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John Dean (Part 1) Watergate Hearings Testimony — Transcript

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0:12the committee met an executive session
0:14earlier today but we don't know what was
0:17said
0:27the committee will come to order and
0:29council will call the first witness
0:31mr john w dean iii
0:34[Music]
0:38stand up and raise your right hand
0:40do you swear that the evidence
0:43that you shall give to the senate select
0:45committee on presidential campaign
0:47activities
0:48shall be the truth the whole truth and
0:50nothing but the truth so help you god i
0:52do so help me god my opinion
0:55you are accompanied by
0:57council and i would ask your name is
0:59john w dean iii
1:01that is correct i would ask council to
1:03identify themselves for the record you
1:05may be seated
1:08mr chairman my name is charles n shaffer
1:12i'm from rockville maryland i'm one of
1:14mr dean's counsel
1:17mr chairman i am robert c mccandless of
1:20washington d.c and i too am one of mr
1:22dean's counsels
1:24i would like for the members of the
1:26committee
1:28and the witness and the
1:30council of the witness to
1:32pay strict attention to what i should
1:34say
1:38mr dean appears before the committee
1:41and has appeared previously before the
1:43staff of the committee
1:45in obedience to subpoena from the
1:47committee
1:49mr dean at all times
1:51has
1:52claimed
1:54that
1:56he is privileged against testifying by
1:58the
2:00self-incrimination clause of the
2:02fifth amendment
2:04on the ground that any testimony
2:06he might
2:09might give
2:10to the committee concerning the matters
2:12the committee is authorized to
2:14investigate
2:16might might
2:18incriminate him
2:20and therefore he appears uh
2:22involuntarily
2:25the committee has uh has unanimously
2:28requested in in times past requested as
2:32honorable judges john sarica the united
2:34states chief judge of the united states
2:36district court for the district of
2:37columbia
2:38to enter an order of immunity for the
2:40witness
2:41under the provisions of sections of 6002
2:44and 6005 of the title 18 united states
2:48code
2:49the committee pursuant to those statutes
2:51gave 10 days notice to um
2:54the attorney general
2:56of his application to judge sarika
2:58and at the instance of the attorney
3:00general judge sarika delayed entering an
3:03order until 20 days more than 20 days
3:05thereafter had expired
3:07he then entered an order of immunity
3:11under the the statutes
3:14and
3:14mr dean is now a form that faction has
3:18previously been informed of that fact
3:21and that he is testifying under this
3:23order of immunity granted instance of
3:26the committee
3:27and he appears here involuntarily as a
3:29witness
3:31pursuant to this order
3:33and he has held a form
3:35been audited by the committee to answer
3:36the questions
3:38and the he has
3:40all the testimony he's previously given
3:42to the committee staff and all of the
3:44testimony which he may give to this
3:46committee
3:47is given by him
3:48on the basis of the order of immunity
3:51is that correct
3:53that is correct mr chairman now if
3:55there's no objection on the part of any
3:56member of the committee the court the
3:58the
3:59chairman will find those
4:01his statement to be the facts on behalf
4:04of the committee mr chairman
4:06i might say just for the completion of
4:08the record in that respect it's also my
4:10understanding that in addition to
4:13appearing
4:14in response to subpoena
4:17and after having claimed his
4:19constitutional privileges
4:21after the attachment of use immunity as
4:23the chairman has just indicated
4:25that counsel for mr dean at a previous
4:29executive session of this committee made
4:31certain other requests
4:33uh particularly that the witness waived
4:37no rights
4:38that he was appearing involuntarily and
4:41pursuant to subpoena
4:43that he filed an application to be
4:45excused from testifying because of the
4:48fear of prejudicial effect
4:50on the possibility of his subsequent
4:52trial
4:53and that he requested that coverage of
4:56the hearings be either an executive
4:58session or limited in accordance with
5:00the rules of this committee i hope it's
5:02appropriate to say mr chairman that
5:04those matters were taken into account by
5:06this committee as a whole an executive
5:08session and the requests were denied i
5:10think that the record ought to indicate
5:12that feather for mr dean's uh for the
5:15completion of mr dean's uh situation i
5:17mean i want to thank you see how i can
5:19call in your view we appreciate that mr
5:22vice chairman and i would like out of an
5:24abundance of caution so that there be no
5:26waiver for me to again call to the
5:28attention of the committee here and now
5:30before the public session the content of
5:32my letter to the chairman dated june 18
5:341973
5:36which i asked you to rule again on the
5:38assertions contained therein and that it
5:40be made a part of this public record
5:42that letter will be printed in the body
5:44of the record i'm requested by one of by
5:47members of the committee sitting on the
5:49left there that
5:50you and mr means fought places because
5:52um i'm going to leave the chair mr
5:54chairman and sit back because the
5:56reporters sort of obstruct that view
6:00mr chairman
6:02mr chairman i'd like for the reporter to
6:04move a little back so i can see the
6:05witness
6:06well i was going to try and move the
6:07witness over here
6:10yes mr chairman we have one
6:13one additional matter we'd like to
6:15call to the attention of the chair
6:17first of all the
6:19subpoena issued
6:21under your rules
6:23does subpoena all documents
6:25so
6:29we conclude that all material supplied
6:31other than his oral testimony all
6:33exhibits
6:34and other documents
6:37are under the same
6:38subpoena and
6:41must be and are be being brought forward
6:44in that manner
6:46also we bring to your attention again
6:50title 18
6:52the u.s code section
6:55798
6:56disclosure of classified information
7:00and section c
7:02saying nothing in this section
7:05shall prohibit the furnishing upon
7:07lawful demand
7:09of information to any regularly
7:11constituted committee of the senate or
7:13house of representatives of the united
7:15states of america
7:16we
7:17raised that mr chairman because
7:21as you are very well aware and
7:23other members of the committee
7:25under a ruling by
7:27the honorable john jay sarika
7:29this committee
7:32came into possession
7:34of certain documents
7:37which
7:38mr shaffer and i as counsel mr dean have
7:41not even seen ourselves there in your
7:43possession
7:44if mr dean is to
7:47to
7:49be asked questions on those documents he
7:51does not have a copy in his possession
7:54the committee would have to furnish
7:56such a copy to him for him to be able to
7:59refresh his recollection
8:01and uh
8:04we just wanted to make sure that that
8:06this section
8:08of the criminal code and your rules uh
8:12pointed out how they dovetail
8:14as to
8:16disclosure of
8:17secret and classified information
8:20but we will
8:21rule on that proper time
8:24i'm hoping that um i'm expecting rather
8:27perhaps questions on those
8:29those documents which were punished to
8:30the committee by judge sarika at the
8:32request of the committee
8:34the questions on that will probably not
8:36come up today and we'll we'll handle
8:37that in a new season thank you very much
8:40mr chairman i'd state myself that for my
8:42study of the subject
8:45i think that
8:47information and or material
8:51cannot be classified
8:55allegedly in the interest of national
8:56security
8:58unless some
9:01it's uh
9:03should not
9:04be
9:07this close to an unauthorized person
9:10because it relates to either to national
9:13defense
9:15or to uh
9:18our foreign relations with other nations
9:21i'm with opinion from my study that um
9:24there is no authority
9:27under any uh under that statute
9:30to classify any
9:33matter
9:34merely because it relates to domestic
9:36intelligence or
9:37internal security
9:39that's a matter though that the
9:40committee will
9:41rule on later when
9:44if it becomes necessary let me say so
9:46it's also our understanding and i hope
9:48it's correct that any uh
9:51doctrines of executive privilege or
9:54attorney client privilege have already
9:55been taken care of by your committee mr
9:58chairman
9:59yes
10:00and i say a word in that respect and on
10:02the point raised by mr mccandless which
10:04i think is important to raise in
10:05connection with the protection of his
10:07clients rights
10:09it is my understanding and mr dash the
10:11chief counsel for the committee can
10:13correct me if i'm in error
10:15it's my understanding that on last
10:17monday there was transmitted to the
10:20witness with copies to the committee and
10:22its staff a letter
10:24from mr leonard garment the
10:26council for the white house or a council
10:29for the white house
10:31indicating that the white house would
10:33not claim executive privilege as to this
10:35witness's testimony nor would it claim
10:37the privilege of attorney client
10:40and as i recall as well that on matters
10:43of the use of
10:45documents nominally classified that they
10:48would leave it to the discretion of the
10:49committee to decide how that should be
10:51handled that is correct senator baker
10:54initially was an oral statement given to
10:56me by mr garman counts for the president
10:58and he followed up with a letter to mr
11:00dean copy to our committee in which he
11:02put in writing that he was authorized by
11:04the president
11:05to do as you just stated and the
11:07committee an executive section on this
11:09past monday
11:10i believe by unanimous vote i'm sure by
11:13unanimous vote
11:14authorize the chairman
11:16to act on behalf of the committee in the
11:17matter of the handling of these
11:19classified manners
11:22thank you sir
11:24certainly let the records show as mr
11:25mckinnis
11:27states that the documents also
11:30any documents that the witness produces
11:32are reduced to him obedience to uh
11:34subpoena due case taker
11:36yes mr dean
11:38you have a statement you wish to present
11:40to the committee that's correct mr dash
11:42but uh
11:46before i commence reading the rather
11:48lengthy statement uh i would just like
11:50to
11:51make a couple comments
11:55first of all mr chairman mr vice
11:56chairman and members of the committee i
11:59i sincerely wish i could say it's my
12:00pleasure to be here today but i think
12:03you can understand why it's not
12:05christine could you please take the
12:06microphone and put it closer to you so
12:08we could all hear certainly
12:13it's a very difficult thing for me
12:16to testify about other people it's far
12:18more easy for me to explain my own
12:20involvement in this matter
12:22the fact that i was involved in
12:24obstruction of justice the fact that i
12:26assisted
12:27another in
12:29perjured testimony
12:32the fact that i
12:33made personal use of funds that were in
12:35my custody
12:37it's far easier to talk about these
12:39things myself than to talk about what
12:41others did
12:42some of these people i'll be referring
12:44to are friends
12:46some are men i greatly admire and
12:47respect
12:49and particularly with a reference to the
12:50present united states i'd like to say
12:52this
12:54it is my honest belief
12:58that while the president
12:59was involved
13:01that he did not realize or appreciate
13:04at any time the implications of his
13:06involvement
13:08and i think that when the facts come out
13:10i hope the president is forgiven
13:17pursuant to the request of the committee
13:19i will commence with a general
13:20description
13:22of the atmosphere that existed in the
13:24white house
13:26prior to june 1972
13:30to one who was in the white house and
13:32became somewhat familiar with its inner
13:33workings
13:35the watergate matter was an inevitable
13:37outgrowth of a climate of excessive
13:39concern
13:40over the political impact of
13:42demonstrators
13:44excessive concern over leaks
13:47an insatiable appetite for political
13:49intelligence
13:50all coupled with a do-it-yourself white
13:52house staff
13:54regardless of the law
13:56however
13:57the fact that many of these elements of
13:59this climate culminated with the
14:01creation
14:02of a covert intelligence operation as
14:05part of the president's reelection
14:06committee
14:08was not by conscious design
14:10rather an accident of faith
14:13these of course are my conclusions but i
14:16believe they are well founded in fact
14:18this committee however is not interested
14:20in my conclusions
14:21rather than the facts as i know them
14:25rather than my characterizing the
14:26climate and attitudes i shall as
14:28requested present the facts which
14:31themselves evidence
14:33some of the precursors of the watergate
14:35incident
14:38it was not until i joined the white
14:40house staff in early july of 1970 that i
14:42fully realized the strong feelings that
14:44the president and his staff had towards
14:47anti-war demonstrators and demonstrators
14:50in general
14:51but even before my joining the white
14:53house staff
14:54i was partially aware of this
14:56presidential concern and a concern that
14:58in turn permeated much of the white
15:00house
15:01during my tenure at the justice
15:02department as an associate deputy
15:04attorney general
15:06i was involved in representing the
15:07government in discussions with
15:08demonstration leaders
15:10regarding the terms of demonstration
15:12permits for activities in the capital
15:14city
15:15while i was not the decision maker in
15:17this capacity i was in close proximity
15:19to the decision-making process
15:22and thus realized that the white house
15:24principally mr erlickman
15:26often made or cleared the final
15:29decisions regarding demonstration
15:30activity
15:32it was also because of my proximity to
15:35those involved with demonstrations at
15:37the department of justice that i became
15:38aware
15:39that the white house was continually
15:41seeking intelligence information about
15:43demonstration leaders and their
15:44supporters
15:45that would either discredit them
15:46personally
15:48or indicate that the demonstration was
15:50in fact sponsored by some foreign enemy
15:53there were also white house requests for
15:55information regarding ties between major
15:57political figures specifically members
15:59of the united states senate
16:01who oppose the president's war policies
16:03and demonstration leaders
16:06i also recall that the information
16:08regarding demonstrators
16:10or rather the lack of information
16:12showing connections between
16:13demonstration leaders and foreign
16:15governments or major political figures
16:18was often reported to a disbelieving and
16:20complaining white house staff that felt
16:22the entire system for gathering such
16:24intelligence was worthless
16:26as i shall elaborate shortly this
16:28attitude towards intelligence gathering
16:30capabilities of the government
16:32regarding demonstrations prevailed
16:34through my tenure in the justice
16:35department and at the white house
16:38and i was hearing complaints from the
16:40president personally as late as march
16:4112th of this year
16:44it was when i joined the white house
16:45staff in july of 1970 that i became
16:48fully aware of the extent of concern at
16:50the white house regarding demonstrations
16:51and intelligence information relating to
16:53demonstrators it was approximately one
16:56month after i arrived
16:57at the white house that i was informed
16:59about a project that had been going on
17:00before i arrived to restructure the
17:03government's intelligence gathering
17:05capacities vis-a-vis demonstrators and
17:07domestic radicals
17:09the revised domestic intelligence plan
17:12was submitted in a document form to the
17:14president for his approval
17:16the president of the committee has in
17:18its possession a copy of that document
17:20and certain related memoranda
17:23pursuant to the order of judge sarika
17:25after i was told of the presidentially
17:28approved plan
17:29they called for bugging burglarizing
17:33mail covers and the like i was
17:35instructed by mr holloman
17:37to see what i could do to get the plan
17:39implemented
17:41i thought the plan was totally uncalled
17:43for and unjustified
17:45i talked with mr mitchell about the plan
17:48he said he knew there was great con
17:49concern or desire at the white house to
17:51see that the plan was implemented but he
17:53agreed fully with fbi director hoover
17:56who opposed the plan
17:57with one exception
17:59mitchell thought that an interagency
18:02evaluation committee might be useful
18:05because
18:06it was not good to have the fbi standing
18:09alone without the information of other
18:10intelligence agencies and the sharing of
18:12information is always good and avoids
18:14duplication
18:16after my conversation with mitchell i
18:20wrote a memorandum requesting that the
18:21evaluation committee be established
18:24and the restraints could be removed
18:26later
18:27i told mr holloman
18:29that the only way to proceed was one
18:30step at a time
18:32and this could be an important first
18:33step
18:34he agreed
18:36the inter agency evaluation committee
18:39the iec as it was referred to was
18:42created as i recall in early nineteen
18:44seventy one
18:45i requested mr jack faulfield who had
18:48been assigned to my office to serve as
18:49the white house liaison to the iec
18:53and when mr caufield left the white
18:54house mr david wilson of my staff served
18:57as liaison
18:58i'm unaware of the iec ever having
19:01engaged in any illegal activities or
19:04assignments
19:05and certainly
19:06no such assignment was ever requested by
19:08my office
19:10the reports of the isc iec or summaries
19:13of the reports were forwarded to
19:15holloman and sometimes ehrlichman
19:19in addition to the intelligence reports
19:21from the iec my office also received
19:23regular intelligence reports regarding
19:25demonstrators and radical groups from
19:27the fbi and on some occasions from the
19:29cia
19:31a member of my staff would
19:32review the material to determine
19:35if it should be forwarded to mr holloman
19:36that is for bringing to the president's
19:38attention
19:39or sent to another member of the staff
19:41who might have an interest
19:43in the contents of the report
19:45mr chairman from time to time i'm going
19:47to
19:48skip parts the statement to in an effort
19:50to make sure that i can move as quickly
19:52as possible and get the statement
19:54completed within the time the committee
19:55has requested so i will
19:57i believe it'd be well to read the whole
19:59statement since you thought it's
20:01important enough to
20:02to write it
20:04i'll honor the the chairman's wish
20:07for example land garment would be sent
20:09information regarding indian uprisings
20:11mr kissinger or general hague
20:13information regarding travels of any war
20:15groups to annoy
20:17also prior to and during a demonstration
20:21my office would prepare summary reports
20:23for the president of the anticipated
20:25size of the demonstration
20:27any information about the leaders of the
20:29demonstration
20:31and during the demonstration a
20:32description of the activities of the
20:34demonstrators in the government's
20:35handling or anticipated handling of the
20:37demonstration
20:39contrary to the contrary to the policy
20:41that existed before i came to the white
20:42house i sought to keep the white house
20:44out of these tactical decisions
20:46regarding the demonstrations
20:48i felt these were decisions for the
20:49department of justice and the police
20:51i felt my job was to merely keep the
20:54white house informed as to what might
20:56happen or was happening
20:59my own desires in this matter were
21:01sometimes superseded when mr ehrlichman
21:03or mr haldeman
21:05did not like the way a particular
21:06demonstration was being handled
21:08sometimes they so instructed me to
21:10inform the justice department or chief
21:12wilson of the metropolitan police and
21:14sometimes mr ehrlich himself would so
21:16inform
21:17the justice department or chief wilson
21:20as soon as a potential demonstration was
21:22in the wind i began receiving calls from
21:24mr larry higbee mr holloman's principal
21:27staff assistant
21:28requesting intelligence reports
21:31i also received frequent complaints
21:33regarding the quality of the available
21:34information despite the fact that i felt
21:37the white house had the best information
21:38available to the government
21:41i became directly
21:43and personally aware of the president's
21:45own interest in my reports
21:47regarding demonstrations when he called
21:49me during a demonstration of the vietnam
21:51veterans against the war
21:53which occurred on the mall in front of
21:54the capitol
21:56this was the occasion in may 1971 and i
21:59believe that's the date
22:01when the government first sought to
22:03enjoy the demonstrations and later back
22:05down
22:06the president called me for a first-hand
22:08report during the demonstration and
22:10expressed his concern that i keep him
22:11abreast of what was occurring
22:13accordingly
22:14we prepared hourly status reports and
22:16sent them to the president
22:25i was made aware of the president's
22:27strong feelings about even the smallest
22:30of demonstrations during the late winter
22:32of 1971
22:34when the president happened to look out
22:35the window of the residence of the white
22:37house and saw a lone man
22:39with a large ten foot sign stretched out
22:42in front of lafayette park
22:44mr higbee called me to his office to
22:46tell me that the president's of the
22:48president's displeasure with a sign in
22:49the park
22:51and told me that mr holliman had said
22:53that the sign had to come down
22:55when i came out of mr higbee's office i
22:57ran into dwight chapin
22:59who said he was going to get some thugs
23:01to remove the man from lafayette park
23:04he said it would take him a few hours to
23:06get them but they could do the job
23:10i told him i didn't believe that was
23:11necessary
23:13the um
23:15audience are held
23:16by the consent of the committee
23:19and i'm going to request the audience to
23:21refrain from
23:23giving
23:24expression of their feelings by laughter
23:27or
23:28otherwise
23:29and i hope the audience will restrain
23:31themselves in that respect
23:37i told him i didn't believe that was
23:39necessary i then called the secret
23:40service and met with mr lewis sims
23:43mr sem said that he felt that the park
23:46police could work it out
23:48i went out with mr sims surveyed the
23:50situation and mr sims talked with the
23:52park police
23:53within 30 minutes the man had been
23:55convinced that he should move to the
23:57back of lafayette park
23:59there the sign was out of sight of the
24:00white house i reported back to mr
24:02hallman and after a personal look-see he
24:04was delighted i told mr chapin to call
24:06the troops off
24:08i also recall the first time i ever
24:10traveled with the president was on a
24:12trip in 1971 to the football hall of
24:14fame and on to iowa to open a dam
24:17after arriving at the akron canton
24:20airport
24:21i noticed there was virtually
24:23no hostile demonstrator inside of the
24:25president
24:26later when the president arrived at the
24:27motel he was spending the night in akron
24:30i was a few paces behind him as he
24:32walked into the lobby
24:33across the street were chanting vietcong
24:36flag waving demonstrators
24:38the president after seeing the
24:39demonstrators told the secret service
24:41agent beside him
24:43and some rather blunt synonyms
24:45to get the demonstrators out of there
24:47the word was passed but the
24:49demonstrators could not be moved much to
24:51the distress of the advanced men who
24:53were responsible for the president's
24:55trip
24:56was after observing that incident that i
24:58talked with several individuals in
25:00charge of advancing presidential visits
25:02and that i learned
25:04a major part of any presidential trip
25:06advance operation was ensuring that
25:08demonstrators were unseen and unheard by
25:10the president
25:11in early february of 1972 i learned that
25:14any means legal or illegal
25:17were authorized by mr holloman to deal
25:19with demonstrators when the president
25:21was traveling or appearing someplace
25:23i would like to add that when i learned
25:25of the illegal means that we're being
25:27employed
25:28i advise that such tactics
25:31not be employed in the future
25:33and if demonstrations occurred they
25:35occurred
25:39i stated earlier that there was a
25:40continuing dissatisfaction with the
25:42available intelligence reports
25:44the most frequent critic was mr holloman
25:46but the president himself discussed this
25:47with me in early march of this year as a
25:49part of the plan counter-offensive for
25:51dealing with the senate watergate
25:52investigation
25:54the president wanted to show that his
25:56opponents had employed demonstrators
25:57against him during his re-election
25:59campaign
26:00however with each demonstration that the
26:02president was confronted with and each
26:05incident that occurred during the
26:06campaign
26:07my office had sought to determine if it
26:10had in fact been instigated by political
26:12opponents of the president senator
26:14mcgovern the democratic party or
26:15whomever
26:17we never found a cintilla of viable
26:19evidence indicating that these
26:21demonstrators were part of a master plan
26:23nor that they were funded by democratic
26:25political funds nor they had any direct
26:27connection with the mcgovern campaign
26:30this was explained to mr holloman but
26:32the president believed that the opposite
26:34was in fact true
26:36i have submitted to the committee
26:38exhibit number one
26:40the text of the president's memorandum
26:42to me on this subject
26:45on on february 16 1973
26:50almost a month prior to this direct
26:52request from the president
26:54i had at mr holloman's request
26:57received all the available intelligence
26:59on the demonstrations the president had
27:01been subjected to during the 1972
27:03campaign
27:05this intelligence did not evidence what
27:07the president was looking for but i
27:08turned it over to mr william baruti
27:11telling him that the president wanted a
27:12speech as part of a counter offensive to
27:14the watergate inquiry several weeks
27:16later mr brudy reported that he too
27:18agreed that the information wasn't there
27:20for such a speech
27:23while there were other things which
27:24occurred that evidence the concern about
27:26demonstrators i believe that the
27:27foregoing
27:28gives this committee a good sampling
27:31of the degree of concern
27:35the committee has asked me about concern
27:37over leaks
27:39i believe that most anyone who worked at
27:41the white house
27:43during the past four years can attest to
27:45the concern that prevailed regarding
27:47leaks any and all leaks
27:50this was a matter of frequent discussion
27:51among staff members and in some
27:53instances
27:54leaks were investigated by mr holliman's
27:57office or mr erlickman
27:59i have submitted to the committee
28:01exhibit number two
28:03some documents evidencing the types of
28:05investigations that were made
28:08i began to understand the high degree of
28:10concern
28:11after i got to know mr jack caulfield
28:13who'd been assigned to my staff
28:15i would guess that i'd been at the white
28:17house almost a year
28:19before mr caufield told me
28:21that he had been directed by mr
28:22ehrlichman
28:24to wiretap
28:26a newsman's telephone in pursuit of a
28:27leak
28:29mr caufield told me that the wiretap was
28:32on for only a short period of time
28:34because he believed that the fbi had
28:36subsequently taken over
28:39he told me that he had been directed to
28:41perform the wiretap when mr hoover was
28:42unwilling but mr ehrlichman wished to
28:45proceed
28:46the wiretap was undertaken as i recall
28:49in late nineteen sixty nine or early
28:50nineteen seventy
28:53caufield told me it was performed by mr
28:55eulassowitz mr john reagan and himself
28:58he later repeated the story
29:01to me telling me that have been rather a
29:03rather harrowing experience when he was
29:05holding a ladder
29:06in a back alley of georgetown while also
29:09trying to keep a lookout as another
29:10member of the group was working on the
29:11top of the ladder
29:13he also told me that he'd received what
29:15he referred to as the pair numbers
29:18from mr john davies who was then on the
29:20white house staff
29:22and who had previously been employed
29:25or associated with the telephone company
29:27before joining the white house staff
29:31i do not know what information if any
29:33they obtained
29:34nor do i know any other details other
29:37than what i have related above
29:38i have no idea if the reason for the
29:40wiretap was related to national security
29:43but i believe that mr caulfield told me
29:46that it was indeed mr joseph crass
29:48telephone
29:50that was tapped
29:54while there's was always a present
29:56concern about leaks that concern took a
29:59quantum jump
30:00when the new york times began publishing
30:02the pentagon papers in june of 1971.
30:06after the initial legal skirmishes to
30:08enjoin publication of the papers had
30:10died down the white house concern about
30:12the problem of leaks had heightened
30:15to the best of my recollection and i've
30:17been unable to confirm
30:19this through
30:20white house records it was in late june
30:23or early july that jack caulfield came
30:25to me to tell me
30:27that mr coulson had called him in at
30:29ehrlichman's direction and instructed
30:31him to burglarize the brookings
30:33institution
30:34in an effort to determine if they had
30:36certain leaked documents
30:39what prompted mister caufield to come to
30:40me was that he thought the matter was
30:42most unwise
30:44and his instructions from mr colson were
30:46insane
30:48he informed me that mr lazowitz had
30:50cased the brookings institute
30:53and that mr lacewitz had made a friendly
30:54contact with one of the security men in
30:56the building
30:57but
30:58but that the security system at the
30:59brookings building was extremely tight
31:02and will be very difficult to break in
31:05caulfield told me
31:07that he had so informed coulson but that
31:09coulson had instructed him to pursue the
31:11matter
31:12and if necessary he should plan a fire
31:14bomb in the building and repeat retrieve
31:17the documents during the commotion that
31:18would ensue
31:20caufield said that coulson's entire
31:23argument for burglarizing the brookings
31:25was based on a publication he had
31:26obtained
31:27indicating that the brookings was
31:29planning for the fall of 1971
31:32a study of vietnam based on documents of
31:35a current nature
31:37and the fact that a consultant
31:40from who had formerly been with the
31:42national security council
31:44worked there
31:47caufield convinced me that coulson was
31:49intent on proceeding by one means or
31:51another so i advise caulfield that he
31:53should do nothing further and i would
31:55immediately fly to california
31:57and tell erlichmann
31:59that this entire thing was insane
32:02i flew to california on a military
32:03aircraft courier flight that was going
32:06to san clemente
32:07i sat with mr robert martian on the
32:09flight who told me he was also going to
32:11see the president about a highly
32:12important matter that he could not
32:13discuss with me
32:15a matter which i will refer to later
32:18when i arrived in california i arranged
32:19to see erlickman and told him that the
32:21burglary of the brookings institute was
32:23insane and to persuade him
32:26probably impossible he said okay and he
32:29called mr colson to call it off and i
32:32called mr caulfield to tell him it was
32:33called off
32:35it was not until almost a year or more
32:37later
32:38that i learned the reason for mr
32:40martian's trip to see the president
32:42mr martian later told me in a social
32:44conversation that he'd gone to see the
32:45president to get instructions
32:47regarding the disposition of wiretap
32:49blogs
32:50that related to newsmen and white house
32:52staffers
32:54who were suspected of leaking these logs
32:57had been in the possession of mr william
32:58sullivan an assistant director of the
33:00fbi
33:01and were per mr martian's instructions
33:04from the president given to mr
33:05ehrlichman
33:13i had occasion to raise this question
33:15about these logs with erlichman during
33:17the fall of 1972
33:22i did not tell him that i had been told
33:24by martian that he had them
33:27about february
33:31excuse me let me go back here after i
33:33had told mr ehrlichman
33:35uh
33:36or asked the question about the logs he
33:38had flatly denied to me that he had the
33:40logs at that time and it was about
33:42february
33:4322nd or 23rd of this year
33:46when time magazine notified the white
33:47house it was going to print a story that
33:49the white house had undertaken wiretaps
33:51of newsmen and white house staffers
33:54that and a request is being respond
33:57request is being asked for that i
33:58further got into the matter
34:00the white house press office notified me
34:02of this inquiry
34:03i called mr mark feld at the fbi to ask
34:06him first what the facts were and
34:08secondly how such a story could leak
34:12mr phelp told me that it was true that
34:14mr sullivan knew all the facts and that
34:17he had no idea how it leaked
34:19i then called mister sullivan and
34:21requested that he drop by my office
34:23which he did
34:24he explained that after much haggling
34:26the wiretaps were installed but as i
34:29recall mr sullivan said they did not
34:31have the blessings of the director
34:33mr sullivan explained to me
34:36all but one set of the logs have been
34:37destroyed
34:39and all the internal fbi records or
34:42relating to the wiretaps
34:44except one set have been destroyed and
34:46all the material had been delivered to
34:47mr martian
34:49after mr sullivan departed i called mr
34:52mitchell who told me
34:54he also had an inquiry from time
34:56magazine and denied time magazine any
34:59knowledge of the matter i did not press
35:01him further as to what he did know
35:03i then called mr ehrlichman and told him
35:06about the forthcoming story in time
35:08magazine
35:09i told him of my conversation
35:12conversations with felt sullivan and
35:14mitchell
35:15i also told him i knew he had the logs
35:17because mr martin had told me
35:19this time he admitted they were in his
35:20safe
35:21i asked him how mr ziegler should handle
35:24it
35:24he said mr ziegler should flatly deny it
35:27period
35:28i thanked him i called mr ziegler and so
35:31advised him
35:33turning now to the so-called plumbers
35:35unit
35:36that was created to deal with leaks
35:40i first heard of the plumber's unit
35:43in late july of nineteen seventy one
35:45i do not recall ever being actually
35:47advised in advance that such a unit was
35:49being created in the white house but i
35:51stumbled into it unknowingly when mister
35:53eagle crow happened to mention it to me
35:56i was not involved in its establishment
35:58i only know that mr krogh and mr david
36:00young were running it under mr
36:02ehrlichman's direction
36:04shortly after mr krogh told me about his
36:06unit he told me that they were operating
36:08out of a super secure location in the
36:10basement of the executive office
36:11building he invited me down to see the
36:13unit which i did
36:14and he showed me the sensor system
36:17and the scrambling scrambler phone
36:20i never discussed with mr kroge or mr
36:23young what they were doing or how they
36:25were doing it
36:26was through jack caulfield that i
36:28learned that mr gordon liddy was working
36:30with mr crogue
36:31i did not know liddy personally although
36:33i may have met him
36:35all i knew about mr liddy was that mr
36:36coffey what mr caulfield had told me and
36:38was to the effect that
36:41mr gene resides of the treasury
36:42department and mr lydia had a falling
36:45out
36:46and kroge had waited in the middle of
36:48this of the dispute by hiring libby and
36:50bringing him into the white
36:52house i did not realize that mr howard
36:56hunt worked most of time while he was at
36:58the white house in the plumbers unit
36:59until after june 17 1972
37:02i had seen hunt on many occasions
37:05in coulson's office and finally asked mr
37:08colson who he was
37:09he told me he was doing some consultant
37:11work for him and then introduced me
37:14that was the only time i've ever talked
37:15with mr hunt
37:18i am not aware of what
37:20success the plumber's unit had and it's
37:23dealing with leaks i recall on one
37:25occasion after jack anderson had printed
37:27the documents from a national security
37:28council meeting
37:30asking bud kroge if they'd figured out
37:31who'd leaked the information to mr
37:33anderson
37:34he told me yes but he couldn't disclose
37:36the name of the individual
37:38as i have indicated the june 1971
37:41publication of the pentagon's papers
37:43caused general consternation at the
37:45white house over the leak problem
37:47on june 29 1971 the president brought
37:50the subject of leaks up in a cabinet
37:52meeting as part of a white house
37:53orchestrated effort to curtail all leaks
37:56as a part of that effort mr holliman
37:58instructed mr fred malik mr larry higby
38:01gordon strawn and myself to develop a
38:03follow-up strategy for dealing with
38:05leaks
38:06malik and i never took the project very
38:08seriously but strawn and higbee
38:09continued to push
38:11i have submitted to the committee
38:13exhibit number three
38:14memorandum outlining the project that
38:16finally developed in which mr malik was
38:19to take charge
38:20and mr holoman was to be brought in as
38:22the lord high executioner when a leak
38:24was uncovered
38:25the committee will note from the
38:27documents which i have submitted that
38:28the project was to complement and not
38:31complete with the plumber's unit
38:33to the best of my knowledge this project
38:35never uncovered the source of a single
38:37leak
38:40i shall turn now pursuant to the
38:42committee's request
38:43from leaks to a matter of political
38:46intelligence
38:50with the hope that my voice will hold up
38:52through this entire statement
38:56the pre-election white house thrived on
38:58political gossip and political
39:00intelligence
39:02i knew of the type of information they
39:03sought even before i joined the white
39:05house staff
39:07during the summer of 1969 while i was
39:09working at the justice department the
39:11then deputy attorney general richard
39:13klein
39:14called me into his office and told me
39:16that the white house wanted some very
39:17important information
39:19mister kleines instructed me to call mr
39:21deloach then deputy director of the fbi
39:24and to obtain from him
39:26information regarding the foreign
39:28travels of mary jo kopechny
39:31i was told that mr deloach would be
39:32expecting a call for me
39:34and once i had the information in hand i
39:36was to give it to jack caulfield at the
39:38white house
39:39the incident stuck in my mind because it
39:41was of the rather sensitive nature of
39:43the information being obtained from the
39:44fbi
39:46and the fact that i was made a courier
39:47of the information
39:49to this day i can only speculate that i
39:51was asked to convey the information so
39:52that others could deny they had done so
39:55should the matter become known
39:57it was not until i joined the white
39:59house staff
40:00and caulfield was placed on my staff
40:02that i learned that caulfield was
40:03assigned to develop political
40:04intelligence on senator edward kennedy
40:08mr caulfield told me that within some
40:11six hours of the accident at
40:12chappaquiddick on july 18 1969 he had a
40:16friend named tony on the scene
40:18who remained on the scene conducting a
40:20private investigation of the matter and
40:22reporting pertinent information back to
40:23him
40:25it was not until this spring that i knew
40:27or could remember tony's full name
40:29anthony eulassowitz
40:32caufield told me that mr lassowitz posed
40:34as a newspaper reporter
40:36and always ask the most embarrassing
40:38questions at any press gatherings
40:40relating to the chapter critic incident
40:42caufield also informed me that his
40:44instructions were to continue
40:46surveillance on senator kennedy and he
40:48was doing so on a selective basis
40:51i was told by caulfield
40:53that although he had been assigned to my
40:55staff that he would continue to perform
40:56various intelligence gathering functions
40:58assigned to him by mr mr erlickman and
41:00mr haldeman
41:02i only recall once becoming involved in
41:04mr caulfield's activities related to
41:06senator kennedy that occurred in the
41:08fall of 1971 when i received a call from
41:10larry higby
41:12who later
41:13and i should say later these calls were
41:15followed up by mr strong
41:17who told me that holloman wanted 24-hour
41:19surveillance of senator kennedy and
41:22regular reports on his activities
41:25i passed this on to caulfield and we
41:27discussed it he told me that he thought
41:29that this was the most on was most
41:30unwise because it would require several
41:32men and could also uncover his
41:35activities in this in that senator
41:36kennedy was bound to realize he was
41:38under surveillance and given the fact
41:40that it could be easily misinterpreted
41:41as someone who is planning an attack on
41:43his life
41:44and the police or the fbi might be
41:46called in to investigate
41:48i agreed fully with caulfield and after
41:50some initial resistance i convinced
41:51higbee
41:53it was a bad idea to have the day-in
41:56day-out surveillance concept and it was
41:58called off instead caufield was to keep
42:00a general overview of senator kennedy's
42:02activity
42:03and pursue special investigations of
42:06activities that might be of interest
42:09caufield seldom informed me of his
42:11findings but occasionally he would bring
42:12matters to my intention
42:14for example caulfield was instructed to
42:16investigate senator kennedy's visit to
42:18honolulu in august 1971.
