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John Mearsheimer: NATO's Choice as Ukraine Collapses - Negotiations or War with Russia — Transcript

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0:01Welcome back everyone. Today is October
0:0328th, 2026 and we are joined by
0:07Professor John Mearsheimer. So, thank
0:09you for coming back. It's great to see
0:11you again.
0:12>> Great to see you Glenn, as always.
0:15>> Uh
0:16it seems that the United States
0:19is facing possible major strategic
0:22defeats in both Ukraine and the Middle
0:24East.
0:25Uh the Middle East would say both the
0:27war against the Iran, but also what's
0:29happening in Yemen will have
0:30consequences. Uh yet the political
0:32leadership still appears, it seems
0:35unwilling to recognize uh limits on
0:38American power. Uh and uh I was
0:41wondering what may be the consequences
0:44of this because well, I ask cuz I know
0:46that you like Machiavelli and I know in
0:48the prince,
0:49you know, he presented the idea that men
0:52tends to see the world as they wish it
0:54was rather than how it actually is and
0:57this become their downfall. So, what
1:00what are the possible miscalculations
1:02here by not accepting uh the limitations
1:05on power?
1:07>> I think Glenn, if you look carefully,
1:10uh that Trump and his entourage
1:14understand the limits of American power.
1:18Uh let's just talk about the three big
1:20conflicts, Iran,
1:22um
1:23Saudi Arabia,
1:25and uh Ukraine.
1:28With regard to Iran,
1:30President Trump has done hardly anything
1:33militarily
1:36for a long time now, since early
1:38September, in fact.
1:40There's no question that he's constantly
1:42threatening about attacking Iran,
1:46but he's not done anything serious in
1:50that regard. Uh
1:52he says he's now going to attack after
1:54the midterms
1:56and he might do that,
1:59but I wouldn't bet a lot money on it.
2:01He's backed off so many times up to now.
2:04Uh
2:05and furthermore, if you look at the
2:07attack that he's threatening, you know,
2:10they're talking about an intensive 3-day
2:13bombing campaign.
2:15We had a 40-day bombing campaign to
2:18start the war, and that didn't work. One
2:20ask him or herself, what's a 3-day
2:22bombing campaign going to do? The answer
2:25is not much. And again, it's not Sure,
2:27it's not clear that he'll do that.
2:30Uh furthermore, if you look at our
2:32position in the Gulf,
2:34virtually all of our bases are either
2:36badly destroyed badly uh
2:40damaged or destroyed, and we really,
2:44when you think about the future, have
2:47not much prospect of reestablishing
2:50those bases, continuing to have a
2:53significant military force in the Gulf
2:55region. It doesn't look like that that
2:58that is in the cards. And we we
3:00understand that, I believe. So, I think
3:03there's a very healthy sense of the
3:05limits of our power in the case of Iran.
3:09Let's go to Saudi Arabia. I think it's
3:11clear
3:13uh that President Trump not only
3:15green-lighted the Saudis to pick a fight
3:18with the Houthis,
3:20uh but I think that President Trump
3:22encouraged them to do that. But then,
3:26when the Saudis quickly got into
3:28trouble,
3:29which he should have foreseen and the
3:31Saudis should have foreseen, the Saudis
3:34came begging for help. They asked for
3:36help twice on September 10th, and they
3:39asked for help again on September 17th.
3:42And President Trump said no.
3:45And the question is, why did he say no?
3:47It's because President Trump understood
3:49the limits of American military power.
3:53And let's go back to last year. This is
3:552025, as you well know, Glenn.
3:57We picked the fight, we meaning the
3:59Americans, picked the fight with the
4:01Houthis in March of 2025
4:04and we basically conceded defeat in May
4:08of 2025. We couldn't beat the Houthis
4:10back then
4:12and Trump, when he was asked
4:14by MBS to intervene on behalf of Saudi
4:17Arabia, undoubtedly thought about what
4:20happened in 2025
4:22and said no in good part because he
4:24understood the limits of American
4:26military power.
4:28So, if you sort of look at the two big
4:31conflicts that are taking place in the
4:33Middle East, Iran and Saudi Arabia I
4:37think you see a lot of evidence that we,
4:39the United States, uh recognize the
4:42limits of what we can do there.
4:45Excuse me, and but by the way, Glenn, I
4:48think we understand that moving forward
4:52those same limits will apply. And this
4:54is what I was saying about
4:56reestablishing
4:57bases in the Persian Gulf region.
5:00And then go over to Ukraine.
5:03Trump has basically
5:06shifted a lot of the burden
5:09of dealing with Ukraine to the
5:11Europeans. He wants the Europeans to pay
5:14for the weaponry that is sent to
5:17Ukraine. He doesn't want to do that.
5:20And the only fly in the ointment here is
5:23that the CIA is obviously still deeply
5:26involved in the war in Ukraine. Uh Trump
5:30has not been able to rein in the CIA and
5:33get the CIA to back off.
5:35But I think Trump fully understands that
5:38there's just not much we can do to win
5:41the war in any possible way in Ukraine.
5:45I think Trump fully understands that we
5:49picked the fight uh and we've lost that
5:51fight and now is time to cut a deal. I
5:54mean, Trump wants to cut a deal.
5:57He He has three big obstacles in front
6:00of him. One is the Ukrainians in the
6:02form of Zelenskyy.
6:04Uh two are the Europeans, which you know
6:06all about, and number three is the deep
6:09state in the United States and all those
6:12hardliners in the Senate. But, if you
6:14think about Trump, Trump understands we
6:17have no war-winning strategy.
6:20So, I think at this point in time you
6:22can make a quite persuasive argument
6:26that the Trump administration at the top
6:29fully understands the limits of American
6:32military power.
6:34And then just one final point on this,
6:35Glenn.
6:36You want to remember that when Trump got
6:38elected, he promised no more forever
6:42wars. He promised no more regime change.
6:45He made it clear that he wanted to
6:47settle the Ukraine war, which he would
6:49have never started because he
6:51understood, so he said that it was a
6:53losing proposition.
6:55All of this is to say, I think that
6:58going into the White House in January of
7:012025,
7:03Trump was interested
7:06in cutting back on American military
7:08commitments, not getting involved in
7:10more wars, in large part because he then
7:12recognized the limits of American
7:15military power.
7:16But, he made one fatal mistake, and I do
7:19believe it was a fatal mistake that will
7:21wreck his presidency. And that is he
7:23entered the war against Iran. And of
7:26course, he also encouraged the Saudis,
7:29uh, to pick a fight, uh,
7:31with the Houthis.
7:33And, uh, and he's been unable to shut
7:35down Ukraine war. So, all those
7:37calculations
7:39make it look, uh, like he might think,
7:44uh, that American military power, uh,
7:47can solve problems here, there, and
7:48everywhere. But, I I don't think that's
7:51the case, Glenn.
7:53>> I I hope you're right about, uh, I I was
7:55also had a similar thought before he
7:57attacked, uh, Iran to begin with that,
8:00uh,
8:01this would have a very low probability
8:03of success as a reason why he wouldn't.
