ethics has been simply to create an
1:12:45image that can be used in a political
1:12:50campaign now we're if that is true about
1:12:54me we are certainly not going to
1:12:56describe me as a virtuous person or as a
1:13:02just
1:13:03person now I have done just
1:13:08things I have cultivated a pattern of
1:13:11just
1:13:13Behavior so why wouldn't you want to
1:13:16describe me as a just
1:13:19person after all doesn't one become a
1:13:24just person by doing just things doesn't
1:13:29one become a courageous person by doing
1:13:33courageous things and by doing just
1:13:37things doesn't that strengthen
1:13:41me and strengthen my disposition to
1:13:44behave justly in future
1:13:48situations well in one sense that is
1:13:50true but there is something that we have
1:13:52left out
1:13:53out in our little formula that
1:13:58states become a virtuous person by doing
1:14:02virtuous Things become a just person by
1:14:06doing just things and it is this to
1:14:10which we will return return in the last
1:14:14part of the
1:14:17lecture by stating that one becomes
1:14:20virtuous by doing virtuous things we
1:14:23have assumed something that we haven't
1:14:26brought out
1:14:28clearly so
1:14:31far notice that the third requirement is
1:14:35the action must proceed from a firm and
1:14:39unchangeable
1:14:42character now what this means is that it
1:14:46is not enough simply to perform just
1:14:52actions but you must do them perform
1:14:55them
1:14:57precisely as a just person would do
1:15:03them in this
1:15:05way doing just
1:15:09things is an expression
1:15:12of who you really
1:15:16are in the case of myself as
1:15:21the self interested self-promoting
1:15:26politician doing just
1:15:29things particularly in my business
1:15:32practices is
1:15:36not an expression of who I am it is not
1:15:41indicative of my
1:15:43character but it in my in my case it's
1:15:46simply an image a
1:15:49front a
1:15:51clever and Insidious way of fooling
1:15:56others into believing that I am someone
1:16:00that I in fact am
1:16:04not so here we add this important
1:16:09provision that being a that virtuous
1:16:13action
1:16:15indicates not simply that you perform
1:16:18just actions but you do them precisely
1:16:21as a just person will do
1:16:25them so now we have three requirements
1:16:29for virtuous action an the agent must
1:16:32have knowledge must choose actions and
1:16:36choose them for their own
1:16:38sakes and the action must proceed from a
1:16:42firm and unchangeable
1:16:45character now note the genus of moral
1:16:51virtue there are three things in the
1:16:55soul they're the passions then the
1:16:58faculties or the abilities and their
1:17:01states of
1:17:03character now States or character are
1:17:07things in virtue of which we stand well
1:17:11or stand badly in relation to the
1:17:17passions so we can ask the question on
1:17:20what basis are we called good
1:17:23on what basis are we called
1:17:27bad we're not praised for
1:17:31passions rather we are praised for
1:17:35feeling them in the right
1:17:39way for
1:17:42instance if I feel I can do very little
1:17:45about feeling
1:17:47anger anger is going to arise in me from
1:17:51being in a certain situation at a
1:17:54certain
1:17:55time I feel anger without
1:17:59choice on the other hand I choose to be
1:18:04virtuous I may be moved by the
1:18:08passions I am moved in respect of them I
1:18:11am moved by anger I am moved by love
1:18:15they have an effect on me they move me
1:18:18in a certain
1:18:20way but with respect to virtues we say
1:18:24that I am
1:18:28disposed not just moved but
1:18:31disposed I have made it a part of my
1:18:35pattern of
1:18:37behavior to act in a certain
1:18:41way and the same is with this the
1:18:44faculties we are not praised for them we
1:18:48have them by
1:18:51Nature
1:18:55so
1:18:56this
1:18:58concludes our discussion of the nature
1:19:03of
1:19:05virtue recall that virtue is a pattern
1:19:10of
1:19:11behavior that is developed or cultivated
1:19:13over a period of
1:19:17time and also a virtue is a pattern of
1:19:22the behavior
1:19:23that
1:19:25arises as an indication of my character
1:19:28and arises from my
1:19:33character if I am
1:19:36virtuous what I
1:19:40do results from who I
1:19:44am as a person of sound moral
1:19:49character now we have to move on to a
1:19:52discussion
1:19:55of the nature of actions and distinguish
1:19:59voluntary actions involuntary actions
1:20:02and compulsory
1:20:05actions we must talk about
1:20:11choice and how in the nature of choice
1:20:15in the nature of
1:20:16deliberation with respect to actions and
1:20:20therefore
1:20:21virtues and it's to that that we will
1:20:24turn in the next
1:20:26lecture welcome to the third lecture on
1:20:30Aristotle's
1:20:31ethics in this lecture we will focus on
1:20:36sections 1 through three or excuse me
1:20:40sections 1 through five of book three of
1:20:44the mo of the Noman ethics sections 1
1:20:48through five concern the nature of
1:20:51action and the nature of
1:20:54choice beginning with Section six
1:20:58Aristotle goes on for a number of
1:21:01sections and into book four to discuss
1:21:05the nature of certain virtues such as
1:21:08courage Temperance and
1:21:13Justice to start with we need to make a
1:21:18distinction between what Aristotle calls
1:21:21voluntary action
1:21:24involuntary action and compulsory
1:21:30action let's note first what he refers
1:21:34to as voluntary action and I will
1:21:38comment on each of these types of
1:21:43action first we want to distinguish
1:21:46voluntary from compulsory action
1:21:49something I do voluntarily and something
1:21:52I do because I have been coerced or
1:21:56forced to do
1:22:00it in the case of an action that is
1:22:04voluntary what Aristotle has in mind is
1:22:08that the motive Force for the action
1:22:12lies within the agent this is the first
1:22:17requirement for a voluntary
1:22:19action the action must to some extent
1:22:23originate from the agent
1:22:27herself in this case let's suppose that
1:22:30Susan stands up and walks across a room
1:22:35it doesn't matter for the moment the
1:22:37reason for which she does so but we will
1:22:40assume that she gets up from her chair
1:22:43walks across the room and looks out the
1:22:47window toward the front lawn and toward
1:22:52the side the the front walk that goes
1:22:56from the street up to the to the front
1:22:59door of her
1:23:03house her action is
1:23:05voluntary provided the motive Force for
1:23:09what she does lies within
1:23:12her that is the principle which is
1:23:17instrumental in moving the parts of her
1:23:20body necessary to to enable her to get
1:23:25up from the chair walk across the room
1:23:28and look
1:23:30outside the window
1:23:32toward the front
1:23:35lawn in this case the principle lies
1:23:39within her to some extent the and to an
1:23:43important
1:23:45extent the action is self initiated by
1:23:50Susan in other words
1:23:53if we're going to provide an
1:23:55explanation for the action we will have
1:23:59to point to
1:24:00something that motivates Susan something
1:24:04within her that motivates her to rise
1:24:10walk across the room and look outside
1:24:13the window toward her front
1:24:16lawn secondly in addition to the more
1:24:20motive Force for her action having to
1:24:24lie within Susan
1:24:28herself also the Dynamics of this motive
1:24:33Force are in an important sense in her
1:24:39control so she acts voluntarily if the
1:24:42motive Force for her action lies within
1:24:45her and if the Dynamics of this motive
1:24:49Force are in
1:24:51control are in her control she must be
1:24:55capable of doing or not doing what she
1:24:59has
1:25:01done when she gets up and walks across
1:25:04the room she must have been capable of
1:25:07not getting up but remaining in her
1:25:11chair now it's easy to see that both of
1:25:16these are going to have to be required
1:25:20for voluntary
1:25:23action let's
1:25:25take let's take for
1:25:29instance
1:25:32Jones Jones is sitting at his favorite
1:25:36bar this is what Jones does after work
1:25:39every night because
1:25:42Jones basically is an after hours
1:25:48drunk he gets up each
1:25:50morning he go goes to work he performs a
1:25:55solid capable day work and after
1:25:59finishing his work for the day he
1:26:02retires to a local bar has a snack and
1:26:05proceeds to get drunk he does this every
1:26:09day of his life Joe is a drunk and an
1:26:15alcoholic now when Joe walks into the
1:26:20bar and sits down and orders something
1:26:24off of the menu while the bartender
1:26:27makes Jones his first
1:26:31drink Jones's action seems initially to
1:26:35be
1:26:36voluntary certainly the motive force
1:26:39behind his action lies within him in
1:26:43other
1:26:46words if we're going to the in other
1:26:49words the principle which is
1:26:50instrumental in moving the parts of his
1:26:53body necessary for him to perform the
1:26:56action of parking his car getting out of
1:26:59his car walking into the bar sitting at
1:27:03his favorite spot at the bar and
1:27:05ordering both his first burnt drink and
1:27:08something to eat certainly the motive
1:27:11Force for that action lies within
1:27:14Joe but are the Dynamics of this motive
1:27:20Force actually in his is
1:27:23control we can imagine that to a certain
1:27:27extent they are not and we're going to
1:27:30assume for the purposes of our example
1:27:33that Joe has abused alcohol to the point
1:27:39that he is basically
1:27:41incapable
1:27:43of
1:27:45not going into the bar and
1:27:49having the number of drinks he usually
1:27:52hases on a given
1:27:54occasion we can imagine somebody with
1:27:57that kind of addiction
1:28:00actually by his own admission not long
1:28:04before his death the great baseball
1:28:07player for the Yan for the New York
1:28:09Yankees from the 50s 60s and early 70s
1:28:14Mickey
1:28:16Manel died as he said a
1:28:19drunk he each night went to his local
1:28:24bar to his favorite bar and drank to the
1:28:28point of
1:28:29inebriation it was to the point at which
1:28:32this was something that the mick was
1:28:36unable to
1:28:40resist the addiction had taken too much
1:28:44control over his
1:28:46life so in this case in our
1:28:50action the the person or in this going
1:28:53back to Jones
1:28:56Jones
1:28:57certainly has gotten himself into a
1:29:01position that his decision to drink each
1:29:05night to the point of
1:29:09intoxication is not something that is
1:29:14effectively under his
1:29:18control but for J but the first few
1:29:22times Jones went into the bar before his
1:29:25addiction came became acute we could
1:29:28certainly say that in those instances
1:29:32Jones did act
1:29:35voluntarily because again the motive
1:29:37Force for the
1:29:39action lay
1:29:42within the agent himself namely
1:29:46Jones and the Dynamics of this motive
1:29:49Force were in his control
1:29:52he was at that in in those initial
1:29:55visits to the bar capable of going to
1:29:59the bar and getting
1:30:01drunk and also capable of not going to
1:30:06the bar and getting
1:30:10drunk but a compulsory action is an
1:30:14action in which the moving principle is
1:30:19outside of the agent
1:30:22and the
1:30:24principle to
1:30:27which and there's nothing in this
1:30:30case that the agent herself
1:30:35contributes to the principle of acting
1:30:38or being acting
1:30:42upon in other
1:30:44words she is forc to do what she does
1:30:48and the motive the the mo the motive
1:30:50Force behind her action is not something
1:30:54to which she has
1:30:55contributed it is something completely
1:30:58outside of her if we're going to as to
1:31:04explain
1:31:05what she has done we will have to point
1:31:11to forces outside of
1:31:15her forces to which she makes no
1:31:19contribution to explain her
1:31:26action so what Aristotle has in effect
1:31:30is a distinction
1:31:33between an action that is
1:31:37self-initiated by the
1:31:39agent and an action that is forced on
1:31:44the agent or the agent is forced to
1:31:48do now it it certainly may be the case
1:31:52that the agent has not acted by choice
1:31:55when the agent agent acts voluntarily as
1:31:58we will see but certainly the motive
1:32:01Force for the action lies within the
1:32:04agent and that motive force or the way
1:32:09in which it plays out its
1:32:11Dynamics are in an important sense under
1:32:15the agent
1:32:17control so now let's move to distinguish
1:32:23involuntary from nonv voluntary
1:32:28action in The Case Case of non-voluntary
1:32:33action that is action done out of
1:32:37ignorance and in this case it is done
1:32:40out of
1:32:42ignorance and the person who has done it
1:32:45feels no reg regret for what he she has
1:32:50done it is s nonv
1:32:54voluntary but if it's
1:32:58involuntary she expresses
1:33:01regret it is something that she
1:33:03certainly did but
1:33:06didn't perhaps genuinely in intend to do
1:33:11and in this case she regrets what has
1:33:16happened now we also can distinguish
1:33:19between acting
1:33:22by reason of
1:33:23ignorance and acting in
1:33:28ignorance when one acts by reason of
1:33:33ignorance
1:33:36one that of which the person is ignorant
1:33:40are the circumstances surrounding the
1:33:42action and the objects with which the
1:33:44action is
1:33:46concerned if Jones acts by reason of
1:33:50ignorance
1:33:52we find that ignorance provides an
1:33:56explanation for why Jones has done what
1:33:59he's
1:34:00done he is not he was not fully aware of
1:34:04the circumstances surrounding his action
1:34:08nor was he fully aware of the relevant
1:34:11objects with which the action was
1:34:15concerned in this sort of case we tend
1:34:18to let Jones off the hook so to speak
1:34:23because he has s he he sincerely was not
1:34:27aware of these circumstances nor was he
1:34:31aware with of the relevant OB objects
1:34:34with which the action was concerned and
1:34:37we do not tend to fault him for this
1:34:40lack of
1:34:41awareness but if he acts in
1:34:46ignorance we might say that he certainly
1:34:48was not aware of
1:34:52pertinent
1:34:54circumstances or factors related to the
1:34:56a related to the
1:34:59action but in these cases we tend to
1:35:03hold him
1:35:04responsible because we think that his
1:35:07ignorance is something that he could and