42:20i have submitted to the committee
42:22exhibit number four
42:23a copy of his report
42:25which he passed on to me to see along
42:28with several follow-up memorandum
42:29relating to the visit
42:31political intelligence often came from
42:33unexpected sources for example
42:36during this last spring of 1972
42:40a top man at the secret service brought
42:42me information regarding senator
42:43mcgovern
42:45i asked mr colson if he were interested
42:47he was very interested and had the
42:49information published
42:51the person on the white house the
42:53persons on the white house staff who
42:54were most interested in political
42:56intelligence were ehrlichman holloman
42:58and coulson
43:00as the re-election campaign drew closer
43:02i would have to say that it was
43:03principally coulson and sometimes
43:05holdemon
43:06who sought information from my office
43:09that had political implications to it
43:12while i've been unable to make a
43:13complete review of my office files to
43:15document the many types of inquiries i
43:18do have some documents that evidence a
43:19fair sampling of the types of requests
43:21that were frequently made of me
43:23and how they were handled by my office
43:26the documents are extremely sensitive
43:28and could be injurious to innocent
43:29people
43:30whose names are mentioned in them
43:32accordingly i have submitted them for
43:34the committee's use
43:35exhibit number five
43:37and
43:39i'm prepared to answer any questions
43:41the committee may have regarding these
43:43documents
43:45in addition to the rather wide ranging
43:47types of inquiries evidenced by the
43:49documents i have just referred to
43:51in addition to the extensive efforts to
43:53obtain politically embarrassing
43:55information on senator kennedy
43:57there were also frequent efforts to
43:58obtain politically embarrassing
44:00information on mr lawrence o'brien
44:03the democratic national committee
44:04chairman senator muskey and senator
44:06mcgovern
44:08while the involvement of my office and
44:10seeking such information was peripheral
44:12i have submitted to the committee
44:14exhibits number six seven and eight
44:17records and documents which show the
44:20efforts of the white house to
44:21politically embarrass these individuals
44:24again because the very sensitive nature
44:26of the information contained in these
44:27documents and the problems that the
44:29information might unfairly cause those
44:30individuals i shall not discuss the
44:33documents further other than to point
44:35out to the committee that the interest
44:37in mr larry o'brien dates back from my
44:39records to the time i first joined the
44:42white house staff in july of 1970
44:45while the interest in senators muskie
44:47and mcgovern developed as the
44:48re-election campaign developed
44:52i would now like to turn
44:53[Music]
44:54to a political intelligence and security
44:56plan that was designed
44:59for the campaign but ultimately rejected
45:10while caulfield was a member of my staff
45:12the use of mr ulawitz slowly diminished
45:14and i had no need for such investigative
45:16work and only requested caulfield to
45:18obtain investigative information when
45:20someone else in the staff requested it
45:23while i did try to find assignments for
45:25caulfield that related to the work of
45:26the council's office it was difficult in
45:28that he was not a lawyer
45:30mr caulfield was aware of the situation
45:32and in the spring of 1971 he came to me
45:35and told me he was thinking of leaving
45:37the white house staff to establish an
45:39investigative security consulting
45:41corporation
45:42he felt there was a need in a market
45:47for such an activity and what he
45:49described
45:50as a republican intertel
45:53the intertel
45:54firm being a long-established firm
45:56that's been in existence for a number of
45:58years working in the field
46:00he told me that he felt that
46:02he should get started as soon as
46:04possible so that he could have a going
46:06concern
46:07by campaign time
46:09and that his firm could provide
46:10investigative security assistance to the
46:12campaign
46:15we casually discussed this on several
46:17occasions the basic and initial concept
46:19he had developed was an operation that
46:22could be funded by contracts with
46:23corporations
46:25mr caulfield's firm would provide
46:27services for these corporations but
46:29would also provide free services to the
46:311972 reelection campaign
46:34i recall telling caufield that i could
46:36not help him in the intelligence field
46:38because i did not have
46:39any expertise in the area but i advised
46:42him
46:43that he should work with a lawyer in
46:44developing the concept he had just
46:46outlined me
46:47because it was fraught with legal
46:49problems for example i told him the
46:50court that corporations are prohibited
46:52under federal law
46:53from making direct or indirect campaign
46:55contributions
46:57shortly after these conversations cofiel
46:59informed me that he had formed a group
47:01to develop a plan to submit to mr
47:03ehrlich and mr hallman and mr mitchell
47:05the planning group intended to become
47:06the principal officers of the
47:08corporation once it commenced its
47:09activity
47:11caufield and the group spent several
47:12months developing their plans and in
47:14early august or september of 1971
47:17caulfield brought me a memorandum
47:19entitled operation sand wedge
47:22and told me that he was seeking a
47:24meeting with mr eric when to discuss the
47:25matter and requested that i assist him
47:27in getting a meeting with mr mitchell
47:30i do not know if mr caufield met with mr
47:32ehrlichman if he did i was not present
47:34and have no knowledge of the meeting
47:36i read the memorandum and found it to be
47:38a privately operated extension of the
47:41types of things that caulfield had been
47:42performing for mr ehrlichman
47:44i returned the memorandum to caulfield
47:46and told him i would raise it with
47:47mitchell
47:49to the best of my recollection
47:50recollection
47:52operation sandwich
47:54envisioned the creation of a corporation
47:57called security consulting group
47:59incorporated
48:00which was to have offices in washington
48:02chicago and new york he was to have an
48:05overt and a covert capacity
48:08the covert capacity would have operated
48:09out of new york presumably
48:12under the aegis of mr eulassowitz it was
48:14to be separate and apart from the other
48:16operations in washington chicago
48:19the principal activity of the security
48:21controlling
48:22consulting group was to provide private
48:24security for all phases of the campaign
48:26but the new york covert operation would
48:29have the capacity to provide bagged men
48:31to carry money and engage in electronic
48:33surveillance if called upon to do so
48:37although i returned the copy of the
48:39operation
48:40sandwich memorandum given to me by mr
48:42caulfield
48:43i did find in my records a copy of a
48:45proposed budget
48:47which reflects some of the items i've
48:48just mentioned
48:50i also found a number of memorandum
48:52relating to the campaign
48:54security aspects of the plan
48:56i have submitted these documents to the
48:58committee exhibit number nine
49:07i did discuss operation sand wedge
49:10with mr mitchell
49:12i recall that he was not interested at
49:13all
49:14he told me that he thought that jack
49:16caulfield was a fine person
49:18but he felt that the principal problems
49:21would relate to security in the problems
49:22that demonstrators might cause
49:25to the campaign
49:28mr mitchell said he wanted a lawyer to
49:30handle any such operation and asked me
49:32to think about candidates
49:34i told him that jack caulfield had
49:35requested an opportunity to discuss his
49:37plan with him i told him that jack i
49:40told him that i told jack i would convey
49:42the message
49:43mitchell did not wish to discuss the
49:44proposal so i kept putting
49:46caulfield off and when he raised it with
49:49me
49:50because i liked jack i did not want to
49:52hurt his feelings i continued to
49:54keep putting him off
49:57i also recall that ehrlichman raised
49:58operation sandwich with me
50:01i do not know if this was a result of
50:03his meeting with caufield or caufield
50:04sending him a copy of the memorandum
50:07ehrlichman told me that he would like to
50:08keep tony eulassowitz around during the
50:10campaign but he did not think much of mr
50:13caufield's proposed grand plan
50:16ehrlichman told me that mitchell knew
50:18about
50:20tony ulsowitz
50:21and that mitchell and jack caulfield
50:24should talk about tony's future
50:26meanwhile
50:27caulfield kept requesting an answer on
50:30his plans
50:33he had his heart set on the proposal he
50:35had spent long hours preparing it and i
50:37knew he was going to be very
50:38disappointed to learn that it had been
50:39shot down
50:40every few weeks mr caulfia would send me
50:42an item or two
50:44to prompt my attention
50:46and to prompt me to take action
50:48i have submitted the committee
50:50in exhibit number nine the types of
50:52items he would send i would just file
50:54them and do nothing
50:56as i decided that the best course of
50:58action to save jack's feelings was to
50:59let the matter die a natural death
51:01through no action
51:03indeed that happened
51:05by november 1971 mr caulfield realized
51:09that his plan was dead and he abandoned
51:11the idea
51:12realizing this he told me he would like
51:14to work for mr mitchell during the
51:16campaign
51:17as an aide to camp and requested that i
51:19assist him in getting an appointment
51:20with mr mitchell
51:22i arranged for him to meet
51:24mr mitchell on november 24 1971
51:28pursuant to mr caulfield's request
51:31i was not present
51:33during the entire meeting but jack later
51:35said that mr mitchell had requested that
51:38he do some investigative work on the
51:41mccloskey campaign
51:43apparently caufield convinced mr
51:44mitchell
51:45that some greatly reduced version of
51:47operation sandwich
51:49might be a value
51:51or he was seeking to show mitchell what
51:53he could do
51:55at any rate
51:56coffee will continue to call
51:58his intelligence gathering operation
52:00operation sandwich i have submitted to
52:02the committee exhibit number 10
52:04copies of the investigative report
52:07mr caulfield prepared for mr mitchell on
52:09the mccloskey new hampshire campaign
52:12and i hasten to add that to the best of
52:14my knowledge
52:16caufield employed no illegal procedures
52:18in gathering this information
52:22pursuant to the request of erlichmann
52:23that mitchell determined whether
52:25continued funding should be provided for
52:27mr ilasowitz mitchell asked me what
52:28ulasswoods have been doing i told him i
52:31did not know but i would have coffee
52:32will prepare a summary of the activities
52:35on january 12 1972 i informed mitchell
52:39that caufield had prepared such a list
52:41and suggested he meet with him i refer
52:44the committee to exhibit number 11. i
52:46would also note at this point that there
52:48is no list accompanying that exhibit
52:50because while i initially thought i did
52:51have a list i have searched my records
52:54that are available and i have no such
52:56list other than the possibility there
52:58might be a list in my files that remain
53:00at the white house
53:03i do not recall how this matter was
53:05resolved but i believe some of the some
53:07arrangement was made to compensate mr
53:09elassowitz but to my knowledge he was
53:11not used in any manner other than that
53:14to which i shall refer later in my
53:15statement
53:16mr caulfield and mr kombach would know
53:18about the arrangements that have been
53:20made
53:21i shall now turn to my knowledge of how
53:24an intelligence unit was established at
53:25the re-election committee
53:31to the best of my recollection it was
53:33the spring of 1971 that mr holman
53:37discussed with me what my office should
53:39do during the forthcoming campaign year
53:42he told me that we should take maximum
53:44advantage of the president's incumbency
53:46and the focus of everyone in the white
53:48house should be on reelecting the
53:49president
53:51it was decided that the principal area
53:53of concern for my office should be
53:54keeping the white house in compliance
53:56with the election laws
53:58and improving our intelligence regarding
54:00demonstrations
54:03i was also told that i should provide
54:04legal assistance in establishing the
54:06re-election committee and ensuring that
54:09that they had their own capacity to deal
54:11with the potential threats of
54:12demonstrations during the campaign and
54:14particularly the convention
54:16i advise holloman that jack caulfield
54:18was developing a security plan and he
54:20wanted to discuss his plan with mr
54:22mitchell and mr ehrlichman
54:24i also told him
54:26i would seek to get
54:27the inter-agency evaluation committee
54:30working on the potential
54:32for demonstrations during the campaign
54:34and subsequently called mr bernie wells
54:36the head of the iec to my office and
54:39told him of the concern of the white
54:40house for good intelligence during the
54:42coming campaign
54:45during the months that followed i
54:46devoted most of my time to regular
54:48office functions keeping abreast of the
54:50new campaign legislation and
54:51familiarizing myself with existing
54:53election laws the hatch act and related
54:55laws
54:56was not until after the proposed
54:58operation sandwich had been shelved and
55:01magruder had left the white house to
55:03form the re-election committee that i
55:04began receiving calls from strong and
55:07magruder that i was expected to suggest
55:09a lawyer to head up the demonstration
55:11intelligence operation at the
55:12re-election committee and to serve also
55:13a general counsel
55:16on several occasions magruder told me
55:18that he would like to have
55:20mr fred feeling my principal assistant
55:22for this job
55:24feeling and i discussed it but rejected
55:26it for several reasons
55:28first feeling was aware of the fact that
55:30i was considering leaving the white
55:31house at that time
55:33i was actually interviewing for jobs
55:34outside the government
55:36and
55:37he knew that i would recommend that he
55:39succeed me as counsel
55:41secondly
55:42if i stayed i would need his assistance
55:44during the coming months i might add
55:46parenthetically as i look back
55:48if i had accepted the job i was
55:50interviewing for at that time
55:52i would not be sitting here today
55:57after i informed magruder that mr
55:59feeling was not available he requested i
56:01suggest someone else
56:03because he was desperately in need of an
56:05in-house lawyer
56:07accordingly i next went to mr krogh
56:10and asked him if david young might be
56:12available and interested
56:14krog told me that young was very much
56:16involved in the declassification project
56:18and could not be spared
56:20the reason young had occurred to me
56:23is that i had spent several days
56:24traveling with him in mid-october
56:26interviewing
56:28prospective candidates for nomination to
56:30the supreme court
56:31i might add that during those days of
56:33traveling around the country together he
56:35never told me what the plumber's unit
56:37was doing or had done
56:38but i felt that mr young was a bright
56:40and extremely capable lawyer he would
56:42make an excellent general counsel
56:44and could handle the security and
56:46demonstration problems the campaign
56:48during my conversation with mr kroger
56:50about young
56:52he suggested mr gordon liddy might be
56:54available
56:55and that he had just about completed his
56:57work krog spoke very highly of liddy's
57:00legal ability
57:02and said that his fbi treasury
57:04department background in law enforcement
57:06would qualify him to handle
57:08a demonstration intelligence and
57:09security operation for the re-election
57:11committee
57:12i did not know mr liddy but i respected
57:14crowe kroeg's judgment both as to his
57:17judgment of other lawyers in his
57:19knowledge of law enforcement
57:21bud had dealt with a demonstration
57:22problem for the white house before i
57:24joined the staff
57:25i asked mr krog to find out if mr liddy
57:28was interested
57:29several days later kroge informed me
57:31that liddy was interested and asked me
57:33to come to his office krog's office
57:36and meet liddy and describe the job i
57:38did this i told liddy that the primary
57:41responsibility for the job was to serve
57:43as the lawyer for the re-election
57:44committee but among the responsibilities
57:46the general counsel would be keeping
57:48abreast of the potential of
57:49demonstrations
57:51that might affect the
57:52campaign lady said he was interested
57:55krog said that he would first have to
57:57clear this with erlichman i advise them
57:59that mr mitchell and mr magruder will be
58:02making the decisions on filling the post
58:04and if crow got the okay from ehrlichman
58:06i would set up a meeting for lady to be
58:08interviewed by mr mitchell
58:11when mr crow gave me the okay from
58:13ehrlichman i called mr mitchell and i
58:15told him that kroge with earlier's
58:17approval had suggested gordon liddy for
58:19the general counsel post
58:21and i arranged for lady to meet mitchell
58:24on november 24 1971 after mr caulfield
58:28met with mr mitchell
58:31i attended the meeting with mitchell and
58:33liddy and i have submitted to the
58:35committee exhibit number 12
58:38a copy of an agenda mr liddy prepared
58:40for the interview session
58:42while i cannot recall every detail it
58:44was discussed i do recall that it was a
58:46very general job type interview
58:49mitchell realized that lydia was not
58:50familiar with the election laws and
58:52asked if i
58:54would assist him in any way i could in
58:56getting himself familiar with those laws
58:57i agreed
58:59there was virtually no discussion of
59:00intelligence plans other than lady would
59:02draw up some sort of plans
59:04most of the conversations centered
59:06around
59:07title and compensation
59:09mr mitchell agreed that liddy would be
59:11titled general counsel i do not recall
59:13the rate of his compensation
59:15i also recall that liddy asked mr
59:17mitchell
59:18when he would actually join the campaign
59:20but mitchell said he did not know
59:28after this meeting
59:31mitchell called me to say
59:32that he wanted magruder to interview
59:34liddy because magruder would be the man
59:36working most with him
59:39iso advised liddy and on december 8 1971
59:42magruder requested i bring liddy over to
59:44his office for an interview
59:47the interview in magruder's office on
59:49december 8th was brief and
59:50non-substantive magruder told liddy that
59:52he had a host of legal problems that
59:54needed attention immediately and pointed
59:56to a stack of papers that i assume
59:58contained the problems that he was
1:00:00concerned about
1:00:01there was a brief discussion of lydia's
1:00:02responsibilities for demonstrations
1:00:04vis-a-vis the campaign and that he said
1:00:06that after he got acclimated to the
1:00:08committee's problems and needs he would
1:00:10drop a plan
1:00:11magruder requested that liddy come to
1:00:13work as soon as possible which i believe
1:00:15was the following monday
1:00:18after liddy was hired at the re-election
1:00:20committee
1:00:21i informed my staff principally mr fred
1:00:23fielding mr david wilson
1:00:26that they should assist lydia in
1:00:27becoming familiar with the election laws
1:00:29i made my election law file available to
1:00:32liddy and believe that he used them and
1:00:34he had periodic contact with my staff
1:00:36and myself in election law matters
1:00:38i can recall that i had several
1:00:40discussions with lydia about his
1:00:42responsibilities
1:00:43with the committee the re-election
1:00:45committee
1:00:46in complying with the election laws he
1:00:47told me that he had more work than there
1:00:49were hours in the day to complete it
1:00:51i urged him to get volunteer lawyers to
1:00:54assist him and suggested several names
1:00:56of lawyers who might assist him
1:00:58i can also recall that several weeks
1:01:00after liddy left the white house he was
1:01:03asked to turn in his white house pass
1:01:06that he came to me and asked me
1:01:08to intervene in his behalf so that i
1:01:09might so he might retain his past and
1:01:11avoid the cumbersome procedures of
1:01:13clearance every time that he wished to
1:01:14enter the white house i thought that my
1:01:16office would have a good deal of contact
1:01:18with liddy so i re requested that he
1:01:20permitted to keep his pass
1:01:22this request was turned down however
1:01:24because
1:01:25they decided to provide a fixed number
1:01:27of passes for people at the re-election
1:01:29committee and magruder would decide who
1:01:30got the passes i so informed liddy and
1:01:33never heard any more about the matter
1:01:37the next time i recall
1:01:39meeting mr lady i might insert before
1:01:42this that uh i did have a brief occasion
1:01:45to to see him in early january i believe
1:01:48about the 9th through the 14th or 15th
1:01:52when he attended a
1:01:55general conference in san diego on the
1:01:57entire scope of the convention
1:02:01and the security problems that were
1:02:02going to confront the convention in san
1:02:04diego
1:02:06after that the next time i recall
1:02:07meeting liddy
1:02:09was at a medium mitchell's office
1:02:12in january 27 1972
1:02:15magruder called my office
1:02:17to set up the meeting and only after i
1:02:19called magruder to ask why he wanted me
1:02:21to attend the meeting did i learn that
1:02:22lydia was going to present his
1:02:24intelligence plan
1:02:25i met magruder and liddy at mitchell's
1:02:27office
1:02:28lady had a series of charts
1:02:30or diagrams which he placed on an easel
1:02:33and the presentation by that he began
1:02:36i did not fully understand everything
1:02:39mr liddy was recommending at that time
1:02:41because some of the concepts were
1:02:43mind-boggling and the charts were in
1:02:46code names but i shall attempt to
1:02:48reconstruct the high points that i
1:02:49remember as best i can
1:02:52levy was in effect making a sales pitch
1:02:55he said that the operation he had
1:02:56developed would be totally removed from
1:02:58the campaign
1:03:00and carried out by professionals
1:03:02plans called for mugging squads
1:03:04kidnapping teams
1:03:06prostitutes to compromise the opposition
1:03:08and electronic surveillance
1:03:10he explained that the mugging squad
1:03:12could for example rough up demonstrators
1:03:14that were causing problems the
1:03:16kidnapping teams could remove
1:03:17demonstration leaders and take them
1:03:19below the mexican border and thereby
1:03:21diminish their ability
1:03:22the ability the demonstrators to cause
1:03:24problems at the san diego convention
1:03:27the prostitutes could be used at the
1:03:28democratic convention to get information
1:03:30as well as compromise persons involved i
1:03:33recall that he's saying that the girls
1:03:34would be high class and the best in the
1:03:36business
1:03:39when discussing the electronic
1:03:40surveillance he said that he had
1:03:42consulted one of the best authorities in
1:03:44the country and his plan envisioned far
1:03:46more than bugging and tapping of
1:03:48telephones
1:03:49he said that under his plan
1:03:51communications between ground facilities
1:03:54and aircraft
1:03:55could also be intercepted i might also
1:03:58at this point he also gave an elaborate
1:04:00description of intercepting
1:04:03various microwaves that traveled around
1:04:05the country through various
1:04:08communication facilities and i cannot
1:04:12explain to the committee what that was
1:04:13because to this day i don't understand
1:04:14it
1:04:16each major aspect
1:04:18of his proposal was on a chart
1:04:21with one chart showing the
1:04:23interrelations with the others
1:04:25each operation was given a code name i
1:04:27have no recollection of these code names
1:04:29with regard to surveillance
1:04:31i did not recall if this was necessarily
1:04:33limited to electronic surveillance
1:04:36he suggested several potential targets
1:04:38i cannot recall for certain it was
1:04:40during this meeting or a second meeting
1:04:42in early february that he suggested the
1:04:44potential targets the targets that i
1:04:46recall
1:04:47he suggested were mr larry o'brien the
1:04:50democratic headquarters and the fountain
1:04:52blue hotel during the democratic
1:04:54convention
1:04:55mr liddy concluded his presentation by
1:04:57saying that the plan would cost
1:04:59approximately one million dollars
1:05:02i do not recall magruder's reaction
1:05:05during the presentation of the plan
1:05:07because he was seated beside me
1:05:09but i do recall mitchell's reaction to
1:05:11the mission impossible plan he was
1:05:13amazed at one point i gave him a look of
1:05:15a bewilderment and he winked
1:05:17knowing mitchell
1:05:19i did not think he would throw liddy out
1:05:21of the office
1:05:23or tell him that he was out of his mind
1:05:25rather he did what i expected when the
1:05:27presentation was completed he took a few
1:05:29long puffs on his pipe
1:05:31and told liddy that the plan he had
1:05:33developed was not quite what he had in
1:05:35mind and the cost was out of the
1:05:36question
1:05:39he said he suggested that he go back and
1:05:42revise his plan
1:05:43keeping in mind that he was most
1:05:45interested
1:05:46in the demonstration problem
1:05:49i remained in mitchell's office for a
1:05:50brief moment after the meeting ended
1:05:53as the charts were being
1:05:55taken off the easel and disassembled
1:05:58and mitchell indicated to me that mr
1:05:59liddy's proposal was out of the question
1:06:02i then joined magruder and liddy
1:06:04and as we left the office i told liddy
1:06:06to destroy the charts
1:06:08mr lady said that he would revise the
1:06:10plan and submit a new proposal
1:06:13at that point i thought the plan was
1:06:15dead
1:06:16because i doubted if mitchell would
1:06:18reconsider the matter i rode back to the
1:06:20to my office with liddy and magruder but
1:06:22there was no further discussion of the
1:06:24plan
1:06:25the next time i became aware of any
1:06:27discussions of such plans occurred i
1:06:29believe on february 4th 1972
1:06:35excuse me magruder had scheduled another
1:06:37meeting in mr mitchell's office on a
1:06:39revised intelligence plan i arrived at
1:06:41the meeting very late and when i came in
1:06:44lydia was presenting a scaled-down
1:06:46version of his earlier plan
1:06:48i listened for a few minutes and decided
1:06:50i had to inject myself into the
1:06:51discussions
1:06:52mr mitchell i felt was being put on the
1:06:54spot
1:06:55the only polite way i thought i could
1:06:57end the discussion was to inject that
1:06:59these discussions could not go on in the
1:07:01office of the attorney general of the
1:07:03united states and the meeting should
1:07:05terminate immediately
1:07:07at this point the meeting ended
1:07:10i do not know
1:07:11to this day who kept pushing for these
1:07:13plans whether liddy was pushing or
1:07:15whether magruder was pushing whether
1:07:17someone was pushing magruder i do not
1:07:19know
1:07:21i do know in hindsight
1:07:23that i should not have been as polite as
1:07:25i was in merely suggesting that lydia
1:07:27destroy the charts after the first
1:07:28meeting
1:07:29rather i should have said forget the
1:07:31plan completely
1:07:33after i ended the second meeting i told
1:07:35liddy that i would never again discuss
1:07:37this matter with him
1:07:38i told him that if any such plan were
1:07:40approved i did not want to know
1:07:43one thing was certain in my mind while
1:07:45someone wanted this operation i did not
1:07:47want any part of it nor would i have any
1:07:49part of it
1:07:51after this second meeting in mitchell's
1:07:53office i sought a meeting with mr
1:07:55halliman to tell him what was occurring
1:07:57but it took me several days to get to
1:07:58see him
1:08:00i recall that mr higby got me into mr
1:08:02hallman's office when another
1:08:03appointment had been cancelled or
1:08:04postponed
1:08:06i told holliman what had been presented
1:08:08by liddy and told him that i felt it was
1:08:10incredible unnecessary and unwise
1:08:13i told him that no one in the white
1:08:14house should have anything to do with
1:08:16this
1:08:17i said that
1:08:19the re-election committee will
1:08:21need an ability to deal with
1:08:22demonstrations
1:08:24but it did not need
1:08:26bugging mugging prostitutes and
1:08:28kidnappers
1:08:30holloman agreed and told me
1:08:32that i should have no further dealings
1:08:33on the matter
1:08:42i assumed the lady plan was dead
1:08:44and it would never be approved
1:08:46i recall liddy coming into my office in
1:08:48late february or early march on a matter
1:08:50related to election laws he started to
1:08:52tell me that he
1:08:54he could not get his plan approved and i
1:08:56reminded him i would not discuss it with
1:08:57him he stopped talking about it and we
1:08:59went on with our business
1:09:01i have thought back over the sequence of
1:09:02events and tried to determine if i in
1:09:05any way encourage mr liddy and his
1:09:07intelligence plans i am certain of this
1:09:09i did not encourage him to develop
1:09:11illegal techniques because i was unaware
1:09:13he was developing such plans
1:09:16between the meeting in mitchell's office
1:09:18on february 4th
1:09:211972
1:09:22and june 19th
1:09:24of 1972 i had no knowledge of what had
1:09:27become of liddy's proposal
1:09:29i did receive a memorandum from magruder
1:09:32on march 26 1972
1:09:34that indicated that lady was doing some
1:09:36investigative work for magruder but
1:09:38nothing that appeared illegal let me
1:09:39explain
1:09:41during the first week of march 1972
1:09:44larry higbee holloman's assistant
1:09:47called me to request for holloman any
1:09:49information that caulfield could come up
1:09:51with regarding the funding of the
1:09:53democratic convention in miami
1:09:56on march 15 1972 i forwarded a newspaper
1:09:59article that caulfield had discovered on
1:10:01the subject
1:10:02later that day magruder brought to me
1:10:05a copy of a memorandum from liddy to
1:10:07mitchell regarding an investigation
1:10:09lydia had conducted using howard hunt in
1:10:12florida
1:10:13i called higbee and he said that
1:10:15magruder had already given him a copy i
1:10:17told higbee that i did not see anything
1:10:18illegal by the democrats based on the
1:10:20information in the memorandum
1:10:22i made a notation on the bottom of the
1:10:24memorandum from mr leddy but i did
1:10:27nothing further and heard nothing
1:10:28further from higbee on the subject i
1:10:31have submitted to the committee exhibit
1:10:33number thirteen
1:10:34the document i've just referred to
1:10:40i shall now turn to the events
1:10:42following the watergate incident of june
1:10:4517 1972
1:10:47and begin by telling the committee how i
1:10:49first learned of the incident
1:10:51i would skip the first part here of
1:10:53explaining how i ended up out of the
1:10:55country uh
1:10:58by a decision that was made in late may
1:11:00and returned on the 18th of june
1:11:05from the far east
1:11:07i returned
1:11:09from my four-day trip to the far east on
1:11:11the morning of june 18th
1:11:13when i landed in san francisco after 20
1:11:15hours of flying i called my assistant
1:11:17fred fielding
1:11:19to check in and tell him i was going to
1:11:20spend an additional day in san francisco
1:11:22to get some sleep before i returned to
1:11:24washington and accordingly i would not
1:11:26be in my office until tuesday
1:11:28was at this time that i first learned
1:11:30from mr feeling at the break-in at the
1:11:31dnc headquarters
1:11:33mr fielding told me that he thought that
1:11:35i should return home immediately as
1:11:37there might be a problem and that he
1:11:38would fill me in when i got home
1:11:40i recall that at first i resisted that
1:11:42mr fielding who was not explicit at that
1:11:44time
1:11:45told me i should come back so he could
1:11:47fill me in
1:11:48accordingly i flew back to washington
1:11:50and arrived on sunday evening i had a
1:11:52brief conversation with mr fielding and
1:11:54he informed me that he had learned from
1:11:56jack caulfield that mr mccord from the
1:11:58re-election committee was among those
1:12:00arrested in the
1:12:02democratic national committee
1:12:03headquarters on saturday
1:12:05and also
1:12:06that one of the cubans that have been
1:12:08arrested had a check that was made out
1:12:10by howard hunt to some country club
1:12:13i recall that my immediate reaction was
1:12:15that chuck colson was probably involved
1:12:18he was i was truly exhausted at this
1:12:20point so i told mr feeling i could i
1:12:23couldn't do anything at that time and i
1:12:25went to bed without doing anything
1:12:28on monday morning
1:12:29june 19th
1:12:31i arrived in my office about 9 15 my
1:12:33normal arrival time at the office
1:12:35when reading the news while reading the
1:12:37news accounts of the incident i received
1:12:39a call from jack caulfield who repeated
1:12:41what mr felian told me on sunday evening
1:12:45mr caulfield informed me that he had
1:12:47received the information from mr boggs
1:12:48of the secret service
1:12:51i next received a call from mr magruder
1:12:53and as best i can recall magruder said
1:12:56something to the effect that this might
1:12:58cause
1:12:59create some problems and i should look
1:13:01into it
1:13:02he also stated that this was all liddy's
1:13:04fault and he volunteered a few harsh
1:13:06epitaphs regarding mr liddy
1:13:09i also recall that magruder mentioning
1:13:11something about how the committee was
1:13:12going to handle the matter publicly but
1:13:15i cannot remember specifically what he
1:13:17stated regarding this
1:13:19i told magruder i just arrived back in
1:13:20the country i did not know any of the
1:13:22facts around the instant but would look
1:13:23into it
1:13:25i next received a call from erlickman
1:13:28who instructed me to find out what i
1:13:30could and report back to him
1:13:32i advised erlickman
1:13:34of my call from magruder and told him i
1:13:36probably should talk to liddy he agreed
1:13:40i recall that ehrlichman told me to find
1:13:42out what coulson's involvement was in
1:13:44the matter and also suggested i speak
1:13:46with mr kleins to see what the justice
1:13:48department knew about it
1:13:50i told him i would
1:13:51i would report back to him after i
1:13:53talked with liddy
1:13:55i next received a call from gordon stron
1:13:58who said he wanted to meet with me i
1:14:00informed him that i would not be able to
1:14:01meet with him until early in the
1:14:03afternoon
1:14:04he said he would drop by my office after
1:14:06lunch
1:14:07i next talked with chuck coulson on the
1:14:09phone
1:14:10i asked him
1:14:11what he knew about the incident and he
1:14:13vehemently protested that he knew
1:14:15nothing and had no involvement in the
1:14:16matter whatsoever
1:14:18coulson advised me that ehrlichman had
1:14:20spoken
1:14:21with him earlier regarding mr hunt
1:14:25earlier during that weekend
1:14:27and coulson
1:14:29uh said that we should get together with
1:14:30erlichmann as soon as possible
1:14:33i recall asking coulson if hunt still
1:14:35worked for him and again he became very
1:14:37defensive and stated that he was merely
1:14:39on his payroll as a consultant because
1:14:41erlichmann had so requested
1:14:43he asked me to determine if hunt was
1:14:45still on his payroll and i said i would
1:14:47check
1:14:49coulson also expressed concern over the
1:14:51content of hunts safe
1:14:53several weeks later
1:14:55probably four or five i learned from
1:14:57paul o'brien who was representing the
1:14:59re-election committee
1:15:01that he had learned from mr hunt's
1:15:03attorney william bittman that hunt and
1:15:05colson spoke on the telephone over the
1:15:07weekend of june 17th 18th that hunt had
1:15:10told colson to get the materials out of
1:15:12his hunt's office safe
1:15:15mr youth sloan called me to tell me he
1:15:17was worried
1:15:18at that time i knew of no reason why mr
1:15:20sloane should be worried so i told him
1:15:22not to worry he told me that he would
1:15:25like to meet with me and i told him and
1:15:27i was trying to find out what had
1:15:28happened
1:15:29and requested we meet in a few days i do
1:15:32not recall the precise date we did meet
1:15:41i next contacted liddy
1:15:43and asked him to meet with me
1:15:44he said he would come to my office
1:15:47as he came into the office i was on my
1:15:48way out i suggested we take a walk
1:15:52shortly before noon and we walk down
1:15:5417th street towards the corcoran gallery
1:15:56i will try to reconstruct the
1:15:58conversation to the best of my memory
1:16:00while i cannot recall every detail i do
1:16:02indeed recall the major items we
1:16:04discussed
1:16:06mr letty told me that the men who had
1:16:07been arrested in the dnc
1:16:09were his men and he expressed concern
1:16:11about them
1:16:12i asked him
1:16:14why he had men in the dnc and he told me
1:16:16that magruder had pushed him into doing
1:16:18it
1:16:19he told me that he had not wanted to do
1:16:21it
1:16:22but magruder had complained about the
1:16:23fact
1:16:24that they were not getting good
1:16:25information from a bug they had placed
1:16:28in the dnc sometime earlier
1:16:30he then explained something about the
1:16:32steel structure of the watergate office
1:16:34building it was inhibiting transmission
1:16:36of the bug
1:16:37and that they had gone into the building
1:16:38to correct this problem
1:16:40he said that he had reported to magruder
1:16:43that during the earlier entry of the dnc
1:16:46they had seen documents which i believe
1:16:48he told me were either government
1:16:50documents or classified documents
1:16:52and magruder told him to make copies of
1:16:54those documents
1:16:56lydia was very apologetic for the fact
1:16:58that
1:16:59they had been caught and that mr mccord
1:17:01was involved
1:17:03he told me that he had used mccord only
1:17:06because magruder had cut his budget so
1:17:08badly
1:17:09i asked him why one of the men had a
1:17:11check from mr howard hunt
1:17:13he told me that these men
1:17:15were friends of hunt and hunted put him
1:17:17in touch with him
1:17:19i do not recall that he discussing any
1:17:21further involvement of hunt other than
1:17:23hunts putting him in touch with the
1:17:24cubans
1:17:25i asked him if anyone from the white
1:17:27house was involved and he told me no
1:17:30as the conversation ended he again
1:17:32expressed his apology and his concern
1:17:34about the men in jail
1:17:36i told him i couldn't help and he said
1:17:38he understood
1:17:40he also told me that he was a soldier
1:17:42and would never talk he said that if
1:17:44anyone wished to shoot him on the street
1:17:46he was ready
1:17:48as we parted i said i'd be unable to
1:17:50discuss
1:17:52this with him further and he said he
1:17:54understood and i returned to my office
1:17:57after returning to my office i arranged
1:17:59a meeting with erlickman in his office
1:18:01for mid-afternoon
1:18:04gordon strong came to my office shortly
1:18:05i after i had met with liddy and strong
1:18:09told me that he had been instructed by
1:18:10haldeman to go through all of mr
1:18:13holliman's files over the weekend
1:18:16and remove and destroy damaging
1:18:18materials
1:18:19he told me that the materials included
1:18:22such matters as memorandum from the
1:18:23re-election committee
1:18:25documents relating to wiretap
1:18:27information from the dnc
1:18:29notes of meetings
1:18:30with holderman
1:18:32and documents
1:18:33which reflected that holloman had
1:18:35instructed magruder to transfer his
1:18:37intelligence gathering
1:18:39from senator muskie to senator mcgovern
1:18:41strong told me his files were completely
1:18:43clean
1:18:47i spoke with mr kleindinst and ho and he
1:18:50told me that both the fbi and the dc
1:18:52metropolitan police were investigating
1:18:55and he assumed that the fbi would take
1:18:57full jurisdiction of the case shortly
1:18:59he also alluded to his encounter with
1:19:01liddy at burning tree country club
1:19:04but he did not explain this in full
1:19:06until i later met with him
1:19:08i do not have a record of when i met
1:19:11with mr clinton's but it was either on
1:19:13monday the 19th or the next day
1:19:15i will describe that meeting shortly
1:19:19i met with erlichmann in mid afternoon
1:19:21and reported in full my conversation
1:19:23with liddy
1:19:25i also told erlichmann about the earlier
1:19:27meetings i had attended in mitchell's
1:19:29office in late january and early
1:19:31february in my subsequent subsequent
1:19:33conversation with mr haldeman
1:19:35he told me he wanted to meet later with
1:19:37colson and told me to attend
1:19:39erlichmann also requested i keep him
1:19:41advised and find out from the justice
1:19:44justice department what was going on
1:19:46i did not mention my conversation with
1:19:48tron because i assumed that ehrlichman
1:19:49was aware of this from holloman himself
1:19:52later that afternoon i attended a second
1:19:55meeting in ehrlichman's office with
1:19:56colson
1:19:58i recall erlickman asking
1:20:01where hunt was i said i had no idea and
1:20:04coulson made a similar statement
1:20:06at that point before the meeting had
1:20:08started
1:20:09ehrlichman instructed me to call liddy
1:20:11to tell him to tell hunt to get out of
1:20:13the country
1:20:14i did this without even thinking
1:20:16shortly after i made the call however i
1:20:18realized that no one in the white house
1:20:20should give such an instruction and
1:20:22raise the matter
1:20:23a brief discussion ensued between
1:20:25erlickman and myself
1:20:28as a result early
1:20:29early as i recall
1:20:31erlichman said that he did not
1:20:34think hunt was a fugitive from justice
1:20:35so why not
1:20:37i said that i did not think it was very
1:20:38wise at this point colson chimed in that
1:20:41he also thought it unwise and ehrlichman
1:20:44agreed i immediately called liddy
1:20:47again
1:20:48to retract the request but he informed
1:20:51me
1:20:52that he'd already passed the message and
1:20:53it might be too late to retract
1:20:56following this brief telephone skirmish
1:20:58regarding hunt's traveling plans the
1:21:00meeting turned to hunt status at the
1:21:02white house
1:21:03i had learned from
1:21:04fred feeling who i who i had asked to
1:21:06check on it that hunt had drawn had not
1:21:09drawn a check from his white house
1:21:11consultantship since late march of 1972
1:21:16but as far as i knew
1:21:18the records indicated that hunt was
1:21:20still a white house consultant colson
1:21:23after discussion discussions of this by
1:21:25coulson
1:21:27who at this point was disowning hunt as
1:21:29a member of his staff erlichman called
1:21:31bruce curley
1:21:32and requested he'd bring hunt's
1:21:34personnel records up to ehrlichman's
1:21:35office
1:21:36before curl i arrived colson raised the
1:21:39matter of hunts safe
1:21:41coulson without getting specific said it
1:21:44was imperative that someone get the
1:21:45content
1:21:47contents of hunts safe
1:21:48colson suggested an erlickman concurred
1:21:51that i take custody of the contents of
1:21:52the safe
1:21:54when curley arrived he was quizzed by
1:21:56erlichmann and coulson on hunt's status
1:21:58at the white house
1:21:59coulson was arguing that hunt should
1:22:01have been removed from the white house
1:22:03as of march 31 1972.