8:05But, of course, this is,
8:07you know, months afterwards, and uh,
8:09surely the lesson must have been learned
8:12now, though. But, that's an interesting
8:13point of view though, because the the
8:15the very belligerent rhetoric of him,
8:17it's you know, it can mean two things.
8:20One, that he's building the case for
8:21war, but it could also mean that
8:24if you're, you know, talking a big game,
8:26this allows him to postpone any further
8:28military action. No one's going to
8:30accuse him of backing away
8:33with all this crazy talk, I'm assuming.
8:36But, how do you make sense of the
8:37military hardware?
8:39Military hardware, troop movements
8:41towards the Middle East. I saw this
8:43third aircraft carrier heading down. Uh
8:47Do you
8:48Is this for pressure during negotiations
8:51or to
8:53have a, I guess, a tough persona,
8:56so he won't be criticized at home for
8:57being weak or
8:59or is this preparing for war?
9:03>> Well, let me make a couple points. First
9:05of all, it's just kicking the can down
9:07the road.
9:08You remember he signed the 17 June
9:11memorandum of understanding,
9:14which was in effect a surrender
9:15document. Uh
9:17The Iranians clearly won the war
9:21based on what we saw in the 17
9:24June
9:25memorandum of understanding. And of
9:27course, that's why he walked away. Um
9:30and he's been desperately searching for
9:33a way to rescue the situation
9:36to get some sort of agreement where he
9:37can claim victory. And he's been unable
9:40to do that, so he just keeps kicking the
9:42can down the road.
9:44Um
9:46Second point, and the more important
9:48point I'd make, is as you know, Glenn,
9:50there's a very important distinction in
9:52the international relations between
9:54threatening military force to coerce an
9:58adversary
10:00into doing something that you want it to
10:02do.
10:04Uh And on the other hand, there is the
10:09matter of actually going to war to get
10:12your way.
10:13So, with with coercion, you threaten
10:16war. You don't go to war. You threaten
10:18war to get what you want. And then with
10:21the actual uh
10:24uh
10:25uh example of going to war, the case of
10:27going to war, uh you use military force
10:30to get what you want. Now, I think that
10:33what Trump is doing here by threatening
10:36to attack Iran and by moving lots of
10:40military assets into the region, which
10:43lends credibility to that threat, uh
10:45he's trying to coerce the Iranians.
10:48There's no question about that.
10:50Now, I don't think that that coercion is
10:54going to work. In fact, I think there's
10:56almost no evidence to think that that
10:59coercion is going to work.
11:01And that brings us to what is the really
11:05key question. Given that the coercion's
11:07not going to work, will he use military
11:10force? That's the question. Uh he can't
11:14kick the can down the road forever. At
11:17some point, he's going to have to decide
11:20whether to go to war or not to rectify
11:23this situation. And therefore, the big
11:26question is will in late November after
11:29the midterms are over and after the USS
11:32Teddy Roosevelt aircraft carrier gets on
11:35station in the Persian Gulf and you have
11:37some ground forces, additional ground
11:40forces, will he then uh launch an
11:43attack? That's the question.
11:46>> Well, I'm glad you mentioned the
11:47elections. Um actually, that's a bit of
11:49a concern as well. That is, when you see
11:50domestic politics
11:52beginning to influence foreign policy,
11:55you know, often you almost
11:57walk into the
11:59in the realm of um irrational
12:02uh being irrational actor. And indeed,
12:04from at least uh
12:05political realist perspective, you would
12:07assume that it's the international
12:08distribution of power which dictates
12:10your foreign policy. But we see now the
12:13US the midterms, but the Israelis are
12:15also having their elections and I guess
12:17the commonality is that they both will
12:19affect US policies foreign policy.
12:23But uh
12:25what will change if the opposition takes
12:27power though? I mean
12:29both Netanyahu and Trump could face
12:30serious legal consequences. Uh
12:34Uh that is be you Well, Netanyahu would
12:36be removed from office. Uh Trump of
12:38course is not a presidential election,
12:39but he could have his position weakened
12:41begin to again also face this legal
12:44repercussions. Uh
12:46But what would be How how do you see
12:49these elections affecting uh the wars?
12:52>> Well,
12:53let me just stick to the American case.
12:56And I'm going to ask you a question. Um
12:59And the question is
13:01why do you think
13:04that Trump
13:05doesn't attack Iran before the midterms
13:10and says that he's going to attack Iran
13:14after the midterms? I mean, I think this
13:16is a very important question. Right? And
13:20let me give you my answer and you can
13:21tell me what you think.
13:23My view is that he's not attacking
13:27before the midterms because he fully
13:29understands that if he attacks, the
13:32Iranians will retaliate and this will
13:34have
13:35disastrous consequences for the
13:38international economy. In other words,
13:40he does not have a war-winning strategy.
13:43If he had a war-winning strategy against
13:45Iran, he would have attacked them a
13:47month ago or 2 weeks ago or 2 months
13:50ago.
13:51Instead, he says, "I'm going to delay it
13:54until after the midterms."
13:57That tells me that they understand that
14:01attacking is going to cause an enormous
14:04amount of trouble.
14:06Then you have to ask yourself the
14:07question, "Well, what's going to change
14:09after the midterms?"
14:11What are we going to be able to do after
14:13the midterms that we couldn't do before
14:16the midterms. And the answer is nothing.
14:19So, all that's a way of saying that if
14:21they attack after the midterms, it's
14:24going to be disastrous.
14:26Just as it would be disastrous if we
14:28attacked before the midterms, which is
14:30why we're not doing it.
14:32And doesn't that just tell you they have
14:34no war-winning strategy here?
14:37So,
14:39So, the the the truth is that the
14:42Iranians have us over a barrel and and
14:45and they understand that.
14:48That's why coercion is not working.
14:52They're just saying to us, "Go ahead,
14:53attack." They're daring us to attack
14:56because they understand it makes no
14:59sense from our point of view. And
15:00therefore, they're betting on the fact
15:02that Trump won't do it. And if they're
15:05wrong and Trump does attack, it's going
15:08to work to their benefit.
15:11What do you think of that logic?
15:15>> No, it does make sense. And that is not
15:17a Well, again, they're they're delaying
15:19the attacking. Well, I also thought it
15:20could be because it would be
15:22uh
15:24it would have low if it has a low level
15:26of success that uh you know, you
15:28wouldn't want to do this before the
15:29election. And also given that this war
15:31has become very unpopular, that it's
15:33easier for him to show strength uh you
15:35know, to suggest this has been
15:37successful. You know, that's kind of the
15:38theme in his speeches. This war ends
15:40when I decide it's over. We might cons-
15:43consider if we'll make a deal with Iran.
15:44And so, like, he wants to be in control
15:46and at least give the illusion of
15:48success. I think if he goes back into
15:50the war, that would be the
15:52vulnerabilities of the the weakness of
15:54the US position might become more
15:56obvious.
15:57But uh that doesn't mean I disagree with
15:59what you said. I think uh
16:02it's more likely that this is because he
16:04he knows this is a horrible idea. So,
16:06that is probably the right uh that would
16:09be
16:09the best interpretation though.