1:35:10should have
1:35:13prevented in product liability cases it
1:35:17is often the case that a company does
1:35:22was not aware of the
1:35:25consequences of a partic of marketing a
1:35:28particular product they weren't aware of
1:35:31its harmful effects or its potentially
1:35:35harmful
1:35:36effects but in some of these rulings
1:35:39what the courts decide is that the
1:35:42company acted in
1:35:44ignorance in the sense that they should
1:35:48have known or perhaps were not
1:35:53sufficiently
1:35:55concerned with the possible difficulties
1:35:59or
1:36:00problems or harmful side effects that
1:36:05the product they had they were marketing
1:36:10had for instance in the case of
1:36:15medication now in the next section the
1:36:18next part of the lecture we will move to
1:36:22to distinguish between actions that are
1:36:25voluntary and actions that are done by
1:36:30choice Aristotle distinguishes between
1:36:34actions that are are the result of
1:36:37choice and actions that are
1:36:42voluntary and it's not difficult to see
1:36:44what the basis of his distinction is
1:36:49because he notices initially that
1:36:52children and animals certainly can act
1:36:57voluntarily but they don't act in
1:37:02Choice H this is this is initially quite
1:37:05odd perhaps and certainly curious
1:37:08because
1:37:10children do not act as a result of
1:37:16choice this seems strange indeed because
1:37:19we often talk to Children about making
1:37:24bad
1:37:26choices that has become in the last 15
1:37:31years or so something of a
1:37:35cliche
1:37:37children are are admonished to make good
1:37:42choices avoid bad
1:37:44choices and they are
1:37:47scolded for doing something that is
1:37:50wrong in a way that we often describe as
1:37:54making bad
1:37:57choices but
1:38:00Aristotle has something specific in mind
1:38:03when he talks about acting from
1:38:07Choice notice
1:38:10that one can act quickly rashly out of
1:38:15anger fly off the
1:38:19handle Act
1:38:22impulsively because something has
1:38:25occurred that has made someone quite
1:38:29angry now in this case the person has
1:38:33certainly acted
1:38:38voluntarily the source of the action
1:38:41lies within her it has been
1:38:44self-initiated
1:38:46and it was a it was an action over which
1:38:50she had
1:38:55control but yet not done out of
1:39:00choice also the person who is
1:39:04incontinent or the person
1:39:08who shall we say suffers from weakness
1:39:12of will also acts
1:39:16voluntarily but the person doesn't act
1:39:20out of choice
1:39:22we will look at weakness of will a
1:39:25little more closely
1:39:27later
1:39:29but weakness of will as we understand it
1:39:32and as it is discussed by
1:39:35Aristotle is an a is an
1:39:38action which has come about in the
1:39:41following
1:39:43way
1:39:44Jones knows what he should do he knows
1:39:50what the good good
1:39:52is he knows what the right thing to do
1:39:57in a certain circumstance or a certain
1:40:01situation he knows what it
1:40:04is he knows in short what he ought to
1:40:08do and he has a certain degree of desire
1:40:13to do what is good in this situation
1:40:17let's say that he is
1:40:19considering an action we will call
1:40:23X Jones knows that X is the right thing
1:40:27to
1:40:28do Jones knows that X is a would be
1:40:32fulfilling the
1:40:34good and Jones has a desire to do
1:40:38X but Jones does not do X because he
1:40:43succumbs to the temptation to do
1:40:48why now this is weakness of of will the
1:40:52reason Jones succumbs to the
1:40:56Temptation is basically because he has a
1:40:59weak
1:41:01will and that is something of course
1:41:03that we we are all all too familiar
1:41:07with but we will return to this
1:41:10later for our purposes now it is
1:41:13important to point out that
1:41:18one acts voluntarily
1:41:21when
1:41:24acting with a weak will but not one does
1:41:28not act from
1:41:32Choice one is the cause of One's Own
1:41:35action it is
1:41:36self-initiated the motive force behind
1:41:39the action arises within the agent
1:41:43herself and she is in
1:41:47control of the Dynamics of that motive
1:41:50Force that leads to her
1:41:55action but in the case of the weakness
1:41:58of will she can succumbs to
1:42:02Temptation specifically she succumbs to
1:42:05some desire some desire for
1:42:10why and there's a sense in which she is
1:42:13overwhelmed by the
1:42:17desire so why are these not not
1:42:21instances of acting from choice we can
1:42:26certainly think of
1:42:28someone who Del is deliberating about
1:42:31what to do knows that X is the right
1:42:34thing to
1:42:36do and has some degree of commitment to
1:42:42do eggs desire to do
1:42:45eggs but succumbs to the pleasure let's
1:42:49say that is associ iated with
1:42:52why so why in this case has the agent
1:42:58not acted from
1:43:03Choice well in a sense this is
1:43:06understood to be something like spur of
1:43:08the- moment actions which are
1:43:12voluntary but as Aristotle makes clear
1:43:16and this is
1:43:18at 1111 b
1:43:2215-9 or
1:43:251111b as in beta lines 15 through
1:43:2919 Choice seems
1:43:34necessarily in accord with reason or
1:43:39with a rational principle it is in
1:43:42accord with
1:43:46logos and in the case of the incontinent
1:43:50person
1:43:51the incontinent
1:43:53person does not act by choice or in
1:43:59Choice the incontinent person does
1:44:03not
1:44:05succumb to the desire for
1:44:08why which he knows is not the right
1:44:12thing to
1:44:16do by following a rational
1:44:19principle this is not something he does
1:44:23on the basis of reason but rather by
1:44:27appetite passion
1:44:32desire which
1:44:34ignores the guidance of
1:44:37Reason in other words
1:44:40Choice involves two
1:44:44things first
1:44:47thought and that distinguishes choice
1:44:50from from spur of the moment type
1:44:54actions or
1:44:56decisions or those in which one flies
1:45:00off her
1:45:02lid or acts quickly out of anger for
1:45:08instance and also choice
1:45:12involves a rational
1:45:14principle the
1:45:18action is selected
1:45:21because it is in accord with
1:45:27reason
1:45:29now Aristotle points
1:45:33out that we can
1:45:35choose the means
1:45:39to an end or an
1:45:43action which contributes to that
1:45:47end but we do not choose
1:45:52ends choice always involves something
1:45:56within our
1:45:57power so there's a difference between
1:46:00choice and wish if I wish something were
1:46:04the
1:46:05case I am in effect admitting that
1:46:09there's nothing I can do to bring it
1:46:13about but
1:46:15Choice involves
1:46:18actions which I could
1:46:21form that would help to bring
1:46:25about what I am choosing to do so Choice
1:46:30involves something within my power
1:46:33whereas wishing does
1:46:36not now I do not choose my ends
1:46:43H that seems odd but the reason
1:46:47Aristotle States this is that we do we
1:46:50cannot not deliberate about ends and it
1:46:53seems Choice which is always in accord
1:46:56with a rational
1:46:59principle is something that is the
1:47:01result of
1:47:03deliberation that's how we discover that
1:47:08the choice we are about to make follows
1:47:12the requirements of practical
1:47:18rationality but within ends this isn't
1:47:21the
1:47:23casee now I certainly can deliberate
1:47:26about some ends or objectives but these
1:47:29are all
1:47:31subordinate to the final
1:47:34end
1:47:36that I cannot deliberate about and
1:47:39therefore cannot
1:47:41choose now if we think about it there is
1:47:46something indeed
1:47:49peculiar about the idea of choosing
1:47:55ends let's suppose
1:47:59that you work for a
1:48:03company and this particular company is
1:48:07devising a set of
1:48:10objectives you know how it is with
1:48:13businesses they can't they are they are
1:48:15always trying to Define their
1:48:19objectives or at least they do this
1:48:22because that is what the latest fed in
1:48:25books on business
1:48:27management indicate that a good company
1:48:30will always be
1:48:32doing but one thing when they but notice
1:48:36what they're doing when they are
1:48:39defining their goals and
1:48:41objectives what they're doing is they
1:48:44are
1:48:46establishing goals to meet that are not
1:48:50final ends but that are instrumental in
1:48:55bringing about the one final end that
1:48:59they certainly don't deliberate about
1:49:02and in fact don't
1:49:04choose and that is being
1:49:10profitable the company doesn't
1:49:12deliberate about whether it wants to be
1:49:16profitable in fact the company exists
1:49:19for the only for the purpose of being
1:49:22profitable when a company defines its
1:49:25goals and
1:49:26objectives and some high-minded
1:49:29way what they are in effect doing is
1:49:34establishing
1:49:36guidelines to be met
1:49:40which they think are necessary
1:49:45requirement for them to be
1:49:49profitable
1:49:50as a
1:49:52company so we can this is what we mean
1:49:55by Aristotle means by saying that we can
1:49:57deliberate about some ends or
1:50:00objectives but these are clearly
1:50:02subordinate to the Final End about which
1:50:06we do not deliberate and in effect do
1:50:08not choose again it's certainly very
1:50:12screwy to suggest that a
1:50:16business decides to be profitable now we
1:50:20might find some examples to the contrary
1:50:24when a business is undertaken for the
1:50:28sole purpose of not being profitable but
1:50:32then larger issues invol are involved I
1:50:35might decide to run a particular
1:50:37business or open a business in a certain
1:50:40area with the idea that the business is
1:50:43going to
1:50:44fail now why am I doing this I am doing
1:50:47this for a tax write off let's say
1:50:51and why am
1:50:53I beginning or starting a business that
1:50:56is going to fail that I can then use as
1:50:59a tax write off well for to promote
1:51:03overall profitability and other
1:51:06words to maximize my overall income that
1:51:11is something about which I do not
1:51:14deliberate and that I do not choose as
1:51:18an end so we can deliberate about things
1:51:22that we can do things that are brought
1:51:25about by our own
1:51:27effort and perhaps not brought about
1:51:29always in the same
1:51:32way we certainly don't deliberate about
1:51:35those things which occur
1:51:38necessarily because we have no power
1:51:41over that so we deliberate about things
1:51:45which tend to happen in a certain
1:51:48way but about but things that have a bit
1:51:53of indeterminacy about
1:51:56them in other words the object of
1:51:59deliberation is something that is to
1:52:01some extent
1:52:02indeterminate if it were already
1:52:04determinate and set it wouldn't be
1:52:07something I could genuinely deliberate
1:52:09about because it wouldn't be something
1:52:11over which I had any significant
1:52:15control so the same thing can be
1:52:18deliberated upon and
1:52:21chosen and once the object of choice is
1:52:24made things are determinant the object
1:52:28of choice is fixed and
1:52:30determinate so choice is deliberate
1:52:33desire for something that is in our
1:52:36power to
1:52:38do and Aristotle notes that once we
1:52:42decide as a result of
1:52:45deliberation
1:52:46then we effectively desire in accordance
1:52:51with our
1:52:52deliberation if we're deliberating about
1:52:55what to do and we choose a course of
1:52:59action then as Aristotle notes the
1:53:03appropriate
1:53:04desire will automatically
1:53:09follow so we can think of the exercise
1:53:12of virtue as concerning
1:53:15means virtues as states of character and
1:53:19virt tend by their own nature to the
1:53:23doing of Acts by which they are
1:53:25produced in other words virtues
1:53:30tend according to their own nature to
1:53:33promote those
1:53:35things those types of actions that led
1:53:38to the virtues in the first place in
1:53:41other words
1:53:43[Music]
1:53:45Justice tends by its own nature to the
1:53:48doing of just Deeds that produced a just
1:53:53person to start with and the exercise of
1:53:57virtue concerns things that are within
1:53:59our power that are
1:54:01voluntary and that are undertaken as the
1:54:06right rule or principle
1:54:09prescribes where in our next lecture we
1:54:12will turn to the to the case of weakness
1:54:17of will or what we might want one
1:54:20one example of what we might call moral
1:54:25failure this lecture has only two parts
1:54:30so we are concluded with lecture number
1:54:3423 on action and
1:54:38decision welcome to lecture 24 in which
1:54:41we will discuss briefly Aristotle's uh
1:54:45account of weakness of will or what has
1:54:48often been been referred to by the Greek
1:54:51term uh acaia which is spelled AC a a a
1:55:00c a s i a that is when we bring the
1:55:06Greek over into
1:55:09English a lot has been written about
1:55:11weakness of will because it had actually
1:55:14is something that uh has an element of
1:55:17mystery about it it was something that
1:55:20so that uh Plato or at least Socrates
1:55:24didn't think was possible that didn't
1:55:26think it ever
1:55:28occurred but we're not going to go into
1:55:32a lot of detail with it we want to give
1:55:34an account of what is involved in
1:55:36weakness of will to try to see how Sak
1:55:41how Aristotle tries to deal with so
1:55:44socrates's View and then a general
1:55:46account of of weakness of will uh both
1:55:51and uh weakness of will per se and
1:55:55weakness of will with some
1:55:57qualification as we know people can a
1:56:00person can be weak willed in general but
1:56:03most the time we have uh a weak will
1:56:07with reference to some specific things
1:56:10um after all we have some Temptations
1:56:14which entice us much more strongly than
1:56:17others do some Temptations might not to
1:56:19us at
1:56:21all so as a background let's first start
1:56:25with a very brief statement without a
1:56:28lot of
1:56:30explanation uh of the view that Socrates
1:56:35held in the dialogue the
1:56:38protagoras
1:56:40Socrates in the middle of a
1:56:43discussion uh
1:56:45about human
1:56:47action and about
1:56:50what motivates
1:56:51action gives an argument against the
1:56:55weakness of
1:56:56will he tries to to convince protagoras
1:57:01that what we understand by weakness of
1:57:03will never happens in other words what
1:57:07he wants us to what he tries to show is