1:22:07colonized records however did not so
1:22:09indicate i have submitted to the
1:22:11committee exhibit 13a
1:22:14memoranda that coulson forwarded to me
1:22:17on june 19th presenting his argument
1:22:20this was later resolved between coulson
1:22:23and kerli pursuant to coulson's argument
1:22:25i always had assumed that this required
1:22:28some alteration of the records but i did
1:22:29not know this for a fact
1:22:32following this discussion erlichmann
1:22:34asked curly
1:22:35where hunt's office was located and how
1:22:37the contents of his safe could be
1:22:39removed
1:22:40curly explained that he would have to
1:22:41have gsa
1:22:43open the safe
1:22:45colson said it must be done immediately
1:22:47and erlichmann instructed curley to have
1:22:49me present when the safe was opened and
1:22:51that i should receive the contents of
1:22:52the safe
1:22:53curl i said he would call me
1:22:55when he had made the arrangements and he
1:22:56left the office
1:22:58erlichman told me to report to him on
1:23:00the contents of hunt's safe and the
1:23:01meeting ended
1:23:11cole i called my office after i had
1:23:13departed
1:23:14he talked with fred fielding
1:23:16and asked him to come
1:23:18with him to open hunts safe i do not
1:23:20recall mentioning this to feeling before
1:23:22i departed and i did not know what curl
1:23:24i told fielding but curl i was aware
1:23:26from the earlier meeting that with
1:23:28erlickman that i was to receive the
1:23:29contents of the safe
1:23:31after departing the office
1:23:33i believe i went to mr mitchell's
1:23:34apartment i do not recall who asked me
1:23:36to come to mitchell's apartment
1:23:39and it may have been
1:23:40the evening of the 20th rather than the
1:23:4219th
1:23:43i recall that when i arrived mitchell
1:23:45martian and magruder were there and i
1:23:48gather had been discussing matters
1:23:49before i arrived
1:23:51i recall listening but i can only recall
1:23:53discussions on how to handle handle the
1:23:55matter from a public relations
1:23:56standpoint i have no other recollection
1:23:58of the meeting
1:24:00it was on june 20th or 21st
1:24:03that gordon strawn and richard howard
1:24:05came to my office
1:24:07strong informed me that holderman had
1:24:09authorized an expenditure by coulson of
1:24:11some funds but the entire amount had not
1:24:13been expended
1:24:14and he was turning over the remainder to
1:24:17me to hold
1:24:18i told strong that i would hold the
1:24:20funds
1:24:21and would be accountable for them i
1:24:23placed the cash fifteen thousand two
1:24:25hundred dollars in my safe
1:24:28i informed mr fielding of my office of
1:24:30the fact that the cash was in my safe
1:24:32and where'd it come from
1:24:33i felt i should inform fielding because
1:24:36i wanted someone to know why the money
1:24:38was in my safe if anything should happen
1:24:39to me
1:24:41the cash remained in my safe untouched
1:24:43until october 12 1972 when i removed a
1:24:46packet of bills amounting to four
1:24:48thousand eight hundred fifty dollars and
1:24:50placed my personal check for that amount
1:24:52with the remaining cash
1:24:54i removed the forty eight fifty after i
1:24:56had failed to make arrangements to pay
1:24:58for the anticipated expense of my
1:25:00wedding and my honeymoon
1:25:02i subsequently expended the cash
1:25:04over a several month period of time as
1:25:06my honeymoon was cut short and the full
1:25:08amount i had anticipated was not
1:25:10necessary
1:25:11thus i used part of the cash for normal
1:25:13daily expenditures
1:25:15at one point
1:25:17after i had withdrawn the cash i
1:25:18returned part of it to the safe and
1:25:19subsequently took it out again when i
1:25:22was later making another attempt after
1:25:24the election to go on a honeymoon
1:25:27at no time when i was making personal
1:25:30use of part of these funds did i plan or
1:25:32believe
1:25:33that i would not have to account for the
1:25:35entire amount at some point in time
1:25:37however as i shall state later there was
1:25:40great pressure long before october
1:25:43to use any and all available cash to pay
1:25:45for the silence of the individuals
1:25:47involved in the watergate and i decided
1:25:49from the outset that i did not want the
1:25:51money i was holding to be used for that
1:25:53purpose
1:25:54i have never sought to hide this fact
1:25:57from that i made personal use of this
1:25:59money from anyone i informed my lawyers
1:26:01i informed the government prosecutors in
1:26:03april
1:26:04and i informed mr dash at the outset of
1:26:06our discussions
1:26:08the money is presently in a trustee
1:26:10account which was established after i
1:26:12informed my lawyers of the fact i was
1:26:14holding the funds and all the records
1:26:16relating to the creation of that account
1:26:17have been turned over to the government
1:26:20and this committee as well i believe
1:26:23as i mentioned earlier in my statement i
1:26:25met with the
1:26:27the attorney general
1:26:29richard kleindings done either monday
1:26:31the 19th or tuesday the 20th i recall
1:26:34that before this meeting i had been
1:26:35asked by erlickman to talk with findings
1:26:37about the scope of the investigation
1:26:39and i had already had my meetings with
1:26:42lydian strong
1:26:45when i went to clinton's office i found
1:26:47him totally dismayed and angered at such
1:26:49a stupid thing could occur
1:26:51he then told me that over the previous
1:26:53weekend while at burning tree country
1:26:55club lydia accompanied by mr powell
1:26:57moore had sought him out
1:26:59he said he was incredulous when lydia
1:27:01stated that john mitchell had instructed
1:27:03him at his litty to tell clinton's to
1:27:06get the men who had been arrested out of
1:27:08jail
1:27:09he told me that liddy was rattled and
1:27:10upset and wanted to talk about the
1:27:12entire matter but kleinings told me that
1:27:14he cut liddy off and told him he would
1:27:16not talk with him i told mr klein
1:27:20that i did not have all the facts but i
1:27:22was very concerned this matter could
1:27:23lead directly to the president
1:27:26i told him that i did not know if the
1:27:27president was involved but i was
1:27:29concerned i remember klein saying to me
1:27:31that he certainly hoped that the
1:27:32president was not involved or that i was
1:27:34not involved in this and i responded
1:27:36that i certainly had not been involved
1:27:38in any criminal activity
1:27:40i told him that i had no idea
1:27:43that there was going to be a break-in at
1:27:45the democratic national committee
1:27:47headquarters
1:27:48and i
1:27:49agreed
1:27:51with his continued assertion of its
1:27:52stupidity
1:27:55i told kleindings without giving him
1:27:57specifics that i did not know what would
1:27:59happen if the investigation led into the
1:28:01white house but that i suspected that
1:28:04the chances of re-electing the president
1:28:06would be severely damaged
1:28:08clinton's called henry peterson and
1:28:10asked peterson to come to his office
1:28:13while we were waiting for peterson
1:28:14clinton's told me that my superiors at
1:28:16the white house never understood that
1:28:18once an investigation begins it runs its
1:28:20full course
1:28:22he said that he was always being asked
1:28:24to take care of this matter or that
1:28:25matter as if by magic he could make
1:28:27something unpleasant go away
1:28:30i said that i was well aware of that
1:28:31attitude that i'd never been able to get
1:28:33through to anyone at the white house
1:28:34that things just didn't happen that way
1:28:37when peterson arrived at clinton's
1:28:39office
1:28:40he gave a status report of the
1:28:41investigation
1:28:44findings then related my concern to
1:28:46peterson
1:28:48peterson was troubled by the case and
1:28:49the implications of it
1:28:51kleines had to go to another meeting so
1:28:53peterson and i
1:28:54i believe the meeting was still in in
1:28:56clinton's office had another meeting in
1:28:58his office
1:28:59so peterson and i went into kleine's
1:29:01back office and talked further
1:29:03to the best of my recollection we did
1:29:05not discuss specifics
1:29:07rather was a general discussion
1:29:09i told him i had no idea where this
1:29:11might end but i told him that i did
1:29:13didn't think that the white house would
1:29:14withstand a wide open investigation
1:29:17the sum and substance of our
1:29:18conversation was that i had no idea
1:29:21how far this thing might go but i had
1:29:24reason without being specific to suspect
1:29:26the worst
1:29:28the meeting ended on that note that i
1:29:30hoped i was wrong
1:29:34i do not recall ever reporting this
1:29:36meeting to ehrlichman because he had a
1:29:38somewhat strained relationship with
1:29:40findings and i thought
1:29:42that he would raise havoc that i
1:29:44did not have an assurance from klein's
1:29:46that
1:29:47he would take care of everything i did
1:29:49report however that i felt that peterson
1:29:51would handle the matter fairly and not
1:29:53pursue a wide open inquiry into
1:29:55everything the white house had been
1:29:56doing for four years
1:29:57i made this statement not because of
1:29:59anything peterson specifically said as
1:30:01much of the impression he gave me that
1:30:03he realized the problems of a wide open
1:30:05investigation of the white house
1:30:08in a election year
1:30:11returning now to the contents of mr
1:30:13hunt's safe
1:30:26it was mid morning on
1:30:28tuesday
1:30:29june 20th when the gsa men brought
1:30:31several cartons to my office which
1:30:33contained the contents of mr hunt's safe
1:30:37i had learned earlier that morning from
1:30:39mr fielding that the boxes had been
1:30:41secured in curley's office overnight
1:30:44feeling also reported that they had
1:30:45found a handgun in the safe which curley
1:30:47had disengaged a large briefcase
1:30:49containing electronic equipment and a
1:30:51number of documents some of which were
1:30:53classified
1:30:54i told fielding that i would like his
1:30:56assistance later that day and going
1:30:58through the material
1:30:59during the afternoon of the 20th feeling
1:31:02and i began going through the cartons of
1:31:04hunt's material
1:31:06i remember looking into the briefcase
1:31:08which contained electronic equipment i
1:31:10frankly do not know
1:31:12what it was it contained but it
1:31:14contained
1:31:16loose wires chapsticks
1:31:19for your lips with
1:31:20wires coming out of them
1:31:23instruction sheets for walkie-talkies
1:31:26and as i recall there were also some
1:31:28antennas in there
1:31:31we then began sorting the documents
1:31:33the bulk of the papers were classified
1:31:35cables
1:31:36from the state department relating to
1:31:38the early years of the war in vietnam
1:31:41these were separated out from the rest
1:31:43of the papers the other papers i assumed
1:31:46related to hunt's work at the white
1:31:47house
1:31:48also there were personal papers i will
1:31:51attempt to the best of my recollection
1:31:52to describe the papers and documents
1:31:55that were found in unsafe i must point
1:31:57out however
1:31:58that i personally did not look at all
1:32:00the documents or read all the documents
1:32:02rather was a combined effort by feeling
1:32:04of myself to determine what was in
1:32:06hunt's safe
1:32:08first
1:32:09among his personal papers were copies of
1:32:11his submissions for his per diem pay as
1:32:13a consultant a few travel vouchers and
1:32:16an envelope containing materials of a
1:32:17personal nature related to his wife
1:32:20among the papers that i assume related
1:32:22to his work at the white house
1:32:24were numerous memoranda to chuck colson
1:32:26regarding hunt's assessment of the
1:32:28plumber's unit
1:32:29operation and critical of mr krog's
1:32:31handling of the matters a number of
1:32:33materials relating to mr daniel ellsberg
1:32:36such as news clippings and a
1:32:39psychological study of mr ellsberg which
1:32:41apparently had been prepared by someone
1:32:42who'd never actually met or talked with
1:32:44mr ellsberg
1:32:45a bogus cable that is other cables that
1:32:48have been spliced together into one
1:32:50cable
1:32:51regarding the involvement of persons in
1:32:53the kennedy administration in the fall
1:32:54of the dm regime in vietnam
1:32:57a memorandum regarding some discussion
1:32:59about the bogus cable with coulson and
1:33:02mr william lambert
1:33:04some materials relating to an
1:33:05investigation hunted conducted for
1:33:07colson at chappaquiddick
1:33:09some materials relating to the pentagon
1:33:11papers and a paperback book containing
1:33:13published pentagon papers
1:33:17upon examining the contents of the safe
1:33:19i recall that
1:33:20fielding and i discussed are concerned
1:33:22about the public impact some of these
1:33:23documents might
1:33:25have if they became public particularly
1:33:27in an election year
1:33:28i requested that feeling removed the
1:33:30politically sensitive documents from the
1:33:32others
1:33:33which he did
1:33:34the classified state department cables
1:33:36were too bulky for my own safe so i
1:33:38called david young and requested that he
1:33:40store them for me in his office
1:33:42as i assumed at that time
1:33:45that they would probably be returned to
1:33:46the state department
1:33:48i told young
1:33:50when he came to pick up the materials
1:33:52that they had come from hunt's safe and
1:33:54he should store them all together until
1:33:57i told him what to do with him
1:33:58accordingly mr young took the state
1:34:00department documents
1:34:02to his office the large briefcase was
1:34:05stored in a locked closet in my office
1:34:07suite and the politically sensitive
1:34:09documents and hunt's personal papers
1:34:11were placed in a safe in my office
1:34:14the remaining materials were left in the
1:34:16cartons on the floor of my office
1:34:19i subsequently met with mr ehrlichman to
1:34:22inform him of the contents of hunt's
1:34:24safe
1:34:25i gave him a description of the
1:34:26electronic equipment and told him about
1:34:28the bogus cable the materials relating
1:34:30to ellsberg and the other politically
1:34:31sensitive documents
1:34:33i remember well his instructions
1:34:35he told me to shred the documents and
1:34:37deep six the briefcase
1:34:39i asked him what he meant by deep six
1:34:42he leaned back in his chair and said
1:34:44you drive across the river on your way
1:34:45home at night don't you i said yes he
1:34:48said well when you cross over the bridge
1:34:50on your way home just cross toss the
1:34:52briefcase into the river
1:34:55i felt very much on the spot so i told
1:34:57him in a
1:34:58joking manner that i would bring
1:35:00materials over to him and he could take
1:35:02care of them because he also crossed the
1:35:04river on his way home at night
1:35:06he said no thank you
1:35:08and i left his office and returned to my
1:35:10office
1:35:18after leaving erlichman's office
1:35:20i thought about what he had told me to
1:35:22do and was very troubled
1:35:24i raised it with fielding and he shared
1:35:26my feeling that it would be an
1:35:27incredible action to destroy potential
1:35:28evidence
1:35:29i think mr feeling appreciated my
1:35:31quandary
1:35:32when ehrlichman said do something he
1:35:34expected it to be done i decided to
1:35:36thank it over
1:35:37i did take the briefcase out of my
1:35:39office because the closet that was being
1:35:41stored in was being used by the
1:35:42secretaries in the office i did not have
1:35:45an available safe to hold the large
1:35:47briefcase i was also giving serious
1:35:49consideration to erlickman's
1:35:51instructions
1:35:52accordingly i placed the briefcase in
1:35:54the trunk of my car where it remained
1:35:56until i returned to the office after i'd
1:35:58reached the decision that i could not
1:35:59follow erlickman's instructions
1:36:02i will explain in a few moment minutes
1:36:04how i handle the material in hunt safe
1:36:07but before doing so i'd like to continue
1:36:08with the sequence of events
1:36:15to the best of my recollection it was on
1:36:16the 20th or 21st that colson told me in
1:36:19a casual conversation in the hall
1:36:21outside of his office about an incident
1:36:23he thought was painfully humorous
1:36:26he told me that a member of his staff mr
1:36:28douglas hallett
1:36:29had an office in the same suite with
1:36:31hunt and that hallett
1:36:33was talking with a wire service reporter
1:36:35while hunt was in the other office
1:36:37colson said to me something to the fact
1:36:39can you believe what a story that
1:36:41reporter might have had if hunt had come
1:36:43walking out of his office while howard
1:36:45was being interviewed
1:36:46colson gave me the impression that this
1:36:48incident had occurred on june 17th or
1:36:50june 19th but i do not recall which
1:36:53however i do recall coulson telling me
1:36:55that he that it had occurred and colson
1:36:57was very concerned about his
1:36:58relationship with hunt
1:37:00to the best of my recollection the fbi
1:37:02contacted me during the morning of june
1:37:05second and requested an interview with
1:37:07coulson
1:37:09i so informed coulson and an interview
1:37:11was arranged for that day
1:37:13coulson said that he wanted me present
1:37:15when he was interviewed and also wanted
1:37:17me to meet with me prior to the
1:37:19interview
1:37:21he was insistent that i'd be present
1:37:23because he was concerned the fbi report
1:37:26of the interview might not be accurate
1:37:28and he wanted someone else to attest to
1:37:30his story
1:37:32colson came to my office shortly before
1:37:34the scheduled meeting with the fbi he
1:37:36said he did not wish to get into
1:37:37unrelated matters and said that
1:37:40again that he had no information
1:37:42regarding the watergate i told i told
1:37:44him i presume that the agents would only
1:37:46be interested in his knowledge about the
1:37:48watergate and his relationship with hunt
1:37:51the agents arrived identified themselves
1:37:54and somewhat to my surprise gave coulson
1:37:55a warning of his rights which he waived
1:37:58i believe
1:37:59that the committee has access
1:38:01to mr colson's fbi interview which was
1:38:03rather brief
1:38:05in that coulson imparted very little
1:38:06information to them
1:38:09i did not inject myself in the interview
1:38:10at any time but did make rough notes of
1:38:13the items covered in fact i believe this
1:38:16was the only interview where i made any
1:38:17notes at all
1:38:19i made these notes because coulson had
1:38:20expressed his concern
1:38:22before the interview regarding
1:38:24someone later being able to attest to
1:38:26his story
1:38:27i have submitted to the committee
1:38:29exhibit number 14
1:38:31the rough notes which have also been
1:38:33transcribed from my
1:38:37own handwriting
1:38:39the rough notes hastily i hastily jotted
1:38:41down during the interview and i find
1:38:44them very revealing in light of the
1:38:45statement that was made during the
1:38:46nomination hearings of mr pat gray
1:38:49for the fbi directorship and would like
1:38:51to digress for a moment regarding the
1:38:52comment
1:38:54that was made during those hearings that
1:38:56dean probably lied to the fbi
1:38:59as to whether hunt had an office in the
1:39:01white house
1:39:03during
1:39:04the interview of mr coulson on june 22
1:39:06the agents asked him if mr hunt had an
1:39:09office at the white house coulson
1:39:11responded
1:39:12that he thought mr hunt had an office in
1:39:14the executive office building but he did
1:39:16not know where it was located
1:39:18the question came up about midway
1:39:19through the interview and was not as i
1:39:21recall pursued further at that point by
1:39:23the agents other than a question to me
1:39:26as to whether it would be possible to
1:39:27get the room number i said yes
1:39:30at the end of the interview and as the
1:39:32agents were departing
1:39:33they had asked they asked me if they
1:39:35could see not whether mr on had but
1:39:37rather whether he could see
1:39:39mr hunt's office right then
1:39:41i told him i'd have to check it out and
1:39:43get back to them
1:39:45those are the facts as i remember them
1:39:47and coulson happened to stop by my
1:39:48office a day that gray said i had
1:39:50probably lied i asked colson for his
1:39:52recollection of the matter and he stated
1:39:54that he remembered it as i had
1:39:56remembered it
1:39:58at that time i had forgotten that i had
1:40:00made the notes during colson's interview
1:40:02which clearly reflect to me that coulson
1:40:04had stated
1:40:07that during the interview that hunt had
1:40:09an office in the white house
1:40:11a few days after coulson's interview i
1:40:13had called the agents and told them that
1:40:15i had the materials from hunt's office
1:40:17and would get them to them shortly
1:40:20i learned after mr gray had made his
1:40:23statement during his nomination hearings
1:40:25that he had based the statement or based
1:40:27his conclusion on a report written by
1:40:29the agent some seven months after the
1:40:31incident
1:40:32when i talked with gray about the matter
1:40:33during his nomination hearing and he
1:40:35informed me that he did not feel he
1:40:37could retract the statement without
1:40:38creating more problems i told him i did
1:40:40not think that the agents involved
1:40:42should be brought into the matter
1:40:44because i was sure that they had
1:40:45honestly reported the matter as they had
1:40:47remembered it
1:40:48i had dealt with the agents involved
1:40:50on several occasions and i felt that
1:40:52they had called it the way they had
1:40:54remembered it so i let the matter drop
1:40:56and decided i would just have to take
1:40:58the rather unpleasant heat and live with
1:40:59it
1:41:10mr chairman this would be a point where
1:41:12i could summarize
1:41:15in
1:41:16part of this statement
1:41:18uh regarding handling of the fbi
1:41:21interviews at the white house and just
1:41:22merely state generally that they
1:41:24followed a very similar pattern that
1:41:26that would if you could uh that would be
1:41:28all right if you could indicate for the
1:41:30for the committee
1:41:32the
1:41:33pages on which uh
1:41:35that the
1:41:36statements are made which you summarize
1:41:38so we can have those pages printed along
1:41:40with all right
1:41:42in full in the body of the record
1:41:44i'll summarize beginning at the bottom
1:41:47of page 63 through 66 and merely note to
1:41:51the committee that the handling of the
1:41:53fbi interviews at the white house
1:41:56followed the pattern that had been first
1:41:57established by
1:41:59the interview with mr colson i had
1:42:01cleared this procedure with mr
1:42:02ehrlichman
1:42:04he thought it was a good idea i was
1:42:06there i was there when he was present
1:42:08when he was interviewed
1:42:10and i think that
1:42:13the material is self-explanatory as to
1:42:15any questions the committee might have
1:42:17regarding those interviews
1:42:21i'll now turn to my first meetings with
1:42:23mr gray beginning on page 66
1:42:27regarding the investigation
1:42:30i believe it was on june 21st that i
1:42:32first met
1:42:34with mr gray in his office in late
1:42:35morning regarding the fbi investigation
1:42:38at that meeting he told me he fully
1:42:40realized the sensitive nature of the
1:42:42investigation that they were pursuing
1:42:45and that he had placed his most trusted
1:42:46senior people in charge of the
1:42:48investigation
1:42:49i told gray i had been asked to keep
1:42:51informed about the investigation mr gray
1:42:53told me that he had been visiting a
1:42:55number of regional offices and would
1:42:56continue to do so in the future thus if
1:42:58i needed information i should call mr
1:43:01mark felt in his absence
1:43:04i might note at this point that indeed
1:43:05gray was frequently absent from the city
1:43:07during the course of the investigation
1:43:09and this irritated ehrlichman greatly
1:43:11when he asked me to get some information
1:43:13from gray and gray was out of the city
1:43:16on several occasions in fact erlickman
1:43:18instructed me to tell grey to return to
1:43:19the city and mine the store
1:43:21i passed this message to gray but i
1:43:23cannot recall when or what prompted
1:43:26ehrlichman to have me do so i do recall
1:43:28that there on one occasion that uh
1:43:30related to
1:43:32some recently
1:43:33major leaked information that had come
1:43:35out of the
1:43:37fbi
1:43:40during my meeting with gray on the 21st
1:43:42of june he also told me
1:43:44a man by the name of mr bates was
1:43:46heading the investigation
1:43:48i do not know mr bates and when i
1:43:50reported this back to ehrlichman he
1:43:51asked me who bates was i told him i did
1:43:54not know bates
1:43:57i can recall on several occasions erlich
1:43:59when asking me if i thought that gray
1:44:01knew what he was doing
1:44:02and if he had the investigation under
1:44:04control
1:44:05i responded that he seemed to be relying
1:44:07on men in whom he had full trust
1:44:10to the best of my recollection it was
1:44:12during this june 21st meeting with gray
1:44:15that he informed me
1:44:17that the fbi had uncovered
1:44:19a number of major banking transactions
1:44:22that had transpired in the account of
1:44:24one of the arrested cubans mr barker
1:44:26he informed me that they had traced a
1:44:28twenty five thousand dollar check to a
1:44:30mister kenneth dahlberg
1:44:32and a four checks totaling eighty nine
1:44:34thousand dollars to a bank in mexico
1:44:36city
1:44:38i do not recall whether i first learned
1:44:40about the dahlberg check for mr gray or
1:44:42whether i learned about it in a meeting
1:44:43in mr mitchell's office by reason of the
1:44:45fact that the fbi was trying to contact
1:44:47mr dahlberg about the matter and
1:44:49dahlberg had called mr stanz
1:44:52at any rate
1:44:53the fact that the fbi was investigating
1:44:55these matters was utmost concern to mr
1:44:57stanz when he learned of it
1:44:59stanz was concerned about the dahlberg
1:45:01check i was informed because it was in
1:45:03fact a contribution from mr dwayne
1:45:06andreas whom i did not know but i was
1:45:08told was a long time backer of senator
1:45:10hubert humphrey
1:45:11neither stanz nor mitchell wanted mr
1:45:13andreas to be embarrassed by disclosure
1:45:15of the contribution
1:45:16the concern about the mexican money was
1:45:18made a little less clear to me
1:45:21i was told that it was a contribution
1:45:22from a group of texans who had used an
1:45:25intermediary in mexico to make the
1:45:27contribution
1:45:28although i had not been told i assumed
1:45:31at that time that they were
1:45:33concerned because it sounded to me as if
1:45:34it might have been a corporate
1:45:36contribution and clearly in violation of
1:45:37the law
1:45:39mr stanz also explained that he had
1:45:42checked with sloan to find out how this
1:45:44money had ended up in mr barker's bank
1:45:46account and sloan reported that he had
1:45:48given the checks to liddy and requested
1:45:51that he cashed them
1:45:53he said that he had no idea how lydia
1:45:54had cashed them but surmised that he had
1:45:57obviously used barker to cash them
1:45:59i was also told i did not recall
1:46:01specifically who told me this that this
1:46:03money had absolutely nothing to do with
1:46:05the watergate it was unrelated and it
1:46:07was merely a coincidence of fact that
1:46:09liddy had used barker to cash the checks
1:46:12and that he had returned the money to
1:46:13sloan
1:46:15i was told that the investigation of
1:46:16this matter which appeared to be
1:46:18connected with the watergate but wasn't
1:46:20was unfounded and would merely result in
1:46:22an unnecessary embarrassment to the
1:46:24contributors accordingly mitchell and
1:46:26stanz both asked me to see if there was
1:46:28anything the white house could do to
1:46:30prevent this unnecessary embarrassment
1:46:33i in turn related these facts to both
1:46:35holloman and erlickman
1:46:37on june 22
1:46:39at the request of erlichmann and harlem
1:46:41and i went to see gray at his office in
1:46:43the early evening to discuss the
1:46:45dahlberg and mexican checks and
1:46:46determine how the fbi was proceeding
1:46:49with this matter
1:46:50mr gray told me that they were pursuing
1:46:52it by seeking to interview the persons
1:46:54who had drawn the checks
1:46:56it was during my meeting with mr gray on
1:46:58the 22nd
1:46:59that we also talked about his theories
1:47:01of the case as was beginning to unfold
1:47:04i remember well that he drew a diagram
1:47:06for me showing his theories
1:47:09at that time mr gray had the following
1:47:11theories
1:47:12it was a setup job by a double agent it
1:47:14was a cia operation because a number of
1:47:17former c i a people were involved or it
1:47:20was someone in the re-election committee
1:47:21who was responsible
1:47:23gray had also
1:47:25had some other theories which he
1:47:26discussed but i do not recall him but i
1:47:28do remember that those that i have
1:47:29mentioned were his principle theories
1:47:32before the meeting ended i recall that
1:47:35gray and i again had a brief discussion
1:47:37of the problems of the investigation
1:47:39into the white house greg
1:47:41expressed his awareness of the potential
1:47:43problems
1:47:44of such an investigation
1:47:46and also told me if i needed any
1:47:48information i should call either mark
1:47:50felder himself
1:47:51gray also informed me that he was going
1:47:53to meet with the cia to discuss their
1:47:56possible involvement he would let me
1:47:58know the outcome of that meeting
1:48:01on june 23rd i reported my conversation
1:48:04with gray
1:48:06of the preceding evening to ehrlichman
1:48:08and haldeman
1:48:09we discussed the dahlberg and mexican
1:48:11checks and the fact that the fbi was
1:48:13looking for answers regarding these
1:48:15checks
1:48:16i had the impression that either
1:48:18ehrlichman or holloman might have had a
1:48:19conversation with somebody else about
1:48:21this matter
1:48:23but that but this is mere
1:48:26speculation on my part at that time
1:48:30within the first days of my involvement
1:48:32in the cover-up
1:48:33a pattern had developed where i was
1:48:35carrying messages from mitchell stanz
1:48:37and martian to ehrlichman and holloman
1:48:39and vice versa
1:48:41about how each quarter was handling the
1:48:42cover-up and the relevant information as
1:48:44to what was occurring i was also
1:48:46reporting to them all the information i
1:48:48was receiving about the case from the
1:48:50justice department in the fbi
1:48:53i checked with holderman and erlickman
1:48:55before i did anything one of the few
1:48:58sets of early documents evidencing this
1:49:00working relationship with holloman
1:49:02erlichman relates to responding to larry
1:49:04o'brien's letter of june 24th
1:49:07to the president requesting the
1:49:09appointment of a special prosecutor i
1:49:11have submitted these documents to the
1:49:13committee exhibit number 15.