16:11>> Let me make one quick point though,
16:13Glenn. You say,
16:15quite correctly, that the war is
16:17unpopular. In fact, it's wildly
16:19unpopular. It's been unpopular from the
16:22get-go.
16:23Uh but if the war is unpopular, doesn't
16:26that incentivize President Trump to end
16:29the war and get a settlement before the
16:32midterms? And if the military instrument
16:36is is effective as he says it is,
16:39doesn't that suggest at least that he
16:43should have gone to war a month or two
16:45ago?
16:47Won the war and put this problem to
16:49rest?
16:50And instead of Instead what he's done is
16:52he's let it fester,
16:54uh which works to his disadvantage
16:58because it is unpopular and as the days
17:01go by it becomes more and more
17:02unpopular,
17:04uh especially because it's linked in so
17:06many people's minds to the state of the
17:08US economy.
17:09Uh
17:10so again it it
17:13all of this just tells me
17:15which you and I understand anyway, that
17:17we have no military option here.
17:20It gets back to the Saudi case as well.
17:22We have no military option.
17:25You know, you read the newspapers and
17:27people talk about a three-day bombing
17:29campaign. It's an intensive bombing
17:31campaign. They're going to go after
17:33nuclear sites, which I thought they
17:35already destroyed, but anyway, they're
17:37going to go after nuclear sites and
17:39they're going to go after infrastructure
17:40and sometimes they put the word energy
17:42in front of infrastructure. Okay, that's
17:45the targets that you're going to do it
17:46for three days. Please explain to me
17:49number one, how this hurts
17:52Iran to the point where it throws its
17:54hands up. And number two, please tell me
17:57what you think the Iranians will do in
18:00response and what the consequences will
18:03be. I mean, we have to have a
18:05full-throated story here, right? We're
18:08in the realm of strategy here. If you're
18:10going to use military force,
18:12we have to know how you produce the
18:15desired
18:17results. How you get your adversary to
18:21dance to your tune. And there's
18:23virtually nothing about that in the
18:25newspapers. And when you listen to
18:27people in the Trump administration talk,
18:30they don't tell a story. They just talk
18:33about whacking Iran, you know, just
18:35slapping it around and sort of implying
18:38that that's all you have to do and
18:40they'll throw up their hands.
18:42This is not smart, right?
18:44You got to explain what your theory of
18:47victory is. And they don't do that. And
18:50of course, the reason they don't do that
18:52is they have no theory of victory.
18:56>> I find uh well, I think that the whole
18:58the this
19:00uh reports we've seen about the plans
19:02for this three-day strike just uh short
19:05but intensive uh
19:07it has some flaws to it. First of all,
19:09that timeline. We assume that Iranians
19:11will agree to this timeline. They don't
19:13have to finish anything. And also, one
19:16of the reasons why the Iranian
19:17restrained themself is because they know
19:19if they go up the escalation ladder, the
19:20Americans will do as well. So, they
19:22don't want to have their energy
19:23facilities destroyed. But if the US
19:25attacks their in energy
19:28installations, why wouldn't they
19:29torch all the Gulf states and do the
19:31exactly the same? And at that point, I
19:33think uh the the the US would have
19:36predictably
19:38uh harmed itself. But uh also, I guess
19:40what what is if if you're going for a
19:42third round of war,
19:44what changed? Uh the US used to have
19:46good infrastructure in the region. All
19:47these military bases, it was uh it's
19:50opportune to attack Iran. Now, it's all
19:53burned to the ground. It's uh it's going
19:55to be very hard to replicate even what
19:56it did in the past. So, if you can't
19:58even replicate what it did in the past,
20:00which didn't work,
20:02why go back in? I guess uh
20:05the lack of a a clear plan here, it
20:07gives me some optimism in terms of the
20:10US not going down that path. But uh
20:12on the other hand, there's so much at
20:13stake though. Domestically,
20:15internationally, this is we're talking
20:17about world order here. Is the US going
20:19to dominate the Middle East or is it
20:20going to have to retreat?
20:22Uh I'm just thinking
20:23there might be willingness to do
20:25irrational and stupid things under these
20:27circumstances. Yeah, I I think the best
20:31explanation for why we will get a war is
20:33desperation, which is what you're
20:35getting at. But, I just want to make
20:37another point on this whole question of
20:39doing this
20:41uh
20:41military campaign. And
20:44here we're talking in rational legal
20:45terms. We're not talking about
20:47desperation.
20:48But, it's quite clear that the the
20:52present situation incentivizes the
20:55United States to really slam Iran.
20:59In other words, if you're going to get
21:00the Iranians to throw up their hands,
21:02you really have to punish them severely
21:06in that 3-day bombing campaign. It can't
21:09be
21:10uh a light touch.
21:13But, the problem that you then face is
21:16the harder that you hit the Iranians,
21:19the more you incentivize them
21:22to do
21:24great damage
21:26to the United States and its allies in
21:28the Gulf and Israel itself.
21:31And let me give you just a couple
21:32examples.
21:34The Iranians have said very clearly
21:37uh that if we attack uh
21:40Pickaxe Mountain, which is their new
21:43nuclear site that we talk about
21:45attacking, we meaning the United States,
21:48we talk about going after Pickaxe.
21:51The Iranians have said, "You go after
21:53Pickaxe, we're going after Dimona, which
21:57is the nuclear site in Israel."
22:01And you just sort of say to yourself,
22:02"Wow, if they actually go after Dimona,
22:05that could have huge consequences
22:08because you're talking about putting
22:10ballistic missiles, you know, on a
22:12nuclear site, and
22:14God knows how that will play out.
22:17Furthermore,
22:19the Iranians have made it clear that
22:21they're now well aware that the that
22:23there are these seven cables that carry
22:26internet and so forth and so on
22:28underneath the Persian Gulf.
22:30And they say that they will go after
22:34those seven cables, sever those seven
22:37cables, and cause huge damage to the
22:41international economy uh
22:43if we go after infrastructure, critical
22:47infrastructure inside of Iran.
22:49And then they've also talked about going
22:51after this is their rhetoric, not mine,
22:54two trillion dollars worth of data
22:56centers
22:58in the Persian Gulf region. We've been
23:00building all these data centers, and
23:02they're talking about, you know, going
23:04after them, destroying them. And it's
23:07quite easy to do that, of course, with
23:09the ballistic missile inventory and the
23:10drone inventory that they have.
23:13Uh so the point that I'm making to you,
23:16Glenn, is yes, we're incentivized to
23:18really slam them, but they are, on the
23:21other hand, really incentivized to
23:23counter slam us. And when you start
23:25thinking about the targets that they can
23:26go after,
23:28right? And I haven't even mentioned
23:29desalination plants. I haven't mentioned
23:32energy infrastructure in the Arab states
23:36uh that could be in their crosshairs.
23:38But just talking about all those
23:39additional things like cables, Damona,
23:41and so forth and so on. You see actually
23:44some pretty frightening scenarios could
23:46play themselves out.
23:48And again, this is why Trump
23:51has not done anything
23:53with regard to bombing Iran. He
23:56understands that as bad as the situation
23:58is, he doesn't want to make it any
24:00worse.