1:57:11that we never
1:57:13knowingly do what we take to be
1:57:17wrong now this is not not to say that we
1:57:20never do something that we have some
1:57:24belief uh that it is not proper or right
1:57:27for us to do but we never in a sense do
1:57:30that
1:57:32knowingly now this seems to be of course
1:57:35a bit strange because we can imagine
1:57:38ourselves many times and we probably
1:57:41have have experienced this on many
1:57:43occasions of saying when I did it I knew
1:57:46it was
1:57:47wrong I knew it was wrong when when I
1:57:49did it but the question is did we really
1:57:52know that it was
1:57:55wrong was it was it genuinely wrong if
1:57:59we really knew that it was wrong we
1:58:01would not have done
1:58:03it well how so well we're not going to
1:58:06go in I'm going to give you a little
1:58:08background about socrates's view without
1:58:10going into the details of how he argues
1:58:12for
1:58:14it but Socrates was convinced that we
1:58:17always pursue that that which we take to
1:58:20be good at least good for us all right
1:58:25good for us we may pursue things that
1:58:28the gener that that in general people
1:58:30take to be to be very bad but at least
1:58:34we pursue them because we take them to
1:58:36be good for
1:58:38us consider this story I REM once recall
1:58:44an interview done oh several decades ago
1:58:48at least 20 years ago I would
1:58:50say uh an interview with a man who was
1:58:53on uh who was uh
1:58:56incarcerated in the penitentiary in
1:59:00California and he was serving a life
1:59:04sentence he may have
1:59:07been
1:59:10uh up for parole at a given time but it
1:59:14was fairly clear he would never get it
1:59:16he would never he he he was never even
1:59:18going to seek it
1:59:20he was certainly unrepentant for what he
1:59:22had done and he was very candid
1:59:25about uh about uh why he thought that he
1:59:30should serve a life sentence he actually
1:59:33thought that he was being appropriately
1:59:36punished this was at a time in which uh
1:59:39the death penalty was not uh was not
1:59:42being implemented in part in most of the
1:59:44country because of constitutional
1:59:47considerations uh subsequent quently
1:59:50death penalty practices were brought in
1:59:52line with the Constitution and as we
1:59:54know death penalty practices were
1:59:57resumed but at the time this fellow
1:59:59committed his crime the death penalty
2:00:02was not uh was was not um being uh
2:00:09um was not being given for capital
2:00:12crimes now the story about this fell he
2:00:15was a he was a graduate student in
2:00:17mathematics at the University of
2:00:18California
2:00:20Berkeley and and his
2:00:24advisor would never pass him for his
2:00:28dissertation but he also would never
2:00:31tell the fellow that he needed to take a
2:00:33master's degree and
2:00:35terminate with the Masters and move on
2:00:38with his life he kept stringing the guy
2:00:40along for more than 10 years on his
2:00:43disertation he was in graduate school up
2:00:47to 16 plus years and his advisor still
2:00:50would not pass him and still would
2:00:55not uh still kept stringing him along
2:00:58and stringing him along finally one day
2:01:01the fellow walked into his professor's
2:01:04office shot him in the head turned
2:01:08around Put the gun down called campus
2:01:10security and told him told them to come
2:01:13pick him up take him down and book him
2:01:16for murder that he had just killed
2:01:19pressure so and so now the interesting
2:01:22thing about the interview with this
2:01:23fellow which was uh taken from the
2:01:27prison uh the prison yard uh is that the
2:01:30fellow basically
2:01:32stated
2:01:35that he was not that that that he
2:01:38had rid the the world of a very
2:01:42malicious an evil person he had no
2:01:45regrets for what he had done and that uh
2:01:48he should
2:01:50serve a life sentence for what he had
2:01:53done in a Maximum Security Prison with
2:01:56all that goes on in a Maximum Security
2:01:59Prison but what he said is that being
2:02:04incarcerated and enduring the
2:02:06humiliation and the violence that's
2:02:09associated with a Maximum Security
2:02:11Prison was worth
2:02:14it it was worth it the penalty was was
2:02:22worth the
2:02:24opportunity to kill his
2:02:27Professor now in this story we can
2:02:30imagine that the person we might say
2:02:33knows that he did something
2:02:35wrong there's no question about that
2:02:38because he he States very clearly that
2:02:41he should that he is being appropriately
2:02:43punished for his crime he stated very
2:02:46clearly that he should never be paroled
2:02:49that the state of California or or any
2:02:52other state would be out of its mind to
2:02:56allow an unrepentant murderer like
2:02:59himself back into normal society he had
2:03:03a debt to pay and he was willing to pay
2:03:06that debt and he thought that that's
2:03:08exactly what he
2:03:11deserved but he said it was worth it and
2:03:14if we think about in this in this
2:03:16context as strange as this may found
2:03:19be for us that the sense of hatred and
2:03:22revenge would be that deep-seated in a
2:03:25person who's obviously rather
2:03:29intelligent that for him the good that
2:03:33he derived or he
2:03:36saw in killing the good he derived from
2:03:41killing his
2:03:43Professor
2:03:45outweighed any consideration of the
2:03:49bad he did his own cost benefit analysis
2:03:54of what the consequences of his action
2:03:58would be and he came to the conclusion
2:04:01that committing the
2:04:03murder was good for him and it
2:04:06outweighed any other
2:04:09considerations now we might
2:04:12disagree obviously we would with his
2:04:17assessment of the consequences of his
2:04:20actions but no doubt by his own
2:04:23admission he took them to be
2:04:27good so he actually was pursuing not
2:04:32something that he thought to be
2:04:34inle bad but something he took to be
2:04:38good and Socrates maintains that this is
2:04:41what we always
2:04:43do we
2:04:45always pursue what we take to be good
2:04:49even if our understanding is
2:04:53Warped or poorly
2:04:57informed
2:04:59aew
2:05:01perverted demented or however we want to
2:05:04describe it Socrates is of the of the
2:05:07view that we always do what we take to
2:05:11be good and we
2:05:13never succumb to the temptation to do
2:05:17something that conf fcts with what we
2:05:20take to be good so the notion of the
2:05:23weakness of will when we know what the
2:05:27good is we have some desire to pursue it
2:05:31and we fail to do so because we succumb
2:05:35to the Temptation or the
2:05:38pleasure of doing what we
2:05:40take not to be good is something that
2:05:45Socrates was
2:05:47insistent that never takes
2:05:51place now how
2:05:55does Aristotle deal with this it's
2:05:59interesting that he does not provide
2:06:02what we might call a knock down drag out
2:06:07argument against weakness of
2:06:10will actually what he does he does not
2:06:13give us in the sense a standard
2:06:17reputation he tries to give us what we
2:06:19might refer to or what we would what the
2:06:22ancient Greeks would refer to as a
2:06:24dialectical argument against Socrates
2:06:28denial of weakness of Will and by that
2:06:33he tries to show that the denial of
2:06:37acaia the denial of weakness of will is
2:06:41inconsistent with other things that we
2:06:44affirm or
2:06:46believe and therefore our view of
2:06:49weakness of will needs to be adjusted in
2:06:52this case uh Den uh uh you know
2:06:57completely uh reversed to bring it in
2:07:00line with other things that we agree
2:07:06upon socr I mean Aristotle's argument
2:07:09thus so therefore Begins by noting that
2:07:13the denial of weakness of will the
2:07:15denial of acrosia cont predicts our
2:07:19common
2:07:22experience then he proceeds to describe
2:07:26the denial of acaia and to show that it
2:07:29leads to an
2:07:31inconsistency for example if one I I if
2:07:35Jones has only a weak opinion or a weak
2:07:41belief that he should not perform a
2:07:43certain
2:07:44action and then he succumbs to his
2:07:47desires or his passion and does it
2:07:51anyway we tend to forgive
2:07:55him particularly if he's someone who is
2:07:58hesitant in succumbing to his
2:08:02passions but we never forgive
2:08:08wickedness now it's clear that the
2:08:11denial of acaia certainly seems to
2:08:14conflict with
2:08:16experience Socrates
2:08:19certainly understood that and tried to
2:08:22describe what actually goes on in what
2:08:25we call weakness of will to try to show
2:08:28that this is not weakness of will after
2:08:31all but with Aristotle the assumption is
2:08:34that a
2:08:36person normally does
2:08:39not act on what she takes to be a weak
2:08:45belief for instance again let's suppose
2:08:48that Jones thinks that he should not
2:08:52perform a certain action call it
2:08:58X and then he succumbs to his desires
2:09:01and does acts
2:09:03anyway since he had a weak opinion to
2:09:07begin with since there was that weak
2:09:11belief and other words there was an
2:09:13element of of genuine uncertainty here
2:09:17we tend to forgive him similar to the
2:09:21person who is in who's
2:09:24hesitant but if if Jones has a strong
2:09:29belief that he should not do
2:09:32X and succumbs to his
2:09:35passions we certainly are far less
2:09:38likely to forgive
2:09:41Jones in fact we never forgive
2:09:47wickedness
2:09:51now in the case
2:09:56of in the case of the person who is
2:10:01practically
2:10:03wise that is a person genuinely
2:10:07virtuous things are a bit different
2:10:09because if you say that practical wisdom
2:10:13is
2:10:15mastered
2:10:16overcome by
2:10:19weakness of will that is clearly
2:10:22inconsistent with practical wisdom
2:10:25because the practically wise person is
2:10:28the one who will do the right thing and
2:10:30who has all the
2:10:32virtues so before proceeding a little
2:10:34more let's say something about the
2:10:36practically wise
2:10:38person before we contrast the
2:10:42incontinent or the weak-willed person
2:10:46with the person who is continent
2:10:50this takes us back to section six of the
2:10:54Noman ethics or book six which I did not
2:10:57and part of book five I mean excuse me
2:11:00book six which I did not assign but I'm
2:11:02going to draw from sections 5
2:11:067 9 and
2:11:0913 if you care to go back and read and a
2:11:12little bit of section
2:11:1512 Aristotle says that practical reason
2:11:18and he defines this in section five of
2:11:23book six is I quote a reasoned and true
2:11:28state or Capa of capacity to act with
2:11:32regard to human
2:11:35Goods now let's note that practical
2:11:39wisdom is not
2:11:42knowledge because for Aristotle
2:11:45knowledge is of things that are
2:11:47Universal
2:11:48that is fundamental laws the ultimate
2:11:52principles of the universe and therefore
2:11:55things that are laws that are changeless
2:11:58Eternal
2:11:59invariable whereas practical wisdom
2:12:01concerns things that could be different
2:12:04that could be
2:12:05otherwise and this is why practical
2:12:08wisdom concerns things about which we
2:12:11could can
2:12:12deliberate do this or do that assuming
2:12:15that things could be different no one
2:12:19deliberates about things which couldn't
2:12:21be otherwise than they
2:12:23are and no one deliberates about things
2:12:26which have no end or
2:12:30goal no one deliberates about things
2:12:33which cannot be brought about by human
2:12:36action or human
2:12:38initiative so knowledge is concerned
2:12:41with General Universal principles while
2:12:45practical wisdom is concerned with
2:12:48specific
2:12:50cases
2:12:52particulars since practice is concerned
2:12:55with particulars am I going to do this
2:12:57action should I do that action should I
2:13:00not do that
2:13:03action am I to do this or that in a
2:13:07given
2:13:11situation now practical wisdom is
2:13:13necessary for happiness because it
2:13:16produces happiness happiness in the way
2:13:19that Health produces
2:13:22Health uh wisdom is a part is a is a
2:13:25part of virtue it is in
2:13:27excellence so the possession of
2:13:33it is a
2:13:35means to and the development I mean a
2:13:38means to or something that leads to
2:13:43happiness now let's briefly distinguish
2:13:46practical wisdom from
2:13:49cleverness now cleverness as Aristotle
2:13:51notes is the
2:13:53capacity or power which enables us to
2:13:57set a goal set a mark to Aspire to set a
2:14:03mark for ourselves and then hit the mark
2:14:06That's
2:14:07cleverness but practical wisdom is not
2:14:10the same as
2:14:11cleverness but it requires the capacity
2:14:13for cleverness I mean I have to be able
2:14:16to set a goal
2:14:18and meet it set a mark for myself and
2:14:21hit the
2:14:22mark but part of practical wisdom is the
2:14:26ability to
2:14:28recognize what are appropriate goals
2:14:32to try to reach and what are not
2:14:38appropriate goals what to it it
2:14:41practical I mean practical wisdom
2:14:43involves the ability to recognize the
2:14:46appropriate and good end
2:14:48and this is the starting point of any
2:14:52action so being
2:14:54good is a necessary requirement for
2:14:57being practically wise wickedness on the
2:15:01other hand corrupts us perverts us and
2:15:05distorts our view of the proper goals
2:15:09for our
2:15:11actions so for Aristotle all virtues all
2:15:16excellences require an involve or
2:15:20involve
2:15:21reason but are not reducible simply to
2:15:25forms of
2:15:29reasoning Aristotle also thought that
2:15:33the virtues had a Unity about
2:15:38them for as he says with the presence of
2:15:42one quality practical wisdom will be
2:15:45given all the excellences
2:15:49so practical wisdom is inseparable from
2:15:53virtue one does not choose
2:15:57correctly unless a choice can be made
2:16:00with practical wisdom that is with
2:16:03virtue and Excellence or as Aristotle
2:16:06says in book 6 section
2:16:0913 for the one determines the end and
2:16:13the other makes us do the things that
2:16:16lead to the end
2:16:20now let's pause before we move into
2:16:23discussing briefly Aristotle's
2:16:26description of weakness of Will and how
2:16:30that is distinct from
2:16:33self-indulgence which is much worse and
2:16:36for continent from continents on the