1:49:17consistent with the reporting pattern
1:49:19that had developed i reported to
1:49:21mitchell in a meeting also attended by
1:49:23mr martian and mr leroux gray's theory
1:49:26of theories of the case
1:49:28as he had related them
1:49:31as he had related them to me
1:49:34this meeting occurred to the best of my
1:49:35recollection
1:49:37on friday afternoon june 23rd or
1:49:39saturday morning june 24th during this
1:49:42meeting
1:49:43there were wide-ranging discussions of
1:49:45the many problems
1:49:47then confronting the re-election
1:49:48committee including such matters
1:49:51as the problem
1:49:53of the civil lawsuit filed by the
1:49:54democratic national committee
1:49:56and the problems that could cause the
1:49:57problem of the dahlberg and mexican
1:49:59checks
1:50:00and to the best of my recollection this
1:50:02was the first time i had heard any
1:50:04discussion of the need for money to take
1:50:05care of those who were involved in the
1:50:07break-in
1:50:10of june 17th
1:50:15i think also
1:50:16mr vice chairman i might
1:50:18omit the first paragraph here on page 71
1:50:21and proceed
1:50:23uh with regard to my receipt of the
1:50:25reports mr dean that'll be entirely
1:50:27agreeable and as the chairman asked you
1:50:29previously if you'd note for the record
1:50:30that point in the your statement where
1:50:33you resume then we'll have an
1:50:34appropriate identification
1:50:36all right i will leave out the first
1:50:38paragraph on
1:50:40page 71 and begin by summarizing and
1:50:43saying that to the best of my
1:50:45recollection
1:50:46it was in early july
1:50:48when i called gray to discuss the matter
1:50:50of receiving reports from the fbi
1:50:54gray indicated that he was going to
1:50:57be in his office on a saturday and i
1:50:59should come to his office and take a
1:51:00look at the reports in his office
1:51:03i told him that i thought that it was
1:51:05unwise for me to be coming in and out of
1:51:07the justice department particularly
1:51:08since most of the guards and people the
1:51:09justice department knew me
1:51:11accordingly we arranged to meet later at
1:51:13his apartment
1:51:14and he said that he would discuss the
1:51:16matter with me then
1:51:17i recall we took a stroll up to the side
1:51:20of his apartment building sat on a bench
1:51:22in front of the river and talked
1:51:23generally about the case and i raised
1:51:25with him
1:51:26the matter of my receiving
1:51:29some of the raw fbi data regarding the
1:51:31investigation
1:51:33craig said that he would have to check
1:51:34but wanted an assurance
1:51:37from me that this information was being
1:51:38reported to the president
1:51:40and that the that was the principal
1:51:42purpose of the request
1:51:44i assured him that it was being reported
1:51:45to the president even though i was not
1:51:48directly reporting to the president that
1:51:49time i was aware of the fact that
1:51:50ehrlichman and holloman had daily
1:51:52discussions with the president and i
1:51:54felt certain because haldeman often made
1:51:56notes of my reporting back
1:51:58about the information i was bringing to
1:52:00their attention that this information
1:52:02was being given to the president
1:52:06i do not recall when i actually received
1:52:09the first written information from the
1:52:11fbi but i believe it was after the 21st
1:52:14of july when i had received a summary
1:52:17report that had been prepared on the
1:52:19investigation to that stage
1:52:22i would also like to now summarize
1:52:26to the bottom of the page
1:52:28and indicate that when
1:52:3172 correct
1:52:34and indicate that after i did get
1:52:36possession of the
1:52:38documents the fbi files i found them
1:52:41[Music]
1:52:43not very meaningful
1:52:45and
1:52:47later mr marty and mr parkinson and mr
1:52:49o'brien came over to my office and read
1:52:52the reports
1:52:53and
1:52:54martian
1:52:55they all reached the same conclusion and
1:52:57i recall that martian's reaction was
1:52:59that the
1:53:00documents indicated that the
1:53:02investigation was too vigorous and he
1:53:04was quite critical of gray and asked me
1:53:06to call grey to to slow down but i never
1:53:08made such a
1:53:10call summarizing the first paragraph on
1:53:13page 73 i'd also note that
1:53:16uh i never
1:53:17showed any of these
1:53:19reports to any persons who were
1:53:20interviewed by the fbi
1:53:23and they were only given
1:53:24to mr dick moore of the white house
1:53:27staff
1:53:27when he was working on the segretti
1:53:29matter
1:53:30for mr ehrlichman and mr haldeman john
1:53:33dean has been explaining his role as
1:53:34white house counsel during the post
1:53:36watergate investigations and he will
1:53:38next explain a plan to involve the
1:53:40central intelligence agency in the
1:53:42cover-up and public television's
1:53:44coverage of the watergate hearings will
1:53:45continue after this pause for station
1:53:47identification
1:53:49unabridged coverage of these hearings is
1:53:51provided as a public service by the
1:53:53member stations of pbs the public
1:53:56broadcasting service
1:54:02from washington npact continues its
1:54:04coverage of hearings by the senate
1:54:06select committee on presidential
1:54:08campaign activities here again
1:54:10correspondent jim lehrer
1:54:12former white house counsel john dean now
1:54:15explains a plan to blame the watergate
1:54:17on the cia
1:54:26i'll turn now to the first dealings i
1:54:28had with the cia
1:54:30it was during the meeting in mitchell's
1:54:31office on the 23rd or the 24th that
1:54:34martian first raised the proposition
1:54:37that the cia could take care of this
1:54:39entire matter if they wished
1:54:42in that they had funds and covert
1:54:44procedures for distributing funds i was
1:54:46personally unaware of the workings of
1:54:47the cia but marty and mitchell appeared
1:54:49very knowledgeable
1:54:50as a result of this conversation
1:54:52which was prompted by my reporting that
1:54:54gray thought that the cia might be
1:54:56involved
1:54:57mitchell suggested i explore with
1:54:59erlichmann and holloman having the white
1:55:01house contact the cia for assistance
1:55:04it was also argued that the individuals
1:55:06involved in the watergate incident as
1:55:08former cia operatives might compromise
1:55:10the cia in some manner and that the cia
1:55:13would be interested in this should be
1:55:14interested in assisting
1:55:17on monday morning june 26 i spoke with
1:55:19ehrlichman regarding this suggestion
1:55:21he thought it was a good idea and worth
1:55:24exploring
1:55:25he told me to call the cia and explore
1:55:28it with him
1:55:29i told him that i had never dealt with
1:55:30anyone in cia
1:55:32and did not know director helms
1:55:35he told me that i should not call helms
1:55:38rather general walters
1:55:40i told him i did not know walters either
1:55:42he then told me that he and holdemon had
1:55:44had a little chat as he called it with
1:55:46helms and general walters a few days
1:55:48earlier about their dealings with the
1:55:50fbi in relationship to the investigation
1:55:53he was not specific
1:55:54he told me that i should deal with
1:55:56general walters because he was a good
1:55:58friend of the white house and the white
1:55:59house had put him in the deputy director
1:56:01position so they could have some
1:56:03influence over the agency
1:56:05he told me i should tell general walters
1:56:07that i was calling because he ehrlichman
1:56:09had requested i follow up on the earlier
1:56:11meeting that they had had and if there
1:56:13were any
1:56:14problems general walter should call him
1:56:17after my meeting with erlickman i
1:56:19telephoned general walters and told him
1:56:20i was calling an erlickman's request on
1:56:22a matter
1:56:23relating to his previous discussions
1:56:25with erlickman and holloman
1:56:28and would like to have him visit with me
1:56:29if possible
1:56:30he seemed somewhat surprised and
1:56:32uncertain about my call
1:56:34so i told him he might like to check
1:56:35with mr ehrlichman
1:56:37he said he would get back to me later
1:56:39and he did get back to me later we set
1:56:41up a meeting
1:56:43for about noon of that day
1:56:46when general walters came to my office i
1:56:47told him again
1:56:49that i was meeting with him at
1:56:50erlickman's request i made some general
1:56:53comments about the watergate case and it
1:56:56was from my discussion as a result of
1:56:57these general comments
1:56:59uh with walters that i became aware of
1:57:01the fact that ehrlichman and haldeman
1:57:03had discussed the dahlberg and mexican
1:57:05money
1:57:07we then discussed the fact that some of
1:57:09the leads that the fbi
1:57:12was pursuing were pursuing
1:57:15to my understanding were unrelated to
1:57:17the watergate but could result
1:57:20in persons totally uninvolved
1:57:22being embarrassed
1:57:24i just like to note the counsel for the
1:57:26record some of this is different than
1:57:28the the original pagination of my draft
1:57:31that
1:57:32might have been lost in the uh
1:57:35transcribing of it here
1:57:37i also told him that i understood
1:57:40that the fbi had developed
1:57:42three
1:57:44possible theories
1:57:46of the case which i explained
1:57:48and then asked if in fact any of the men
1:57:51arrested
1:57:52were persons who were working at the cia
1:57:54general walters assured me they were not
1:57:57i then told him that i had been asked to
1:57:58explore every possible means of dealing
1:58:00with this rather embarrassing and
1:58:02troublesome situation
1:58:03because some of the men involved were
1:58:05looking for assistance
1:58:08i asked him if there was any possible
1:58:09way the cia could be of assistance in
1:58:11providing support for the individuals
1:58:13involved general walters told me that
1:58:15while it could of course be done he told
1:58:17me that he knew the director's feelings
1:58:19about such a matter and the director
1:58:20would only do it on a direct order from
1:58:22the president
1:58:24he then went on to say that to do
1:58:26anything to compound the situation would
1:58:28be most unwise and to involve the cia
1:58:30would only compound the problem because
1:58:32it would require that the president
1:58:33become directly involved
1:58:36while i cannot recall and detail
1:58:37everything general walters told me i do
1:58:39recall that his argument was most sound
1:58:41and very persuasive i told him i agreed
1:58:44with his position fully and i had merely
1:58:46been asked to explore the potential
1:58:48which he very rightly stated was too
1:58:51great a risk
1:58:53as the discussion ended i asked him if
1:58:54he had any further ideas
1:58:56and told him i would appreciate the
1:58:58benefit of his thoughts
1:59:00i thanked him for his coming over and
1:59:02his candid answers and he departed
1:59:04subsequent to my meeting with general
1:59:06walters i reported back to ehrlichman
1:59:08that walters had informed me that any
1:59:10involvement by the cia in this matter
1:59:12was impossible
1:59:13i recall that when i reported this to mr
1:59:15ehrlichman he was very he very cynically
1:59:17said very interesting
1:59:19he told me that i should talk with
1:59:21walters further and push him a little
1:59:23harder to see if the cia could help out
1:59:26particularly with regard to the
1:59:28unnecessary pursuit of investigative
1:59:30leads
1:59:31i also recall
1:59:33erlichman saying something to the effect
1:59:35that general walters seems to have
1:59:36forgotten how he got where he is today
1:59:41i'd like to skip the paragraph on page
1:59:4377 regarding the call from gray and turn
1:59:45to the last paragraph on 77
1:59:48on the morning
1:59:49of june 28th
1:59:51i arranged to meet with general walters
1:59:54i was first embarrassed about requesting
1:59:56the meeting because he had been most
1:59:58explicit and convincing to me at the
1:59:59first meeting i told him that i
2:00:01requested the meeting herlickman's
2:00:03behest to further discuss the problems
2:00:05of the dahlberg and mexican checks
2:00:08i told him
2:00:09what i knew about the matter
2:00:13and that to the best of my knowledge
2:00:15they were not related to the watergate
2:00:17incident i then asked him if he had any
2:00:19suggestions
2:00:20he expressed sympathy over the situation
2:00:22but said there was nothing his agency
2:00:24could do
2:00:25he again explained the reasons similar
2:00:27to his earlier comments regarding the
2:00:28cia involvement and i expressed my
2:00:31understanding
2:00:32i then asked him if he had any ideas at
2:00:34all
2:00:35and he said that he it might be possible
2:00:37to explain the matter as an anti-castro
2:00:39activity we had some general discussion
2:00:41of this but nothing concrete emerged
2:00:43from the discussion
2:00:45before walters departed i assumed
2:00:49right i assured
2:00:51him that i agreed
2:00:53that it would be most unwise to involve
2:00:54the cia i thanked him almost
2:00:56apologetically for coming by again
2:00:58at no time did i push him as i've been
2:01:00instructed
2:01:02at the conclusion of this meeting i was
2:01:04totally convinced
2:01:06as i had been earlier that the cia could
2:01:08not and would not be brought in to solve
2:01:10the problems confronting the white house
2:01:11and the re-election committee as a
2:01:12result of the watergate incident
2:01:14i subsequently informed erlickman and
2:01:17holloman that unless the president
2:01:18directly ordered the cia to provide
2:01:20support for those involved that the cia
2:01:23was not going to get involved i told
2:01:25them
2:01:28i agreed with walters
2:01:30that this should be that this would be a
2:01:31terrible mistake and they both told me
2:01:33they agreed
2:01:37i would now like to explain the
2:01:38transmitting of the material in hunt's
2:01:40safe to the fbi
2:01:43as i noted earlier
2:01:45shortly after the fbi interview on the
2:01:4822nd of mr colson
2:01:50and my later instructions from
2:01:51ehrlichman to deep six the briefcase and
2:01:54shred the documents i had informed the
2:01:56fbi
2:01:57that i would forward the material found
2:01:59in hunt's office
2:02:02after weighing the implication of
2:02:04ehrlichman's instructions to destroy the
2:02:05items
2:02:07i decide i would not engage in any such
2:02:09activity myself or be pushed into it
2:02:11accordingly i asked david young to
2:02:13return the state department cables to my
2:02:15office i i had already returned the
2:02:17briefcase from my car trunk to my office
2:02:20i received several calls from the fbi
2:02:21requesting material but i had not yet
2:02:24figured out how to tell erlang when i
2:02:25was not going to destroy the material
2:02:28i knew i had to develop a good argument
2:02:29to give erlichman as to why the
2:02:31materials should not
2:02:32be destroyed
2:02:34on the 25th or 26th of june i went to
2:02:37harlequin and explained
2:02:39that i thought that the men who had
2:02:40drilled the safe had probably seen the
2:02:42briefcase that the secret service agent
2:02:44who had been present had probably seen
2:02:46some of the material
2:02:47that mr curly and mr feeling had seen it
2:02:50and what would happen when all those
2:02:51people were later asked by the fbi about
2:02:53the content contents of the safe
2:02:56then i said i felt we must turn over
2:02:58materials to the fbi
2:03:00with regard to the sensitive documents i
2:03:03suggest that they be given directly to
2:03:04gray
2:03:05i told erlickman that if ever under oath
2:03:07i had to be able to testify to the best
2:03:09of my knowledge everything found the
2:03:11safe have been turned over to the fbi
2:03:15the agents the fbi agents came to my
2:03:17office i believe on the 26th or 27th of
2:03:19june i gave them one box which had been
2:03:22packed and told them as soon as i got
2:03:23the other materials packed i would give
2:03:25it to them when i got tied up in a
2:03:27meeting i phoned mr fielding and asked
2:03:30him to pack up the remainder of the
2:03:31material which i believe
2:03:33was the state department cables in the
2:03:34briefcase
2:03:36he did so and turned them over the
2:03:37material to the fbi
2:03:40with the exception of the two envelopes
2:03:42which contained the political sensitive
2:03:44materials i described earlier
2:03:46i spoke with erlickman on the 28th and
2:03:48informed him that the material had been
2:03:49sent to the fbi with the exception of
2:03:51politically sensitive documents
2:03:53he told me
2:03:55that he was meeting later that day with
2:03:57gray and i should bring
2:03:59the materials over to him at that time
2:04:02i went to ehrlichman's office just
2:04:03before mr gray arrived i placed the
2:04:05envelopes on a coffee table in his
2:04:07office when gray arrived erlichman told
2:04:09him that we had some materials
2:04:12for him that had come from hunt safe
2:04:14erlichman described it as politically
2:04:15sensitive but not related to the
2:04:17watergate
2:04:18i told gray that feeling and i had gone
2:04:21through hunt's documents
2:04:23and had turned over all the materials to
2:04:25the agents except the documents in these
2:04:27two envelopes
2:04:28i said that i did not believe that they
2:04:30related to the watergate in any way
2:04:32but
2:04:33should they leak out they would be
2:04:35political dynamite in election year
2:04:41i believe at that point
2:04:43gray placed the two envelopes in his
2:04:46briefcase at no time when i was present
2:04:48with gray and ehrlichman was he
2:04:50instructed by myself erlichman to
2:04:52destroy the documents
2:04:54rather he was merely told that they must
2:04:55never be leaked or made public i
2:04:58departed and returned to my office
2:05:00the next
2:05:01time the fact of giving these documents
2:05:03to gray
2:05:04came up was shortly before the criminal
2:05:06watergate trial in january of this year
2:05:09fielding kerli and i were being
2:05:11interviewed by the prosecutors regarding
2:05:13the handling of materials and hunts
2:05:16safe to establish the evidentiary chain
2:05:18at one point in the interview i asked
2:05:20henry peterson who was present with mr
2:05:22earl silbert if i could speak with him
2:05:24privately
2:05:25at that time i felt i had to tell
2:05:26peterson that not all the materials from
2:05:29hunt's safe had gone directly to the
2:05:31agents rather the two envelopes of
2:05:33material the contents of which i could
2:05:35not itemize any better than than i can
2:05:37now
2:05:39had been given directly to gray
2:05:41i told peterson that if i were to
2:05:43testify i would have to reveal this fact
2:05:45mr peterson suggested that the interview
2:05:47be terminated which it was and that they
2:05:48would get back to me and we could
2:05:50contemplate it on another day
2:05:54i was not called and as not because of i
2:05:56think my knowledge but because of other
2:05:58intervening events on a motion that mr
2:06:01bittman had filed not being pursued
2:06:04that fielding and curl i testified as
2:06:07the evidentiary chain at the trial
2:06:10i recall that shortly after this meeting
2:06:11in peterson's office
2:06:13when i disclosed these facts to peterson
2:06:16i talked to gray at a department of
2:06:18justice luncheon
2:06:19after the luncheon he came up to me and
2:06:21told me i must hang tight and not
2:06:23disclose his receipt of the documents
2:06:26i also he also informed me that he had
2:06:28destroyed the documents
2:06:30i told erlickman about this shortly
2:06:32after gray told me
2:06:34that he had destroyed the documents and
2:06:35when ehrlichman called me just before
2:06:37the president selected gray as his
2:06:38nominee for director of the fbi
2:06:40erlichman asked me if i had any problems
2:06:43with gray and i reminded him of the
2:06:44destruction of the documents he
2:06:46indicated that this was not a problem
2:06:48it was after i commenced my informal
2:06:51interviews with the watergate
2:06:52prosecutors in early april of this year
2:06:55the subject arose again
2:06:57i repeated my story as i had this
2:06:59committee they later informed me that
2:07:01gray denied
2:07:03having ever received such documents
2:07:06this was the first issue of fact that
2:07:08arose in my discussions with a
2:07:10prosecutor so my attorney requested i
2:07:11take a polygraph test which i did
2:07:14subsequently as is now public knowledge
2:07:16and not to my surprise because i believe
2:07:18that mr gray is both an honorable and
2:07:20truthful man he has admitted that he had
2:07:22received and destroyed the documents
2:07:26i would now like to turn to
2:07:29back again to the end of june 1972.
2:07:34the
2:07:35wish of the chairman who had to go to
2:07:37the floor of the senate to attend other
2:07:39business that we
2:07:40continue to about 12 30 and recess for
2:07:43lunch if that's agreeable with you
2:07:46and i would judge then you might have
2:07:47time to finish this sequence and recess
2:07:50then a little before 12 30.
2:07:52i think on page 97 would be a good break
2:07:56let's see how far the witness can get
2:07:58then to uh
2:07:59get us to 12 25 over there the witness
2:08:02only has part one of the statement that
2:08:04was given him by the committee this
2:08:05morning i understand there's another
2:08:07part that's another 150 pages are there
2:08:10about so
2:08:11we're anxious to go as long as we can
2:08:13but you've been reading now for two and
2:08:15a half hours almost so
2:08:17another 10 minutes i think and then
2:08:19we'll break for lunch
2:08:22as i mentioned i would like to turn back
2:08:24again to the end of 72 june 72
2:08:27after my meeting with general walters in
2:08:29subsequent meetings
2:08:31with mr holliman narlikman i informed
2:08:33mitchell that there could be no cia
2:08:35assistance
2:08:37to the best of my recollections this
2:08:39occurred on the afternoon of june 28th
2:08:41in a meeting in mr mitchell's office and
2:08:43i believe that mr larue and mr martian
2:08:44were also present
2:08:46there was a discussion of the need for
2:08:48support money in exchange for the
2:08:50silence for the men in jail and if the
2:08:51cia could not do it they would have to
2:08:54find the money somewhere else mr leroux
2:08:56indicated that stans had only a small
2:08:58amount of cash i believe he said seventy
2:09:00or eighty thousand dollars but more
2:09:01would be needed
2:09:02after some discussion which i cannot
2:09:04recall with any specificity at this time
2:09:06mitchell asked me to get the approval of
2:09:09holloman and ehrlichman to use mr herb
2:09:11com herbert kombach to raise the
2:09:13necessary money
2:09:14before i departed the meeting i remember
2:09:16that mr mitchell an aside from my ears
2:09:18only told me that the white house in
2:09:20particular erlickman should be very
2:09:22interested and anxious to accommodate
2:09:24the needs of these men
2:09:26he was referring to the activities that
2:09:27they had conducted in the past that
2:09:29related to the white house such as the
2:09:32ellsberg break-in
2:09:34i conveyed this request to holloman and
2:09:36arlington and they told me to proceed to
2:09:38contact mr comback i called mr kombach
2:09:41on the 28th of june and told him that
2:09:44holloman ehrlichman and mitchell had
2:09:45requested he come back to washington as
2:09:47quickly as possible he told me you would
2:09:48take the next flight
2:09:50i met kombach at the mayflower on the
2:09:5329th of june
2:09:55when we first met in the cough we first
2:09:56met in the coffee shop but could not
2:09:58find sufficient privacy to talk so we
2:09:59went to his room
2:10:01i'd always been very open in my dealings
2:10:03with mr comback and i knew that he had
2:10:05stated after he completed his
2:10:07fundraising activities prior to april
2:10:097th 1972 that he did not wish to engage
2:10:12in any further fundraising activities
2:10:18so i told him everything i knew about
2:10:19the case at that time including my
2:10:21concern that it might involve the
2:10:22president himself but i did not know
2:10:24that for a fact
2:10:26i also told him that holliman and
2:10:27erlickman and mitchell felt it was very
2:10:29important that he raised the money
2:10:31i told him that per mitchell's
2:10:33instructions he should contact fred
2:10:35larue as the amounts needed and the
2:10:37timing
2:10:38i knew that kombach was not happy with
2:10:40this assignment and he was
2:10:42and he said he was undertaking it only
2:10:44because mitchell haldman and erlichmann
2:10:46had so requested
2:10:48i do not know if mr kombach discussed
2:10:50this with any of these persons
2:10:52but given the nature of the request i
2:10:54did not expect it to take my word alone
2:10:58i have never before i'd never before
2:11:00given combach any instructions to raise
2:11:02money or ever passed on any similar
2:11:04instructions to him
2:11:06subsequent to our meeting kombach
2:11:08informed me that he
2:11:10was departing to raise money but that he
2:11:12wanted
2:11:13mr ulassowitz to handle any deliveries
2:11:15because mr lazowitz was the only man he
2:11:17would trust
2:11:18he said he did not have his telephone
2:11:20number and requested that
2:11:23jack caulfield
2:11:24that i call jack caulfield and request
2:11:26that mr lassowitz call him in california
2:11:29i called mr caulfield and made the
2:11:31request but did not tell mr caufield the
2:11:33reason kombach wanted to have mr alaska
2:11:35was to call him
2:11:37within a week or so combach returned to
2:11:39washington and requested that
2:11:42i meet with him in lafayette park which
2:11:44i did
2:11:45he said i could report to holliman and
2:11:47ehrlichman that he had raised the money
2:11:49and in fact he had it in his briefcase
2:11:51with him to the best of my recollections
2:11:52he told me he was in route to meet mr
2:11:54elassowitz who wanted me to know that
2:11:56the job was done
2:11:58following that meeting
2:12:00several days later as i recall he called
2:12:02me again and said that he asked had
2:12:04asked fred larue to come to my office to
2:12:06give him the details of who was to get
2:12:08how much
2:12:09i recall that such a meeting did occur
2:12:10in my office
2:12:12but i was on and off the telephone while
2:12:14larue and kombach were going over the
2:12:16figures and i have absolutely no
2:12:17recollection of the details of their
2:12:19discussion i know that larue had the
2:12:20figures on a sheet of paper and a combat
2:12:23wrote them down in his own code on a
2:12:24small piece of paper which he placed in
2:12:26his wallet i have no further knowledge
2:12:28of how or when or to whom the deliveries
2:12:29were made
2:12:31mr comback merely told me later that it
2:12:33had been done and i passed this on to
2:12:35erlichmann and holloman
2:12:38i'd like to return once again to the
2:12:40period of june
2:12:4121st through june 30th and discussing
2:12:45the
2:12:46matter of mr mitchell and mr maguire
2:12:49remaining at the re-election committee
2:12:51as i've indicated i had frequent
2:12:53discussions with erlickman and holloman
2:12:55in which i would report back to them on
2:12:57information they had requested to report
2:12:59information i had received
2:13:01was some time during the last 10 days of
2:13:03june that i recall a meeting in mr
2:13:05haldeman's office in which they asked me
2:13:08for my recommendation regarding removing
2:13:10mitchell and maguire from the
2:13:11re-election committee
2:13:13this discussion preceded my contacting
2:13:15combat
2:13:17at that time i repeated my knowledge of
2:13:19the meetings which had occurred in mr
2:13:21mitchell's office in january and
2:13:22february when lydia was presenting his
2:13:23proposal i told him i did not know for a
2:13:25fact that mitchell had ever approved
2:13:27liddy's plans but magruder had recently
2:13:29inferred to me that mitchell was aware
2:13:30of the operation
2:13:32i told him that i had never discussed it
2:13:34with mr mitchell himself and the only
2:13:36observation i could make was that the
2:13:38watergate matter appeared to be
2:13:39consuming most of mitchell's time which
2:13:41might distract him
2:13:43from the campaign with regard with
2:13:45regard to magruder i repeated what liddy
2:13:48had told me
2:13:49regarding magootus pushing him into
2:13:51doing the break-in at the democratic
2:13:53national committee
2:13:54i also said that i thought there was a
2:13:55real chance that he could be indicted
2:13:58although mitchell and magruder thought
2:13:59that the matter might be stopped at
2:14:01liddy
2:14:02accordingly i told them that i did not
2:14:04think i could make a recommendation
2:14:05regarding mitchell but i did recommend
2:14:08that magruder be removed in a graceful
2:14:10manner that would not unduly jeopardize
2:14:12him
2:14:13they thanked me they told me they would
2:14:15take my recommendations under advisement
2:14:17the next time i heard anything about
2:14:19this subject was when it was publicly
2:14:20announced that mr mitchell was resigning
2:14:23i was somewhat startled that magruder
2:14:25was remaining
2:14:26it was cleared that magruder was the
2:14:29only link back to the white house and
2:14:31magruder might not stand up and indicted
2:14:33i recall holloman asking me
2:14:35if i thought magruder would stand up if
2:14:37indicted and i said no
2:14:39i said i always assumed that it was a
2:14:41pres i have always assumed it was a
2:14:43presidential decision to keep magruder
2:14:44on at the re-election committee
2:14:47following this decision erlichman and
2:14:48holloman indicated a greatly increased
2:14:50interest in magruder's problems they
2:14:53were aware of the strategy to stop the
2:14:55involvement at liddy because i had
2:14:56reported to them on the story that
2:14:58magruder would tell
2:14:59that is that he did not know what liddy
2:15:02was doing
2:15:03they frequently asked me how magruder
2:15:04was doing in relationship to the fbi and
2:15:06the grand jury investigation i also had
2:15:09calls from mr larry higby as to
2:15:10magruder's status
2:15:12i do not know when i first learned of
2:15:14magruder's proposed testimony but i do
2:15:16know that i had all it had already been
2:15:17formulated when i first heard it i
2:15:19informed harlem and erlichmann of this
2:15:21story we discussed it
2:15:23and no one was sure it would hold up
2:15:25this this discussion did occur before
2:15:28mitchell resigned
2:15:29we of course knew that it was a
2:15:31fabricated story when i later learned
2:15:33that mr porter would corroborate mr
2:15:36magruder's testimony i informed holloman
2:15:37and erlickman of that
2:15:39i had never heard mr magruder's story in
2:15:42full detail until just before his grand
2:15:44jury appearance in mid-august 1972
2:15:47when he asked me if i would be a devil's
2:15:49advocate and question him before he went
2:15:50before the grand jury magruder came to
2:15:53my office as i recall the day before his
2:15:55second grand jury appearance
2:15:57and he told me that he had made the
2:15:59decision himself as to how
2:16:01he was going to handle his testimony and
2:16:03wanted me to ask him any and all
2:16:05questions i could think of i spent about
2:16:07an hour or more questioning him
2:16:10shortly after i had this session with
2:16:11magruder higbee called me to tell me
2:16:13that magruder had been to see him to let
2:16:15holdemon know that he was ready
2:16:18following magruder's appearance before
2:16:19the grand jury i received a call from
2:16:21higbee requesting information for
2:16:23haldeman as to how magruder had done
2:16:24before the grand jury
2:16:26i subsequently called mr peterson who
2:16:28said he would find out and call back
2:16:31peterson called back and said that he
2:16:32had made it through by the skin of his
2:16:34teeth
2:16:35i called holloman and so informed him
2:16:37and subsequently informed
2:16:38mitchell and magruder i recall that
2:16:40holloman was very pleased because this
2:16:42of course meant that the investigation
2:16:44would not go beyond liddy
2:16:47in early september paul o'brien came to
2:16:49my office and informed me that there was
2:16:51an outstanding subpoena for magruder's
2:16:53diary o'brien said that magruder's diary
2:16:55reflected the meetings in mitchell's
2:16:57office in january and february with
2:16:58liddy magruder dean and mitchell
2:17:01o'brien also informed me that there had
2:17:03been discussions of destroying or
2:17:04altering the diary but he did not think
2:17:06much of that i agree that to alder it
2:17:08would be impossible because it would be
2:17:10discovered by the fbi laboratory
2:17:12i remember talking with magruder and
2:17:14asking him why he kept the diary being
2:17:16somewhat facetious i told magruder that
2:17:19he should not eat that he should talk
2:17:21with mitchell about this because he was
2:17:22probably going to have to turn the diary
2:17:26over
2:17:28long before the matter of magruder's
2:17:29diary had arisen i had talked with
2:17:31mitchell about the meetings in january
2:17:33and february in his office i told him
2:17:36that should it ever be necessary i would
2:17:37testify that i knew
2:17:40that he had not approved anything at
2:17:41these meetings
2:17:42it was after the matter of magruder's
2:17:44diary being subpoenaed and magruder
2:17:47again being recalled
2:17:49to testify before the grand jury that
2:17:51mitchell requested that i meet with him
2:17:54and magruder to discuss how magruder
2:17:56should handle this matter before the
2:17:58grand jury
2:17:59during the meeting at which this was
2:18:01discussed i told mitchell magruder that
2:18:04i had no idea what they had discussed
2:18:05before i arrived late at the second
2:18:07meeting in february i said i'd recall
2:18:10there was some reference to the election
2:18:12laws at the first meeting and magruder
2:18:14could explain my presence with lydia at
2:18:16the meeting by reason the fact of the
2:18:18election law discussion
2:18:20magruder liked the idea and said that
2:18:23that was how he would handle it i later
2:18:25learned that magruder testified that one
2:18:27of the meetings
2:18:28had been cancelled that the meeting that
2:18:30did occur was to introduce liddy to
2:18:32mitchell and had
2:18:34dealt with the election law problems
2:18:36i assume that these refinements to the
2:18:38story were added by magruder because
2:18:40they were not discussed at my meeting
2:18:42with mitchell and magruder mr dean that
2:18:45would seem to be a convenient breaking
2:18:46place i notice on the next page 91 that
2:18:50the heading his appearance is a white
2:18:52house personnel before the grand jury so
2:18:54if you have no
2:18:56objection to it the committee will stand
2:18:58in recess until two o'clock
2:19:02we'd simply like to announce that we are
2:19:04not going to be available for interview
2:19:05with the press until his next appearance
2:19:07and i want to save them the trouble of
2:19:09trying to reach it thank you very much
2:19:14former white house counsel john dean has
2:19:16been telling the watergate committee
2:19:17about the cover story concocted to
2:19:20explain the meetings early in 1972 when
2:19:23the campaign intelligence plan including
2:19:26the watergate incident was approved his
2:19:28next topic will be the testimony of
2:19:30white house staff members before the
2:19:32watergate grand jury public television's
2:19:34complete coverage of the hearings
2:19:36continues after station identification
2:19:39from washington mpact continues its
2:19:42coverage of hearings by the senate
2:19:43select committee on presidential
2:19:45campaign activities here again
2:19:47correspondent robert mcneill
2:19:49john dean now continues his testimony of
2:19:52the activities of white house aides
2:19:54during the watergate investigation
2:19:58committee will come to autumn
2:20:04mr dean i i realize that uh
2:20:07when you have to do so much reading
2:20:10it sometimes gets pretty hard on your
2:20:12voice and anytime that you feel like
2:20:15that you need a little break
2:20:17to sort of relieve your voice just let
2:20:19me know and we'll certainly grant it to
2:20:20you i appreciate that very much mr
2:20:22chairman
2:20:40if the chairman is ready i'll proceed
2:20:49when we
2:20:50stopped
2:20:52before lunch i was just
2:20:55commencing on page 91
2:20:57of the appearances of the white house
2:20:59personality for the grand jury
2:21:05i shall now turn from the matter of
2:21:07magruder's appearances before the grand
2:21:09jury to the appearances of members of
2:21:11the white house staff before the grand
2:21:12jury
2:21:14the handling of appearances of the white
2:21:15house staff before the grand jury was
2:21:17very similar to the procedure that had
2:21:18been followed with regard to their
2:21:20interviews by the fbi
2:21:22by that i mean either mr feeling or
2:21:24myself would discuss with the individual
2:21:26before he went to the grand jury the
2:21:28likely questions he would be asked the
2:21:31unrelated areas that we didn't feel it
2:21:32was necessary for
2:21:34the individual to get into
2:21:36when coulson
2:21:38learned that he was going to be called
2:21:39before the grand jury he was outraged he
2:21:42felt that the press had been rather
2:21:44hostile towards him because of his
2:21:45association with mr hunt
2:21:48and his appearance in the courthouse
2:21:50before the grand jury
2:21:52would be most detrimental he was very
2:21:54insistent
2:21:56that something be done about the
2:21:57situation asked me to see if i could do
2:21:59anything to help him
2:22:01i called henry peterson and discussed
2:22:03this with him
2:22:04and asked him if there was anything that
2:22:06could be done peterson told me he would
2:22:09explore it
2:22:10peterson called back
2:22:12and said he appreciated the problem of
2:22:13the white house staff people coming down
2:22:15to the courthouse to appear before the
2:22:16grand jury
2:22:18and he had
2:22:19worked out an arrangement whereby they
2:22:22could come to the department of justice
2:22:25be interviewed by the prosecutors with
2:22:27counsel present
2:22:28and then the prosecutor would take a
2:22:30sworn statement without counsel present
2:22:31as if it were a secret grand jury room
2:22:33and later the prosecutors would read the
2:22:35statement to the grand jury
2:22:38this procedure
2:22:40was followed as i recall for mr colson
2:22:42mr krogh mr young
2:22:44mr chapin and mr strong
2:22:48when secretary stanz learned that he was
2:22:50being called before the grand jury he
2:22:52expressed a similar outrage and
2:22:54requested a procedure like that which
2:22:56had been given
2:22:57members of the white house staff
2:23:00i just i discussed this again with
2:23:02peterson but he said he didn't feel it
2:23:04would be possible to follow follow a
2:23:06similar procedure
2:23:08mr stanz's outrage continued and finally
2:23:10he raised it directly with mr ehrlichman
2:23:12ehrlichman asked me why i couldn't do
2:23:14anything with peterson about this
2:23:16and i told him that peterson had done
2:23:18the best he could but there was nothing
2:23:20he could do about it because the grand
2:23:22jury wanted stans to appear
2:23:25ehrlichman could not accept my
2:23:26explanation and called peterson and was
2:23:28very harsh in telling peterson that he
2:23:30should honor the white house request
2:23:32that stands not be forced to appear
2:23:33before appear at the courthouse and go
2:23:36before the grand jury
2:23:37i was present when erlickman called
2:23:39peterson and felt he was wrong in doing
2:23:41so
2:23:42i felt that peterson had been more than
2:23:44accommodating and if he could have done
2:23:46it he would but obviously the grand jury
2:23:49wanted to see these people and peterson
2:23:52was not happy with the
2:23:54procedures that had been followed with
2:23:55the others it had been merely an
2:23:57accommodation
2:23:59i called mr peterson and apologized for
2:24:02the call he had received from erlickman
2:24:05the only other significant matter that i
2:24:07can recall in connection with the grand
2:24:09jury appearances was in connection with
2:24:10mr colson's grand jury appearance also
2:24:14after coulson returned from his grand
2:24:15jury interview
2:24:17he sent me a memorandum a copy of which
2:24:19i have submitted to the committee
2:24:21exhibit number 16.
2:24:23which he suggested
2:24:25i might wish to send on to the
2:24:26prosecutors
2:24:27i've been present during coulson's
2:24:29interview with the prosecutors before
2:24:30his sworn statement was taken i did not
2:24:33find anything significant in the
2:24:34memorandum that he had failed to cover
2:24:36during his interview
2:24:38i'd also received information from
2:24:39magruder that he had been pressured by
2:24:42coulson and members of coulson staff
2:24:44into authorizing the adoption of liddy's
2:24:46plans on several occasions
2:24:48and this information was not reflected
2:24:50in the memorandum that coulson had
2:24:51prepared
2:24:53i felt that the memorandum was rather
2:24:54self-serving to mr colson and i was not
2:24:57convinced it was totally factual
2:24:59memorandum also came to my attention
2:25:01almost a week after colson had sent it
2:25:03to me because immediately following his
2:25:06appearance before the grand jury at the
2:25:07end of august i had gone to san clemente
2:25:10i advise colson that i did not know if
2:25:12everything in his memorandum was
2:25:14consistent
2:25:15with magruder's testimony and thought we
2:25:17ought to leave well enough alone he
2:25:19agreed accordingly i filed the document
2:25:22rather than forwarding it to mr silbert
2:25:26it was while i was in san clemente at
2:25:28the end of august that the president
2:25:30announced at a press conference the
2:25:31so-called dean report which cleared
2:25:34everybody presently employed at the
2:25:35white house or in the administration
2:25:37from any complicity in the watergate
2:25:38matter
2:25:40this statement was made on august 29
2:25:421972.