24:01He if he's going to use military force,
24:04he he's got to be able to tell a
24:06plausible story about how it works. And
24:09as I said, you know, 5 minutes ago,
24:11nobody's telling that plausible story.
24:13And what you and I are doing is going
24:15back and forth and explaining how this
24:18could lead to disaster.
24:21>> Yes, another thought that uh occurred to
24:23me, that is uh the you know, the merger
24:25of all these wars, because it looked for
24:27a while that um
24:29Ukraine war might merge with the Iran
24:31war, but there's two other wars that is
24:32uh
24:33the the Iran war merging with the the
24:37Saudi war, the Saudi Yemen war. That is
24:40if the US attacks Iran now, it would
24:43probably use uh Saudi airspace or
24:45facilities. So, in other words, the
24:47Saudis would make themselves complicit
24:49in the attacks on Iran. Iran would then
24:52almost certainly retaliate against Saudi
24:54Arabia.
24:55However, at the moment, Pakistan,
24:56Turkey, Egypt, they they all said that
24:59they're committed to defending Saudi
25:01Arabia from Yemen.
25:03But, would they then also defend the
25:05Saudis from Iran? I just It looks like
25:08this could get very messy very quickly.
25:11But, it could be advantageous for Trump
25:13though if he's if he wants to
25:15you know, do this buck-passing and
25:16essentially hand over the war to to
25:19regional powers instead. Again,
25:21not not saying that any of this is what
25:23is you know, currently the thoughts of
25:26uh but
25:27but it could be um miscalculation though
25:30and a danger if these wars would merge.
25:33Or I was wondering what you were
25:35thinking around that possible scenario.
25:38>> Well,
25:39I would note that there are some reports
25:41in the press. I'm not 100% sure whether
25:44they're correct
25:46that the Russians are helping the
25:49Houthis
25:50uh with intelligence and targeting
25:53information vis-à-vis their attacks on
25:56Saudi Arabia.
25:58And of course, there's no doubt that the
26:00Russians have been helping the Iranians
26:02as well.
26:04So, you have this very interesting
26:06situation where the Russians, the
26:08Chinese, the North Koreans, the
26:09Iranians, and maybe even now the Houthis
26:12are all being driven together
26:15uh and put in a position
26:17uh where they have a deep-seated
26:20incentive to defeat the United States.
26:24If you think about the Russian position
26:26here and even the Chinese position, they
26:30have a vested interest in making sure
26:31Iran wins this war.
26:34Uh
26:34the last thing the Russians want is for
26:36the United States to defeat Iran.
26:39Uh and I believe the same thing is true
26:41with regard to China.
26:43And the Houthis come into play here as
26:45well because Saudi Arabia is closely
26:48aligned with the United States. The
26:50Iranians understand that, the Russians
26:52understand that. And the Russians have a
26:56vested interest in seeing the Houthis
26:58really slam the Saudis.
27:00Cuz the Saudis are aligned with the
27:02United States, and the United States is
27:04a mortal enemy of Russia. There's just
27:07no question about that. We're not
27:09talking about that today, you and I, but
27:11you and I have talked about that at
27:13great length in the past great lengths
27:15in the past. Right? The Russians
27:17understand that the United States is out
27:21to get them. Trump may have be a bit
27:23different, but the deep state is out to
27:25do the Russians in. So, the Russians
27:27have very powerful incentives to help
27:29both the Houthis
27:31and the Iranians. Now,
27:34I don't think the Iranians have any
27:36reason at this point to help the
27:39Houthis.
27:41As best I could tell, the Houthis are
27:42doing very well by themselves. Right?
27:45Not only are they doing significant
27:48damage to the various airports inside of
27:53Saudi Arabia, but they're now beginning
27:56to tear apart infrastructure as well. Uh
27:59they have hit the East-West pipeline.
28:02There's evidence, it's hard to say
28:04whether it's
28:06uh correct or not, but there is evidence
28:08that pipeline East-West pipeline has
28:11been shut down. They have been targeting
28:13Yanbu, which is of course on the western
28:15side of that
28:17pipeline on the Red Sea, and very
28:19important and um
28:22uh and to my surprise, they have hit Ras
28:25uh Ras Tanura, which is this big
28:29Saudi uh refinery and port uh on the
28:33Persian Gulf. Uh so they're tearing
28:36apart the Houthis infrastructure.
28:38Uh they're tearing apart the airports.
28:41Uh
28:42and uh the Saudis have no
28:46way of dealing with the threat. The
28:48Saudis are trying to put an end to this
28:50conflict. Uh so I don't see any
28:53incentive for the Iranians to do any
28:55more than they're now doing.
28:57But it is possible, as you say,
29:01that uh
29:03that the Iranians may get dragged into
29:06the fight against the Saudis because the
29:10United States and Israel may attack
29:13Iran and the United States may use Saudi
29:15airspace. I would think the Saudis would
29:18go to great lengths to tell the
29:19Americans they can't use their airspace
29:22to avoid that outcome.
29:24But you know,
29:26I don't know for sure what all the
29:28stocks of weapons look like on all the
29:31different sides, but one could imagine
29:33that if you're the Iranians and Saudi
29:37airspace is used by the Americans in an
29:39offensive in an American offensive
29:41against Iran, that the
29:45that the Iranians won't seriously attack
29:48Saudi Arabia. They'll take their assets
29:51and use them on Israel or the other Gulf
29:54states. And let the Houthis continue to
29:59deal with the Saudis. In other words,
30:02the fact that the Houthis are dealing
30:04with the Saudis in a way relieves the
30:07Iranians of having to deal with the
30:10with the Saudis. That kind of logic
30:12could kick in. And that would mean that
30:15the uh
30:17that the Iranians would have more assets
30:19to throw at countries like the UAE
30:23uh and countries like Israel, Kuwait,
30:26Iran, and so forth and so on.
30:29Uh
30:30and that of course would just contribute
30:31to making a bad situation worse.
30:36Well, uh
30:37Well, we we did link it to to Ukraine
30:39here and uh of course this is all
30:41happening at the same time and uh
30:43I guess strategic defeat in Ukraine will
30:45also have profound impact uh not just on
30:49the US. I would think more on Europe,
30:52but uh
30:53uh
30:54but we've seen a lot of developments
30:55lately that is uh there's been some
30:57renewed efforts for diplomacy and
31:00obviously this is tied up to the fact
31:02that things are going
31:04terribly wrong for NATO on the Ukraine
31:07frontline against Russia and
31:10so we kind of between this position now
31:12where the Europeans especially are, you
31:14know, thinking either we talk to the
31:15Russians or we have to
31:17get more directly involved to try to
31:20rebalance this uh well, as you said,
31:23rescue the situation. So,
31:25well, what what do you see this headed
31:26at the moment because it doesn't look
31:28like all the Western countries are on
31:30the same page.
31:33>> I think there's no question that
31:36all of the Western countries are not on
31:38the same page and I think this is
31:40reflected by the fact that the Norwegian
31:43Prime Minister and the Finnish President
31:45talked to Putin and this angered uh a
31:50number of
31:51uh the other EU states or the number of
31:54the other European states uh especially
31:56the Danes.