2:16:39other
2:16:43hand let's note Aristotle's definition
2:16:46of in continence or weakness of will
2:16:51specifically incontinence or weakness of
2:16:54will without
2:16:56qualification that is without
2:16:59application to a
2:17:02particular uh
2:17:05Vice I'm going to use the marginal page
2:17:11numbers since some of you might have
2:17:14different English translations or
2:17:16additions of Aristotle and Noman ethics
2:17:20just like I did with Plato's
2:17:24minnow so this is
2:17:27from
2:17:29Pages
2:17:311148 A6 through 11 page
2:17:371148a 6- 11 this is the definition of
2:17:43incontinence per se or incontinence or
2:17:47weakness of will without
2:17:51qualification Aristotle
2:17:54writes he who pursues the excesses of
2:17:58things
2:17:59Pleasant and shuns those
2:18:02things painful of hunger and thirst and
2:18:07heat and cold and all the objects of
2:18:10taste and
2:18:12touch not by choice but contrary to his
2:18:16choice and his
2:18:18judgment is called
2:18:21incontinent not with
2:18:24qualification in respect of this or that
2:18:27for exam example anger but without
2:18:31qualification end of quote let me read
2:18:34this again because there is uh
2:18:38one point that he makes that I want to
2:18:42note
2:18:45specifically he who Pur pursues the
2:18:48excesses of things Pleasant and shuns
2:18:52those of things painful of hunger and
2:18:56thirst and heat and cold and all the
2:19:00objects of touch and taste not by choice
2:19:05but contrary to his choice and his
2:19:10judgment is called
2:19:13incontinent not without qualification in
2:19:16respect of this or that for one of anger
2:19:21but with
2:19:23qualification so let's note what is
2:19:25involved
2:19:27here uh the person who is incontinent
2:19:31knows what she does is bad but does it
2:19:36because of
2:19:38passion does it because of the excessive
2:19:42excesses of Desire or of pleasure and
2:19:46note here that the incontinent person
2:19:50unlike in arist in in socrates's
2:19:53description does
2:19:56not succumb
2:19:58to passions or desires or Pleasures by
2:20:03choice but contrary to choice and
2:20:09judgment note with the in the case of
2:20:13Socrates the person the murderer
2:20:15interviewed in the prison
2:20:18yard describes what he is doing at least
2:20:21we're using him as an example of
2:20:26sacratic uh denial of acrosia or
2:20:30weakness of
2:20:31will this person did what he did not
2:20:37contrary to choice and
2:20:39judgment
2:20:41but indeed in light of his choice and
2:20:47and judgment in other words what he did
2:20:50conformed directly to the choice he was
2:20:54making it was not a matter of going
2:20:57against his better judgment what he did
2:21:00was indeed what his judgment
2:21:05was now in this case if we examine
2:21:09incontinence we find the sense in which
2:21:12our
2:21:14own wisdom our own
2:21:18rationality is in a sense
2:21:22overwhelmed by The Lure of in this case
2:21:29pleasure one succumbs to the
2:21:33Temptation not out of choice but
2:21:37contrary to her or his
2:21:43judgment and so it seems as though there
2:21:47is almost something irrational
2:21:51about weakness of
2:21:53will because one acts not on the basis
2:21:59of choice and
2:22:01judgment that is not on the basis of a
2:22:06consideration that is
2:22:09deliberation that is not on the basis of
2:22:11a consideration of what one ought to do
2:22:15whether we're talking about moral what
2:22:17one ought to
2:22:19do or what is in one's best judgment I
2:22:23mean best interest in what one should
2:22:26do but it is contrary to that assessment
2:22:32not on the basis of a
2:22:36consideration but it is the pursuit of
2:22:40the
2:22:41existes of
2:22:45pleasure and it's done
2:22:48not on the basis of
2:22:50judgment so one departs from one's good
2:22:54judgment from a consideration of what
2:22:56one ought to do and acts contrary to
2:23:01it the only that and and and in this
2:23:04sense the way that what what explains
2:23:07why one departs from one's good judgment
2:23:10why does one
2:23:12do uh something that one knows according
2:23:16to his or her best judgment is not
2:23:20something that he should he or she
2:23:23should do and also one has the desire to
2:23:26do the right thing but both that good
2:23:29judgment and that
2:23:31desire are
2:23:34overcome by the Temptations of pleasure
2:23:36one succumbs to pleasure whether it be
2:23:41momentary which is often the case or whe
2:23:47whether it be even longer term
2:23:51Pleasures
2:23:54now we want to note
2:23:58that this is unless a definition of
2:24:02incontinence as we say without
2:24:05qualification but most of the time of
2:24:07course
2:24:08incontinence uh
2:24:11is or weakness of will is something that
2:24:15uh is with qualif ification and by with
2:24:19qualification we mean it is
2:24:22specific specifically related to one
2:24:25form of
2:24:27Temptation
2:24:30um now let's suppose that uh one in in
2:24:36this case could have
2:24:38incontinence with qualification with
2:24:41regard to uh the desire for victory the
2:24:46desire for wealth or honor or
2:24:52anger remembering some of the things the
2:24:55Greeks valued in common everyday lives
2:24:59everyday life
2:25:01uh
2:25:03wealth
2:25:05honor
2:25:08power that is people and note people who
2:25:12are incontinent as Aristotle says with
2:25:15regard to things such as honor that is
2:25:18when they they
2:25:20pursue
2:25:22something from The Lure of Honor or The
2:25:25Lure of wealth even the lure of Victory
2:25:29when it is against their better
2:25:32judgment and which and when it is
2:25:35against what they know that they should
2:25:38do they're incontinent with respect to
2:25:41those things and of course as Aristotle
2:25:43notes people who are Inc continent were
2:25:46with regard to these sub types of
2:25:49objects would not be referred to as soft
2:25:52in his
2:25:53words now obviously some forms of
2:25:58incontinence are more disgraceful than
2:26:01other forms of incontinence for
2:26:05instance
2:26:07if let's suppose that the person is
2:26:11incontinent with respect to
2:26:15anger this is as Aristotle says normally
2:26:19a less disgraceful form of
2:26:22incontinence why because the person who
2:26:27is incontinent with respect to anger is
2:26:30the person who
2:26:32overreacts who overreacts out of
2:26:35anger uh who doesn't control his or her
2:26:39anger uh but we're assuming that the
2:26:42anger is something itself that's that
2:26:45that is that has some
2:26:47justification in other words what we
2:26:50have with the incontinence of anger is a
2:26:55rashness a lack of discipline in other
2:26:59words one acts angrily and does so in a
2:27:03rash
2:27:05way uh when because one discerns some
2:27:11sort
2:27:12of unjustified insult or one does so in
2:27:17the face of Injustice we can imagine
2:27:21someone who uh who
2:27:24appropriately is angered by Injustice
2:27:27but the weak-willed person is the person
2:27:29who succumbs to the emotion of
2:27:32anger when it is not when he he knows or
2:27:37she knows that it is not appropriate to
2:27:41express the anger in that way on that
2:27:45occasion
2:27:48and has a
2:27:51desire to control himself or herself but
2:27:56succumbs to the emotion or the passion
2:27:59of
2:28:00anger well we this is less disgraceful
2:28:03particularly when we're assuming that
2:28:04the anger is directed to a genuine
2:28:10Injustice now this person is less
2:28:13disgraceful because this person will
2:28:15listen to reasoning as Aristotle
2:28:18says this person will will listen to the
2:28:22advice that it is not appropriate to
2:28:25behave in this particular way that
2:28:28someone needs to temper to control the
2:28:31anger that it doesn't need to be
2:28:33expressed with the force in which it is
2:28:37being expressed on that occasion but
2:28:40it's a little
2:28:42different when it comes to incontinence
2:28:46with regard to
2:28:49Pleasures because the incontinence with
2:28:53regard to
2:28:55Pleasures is the the
2:28:59incontinence the weakness of will
2:29:02seccombes to something that is an
2:29:05unnecessary object an object of pleas of
2:29:09pleasure that is unnecessary that has
2:29:12far less importance or significance than
2:29:15something like
2:29:18Injustice we're assuming that anger in
2:29:21the face of Injustice is of course has
2:29:25even if the anger expressed is an
2:29:30expression of weakness of will at least
2:29:33it is targeted to a legitimate proper
2:29:37object that is
2:29:40Injustice whereas pleasure the
2:29:43incontinence associated with pleasures
2:29:47is that which is directed toward
2:29:50unnecessary
2:29:52objects
2:29:54now contrast this with the continent
2:29:58person who knows that her desires to do
2:30:04something or wrong but she Des resists
2:30:08them on account of her
2:30:10reason this again suggests that there's
2:30:13something irrational about weakness of
2:30:15will
2:30:17Jones
2:30:18knows that she ought not
2:30:21to pursue a certain course of action
2:30:25Jones knows that she should not do
2:30:28something she desires to uphold what she
2:30:34knows she should not
2:30:37do she desires to uphold her belief and
2:30:40act accordingly but she also has this
2:30:45temptation to to do it
2:30:47anyway and is experiencing The Lure the
2:30:51pull the desire to succumb to the
2:30:54temptation but she
2:30:56resists the Temptation she resists the
2:30:59desires on account of her better
2:31:04judgment that she should not do this
2:31:06particular thing that's a sign of
2:31:12continents
2:31:14now let's distinguish
2:31:17incontinence from
2:31:21self-indulgence as we see the
2:31:23incontinent person doesn't really
2:31:27believe that she should be doing what
2:31:30she's doing in fact she thinks that she
2:31:32shouldn't be doing it but she's
2:31:34succumbed to the Temptation
2:31:36nonetheless but the self-indulgent
2:31:40person pursues the ex excesses of
2:31:43pleasurable things by choice
2:31:49and does so for the sake of these
2:31:53pleasures and not for something that
2:31:55these Pleasures can acquire for
2:31:59him and the self-indulgent person does
2:32:02it without one Quint of
2:32:06regret now this shows you something
2:32:08fundamentally different the
2:32:10self-indulgent person is a person who is
2:32:14uh who who
2:32:17is a person of of genuinely flawed
2:32:20character res with respect to this
2:32:23particular object of
2:32:26self-indulgence because where is the
2:32:27incontinent person
2:32:31succumbs to the Temptation against her
2:32:34better judgment and therefore in a sense
2:32:37against in in in a sense in in a way
2:32:39that is a bit
2:32:41irrational she does not choose to do
2:32:45what she does
2:32:48she does not act according to her own
2:32:51judgment but the self-indulgent person
2:32:54does again he pursues the excesses of
2:32:59pleasurable things by choice and does it
2:33:03for the sake of those
2:33:07pleasures and not for the sake of what
2:33:09they might be able to acquire for him
2:33:12that's why we call him
2:33:15self-indulgent
2:33:18and does so without any
2:33:21regret the incontinent person does not
2:33:24think that she should be pursuing
2:33:27excessive
2:33:29pleasure but she does so because she has
2:33:32a weak
2:33:34will the self-indulgent person thinks
2:33:38that he is precisely the person to do
2:33:43what he does he has the arrogance of
2:33:46thinking well I am doing what I ought to
2:33:48do and I'm precisely the person to do
2:33:54it now let's note that in that
2:33:58continence does
2:34:02not uh the incontinence is continent or
2:34:07a strong will does Den not deny all
2:34:11pleasures this is not an
2:34:13aesthetic response to pleasures it's an
2:34:16inter intermediary position to what
2:34:19Aristotle calls complete ins
2:34:22insensibility that is not finding uh
2:34:26being being
2:34:27dulled or
2:34:29blunted uh over against
2:34:32Pleasures uh it's not it is a middle
2:34:35position the Aristotelian mean between
2:34:39excesses the excesses of
2:34:42denying on self Pleasures altogether and
2:34:45the the excesses of following them
2:34:49succumbing to them against one's better
2:34:52judgment but the practically wise person
2:34:56in the end is the person who knows what
2:34:59he or she should do and acts
2:35:02accordingly the incontinent person is
2:35:06the person or the person who has weak
2:35:08will is the person who is unable to act
2:35:13now in the next lecture we're going to
2:35:15do to to discuss Aristotle's account of
2:35:19friendship which is without a doubt one
2:35:22of the best things that have ever been
2:35:24written on friendship Aristotle gets at
2:35:27the heart of what a
2:35:30true genuine friendship
2:35:33is he describes quite clearly
2:35:37why people have really few genuine
2:35:43friends
2:35:44uh or whereas on the other hand he
2:35:47describes
2:35:49why genuine
2:35:51friendships
2:35:53are as deep-seated and a and and
2:35:56longlasting as they
2:36:05are welcome to lecture
2:36:0925 which deals with Aristotle's
2:36:13conception of friendship as I mentioned
2:36:16this is one
2:36:21of one of the best things that has ever
2:36:25been written on
2:36:26friendship it's in a sense hard to
2:36:29describe it with the appropriate
2:36:31superlative it is just a lovely piece of
2:36:36work
2:36:40Aristotle describes three types of
2:36:44friendship according to the three
2:36:48different
2:36:49relations that one might have toward the
2:36:53object of one's
2:36:55affection in other words the friendships
2:36:58are described in terms of how uh well in
2:37:04terms of the object of one's
2:37:07affection The Good the pleasant and the
2:37:13useful in this sense what is it
2:37:17that
2:37:19underwrites and sustains the Friendship
2:37:23what is the basis for the Friendship
2:37:26what is it that gives the Friendship its
2:37:28Integrity in other words what is its
2:37:30core what holds it together what is the
2:37:34nature of that type of friendship and
2:37:36that is determined in terms of what the
2:37:40object of one's affection
2:37:43is and it's interesting that it doesn't
2:37:46describe it as the individual person but
2:37:49describes it in terms of three different
2:37:52things namely The Good the pleasant and
2:37:57the
2:37:58useful well first let's look let's start