2:25:44i would like to recall to the committee
2:25:46what the white house had publicly said
2:25:47about this incident prior to the august
2:25:4929 statement of the president
2:25:52on june 19th ziegler reported
2:25:54that there was no inquiry being made by
2:25:57the white house into the matter
2:25:58on june 20th ziegler stated the case is
2:26:01something that the president will not
2:26:02get into at all
2:26:04despite the fact that mr hunt had been
2:26:06publicly linked to the white house
2:26:09on june 21st ziegler stated that coulson
2:26:12had assured him that he was not involved
2:26:14and the white house repeated the
2:26:15statement that the president would not
2:26:16get involved
2:26:18on june 23rd the president stated that
2:26:20as ziegler had said
2:26:23the white house has had no involvement
2:26:25whatever in this particular incident
2:26:28on july 3rd when the president was in
2:26:30california he ruled out a special
2:26:32prosecutor and said that the fbi and
2:26:34other authorities will pursue the
2:26:36investigation thoroughly and completely
2:26:38and ziegler further reported on that
2:26:40date that the president would not be
2:26:42getting special reports on this
2:26:44politically sensitive case since that
2:26:46would be inappropriate suddenly came
2:26:48august the august 29 statement citing
2:26:51the dean investigation
2:26:53i had no advance knowledge that the
2:26:55president was going to
2:26:56indicate that i had investigated the
2:26:58matter and found no complicity on the
2:27:00part of anyone at the white house or
2:27:01anyone pleasantly presently employed in
2:27:03the administration
2:27:05i first learned of the matter when i
2:27:06heard it on the television news
2:27:07broadcast that evening after i departed
2:27:09from the compound of san clemente
2:27:12i was going to walk up to the residence
2:27:14and listen to the press conference that
2:27:16day because i'd never been to a press
2:27:17conference on the west coast but at the
2:27:19last minute i returned to my room and
2:27:21later turned on the television and heard
2:27:23the statement
2:27:25had i have been consulted in advance by
2:27:27the president i would have strongly
2:27:28opposed the issuing of such a statement
2:27:30for several reasons
2:27:32which i would have told the president
2:27:34first i was aware that gordon strong
2:27:37had close daily liaison with mr magruder
2:27:41and it carried information relating to
2:27:42wiretapped conversations into the white
2:27:44house
2:27:45and later destroyed destroyed
2:27:47incriminating documents at holloman's
2:27:48direction
2:27:50secondly i had never been able to
2:27:52determine whether haldeman had advanced
2:27:54knowledge or not and in fact had never
2:27:56asked him because i didn't feel i could
2:27:59thirdly
2:28:00i'd always suspected but never been able
2:28:02to completely substantiate my suspicion
2:28:05that coulson was far more knowledgeable
2:28:07than he protested
2:28:09i was very aware of mr colson's efforts
2:28:12to disassociate himself with hunt
2:28:14and of course continual production of
2:28:16documents that would disassociate
2:28:17himself with hunt
2:28:19coulson protested too much
2:28:21finally i was aware of the two meetings
2:28:23that i had attended and had reported
2:28:25these to both holloman and erlington i
2:28:28had reported to holloman as i mentioned
2:28:29earlier shortly after the meeting
2:28:32meetings had occurred when i told him i
2:28:33thought the idea was bad and incredible
2:28:36and told him that i would have no
2:28:37connection or relationship with the
2:28:38matter i reported this to erlichmann in
2:28:41june of 1972 shortly after the incident
2:28:44i never understood how the lady plan had
2:28:46been approved and magruder had indicated
2:28:48to me that there had been white house
2:28:50pressure
2:28:51to get the plan
2:28:52moving accordingly i would have been the
2:28:55last to say unequivocally as the
2:28:57president so stated that no one
2:28:59presently employed at the white house
2:29:00had any advance knowledge of the matter
2:29:03i did believe however that nobody at the
2:29:05white house knew there was going to be a
2:29:07break-in of the democratic national
2:29:09committee on june 17th because i don't
2:29:11believe that anyone
2:29:13other than those directly involved
2:29:15knew that that was going to happen on
2:29:17that day
2:29:19i don't know if the president's
2:29:20statement was meant to be a very literal
2:29:22play on carefully chosen words or
2:29:24whether he intended to give it the broad
2:29:26brush interpretation that it later
2:29:28received
2:29:29however
2:29:30i would have certainly counseled the
2:29:32president against issuing a statement
2:29:34and i was very unhappy to have my name
2:29:37associated with the statement without
2:29:38being consulted whatsoever and put out
2:29:41in front on the issue
2:29:44the issuing of the so-called dean report
2:29:46was the first time i began to think
2:29:47about the fact that i might be
2:29:49being set up
2:29:50in case this whole thing came tumbling
2:29:53or crumbling down at a later time
2:29:55i subsequently discussed this with other
2:29:57individuals mr moore mr fielding mr
2:29:59mitchell
2:30:00and they assured me but not unanimously
2:30:03that i need not worry because they did
2:30:04not believe that anyone at the white
2:30:06house would do that to me
2:30:10in early september
2:30:12as the fbi and the department of justice
2:30:14investigations began winding down the
2:30:17concern of the white house and the
2:30:18re-election committee shifted to the
2:30:21very active investigation that was being
2:30:22pursued by the democratic national
2:30:24committee through its discovery
2:30:25proceedings in its civil lawsuit against
2:30:28the re-election committee
2:30:30the democrats were making daily
2:30:31headlines with their lawsuit
2:30:35horses dropped in i suggest you talk
2:30:37more directly into the microphone i will
2:30:39move closer thinking i have several
2:30:42hours i thought i ought to try to
2:30:44ease it back a little bit
2:30:51on or about september 9th or 10th
2:30:55i received a presidential request from
2:30:57both holloman and coulson
2:31:00the president felt that the best defense
2:31:02to the actions being pursued by the
2:31:04democrats and the charges and
2:31:06implications that were stemming from the
2:31:08lawsuits being filed by the democrats
2:31:10was our own counter-offensive with our
2:31:12own series of lawsuits against the
2:31:14democrats
2:31:16i recall that coulson called me
2:31:17repeatedly and finally reported that he
2:31:20had just come from the president's
2:31:21office and the president wanted action
2:31:23on this as quickly as humanly possible
2:31:26i informed mr colson that i was working
2:31:28on it
2:31:29but i wasn't going to suggest filing any
2:31:31lawsuit or taking any action that was
2:31:33not well founded
2:31:35i had talked with mitchell ken parkinson
2:31:38and paul o'brien about the matter and mr
2:31:40parkinson informed me that he was
2:31:42working on several potential
2:31:43counteractions
2:31:45i requested he submit a memorandum to me
2:31:47as soon as possible because there was
2:31:49great interest at the white house and
2:31:51the counter-attack
2:31:52including the interest by the president
2:31:55on september 11th 1972 mr parkinson
2:31:58submitted his memorandum to me
2:32:01and after some additional conversations
2:32:03with him about the memorandum i
2:32:05redrafted his documents for submission
2:32:07to holloman
2:32:08i have submitted to the committee
2:32:10exhibit number 17 copies of both mr
2:32:12parkinson's memorandum and the
2:32:14memorandum i submitted
2:32:18to holdemon
2:32:20you will note that my memorandum of
2:32:22september 12 1972 to mr holloman has
2:32:27a initial p
2:32:29with a check mark in the upper right
2:32:31hand corner which indicates the document
2:32:33was forwarded directly to or reviewed by
2:32:36the president i later learned that the
2:32:38president was pleased and wanted a full
2:32:40follow-up on the items in the memorandum
2:32:43the markings on the memorandum are mr
2:32:45holloman's markings
2:32:48was also about this time
2:32:51late
2:32:52july early september
2:32:54that i learned
2:32:56during a meeting in mitchell's office
2:32:58that mr romer mcphee was having private
2:33:00discussions with judge ritchie
2:33:03regarding the civil suit filed by the
2:33:05democrats
2:33:07i believe this fact was known to mr
2:33:09mitchell mr leroux
2:33:11paul o'brien and ken parkinson
2:33:14i was not aware of specifics but i was
2:33:16told by parkinson and later again by
2:33:18mcphee that judge richie was going to be
2:33:21helpful whenever he could
2:33:23i subsequently talked to mr mcphee about
2:33:26this as late as march 2nd of this year
2:33:29when he told me he was going to visit
2:33:31the judge in the judge's rose garden
2:33:33over the weekend to discuss an aspect of
2:33:36the case
2:33:39on september 15th
2:33:42the justice department announced the
2:33:44handing down of seven indictments by the
2:33:46federal grand jury investigating the
2:33:48watergate
2:33:50late that afternoon
2:33:52i received a call requesting me to come
2:33:54to the president's oval office
2:33:56when i arrived at the oval office i
2:33:58found mr haldeman the president
2:34:01and the president
2:34:03the president asked me to sit down
2:34:05both men appeared to be in very good
2:34:07spirits and my reception was warm and
2:34:09cordial
2:34:10the president then told me that bob
2:34:13referring to mr holdeman
2:34:15had kept him posted on my handling of
2:34:17the watergate case
2:34:19the president told me i had done a good
2:34:21job and he appreciated how difficult a
2:34:24task it had been
2:34:25and the president was pleased that the
2:34:27case had stopped with liddy
2:34:30i responded that i could not take credit
2:34:32because others have done much more
2:34:33difficult things than i had done
2:34:36as the president discussed
2:34:37the present status of the situation i
2:34:40told him
2:34:41that all i've been able to do is to
2:34:42contain the case and assist in keeping
2:34:44it out of the white house
2:34:47i also told him
2:34:48that there was a long way to go before
2:34:50this matter would end and that certainly
2:34:53i certainly could make no assurances
2:34:55that the day would not come
2:34:57when this matter would not start to
2:34:58unravel
2:35:00early in our conversation the president
2:35:02said to me that former fbi director
2:35:04hoover
2:35:05had told him shortly after he had
2:35:07assumed office in 1969
2:35:10that his campaign had been bugged in
2:35:111968
2:35:13the president said that at some point we
2:35:15should get the facts out on this
2:35:18and use this to counter the problems
2:35:20that we were encountering
2:35:22the president asked me when the criminal
2:35:24case would come to trial and would it
2:35:27start before the election
2:35:29i told the president i did not know
2:35:32i said that the justice department had
2:35:33held off as long as possible the return
2:35:35of the indictments
2:35:37but much would depend on which judge got
2:35:39the case
2:35:41the president said that he certainly
2:35:42hoped the case would not come to trial
2:35:44before the election
2:35:46the president then asked me about the
2:35:48civil cases that had been filed by the
2:35:50democratic national committee in the
2:35:51common cause case and about the counter
2:35:54suits that we had filed
2:35:56i told him that the lawyers at the
2:35:57re-election committee were handling
2:35:59these cases and they did not see the
2:36:00common cause suit as any real problem
2:36:02before the election because they thought
2:36:05that they could keep it tied up in
2:36:06discovery proceedings
2:36:08i then told the president that the
2:36:09lawyers at the re-election committee
2:36:11were very hopeful of slowing down the
2:36:13civil suit filed by the democratic
2:36:14national committee because they'd been
2:36:16making ex-parte contacts with the judge
2:36:18handling the case the judge was very
2:36:21understanding and trying to accommodate
2:36:22their problems
2:36:24the president was pleased to hear this
2:36:26and responded to the effect
2:36:28that well that's helpful
2:36:30i also recall explaining to the
2:36:32president about the suits that the
2:36:33re-election committee lawyers had filed
2:36:35against the democrats as part of their
2:36:37counter-offensive
2:36:39there was a brief discussion about the
2:36:41potential hearings before the patman
2:36:43committee
2:36:44the president asked me what we were
2:36:46doing to deal with the hearings and i
2:36:47reported that dick cook
2:36:49who had once worked on the chapman
2:36:51committee's staff
2:36:53was working on the problem the president
2:36:55indicated that bill timmons should stay
2:36:58on top of the hearings that we did not
2:36:59need the hearings before the election
2:37:04the conversation then moved to the press
2:37:06coverage of the watergate incident and
2:37:09how the press was really trying to make
2:37:10this into a major campaign issue
2:37:13at one point in the conversation i
2:37:14recall the president telling me to keep
2:37:16a good list of the press people giving
2:37:19us trouble because we'll make life
2:37:21difficult for them after the election
2:37:24the conversation then turned to the use
2:37:26of the internal revenue service to
2:37:27attack our enemies
2:37:29i recall telling the president that we
2:37:31had not made much use of this because
2:37:32the white house didn't have the clout to
2:37:34have it done
2:37:35that the internal revenue service was a
2:37:36rather democratically oriented
2:37:38bureaucracy
2:37:39and it would be very dangerous to try
2:37:41any such activity
2:37:43the president seemed somewhat annoyed
2:37:44and said that the democratic
2:37:46administrations had used this tool well
2:37:48and after the election we would get
2:37:50people in these agencies who would be
2:37:51responsive to the white house
2:37:53requirements
2:37:54the conversation then turned to the
2:37:56president's post-election plans to
2:37:57replace people who were not on our team
2:38:00in all the agencies it was at this point
2:38:02that mr holloman i remember started
2:38:04taking notes and he also told the
2:38:07president that he had been developing
2:38:08information on which people should stay
2:38:11and which should go after the election
2:38:14i recall several days after my meeting
2:38:16with the president i was talking with
2:38:17dan kingsley
2:38:19who was in charge of developing the list
2:38:21for harlem and as to the people who
2:38:22should be removed after the election
2:38:25i told kingsley that this matter had
2:38:26come up during my conversation
2:38:28with the president
2:38:30and he said that he had wondered what
2:38:32had put new life into his project as he
2:38:34received several calls from mr higby
2:38:36about the status of this project within
2:38:38the last few days
2:38:40the meeting ended
2:38:42with the president with a conversation
2:38:44about a book i was reading
2:38:45i left the meeting with the impression
2:38:47that the president was well aware
2:38:49of what had been going on regarding the
2:38:50success of keeping the white house out
2:38:52of the watergate scandal
2:38:54and i had also expressed to him my
2:38:56concern that i was not confident that
2:38:58the cover-up could be maintained
2:38:59indefinitely
2:39:02i would next like to turn to the white
2:39:04house efforts to block the patman
2:39:07committee hearings
2:39:12as early as mid august 1972 the white
2:39:15house learned through the congressional
2:39:17relations staff
2:39:18that an investigation was being
2:39:19conducted by the staff of the house
2:39:21banking and currency committee under the
2:39:23direction of chairman patman into many
2:39:25aspects of the watergate incident
2:39:27the focus of the investigation at the
2:39:29outset was the funding of the watergate
2:39:31incident and other possible illegal
2:39:32funding that may have involved banking
2:39:34violations
2:39:36the white house concern was twofold
2:39:38first the hearings would have resulted
2:39:40in more adverse pre-election publicity
2:39:43regarding the watergate and secondly
2:39:46they just might stumble into something
2:39:48that would start unraveling the cover-up
2:39:50the initial dealings with the patent
2:39:52committee and the and the re-election
2:39:54committee were handled by mr stanz and
2:39:56mr parkinson
2:39:57however as the patent committee
2:40:00proceeded stands called for assistance
2:40:02from the white house
2:40:04i was aware of the fact that the patman
2:40:06investigators had had numerous
2:40:08conversations with parkinson and the
2:40:10investigators themselves came to the
2:40:12republican national convention to
2:40:13interview mr stanz on august 25 1972
2:40:18upon mr stanz's return
2:40:20from the republican convention he met
2:40:22with the investigative staff of the
2:40:23papin committee which i believe occurred
2:40:26on august 30th he was accompanied to
2:40:29both these interviews by mr parkinson
2:40:32at some point in time during these
2:40:33investigations
2:40:35mr parkinson was put in touch with
2:40:37congressman gary brown
2:40:39who was a member of the banking and
2:40:40currency committee
2:40:42for the best of my recollections this
2:40:44may have resulted from discussions
2:40:46between members of the white house
2:40:47congressional relations staff with
2:40:49members of the
2:40:50with the republican members of the
2:40:51banking and currency committee to
2:40:52determine who would be most helpful on
2:40:55the committee and brown indicated his
2:40:57willingness to assist
2:40:59on september 8th
2:41:01congressman brown sent a letter
2:41:03to the attorney general regarding the
2:41:04forthcoming appearance of secretary
2:41:06stans and others before the patman
2:41:08committee
2:41:10i have submitted to the committee a copy
2:41:12of this letter exhibit number 18
2:41:14which was in fact drafted by
2:41:17mr parkinson for congressman brown
2:41:21it was my recollection that secretary
2:41:23stans was scheduled to appear before the
2:41:24department committee for a formal
2:41:26testimony on september 14th
2:41:30prior to parkinson's drafting the letter
2:41:32for congressman brown
2:41:34i have been asked to discuss the matter
2:41:36with henry peterson which i did
2:41:39i told peterson of the problem
2:41:41and ask him for his feelings about stans
2:41:43and others appearing before the patment
2:41:45committee and what effect that might
2:41:47have on either the grand jury or the
2:41:49indicted individuals once the
2:41:50indictments were handed down
2:41:52i recall that peterson had very strong
2:41:54feelings that it could be very
2:41:55detrimental to the government's ability
2:41:57to prosecute successfully the watergate
2:41:58case but he said he would have to give
2:42:00some thought to responding to
2:42:01congressman brown's letter
2:42:04i had several additional discussions
2:42:05with peterson and later with the
2:42:07attorney general when peterson indicated
2:42:09to him
2:42:10he did not think he could respond before
2:42:12the schedule apparent appearance of
2:42:14stands
2:42:15on september 14th
2:42:18the justice department did not feel that
2:42:20it could write such a letter for one
2:42:21individual regarding the patman hearings
2:42:24and was very reluctant to do so
2:42:26i also had conversations with mitchell
2:42:28about this and reported the matter to
2:42:30holloman erlichman
2:42:32the justice department felt
2:42:34that for them to write such a letter
2:42:36would look like a direct effort to block
2:42:38the hearings and i happen to frankly
2:42:40agree
2:42:41therefore no response was sent prior to
2:42:43the scheduled september 14th appearance
2:42:45of mr stanz
2:42:47and mr parkinson himself informed the
2:42:49committee that stands would not appear
2:42:51because he felt he would be detrimental
2:42:53to the pending civil and criminal
2:42:55investigations
2:43:02it was after my september fifteenth
2:43:04meeting with the president for this
2:43:06matter had been briefly and generally
2:43:08discussed
2:43:09and as the subsequent activities of the
2:43:11patent committee became more intense
2:43:14that the white house became more
2:43:15involved in dealing with the patent
2:43:16committee
2:43:18on september 25th chairman papman
2:43:21announced that he would hold
2:43:23a vote
2:43:24on october third regarding the issuing
2:43:26of subpoenas to witnesses
2:43:28with this announcement the white house
2:43:30congressional relations staff began
2:43:31taking talking with members of the
2:43:33committee as well as the republican
2:43:35leadership of the house
2:43:36i recall several conversations with mr
2:43:39timmins and dick cook
2:43:41regarding this matter
2:43:43as well as conversations with holloman
2:43:46timmons and cook informed me
2:43:48that there was a there was a daily
2:43:50change in the list of potential
2:43:51witnesses
2:43:52and the list was ever growing and
2:43:54beginning to reach into the white house
2:43:55itself
2:43:57in discussing it with holderman i asked
2:43:59him how he thought the patent hearings
2:44:01might be turned off
2:44:03he suggested that i might talk with
2:44:04secretary conley about the matter
2:44:06because connie would know patman as well
2:44:09as anybody
2:44:10i called secretary conley and told him
2:44:12the reason i was calling
2:44:14he said that the only thing he could
2:44:15think of the only soft spot that patman
2:44:17might have was that he had received a
2:44:19large contribution from a washington
2:44:21lobbyist and he had heard rumors that
2:44:24some of these
2:44:25contributions may not have been reported
2:44:28i discussed this matter with bill
2:44:29timmons and we concluded that several
2:44:32republicans would probably have a
2:44:33similar problem so the matter was
2:44:35dropped
2:44:36at this time
2:44:38i cannot recall the name of the lobbyist
2:44:40whom secretary conley said had made the
2:44:42contributions to mr pappin
2:44:45timmons and i had also discussed that
2:44:47probably some of the members of the
2:44:48banking currency committee would have
2:44:50themselves potential campaign act
2:44:52violations
2:44:53and that it probably would be worthwhile
2:44:55to check out their reporting to the
2:44:56clerk of the house i told timmins i
2:44:58would look into it on september 26th i
2:45:01received a report i had requested
2:45:04from mr parkinson after he had one of
2:45:06his associates check the reports of the
2:45:08members of the committee
2:45:10with the clerk of the house
2:45:12after i received the document from
2:45:13parkinson a copy which i have submitted
2:45:15to the committee in exhibit 19 i decided
2:45:18it would be a cheap shot to get into
2:45:20anything of this nature accordingly i
2:45:22never reviewed the document that
2:45:23parkman's parkinson submitted and i have
2:45:25not reviewed it to this day
2:45:28while the white house had received
2:45:30through its congressional relations
2:45:31staff
2:45:32informal reports as to who was likely to
2:45:34be subpoenaed
2:45:35chairman patman made public his list on
2:45:38october second nineteen seventy two
2:45:40the end the individuals for whom
2:45:42subpoenas were to be requested was
2:45:44extensive and included several people
2:45:46who had varying degrees of knowledge
2:45:48regarding the watergate related matters
2:45:50this list for example included alfred
2:45:52baldwin
2:45:54jack caulfield persons from the finance
2:45:57committee sally harmony fred larue clark
2:46:00mcgregor mr magruder mr martian mr
2:46:03mitchell
2:46:04robert odell bart porter you sloan stanz
2:46:07timmons and myself
2:46:10hides i have submitted to the committee
2:46:12a copy of the entire list exhibit 20.
2:46:15as the names on the list had continued
2:46:17to evolve it became increasingly
2:46:19apparent that the white house did not
2:46:21have did not want the hearings to be
2:46:23held for example
2:46:25bill timmons took a much greater
2:46:27interest in the project when he realized
2:46:29early on that his name was among those
2:46:31who would be called
2:46:33i say this not because timmons had any
2:46:34reason to to appear not to appear
2:46:37because i know of no illegal or improper
2:46:39activities on timmins part rather he had
2:46:42been working to prevent the hearings
2:46:44from occurring in the first instance
2:46:46through his conversations with
2:46:47republican leaders and members of the
2:46:48committee
2:46:49this indeed would have put him in an
2:46:51awkward position
2:46:53i began receiving increasing pressure
2:46:55from mitchell stans and parkinson and
2:46:57others to get the justice department to
2:46:58respond to the september eighth letter
2:47:00of congressman brown as a vehicle that
2:47:02the
2:47:03that congressman brown could use in
2:47:06persuading other republicans not to vote
2:47:08in favor of the subpoenas
2:47:10congressman brown felt
2:47:12with this document in hand
2:47:15he could he could give the republicans
2:47:17and others something to hang their vote
2:47:18on i had continued my conversations with
2:47:21henry peterson and after the indictments
2:47:24had been returned he said that indeed he
2:47:25did feel that the justice department
2:47:27should issue such a letter because of
2:47:29the potential implications on the
2:47:31breadth of the patent hearings
2:47:33the letter was sent on october 2nd 1972
2:47:36i have submitted to the committee a copy
2:47:39of congressman brown's letter
2:47:41and assistant attorney general
2:47:42peterson's response exhibits 18 and 21.
2:47:47a number of people worked on getting the
2:47:48votes necessary to block the patment
2:47:51committee hearings
2:47:52mr timmins discussed the matter with the
2:47:54house republican leaders who agreed to
2:47:56be of assistance by making it a matter
2:47:57for the leadership consideration
2:47:59which resulted in a direction from the
2:48:01leadership to members of the committee
2:48:03to vote against the hearings
2:48:06i was informed that congressman brown
2:48:07had been working with several members of
2:48:09the democratic side of the patent
2:48:10committee to assist in voting against
2:48:12the hearings or as an alternative not to
2:48:15appear for the hearings
2:48:16timmons informed me
2:48:18that he also was in direct contact with
2:48:20one of the leaders of the southern
2:48:21delegation who was being quite helpful
2:48:23in persuading the southerners on the
2:48:25committee not to vote for the subpoenas
2:48:27on the alternative not to appear at the
2:48:29meeting on october third
2:48:31also mitchell reported to me that he had
2:48:34been working with some people in new
2:48:35york to get the new yorkers on the
2:48:37committee to vote against the hearings
2:48:39he told me and i cannot recall now which
2:48:41members of the new york delegation you
2:48:42referred to that he had assurances that
2:48:45they would either not show up or would
2:48:48vote against the hearings
2:48:50i in turn pass this information on to
2:48:52timmins but i did not tell him the
2:48:53source of the information
2:48:55on october 3rd the vote was held and the
2:48:57subpoenas were defeated by a vote of
2:48:5920-15 and another sign of relief was
2:49:01made at the white house
2:49:03that we had leaked one more hurdle in
2:49:05the continuing cover-up
2:49:07on october 4th however chairman patman
2:49:10requested a gao investigation
2:49:12and i was asked by stans what this would
2:49:14mean
2:49:15i told him that this would be primarily
2:49:17between himself and gao
2:49:20but that since the gao had no subpoena
2:49:22power to compel testimony the scope of
2:49:24their investigation would have to have
2:49:26limits
2:49:28he said that he felt
2:49:30that he could work with elmer stats who
2:49:32was an old good friend
2:49:34and not let this matter get out of hand
2:49:36with gao
2:49:38on october 10th chairman patman decided
2:49:40to proceed without subpoena power
2:49:43and sent letters to mcgregor stans
2:49:45mitchell and myself
2:49:47everybody who received such a letter
2:49:49declined to appear and pacman held his
2:49:51hearings with an imp with empty witness
2:49:53chairs and as i recall the press
2:49:55accounts lectured the missing witnesses
2:50:04i would now like to turn to the
2:50:06so-called segreti matter
2:50:09i've been informed by the committee
2:50:11council that the subject of the alleged
2:50:13of alleged political sabotage will be
2:50:15taken up in subsequent hearings
2:50:17however
2:50:18i've been asked to explain in full the
2:50:20pattern of cover up cover-up which
2:50:22evolved in connection with the watergate
2:50:23related matters
2:50:25my explanations would be less than
2:50:27complete
2:50:28and presenting my knowledge of the
2:50:29subject if i were to omit the so-called
2:50:32sagretti matter
2:50:34while the segretti matter was not
2:50:36directly related to the watergate the
2:50:38cover-up of the facts surrounding mr
2:50:39segrete's activities was consistent with
2:50:41other parts of the general white house
2:50:43cover-up which followed the watergate
2:50:44incident
2:50:46i will not go into extensive details at
2:50:48this time while i will give the
2:50:49highlights of the pattern that was
2:50:51followed regarding the dealings of the
2:50:53white house with mr segrete
2:50:57i first heard of mr segretti when gordon
2:50:59strong called me in late june and told
2:51:01me
2:51:02that the fbi
2:51:03had called a friend of his
2:51:05by the name of donald segrete and
2:51:07requested to interview him in connection
2:51:09with the break-in at the democratic
2:51:11national committee
2:51:12strawn asked me if i would meet with
2:51:14segrete
2:51:16i told him
2:51:17i would and strong arranged a meeting at
2:51:20the mayflower hotel where sigretti was
2:51:22staying
2:51:23strong gave me a very general
2:51:25description of mr segretti's activities
2:51:28and said that he was a dirty tricks type
2:51:30operator who had been paid by mr comback
2:51:33he told me that he would rather have
2:51:34sigretti himself tell me what he'd been
2:51:36doing because he in fact was not aware
2:51:38of all of secrets ready's activities
2:51:42he also informed me that mr chapin had
2:51:44been involved in hiring secretary i met
2:51:46with segreta in the lobby of the
2:51:47mayflower hotel
2:51:49at which time he gave me a very broad
2:51:51description of his activities
2:51:53and said that
2:51:54he had had contact with a man by the
2:51:56name of ed warren
2:51:58who by having seen subsequent pictures
2:52:00in the paper he assumed was howard hunt
2:52:03i told segrete to come to my office the
2:52:05next day and we would discuss the matter
2:52:07further
2:52:08when segretti came to my office the next
2:52:10morning
2:52:11he told me
2:52:13of his relationship with mr hunt and
2:52:15that he had only had incidental dealings
2:52:17with him and recalled meeting with him
2:52:20twice in florida and several subsequent
2:52:22telephone calls
2:52:24sigretti told me that hunt had scared
2:52:26him and that he had really decided early
2:52:28on to deal with him as little as
2:52:30possible
2:52:32sigretti then described how he had been
2:52:35hired in the fact that he had met with
2:52:37combat to arrange his compensation
2:52:40he said he wanted to know whether he
2:52:42should mention the fact that strawn
2:52:43chapin and chapin had recruited him
2:52:46and kambach was paying him when he was
2:52:48interviewed by the fbi
2:52:50i told segretti that he should answer
2:52:52any and all questions asked about hunt
2:52:55and his relationship with hunt but that
2:52:57he should withhold the names of strawn
2:52:59chapin and kombach unless the fbi felt
2:53:02it was absolutely necessary to have the
2:53:04names
2:53:05segretti departed and returned to
2:53:07california
2:53:09several days after segreti's fbi
2:53:11interview he called me
2:53:12he told me that he thought his interview
2:53:14had gone very well
2:53:16he said that he told the fbi everything
2:53:18he knew about mr hunt and the fact that
2:53:20he had no knowledge of the watergate
2:53:21incident and that the agents had not
2:53:23pressed him
2:53:24in a manner that required him to reveal
2:53:26the names of straw and chapin and
2:53:27kombuch
2:53:28i thanked him for informing me of the
2:53:30results of his interview and did not
2:53:31hear again from him till much later
2:53:34the next time i heard from sigretti was
2:53:36in august during the republican national
2:53:38convention in miami
2:53:40i received a call from mr chapin who
2:53:42indicated that segreti was very
2:53:44concerned about the fact he was being
2:53:46called before a federal grand jury in
2:53:48washington to investigate the watergate
2:53:50chapin told me that sigretti
2:53:53was looking for guidance
2:53:55as to
2:53:56his appearance before the grand jury and
2:53:58he was concerned again that he might
2:54:00have to reveal the names of strong
2:54:01chapin and combuck
2:54:03i informed chapin that it would be
2:54:05impossible for me to go to washington to
2:54:07see segrete but if he wished to come to
2:54:08florida in route to his scheduled grand
2:54:11jury appearance i'd be happy to meet
2:54:12with him
2:54:13after my conversation with chapin
2:54:16i called mr peterson at the department
2:54:18of justice
2:54:19and explain the problem that was
2:54:20confronting segreti
2:54:22i told peterson that to the best of my
2:54:24knowledge segretti had no involvement in
2:54:25the watergate incident but he had had
2:54:27dealings with hunt in connection with
2:54:30some campaign activities he had been
2:54:31performing for the white house
2:54:34i also informed peterson
2:54:36that he was being paid by the
2:54:38president's personal attorney mr comback
2:54:40and that he had been recruited by chapin
2:54:42and strong
2:54:43i said that these facts if revealed
2:54:45would obviously be quite embarrassing
2:54:47and could cause
2:54:48political problems during the waning
2:54:50weeks of the election
2:54:52mr peterson said that he understood the
2:54:54problem and would determine what he
2:54:56could do
2:54:57i subsequently talked to mr peterson
2:54:59again
2:55:00he told me that he did not believe it
2:55:01would be necessary for the prosecutors
2:55:03to get into these areas when mr segetti
2:55:06appeared before the grand jury
2:55:08segretti came to florida a day or so
2:55:10before his appearance before the grand
2:55:11jury
2:55:12to the best of my recollection
2:55:14he was on a saturday during the week i
2:55:16was in miami preparing for the
2:55:18convention
2:55:19i had a very brief meeting with segrete
2:55:22not longer than 30 minutes as i recall
2:55:25in which we reviewed his potential
2:55:26problem
2:55:27i told him i did not believe that the
2:55:29government was particularly interested
2:55:30in pursuing the names of stron chapin
2:55:33and kombach in connection with his
2:55:35activities and i doubted if he would be
2:55:37asked any questions about these areas
2:55:40i told him however that if he were asked
2:55:42the questions he should answer any
2:55:44question and every question truthfully
2:55:47and if he were asked the names
2:55:50who who had hired him and who had paid
2:55:51him that he should give the names
2:55:53i told him if pressed he should lay out
2:55:55the whole ball of
2:55:56wax i later learned from sigretti that
2:56:00the names had come out during the grand
2:56:01jury appearance and i had a discussion
2:56:03later with peterson also on the subject
2:56:05in which he told me that mr silver had
2:56:07tried to avoid getting into the area and
2:56:09in fact did not ask him the question
2:56:11which resulted in his giving the names
2:56:14rather that a grand juror had asked the
2:56:15question despite the fact that the
2:56:17prosecutors had tried to gloss over it
2:56:20as a result of sigretti's appearance
2:56:22before the grand jury fbi interviews
2:56:24were scheduled for chapin straw and
2:56:26kombuch
2:56:27i had by this time learned the full
2:56:29story that in fact holloman in a meeting
2:56:32with kombach had approved sigretti's
2:56:34activities and authorized combach to
2:56:36make payments to sigretti
2:56:38in discussing this with chapin and
2:56:40strong before their appearances
2:56:42or their fbi interviews
2:56:45i should say they both had great concern
2:56:48about revealing mr holloman's
2:56:49involvement
2:56:51in fact i recall that strong came into
2:56:53my office when dick moore was present
2:56:55and said that he would if necessary
2:56:57perjure himself to prevent involving
2:56:58holloman in this matter
2:57:00i told strong that
2:57:02that was not
2:57:04that that was certainly not necessary in
2:57:06my estimation
2:57:07but he was indeed most loyal to holloman
2:57:09for taking that position
2:57:11dick moore made a similar comment
2:57:13when the ancient agents came to
2:57:15interview chapin and strong they
2:57:17contained themselves in their questing
2:57:18and to the best of my knowledge all the
2:57:20answers that chapin and strong provided
2:57:22were truthful although i must say
2:57:24pursuant to the discussions i'd had with
2:57:26him
2:57:28prior to their interview
2:57:29they did not volunteer any information
2:57:31that was not asked for
2:57:34when i was in california in late august
2:57:36i was asked by mr ehrlichman to meet
2:57:39with kombach and
2:57:41prepare him for his fbi interview
2:57:43regarding the segregated matter
2:57:46kombach was very concerned that the
2:57:47interview could lead into other areas
2:57:49and had discussed this problem with
2:57:51erlickman accordingly i helped comback
2:57:54prepare for his fbi interview
2:57:56and he later informed me that it had
2:57:58gone well and that they had not asked
2:57:59questions unrelated to the security
2:58:01matter and he had volunteered nothing
2:58:10on october 10th 1972
2:58:14an article based on leaked fbi
2:58:16information reported the segretti story
2:58:19for the first time publicly
2:58:22following the october 10 story
2:58:24there commenced a series of stories
2:58:26involving chapin strong kombach and
2:58:28later haldeman
2:58:30these stories created a new frenzy in
2:58:32the white house press office as to how
2:58:34to deal with the stories
2:58:36on friday the 13th
2:58:38i had left washington to go to florida
2:58:39to spend several weeks on a honeymoon
2:58:42but was abruptly called back to
2:58:43washington on sunday the 15th because of
2:58:46the cascading leaked stories regarding
2:58:48segreti
2:58:49when i returned i went to the white
2:58:51house where a meeting was in session
2:58:53in the roosevelt room
2:58:55in attendance the meeting were
2:58:56ehrlichman ziegler buchanan moore and
2:58:59chapin the purpose of the meeting was to
2:59:01prepare ziegler for his press briefings
2:59:03on the segreta related stories
2:59:05for a reason that i cannot explain a
2:59:07secretary to mr chapin was present
2:59:09taking notes during parts of the
2:59:10discussions and the hypothetical
2:59:12questioning and answering of mr ziegler
2:59:14i believe this is probably one of the
2:59:16rare occasions when the preparation of
2:59:18ziegler
2:59:19the ziegler briefing was actually
2:59:20recorded and i have submitted
2:59:22to the committee
2:59:24a copy of the notes
2:59:26recording parts of that session
2:59:28which is exhibit number 22.
2:59:31i might also add that this session was
2:59:33not unlike many other sessions that had
2:59:34preceded it
2:59:36and that were to follow it in preparing
2:59:38ziegler to meet with the white house
2:59:39press corps
2:59:40it would however take another 200 pages
2:59:42to give that story
2:59:45after segetti became the subject of
2:59:47intense inquiry by the press erlichman
2:59:49suggested that i advise sigretti to go
2:59:52incognito to hide from the press and
2:59:54avoid further stories
2:59:56that might result from the press
2:59:57interviews of him
2:59:59i so advised sigretti and he came to
3:00:01washington in late october because he
3:00:03was very distressed about the fact that
3:00:04a number of the people who were issuing
3:00:06what he considered to be inaccurate and
3:00:08false stories regarding his activities
3:00:11when segetti arrived in washington he
3:00:12was met by mr feeling and myself to
3:00:14discuss
3:00:16whether he should issue a press
3:00:17statement himself at that time the
3:00:19subject was also discussed in a meeting
3:00:21at mr chapin's office attended by
3:00:23ziegler erlichmann chapin and myself
3:00:26and later by fielding after he had
3:00:28received a draft copy of segrete's
3:00:29proposed press statement
3:00:32it was decided it would be unwise for
3:00:33segreta to issue the statement so he
3:00:35commenced his travels around the united
3:00:37states once again to avoid the press mr
3:00:39segretti would periodically call me to
3:00:41tell me he was in some small town and
3:00:43had not seen a newspaper or television
3:00:45for several days and was curious to know
3:00:47what they were saying about him i would
3:00:49give him a summary report as to the
3:00:51press coverage
3:00:52following the election
3:00:54i was asked by holdeman and erlichmann
3:00:56to meet with segrete to determine the
3:00:58extent of his his involved the
3:01:00involvement of the chapin and strawn it
3:01:02had with him
3:01:03segrete at this time was in palm springs
3:01:05california where he had been spending
3:01:07the last weeks before the election in
3:01:10the desert
3:01:12i arranged to meet with him on november
3:01:1510th in palm springs
3:01:20and had planned to spend a week myself
3:01:21relaxing after the election in palm
3:01:23springs on november 10th i met with
3:01:26sigretti and pursuant to an arrangement
3:01:28between segrete and myself i agreed to
3:01:30tape the interview with him with the
3:01:32understanding that i felt
3:01:34it was privileged under the doctrine of
3:01:36executive privilege and it would never
3:01:37be released
3:01:39i have submitted the tape of that
3:01:41conversation between segrete and myself
3:01:43to the committee pursuant to the
3:01:44subpoena issued for the material
3:01:47my visit to palm springs was abruptly
3:01:49interrupted when i received a call on
3:01:51november 11th for mr todd helen
3:01:53erlichman's assistant
3:01:55requesting i come to florida where
3:01:56erlichmann and holloman were
3:01:58accompanying the president to report on
3:01:59my interview with mr segrete
3:02:02accordingly i flew to florida
3:02:04immediately and met with holdemon
3:02:05ehrlichman on november 12th
3:02:08and played the taped interview i had had
3:02:10with sigretti
3:02:11for them
3:02:12i recall that while i was discussing
3:02:14this matter with erlickman and holderman
3:02:17the president requested that parliament
3:02:18come over to see him
3:02:20i was surprised on this occasion as i
3:02:22had been on other occasions when a
3:02:24similar situation had occurred that
3:02:26holloman sent a message back to the
3:02:28president that he was meeting with me
3:02:30and would be over shortly to report
3:02:32i was surprised that my reporting on
3:02:34segrete would take precedent over
3:02:36holloman's responding to an immediate
3:02:37request of the president
3:02:40on november 15
3:02:42i arranged to meet
3:02:44with mr hallum and mr likeman at camp
3:02:46david on another subject which i'll
3:02:47discuss later
3:02:49during the first part of the meeting
3:02:51however the subject of chapin's
3:02:53remaining at the white house came up and
3:02:55i learned that the president had made a
3:02:56decision
3:02:57based on the information
3:02:59that had been imparted to harlem in an
3:03:01election in florida
3:03:02that mr chapin would have to leave the
3:03:04white house staff
3:03:05before going to camp david i was aware
3:03:08of the subject being under discussion
3:03:10and mr moore and i had talked about it
3:03:14moore felt that the president should
3:03:16merely issue a letter of censure to
3:03:17chapin and let it go at that
3:03:20but moore was unaware of the contents of
3:03:22the tape and had never heard it
3:03:24pursuant to the requests of mor the
3:03:27request of moore
3:03:28however i did raise his suggestion with
3:03:31erlichmann and haldeman holloman said
3:03:33that he was personally too close to
3:03:35chapin to make a judgment on such a
3:03:37thing and that if it was to be done it
3:03:40was going to be re-raised with the
3:03:41president it would have to be done
3:03:43by
3:03:44erlichman
3:03:45erlichman said that he did not think
3:03:47that it was possible to re-raise the
3:03:48matter and subsequently
3:03:50shape and resign from the white house
3:03:52staff
3:03:57as the press accounts
3:03:59of segretti's activities lingered on
3:04:01after the election
3:04:03as well as the continuing watergate
3:04:04stories
3:04:06there was serious discussion about
3:04:07putting out the facts in late november i
3:04:10recall a conversation with haldeman in
3:04:12his office
3:04:13we talked about the facts
3:04:15and he asked my opinion about what would
3:04:17happen if we put them out
3:04:19i told him i thought that the then
3:04:22pending trial would be put back in the
3:04:24grand jury and it would very likely
3:04:27it was very likely that mitchell
3:04:28magruder strong ehrlichman holloman and
3:04:30dean could be indicted
3:04:32he asked me to elaborate
3:04:34i said i had no idea nor did i have full
3:04:36knowledge of what had happened before
3:04:38june 17th but i did know that there was
3:04:40a good possibility that any reconvened
3:04:42grand jury could get into questions of
3:04:44obstruction of justice which would lead
3:04:46right to us
3:04:48holloman said the president wished
3:04:50that now that the election was over to
3:04:51get rid of the watergate and related
3:04:53matters by laying them open but based on
3:04:56what i just told him he said
3:04:58it doesn't seem to be a very viable
3:05:00option
3:05:02i told him that i was ready at any time
3:05:04to account for myself and i thought we
3:05:06should continue to examine that option
3:05:08so the president was not damaged he then
3:05:11asked me to attempt to write a report
3:05:13that could be made public a report that
3:05:15would be a written version of the
3:05:17so-called dean investigation that if the
3:05:19president had announced on august 29th
3:05:22and include a new report on the sagretti
3:05:24matter
3:05:26i told holloman that i thought this
3:05:28could only create additional new
3:05:29problems because it would be just like a
3:05:31peek into the tent without letting
3:05:32anyone in
3:05:33it would be very difficult to write but
3:05:35i would do my best
3:05:37i did not tell holloman that i was also
3:05:38opposed to writing a report under my
3:05:40name which i felt would come back to
3:05:42haunt me
3:05:43someday
3:05:44accordingly to follow his instructions i
3:05:46decided
3:05:47that i would draft a series of carefully
3:05:49worded interrogatories or affidavits for
3:05:51each individual whose name had come up
3:05:53in the press regarding political
3:05:55sabotage and espionage
3:05:57then based on the affidavits i would
3:06:00write a summary report
3:06:01and attach the affidavits
3:06:04i thought that this i would merely waltz
3:06:05over the watergate matter by referring
3:06:08to the fact that other governmental
3:06:09investigations the fbi the grand jury
3:06:12had cleared anyone in the watergate from
3:06:15involvement
3:06:17after drafting the document i
3:06:18reluctantly submitted it to halliman on
3:06:20december 5th i have submitted a copy of
3:06:22this document to the committee exhibit
3:06:24number 23.