31:58Uh so, they're not all on the same page.
32:01But the more important issue, Glenn, is
32:03what's going on here.
32:05And I think it's quite clear that many
32:09Europeans,
32:10maybe even most Europeans, understand
32:14that Russia's going to win the war.
32:17Um
32:18you know, Mike McFaul, who is a real
32:21Putinophobe and I would argue even a
32:24Russophobe and has been a huge supporter
32:27of
32:28the war in Ukraine. He's
32:31uh you know,
32:32uh
32:33a staunch supporter of the Zelenskyy
32:35government. He just published a piece in
32:37Foreign affairs
32:39and the piece is entitled
32:42"Putin's strategy is working."
32:45This is Mike McFaul
32:47publishing a piece in the most recent
32:49issue of foreign affairs that says
32:51"Putin's strategy is working."
32:54And of course, I think what you see in
32:58Europe is a lot of evidence that people
33:00are coming to understand this.
33:04And I think the key, Glenn, is
33:07that
33:08once the Russians took the gloves off in
33:12terms of their strategic bombing
33:13campaign,
33:15which they did in midsummer,
33:18and they really ramped up the campaign
33:24all across Ukraine. What they did was
33:29seriously damaged the Ukrainian economy
33:34and other kinds of infrastructure
33:39that relate to the military
33:41inside of Ukraine.
33:44And this has two effects.
33:47One is that it means that events up on
33:51the front lines are going to be affected
33:55by this bombing campaign. This bombing
33:58campaign, again, is tearing apart
34:01infrastructure
34:03that is important for supporting the
34:06troops on the front line.
34:09But furthermore, putting that aside,
34:12it's
34:13badly damaging
34:15the Europe, excuse me, the Ukrainian
34:17economy
34:19and making Ukraine more dependent on
34:23ever
34:24for economic support from the Europeans.
34:29Not the Americans cuz the Americans have
34:31gotten out of the business. The burden
34:33of providing economic support for
34:36Ukraine is now on the shoulders of the
34:38Europeans.
34:40And what the Ukrainians are saying is we
34:43need more and more
34:47economic support from the EU.
34:51As you know,
34:52at the end of 2025, we agreed to give uh
34:57Ukraine 52
34:59billion dollars for 2026
35:02and 52 billion dollars for 2027.
35:07This summer,
35:09Zelenskyy said the 52 billion dollars
35:13for 2026 is not enough. We need 27
35:18billion dollars more.
35:20And of course, the Europeans balked at
35:22this.
35:24Right?
35:25They thought the 52 billion dollars
35:27would be enough.
35:28But
35:30Zelenskyy says, "No, we need another 27
35:32billion." And you can understand what's
35:34happening here. Right?
35:36What's happening is that the Ukrainian
35:39economy is crashing and the Ukrainians
35:43cannot
35:45find the money
35:46to
35:47fund this war. And they need more and
35:49more help from
35:52the Europeans. To take it a step
35:53further, 2027, they got 52 billion for
35:572027.
35:58They have said, Zelenskyy has said, they
36:01need another 82 billion. Think about
36:03that number. 82 billion. They're going
36:06to need another 82 billion dollars to
36:08fund the war for next year, on top of
36:11the 52 billion that they have already
36:13gotten.
36:15All of this at a time when the Europeans
36:18are in terrible position when it comes
36:22to providing those sums of money to the
36:25Ukrainians.
36:27Do you really believe that Europe is
36:30going to be able to cough up 82 billion
36:32dollars more?
36:34I don't even know where they're going to
36:35get the 52 billion that they've already
36:37pledged.
36:38Uh
36:40So, I think when you look at the
36:41financial situation
36:44or the economic situation that is that
36:47Ukraine is in. I don't see how this war
36:49gets funded moving forward.
36:52And then furthermore, all this
36:53infrastructure that's being torn apart,
36:56uh these bridges that are being
36:58destroyed, these railroad locomotives
37:01and these railroad track and railroad
37:03stations, the transportation network.
37:06Um the damage that's being done to the
37:08energy network.
37:10What's going to happen to Kyiv over the
37:12course of this coming winter?
37:14This is just going to have huge
37:15consequences on what happens up on the
37:18front lines.
37:19And they're doing poorly up on the front
37:22lines. I mean, we could go through that.
37:24You know, lots of people think the
37:25Russians have been stalemated and so
37:28forth and so on. They're losing
37:30astronomical numbers of soldiers. All of
37:32this is nonsense, right? Uh there's no
37:35question that the Russians are moving
37:36very slowly, but they're moving very
37:39slowly in part because they want to
37:41minimize casualties, number one, and
37:43number two, because they're depending on
37:46the air war to greatly weaken the air
37:49war against infrastructure in the rear
37:51areas to weaken the forces up on the
37:54front lines. And I think that that is
37:56working. Um
37:59So anyway, all of this is to say that I
38:01I think that Ukraine uh
38:03is definitely going to lose the war. Uh
38:07the Russians are going to win an ugly
38:09victory. What exactly that looks like,
38:11we can't say. We can't say.
38:14Uh but there's there's no plausible
38:16story anyone can tell at this point in
38:18time as to how Ukraine rescues the
38:21situation.
38:23>> All right. I agree, but uh
38:26I want to get back to the front line
38:28issue, but but first, um
38:31you know, we we seem to be
38:33either between we have to go for a
38:35diplomatic settlement, otherwise Russia
38:37will win this ugly victory, which you
38:39say.
38:40Uh the I guess my concern is that what
38:42the Russian demands is essentially what
38:44they said for the past 30 years. They
38:46want a European security architecture.
38:49Um that you know, because we had 30
38:52years now of building a European
38:54security architecture that didn't take
38:55into account Russian security. I mean,
38:58it's it's kind of take a step back and
39:00look at it. The whole premise of
39:01European security was we'll expand NATO
39:04closer and closer to Russian borders.
39:06Eventually, everyone should be part of
39:08NATO except for the largest country in
39:10Europe. The country with the largest
39:12territory, largest population, largest
39:14army, now largest economy.
39:16Uh and you know, and this would you
39:19know, create stability. So, but again,
39:22we've done this for for 30 years. So,
39:24now
39:25what what we're asked what the Russians
39:27are asking us is we want what we asked
39:29for in the '90s. We want a mutually
39:31acceptable post-Cold War
39:34uh architecture in Europe. So,
39:37uh
39:38you know, how can this doesn't seem
39:40likely though because it's a lot to ask,
39:42but it's even more to ask if we consider
39:44that in Europe, you know, we're not even
39:46allowed to discuss Russian security. Our
39:48media doesn't, our politicians don't do
39:50it. I mean, if you would have a
39:52politicians uh arguing that well, we do
39:54have to take into account Russian
39:56security as well. Maybe they should have
39:58some security guarantees. I mean, this
40:00would be the end of your political
40:01career. You would be a Putin stooge. So,
40:04you know,
40:05how
40:06And if this is not possible, I'm saying
40:08if I would like to ask,
40:10what does it mean if Russia just goes
40:12for victory? What what happens to
40:14Ukraine, the political West, US, NATO,
40:18Europe? Sorry, I'm making the question a
40:19bit too big here. But it seems, you
40:22know, we're very critical time.