2:38:03at the end and work our way back to the
2:38:07beginning in other words let's start
2:38:09with the
2:38:11useful what Aristotle has in mind here
2:38:16is a type of friendship that is based
2:38:19upon what he calls
2:38:22utility and then he will describe a
2:38:25friendship based upon pleasure and then
2:38:29a friendship based upon the good and
2:38:33it's really the last of these which is
2:38:36the only
2:38:38genuine sense of friendship and as I
2:38:41mentioned at the end of the last
2:38:44lecture it will become clear both why
2:38:49true
2:38:50friendships have genuine
2:38:53depth and Longevity to them and also why
2:38:59they're just not that many friends that
2:39:01one
2:39:04has now turning to the type of
2:39:08friendship we might call a utility based
2:39:13friendship that is one in which
2:39:16what holds the Friendship together what
2:39:20attracts the two friends to one another
2:39:24is the notion of utility or
2:39:30usefulness for instance let's say that
2:39:33Susan likes John now Aristotle in this
2:39:36case always uses the term love so we let
2:39:39let's use that uh without reading too
2:39:42much into what the you know into to love
2:39:44as we normally use it but
2:39:48Susan uh is attracted to John Susan
2:39:51loves
2:39:52John for the sake of
2:39:56utility and in this case what this means
2:40:00is that Susan loves John for the sake of
2:40:06what uh a relationship with John can do
2:40:10for her in other words she loves John
2:40:15for the sake of what is good for
2:40:18Susan this is why we describe this as a
2:40:23utility-based
2:40:24friendship Susan loves John for the sake
2:40:28of
2:40:29utility for the sake of what it will do
2:40:32for her what is good for
2:40:35her in this case utility or
2:40:39usefulness is more like a commercial
2:40:43transaction there is no common Bond or
2:40:47likeness between these
2:40:49Partners beyond the
2:40:52usefulness that the relationship
2:40:56holds for
2:40:58them for each of them
2:41:02individually so such relationships of
2:41:05course will tend to
2:41:07dissolve once one or both partners are
2:41:11no longer useful to the
2:41:14other we can
2:41:17imagine uh someone who cultivates a
2:41:21relationship with some with with
2:41:24somebody specifically and solely for the
2:41:27purpose of career
2:41:30advancement to use the cliche someone
2:41:32might say that Jo you in this case that
2:41:36Susan befriends John because John has a
2:41:41relative who is in a position to really
2:41:45help Advance Susan's
2:41:49career and in this case
2:41:51Susan loves John not for
2:41:56anything uh related to John
2:42:00specifically but for the usefulness that
2:42:03being John's
2:42:05friend has for her in this case because
2:42:09John has a relative and a close relative
2:42:14who is in a position
2:42:16to help Advance Susan's
2:42:19career so in this case there doesn't
2:42:22need to be any real common
2:42:25bond between Susan and
2:42:28John there doesn't have any have to be
2:42:31any likeness or Comm you know no
2:42:34commonality between them beyond the
2:42:37usefulness of the relationship and we
2:42:39could of course imagine that John also
2:42:43would find the usefulness
2:42:45some usefulness in his relationship with
2:42:48Susan we'll assume that it goes both
2:42:51ways the motive for the relationship is
2:42:55no longer present once the
2:42:58usefulness is no longer there so there's
2:43:01no there's no motivation to sustain the
2:43:05relationship so it tends to
2:43:08dissolve
2:43:10why continue the relationship when the
2:43:14purpose of the relationship
2:43:16what it did for Susan herself as an
2:43:19individual irrespective of John and what
2:43:23it did for John as an individual
2:43:26irrespective of
2:43:29Susan well because utility changes
2:43:33usefulness comes and
2:43:35goes partner Partnerships that are based
2:43:39on utility or
2:43:42usefulness will constantly change we can
2:43:46imagine that they would be sort of on
2:43:49again and off again as you Mutual
2:43:54Advantage might arise for the two
2:43:58partners clearly not much of a
2:44:04relationship certainly one that is at
2:44:07best
2:44:09superficial
2:44:12now we can call a a
2:44:19friendship based upon pleasure again a
2:44:22pleasure based
2:44:24friendship in this case Susan loves John
2:44:29not for John's sake or for any intrinsic
2:44:35goodness that she finds in John but
2:44:38simply for the pleasure that she
2:44:42receives from the relationship she has
2:44:45has with
2:44:46John and we can assume for the sake of
2:44:50our example that John is attracted to
2:44:54Susan for precisely the same
2:44:57reason in his case not for her sake or
2:45:02for any intrinsic goodness she find that
2:45:05he finds in her but for the pleasure
2:45:08that he receives from his relationship
2:45:12with
2:45:13Susan Susan Susan loves John for the
2:45:16sake of what is Pleasant to
2:45:19Susan John loves Susan for the sake of
2:45:23what is
2:45:24Pleasant to John she does not love John
2:45:29for the sake of
2:45:30John but because John is Pleasant in
2:45:34other words because she finds pleasure
2:45:38in her relationship with John it's
2:45:43fun I I recall an instance one time in
2:45:47which two
2:45:48people
2:45:50uh got together went out on
2:45:54occasion uh did things together and
2:45:58um sort
2:46:01of what
2:46:03uh some of you might refer to as you
2:46:07know hooking
2:46:09up uh and they um they got
2:46:13together for a while quite often and
2:46:17once I recall they they
2:46:19both got into something of an
2:46:22argument in public it wasn't heated but
2:46:25they got into something of an argument
2:46:26about whether they were going to get
2:46:28together uh on on a given at a given
2:46:32time a few nights later and um one
2:46:36person says to the
2:46:38other why are we doing
2:46:41this why don't we get together at all
2:46:44you don't even like
2:46:46me and frankly I don't really much like
2:46:52you to which the other one
2:46:55responded but of course it's so much
2:46:59fun well in that
2:47:01case we have a
2:47:05friendship based upon pleasure and just
2:47:09like a utility friendship a friendship
2:47:14of pleasure one in which Susan loves
2:47:18John not as and for the person of John
2:47:23but for the pleasure she receives from
2:47:26her relationship with John it is going
2:47:29to be one that is going to be fragile
2:47:33superficial and not particularly
2:47:35longlasting
2:47:37now note that a friendship based on
2:47:42utility or pleasure will
2:47:46dissolve once the ends for which these
2:47:50types of friendship exist are no longer
2:47:54ends which the lover pursues or the
2:47:58friend pursues or once the Beloved no
2:48:02longer provides a means to these ends in
2:48:06the case of utility-based
2:48:09friendship if Susan is attracted to John
2:48:13for the usefulness that that friendship
2:48:16provides her once the end for
2:48:21which she befriends John namely what it
2:48:25can do for her career once that is no
2:48:29longer an end or a goal that John can
2:48:34help her
2:48:36reach then the Friendship is going to
2:48:41dissolve um since John no longer
2:48:46provides the
2:48:48means toward the goal of prevent of of
2:48:53advancing her career since he no longer
2:48:56can
2:48:57contribute one way in which to advance
2:49:00her
2:49:02career then the motive for engaging in a
2:49:08relationship with John no longer exists
2:49:12and of course it's going to dissolve
2:49:15the same will be the casee with pleasure
2:49:19once John no longer finds it pleasurable
2:49:25enjoyable or fun to have a relationship
2:49:29with Susan once a relationship with
2:49:33Susan no longer is a means toward the
2:49:38end or the goal of pleasure or having
2:49:43fun a good
2:49:45time then that particular relationship
2:49:50is going to
2:49:55dissolve and in these cases these goals
2:49:59which are on the one hand utility on the
2:50:02other hand pleasure have objects that
2:50:05are constantly
2:50:08changing I mean after all pleasure is
2:50:11something that can can uh can come and
2:50:16go uh different Pleasures can be pursued
2:50:21at different
2:50:22times Susan
2:50:24may have a current goal of advancing her
2:50:29career but then again she might want to
2:50:33run for for public office and she might
2:50:36then have a goal
2:50:40of seeking public office and uh
2:50:45the usefulness that certain
2:50:47relationships might provide for her to
2:50:51seek public
2:50:55office so these things can constantly
2:50:59change in other words the ends
2:51:02themselves are going to
2:51:04fluctuate and they're not going to
2:51:06endure in fact they will be quite
2:51:12fleeting now before we pause let's pause
2:51:17and think about these before we move
2:51:20over to uh the third type of of
2:51:26friendship which is based upon
2:51:31goodness with the third type of
2:51:34friendship a friendship that is that is
2:51:37based upon or grounded in the good we
2:51:41come to what is genuinely and firstly a
2:51:45true
2:51:47friendship this is a friendship that is
2:51:49based on the goodness of the one in with
2:51:54whom the one you befriend the one who is
2:51:59the object of your
2:52:03affection Aristotle calls this a perfect
2:52:07friendship in book 8 section 3 and in
2:52:10book 8 section 4 he calls it a
2:52:13friendship that is a friendship firstly
2:52:17and in the most proper sense so it's
2:52:21clear that Aristotle really
2:52:24considers a friendship based upon
2:52:27goodness the goodness that one finds in
2:52:32the one that you befriend in the one in
2:52:35which you enter the
2:52:39relationship this is a true
2:52:42friendship now in this this case note
2:52:45its
2:52:46characteristics and we're going to go
2:52:48through four of these uh one of at least
2:52:53one of which is going to to be a bit
2:52:58controversial or at least controversial
2:53:01in the sense that it's going to be
2:53:03difficult for us to to understand given
2:53:06the soci the type of society in which we
2:53:11live but first of all in a friendship
2:53:16that is based on the good the true
2:53:20proper perfect
2:53:23friendship Susan loves John for the for
2:53:26the sake or Susan loves John for the
2:53:31intrinsic goodness that John
2:53:35possesses and the same will'll say with
2:53:38regard to John he is attracted to Susan
2:53:42he loves her for the intrinsic goodness
2:53:45that he sees in
2:53:47her Susan loves John by reason of his
2:53:52own
2:53:56nature and John loves Susan precisely in
2:54:01the same way they love each other in
2:54:04Aristotle's words in book 8 section 4
2:54:10they love each other quote by reason of
2:54:13Their Own
2:54:14nature and not
2:54:20incidentally so the
2:54:23Friendship is between two people both
2:54:27are of whom are good
2:54:30people and they are
2:54:34alike they are alike one another in
2:54:37terms of virtue or
2:54:39Excellence because J John is attracted
2:54:42to Susan because she is a intrinsically
2:54:47good
2:54:49person she has become a good person in
2:54:52the development of a virtuous
2:54:55life and vice
2:54:58versa she loves him because John has
2:55:03become a good
2:55:05person and in his life and in his
2:55:08actions he
2:55:10displays a virtuous
2:55:13character a genuine
2:55:17goodness so this is the first
2:55:19characteristic Susan loves John for the
2:55:23intrinsic goodness that John himself
2:55:27possesses and John loves her for the
2:55:30same reason the intrinsic goodness that
2:55:34she
2:55:36possesses
2:55:38secondly with true friends there is a
2:55:42likeness between them
2:55:45and that likeness is their own intrinsic
2:55:52goodness this is something they share
2:55:55and that ties them
2:55:58together lightess also exists in other
2:56:02types of friendship but AR Aristotle
2:56:06notes that this this
2:56:09characterizes bad people as well that is
2:56:13even bad people can have likenesses
2:56:16between one
2:56:17another but that likeness is simply the
2:56:21mut the mutual
2:56:22utility that they share or the mutual
2:56:26pleasure they share in spending time
2:56:29with one another as we see two bad
2:56:35people two people of bad
2:56:39character can come together and form a
2:56:43friendly
2:56:45relationship based upon pleasure or
2:56:52utility but the likeness among true
2:56:56friends those based in a friendship of
2:57:01goodness is of course of Greater
2:57:05depth so the Friendship of the
2:57:09good is only is the only proper
2:57:13friendship
2:57:14and others are called friendship that
2:57:19is those relationships based upon
2:57:23utility or pleasure only because of some
2:57:27resemblance to what is a real friendship
2:57:32now we can see that there is some
2:57:33resemblance because there is there is
2:57:36something that the two friends
2:57:38share they there is something they they
2:57:42each see in one another other but in
2:57:45each in this case it happens to be
2:57:47simply the pleasure that one can get
2:57:51from being associated or involved with
2:57:53or spending time with the other or the
2:57:57usefulness that one individual can get
2:58:00out of the
2:58:02Friendship
2:58:04thirdly Susan loves John for John's sake
2:58:09on account of John's intrinsic goodness
2:58:14and the fact that because he is a good
2:58:17person of good character he is
2:58:23lovable she loves John for John's sake
2:58:27not for her own
2:58:31sake
2:58:33now this is a marked contrast obviously
2:58:39with the first two types of friendship
2:58:41because as we noted in a friendship
2:58:45based upon utility Susan loves
2:58:49John based upon what that
2:58:53relationship with John can do for her
2:58:57she loves John for the sake of what is
2:58:59good for
2:59:01Susan and in the case of
2:59:04pleasure she doesn't love John for
2:59:06John's own sake but for the pleasure
2:59:10that she receives from the relationship
2:59:13with John
2:59:16but here Susan loves John that is in the
2:59:19case of a true
2:59:22friendship Susan loves John for John's
2:59:25own sake and not for her own sake on
2:59:29account of his intrinsic goodness and
2:59:34his being
2:59:38lovable now note that this that this
2:59:42particular point
2:59:44requires that we not read Aristotle as
2:59:47an egoist that is as someone who says
2:59:51that we should always pursue our own
2:59:53best interest
2:59:56otherwise the discussion of of