3:06:26holloman in turn gave it to ehrlichman
3:06:28who made the editorial changes that
3:06:30appear on the draft erlichman then gave
3:06:32it to ziegler
3:06:33on december 13th a meeting was scheduled
3:06:36in holliman's office to discuss the
3:06:37matter but was subsequently moved to
3:06:39ziegler's office
3:06:40present at the meeting were holloman
3:06:42moore ziegler and myself
3:06:44erlichmann had showed up for the earlier
3:06:46meeting in holliman's office but when it
3:06:48had been moved to ziegler's office he
3:06:49had never returned to the meeting to the
3:06:51best of my recollection
3:06:53nothing was resolved at the meeting and
3:06:55it was a consensus of the group that the
3:06:58white house should do should continue in
3:07:00dick moore's word to hunker down do
3:07:03nothing on the general theory that no
3:07:05one would be arrested for what they
3:07:06didn't say
3:07:11turning now to the handling of demands
3:07:14for white house money
3:07:16i have previously discussed mr combox
3:07:18raising money for the first pressures
3:07:21for support money for silence these
3:07:24pressures were continuous
3:07:26and following the election there were
3:07:28increasing pressures from hunt
3:07:30for money for himself and the others
3:07:32indicted other indicted defendants as a
3:07:34means
3:07:35of assuring their
3:07:36silence while this pressure had begun
3:07:39well before the election it steadily
3:07:41grew after the election until the
3:07:43demands were being made directly to the
3:07:44white house for financial assistance
3:07:47before getting into the details of these
3:07:49pressures and how they were handled i
3:07:51believe it might be helpful to explain
3:07:52the situation at the white house
3:07:54regarding the handling of an
3:07:56availability of cash
3:07:58in early 1971 i was asked by holloman to
3:08:01assist in establishing the re-election
3:08:03committee that they had no lawyer of
3:08:04their own my activities resulted in my
3:08:07learning that there were large sums of
3:08:09cash that have been left over from the
3:08:111968 nixon primaries and some funds have
3:08:14been left from the 1970 congressional
3:08:16fundraising efforts
3:08:18these monies which were referred to as
3:08:20surplus monies
3:08:22were held by combach and controlled by
3:08:24harlem and eliquin
3:08:27i have submitted to the committee
3:08:28exhibit number 24
3:08:30a memorandum prepared by strong of a
3:08:32meeting that was attended by harlem and
3:08:34strong and myself on the 18th of may
3:08:361971 which reflects the tight controls
3:08:39all of an exercise over the surplus
3:08:41monies held by combuck
3:08:43i've also submitted documents exhibit 25
3:08:46evidencing that it was necessary to have
3:08:48holloman's approval
3:08:50based on a full explanation of the
3:08:52reasons
3:08:53for even the smallest disbursement by
3:08:55comback of surplus money
3:08:57in this instance i'm referring to an
3:08:58expenditure of 813
3:09:00dollars was sometime prior to april
3:09:03seventh nineteen seventy two that i
3:09:05learned
3:09:06that cash was being sent to the white
3:09:07house i was not told the amount but i
3:09:09was asked by strong if i could suggest
3:09:12someone outside the government who might
3:09:14be willing to hold a large amount of
3:09:16cash in a safety deposit box
3:09:18i told him i'd have to think about it
3:09:20but later told him i couldn't think of
3:09:21anyone
3:09:23it was in late june or early july
3:09:28it was in late june early july that i
3:09:30learned
3:09:31that 350 000 of the surplus money had
3:09:34been delivered to the white house prior
3:09:35to april 7th 1972.
3:09:38i was informed that the money came from
3:09:40the 1968 primaries and the delivery was
3:09:43made before april 7th to ensure that it
3:09:45not become part of the 1972 campaign
3:09:47funds
3:09:49the 350 thousand dollar fund as i have
3:09:51indicated was held by strong but i do
3:09:53not
3:09:54know where he held it
3:09:57he was shortly before
3:09:59mr sloan was being called to testify in
3:10:01july
3:10:02that discussions commenced on how to
3:10:04make the 350 000 fund whole and get it
3:10:07out of the white house there was no easy
3:10:10answer
3:10:11because there was no place to send it
3:10:13out without reporting requirements the
3:10:15concern was that mr sloan would testify
3:10:18that he was aware of the dispersal of
3:10:19the 350 000 dollars to the white house
3:10:23this in turn would have created two
3:10:25problems the white house would have been
3:10:26accused of having a secret slush fund if
3:10:28this became public and secondly
3:10:31a sixty eight hundred dollar expenditure
3:10:33out of a twenty two thousand dollar
3:10:34authorization which had been
3:10:36made presented a potential campaign act
3:10:38violation for holdemon coulson and
3:10:41richard howard
3:10:42i had numerous discussions about how to
3:10:44handle this problem with mr stanz and mr
3:10:46parkinson but there was no easy answer
3:10:49i also discussed this matter with mr
3:10:51holderman telling him that there was no
3:10:52easy answer finally after the elections
3:10:55stands indicated that he had cash
3:10:57available and it was decided that stan
3:11:00should provide twenty two thousand
3:11:01dollars to strong to make the funds
3:11:03whole and then they could be removed
3:11:05from the white house and if necessary
3:11:06reported
3:11:08this plan was approved by harlem and
3:11:10stands was so informed
3:11:12on the morning of november twenty eight
3:11:14stanz called to request that strawn
3:11:17come to his office to receive the money
3:11:19that he had available
3:11:21i do not know the source of the money or
3:11:23whether it was campaign money or any of
3:11:25the details about the twenty two
3:11:26thousand dollars that stands had made
3:11:27available
3:11:29i could not locate strong and stands
3:11:31indicated that it would it should be
3:11:32picked up immediately but i cannot
3:11:34recall at this time the reason he called
3:11:36for the immediacy accordingly i asked mr
3:11:38fielding to pick up a package from
3:11:40stan's and give it to strong as soon as
3:11:42he could
3:11:43i informed stan that feeling would be
3:11:45over to pick up the package but he would
3:11:47not know what he was picking up and when
3:11:49i later learned that stans had informed
3:11:52fielding i was somewhat annoyed because
3:11:54i felt that was unfair to fielding
3:11:56the money was then given by feeling too
3:11:58strong but no final decision had been
3:12:01made regarding how to dispose of the 350
3:12:04000
3:12:06having explained the status of the cash
3:12:08at the white house i must now return to
3:12:10the pressures that were being placed on
3:12:12the white house for the use of these
3:12:14funds which i've just described for
3:12:15payments to the seven indicted
3:12:18individuals
3:12:27the pressure began
3:12:29long before election day
3:12:31and that paul o'brien was receiving
3:12:33messages from
3:12:35william bittman
3:12:36hunt's lawyer that hunt
3:12:39and others expected to have more support
3:12:41money and attorney's fees in exchange
3:12:43for their continued silence
3:12:45the initial payments by comback had not
3:12:47been sufficient o'brien reported this
3:12:49frequently to mitchell martian
3:12:51larue and myself
3:12:53i in turn was reporting to harlem in an
3:12:55erlichman
3:12:57there were discussions in late july
3:12:59august and september abusing
3:13:02the funds at the white house for these
3:13:03payments
3:13:05i informed holloman that these
3:13:07of these discussions but they were still
3:13:09in the discussion stage and no action
3:13:11was taken
3:13:12after the election the pressure was
3:13:14greatly increased when coulson received
3:13:16a call from mr hunt which coulson
3:13:18recorded
3:13:20colson brought the recorded call to me
3:13:22and i in turn transcribed it onto a
3:13:24cassette tape
3:13:26i have been informed by committee
3:13:27council that the committee has in its
3:13:29possession a transcript of the
3:13:31conversation between coulson and hunt in
3:13:33which hunt makes demands for money
3:13:36on november 15th i arranged a meeting
3:13:39with holloman and ehrlichman so that
3:13:40they could hear the tape of the
3:13:42conversation coulson had had with hunt
3:13:44and also to inform them of the increased
3:13:47increasing
3:13:49and now threatening demands that were
3:13:51being transmitted through hunt's lawyer
3:13:53to mr o'brien and then turn on to the
3:13:56white house
3:13:58holloman and ellickman were at camp
3:13:59david at that time developing plans for
3:14:01the reorganization of the executive
3:14:02branch for the second term of the nixon
3:14:04administration
3:14:05i departed on the morning of november 15
3:14:08for camp david with mr walter minnick
3:14:10who was going to camp david to discuss
3:14:11the reorganization plans with erlickman
3:14:14many could be doing virtually all of the
3:14:16legal work at that time for erlichmann
3:14:17on the reorganization plan he was a
3:14:20member of erlickman staff in fact i was
3:14:21somewhat surprised that the council's
3:14:23office had not been more involved or
3:14:24involved at all
3:14:26prior to that time in the reorganization
3:14:28plans
3:14:30after arriving at camp david
3:14:32ehrlichman holliman and i went into the
3:14:34president's office in laurel lodge which
3:14:36was empty
3:14:39i have referred earlier to the fact that
3:14:41in this meeting the matter of dwight
3:14:42shapens remaining at the white house was
3:14:44discussed
3:14:45was after that discussion
3:14:47that i told them
3:14:48of the telephone conversation between
3:14:50hunt
3:14:51and coulson and played the tape for them
3:14:53and also told them of the increasing
3:14:55demands being made for money
3:14:57i told him i was going to new york that
3:14:59afternoon because mitchell had requested
3:15:00that i come to visit him regarding the
3:15:02bans being made and told him i also
3:15:05would play the tape for him
3:15:06my instructions from this meeting were
3:15:09to tell mitchell to take care of all
3:15:10these problems
3:15:12when we came out of the private meeting
3:15:14ehrlichman told mr minnick who had been
3:15:16waiting to meet with him that we had
3:15:18been talking about reorganization
3:15:20matters
3:15:21this position was taken because minik
3:15:23was at camp david for that purpose it
3:15:25would seem very logical a very logical
3:15:27thing that i might be discussing with
3:15:29harlem and erlickman in fact in our
3:15:31private meeting there was no discussion
3:15:33of the reorganization at all
3:15:43after a
3:15:44brief discussion about the
3:15:46reorganization matters
3:15:48i departed camp david and returned to
3:15:51washington and then flew to new york
3:15:53with mr stanz
3:15:54stanz had told me some day days earlier
3:15:57that he was going to meet
3:16:00with mr mitchell
3:16:02to discuss a number of matters about
3:16:04winding down the re-election committee
3:16:05and asked me to join him
3:16:09i'll stay here and proceed with the
3:16:10committee and uh
3:16:12ask him to hold a vote till i get over
3:16:13and somebody's heard back so they can
3:16:15take charge so i go and vote go ahead
3:16:18thank you
3:16:19stans had arranged the meeting uh with
3:16:22mitchell to take place at the
3:16:23metropolitan club in new york city
3:16:25because stan was anxious to return to
3:16:27washington as soon as the meeting was
3:16:28over did not want to go down to wall
3:16:30street and get tied up in traffic
3:16:33after the first part of the meeting
3:16:34where stans and mitchell discussed their
3:16:35problems stands departed and i played
3:16:38the tape for mitchell
3:16:40i recall that he hailing had only one
3:16:42reaction to the tape and it was to the
3:16:44effect that it was certainly a
3:16:45self-serving tape for coulson and he
3:16:48wondered what in the hell hunt was
3:16:49talking about with regard to mitchell's
3:16:51having perjured himself
3:16:53i informed mitchell that erlichmann and
3:16:55holloman had heard the tape and
3:16:57requested that he
3:16:59do what he could to solve the problem
3:17:01i received no instructions or really any
3:17:03indication at all from
3:17:06at that time from mitchell regarding the
3:17:07matter that hunted raised in the
3:17:09conversation with
3:17:10coulson to the best of my recollection
3:17:13it was the first week of december
3:17:15that mitchell called me and said that we
3:17:17would have to use some of the 350 000
3:17:19dollar fund to take care of the demands
3:17:21that were being made
3:17:22by hunt and others for money
3:17:25indicated that the money
3:17:27that was taken out would be returned
3:17:29in order that the fund could be made
3:17:30whole again
3:17:32he asked me to get holloman's approval
3:17:34prior to mitchell's call i had been
3:17:36informed by coulson's secretary that mrs
3:17:38hunt
3:17:39had called her at home on a number of
3:17:41occasions
3:17:42to discuss this problem with her in
3:17:44order that she might pass it on to
3:17:45coulson and get something done about the
3:17:47problem
3:17:48coulson's had sent his secretary miss
3:17:50joan hall to me with these messages
3:17:52indicating that he did not want to talk
3:17:54to her about it but that she should pass
3:17:56the message on to me
3:17:57i told miss hall not to take missus not
3:18:00to talk to mrs hunt and if necessary get
3:18:02an unlisted telephone
3:18:05after the phone call from mitchell i
3:18:07called holdeman
3:18:08and i described the situation in full to
3:18:10him
3:18:11and i told him i had told mitchell that
3:18:14i was very reluctant to see the white
3:18:15house money used but he indicated there
3:18:18it would be returned as soon as they
3:18:20could raise some additional money i told
3:18:22harlem i didn't think it was a good idea
3:18:24to to further involve the white house
3:18:25and raising money for these men but
3:18:27frankly i had no answer
3:18:29holloman said he did not like it either
3:18:32but since we had the assurance that the
3:18:33money would be returned i should inform
3:18:35strong that he could make the delivery
3:18:37of the money to the committee
3:18:40following my conversation with harlem
3:18:42and i called i called stron
3:18:44i told him just
3:18:45he should speak with fred larue and make
3:18:47a delivery to larue pursuant to larue's
3:18:50instructions
3:18:52i also informed strong that he should
3:18:53anticipate the fact that we would get
3:18:55this money back in the near future i do
3:18:58not recall how much money was delivered
3:18:59by strong but i believe it was either
3:19:01forty thousand or seventy thousand this
3:19:04delivery did not satisfy the demands and
3:19:06they continued to be relayed by mr
3:19:08bittman to mr o'brien and in turn would
3:19:10relay them to mitchell larue and myself
3:19:12i in turn would tell harlem in an
3:19:14argument of demands i can recall that
3:19:16larue and o'brien
3:19:18coming to my office
3:19:20to discuss these demands
3:19:22and i told him that there could be no
3:19:24further use of the white house money and
3:19:26in fact to the contrary
3:19:28holloman was expecting that the money
3:19:31which had been provided
3:19:32earlier was to be returned in full
3:19:35to the best of my recollection it was
3:19:37sometimes shortly before the trial when
3:19:39the demands reached the crescendo point
3:19:41once again
3:19:42o'brien and larue came to my office and
3:19:44told me of the seriousness of the
3:19:45problem subsequently mitchell called me
3:19:47and told me that once again i should ask
3:19:49him to make available the necessary
3:19:50funds
3:19:51i called holloman and told him of
3:19:53mitchell's request in the situation and
3:19:56told him that i thought it was time to
3:19:58get the entire money
3:19:59out of the white house rather than
3:20:00continue as it were every few weeks
3:20:03further bites being taken out of the
3:20:05apple
3:20:06after we discussed the matter holloman
3:20:08said
3:20:09send the entire damn bundle to them but
3:20:11make sure we get a receipt for the 350
3:20:14000
3:20:15after receiving my instructions from
3:20:17holloman i called strong and told him
3:20:20that he was delivered the remainder of
3:20:21the money to larue but he was to make
3:20:23certain that he got a receipt for 350
3:20:25000 dollars
3:20:27strong later told me that larue had
3:20:29refused to give him a receipt
3:20:32with each of these deliveries i'm only
3:20:34aware of the fact that the money was
3:20:35delivered to larue by strong i have no
3:20:38knowledge of how larue in turn delivered
3:20:40it to those who were making demands upon
3:20:42the committee nor do i know how much in
3:20:44fact was paid
3:20:49after mrs hunt was tragically killed on
3:20:52december 8th 1972
3:20:54paul o'brien informed me that he had
3:20:56learned from william pittman
3:20:58that hunt was in very bad shape
3:21:00he had become extremely depressed and
3:21:02grieved over the wife of over the death
3:21:04of his wife
3:21:05i also recall
3:21:07that the funeral of mrs hunt created a
3:21:08serious dilemma for mr colson
3:21:11who had known the hunts personally was
3:21:12very fond of them both
3:21:14but was concerned about
3:21:17in any way publicly identifying himself
3:21:19with mrs with mr hunt
3:21:21accordingly he came to ask me if he
3:21:23should attend mrs hunt's funeral and i
3:21:26told him that i thought he ought to do
3:21:27whatever he felt in his heart
3:21:30that certainly attending her funeral
3:21:31could not in any way be deemed to show
3:21:33that he was in any way involved with
3:21:35hunt in the watergate
3:21:37coulson initially told me he was going
3:21:38to attend the funeral but subsequently
3:21:40decided to send his secretary with a
3:21:42letter to hunt expressing deep sympathy
3:21:45over the situation
3:21:47it was also after the death of mrs hunt
3:21:50that i learned from o'brien that hunt's
3:21:52lawyer
3:21:53did not think that mr hunt was capable
3:21:55of standing trial
3:21:56in his then psychological situation and
3:21:59that he had been examined by a
3:22:00psychiatrist who had reached that
3:22:02conclusion
3:22:03o'brien had discussed this matter with
3:22:05mitchell because mitchell and i had a
3:22:07conversation in which he told me that
3:22:09bittman
3:22:10thought that the government might be of
3:22:12some assistance in resolving hunts
3:22:14problems temporarily by finding a
3:22:16sympathetic
3:22:17psychiatrist to examine hunt who
3:22:20would concur in the findings of the
3:22:22psychiatrist who had already examined
3:22:23him and found him not fit to stand trial
3:22:26mitchell asked me to discuss this with
3:22:27peterson and i said i would
3:22:30i had
3:22:31a brief conversation with peterson about
3:22:33this and he said that if there was
3:22:36anything that he could could be done it
3:22:38would but he did not think anything
3:22:40could be done regarding this matter
3:22:44after the government psychiatrist
3:22:45determined
3:22:46that mr hunt was capable of standing
3:22:48trial i had a report back from o'brien
3:22:51that hunt was outraged that no one at
3:22:53the white house was doing anything to
3:22:54take care of him and in fact he thought
3:22:57the white house and his friends had
3:22:58turned against him he was not asking
3:23:01anyone to fix his case but merely asking
3:23:03for someone to give him time to recover
3:23:05from the tragedy of his wife's death
3:23:08i can recall telling coulson about this
3:23:10when i reported to him generally that
3:23:12hunt was in rather bad shape and was
3:23:14thinking about pleading guilty rather
3:23:16than going through the rigors of a trial
3:23:18in his present situation
3:23:20i also told coulson that i have been
3:23:22informed that hunt wanted to talk with
3:23:24him but since hunt knew that that would
3:23:26put coulson in an awkward position that
3:23:28he wanted coulson to talk to his lawyers
3:23:40i shall now turn to
3:23:42the matter of executive clemency for
3:23:44hunt and the others
3:23:46it was i was out of my office from
3:23:49roughly december 22nd
3:23:51until the morning of january third
3:23:53would you like to take a little recess
3:23:55right now i think my throat would enjoy
3:23:57that very much mr chairman let's suppose
3:23:59we'll give the witness recess and vote
3:24:07john dean has been interrupted just as
3:24:09he was about to explain how executive
3:24:11powers would be used to promote the
3:24:13watergate cover-up the committee paused
3:24:15at this time for a floor vote
3:24:17dean's story and public television's
3:24:19complete coverage of the hearings will
3:24:20continue after this pause for station
3:24:23identification
3:24:24unabridged coverage of these hearings is
3:24:26provided as a public service by the
3:24:28member stations of pbs the public
3:24:31broadcasting service as the hearing
3:24:33resumes john dean is explaining further
3:24:36how the white house was involved in the
3:24:37watergate cover-up
3:24:41as i was commencing before the break
3:24:45on page 135
3:24:48in dealing with the subject of executive
3:24:50clemency for mr hunt and others
3:24:55i was out of my office from roughly
3:24:57december twenty second
3:25:00until the morning of january third
3:25:03the latter part of this time i was in
3:25:05california with other members of the
3:25:06white house staff and their families on
3:25:08a short vacation
3:25:10i received a call
3:25:12on the morning of january 2nd
3:25:14while awaiting takeoff from california
3:25:17in the president's new air force one
3:25:19the call was from paul o'brien
3:25:22who told me that there were some serious
3:25:24problems and i should speak with him as
3:25:26soon as i returned to washington
3:25:27he told me
3:25:29that mr hunt was off the reservation
3:25:32i was traveling with haldeman and told
3:25:34him about the call when i arrived in
3:25:37washington that evening i called
3:25:39o'brien
3:25:41and he told me that hunt was quite upset
3:25:43and wished to plead guilty but before he
3:25:45did so he wanted some assurances from
3:25:47the white house that he would receive
3:25:49executive clemency
3:25:52o'brien told me that hunt
3:25:54would only take the assurances from
3:25:56coulson and that bitman had been trying
3:25:58to reach coulson
3:26:00i told o'brien that i doubted if coulson
3:26:02would be willing to give any such
3:26:04assurances because he was staying more
3:26:06than an arm's length from hunt
3:26:08i told o'brien
3:26:10that i would have to talk to him about
3:26:12about it in the morning
3:26:14on the morning of january third
3:26:17i received another call from mr o'brien
3:26:19saying that the matter had to be
3:26:20resolved immediately
3:26:22because he had talked to bitman and they
3:26:24had been trying to get hold of coulson
3:26:26without any success
3:26:28coulson called me to tell me that
3:26:29bittman was trying to reach him and
3:26:31asked me
3:26:32if i had seen the letter that hunted
3:26:34sent him
3:26:36i've submitted a copy of the letter
3:26:39to the committee exhibit number twenty
3:26:40six
3:26:42i told colson that i had not seen the
3:26:44letter
3:26:45i just returned to my office
3:26:47and that while we were talking i found
3:26:49in my mail a memorandum from colson
3:26:52with a letter attached from hunt in
3:26:54which he was desperately pleading to
3:26:56have colson meet with his attorney mr
3:26:58bitman
3:27:00i told colson that i was aware of the
3:27:02fact that bittman wanted to discuss the
3:27:04matter of executive clemency for hunt
3:27:06and that hunt would only take assurances
3:27:08from him coulson
3:27:10as i recall coulson said he did not want
3:27:13to meet mr bittman but would do whatever
3:27:15i suggested i told him i would have to
3:27:18get get back in touch with him
3:27:20i next met with erlickman and told him
3:27:22about the situation and he thought that
3:27:25coulson should meet with bittman
3:27:27i do not believe
3:27:28coulson was present when i first
3:27:30discussed this with erlickman i informed
3:27:32coulson that erlickman thought he should
3:27:34meet with bitman
3:27:35in trying to reconstruct as best i can
3:27:37what i
3:27:38as i recall what occurred
3:27:41there was a meeting in ehrlichman's
3:27:42office on january third
3:27:44after coulson had had a conversation
3:27:46with bittman about hunt's potential for
3:27:48executive clemency
3:27:50i recall that when colson came to the
3:27:52meeting with erlickman he was extremely
3:27:54shaken which was unlike coulson
3:27:57he was not specific in his arguments to
3:27:59ehrlichman but he said
3:28:02he felt it was imperative that hunt be
3:28:04given some assurance
3:28:06assurances of executive clemency
3:28:08the meeting in ehrlichman's office did
3:28:10not last long and ehrlichman said that
3:28:12he would have to speak with the
3:28:13president
3:28:14ehrlichman told coulson that he should
3:28:16not talk with the president about this
3:28:18on january 4th i learned from erlickman
3:28:20that he had given coulson an affirmative
3:28:23regarding clemency for hunt and that
3:28:25coulson had talked
3:28:27with bittman about the matter
3:28:29there was another meeting on this
3:28:30subject on january 5th in erlickman's
3:28:32office
3:28:33in which coulson explained exactly what
3:28:35he had told bitman regarding clemency
3:28:37he said that he had told bittman that he
3:28:39could not give a specific specific
3:28:41commitment but he gave him a general
3:28:44assurance he also said
3:28:46that he told him that clemency generally
3:28:48came up around christmas and a year was
3:28:51a long time
3:28:52it was at this meeting it was as this
3:28:54meeting was ending i said to erlickman
3:28:56that this will obviously affect all the
3:28:58others involved
3:29:00as the word will spread
3:29:02and can i assume that the same
3:29:03commitment extends to all he said that
3:29:06no one could be given a specific
3:29:07commitment but obviously if hunt was
3:29:09going to get an assurance for clemency
3:29:11the others could understand that it
3:29:13applied to all
3:29:15after the meeting in ehrlichman's office
3:29:17coulson told me that although erlichmann
3:29:20had told him
3:29:22that he coulson should not discuss this
3:29:24matter with the president that he in
3:29:26fact
3:29:27thought it was so important that he had
3:29:28taken it up with the president himself
3:29:30i also learned shortly thereafter as a
3:29:33result of a telephone call from o'brien
3:29:35the bittman had informed o'brien
3:29:38that hunt was satisfied with coulson's
3:29:40assurances
3:29:41as i shall state later the president
3:29:43himself
3:29:44raised this subject on two occasions
3:29:46with me
3:29:47and told me that he had discussed the
3:29:49matter of executive clemency for hunt
3:29:51with both ehrlichman and coulson
3:29:53the president raised this with me on
3:29:54march 13
3:29:561973 and april 15 1973.
3:30:02while i was in california during late
3:30:04december
3:30:05early january that i just referred to a
3:30:07moment ago i also received a call from
3:30:09mr feeling who told me
3:30:12that
3:30:13jack caulfield had received a letter
3:30:15from accord
3:30:17feeling was not explicit regarding the
3:30:19contents of the letter and said that he
3:30:21had taken down the letter and that i
3:30:23could read it when i returned the next
3:30:25day or so to the office
3:30:28i have submitted a copy of the letter
3:30:29transcribed by feeling to the committee
3:30:31exhibit number 27.