40:26>> Well,
40:26if you look at the proposals
40:29that the West is putting forward at this
40:32point in time,
40:34what they want to talk about as the
40:36basis for negotiations,
40:39uh
40:40I would think that anybody with a
40:41triple-digit IQ could figure out very
40:44quickly
40:45that the West's ideas are non-starters,
40:48right?
40:49Uh
40:50Look, if you're playing Putin's hand,
40:55you understand full well you cannot
40:58trust the West
41:00and you cannot trust Ukraine.
41:03The idea that you could strike a deal
41:05now, you can get a ceasefire or some
41:08sort of tentative peace agreement, and
41:10that the West and Ukraine will stick to
41:12that deal,
41:14uh and that they will negotiate in good
41:16faith,
41:17is it Putin is really going to believe
41:19that? He He have to be a fool
41:23to think in those terms. Putin
41:25understands, I am absolutely certain,
41:28that he has to end this war
41:33in ways that Ukraine is so weakened that
41:36it is no longer a meaningful threat to
41:39him, and that there is no way that
41:42Ukraine can come into NATO or have
41:46meaningful security guarantees from the
41:49West. Putin has a deep-seated interest
41:53in taking as much Ukrainian territory as
41:58he can conquer
41:59and then govern. Right? It's very
42:02important to understand this. He wants
42:05to take as much territory as he can
42:08possibly get because that's the best way
42:11of maximizing Russia's security over the
42:15long term.
42:17From Russia's point of view, you have
42:19two choices. You can end up with a
42:21settlement where you control Odessa, or
42:23you can end up with a settlement where
42:26Ukraine controls Odessa. Which one do
42:28you want? In my opinion, this is not an
42:31interesting question, right? From a
42:33Russian point of view, you absolutely
42:36want to control Odessa if you can. Now,
42:39I'm not sure that the Russians can
42:40conquer Odessa, but if they can at some
42:43reasonable cost, they certainly will.
42:46They'd be fools not to. You're dealing
42:48with the West and you're dealing with
42:50Ukraine, and these countries will come
42:53back at you someday if they can.
42:58Or at least there's a serious
43:00possibility that they will come back at
43:02you if they can. Therefore, you want to
43:05make it impossible for them to come back
43:08at you if you can. So, that means
43:11conquering lots of territory, number
43:13one, and number two, turning Ukraine
43:17into a thoroughly dysfunctional rump
43:20state and keeping it as a thoroughly
43:23dysfunctional rump state so that it's in
43:26no position to join the West.
43:29In other words, what we've done up to
43:31now is we have incentivized
43:34the Russians to weaken Ukraine as much
43:38as possible and to take as much
43:41Ukrainian territory as possible for
43:44strategic reasons.
43:46As you know, Glenn, from
43:49being a student of international
43:50relations theory, one of the biggest
43:52problems with regard to uh international
43:56politics is the credibility of
43:59commitments argument. The credibility of
44:02a promise from the West and from Ukraine
44:07to accept forever
44:10a security architecture
44:14that satisfies the Russians is just not
44:17very great, right? Uh
44:21the credibility of any commitment that
44:23Zelensky makes or the credibility of any
44:26commitment that the West makes to Russia
44:30is remarkably low.
44:33And in a world where you can't trust the
44:37other sides' commitments,
44:41and where there's no higher authority
44:43that can come down and punish the other
44:45side if it misbehaves, the Russians are
44:48incentivized again
44:50uh
44:51to maximize the amount of territory they
44:53take and inflict as much damage on
44:56Ukraine as possible and turn it into a
44:59rump state.
45:01A badly damaged rump state. I mean,
45:03that's the tragedy of this whole
45:05situation.
45:07We we have incentivized the Russians to
45:12do as much damage as possible to
45:14Ukraine.
45:16>> You know, after the Cold War or after
45:18the Soviet Union broke up to be more
45:20specific, uh
45:22there was a theory in Russia which
45:24gained some popularity. There was
45:26Ireland
45:27Ireland Russia. That would be that the
45:30Russia could be a little bit like the
45:31United States. It would be protected
45:34by the water around it. Of course, it's
45:35not real waters, but it would have it
45:37wouldn't have so close proximity to to
45:40the NATO countries and uh
45:43and yeah, they this was
45:44yeah, assumed that that this could keep
45:46it peaceful or may maintain his borders
45:49stable. And I was thinking, you know, if
45:53through this thinking, it wouldn't be so
45:54bad if
45:57if Odessa would be in a neutral Ukraine,
45:59they they you could actually serve their
46:01interest. That is to not be so close to
46:03NATO, but
46:04in a world where Odessa has to be either
46:08falling inside some NATO sphere or
46:12be under Russian control. I mean, I
46:13think from that perspective, then the
46:15position hardens even more then it's
46:17impossible, I think, for them to let
46:19Odessa fall
46:21to to to will remain outside the Russian
46:24control.
46:25Which is also I agree with you. I think
46:27it's so
46:28incredible to see all of this uh
46:31NATO leaders talk about, you know, after
46:33this war, Ukraine will be a part of
46:35NATO. I mean, what are you doing? You
46:38essentially telling the Russians you
46:39can't, you know,
46:41Ukraine has to be a landlocked country.
46:43You have to take Odessa. I mean, that's
46:44what they're hearing. I just I
46:48I find it incomprehensible. I don't
46:49understand what what they're doing.
46:52>> Glenn, just go back to 2014. Why did the
46:55Russians take uh Crimea?
46:58Because the thought of Sevastopol being
47:01a NATO naval base was categorically
47:04unacceptable to them.
47:06Going back to Mike McFaul, Mike McFaul
47:08has said that This is Mike McFaul. He
47:10says there's no evidence that Putin was
47:13intent on taking Crimea before 2014.
47:18And what happened in 2014 is Putin was
47:20spooked by the possibility that the
47:22Crimean Peninsula would become a NATO
47:25naval base or a NATO naval base would be
47:28located on the Crimean
47:30Peninsula. And what you're doing is
47:32laying out the same basic logic for uh
47:34Odessa.
47:36So, the Russians have a deep-seated
47:38interest in making sure
47:40that NATO is not able to put naval
47:43assets uh in Odessa.
47:46Look, Glenn, the more general point here
47:48is just building on what you said. If
47:50there had been no NATO expansion,
47:53and there was no talk of or no
47:55possibility of bringing Ukraine into
47:58NATO,
47:59uh Ukraine would be intact today in its
48:03pre-2014 borders. And that includes
48:06owning Crimea. Again, as McFaul said,
48:09there was no evidence. I know you can't
48:11sell this argument in the West, but the
48:14fact is there is no evidence that the
48:17Russians were thinking about taking
48:19Crimea before 2014
48:22or conquering all of the territory that
48:24they've now conquered and annexed since
48:27uh 2022.