2:59:58friendship will be inconsistent with
3:00:01other parts of the
3:00:05ethics
3:00:07now fourthly we come
3:00:11to a point of
3:00:14controversy at least when I say of
3:00:17controversy because we come to a point
3:00:20that is difficult for us to accept or to
3:00:26understand and that is because Aristotle
3:00:30lived in a class-based
3:00:34society uh not the type of society we
3:00:38have here at least not those of us who
3:00:41live in the West and we'll see what I
3:00:44mean in a
3:00:47moment fourthly friendship exists among
3:00:54equals that is equal in social
3:01:02position and Excellence that is in
3:01:06virtue note this again friendship exists
3:01:10among equals and by equal he means not
3:01:13only equal in the sense of virtue or
3:01:17Excellence but also equal in social
3:01:23position as Aristotle says to use a
3:01:26stark example one can't be a friend of a
3:01:33slave in terms that is a slave uh when
3:01:39one treats the other as a slave but only
3:01:43with a Slave slave when one considers
3:01:46the other person as a human
3:01:51being if inequality exists then the love
3:01:56between the friends should be
3:02:00proportional that is the more excellent
3:02:03lover will give less and receive more in
3:02:09return
3:02:11now this is difficult
3:02:14for us to understand specifically
3:02:19because we do not live in a class-based
3:02:25society in fact the closest we can get
3:02:29to the notion of
3:02:31class in our country we would have to go
3:02:36to the East Coast or to the
3:02:38southeast being here in the west it's
3:02:42very difficult to understand understand
3:02:43that
3:02:46term but when you live in the in in the
3:02:50Southeast the Old South there is this
3:02:54notion of class just like there is in
3:02:56New
3:02:57England I mean think of the case of
3:02:59Charles Emerson
3:03:01Winchester in the mash
3:03:04episodes Charles Emerson
3:03:07Winchester came from obviously very blue
3:03:11blood old family New
3:03:15England Trace his ancestry back to early
3:03:19settlers of this
3:03:21country and Charles thought of himself
3:03:25as inherently
3:03:27Superior to many other people not
3:03:31because he was smarter and more talented
3:03:33which of course he was but because as he
3:03:36said of his
3:03:39breeding so in this sense we can imagine
3:03:42Charles trying to bring some young woman
3:03:46home to visit his
3:03:47family who was not of the proper social
3:03:51class or
3:03:54position the same thing used to exist
3:03:56and probably and still does to some
3:03:59extent but used to exist in the
3:04:02South where there was this sense of
3:04:06class where there were still vestiges
3:04:10as in New England of old a
3:04:14aristocracy where people of
3:04:18different social class could not be
3:04:21genuine friends because they were not
3:04:25equals they were not
3:04:29equals you would not
3:04:32find it
3:04:34allowable in some families for a person
3:04:38to marry below his or her class
3:04:44it was just not acceptable and this of
3:04:46course is something Aristotle recognizes
3:04:49because he lives in a
3:04:52stratified
3:04:54Society he lives in a society in which
3:04:57social class
3:04:59imposition is taken
3:05:02seriously but being here in the west
3:05:06this notion of
3:05:09class uh is much more foreign to
3:05:14to the society here people may
3:05:19distinguish themselves from others in
3:05:22terms of
3:05:23wealth but not in terms of class unless
3:05:28class is become synonymous with
3:05:32wealth class
3:05:34distinctions just don't seem to be
3:05:38applicable as much
3:05:40here as they are in the South or in New
3:05:46England but Aristotle maintains of
3:05:50course that friendship exists among
3:05:53equals that is equal in social position
3:05:58and Excellence or virtue and as he
3:06:02stated as I mentioned if inequality
3:06:05exists then the love between friends
3:06:08should be proportional in other
3:06:12words what one gives to the other and
3:06:15receives from the other should balance
3:06:18out according to the
3:06:22inequality between them there should be
3:06:25an effort to balance that
3:06:27inequality so the more excellent lover
3:06:32will give less and receive more
3:06:35love making love proportional to the
3:06:39Merit of the partners produces as I
3:06:42mentioned balance or
3:06:45equality characteristic of
3:06:50friendships so if there is some social
3:06:53inequality or one person is genuinely a
3:06:57better person of Greater character than
3:07:00the
3:07:01other then something has to be done in
3:07:05the Friendship to balance out this
3:07:11inequality so again this this is because
3:07:14Aristotle has as I said a stratified or
3:07:17a hierarchical view of human
3:07:21society so let's pause at this point and
3:07:24come back and then finish our
3:07:31discussion let's
3:07:33note some other components of this type
3:07:36of friendship that Aristotle
3:07:40describes as he
3:07:42notes as he says at
3:07:451169 A1 12 lines 12 and 13 that's 11
3:07:5269a 12 lines 12 and
3:07:5613 a good man should be a lover of
3:08:00self for he will both himself profit by
3:08:04doing Noble deeds and will benefit his
3:08:08fellows notice what Aristotle says again
3:08:12here
3:08:13a good man should be a lover of self for
3:08:18he will both himself profit by doing
3:08:22Noble
3:08:23deeds and will benefit his
3:08:26fellows end of
3:08:30citation it's obvious here what
3:08:33Aristotle does not
3:08:37mean he rejects those that assign to
3:08:40themselves a greater share of or give
3:08:45preference concerning wealth honors and
3:08:49bodily
3:08:52Pleasures he rejects the idea rejects
3:08:55those who think that they should be
3:08:58given a
3:09:01preferential
3:09:03share
3:09:05of wealth honor or bodily
3:09:10Pleasures this is not what he means by a
3:09:13lover of self but rather a lover of Self
3:09:17in the proper
3:09:19sense that is that includes at least two
3:09:23things
3:09:25one is the the person who loves herself
3:09:32properly assigns to herself things that
3:09:36are the most noble and
3:09:39best in other words she pursues those
3:09:42things things which it would be most
3:09:45noble to pursue those things that will
3:09:48enhance her character make her a better
3:09:52person and secondly she obeys
3:09:57reason or what is the most authoritative
3:10:00element within
3:10:03herself that is one who loves the most
3:10:07noble and authoritative element within
3:10:11humankind is a lover of self now notice
3:10:16back recall back in book one section 7
3:10:21Aristotle talked about what is
3:10:24distinctive about
3:10:26human uh about human nature in terms of
3:10:30the function of human beings as rational
3:10:33creatures and this
3:10:35being the most noble and distinctive
3:10:38element of humankind but the one
3:10:44the person who
3:10:46loves herself in the proper way will
3:10:50obey her
3:10:53reason or obey that element within her
3:10:57which is most
3:11:00authoritative she will love that aspect
3:11:04of her which is most
3:11:07noble and most authoritative part of
3:11:11herself this is a true lover of
3:11:15self now note earlier in the same
3:11:18chapter that is in book n chapter 8 or
3:11:21Section 8 Aristotle maintains that a
3:11:25good person acts for the sake of Honor
3:11:30acts for honor's sake and the more so
3:11:35the better he
3:11:37is and he acts for his friend's sake and
3:11:41sacrifices his own
3:11:46self-interest note
3:11:48also at the end
3:11:51of book nine Section 8 that Aristotle
3:11:56claims that one way to
3:11:59allow that one note note that Aristotle
3:12:03claims that one may allow a friend to
3:12:05perform ethical actions that is giving
3:12:10them to the friend to perform instead of
3:12:14doing them
3:12:17oneself because it's considered more
3:12:21noble to be the cause of another
3:12:24person's Noble action than to perform
3:12:29the action oneself now that is a true
3:12:32sense of acting or treating the person
3:12:37uh for the sake of that person instead
3:12:39of One's Own Self when one gives to the
3:12:43other person the opportunity to
3:12:46develop his or her character in a good
3:12:50way instead of taking that opportunity
3:12:55oneself that is a true sense of
3:12:59self-sacrifice in giving for the sake of
3:13:02the
3:13:04friend now
3:13:06earlier Aristotle had indicated that the
3:13:09relation between friends
3:13:13is modeled in the relation a good person
3:13:17has to herself or
3:13:20himself for
3:13:23example opinions that are har opinions
3:13:27that are
3:13:28harmonious and
3:13:30desire their opinions are harmonious or
3:13:33one's opinions are harmonious and desire
3:13:36the same thing with all her
3:13:39soul she wishes what is good for her
3:13:43herself she wishes for herself what is
3:13:46good in what seems
3:13:49good and does what is good and does it
3:13:52for its own
3:13:58sake meaning that she does it for that
3:14:02element within
3:14:04herself which is most noble and
3:14:06genuinely human that is her
3:14:11reason
3:14:13and she wishes to live and be preserved
3:14:16and preserved especially this element of
3:14:21rationality that lays at that lies at
3:14:24the basis of
3:14:26virtue now we can see here why Aristotle
3:14:30is talking about a friendship that has a
3:14:36depth
3:14:37that ad depth to it that one cannot have
3:14:42with that many
3:14:44people it's a type of friendship that
3:14:46you not only are attracted to the
3:14:49goodness of the other person but you
3:14:52love that person for the sake of his or
3:14:56her
3:14:57goodness and you were willing to in a
3:15:00sense put that person first to give
3:15:04yourself to the other person and to
3:15:07sacrifice
3:15:08yourself for the sake of her good
3:15:14rare friendships indeed but you can see
3:15:17why this type of a friendship that that
3:15:20Aristotle calls the perfect friendship
3:15:24the proper friendship the true
3:15:26friendship is one that is of genuine
3:15:31endurance if you have a friend like this
3:15:35and it is likely that you do at least
3:15:38have a
3:15:40few it's a type of friend ship that is
3:15:43not dependent upon you seeing the person
3:15:45all the time you might have a type of
3:15:48friendship this type of Friendship with
3:15:50someone that for geographical purposes
3:15:54you don't get to see that
3:15:57often but yet it is it is the type of
3:16:00friendship that when you you meet one
3:16:03another and spend time again after
3:16:06having been apart or having not seen
3:16:09each other for a year or two you pick up
3:16:12right where you left
3:16:14off I am fortunate to have a few of
3:16:18these
3:16:19friendships it's the type of friendship
3:16:21that you have with someone that you no
3:16:24doubt would give your life
3:16:27for um true genuine friendship indeed
3:16:33when you love someone not just for the
3:16:35other person's sake but for the sake of
3:16:38the true goodness that that person has
3:16:43and when that person loves you for the
3:16:47same
3:16:48reason you really have a depth and an
3:16:53intimacy that is rare but indeed highly
3:17:00rewarding now we're going to move for
3:17:03our last
3:17:05lecture on Aristotle's ethics to book 10
3:17:09book 10 is quite different
3:17:13from the remaining from the previous
3:17:16nine books because early in in the first
3:17:20in in the first nine books or
3:17:23chapters of Aristotle's ethics he talks
3:17:27about The Virtuous life in terms of good
3:17:32citizenship in the sense of
3:17:35cultivating the social
3:17:38virtues but here in book 10
3:17:43Aristotle all of a sudden begins to talk
3:17:46about happiness in a different way
3:17:49instead of Happiness being
3:17:53uh an
3:17:56Excellence a human flourishing in the
3:17:59pursuit of good citizenship in the
3:18:03pursuit of excellence and social the the
3:18:06social
3:18:07virtues here Aristotle is going to say
3:18:10that happiness is something quite
3:18:13different
3:18:17contemplation the the cultivation not of
3:18:20practical rationality or the pursuit of
3:18:23practical wisdom but of theoretical
3:18:28reason the contemplation of the ultimate
3:18:32principles on which the universe is
3:18:36based and this has led many scholars
3:18:40to uh
3:18:42to consider the possibility and some to
3:18:45argue for for this
3:18:48view that book 10 is was written
3:18:53separately and on a different
3:18:55occasion from the first nine
3:18:58books that is that book 10 is not
3:19:01consistent with books
3:19:041-9 we will look at this view that
3:19:07happiness is contemplation in our next
3:19:11lecture and we'll also consider whether
3:19:14or not it is consistent with books 1-9
3:19:19in other
3:19:20words does Aristotle's Noman ethics have
3:19:25an
3:19:27Integrity that holds them all together a
3:19:30single uni Unity or do we have an
3:19:34inconsistency within the text
3:19:37itself I will
3:19:41present
3:19:43reasons for holding that indeed there is
3:19:48a consistency in the text so to that we
3:19:52will turn in the next and final lecture
3:19:56on
3:19:58Aristotle welcome to lecture 26 which is
3:20:02the final lecture on
3:20:05Aristotle and in this lecture we will
3:20:10deal with uh Aristotle's conception of
3:20:14Happiness as he unpacks that in book
3:20:2010 and as I mentioned at the end of the
3:20:23last lecture we are presented with a
3:20:25difficulty with a problem uh that has
3:20:30concerned Aristotle Scholars uh for a
3:20:33considerable amount of time and is still
3:20:36an issue that is that is cons is
3:20:38considered somewhat unresolved
3:20:41unresolved in the sense that there is
3:20:43not a complete and full consensus on how
3:20:46to deal with the problem and the problem
3:20:49basically is uh the position that book
3:20:5310 has
3:20:56within the course of Aristotle's Noman
3:21:01ethics as a whole because B book 10
3:21:05seems to uh present to
3:21:09us a view of happiness that
3:21:13is quite a departure from what we have
3:21:17seen in the
3:21:20earlier books of the
3:21:23ethics and it is there is enough of a
3:21:27discontinuity between books 1 through n
3:21:31or books 2 through nine specifically and
3:21:34book 10 to lead some Scholars to
3:21:39question whether book 10 was added much
3:21:41much later uh some to to claim that book
3:21:4610 renders the entire uh ethics uh uh