3:30:34within two or three days of my return to
3:30:36the office that is between the third and
3:30:38fifth of january mr caufield came to my
3:30:41office
3:30:42with the original letter
3:30:44i do not know what i did with the
3:30:45original but i believe i gave it to paul
3:30:48o'brien i know that o'brien and i
3:30:50discussed the matter because he told me
3:30:52that mccord was not cooperating with his
3:30:54lawyer mr ulch
3:30:56o'brien also told me
3:30:58that bittman had planned a cia defense
3:31:01to the case but mccord who initially had
3:31:03been willing to go along later refused
3:31:06o'brien subsequently talked with
3:31:08mitchell about the matter
3:31:10because mitchell called me and informed
3:31:12me that he had discussed the matter with
3:31:13o'brien and mitchell asked me to request
3:31:15that jack caulfield talk with mccord to
3:31:18find out what he was going to do
3:31:20i told mitchell i would ask caulfield to
3:31:22speak with mccord
3:31:24when i later tried to reach caulfield he
3:31:26had gone to california for a drug
3:31:28conference
3:31:29i later informed mitchell that caufield
3:31:31was out of town
3:31:33was on january 10th that i received
3:31:35calls from both o'brien and mitchell
3:31:38indicating that since hunt had been
3:31:40given assurances
3:31:41of clemency
3:31:43and that those assurances were being
3:31:44passed by hunt to others that caufield
3:31:47should give the same assurances to
3:31:48mccord who is becoming an increasing
3:31:51problem and again i was told that
3:31:53mccord's lawyer was having problems with
3:31:56him
3:31:57both o'brien and mitchell felt that
3:31:58mccord might be responsive to an
3:32:00assurance from caufield because hunt
3:32:02bittman and his lawyer alt had lost
3:32:04rapport with him i told mitchell i would
3:32:07do so
3:32:09based on the earlier conversation i'd
3:32:11had with erlichmann on the fifth of
3:32:12january that clemency assurances that
3:32:14have been given to hunt would also apply
3:32:16to the others and coulson's description
3:32:19of how he had given bitten bitten a
3:32:21general assurance without being specific
3:32:23as to the commitment i called caufield
3:32:26later that day to request that he get in
3:32:29touch with mccord
3:32:31caufield told me that it would be a very
3:32:33be very difficult because he was going
3:32:36to be in california for several more
3:32:37days
3:32:38caulfield indicated it would be easier
3:32:40for mr ulassowitz rather than himself to
3:32:42talk with mccord because he was tied up
3:32:45with a lot of people at the drug
3:32:46conference
3:32:47i said fine
3:32:48and then gave him a clemency message
3:32:51similar to the message that coulson had
3:32:52transmitted to hunt the abitment
3:32:55caufield wrote down the gist of the
3:32:57message he repeated his notes back and i
3:32:59said that was fine and told him i
3:33:01thought mccord would be expecting to
3:33:03hear from him as soon as possible
3:33:05caufield said he would have the message
3:33:07delivered right away
3:33:09on january 11th i received a call from
3:33:12o'brien
3:33:13who asked me if the message had been
3:33:14delivered by caufield i told him that it
3:33:17had
3:33:18o'brien told me that mccord wanted to
3:33:20speak with caulfield personally and
3:33:22asked me when caufield could meet with
3:33:24mccord
3:33:25i told him i would try to arrange it
3:33:27o'brien told me that he was going to be
3:33:29out of
3:33:30town but i could reach him if there were
3:33:32any problems he told me he was keeping
3:33:33mitchell posted
3:33:35and requested that i keep him posted
3:33:40o'brien said
3:33:42that we needed a firsthand report her
3:33:45firsthand reading on mccord from someone
3:33:47he will talk with
3:33:48because he's not talking openly with his
3:33:50lawyer about what he plans to do
3:33:53i told o'brien i would call him
3:33:55as soon as i had learned anything
3:33:58i called caufield on january 11th and
3:34:00told him that mccord wanted to meet with
3:34:02him and ask him if he would do so and
3:34:05take mccord's pulse as to what he
3:34:07planned to do he told me he would meet
3:34:10with the court as soon as he returned to
3:34:11washington
3:34:13on friday june 12th mitchell called
3:34:16me for a report i told him that i
3:34:18thought i would hear from caufield after
3:34:20he talked to mccord
3:34:23caufield called me at home friday night
3:34:25to inform me that he had met with mccord
3:34:27and suggested we meet at my office
3:34:30in the morning so that he could give me
3:34:32a report that was a saturday morning
3:34:35i said fine
3:34:36and on saturday morning we met
3:34:38and he gave me a report
3:34:40the and substance of the report was that
3:34:42mccord had decided had not decided what
3:34:44he was going to do
3:34:46but he wanted his freedom
3:34:48kaffiel reported that mccord was very
3:34:50annoyed at magruder he had seen a
3:34:52picture of magruder in the paper which
3:34:54had piqued his annoyance he also told
3:34:56caufield that he had a plan
3:34:58would enable him to get his case
3:34:59dismissed but his lawyers had not helped
3:35:02him with the matter and the government
3:35:03had lied to him
3:35:05he explained that he had made
3:35:07calls to certain foreign embassies that
3:35:10these calls have been recorded but the
3:35:12government would not admit it
3:35:14during this meeting with caulfield i
3:35:16received a call from either john
3:35:17mitchell or paul o'brien requesting a
3:35:20report on the meeting i told the caller
3:35:22i was getting a report from caulfield
3:35:24and would
3:35:26excuse me
3:35:28and would call
3:35:34and would call back
3:35:35coffield told me that mccord was very
3:35:38adamant about his plans to gain his
3:35:40freedom through the phone calls that he
3:35:42had made to the foreign embassies i told
3:35:44caulfield i really did not understand
3:35:46why mccord thought he could get his case
3:35:47dismissed by reason of the wiretaps
3:35:50but i would give
3:35:52i would give the matter some thought
3:35:54caufield told me
3:35:56it was his assessment that mccord would
3:35:58only respond to a direct request from
3:36:00the president
3:36:01i told caufield that i could not make
3:36:03such a statement because i had no such
3:36:05request from the president to suggest
3:36:07that he meet again with mccord and keep
3:36:08him happy by telling him we were
3:36:10checking out the matter and
3:36:13of his conversations with the embassies
3:36:24later that afternoon caufield reported
3:36:26again to me
3:36:27that mccord was only interested in his
3:36:29theory about the calls to the embassies
3:36:32i told caufield to keep in touch with
3:36:34mccord but i couldn't promise anything
3:36:36about his calling the embassies i told
3:36:39caufield to have mccord give him a memo
3:36:42and why he thought this that his calls
3:36:44to the embassies would result in
3:36:46dismissal of his case i called o'brien
3:36:49and told him what it transpired
3:36:51on monday morning i reported to mitchell
3:36:53what caulfield had reported
3:36:55it was sometime during this period
3:36:58that as a result of my reports of
3:37:00caulfield's meetings with mccord that
3:37:02o'brien mitchell and mr ulch discussed
3:37:05having f lee bailey ultra's partner meet
3:37:08with mccord and inform him that he would
3:37:10personally handle his case on appeal
3:37:13mitchell was to talk to mr bailey about
3:37:15this i don't know what happened
3:37:17regarding this proposed plan
3:37:20on january 19th or 20th
3:37:22mr caufield brought me copies of
3:37:24mccord's
3:37:25memos regarding his intercepted
3:37:28conversations to the embassies i have
3:37:30submitted these documents to the
3:37:31committee exhibit number twenty eight i
3:37:34never did anything with these documents
3:37:35other than to inform mitchell that i had
3:37:37received them and i showed them to mr
3:37:39o'brien in my office
3:37:41i do not recall ever talking with anyone
3:37:43at the department of justice regarding
3:37:45mccord's proposal
3:37:47at this time i concluded that mccord was
3:37:49going to do what he thought best for
3:37:51himself
3:37:58on january 4th gordon liddy called mr
3:38:01bud krogh
3:38:03krog's secretary received the call
3:38:06and lydia said that he had received a
3:38:09letter
3:38:10from an investigator for the senate
3:38:11commerce committee about his
3:38:12relationship with kroge this letter was
3:38:15part of an investigation
3:38:17being conducted by the committee staff
3:38:19the commerce committee staff in
3:38:21connection with krog's nomination
3:38:23hearing for under secretary
3:38:25of transportation post should be
3:38:28liddy wished to speak to kroger but the
3:38:31call was not put through to krog
3:38:34krog came to my office
3:38:36and asked what he should do
3:38:37he said he wanted to be able to testify
3:38:39at his confirmation hearing that he had
3:38:41not spoken with liddy since long before
3:38:43the watergate incident i told kroge that
3:38:45his secretary should return the call
3:38:48we then worked out a response which
3:38:50kroger wrote down
3:38:51for his secretary and she returned the
3:38:53call i have submitted to the committee
3:38:55the document prepared by mr krog's
3:38:57secretary after the call was returned to
3:39:00mr liddy exhibit number 29 and i might
3:39:02note that that was not in the exhibits
3:39:05when i assembled them last night but i
3:39:07do know where it is on the table at home
3:39:10on friday
3:39:13take it you'll supply that document
3:39:15later in your testimony yes senator i
3:39:16will thank you very much
3:39:18on friday afternoon
3:39:20january 5th i received a report from
3:39:22o'brien
3:39:23that liddy
3:39:24have been rather miffed and annoyed that
3:39:26kroge had been unwilling to speak with
3:39:28him i reported this to kroger who asked
3:39:30if i
3:39:31would personally see what i could do
3:39:32because kroger felt sorry for liddy but
3:39:34just couldn't talk with him i agreed i
3:39:36would do something on and on saturday
3:39:39january 6 i called liddy from my house
3:39:42at his home it was a brief call which i
3:39:45told him the reason
3:39:46krog had not called and told him that
3:39:49krog had a great sympathy for his plight
3:39:51but he said he understood
3:39:54the only thing i can recall that he's
3:39:55saying to me
3:39:56was that he hoped that there would be
3:39:58some money forthcoming for his lawyers i
3:40:00said i would pass that message along
3:40:02i also expressed sympathy over his
3:40:04situation and the call ended i later
3:40:07reported to kroge that liddy understood
3:40:09why he did not speak with him personally
3:40:12and kroger appreciated
3:40:18now i'm going to turn to
3:40:19the receiving of or retrieving of
3:40:22certain cia materials from the
3:40:24department of justice in connection with
3:40:25the investigation
3:40:27as a result of a conversation i had had
3:40:30with erlaquin
3:40:31i was asked to attempt to have the cia
3:40:34retrieve from the department of justice
3:40:36information relating to hunt's dealings
3:40:38with the cia
3:40:40to understand erlickman's request i must
3:40:43provide some background
3:40:45during the course of the watergate
3:40:47investigation the prosecutors had
3:40:49requested material from the cia
3:40:52and because of the fact this material
3:40:53related to the white house the cia had
3:40:55informed the white house of the request
3:40:58the first incident when this came up was
3:41:00regarding the fact of who had made the
3:41:03initial request to the cia to assist
3:41:06hunt
3:41:08general cushman had been the deputy
3:41:09director of the cia at the time the
3:41:12matter occurred and when he was asked he
3:41:14reported that he had been requested from
3:41:16john ehrlichman
3:41:18when ehrlichman was informed of this i
3:41:19believe by general cushman he denied the
3:41:22fact
3:41:23that he had ever made such a request and
3:41:25requested the cushman
3:41:32this is incorrect in the texture and
3:41:34told cushman that he had never asked for
3:41:36such assistance
3:41:38subsequently general cushman prepared a
3:41:40memorandum that indicated that the
3:41:43request had come from either erlichman
3:41:44coulson or myself
3:41:47erlichman forwarded a copy of this
3:41:48document to me and asked if i would get
3:41:50the matter taken care of i told him i
3:41:52thought it was somewhat strange that my
3:41:54name was on the memorandum from cushman
3:41:56and i had never spoken with cushman in
3:41:57my life
3:41:59he then asked me
3:42:00if i did not think it would be better
3:42:02that cushman mentioned no one since he
3:42:04couldn't remember who it was
3:42:06i remember suspecting at this time as i
3:42:08do today that erlichmann had my name
3:42:10inserted in the memorandum
3:42:12memorandum as a means of getting me to
3:42:13make sure that cushman would have no
3:42:15names in the memorandum at all
3:42:17i remember calling general cushman and
3:42:19telling him that i had received from
3:42:21ehrlichman a copy of his memorandum and
3:42:23that i was somewhat surprised to find my
3:42:25name in it
3:42:27because this was the first time i'd ever
3:42:29spoken with him he agreed that we had
3:42:31never talked and i said that ehrlichman
3:42:34had suggested to me that if he could not
3:42:36remember who it was that he cushman
3:42:38probably should not mention anyone
3:42:40a short time later
3:42:42another memorandum on the subject of who
3:42:44had asked for hunt to have the
3:42:45assistance of the cia came forward from
3:42:47general cushman and this time no names
3:42:49were mentioned at all was after this
3:42:52episode in getting the cushman statement
3:42:54corrected that i had occasion to discuss
3:42:56this with colson
3:42:58coulson told me that he had been present
3:42:59when erlickman had made the call to
3:43:01cushman
3:43:03the other cia material relating to
3:43:05hunt's dealings
3:43:06with the cia emanated from a series of
3:43:09questions that have been asked by the
3:43:11watergate prosecutors
3:43:12i recall the discussion with cia
3:43:15director helms and one of his deputies
3:43:17in erlichman's office when they went
3:43:18over the types of materials that they
3:43:20would be providing to the department of
3:43:22justice
3:43:24i subsequently had occasion while at the
3:43:26department of justice to talk with henry
3:43:27peterson about the cia material and he
3:43:29showed me a copy of the information the
3:43:31cia provided him
3:43:33and he told me mr gray had the same
3:43:35material remember that the documents had
3:43:37attached to it a number of photographs
3:43:39which had come from a camera
3:43:42uh the pictures uh
3:43:44again our text has gotten confused here
3:43:47come from a camera the pictures which
3:43:49had been processed by the cia
3:43:52let me explain this come from a camera
3:43:54which had been returned by hunt
3:43:56to the cia is a camera that had been
3:43:59borrowed by hunt from the i a
3:44:02the pictures which have been processed
3:44:03by the c i a include a picture of lydie
3:44:06standing in front of ellsberg's
3:44:08psychiatrist office
3:44:10i informed erlickman about this
3:44:12and that the reason
3:44:14that he subsequently requested that i
3:44:16seek to retrieve the documents before
3:44:18the senate investigators got a copy of
3:44:20the material
3:44:21i discussed this with peterson
3:44:24but he said that he had received a
3:44:25letter in early january of this year
3:44:27from senator mansfield regarding the
3:44:28maintenance of all records like relating
3:44:30to the case
3:44:31that the only thing that he could do
3:44:33would be to extract the document and
3:44:35leave a card to the effect that the
3:44:37document had been returned to the cia
3:44:40i reported this to erlichmann and he
3:44:41told me that he thought the cia ought to
3:44:43get all of the material back and that no
3:44:46card should be left in the file and the
3:44:47national security ground should be used
3:44:49to withhold release of the information
3:44:52on february 9 1973 i spoke with director
3:44:55schlesinger of the cia
3:44:57and ask him if he would if it would be
3:44:59possible to retrieve the material that
3:45:00had been sent to the department of
3:45:02justice in connection with the watergate
3:45:03investigation
3:45:05i told him that i discussed this with
3:45:06the department of justice and they
3:45:08indicated that they would
3:45:10merely leave a card in their files
3:45:12indicating that the material had been
3:45:13returned to the cia
3:45:16i subsequently had a visit from general
3:45:18walters in late february
3:45:20at which time he told me that the cia
3:45:22was opposed
3:45:24to retrieving the material and leaving a
3:45:25card indicating they had so retrieved it
3:45:28because they also have been requested by
3:45:30the senate not to destroy any material
3:45:33relating to the case
3:45:35i told walters that i did not suggest
3:45:36that the material be destroyed rather i
3:45:38thought that national security grounds
3:45:40might justify withholding release of the
3:45:42information to the senate investigators
3:45:44he said it simply could not be done and
3:45:46i dropped the matter
3:45:47as all as i will explain later in a
3:45:50meeting with bud kroger
3:45:52this fact the fact that this material
3:45:54was in the possession of the
3:45:55department's justice
3:45:56meant to me
3:45:57that it was inevitable that the burglary
3:46:00of ellsberg's psychiatrist's office
3:46:01would be discovered i felt that any
3:46:03investigator worth his salt would
3:46:05certainly be able to look at the
3:46:06pictures in the files the department of
3:46:09justice and immediately determine the
3:46:11location
3:46:12and from
3:46:13there discover the fact that there had
3:46:15been a burglary of the office that was
3:46:17in the picture
3:46:21i would now like to turn to
3:46:24the white house plans for dealing with
3:46:26this committee
3:46:30even before
3:46:31the watergate criminal trial in january
3:46:34of this year
3:46:35there have been press reports and rumors
3:46:37that the senate
3:46:39planned independent hearings on the
3:46:40watergate and related matters
3:46:43the white house congressional relations
3:46:44staff reported that the subject of the
3:46:46watergate hearings was being discussed
3:46:48in the senate democratic policy
3:46:50committee but they did not know the
3:46:52substance of those discussions
3:46:55i was aware of the interest of erlickman
3:46:56and holloman in the prospects of such
3:46:58hearings because they had discussed it
3:47:00with me and bill timmons told me they
3:47:02had discussed it with him on december 13
3:47:051972 timmons informed me that senator
3:47:08jackson
3:47:09was coming to the white house for a
3:47:10meeting with the president
3:47:12timon said that senator jackson was
3:47:14meeting
3:47:15with a member of the senate democratic
3:47:16policy committee and had had an
3:47:18excellent rapport with the president
3:47:21timmons asked me what i thought about
3:47:23having the president inquire of senator
3:47:25jackson regarding the potential of a
3:47:27senate inquiry into the watergate
3:47:29i responded that i thought it was a good
3:47:31idea but i would have to check
3:47:33timmons said that the meeting with
3:47:34senator jackson was going to be without
3:47:36staff present and asked me to draft a
3:47:38memorandum to the president raising the
3:47:40issue i told him i would check with
3:47:42haldeman
3:47:43i prepared a memorandum for the
3:47:45president and went to holloman's office
3:47:47but he was not there
3:47:49he was in the president's office with
3:47:50miss ann armstrong who was discussing
3:47:52with the president joining the white
3:47:54house staff
3:47:56a meeting had been scheduled in mr
3:47:57ehrlichman's office at which mr
3:47:59ehrlichman moore ziegler and i were to
3:48:01attend
3:48:03when erlingman came to holloman's office
3:48:04for the meeting i raised the matter
3:48:07of the president's asking senator
3:48:09jackson about the hearings because i did
3:48:10not have authority to send memoranda
3:48:13directly to the president
3:48:15ehrlichman thought it was a good idea so
3:48:17i walked the memorandum down to alex
3:48:19butterfield to take to the president
3:48:21before the meeting
3:48:22i have submitted to the committee
3:48:24exhibit number 30 a copy of the
3:48:25memorandum
3:48:27when holloman returned to his office
3:48:29with mrs armstrong erlichman and i were
3:48:31there in his office waiting but he asked
3:48:33us to leave and to proceed with the
3:48:35meeting in ziegler's office where
3:48:36maureen ziegler were waiting
3:48:38i referred earlier to the substance of
3:48:40the meeting on december 13th in
3:48:41discussing the proposed written dean
3:48:43report
3:48:44erlichman returned to his office and
3:48:46holliman later came to the meeting and
3:48:48told me that he had blocked the
3:48:50memorandum regarding the watergate
3:48:51inquiry from going to the president
3:48:53he in fact had the original memorandum
3:48:55with him and had drawn a line through it
3:48:58i told him that timmons had suggested it
3:49:00and that ehrlichman had also approved it
3:49:02he said he had not known that
3:49:04and made a notation on the memorandum to
3:49:06the president and immediately
3:49:08sent it back to butterfield to give to
3:49:10the president
3:49:21i learned that day from timmins who
3:49:24later met with senator jackson that the
3:49:26senator did not know what the democratic
3:49:28senate democratic policy committee was
3:49:29going to do about the watergate i do not
3:49:31know if the president discussed this
3:49:33subject with senator jackson
3:49:35timmons continued to report to haldeman
3:49:37and me that there were rumblings on the
3:49:39hill that the senate was going to
3:49:41proceed with hearings
3:49:42senator kennedy's subcommittee on
3:49:44administrative practices and procedures
3:49:46have been conducting an investigation
3:49:48for several months
3:49:49but it was uncertain as to whether they
3:49:51would proceed
3:49:53it was learned in late december early
3:49:55january that senator mansfield
3:49:57was pushing hard for watergate hearings
3:50:00but there was a debate as to who should
3:50:02handle the hearings
3:50:03on january 5th or 6th
3:50:05it was reported that the in the press
3:50:07that senator mansfield had sent a letter
3:50:09to senator eastland and senator irvin
3:50:12regarding the holding of hearings
3:50:14before that letter became public however
3:50:17both wally johnson and fred larue had
3:50:19informed me that they had talked with
3:50:21senator eastland the white house wanted
3:50:23senator easton to hold such hearings
3:50:25because they felt that senator eason
3:50:27would be friendly that the white house
3:50:29had more friends on the judiciary
3:50:30committee than on senator irvine's
3:50:32government operations committee
3:50:35i was told that the white house
3:50:36congressional relations staff was doing
3:50:38what it could to get the hearings before
3:50:40senator eastland's committee
3:50:42on january 11th of this year the senate
3:50:44democrats formally voted the senator
3:50:47urban would head the the inquiry into
3:50:49the watergate incident in related
3:50:51matters and i must add much to the
3:50:53displeasure of the white house
3:50:56on february 5th 1973 the chairman
3:50:59introduced his resolution to create this
3:51:01committee
3:51:02an advanced copy of that resolution was
3:51:04forwarded to me by timmins and i
3:51:06subsequently request
3:51:09i was subsequently requested to attend a
3:51:11luncheon
3:51:12meeting with erlichmann timmons and
3:51:15johnson to discuss the resolution
3:51:17erlichman was tied up in another meeting
3:51:19and never attended i was asked what i
3:51:21thought about the resolution and did i
3:51:23have any suggested amendments to the
3:51:25that the republicans might offer
3:51:27i had not had an opportunity to start to
3:51:30study the resolution closely so i reread
3:51:32it and offered a few suggestions off the
3:51:34top of my head
3:51:35did it be broadened to cover other
3:51:37elections in the 1972 presidential
3:51:39campaign that the minority members have
3:51:42adequate staff that it be a bipartisan
3:51:44with equal representation of the
3:51:46republicans and the democrats and that
3:51:47the minority members have the power to
3:51:49call for an executive session when they
3:51:52believed it necessary
3:51:53wally johnson indicated that he would
3:51:55get someone at the department of justice
3:51:57to draft amendments and that he and
3:52:00timmins would peddle them to friendly
3:52:01republicans
3:52:03i later had discussions with holloman
3:52:05and erlickman about the senate hearings
3:52:08and they felt it was time to develop a
3:52:09strategy for dealing with the senate
3:52:11situation
3:52:12i received what i interpreted as mild
3:52:14criticism that i wasn't getting the
3:52:16white house prepared for the forthcoming
3:52:18hearings and it was recognized that we
3:52:20were fast moving into an uncontrollable
3:52:22if not hostile form
3:52:25we had made it through the trial without
3:52:26any problems but the senate hearings
3:52:28were a new and possibly larger problem
3:52:32accordingly i suggested there be a
3:52:33meeting called where these matters could
3:52:36be discussed
3:52:37i also suggested that we call on mr
3:52:40bryce harlow
3:52:41ehrlichman holloman and mitchell all
3:52:43agreed that harlow's counsel would be
3:52:45most helpful
3:52:46accordingly i had my secretary schedule
3:52:48a meeting in ehrlichman's office on
3:52:49february 6 1973.
3:52:52i recall that it was a at some hardship
3:52:55that mr harlow attended and that he was
3:52:57to fly to arizona that day but i
3:52:59explained to him that my superiors were
3:53:01anxious to focus on the problem and
3:53:02wanted his advice
3:53:05prior to this meeting but after my
3:53:07meeting with the president in september
3:53:09when he had mentioned to me that mr
3:53:11hoover
3:53:12had told him
3:53:14that he the president had been
3:53:16bugged during his 1968 campaign
3:53:19the thought of getting this information
3:53:21had out had been discussed
3:53:34i recall discussing it with erlichmann
3:53:36and holloman and in turn discussing with
3:53:37mitchell
3:53:38holloman and erlickman wanted mitchell
3:53:40to get information from deloach
3:53:43i so informed mitchell
3:53:45mr mitchell informed me that he was
3:53:47trying to get the facts regarding the
3:53:48bugging from mr deloach whom he believed
3:53:51would have known if it had in fact
3:53:54happened
3:53:56mitchell had talked to deloach prior to
3:53:58the february 6 meeting and received some
3:54:00information but not much
3:54:02the meeting assembled in erlichman's
3:54:04office
3:54:06mitchell was late in arriving because of
3:54:07the delayed flight from new york
3:54:09those present
3:54:11were erlichman holloman finally mitchell
3:54:13harlow
3:54:14moore and myself
3:54:16when mitchell arrived he reported that
3:54:19there had been some surveillance by the
3:54:21johnson administration but deloach was
3:54:23unaware of a bugging or wiretap
3:54:26i remember that he i told harlow that i
3:54:29thought he had been recorded when he was
3:54:30traveling with the vice president in
3:54:321968
3:54:33i based this on a conversation i'd had
3:54:36with mitchell earlier
3:54:37the surveillance that deloach reported
3:54:40to mitchell was related to mrs anna
3:54:42chennault in a foreign embassy
3:54:45also
3:54:46the telephone toll records from the vice
3:54:48presidential candidate ag news
3:54:51airplane when he had stopped in
3:54:52albuquerque new mexico had been checked
3:54:54by the fbi
3:54:57the meeting then turned to a general
3:54:59discussion of the proposed amendments
3:55:01and timmons was called from the
3:55:03congressional leadership meeting that
3:55:04was then in session in the cabinet room
3:55:07timmons reported that the senate was
3:55:10going to begin debate on senator urban's
3:55:12resolution that afternoon
3:55:14timmons was instructed to request
3:55:16senator scott
3:55:17to come to his office after the
3:55:19leadership meeting and i was instructed
3:55:21to go to mr timmon's office to explain
3:55:23the amendments to the resolution to
3:55:25senator scott
3:55:27i was also told that i should tell
3:55:29senator the senator senator scott to
3:55:31raise the 1968 bugging incident as a
3:55:34reason to explain her reason to expand
3:55:37the scope of the resolution prior to the
3:55:38presidential elections
3:55:43with reference to prior presidential
3:55:44elections
3:55:46i left to brief senator scott
3:55:49with the feeling that the meeting had
3:55:50accomplished nothing i went to timmins
3:55:52office had a brief meeting with senator
3:55:54scott
3:55:54and as i was returning to my office i
3:55:56ran into dick moore who told me that he
3:55:59felt the meeting had been useless i
3:56:00agree
3:56:02on february 7th timmons informed me that
3:56:04the white house amendments have been
3:56:05virtually rejected out of hand and the
3:56:07resolution adopted 77 to nothing
3:56:10timmons told me that he had discussed
3:56:12with holloman the possibilities of
3:56:14suggesting names
3:56:16for the republican side of the select
3:56:17committee with senator scott
3:56:19and scott seemed receptive
3:56:22on february eighth the members of this
3:56:23committee were named and as i recall
3:56:26timmins telling me that holloman had
3:56:28chewed him out but timmons told told me
3:56:31that scott had never given him a chance
3:56:33to make any recommendations
3:56:36on february 9th i had planned to go to
3:56:38florida
3:56:39for a week to 10 days
3:56:41the president had departed for san
3:56:43clemente and it appeared that everyone
3:56:45could relax for a while
3:56:47in mid-afternoon however my plans were
3:56:49changed
3:56:51when i received a call from erlichmann
3:56:52in san clemente telling me that he
3:56:54wanted mr moore and me to come to
3:56:56california that night so that we could
3:56:59discuss in full detail the problems of
3:57:01how to deal with the forthcoming senate
3:57:03hearings
3:57:04ehrlichman indicated that he and
3:57:06haldeman were going to have some
3:57:08available time over the weekend so we
3:57:10should come immediately
3:57:11i contacted mr moore who was about to
3:57:13take a train trip to southern virginia
3:57:15with his young son and wife
3:57:17moore said that since he was packed he
3:57:19would merely fly west instead of
3:57:20training saul south
3:57:23my wife and i
3:57:24and the moors all flew to san diego on
3:57:26the evening of the 9th of february
3:57:32everyone was staying at the la costa
3:57:34resort hotel south of san clemente the
3:57:37meetings with holloman and erlichmann
3:57:39moore and myself ran for two days
3:57:42and i would estimate they involved
3:57:44between 12 to 14 hours of discussion the
3:57:48meetings began on saturday morning
3:57:50february 10th at san clemente
3:57:52but the discussions did not begin to
3:57:54take any focus until saturday afternoon
3:57:57and sunday when we met at hollomansville
3:57:59at la costa
3:58:01based on the notes i took during the
3:58:03meeting i will attempt to reconstruct
3:58:04what transpired
3:58:06i should also point out that before i
3:58:09departed san clemente to return to
3:58:11lacoste i was given several memoranda
3:58:14which i have submitted to the committee
3:58:16exhibit number 31 which directly relate
3:58:18to what occurred at la costa
3:58:21i did not look at the his memorandum
3:58:23until several days after the meeting was
3:58:25rather surprised that holderman would
3:58:27state in writing specific instructions
3:58:29to me regarding his thoughts on
3:58:31perpetuating the watergate tactics or
3:58:32the cover-up by a counter-offensive
3:58:34against the forthcoming senate hearings
3:58:37what had happened by this point in time
3:58:39was that the cover-up had become a way
3:58:40of life in the white house
3:58:42and having made it to this point those
3:58:44involved were becoming careless and more
3:58:46open about it also the senate was
3:58:48different than the courts the grand jury
3:58:50the fbi and the like in that that had
3:58:53been dealt with earlier
3:59:04before turning to the substance of the
3:59:06lacosta meeting
3:59:07i would like to note
3:59:09that mr moore and i had talked on many
3:59:11occasions about the watergate affair and
3:59:12the damage it was doing
3:59:15mr moore is the only person
3:59:17other than mr o'brien on a few occasions
3:59:20to whom i ever expressed my deep concern
3:59:22about the matter particularly the
3:59:23cover-up
3:59:24while moore did not know all the facts
3:59:26he knew a great deal and was becoming
3:59:28increasingly aware of the dimensions of
3:59:30the problem
3:59:31i talked to more far differently than
3:59:33anyone else
3:59:34i talked to him about how we could end
3:59:36this matter once and for all
3:59:38i expressed my concern to him often
3:59:40about how to end the matter before it
3:59:42ruined the second term of the president
3:59:44i was concerned it was not going to
3:59:46simply go away
3:59:48and i had learned that
3:59:50that the press was becoming aware of
3:59:51other illegal activities at the white
3:59:53house i never discussed these other
3:59:55matters with more but i told him that
3:59:57the cover-up was bigger than the
3:59:58watergate incident per se
4:00:00the more that we talked about it the
4:00:02less we could find a solution so the
4:00:04cover-up proceeded
4:00:06as i have indicated the purpose
4:00:09of what i call the lacosta meetings was
4:00:11how to deal
4:00:12with this committee's investigation of
4:00:14the watergate
4:00:15the watergate trial was over
4:00:17and that problem appeared to be over the
4:00:19next major problem was the senate
4:00:20hearings was realized
4:00:23it was going to take an all-out effort
4:00:24by the white house to deal with the
4:00:26senate inquiry because of the scope of
4:00:28the resolution
4:00:29the composition of the committee the
4:00:31investigative powers of the committee
4:00:33and the general feeling that the senate
4:00:34was a hostile world for the white house
4:00:37holloman and erlichman were disappointed
4:00:40that the efforts to influence the senate
4:00:42resolution creating the select committee
4:00:43had failed as well as the white house
4:00:45efforts to recommend members to the
4:00:47select committee
4:00:49thus the focus of the discussion was how
4:00:51to deal with a committee henceforth
4:00:54it was during
4:00:55the morning meeting in ehrlichman's
4:00:57office in san clemente there was a
4:00:59discussion of the members
4:01:01of this committee
4:01:02erlickman said that the white house
4:01:04could not look for any help from the
4:01:05democrats
4:01:07i recall that when we were discussing
4:01:08the democratic members of this committee
4:01:10and i read from the congressional
4:01:12directory the data on senator anaya
4:01:15erlichman said that his name is
4:01:17pronounced ain't no way
4:01:20and i said indeed and then said indeed
4:01:23there ain't no way he's going to give us
4:01:25anything but problems
4:01:27the republican members of this committee
4:01:33[Music]
4:01:36the republican members of this committee
4:01:38were also discussed in that morning
4:01:39meeting
4:01:40it was ehrlichman who was doing most of
4:01:42the assessing but occasionally holloman
4:01:44would also add a comment senator weiker
4:01:46was an independent
4:01:48who would give
4:01:49the white house problems
4:01:51senator gurney would help the white
4:01:53house and would not have to be told to
4:01:55do so
4:01:56i recall that ehrlichman
4:01:58said that senator gurney needs the white
4:01:59house because former congressman cramer
4:02:01may take him on in the next primary
4:02:04senator gurney was considered a sure
4:02:05friend and a protector of the
4:02:07president's interest
4:02:08senator baker was an unknown and neither
4:02:10holloman or ehrlichman knew which way he
4:02:12might go
4:02:13[Music]
4:02:16please please the artists will please
4:02:18refrain from
4:02:20demonstrating them
4:02:22and respect the testimony
4:02:29i might add that in subsequent
4:02:31discussions i had with the president he
4:02:33also reached a similar conclusion
4:02:35regarding the republicans
4:02:36he thought that senator baker might help
4:02:39but he was not sure he was confident
4:02:40however that senator gurney would
4:02:42protect the white house and would do so
4:02:44out of political instinct and not have
4:02:46to be persuaded to do so
4:02:47the long and short of this morning
4:02:49discussion was that the white house had
4:02:51one friend senator gurney and the
4:02:53possibility of wooing and winning
4:02:55another
4:02:57later after the meeting had reconvened
4:03:00at la costa
4:03:01the discussion turned to a general
4:03:03approach about how to deal with the
4:03:04select committee
4:03:06ehrlichman suggested that it would be it
4:03:08should be publicly
4:03:09analogized to the itt hearings that is
4:03:13the hearings were a waste of time to the
4:03:15senate they were very partisan and
4:03:17ultimately repudiated by the senate and
4:03:19clint east was confirmed
4:03:21after a general discussion ehrlichman
4:03:24holderman concluded that the theory for
4:03:26dealing with this committee should be as
4:03:28follows
4:03:29the white house will take a public
4:03:31posture of full cooperation
4:03:33but privately will attempt to restrain
4:03:35the investigation and make it as
4:03:37difficult as possible to get information
4:03:39and witnesses
4:03:41a behind the scenes media effort would
4:03:42be made to make the senate inquiry
4:03:44appear very partisan
4:03:46the ultimate goal would be to discredit
4:03:48the hearings and reduce their impact by
4:03:51attempting to show the democrats have
4:03:52engaged in the same types of activities
4:03:56during the meeting on saturday afternoon
4:03:58february 11th ehrlichman instructed me
4:04:01to call wally johnson and tell johnson
4:04:03that he was going to visit with senator
4:04:05baker during the then congressional
4:04:07recess
4:04:08to find out how senator the senator
4:04:10planned to operate that is was he going
4:04:13to be friend or foe
4:04:14and asked senator baker how the white
4:04:17house could aid him particularly
4:04:18regarding the selection of the minority
4:04:20council
4:04:22prior to making the call
4:04:24i asked erlichmann
4:04:26if i should
4:04:28arrange to give johnson some kind of
4:04:30briefing before he went to see senator
4:04:31baker so that he would know
4:04:33fact from fiction when talking to the
4:04:35senator
4:04:36about the watergate
4:04:38herlicman said that was not necessary
4:04:41i called mr johnson while the
4:04:42discussions proceeded
4:04:44and passed the message to him he said he
4:04:47would proceed immediately
4:04:48at one point in the meeting erlichman
4:04:50raised the question
4:04:51of whether or not the select committee
4:04:53was going to be able to obtain the grand
4:04:55jury minutes and other investigative
4:04:56reports from the fbi and the us
4:04:58attorney's office
4:05:01i said i did not know
4:05:03and then a discussion of the possible
4:05:05legal options ensued
4:05:07no one really knew what the law might be
4:05:09regarding this matter but ehrlichman
4:05:11stated that the attorney general will
4:05:12have to be told that the justice
4:05:14department should resist turning over
4:05:16such records that i should get word back
4:05:18to the attorneys for the defendants that
4:05:20they should fight the release of these
4:05:22investigative records to the senate on
4:05:24the grounds that would have an adverse
4:05:25impact on their appeals
4:05:28when discussing how to handle the press
4:05:30coverage of the senate hearings holloman
4:05:32suggested that pat buchanan be used as a
4:05:34watchdog of the press mr buchanan could
4:05:37be could repair speeches on the bias
4:05:40press coverage he could write op-ed
4:05:42articles and actually attend the
4:05:44hearings and be a white house spokesman
4:05:47to take the pressure off of ziegler's
4:05:48daily briefings
4:05:50he was decided by alderman and
4:05:52erlichmann that mr baruti's white house
4:05:54attack group a group of media-oriented
4:05:56white house aides who meet virtually
4:05:58every morning to determine how to
4:05:59counter adverse news or push white house
4:06:02programs should not be involved
4:06:05there was also discussion during the la
4:06:07costa meeting of the role of the
4:06:08re-election committee
4:06:10the role they would play during the
4:06:12senate hearings was decided that the
4:06:14re-election committee should have knew a
4:06:16new titular head
4:06:18several names were suggested and
4:06:19rejected and the matter was left
4:06:21unresolved
4:06:22however it was decided that the
4:06:24re-election committee should beef up
4:06:26its legal and public relations staff
4:06:29follow brian and ken parkinson should be
4:06:31given additional legal staff they wished
4:06:34as they would be responsible for handing
4:06:37witnesses from the committee who would
4:06:38be called to the hill to testify
4:06:41mr van sumway
4:06:43who had been handling press relations
4:06:44for the re-election committee would be
4:06:46asked to remain on and provide
4:06:49provided with any additional staff he
4:06:50needed
4:06:52mr moore would have general oversight
4:06:55over mr shemway's operation
4:07:03at one point holloman suggested that the
4:07:05re-election committee hire private
4:07:06investigators to dig out information
4:07:08about the democratic campaigns
4:07:10i raised the wisdom of this because i
4:07:12thought it would be more political
4:07:14surveillance the matter was left
4:07:15unresolved
4:07:16there was a lengthy discussion of the
4:07:18importance of the minority council
4:07:21mr mueller related back to some episodes
4:07:23during the mccarthy hearings
4:07:26both ehrlichman and holliman felt very
4:07:27strongly about having a man as minority
4:07:30council who would work with the white
4:07:31house
4:07:32a number of suggestions were made and
4:07:34discussed ehrlichman thought that mr
4:07:35fred buzzhard would be an excellent
4:07:37choice
4:07:38i i was asked to come up with some names
4:07:40for consideration as soon as possible
4:07:42report back
4:07:44was toward the end of the meeting on
4:07:46sunday afternoon february 11th
4:07:49ehrlichman raised the bottom line
4:07:51question
4:07:52would the seven watergate defendants
4:07:54remain silent through the senate
4:07:55hearings
4:07:57i say this was the bottom line question
4:08:00because the entire strategy was based on
4:08:02this continued silence
4:08:05i reported that i could not answer the
4:08:07question because i did not know
4:08:09i said that i understood
4:08:11that they were still demanding more
4:08:12money but we had this but as we had
4:08:15discussed previously there was no money
4:08:17available
4:08:19i told both holdemon and erlickman that
4:08:21i had carried their messages to mitchell
4:08:24and that
4:08:25this is something that he
4:08:27that they would have to take care of
4:08:30i think our transcript here got confused
4:08:32again this was something that he should
4:08:34take care of he mitchell
4:08:36but that
4:08:38they were aware of mitchell's feelings
4:08:39that this was something the white house
4:08:41should be concerned about
4:08:42i said that as far as i was concerned
4:08:45that they would have to take this up
4:08:46with mitchell themselves and the
4:08:48mitchell felt it was a matter for the
4:08:50white house at that point erlichmann
4:08:52told mr moore
4:08:54who was hearing all of this for the
4:08:55first time that he more should go to
4:08:58mitchell and simply lay it out that it
4:09:00was mitchell's responsibility to raise
4:09:02the necessary funds for these men
4:09:04it had been decided at the outset of the
4:09:06first day of the meetings that moore
4:09:09would go to new york and report to
4:09:11mitchell on what had been resolved
4:09:13regarding the senate hearings and now
4:09:16erlichmann was telling moore that an
4:09:17important element of his visit with
4:09:19mitchell would be for him to get
4:09:21mitchell to raise the necessary future
4:09:24funds for the seven watergate
4:09:26defendants the meeting concluded on this
4:09:29item and more and i departed together
4:09:32i told him as we walked back to our
4:09:34rooms that i was very distressed that
4:09:36this had come up
4:09:37in his presence
4:09:39but he now had some very real idea of
4:09:41the dimensions of the situation
4:09:43i told him i did not think that he
4:09:45should get involved in carrying such a
4:09:46message to mitchell
4:09:48moore was concerned but felt that he had
4:09:49an obligation to do what erlickman and
4:09:51holliman expected of him but he did not
4:09:53understand why they thought that he
4:09:55could change mitchell's mind
4:09:57shortly after moore and i departed i
4:09:59went to los angeles to join my wife
4:10:01at her mother's home and we left for
4:10:03florida the next morning february 12th
4:10:14while in florida i received calls from
4:10:16higbee moore johnson and others
4:10:18following up on matters that have been
4:10:19set in motion at the la costa meeting
4:10:22on february 13th i received a call from
4:10:25wally johnson who informed me that he
4:10:27had talked to senator baker by telephone
4:10:29he told me that he had informed senator
4:10:31baker that he would serve as the white
4:10:33house liaison to the select committee
4:10:36johnson reported that senator baker had
4:10:37told him that a personal visit was not
4:10:39necessary that they could talk when he
4:10:41returned to washington from tennessee
4:10:44johnson said that he had discussed the
4:10:46minority council position with senator
4:10:47baker and at the center said that he did
4:10:49not want any official input from the
4:10:51white house and already given some
4:10:53thoughts to the qualifications he was
4:10:54seeking in his minority council
4:10:56johnson reported that the senator had 50
4:10:59names already under consideration and
4:11:01planned to make his selection within the
4:11:02next few days