48:29Uh in
48:31um
48:32in the period before 2022.
48:35Uh Putin is not Let me put it
48:38differently. Putin was not an
48:40imperialist before 2014, and he was not
48:44an imperialist before 2022. And the only
48:47reason that Russia has conquered and
48:49annexed all this territory and is going
48:52to want to conquer even more territory
48:55as we were talking about is for
48:57strategic reasons. It has to do with the
48:59fact that Russia lives in a dangerous
49:02neighborhood. By the way, you are
49:04comparing the United States' geographic
49:06situation to Russia's strategic or
49:10geographic situation. I would note that
49:13they're fundamentally different. In
49:151812, Napoleon invaded Russia. Moscow in
49:19the process got burned to the ground.
49:22In
49:231917,
49:26uh the Russians had to surrender to
49:30Imperial Germany. They were defeated by
49:33Imperial Germany, which through the
49:35Brest-Litovsk Agreement of March 1918,
49:38ended up taking a huge chunk of Russian
49:42territory and incorporating it into
49:44Imperial Germany. And then, on June
49:4622nd, 1941,
49:49Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union.
49:52And that was one of the most barbaric
49:54military campaigns in recorded history.
49:57So, Napoleon, Imperial Germany, and Nazi
50:00Germany all have invaded the Soviet
50:02Union. All three inflicted enormous
50:05damage on the Soviet Union or Russia as
50:08it was at different points in time. And
50:12therefore, if you are a Russian leader
50:15today, you're Vladimir Putin, and you
50:18see NATO, a military alliance that was
50:22a mortal foe of the Soviet Union during
50:25the Cold War
50:26when Vladimir Putin was a young man, as
50:28you know. You see that alliance moving
50:31up to your border, and you think about
50:32what happened in 1812, 1917, and 1941.
50:37You get very nervous.
50:39You get very nervous. The United States
50:41is in a fundamentally different
50:43situation. We're regional hegemon. We're
50:45separated on the east and west by two
50:48two giant moats, the Atlantic Ocean and
50:50the Pacific Ocean.
50:52The The Russians/Soviets don't have
50:54those two giant moats. And who are our
50:57neighbors? The Canadians and the
50:58Mexicans and the Cubans and the
51:00Guatemalans. Are any of these countries
51:02a serious military threat to the United
51:04States? Thankfully, they're not. Right?
51:08But, the Russians have neighbors
51:13uh
51:13make one
51:15uh
51:16stay awake at night. And by the way,
51:18although the although the Russians and
51:20the Chinese are close allies at the
51:22moment,
51:23the fact is that the Russians and the
51:25Chinese historically have not had good
51:27relations.
51:29And I remember when I was young and they
51:30fought some huge battles
51:33uh in the Siberian region. And then, of
51:35course, the Russians have to think about
51:37the Germans.
51:39Uh
51:39and they also have to think about the
51:40United States projecting power through
51:43NATO into Europe and threatening them.
51:45And as you and I have talked about
51:47before,
51:48what happened in August of 2024?
51:51Uh
51:52the uh
51:54uh
51:55the the Ukrainians invaded uh Russia.
51:59Uh
52:00anyway,
52:02let us No, but the history is important
52:04though because well, I was actually
52:05interviewed earlier today by a Chinese
52:07journalist and you know, she even asked
52:09me why why why why can't you know, the
52:12Europeans sit down and negotiate with
52:14the Russians? And I was
52:15making the point that uh well, we kind
52:17of have the ideological consensus here
52:19that uh NATO was a force for good. That
52:22is NATO expansion meant expanding
52:25democracy and freedom and we were we all
52:27agreed that
52:29Russia shouldn't consider it a threat.
52:30They should be happy because we're
52:32bringing stability, you know, and and
52:34she was smirking like this is a
52:36it's a mad proposition. What are you
52:38But, this is kind of where we were
52:40though. This is what we all agreed on.
52:42Uh not we, but uh you know, this was the
52:45you know, consensus of liberal hegemony.
52:46It's quite extraordinary that
52:48this kind of has gone unchallenged and
52:50it's even contesting it is seen as
52:52something you know, suspicious. Um
52:56But, uh I I yeah, my my my last question
52:58to you though was about you mentioned
52:59before the front lines. And indeed, not
53:01just the front lines, what's happening
53:02behind the front lines, which is
53:04becoming as you said, more important.
53:06What exactly are the Russians doing
53:08that? What do you see being the strategy
53:09because it has shifted? I mean,
53:12it is part of this, you know, war of
53:14attrition, but how do you see what what
53:16what's being done now?
53:18>> I think, Glenn, up until Excuse me. Up
53:22until this summer, uh the bombing
53:25campaign that the Russians waged against
53:29Ukraine was quite limited. Uh the
53:33Russians had not taken off the gloves.
53:36And as you know, inside of Russia, there
53:39was a huge amount of dissatisfaction
53:42inside the Russian national security
53:45community
53:46with Putin over his unwillingness to
53:50take the gloves off. Many people felt
53:53that he should have done that a long
53:55time ago. But Putin did not do that.
53:59Putin has waged this war in a very
54:02cautious and restrained way. I know you
54:05can't sell that argument in the West,
54:07but anybody who I think is fair-minded
54:10uh understands that. But what happened
54:15uh
54:16once the
54:17Ukrainians launched this extensive
54:2040-day drone campaign against Russia is
54:25that Putin was forced to retaliate in a
54:28significant way. So, he took the gloves
54:30off.
54:31And I think once that happened, Glenn,
54:34the Russians began to realize
54:37that it was a very effective way of
54:40weakening the Ukrainian economy
54:44and damaging military infrastructure and
54:48hurting uh the fighting forces up on the
54:51front lines who were already stretched
54:54to the limit.
54:56So, what the Russians have done is
54:59they've kept the pressure on up on the
55:01front lines for sure. But I think they
55:05have not been waging the war on the
55:07front lines all that vigorously
55:11in recent months. And they've been
55:14waiting for the air campaign
55:17to do great damage
55:20to the fighting forces up on the front
55:22lines and to the Ukrainian economy.
55:25And I think the Russians also understand
55:28that as support in the West continues to
55:32wither, support for Ukraine in the
55:35West continues to wither. And Trump is
55:38more and more friendly towards Russia,
55:41that that will have a an effect on
55:44Ukraine's willingness to continue the
55:46war and maybe even have an effect uh on
55:49the front line Ukrainian Ukraine's front
55:52line forces.
55:53Uh so I think the Russians are moving
55:56cautiously, very cautiously up on the
55:58front lines, very slowly, very
56:00deliberately.
56:01Um and again, as I said before, this is
56:05a smart strategy because it minimizes
56:07Russian casualties.
56:09Uh and at the same time, I think they're
56:11depending depending more heavily than
56:14ever on the air war to affect events on
56:18the battlefield.