3:21:52inconsistent and so forth but we're
3:21:54going to try to uh get clear about what
3:21:57Aristotle has to say here and uh I think
3:22:01we can at least
3:22:03present uh a a a a resolution of the
3:22:08problem that I mentioned here in the
3:22:10beginning but let's take a closer look
3:22:13at this
3:22:15problem the problem we face is that of
3:22:20the relation between book 10 of the
3:22:23Noman ethics and the rest of the Noman
3:22:28ethics recall that in book one Aristotle
3:22:33argues that happiness is an activity in
3:22:37Conformity with
3:22:40virtue um call of course for Aristotle a
3:22:44virtue is a pattern of
3:22:46behavior it is um
3:22:50less a psychological State and more a
3:22:56way of living a way of doing things a
3:23:01way of uh guiding one's everyday
3:23:06activities and this stress is on acting
3:23:09what you do in the way in which you do
3:23:12it so
3:23:15happiness
3:23:17is a life that is a flourishing life a
3:23:22life that is fulfilling in the sense
3:23:24that
3:23:26one uh arrives at a goal of becoming a
3:23:31person of good sound virtuous
3:23:36character
3:23:38but so here in books two through book
3:23:43books
3:23:44nine Aristotle proceeds
3:23:47to describe happiness as a life devoted
3:23:51to civic
3:23:53virtue a life of good
3:23:56citizenship suggesting of course that
3:23:59happiness is the second life that is
3:24:03mentioned in book one section five if
3:24:08you recall he states that there are
3:24:10three types of life there is the life in
3:24:13pursuit of pleasure which he hardly
3:24:17considers it worthy of being called
3:24:19happiness because remember happiness is
3:24:24uh understood as flourishing as
3:24:29udonia he mentions the second kind of
3:24:33Life of course which is a life lived in
3:24:37the pursuit of virtue particularly the
3:24:39social virtues but but but a life
3:24:43devoted to civic virtue to being a good
3:24:48citizen in one's
3:24:50country this is this suggest of course
3:24:53as I mentioned strongly that happiness
3:24:56is this second kind of life now note the
3:25:00point here happiness is the second kind
3:25:04of Life Aristotle mentions in book one
3:25:10section five
3:25:12a life devoted to civic
3:25:15virtue and there's a strong there
3:25:18there's a strong indication that that's
3:25:20exactly what uh Aristotle has in mind
3:25:24this exactly what he intends because he
3:25:27spins books 2 through n
3:25:32in explicating what that type of Life of
3:25:38civic virtue involves
3:25:43but in book 10 Aristotle says that
3:25:47happiness is
3:25:51contemplation notice I said that he that
3:25:54Aristotle says that happiness is
3:25:59contemplation now book one chapter 5 or
3:26:03section five had listed contemplation as
3:26:08a third life but post poned any
3:26:12discussion of
3:26:13it in fact we find uh no discussion of
3:26:18it at all no mention of it in books
3:26:232-9 but in book 10 particularly section
3:26:29seven and 8 Aristotle
3:26:32argues for the
3:26:36equation of happiness and
3:26:39contemplation or for the
3:26:44superiority of
3:26:46contemplation so it looks like that that
3:26:49either Aristotle has stated that
3:26:52happiness that is in books in book 10
3:26:55section 7 and 8 he's either stated that
3:26:58happiness is to be identified with
3:27:01contemplation
3:27:03or a weaker
3:27:07statement
3:27:08that contemplation is a superior form of
3:27:13human
3:27:15flourishing now the argument Aristotle
3:27:19offers in book 10 section 7 and 8 argues
3:27:24from the claim that intellectual
3:27:27activity is the highest activity of
3:27:32humankind in fact as we will see in in
3:27:36Section 8 he argues
3:27:39that intellectual activity
3:27:41has to be the highest form of human
3:27:44activity
3:27:46because it is an activity that is more
3:27:50like what the gods do it is uh there is
3:27:53a likeness between intellectual
3:27:57activity more accurate the pursuit of
3:28:00theoretical
3:28:03reason and the activity of the
3:28:07Gods so
3:28:10note uh uh this passage from book
3:28:1410 um Noman ethics
3:28:221177a starting on line
3:28:2716 Aristotle writes the activity of this
3:28:32that is the intellect in accordance with
3:28:36its proper Excellence that is
3:28:39contemplation will be be
3:28:42complete that is perfect
3:28:46happiness that this activity is
3:28:49contemplative we have already
3:28:54said note the passage again Noman ethics
3:28:591177a beginning on line
3:29:0316 the activity of the intellect in
3:29:06accordance with its proper
3:29:10excellence will
3:29:12be complete or perfect
3:29:17happiness that this activity is
3:29:21contemplative we have already
3:29:24said so here is our
3:29:29problem Aristotle develops a conception
3:29:32of Happiness as a life devoted to civic
3:29:36virtue that is activity in Conformity
3:29:40with virtue
3:29:42over a lifetime and he does this
3:29:46from books
3:29:482-9 living your life in a virt living a
3:29:53virtuous life over an entire
3:29:57lifetime but in book 10 section 7 and 8
3:30:03Aristotle states that happiness or
3:30:06perfect happiness that is happiness that
3:30:09is complete
3:30:12is a different type of activity namely
3:30:19contemplation now for and and notice a
3:30:23different activity which which exercises
3:30:27or involves the exercise of a different
3:30:31type of reason or
3:30:34rationality the life of civic
3:30:37virtue is a life in which one becomes
3:30:41practically
3:30:43wise or one attempts to become and to
3:30:46develop oneself into a practically wise
3:30:51person the stress being on practical
3:30:54reason practical
3:30:57rationality but here in book 10 we have
3:31:01happiness is or perfect complete
3:31:05happiness is going to be a life of
3:31:09contemplation
3:31:12and so we have a life in the pursuit of
3:31:16or the exercise of theoretical
3:31:21reason one's effort to contemplate think
3:31:24about
3:31:25investigate the
3:31:28ultimate immutable Eternal principles of
3:31:31the
3:31:34universe
3:31:36so it looks as though when Aristotle
3:31:39says in section s and 8 of book 10 that
3:31:44happiness or per perfect happiness is a
3:31:47type of activity namely is a different
3:31:50type of activity namely
3:31:54contemplation he has shifted his
3:31:56emphasis from practical activity to
3:31:59theoretical
3:32:02activity so the question
3:32:05arises is there a conflict between books
3:32:122-9 and book 10
3:32:16particularly sections 7 and 8 of book 10
3:32:20where Aristotle argues for the
3:32:25superiority of
3:32:27contemplation or
3:32:30perhaps the stronger claim that
3:32:33happiness
3:32:34is contemplation meaning real happiness
3:32:39is
3:32:39contemplation
3:32:42so is there a conflict between books 2-9
3:32:45and book 10 or more
3:32:49specifically is there a conflict between
3:32:53book
3:32:54one section
3:32:577 that pivotal section that uh where uh
3:33:02Aristotle argues for happiness as an
3:33:06activity in conformity in Conformity
3:33:10with ver
3:33:11virtue that becomes the basis
3:33:14for sections
3:33:172-9
3:33:20and book 10 sections 7 and 8 again more
3:33:26specifically is there a conflict between
3:33:29book 1.7 book one section 7 and book 10
3:33:34section 7 and
3:33:378 and if so if there is a conflict here
3:33:41how serious is this
3:33:43conflict if there's a tension here how
3:33:48serious is this
3:33:50tension is it serious enough to
3:33:53undermine the unity of Aristotle's
3:33:59ethics now addressing this
3:34:02issue uh is not simply a matter of
3:34:06trying to look at and perhaps resolve a
3:34:10scholar ly
3:34:11dispute that sort of thing is not the
3:34:14purpose of our work in this
3:34:17course but addressing this issue does
3:34:22will have the benefit of enabling us to
3:34:27clarify Aristotle's overall conception
3:34:30of
3:34:31happiness and to do so in a way that
3:34:34allows not only for the unity of the
3:34:38Noman ethics and the consistency between
3:34:43book one chapter 7 or section 7 and book
3:34:4810 section 7 and
3:34:508 but also for the claim that both a
3:34:55life of civic virtue and a life of
3:35:00contemplation or philosophical Pursuits
3:35:04are happy
3:35:05lives so I have put my cards on the
3:35:09table in terms of where I stand on this
3:35:15so-called scholarly program and I've
3:35:17identified what I think uh is can be uh
3:35:22can be defended as a part of Aristotle's
3:35:25overall
3:35:27view so again we're going we need to
3:35:30look at the relationship between book
3:35:33one and book SE in book 10 that will
3:35:37enable us to do a few
3:35:41things number one to clarify Aristotle's
3:35:45overall conception of
3:35:48happiness and to do so in a way that
3:35:52allows for the unity of his overall
3:35:57ethics and a consistency between book
3:36:01one and book
3:36:0210 but secondly also for the claim
3:36:08that a life of Civic virtue is
3:36:13happiness a life
3:36:16pursued in accordance with civic virtue
3:36:20is a happy life it is a life that we
3:36:23could say is a is one of human
3:36:27flourishing but
3:36:29also a life of com contemplation a life
3:36:33of of philosophical Pursuits or we might
3:36:37say in in uh you know in today's life
3:36:40language a life
3:36:44of a life pursuing uh philosophy
3:36:49specifically
3:36:51metaphysics that tries to get at the
3:36:53ultimate nature of
3:36:55reality or the life of the theoretical
3:36:59physicist is also a happy
3:37:02life now one of the things we'll have to
3:37:05do is to say is
3:37:09there is is there a hierarchical
3:37:12ordering between these two types of Life
3:37:16both of them we will see are lives that
3:37:19can be described as happy as
3:37:23flourishing but is one superior to the
3:37:26other and we will see indeed that is the
3:37:30case so let us pause for a moment and we
3:37:33will
3:37:34return and begin to tackle these
3:37:38specific issues
3:37:41let's begin by noting the possible ways
3:37:45in which these two conceptions of
3:37:49Happiness might
3:37:51conflict that is the that we will call
3:37:53them the life of civic virtue and the
3:37:57life of
3:38:00contemplation the argument in book 10
3:38:04section
3:38:067 uh for the superiority of
3:38:09contemplation
3:38:11points out that Civic life is more
3:38:16dependent number one on the basic
3:38:19necessities of life and number two on
3:38:24other people to provide the
3:38:26opportunity to exercise virtue that is
3:38:30to exhibit Justice For
3:38:34example now clearly that seems there's a
3:38:37sense in which this is
3:38:39correct
3:38:41if I
3:38:43am so
3:38:45preoccupied because of the lack of the
3:38:50basic necessities of life for myself and
3:38:53my
3:38:54family if all most or all of my
3:38:58energy is devoted
3:39:02squarely with
3:39:06providing a life for my family I don't
3:39:10have the
3:39:13opportunity to engage in some of the
3:39:17activities that would go into a life of
3:39:21civic
3:39:22virtue let's suppose that I have to work
3:39:26multiple jobs simply to provide a roof
3:39:31over a
3:39:33roof for my family and food on the table
3:39:38I don't have the opportunity for
3:39:39communic Comm involvement I'm spending
3:39:42all of my time simply keeping
3:39:46them alive and keeping
3:39:49them
3:39:51nourished um so that's this in the sense
3:39:54in which this seems to be quite clearly
3:39:57the case also uh it's very difficult for
3:40:01me to exhibit Justice unless I have
3:40:05interactions with other
3:40:08people so there's a sense in which the
3:40:13life uh uh happiness or the life of
3:40:16civic
3:40:17virtue is more dependent upon the basic
3:40:20necessities of life and other people to
3:40:23provide opportunities to exhibit Justice
3:40:28For
3:40:29example but does that mean that civic
3:40:33virtue and
3:40:35contemplation can
3:40:37conflict that is in such a a way that
3:40:41there could be cases in which one should
3:40:46foro one's civic duty and rather pursue
3:40:52a life of
3:40:55contemplation that is cases in which
3:41:00doing one's civic duty would
3:41:03interrupt
3:41:05contemplation and therefore not fulfill
3:41:08civic duty
3:41:12in other words to put it a little more
3:41:16bluntly uh does community involvement
3:41:20and service to my
3:41:23community become an obstacle for
3:41:27philosophical or scientific
3:41:30theoretically theoretical scientific
3:41:34Pursuits now note that Aristotle never
3:41:39says never
3:41:41says that one should always pursue
3:41:46contemplation when one is forced to
3:41:49choose between civic duty and
3:41:54contemplation but even if one
3:41:57should pursue civic
3:42:00duty that does not alter the fact that
3:42:04one's life will be less happy
3:42:12now let's note this again this again
3:42:14we're talking about an argument for the
3:42:18superiority of
3:42:22contemplation even though Aristotle
3:42:25never says that everyone should pursue
3:42:27contemplation should pursue that sort of
3:42:31life when one is in a position to have
3:42:36to make a choice between civic duty and
3:42:41contemplation but even if you choose
3:42:44civic
3:42:46duty you will have a happy
3:42:50life on the other hand that does not
3:42:54alter the fact that your life will be
3:42:57less happy than it would have been had
3:43:01you pursued the life of
3:43:05contemplation notice that the claim that
3:43:10a life devoted solely to civic
3:43:13duty and therefore to the cultivation
3:43:17and exercise of practical virtues is
3:43:22described as less
3:43:26happy and note that the passage cited
3:43:30earlier that
3:43:32is at
3:43:341177a starting on line
3:43:3816 that AOS writes there that
3:43:42contemplative activity leads to the most
3:43:46complete and perfect
3:43:50happiness now this suggests that the
3:43:55life of civic virtue could be happy as
3:44:00well just a secondary form of of
3:44:06Happiness so let's pause for a moment
3:44:09moment and consider an
3:44:15example a life of service to
3:44:21God well in the Middle Ages we could
3:44:25understand a life devoted to the service
3:44:27to God as one in
3:44:30which uh one as Jesus said fed the
3:44:37Sheep a life in which you were
3:44:40in which one is
3:44:43engaged in worship but also in
3:44:48Ministry to people in one's
3:44:54Community feeding the poor
3:44:58Etc but there's also the life
3:45:02of uninterrupted service to God in the
3:45:07monastery in which in which one pursues
3:45:10the life of
3:45:14prayer now we might say that both of
3:45:17those are in service to
3:45:21God but analogous to Aristotle's
3:45:26example one would be a superior form of
3:45:32service
3:45:33namely the life of
3:45:36prayer so you can see by this anal ology
3:45:40what Aristotle has in mind but both just
3:45:44as both types of service would be
3:45:48genuine service to
3:45:51God both
3:45:54legitimate ways in which to live one's
3:45:58life devoted to
3:46:02God
3:46:05Aristotle's conception of
3:46:08Happiness allow ows for both the
3:46:11contemplative life and the life in
3:46:14pursuit of civic virtue to be
3:46:18considered flourishing or happy
3:46:23lives so as I
3:46:25said the passage at
3:46:291177a starting on line 16 again which
3:46:32says the activity of the intellect in
3:46:36accordance with its proper excellence
3:46:39will be will be complete happiness that
3:46:44this activity is contemplative we've
3:46:46already
3:46:48said I mean if you say this is complete
3:46:51note he's saying here that this is
3:46:52complete or perfect
3:46:54happiness he's not saying that it
3:46:58is
3:47:01happiness in other words he's saying
3:47:04that it is compar it is happiness in a
3:47:07comparative sense there's another form
3:47:10of Happiness this one contemplation is
3:47:13perfect and
3:47:16complete rather than
3:47:18saying contemplation happy or happiness
3:47:22is
3:47:23contemplation and nothing else is a form
3:47:27of
3:47:28Happiness so Aristotle seems to
3:47:33affirm the life of civic virtue could be
3:47:37indeed happy just a secondary form and
3:47:42this this he seems to affirm
3:47:45in uh a
3:47:47few lines further down from the previous
3:47:52quote um
3:47:55in book 10 Section
3:47:598
3:48:011177
3:48:03b nine lines N9 and 10 Aristotle
3:48:10but in a secondary degree the life in
3:48:14accordance with the other kind of
3:48:18Excellence is
3:48:20happy for the activities in accordance
3:48:23with this beit our human
3:48:28estate let me repeat that again but in a
3:48:31secondary degree the life in accordance
3:48:34with the other kind of Excellence is
3:48:36happy for the activities in a accordance
3:48:40with this beit our human estate so if
3:48:45both the second and the third types of
3:48:48lives a life of civic virtue a life of
3:48:53contemplation can be described as
3:48:56happy perhaps there is no
3:49:00inconsistency
3:49:01between books 10 section 7 and
3:49:058 and the rest of the Noman ethics
3:49:10the bulk of the ethics is devoted to
3:49:14giving an account of the second type of
3:49:18life but this is quite
3:49:22consistent with Aristotle's
3:49:25claim that the life of contemplation is
3:49:28one that very few people can pursue
3:49:34consistently and with endurance
3:49:40some of us are
3:49:43simply most suited to a life of civic
3:49:49virtue so the question remains how this
3:49:54consistency can be shown to follow from
3:49:57Aristotle's conception of
3:50:00happiness and to do so in a way that
3:50:04preserves the superiority of
3:50:08contemplation
3:50:10now to tackle this we're going to return
3:50:14to book one section 7 and two arguments
3:50:21number
3:50:22one that the ultimate end of human life
3:50:26is
3:50:27Happiness and happiness understood not
3:50:32as the pursuit of pleasure wealth and
3:50:38honor but but an activity in Conformity
3:50:42with virtue or right
3:50:47reason so the first argument that the
3:50:50ultimate
3:50:52form argument that that will defend the
3:50:56claim that the ultimate end of human
3:50:58happiness of human life is Happiness and
3:51:00happiness understood not as the pursuit
3:51:03of pleasure wealth and honor but an
3:51:07activity in Conformity with virtue or
3:51:10right
3:51:11reason and the second argument which is
3:51:15the which we refer to is the function
3:51:17argument that identifies the proper end
3:51:20of human activity and then shows that
3:51:25that end or goal conforms to the
3:51:30distinct function of human
3:51:34beings again the function argument that
3:51:37identifies the proper end of of human
3:51:39activity and then shows that that end or
3:51:43goal conforms to the distinct function
3:51:48of human
3:51:50beings so let's start with the ultimate
3:51:55end the first of the
3:51:57two notice that Aristotle's argument in
3:52:01the early paragraphs of book one section
3:52:057 and it would may I pause and say it
3:52:09would benefit you that uh for you to go
3:52:12back and and uh
3:52:14review
3:52:16those uh those paragraphs in book in in
3:52:21book one section
3:52:237 so notice that Aristotle's argument in
3:52:27the early paragraphs of book one section
3:52:307 establishes a framework for a a
3:52:36hierarchy or a scale of ends organized
3:52:42around the forsake of relation a
3:52:47relation we can describe as uh a for the
3:52:51sake of type of
3:52:54relation a perfect end or goal would be
3:52:58one that is not pursued for the sake of
3:53:00anything
3:53:02else it would not be a means to some
3:53:05further
3:53:06end but the most perfect end would be
3:53:10the one that could be pursued only for
3:53:13itself and could not be pursued for the
3:53:17sake of anything else and that end or
3:53:20goal is
3:53:23happiness the the for the sake of
3:53:25relation can be understood in this
3:53:28way things P pursued for the sake of
3:53:32some ends are things that bring about or
3:53:37promote that end or goal and the end
3:53:41provides the standard for those things
3:53:45or those deeds in other words the end or
3:53:49the gold provides the
3:53:52norm now let's note this again the the
3:53:55for the the the for the sake of relation
3:53:59can be understood in this way things P
3:54:03pursued for the sake of some end are
3:54:06things that bring about or promote that
3:54:10end and the end provides the standard
3:54:15for those things or
3:54:18deeds now on this
3:54:20interpretation happiness would be the
3:54:23end that provides the standard or the
3:54:26norm for all human
3:54:29conduct and all actions should be
3:54:33pursued so that they bring about or
3:54:37promote human human happiness or human
3:54:42flourishing since Aristotle writes that
3:54:45the most complete happiness is
3:54:50contemplation this would mean that
3:54:52happiness is a single end or
3:54:57gold and not a composite or a collection
3:55:02of
3:55:04goods in short happiness is the
3:55:10end the good and not simply a good or an
3:55:18end or
3:55:21gold nothing could be added to happiness
3:55:24to increase its
3:55:27goodness this is what Aristotle means in
3:55:31book one section 7 by the
3:55:36self-sufficiency of Happiness as we saw
3:55:39in our study of book
3:55:43one Aristotle States clearly and if you
3:55:46want a
3:55:47reference uh consider
3:55:511097
3:55:53b line 16-
3:55:5621
3:55:581097 b line 16-
3:56:0221 where Aristotle States clearly that
3:56:05happiness is an end or good to which
3:56:08nothing could be added to improve it
3:56:12precisely because it is not one good
3:56:16among other
3:56:18goods for if it were something for if it
3:56:22were simply one good among other Goods
3:56:26something could be added to it to
3:56:29increase its value and that is not the
3:56:33case with
3:56:35happiness so Aristotle can say that
3:56:38happiness is the most complete
3:56:41good without having to say that the good
3:56:45is a composite of many or all
3:56:50Goods that are consistent with one
3:56:54another note that the comp a composite
3:56:57view that happiness is a collection of
3:57:00goods would not allow one to
3:57:05systematize
3:57:07organize the virtue
3:57:09that is you would not be able to explain
3:57:13how the virtues or any intrinsic goods
3:57:17are related to each
3:57:20other the view that that interprets
3:57:23Aristotle to say that the exercise of
3:57:27theoretical reason is the most complete
3:57:32happiness while the exercise of
3:57:35practical reason is a secondary form of
3:57:38Happiness provides for a way of
3:57:43organizing and
3:57:46systematizing things that we consider to
3:57:48be
3:57:50Goods now let's before we let's
3:57:54pause for a m for a bit before we go to
3:57:58the
3:58:00second uh argument namely the function
3:58:03argument that also helps us to clarify
3:58:07Aristotle's conception of
3:58:13Happiness the function argument that we
3:58:17find in book one section
3:58:207 identifies reason as the def
3:58:25distinctive function of human beings or
3:58:29humankind we are uniquely
3:58:33human when we
3:58:35exercise reason or our rational
3:58:40Powers note that the
3:58:43argument from
3:58:45Divinity in book 10 Section 8 that is
3:58:50the argument that says that when we
3:58:54engage in
3:58:57contemplation we are most like the
3:59:01gods so note that the argument from
3:59:04Divinity in book 10 Section 8 maintains
3:59:09that we most that we most
3:59:12approximate the activity of the Gods
3:59:15when we contemplate or exercise
3:59:19theoretical
3:59:22reason and we see that activity in
3:59:26Conformity with virtue is activity that
3:59:30conforms to
3:59:33reason
3:59:35so for Aristotle virtuous activity is
3:59:40that in which we exercise
3:59:44reason whether practical reason or
3:59:47theoretical
3:59:49reason go back to our
3:59:53analogy uh of service uh the analogy
3:59:56mentioned earlier of service to
4:00:00God uh
4:00:02in in both cases we have service to God
4:00:08whether it is in serving one's community
4:00:13in Ministry within the community or
4:00:16whether it is a life of of uh of prayer
4:00:22whether it is involvement with the
4:00:23community or the cled life of prayer and
4:00:28devotion both are service to
4:00:31God in this
4:00:33case virtuous activity for Aristotle
4:00:37again is that that in which we exercise
4:00:41reason whether it's practical reason or
4:00:44theoretical reason whether it is going
4:00:47to be a life of practical or civic
4:00:49virtue social virtues or intellectual
4:00:55virtues the proper actions are those
4:00:58that promote and conform to
4:01:03reason we should do what we do so that
4:01:06our actions promote or lead to the
4:01:10greatest exercise of our reasoning
4:01:15ability this means that Aristotle to
4:01:18some extent has
4:01:21intellectualized the
4:01:23virtues now what do we mean by
4:01:26intellectualizing the
4:01:28virtues that is the ultimate end of
4:01:32Justice
4:01:33courage Temperance and so forth is that
4:01:38they they
4:01:39promote the distinctive function of
4:01:44humankind
4:01:47namely human beings reasoning
4:01:52power and the highest use of reason is
4:01:58contemplation that is reflection
4:02:03upon the ultimate truths of the
4:02:07universe which bring note far more
4:02:11certainty than practical
4:02:14deliberation which always faces the
4:02:17uncertainty of the
4:02:20future civic virtue and contemplation
4:02:24are related by the use of
4:02:28rationality they are both rational
4:02:32Pursuits and promote the rational
4:02:35capacity of
4:02:37humankind
4:02:38and ultimately all activity should be
4:02:42undertaken so as to facilitate
4:02:46contemplation now clearly there as
4:02:49Aristotle
4:02:50notes uh we many of us might be faced
4:02:55with a
4:02:57decision as to whether to engage in a
4:03:00life of contemplation or to pursue a
4:03:04life of civic
4:03:05virtue and it may very well be that even
4:03:09though we may clearly be cut out for a
4:03:12life of
4:03:13contemplation that the circumstances of
4:03:16our life would demand that we forgo
4:03:21it consider
4:03:24someone who is utterly
4:03:27convinced and we will say that the
4:03:30person is prayerfully convinced meaning
4:03:36that her sense of of
4:03:39conviction has arisen in part
4:03:43from her best ability to discern what
4:03:46God's will for her
4:03:48is and let's suppose that is a a life in
4:03:53p a life of of scholarly
4:03:57Pursuits in which
4:03:59she as a let's say a Biblical
4:04:04scholar
4:04:06uh understands her
4:04:10vocation as one of the study of the
4:04:14scriptures and the teaching of the
4:04:17scriptures to students and to people in
4:04:23churches but to do this properly is
4:04:26going to
4:04:28require uh a a great
4:04:31Devotion to work in the library in the
4:04:36archives or on archaeological sites and
4:04:40so
4:04:42forth but she has to forgo
4:04:46that because she has an invalid
4:04:53mother and she is the only one who can
4:04:57take care of her
4:04:58mother now it's not to say that she
4:05:01forgo the scholarly life
4:05:04altogether but she cannot pursue it to
4:05:08the degree to which she would need
4:05:11to to be a
4:05:14leading biblical
4:05:17scholar but the the the an the the
4:05:20choice here is obvious take care of the
4:05:23invalent
4:05:24mother that comes first now in this
4:05:29case our Biblical scholar is not going
4:05:32to have as a as a as happy a life as
4:05:35flourishing a life if she might
4:05:39otherwise had had the circumstances been
4:05:42different but it's clear to Aristotle
4:05:45what she should
4:05:48choose now again civic virtue and
4:05:51contemplation are related by the use of
4:05:56rationality and again they are both
4:05:59rational Pursuits they both promote the
4:06:02rational power of
4:06:03humankind and
4:06:06ultimately however
4:06:08all activities should be undertaken so
4:06:10as to facilitate
4:06:13contemplation now note that this gives
4:06:15us a way of understanding Aristotle's
4:06:18doctrine of the
4:06:20mean of
4:06:24moderation this the
4:06:27mean that toward which we should
4:06:32steer is that which would
4:06:35promote properly
4:06:38and facilitate the exercise of
4:06:42reason so we can see that our effort to
4:06:47solve a a scholarly dispute namely one
4:06:51over the unity of the
4:06:53ethics has helped us in the end to
4:06:56clarify Aristotle's conception of the
4:07:00good life a life of human flourishing a
4:07:05life of virtue or excellence
4:07:10well next we turn to John Stewart
4:07:15Mills utilitarianism in which he ATT
4:07:18attempts to
4:07:20defend the
4:07:22utilitarian approach to ethics the
4:07:26utilitarian ethic against both
4:07:30misunderstanding which he found to be uh
4:07:34rather rampant in his day as well as
4:07:38uh against some of the standard
4:07:41criticisms that one might bring against
4:07:45utilitarianism it's to that that we turn
4:07:49next

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