56:22>> Is there anything that stands out and
56:24particularly in terms of how the front
56:27lines are moving? I know this is a war
56:28of attrition, but even in a war of
56:30attrition, there's some
56:32you know, the key key cities have a
56:34purpose of logistics. They are,
56:37you know, Zaporizhzhia,
56:39Kyiv, I mean, Kharkiv. A lot of these
56:42very important cities the Russians are
56:44either moving closer to or they're well,
56:47pummeling them like they're doing with
56:49Kyiv. So, uh I don't know, just
56:52Sorry, I'll squeeze in one last
56:53question. What What What do you think is
56:55most critical here because uh
56:58I guess they all have great importance.
57:01>> I think that the Russians are not far
57:04away from conquering all of the Donbas.
57:08Uh the Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, salient
57:13uh, or agglomeration is really the last
57:18main
57:19uh, Ukrainian
57:21uh, set of cities that they have to
57:23concentrate and they're not far away
57:25from the point where they where they
57:27will envelop those two cities or envelop
57:30that agglomeration
57:32and end up controlling all of the Donbas
57:35and I think they're making significant
57:37progress in Zaporizhzhia as well.
57:41Uh, and I would imagine that you know,
57:43in the next couple months that uh, that
57:47oblast will be rolled up
57:50and the Russians will be in excellent
57:52shape and I think all the while the
57:54Ukrainian forces up on the front line
57:58uh, are withering away. It's very clear
58:02if you read various Telegraph channels
58:04that the
58:06Ukrainians are having difficulty
58:08populating the forward edge of the
58:10battle area. There are certain places
58:12where they just can't uh, fill gaps with
58:15manpower and instead what they have to
58:17rely on are drones.
58:20Uh, and that's creating problems for
58:22them and I think that problem will only
58:24get worse with the passage of time. And
58:27the Russians are not facing similar
58:29problems, you know,
58:31if you read the Western media, you have
58:34the sense that the Russians are
58:35suffering these astronomical casualties.
58:38Uh, and this is in line with
58:41the rhetoric that you sometimes hear
58:43that the Russians
58:44don't care about lives and they're
58:47launching frontal attacks against fixed
58:51Ukrainian positions and the Ukrainians
58:53are blowing down those Russian forces
58:56and the Russians are not able to replace
58:59all the soldiers they're losing.
59:01Uh, this argument bears no resemblance
59:03to what's really happening. Again, the
59:06Russians are using infiltration tactics.
59:09They're using very small units
59:12uh, to infiltrate Ukrainian positions.
59:15And very importantly, what they're doing
59:17is substituting firepower for manpower
59:20as much as possible. You see this
59:22tendency in any war of attrition. Once
59:25an army gets into a war of attrition, it
59:27quickly figures out that the last thing
59:29you want to do is uh
59:32uh pursue tactics or strategy where you
59:36kill huge numbers of your own soldiers.
59:38The name of the game is to kill huge
59:40numbers of the adversary's soldiers and
59:43preserve your soldiers' lives as much as
59:46possible. And that invariably leads to
59:51uh emphasizing firepower as a way of
59:54winning the war. You saw this in World
59:55War
59:56as the importance of artillery
59:59grew by leaps and bounds in the rival
1:00:02armies. And during the Cold War, I
1:00:04remember very well the conventional
1:00:06wisdom used to be that the Soviets or
1:00:08the Warsaw Pact had an advantage over
1:00:11NATO and the United States in terms of
1:00:13manpower. And our solution to that
1:00:15problem was to
1:00:17was to emphasize firepower over
1:00:19manpower.
1:00:20Uh this is just
1:00:22a normal way of doing business. All this
1:00:24is to say, just look at what the
1:00:26Russians are doing. They're using
1:00:28infiltration tactics with small units.
1:00:30No frontal assaults here. They're moving
1:00:33slowly and deliberately, and they're
1:00:35substituting firepower for manpower.
1:00:38And you want to remember that while
1:00:40although drones matter greatly,
1:00:42artillery matters as well. And the
1:00:44Russians have a huge advantage in
1:00:45artillery. They have a huge advantage in
1:00:48terms of FAB bombs,
1:00:50uh which can destroy uh Ukrainian
1:00:52front-line forces. Uh and
1:00:55the Ukrainians themselves don't have
1:00:57that capability hardly at all uh to drop
1:01:01uh these very accurate bombs on Russian
1:01:04forces. So, when you put all these
1:01:05things together, I think it's quite
1:01:07clear that the Russians are suffering
1:01:09fewer casualties than the Ukrainians,
1:01:11and the Russians are making progress.
1:01:14Uh
1:01:15I I think it's just a matter of time
1:01:17before they control all of Donbas
1:01:20uh and all of uh
1:01:23all of Zaporozhye. And then the last
1:01:27oblast they'll have to deal with is
1:01:28Kherson. And once they deal with
1:01:30Kherson, they'll have to think about
1:01:32Odessa and Kharkiv.
1:01:35And you know, whether they can take
1:01:37those oblasts, Kharkiv and
1:01:41and Odessa, remains to be seen.
1:01:45>> I'm also concerned that we delude
1:01:47ourselves with this
1:01:49tales [clears throat] about
1:01:51Russia's huge casualties because they do
1:01:54have large reserves. And I think once
1:01:56they well, collapse or
1:01:59fragmentation in Ukraine begins to set
1:02:01in, they will have some options in terms
1:02:03of how to intensify it. That is, if
1:02:05there's a massive manpower shortage,
1:02:07then you know, open up I think they
1:02:09there's some plans to open up a huge
1:02:10front in the Chernihiv
1:02:12region. And if they do this, then they
1:02:14would do the Ukrainian troops is troops
1:02:16would be spread out even further. And uh
1:02:19just looks like uh things can speed up
1:02:22very quickly. And uh
1:02:24again, my concern is at the end of these
1:02:26kind of wars, that's when you see the
1:02:28real casualties beginning to spike,
1:02:31especially from the fleeing soldiers.
1:02:33And I think uh
1:02:35I think that's quite obvious that that
1:02:37will be the Ukrainians. So, now I think
1:02:38we're looking at a disaster here.
1:02:40Um
1:02:41Anyways, any last thoughts?
1:02:43>> Yeah, just just very quickly.
1:02:46You do want to remember that the Russian
1:02:49military is basically, at least in terms
1:02:52of the forces that are fighting inside
1:02:54of Ukraine, an all-volunteer military.
1:02:58Uh they don't rely heavily on
1:03:01conscripting people they then send to
1:03:03the front lines.
1:03:05Uh the Ukrainians, on the other hand,
1:03:09are conscripting people.
1:03:11And there are apparently a huge number
1:03:14of draft dodgers inside of Ukraine.
1:03:18Uh
1:03:19the Iranians, excuse me, the Iranians,
1:03:22the Ukrainians have to use very coarse
1:03:24of measures to get people to serve up on
1:03:27the front lines.
1:03:29Uh not a lot of volunteers these days.
1:03:31And in the Russian case, it's a very
1:03:33different story.
1:03:35And I think as you come to the climax
1:03:38here, that factor will matter as well.
1:03:43>> Thank you for taking the time. And uh
1:03:45should have probably started with
1:03:46Ukraine and ended with Iran cuz I
1:03:49you had some more optimistic views on
1:03:51Iran, so anyways, thank you so much.
1:03:53>> You're welcome, Glenn.

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