4:11:04johnson told me that he did not think
4:11:06that senator baker had ruled out a white
4:11:07house
4:11:08ruled out the white house making some
4:11:10suggestions
4:11:11but we would have to move quickly
4:11:14mr johnson also reported that senator
4:11:16baker had told him that the white house
4:11:19should be concerned about the
4:11:20president's posture vis-a-vis the senate
4:11:22inquiry
4:11:23finally he reported that senator baker
4:11:24in in had indicated that he
4:11:27and the chairman would be getting
4:11:29together after the recess and would
4:11:30discuss staffing and procedural matters
4:11:32at that time
4:11:33i passed this report to holdemon via mr
4:11:36higby
4:11:37on the 14th
4:11:38of february paul o'brien came to visit
4:11:41me in florida
4:11:42he arrived in the evening and we went
4:11:44out to dinner nothing no substance was
4:11:46discussed that evening other than some
4:11:48hand-wringing
4:11:49over the general situation
4:11:52o'brien
4:11:54came to florida to get a report from me
4:11:56on what had occurred at the costa
4:11:57meeting he told me that mitchell wanted
4:12:00him o'brien to get my version of the
4:12:03meeting as well as the report he was
4:12:04getting from mr moore
4:12:07on february 15th after a late breakfast
4:12:09o'brien and i took about a two hour walk
4:12:11down down the beach
4:12:13at which time i told him what had
4:12:16occurred at la costa i told him that
4:12:18moore had been dispatched to new york by
4:12:20holloman and erlickman to tell mitchell
4:12:21it was his responsibility to raise the
4:12:23future money for the convicted
4:12:25defendants
4:12:26o'brien's reaction
4:12:28as he was well aware of mitchell's
4:12:29feelings that this was holloman and
4:12:31erlichman's problem and not his
4:12:33was that mitchell would probably go
4:12:35through the roof
4:12:36after returning from our walk we talked
4:12:38about the fact that i have been
4:12:39requested to suggest the names
4:12:42for minority council
4:12:44it was during this conversation i
4:12:46thought of martin hoffman who i knew to
4:12:49be a very capable lawyer and then
4:12:50serving as general counsel of the atomic
4:12:52energy commission
4:12:53and a person who had worked on the hill
4:12:55i called mr hoffman and asked him if he
4:12:57was interested
4:12:58he said he was but he didn't know if
4:12:59senator baker would be because they'd
4:13:01had some differences of opinion over a
4:13:02matter of the atomic energy commission
4:13:06he said however that he had done some
4:13:08work for senator baker in the past and
4:13:10liked him very much i then called her
4:13:12lichtman
4:13:14and he agreed that mr hoffman would be a
4:13:15good choice
4:13:17next i called haldeman and he said okay
4:13:19if if erlichman says okay
4:13:21during my conversation with holloman he
4:13:23told me that he had learned
4:13:25that the chief counsel's job had been
4:13:27offered to mr kenneth keating and mr
4:13:29keating had sent a feeler to the white
4:13:31house as to whether he should be
4:13:33interested holland asked me to think
4:13:35about it
4:13:36after talking with erlichmann and
4:13:38holloman about mr hoffman i called
4:13:40timmons and johnson
4:13:42and asked them to float mr hoffman's
4:13:43name to senator baker
4:13:46mr timmons called me back later and said
4:13:49that it wouldn't float because the
4:13:50senator had indicated he still had some
4:13:52problems mr hoffman or he had had some
4:13:54problems with mr hoffman and chairman
4:13:55schlesinger over an aec matter
4:13:58he liked kaufman but said he was still
4:14:00miffed at him
4:14:02later that day i called mr moore
4:14:04but learned that he had gone to new york
4:14:06to see mitchell i talked with moore
4:14:08earlier that week but had forgotten he
4:14:10was going to new york on the 15th
4:14:12paul o'brien called mitchell in the
4:14:14mid-afternoon to report our conversation
4:14:17i was in and out of the room while he
4:14:19was on a telephone
4:14:20talking to mitchell as i didn't feel it
4:14:22was my business listening to his
4:14:23conversation
4:14:25i talked briefly with mitchell at the
4:14:26end of the conversation he had had with
4:14:28o'brien we talked about the possibility
4:14:30of mr keating as chief counsel mr
4:14:32mitchell seemed intrigued by the idea
4:14:34but doubted if mr keating would accept
4:14:36after i hung up o'brien reported that mr
4:14:39moore had brought up
4:14:41the money-raising matter but mitchell
4:14:43just didn't discuss it at any length
4:14:45with more
4:14:46o'brien departed from florida late that
4:14:47afternoon and my wife and i got away
4:14:49from the telephone for the next three
4:14:50days
4:14:52i returned to the office on monday
4:14:54february 19th and spoke with holloman
4:14:58on either the 19th or the 20th
4:15:01he requested i draw up an agenda for a
4:15:04meeting with the president regarding
4:15:05matters which the president should
4:15:07reflect on as a result of the la costa
4:15:09meeting and subsequent matters which had
4:15:11come up
4:15:13mr holliman and i went over the high
4:15:15points of what should be raised
4:15:16including the items that had not come up
4:15:18with uh at la costa such as
4:15:21magruder's desire to return to the white
4:15:23house staff and sending mr stands to the
4:15:26senate for a confirmable post as a
4:15:28tactic to counter the watergate hearings
4:15:30i prepared the agenda
4:15:32i thought that i was going to attend the
4:15:34meeting with the president but haldeman
4:15:35called for the agenda and not me
4:15:37i have submitted to the committee a copy
4:15:39of the agenda exhibit number 32
4:15:42you will see that the agenda deals with
4:15:44five items to be discussed and resolved
4:15:46with the president
4:15:48one senator baker's requested meeting
4:15:50with the president
4:15:52two submitting secretary stan's name for
4:15:55a confirmable position
4:15:57three what to do with mr magruder four
4:16:01using mr buchanan during the senate
4:16:02hearings and five
4:16:04getting the attorney general back in
4:16:06touch with the white house
4:16:09subsequent to
4:16:10holloman's meeting with the president he
4:16:12informed me that the president would
4:16:14meet with senator baker i should discuss
4:16:17with stans his interest in a confirmable
4:16:18position magruder could not return to
4:16:20the white house staff
4:16:22buchanan could not be used at the senate
4:16:24hearings and the president would meet
4:16:26with the attorney general i have not
4:16:28explained at this point the details of
4:16:31this rather significant document
4:16:33but i believe the document is rather
4:16:34self-explanatory of the continuing
4:16:36cover-up and i will of course answer any
4:16:38questions about it
4:16:40i was not present when the president and
4:16:42harlem discussed these matters but i had
4:16:44discussed them with holloman before he
4:16:46went to see the president and he
4:16:47informed me of the president's decisions
4:16:49after the meeting thus i assumed the
4:16:51agenda that i had prepared was the basis
4:16:54of their discussions
4:16:58on february 20th the 21st
4:17:02mr timmons told me that he arranged for
4:17:04the president to have an off the record
4:17:06private meeting with senator baker
4:17:09as you will note from the agenda i refer
4:17:11to just a moment ago mr timmons had
4:17:13reported that senator had told timmons
4:17:15that he wanted guidance and timmons and
4:17:17and timmon's interpretation was
4:17:20the senator wished to help the white
4:17:21house
4:17:22holloman told me to prepare a briefing
4:17:24paper for the president and to bring it
4:17:26directly to him rather than writing it
4:17:28through normal channels
4:17:30i have submitted to the committee
4:17:32exhibit number 33 a copy of the agenda i
4:17:35prepared for the president's meeting
4:17:36with senator baker
4:17:45after the president met with senator
4:17:47baker i was informed by holliman that
4:17:49the senator had appeared to be very
4:17:50interested in being cooperative the
4:17:52president had the impression he might be
4:17:54helpful this of course was the white
4:17:56house hope but nothing that was reported
4:17:57from the meeting made these any more
4:17:59than a hope
4:18:00also senator baker had told the
4:18:02president that he wanted his contact
4:18:04point to be mr clinton's rather than
4:18:06someone on the white house staff
4:18:08holloman told me that senator baker had
4:18:10urged the president to waive executive
4:18:12privilege and send members of the white
4:18:14house staff to the hearings as quickly
4:18:16as possible but the president
4:18:18had told senator baker that he was going
4:18:20to hold the line of written
4:18:21interrogatories
4:18:23finally i was told that both the
4:18:24president and senator baker had
4:18:26discussed that there should be an effort
4:18:27to get the hearings over as quickly as
4:18:29possible
4:18:30this report this report
4:18:32of the meeting which holloman gave me
4:18:34was later confirmed in discussions i had
4:18:36with the president myself in early march
4:18:38of this year
4:18:40on february 27 22
4:18:43mr holliman requested that i prepare a
4:18:45briefing paper for the president's
4:18:47meeting that day with the attorney
4:18:48general
4:18:50throughout the watergate investigation
4:18:52holloman and particularly erlichmann had
4:18:54complained about clinton's passive role
4:18:56in the investigation in the prosecution
4:18:58holloman and erlickman were both aware
4:19:00of the strained relationship between
4:19:02klein east and the white house
4:19:05i knew that erlickman was riding hard on
4:19:07the justice department in an effort to
4:19:08undermine kleine's i also knew from
4:19:11conversations with clients that he had
4:19:13little affection for mr ehrlichman
4:19:15the senate watergate hearings presented
4:19:17a real possibility of the justice
4:19:18department having to make further
4:19:20criminal investigations that would lead
4:19:22back to the white house
4:19:23accordingly the president was the only
4:19:25one
4:19:26who could bring mr findings back into
4:19:28the family to protect the white house
4:19:30and this meeting was de designed to do
4:19:32just that
4:19:33as a result of senator baker's request
4:19:35that clint east be his contact point the
4:19:38president had a perfect vehicle to
4:19:39solicit findings assistance during the
4:19:42hearings and if anything should develop
4:19:44during the hearings to not let all hell
4:19:46break loose in the subsequent
4:19:47investigation
4:19:49i have submitted to the committee
4:19:51exhibit number 34 a copy of the briefing
4:19:53paper i was requested to prepare
4:19:56i know that this document went to the
4:19:57president because just before the
4:19:59meeting
4:20:00was to be to occur i realized that the
4:20:02president might not understand the
4:20:04reference to the fact that klein was
4:20:05considering one particularly attractive
4:20:07offer from a law firm
4:20:09that he was likely to accept i called
4:20:11haldeman to explain this but holloman
4:20:13said the paper had gone in and the
4:20:15president would understand that this was
4:20:17a reference to governor conley's law
4:20:19firm because governor conley had
4:20:21discussed this with the president
4:20:24the president subsequently discussed
4:20:26this meeting with me in early march he
4:20:28told me that he would continue to call
4:20:30mr kleinings from time to time but i
4:20:31should also make certain that kleines
4:20:33was working closely with senator baker
4:20:35in preparation for the select committee
4:20:37hearings
4:20:39[Applause]
4:20:46as i have mentioned earlier
4:20:49i had also been informed that the
4:20:50president had made a decision that
4:20:52magruder
4:20:53could not return to the white house
4:20:56magruder had been working at the
4:20:57inaugural committee and even before the
4:20:59inauguration he told me that he had
4:21:00called mr higby requesting a meeting
4:21:02with holdemon to discuss his future
4:21:05after the inauguration magruder told me
4:21:08he had to decide what he was going to do
4:21:10prior to that meeting i had informed
4:21:12haldeman that mr o'brien had had some
4:21:15discussion with magruder
4:21:18and that magruder had indicated that
4:21:20holderman and coulson were very much
4:21:22involved in the planning and approval of
4:21:23lydia's operation
4:21:25after magruder met with haldeman in late
4:21:27january 1973 i had occasion to see him
4:21:30in the hall of the executive office
4:21:31building
4:21:32he told me that he was talking with
4:21:34haldeman and mitchell about running for
4:21:36office in california and was planning a
4:21:38trip to california to test the water
4:21:41he said now was the time because he felt
4:21:44he could get good financial backing
4:21:46i felt magruder was in for some serious
4:21:48problems built before the grand jury in
4:21:50the senate hearings
4:21:51but without saying this to him i tried
4:21:53to dissuade him from running for office
4:21:55until this entire matter had been
4:21:56resolved
4:21:59shortly after this conversation with
4:22:01magruder
4:22:02i phoned holloman and told him that i
4:22:05thought magruder was making a mistake
4:22:06going to california in pursuit of
4:22:08elective office holloman agreed and said
4:22:10that he was going to call bob finch and
4:22:13suggest that when magruder met with him
4:22:15finch
4:22:16that he'd be dissuaded he asked me to
4:22:18call kombach and make a similar
4:22:20suggestion which i did and comeback said
4:22:22he would do
4:22:24after magruder returned from california
4:22:26he decided that he wanted to stay in
4:22:28washington
4:22:29he was pushing hard to return to the
4:22:31white house staff
4:22:32and work on the bicentennial program
4:22:36no one had the heart to tell magruder
4:22:38the president had said that he could not
4:22:40return to the white house staff
4:22:42he was during this period of time
4:22:44which i believe was mid-february
4:22:47magruder had a conversation with mr
4:22:48o'brien
4:22:50in which he told o'brien that he had
4:22:52received his final authorization for
4:22:54liddy's activities from gordon strong
4:22:57and that strawn had reported that
4:22:58haldeman had cleared the matter with the
4:23:00president
4:23:01i reported this to holloman who
4:23:03expressed concern over magruder's
4:23:05statement
4:23:06after i reported this information the
4:23:09white house white house efforts to find
4:23:11a job for magruder became intense
4:23:13and haldeman assigned mr higby to the
4:23:15task
4:23:17higbee called me to discuss the general
4:23:19type of job that i thought would satisfy
4:23:21magruder and then he instructed mr jerry
4:23:24jones the head of the white house
4:23:25personnel operation at that time to find
4:23:28an available high-level non-confirmable
4:23:31non-confirmable position for mr magruder
4:23:35during the time when mr jones was
4:23:36reviewing all of the potential jobs for
4:23:39magruder
4:23:40i recall that magruder dropped by my
4:23:42office and told me
4:23:43he had discussed his potential problems
4:23:45in full with both higbee and haldeman
4:23:48he asked me for my assistance and
4:23:50support in finding him a job
4:23:53i assured magruder i would help
4:23:55he also indicated that mitchell was
4:23:57trying to help him get a job
4:23:59or get the job matter resolved
4:24:02on february 28th mr jones submitted a
4:24:04memorandum to higbee and myself a copy
4:24:07of which i have submitted to the
4:24:08committee exhibit 34a
4:24:12after holoman
4:24:14reviewed the memorandum a meeting was
4:24:16scheduled for magruder to meet with
4:24:17haldeman and i was asked to attend
4:24:24this meeting occurred during the first
4:24:25week of march
4:24:27and recruiter explained to haldeman at
4:24:29the meeting
4:24:30that he did not want to leave the what
4:24:32leave washington
4:24:34holliman told magruder that his working
4:24:36at the bicentennial was not realistic
4:24:39but to consider the position at the
4:24:41department of commerce as an assistant
4:24:42to the secretary for policy development
4:24:45magruder said he was interested but
4:24:47wanted some assurances from haldeman
4:24:49that if he made it through the senate
4:24:51hearing as he had the grand jury in
4:24:53trial that he could be that he could
4:24:55have a better job later
4:24:58holloman said that he could not make a
4:24:59firm promise
4:25:01but that he would do all he personally
4:25:02could to assist this was good enough for
4:25:05magruder
4:25:06holloman said that mr jones would be
4:25:08told to proceed with secretary den to
4:25:10get the position at commerce department
4:25:12finalized
4:25:14on march 5th
4:25:16i received a call from secretary dent
4:25:18regarding his hiring mr magruder
4:25:21i did not want to tell secretary den
4:25:22that magruder was totally free from
4:25:24future problems so i was evasive with
4:25:27him but hinted that magruder might have
4:25:28some problems because i regretted
4:25:30misleading him i prepared a memorandum
4:25:32for my files something i seldom do
4:25:35because i felt magruder was in fact
4:25:37going to have his problems
4:25:39in fact i thought everyone was going to
4:25:41have problems i have submitted a copy of
4:25:43this memorandum reflecting this
4:25:44conversation with secretary and to the
4:25:46committee exhibit number 35.
4:25:59i would now like to turn to the
4:26:01meetings i had with the president in
4:26:02february and march of this year
4:26:06i have described to the committee
4:26:07several matters that follow the la costa
4:26:10meeting which directly involve
4:26:11presidential
4:26:12decision-making and presidential
4:26:14involvement i would now like to turn
4:26:18to my direct dealings with the president
4:26:19which began in late february of 1973
4:26:22with regard to the watergate related
4:26:23matters
4:26:25i feel i can best set forth which what
4:26:28what transpired at these meetings by
4:26:30discussing what occurred at each meeting
4:26:34the meeting of february 27th
4:26:38this was the first meeting i had had
4:26:40with the president since my september 15
4:26:421972 meeting which related to the
4:26:44watergate
4:26:45was at this meeting that the president
4:26:46directed that i report directly to him
4:26:48regarding all watergate matters
4:26:51he told me that this matter was taking
4:26:53too much time from holloman and
4:26:54erlickman's normal duties
4:26:56and also told me that they were
4:26:58principles in the matter and i therefore
4:27:00could be more objective than they
4:27:03the president then told me of his
4:27:04meeting
4:27:05meetings with senator baker and the
4:27:07attorney general he told me that senator
4:27:09baker had requested that the attorney
4:27:11general be his contact point and that i
4:27:13should keep in contact with the attorney
4:27:15general
4:27:16to make sure that the attorney general
4:27:18and senator baker were working together
4:27:21he asked me to follow up immediately to
4:27:23determine if the attorney general and
4:27:24baker had met i informed him that i had
4:27:26earlier discussed this with the attorney
4:27:28general the attorney general was
4:27:30planning to meet with senator baker and
4:27:33senator urban to discuss turning over
4:27:35fbi data regarding the watergate
4:27:37investigation
4:27:38a brief discussion followed in which the
4:27:41president recounted
4:27:42what had already been reported to me
4:27:44by haldeman
4:27:47that he had told senator baker that he
4:27:48would not permit the white house staff
4:27:50to appear before the select committee
4:27:52rather he would only permit the taking
4:27:53of written interrogatories
4:27:55he asked me if i agreed with this and i
4:27:57said that written interrogatories were
4:27:59something that could be handled whereas
4:28:01appearances might create serious
4:28:02problems
4:28:04he told me he would never let haldeman
4:28:05and erickman go to the hill
4:28:07he also told me that senator gurney
4:28:09would be
4:28:10very friendly to the white house it
4:28:12would be not necessary to contact him
4:28:14because the president said that senator
4:28:15gurney would know what to do on his own
4:28:18on the way out of his office he told me
4:28:20i had done an excellent job of dealing
4:28:22with this matter during the campaign
4:28:24that it had been the only issue that the
4:28:26government had and the democrats had
4:28:28tried to make something out of it
4:28:30but to no avail i told him
4:28:33that we were as we were walking together
4:28:35out of the office that i had only
4:28:37managed to contain the matter during the
4:28:39campaign
4:28:40but i was not sure it could
4:28:43it could be contained indefinitely
4:28:46he then told me
4:28:48that we would have to fight back
4:28:50and he was confident that i could do the
4:28:52job
4:29:01the meeting on february 28th with the
4:29:04president
4:29:05i had received word before i arrived at
4:29:07my office that the president wanted to
4:29:08see me
4:29:10he asked me if i had talked to the
4:29:11attorney general regarding senator baker
4:29:13i told him that the attorney general was
4:29:15seeking to meet with both senator irvin
4:29:17and senator baker
4:29:18but a meeting date had not yet been
4:29:20firmed up
4:29:21i told him that i knew it was the
4:29:24attorney general's wish to turn over the
4:29:26fbi investigation the president said
4:29:28that he didn't think we should but asked
4:29:30me what i thought of the idea i told him
4:29:32i did not think there was much damaging
4:29:34information in the fbi investigation
4:29:36although there could be some bad public
4:29:38relations from it
4:29:39he told me to think about this matter he
4:29:42also said that he had read in the
4:29:43morning paper about the vesco case and
4:29:46it asked me what part if any his brother
4:29:48ed had in the matter
4:29:50i told him what i knew of his brother's
4:29:52involvement which was that he was an
4:29:54innocent agent in the contribution
4:29:56transaction
4:29:58we then discussed the leak to time
4:30:00magazine of the fact that the white
4:30:02house had placed wiretaps on newsmen and
4:30:04white house staff people
4:30:06the president asked me if i knew how
4:30:07this had leaked
4:30:09i told him that i did not
4:30:11that i knew several people were aware of
4:30:13it but i didn't know any who had leaked
4:30:15it he asked me who knew about it i told
4:30:18him that mr sullivan mr mark felt and mr
4:30:21martian were aware of it i told him that
4:30:23sullivan had told me that he thought
4:30:25that director hoover had told somebody
4:30:27about it shortly after it happened
4:30:29because hoover was against it and that
4:30:31sullivan said that he had heard that
4:30:34this information had gone to governor
4:30:35rockefeller and in turn come back from
4:30:37governor rockefeller to dr kissinger
4:30:40we then talked about
4:30:42executive prep the executive privilege
4:30:44statement and the president expressed
4:30:46his desire to get the statement out will
4:30:48in advance
4:30:49of the watergate hearings so they did
4:30:51not appear to be in response to the
4:30:52watergate hearings
4:30:54we also discussed mr mullenhoff's
4:30:56interest in the fitzgerald case and he
4:30:58asked me to look into the matter for mr
4:30:59mullenhoff
4:31:01before departing his office
4:31:03he again raised the matter that i should
4:31:05report directly to him and not through
4:31:06harlem and ehrlichman i told him that i
4:31:09thought he should know that i was also
4:31:11involved in the post-june 17th
4:31:12activities regarding the watergate i
4:31:14briefly described to him why i thought i
4:31:16had illegal legal problems and that i
4:31:19had been a conduit for many of the
4:31:20decisions that were made and therefore
4:31:23could be involved in obstruction of
4:31:24justice he would not accept my analysis
4:31:27and did not want me to get into it in
4:31:29any detail other than what i have just
4:31:31related he reassured me not to worry
4:31:34that i had no legal problems
4:31:36i raised this on another occasion with
4:31:38the president when dick moore was
4:31:39present
4:31:42meeting on march 1st
4:31:45the first meeting on this date
4:31:48and the afternoon meetings which
4:31:49occurred on march 1st related to
4:31:51preparing the president for his
4:31:52forthcoming press conference
4:31:54the president asked me a number of
4:31:56questions about the gray nomination
4:31:57hearings and facts that had come out
4:32:00during the hearings
4:32:02in particular i can recall his stating
4:32:03that there should be no problem with the
4:32:05fact that i have received the fbi
4:32:07reports
4:32:08he said that i was conducting an
4:32:09investigation for him
4:32:11and that it would be perfectly proper
4:32:12for the council to the president
4:32:14to have looked at these reports
4:32:17i did not tell the president that i had
4:32:19not conducted an investigation for him
4:32:20because i assumed he was well aware of
4:32:22this fact and to the so-called dean
4:32:24investigation was a public relations
4:32:26matter
4:32:27and that frequently the president made
4:32:28references and press conferences to
4:32:30things that never had in fact occurred
4:32:34i was also aware that often in answering
4:32:37watergate questions that he had made
4:32:39references to my report and i did not
4:32:41feel that i could tell a president he
4:32:43cannot use my name
4:32:45there have been considerable adverse
4:32:47publicity stemming from the gray
4:32:48hearings and the fact that the gray and
4:32:50the gray was turning over fbi
4:32:52information
4:32:53to the senate judiciary committee which
4:32:55caused the president to tell me at this
4:32:57morning meeting the gray must be pulled
4:32:58up short
4:33:00he told me
4:33:01that he had talked with the attorney
4:33:02general to tell him
4:33:04to read a chapter in his book six crises
4:33:07dealing with his case regarding the lack
4:33:09of cooperation which truman and the fbi
4:33:11had given to his investigation
4:33:13he also told me
4:33:15that the fbi watergate materials should
4:33:18not be turned over by gray
4:33:20i informed him that i had had a meeting
4:33:23several days prior with mr sullivan
4:33:25who had been at the fbi for many years
4:33:27and sullivan had alluded to the fact
4:33:30that the fbi had been used for political
4:33:32purposes by past administrations
4:33:34i cited a few examples that mr sullivan
4:33:36had given me the president told me to
4:33:39get this information from sullivan
4:33:41the president told me
4:33:43that he was reading a book at that time
4:33:45called the 13 mistakes of kennedy and he
4:33:48told me that i should read the chapter
4:33:51regarding kennedy's use of the fbi
4:33:54he also told me that i should gather any
4:33:56materials i could gather regarding the
4:33:59uses and abuses of the fbi by past
4:34:01administrations so that we could show
4:34:03that we had not abused the fbi for
4:34:05political purposes the president told me
4:34:08that he was convinced that he had been
4:34:09wire capped in 1968 and the fact that
4:34:12the loach had not been forthcoming
4:34:13indicated to the president that the
4:34:15loach was probably lying
4:34:17he told me that i should call don
4:34:18kendall deloach's employer
4:34:21and tell him that deloach had better
4:34:23start telling the truth because the boys
4:34:25are coming out of the woodwork
4:34:26he said that this ploy may smoke the low
4:34:28out deloach out i might add at this
4:34:31point i never did call mr kendall
4:34:34he also asked me who else
4:34:37might know about the bugging of his 1968
4:34:40campaign and i suggested that mr tolston
4:34:42hoover's former assistant might have
4:34:44some knowledge of it he told me that he
4:34:46probably had to call mr tolson and wish
4:34:49him happy birthday or good health and
4:34:50possibly get some information from him
4:34:52when he was talking to him
4:34:55the discussion then turned back to the
4:34:57his case and i reminded the president of
4:34:59the strong statement he had made in 1950
4:35:01regarding truman's refusal to provide
4:35:03his committee with information
4:35:05and that
4:35:06and that that speech might be raised at
4:35:08his press conference
4:35:11he asked me to get a copy of the speech
4:35:13i returned to his office shortly with a
4:35:15copy of the speech and he asked me to
4:35:17discuss with him how it could be
4:35:18differentiated from the present
4:35:19situation
4:35:29during the march first afternoon meeting
4:35:33the president also asked me some
4:35:35questions about executive privilege and
4:35:37the timing of the release of the
4:35:38executive privilege statement
4:35:40which he had discussed in his press
4:35:42conference on january thirty first
4:35:44i told him that the statement as far as
4:35:47i was concerned was ready for release
4:35:49and merely would require the sign off of
4:35:51a handful of other people
4:35:52i told him i thought it could be out
4:35:54within a week
4:35:56was during the days after
4:35:59this march series of march first
4:36:01meetings
4:36:02with the president that i that the name
4:36:05dean became became coming increasingly
4:36:07the forefront of the great confirmation
4:36:08hearings and the rumblings were
4:36:11that there was going to be a situation
4:36:13where dean would be called to the
4:36:14committee
4:36:16to testify and a number of senators were
4:36:18anxious to use me as a vehicle to test
4:36:20executive privilege
4:36:22on march 4th or 5th
4:36:24i had a conversation with erlickman
4:36:27which i might add occurred in the hall
4:36:28of the west wing
4:36:30in which he told me that i thought
4:36:33that i thought it would be very
4:36:35difficult to maintain a court test on
4:36:37executive privilege over me when in fact
4:36:39i had only met with the president
4:36:41infrequently and had had very few
4:36:43conversations with him it would be
4:36:45protected
4:36:46was following this conversation with
4:36:48erlickman that i began meeting and
4:36:50talking with the president at his
4:36:52request with ever increasing frequency
4:36:59the presidential meeting of march
4:37:0216th or 6th oh that's the voting as
4:37:05they've put their votes on such a
4:37:0710-minute basis it's uh i expect the
4:37:09committee better go and vote hurry back
4:37:12we'll come back and we'll we'll finish
4:37:14this statement this afternoon
4:37:21that says john dean reveals more details
4:37:24of the white house strategy in dealing
4:37:26with the senate watergate committee the
4:37:28committee has recessed for another floor
4:37:30vote when they return dean will continue
4:37:33to chronicle his conversations with the
4:37:35president
4:37:36public television's coverage of the
4:37:38senate hearings will resume after a
4:37:40pause for station identification
4:37:43unabridged coverage of these hearings is
4:37:45provided as a public service by the
4:37:47member stations of pbs the public
4:37:50broadcasting service
4:37:53if you've stayed up this long you'll
4:37:55probably find the hour that follows now
4:37:57the most interesting and rewarding of
4:38:00the whole evening john dean is about to
4:38:02resume his version of the cover-up
4:38:04activities including his talks with
4:38:06president nixon
4:38:16the committee will resume
4:38:21um
4:38:23have another boat
4:38:24do we have a procedure
4:38:28the trouble of this is
4:38:30that short time on the boat you know you
4:38:31may miss one time
4:38:33shall we go back again
4:38:44[Music]
4:38:46mr dean you can proceed senator wyker is
4:38:49here
4:38:51making up the forum
4:38:52for the quorum as required by our rules
4:38:55thank you
4:39:05the meeting with the president
4:39:07on march 6th
4:39:09this meeting was brief
4:39:11and a general discussion of the status
4:39:14of the gray hearings
4:39:15and the president reminded me again
4:39:18that i should report directly to him and
4:39:20not involve holloman and ehrlichman
4:39:22with regard to watergate matters
4:39:26the meeting on march 7th
4:39:30the president was very unhappy with
4:39:32gray's performance before the senate
4:39:34judiciary committee
4:39:36in my meeting with him on this date he
4:39:38made a reference to the fact that gray's
4:39:41comment regarding my sitting in on the
4:39:43investigations by the fbi was absurd
4:39:47he felt it was perfectly proper
4:39:49that i was present at those interviews
4:39:51and said that gray's attitude that he
4:39:53quote jolly well
4:39:55end quote went forward because he had no
4:39:58alternative was absurd
4:40:01i also discussed with the president the
4:40:03fact that ziegler was considering
4:40:05endorsing
4:40:06the aclu letter to the judiciary
4:40:09committee regarding the turning over of
4:40:11fbi materials
4:40:13the president thought that that was a
4:40:15good idea
4:40:17at the end of the meeting the president
4:40:19instructed me to tell the attorney
4:40:20general to cut off gray from turning
4:40:23over any further watergate reports
4:40:26to the senate judiciary committee he
4:40:28said this just had to cease
4:40:30the meeting of march 8th
4:40:33i had a very brief meeting with the
4:40:34president on this date
4:40:36during which he asked me if something
4:40:38had been done to stop gray from turning
4:40:40over
4:40:41the fbi materials to the senate
4:40:42judiciary committee i told him that i
4:40:44thought the matter had been taken care
4:40:46of by the attorney general
4:40:49phone conversation
4:40:50of march 10th
4:40:53the president called me to tell me
4:40:55that he felt we should get the executive
4:40:57privilege statement out immediately
4:41:00that this should be done before i was
4:41:02called before the senate judiciary
4:41:04committee in connection with the gray
4:41:05hearings so they would not appear that
4:41:07the statement on executive privilege was
4:41:09in response to the action by the senate
4:41:11committee
4:41:13meeting on march thirteenth
4:41:15this was a rather lengthy meeting
4:41:17the bulk of which was taken up by a
4:41:19discussion about the gray hearings and
4:41:22the fact the senate judiciary committee
4:41:23had voted to invite me to appear in
4:41:26connection with gray's nomination
4:41:28it was at this time we discussed the
4:41:31potential of litigating the matter of
4:41:32executive privilege and thereby
4:41:34preventing anybody from going before any
4:41:37senate committee until the matter was
4:41:39resolved the president liked the idea
4:41:42very much
4:41:44particularly when i mentioned
4:41:45to him that it might be possible
4:41:48that he could also claim attorney-client
4:41:50privilege on me so that the strongest
4:41:52potential case on executive privilege
4:41:54would probably rest on the council of
4:41:56the president
4:41:57i told him that obviously this area
4:41:59would have to be researched
4:42:02he told me he did not want holloman and
4:42:04ehrlichman to go before the urban
4:42:05hearings and that if we were litigating
4:42:07the matter on dean
4:42:09that no one would have to go to appear
4:42:12toward the end of the conversation we
4:42:13got into a discussion of watergate
4:42:15matters specifically
4:42:17i told the president about the fact that
4:42:20there were money demands being made by
4:42:22the seven convicted defendants
4:42:25and that the sentencing of these
4:42:26individuals was not far off
4:42:29it was during this conversation that
4:42:31holloman came into the office
4:42:33after this brief interruption by
4:42:35holloman's coming in but while he was
4:42:37still there
4:42:38i told the president about the fact
4:42:40there was no money to pay these
4:42:41individuals to meet their demands
4:42:43he asked me how much it would cost i
4:42:46told him i could only make an estimate
4:42:47that it might be as high as a million
4:42:49dollars or more
4:42:51he told me that that was no problem
4:42:54he also looked over at holloman and
4:42:55repeated the same statement
4:42:57he then asked me who was demanding this
4:43:00money and i told him it was principally
4:43:02coming from hunt through his attorney
4:43:04the president then referred to the fact
4:43:07that hunt had been promised executive
4:43:08clemency
4:43:10he said that he had discussed this
4:43:11matter with erlickman and contrary to
4:43:13instructions that ehrlichman had given
4:43:15coulson not to talk to the president
4:43:16about it that coulson had also discussed
4:43:19it with him later
4:43:21he expressed some annoyance at the fact
4:43:22that coulson had also discussed this
4:43:24matter with him
4:43:25the conversation then turned back to a
4:43:27question from the president regarding
4:43:29the money that was being paid the
4:43:30defendants he asked me how this was done
4:43:33i told him i didn't know much about it
4:43:35other than the fact that the money was
4:43:37laundered so it could not be traced and
4:43:40then there were secret deliveries
4:43:42i told him i was learning about things i
4:43:44had never known before but the next time
4:43:46i would certainly be more knowledgeable
4:43:48this comment got a laugh out of haldeman
4:43:52the meeting ended on this note and there
4:43:54was no further discussion of the matter
4:43:56and it was left hanging just as i've
4:43:58described it the meeting on march 14th
4:44:03the meetings which occurred on this day
4:44:06principally involved preparing the
4:44:07president for a forthcoming press
4:44:09conference
4:44:10i recall talking about executive
4:44:12privilege and making dean a test case in
4:44:14the courts on executive privilege the
4:44:16president said that if he he would like
4:44:18very much to do this and if the
4:44:20opportunity came up in the press
4:44:21conference he would probably so respond
4:44:24i also recall that during the meetings
4:44:26which occurred on this day that the
4:44:28president was going to try to find an
4:44:29answer that would get ziegler off the
4:44:32hook of the frequent questions asked him
4:44:35regarding the watergate
4:44:37he said that he was going to stay or say
4:44:40that he would take no further questions
4:44:42on the watergate until the completion of
4:44:44the urban hearings and that ziggler in
4:44:47turn
4:44:48could repeat the same statement and
4:44:49avoid further interrogation by the press
4:44:52on the subject
4:44:53meeting on march 15th
4:44:56it was late in the afternoon after the
4:44:58president's press conference that he
4:45:00asked dick moore and i to come over to
4:45:01visit with him
4:45:02he was in a very relaxed mood and
4:45:04entered into a general discussion about
4:45:06the press conference
4:45:07the president was amazed and distressed
4:45:09that the press had paid so little
4:45:11attention to the fact that he had made a
4:45:13historic announcement about ambassador
4:45:15bruce opening up the liaison office in
4:45:17peking
4:45:18he said he was amazed when the first
4:45:20question following that announcement was
4:45:22regarding whether or not dean would
4:45:24appear before the senate judiciary
4:45:25committee in connection with the gray
4:45:26hearings
4:45:28the conversation then rambled into a
4:45:29discussion of the his case and mr moore
4:45:32discussed his memory of the president's
4:45:34handling of the case
4:45:36meeting on march 16th
4:45:40this meeting was a discussion with
4:45:42ziegler on how to follow up on a number
4:45:44of matters that arisen in the press
4:45:45conference the preceding day
4:45:48meeting on march 17th
4:45:50this was st patrick's day and the
4:45:52president was in a very good mood and
4:45:54very relaxed and we engaged in a
4:45:55rambling conversation with only some
4:45:57brief references to the gray hearings
4:45:59and the problems that were then
4:46:01confronting the white house regarding
4:46:02the president's statement on executive
4:46:04privilege and his willingness to go to
4:46:06court on the matter he opined that he
4:46:08did not think the senate would be dumb
4:46:10enough to go for the debate that he had
4:46:11given them but he is hopeful that they
4:46:13might
4:46:15meeting on march 19th
4:46:17as best i recall this meeting it was a
4:46:19rather rambling discussion regarding
4:46:20media problems in connection with the
4:46:22gray hearings as the discussion
4:46:24proceeded i suggested that mr moore
4:46:25might like to engage in this
4:46:27conversation with us
4:46:28there was some discussion of senator
4:46:30irvine's appearance the preceding sunday
4:46:32on face the nation and whether or not it
4:46:34would be appropriate for me to respond
4:46:36to some of the points that were being
4:46:38made
4:46:40regarding my requested appearance before
4:46:42the senate judiciary committee i told
4:46:44the president that i would work with
4:46:45dick moore in preparing a draft response
4:46:49meetings on march 20th
4:46:51the president called me earlier that
4:46:53morning to tell
4:46:55me that i should work up a draft letter
4:46:57of response as a result of the
4:46:59discussions we had the preceding evening
4:47:00with more
4:47:02i told him i was drafting a letter and
4:47:04he
4:47:05and he told me
4:47:06as soon as i had the letter prepared
4:47:08that i should arrange to meet with him
4:47:10shortly after lunch i took over a draft
4:47:13copy of the letter which i had developed
4:47:15with mr moore and submitted a copy of
4:47:17that draft letter to the and i've
4:47:19submitted a copy that draft letter to
4:47:20the committee the president read the
4:47:22draft and we discussed it
4:47:25there was no resolution of the problem
4:47:27he told me to talk with ziegler i told
4:47:29him if i did this as a sworn statement
4:47:31that i was going to obviously redraft
4:47:32very carefully before i signed any
4:47:35affidavit on a letter
4:47:36it was during the afternoon of march
4:47:3820th that i talked again with dick moore
4:47:40about this about the entire cover-up
4:47:43i told moore that there were new and
4:47:45more threatening demands for support
4:47:47money
4:47:48i told him that hunt had sent a message
4:47:50to me
4:47:51through paul o'brien that he wanted
4:47:53seventy two thousand dollars for living
4:47:55expenses and fifty thousand dollars for
4:47:57attorney's fees and if he did not
4:47:59receive it that week
4:48:01he would reconsider his options and have
4:48:03a lot to say about the seeming things he
4:48:05had done for erlickman while at the
4:48:07white house
4:48:08i told moore that i had about reached
4:48:11the end of the line
4:48:13and was now in a position to deal with
4:48:15the president to end the cover-up
4:48:17i did not discuss with moore the fact
4:48:19that i had discussed money and clemency
4:48:21with the president earlier but i told
4:48:23him that i really didn't think the
4:48:24president understood all of the facts
4:48:26involved in watergate and particularly
4:48:28the implications of those facts
4:48:30i told him that the matter was
4:48:32continually compounding itself and i
4:48:34felt i had to lay the facts out for the
4:48:36president as well as the implication of
4:48:38those facts
4:48:39moore encouraged me to do so
4:48:44phone conversation from the president on
4:48:46march twentieth
4:48:47when the president called me and we had
4:48:49a rather rambling discussion i told him
4:48:52at the conclusion of the conversation
4:48:53that evening that i wanted to talk with
4:48:56him as soon as possible about the
4:48:57watergate matter because i did not think
4:48:59he fully realized all the facts and the
4:49:01implications of those facts for the
4:49:03people at the white house as well as
4:49:04himself
4:49:06he said that i should meet with him the
4:49:07next morning about ten o'clock
4:49:10before going to tell the president some
4:49:12of these things i decided i should call
4:49:13holdeman because i knew that his name
4:49:15would come up in the matter i called
4:49:18holloman and told him what i was going
4:49:19to do and holloman agreed that i should
4:49:21proceed to so inform the president of
4:49:23the situation
4:49:25meeting of march 21st
4:49:28as i have indicated my purpose in
4:49:30requesting this meeting
4:49:32particularly with the president was
4:49:35that i felt it necessary that i gave him
4:49:37a full report of all the facts that i
4:49:38knew and explained to him
4:49:40what i believe to be the implications of
4:49:43those facts
4:49:45it was my particular concern with the
4:49:47fact that the president did not seem to
4:49:48understand the implications of what was
4:49:50going on for example when i had earlier
4:49:53told him that i thought i was involved
4:49:55in an obstruction of justice situation
4:49:56he had argued with me to the contrary
4:49:58after i'd explained it to him
4:50:00also when the matter of money demands
4:50:02had come up
4:50:03previously he had very nonchalantly told
4:50:06me that that was no problem i did not
4:50:08know if he realized
4:50:09that he himself could be getting
4:50:11involved in an obstruction of justice
4:50:13by having
4:50:14by having promised clemency to hunt
4:50:18what i had hoped to do in this
4:50:21conversation was to have the president
4:50:22tell me
4:50:24we had to end the matter now
4:50:26accordingly i gave considerable thought
4:50:28to how i would present this situation to
4:50:31the president and try to make as
4:50:32dramatic a presentation as i could to
4:50:35tell him how serious i thought the
4:50:36situation was that the cover-up continue
4:50:40i began by telling the president that
4:50:42there was a cancer growing on the
4:50:43presidency
4:50:44and if the cancer was not removed the
4:50:47president himself would be killed by it
4:50:49i also told him that it was important
4:50:51that this cancer be removed immediately
4:50:54because it was growing more deadly every
4:50:56day
4:50:57i then gave him what i told him would be
4:50:59a broad overview of the situation and i
4:51:02would come back and fill in details and
4:51:04answer any questions he might have about
4:51:06the matter
4:51:07i proceeded to tell him how the matter
4:51:09had commenced in late january early
4:51:11february but that i did not know how the
4:51:14plans had been finally approved i told
4:51:16him that i had informed haldeman what
4:51:18was occurring and holloman told me that
4:51:20i should have nothing to do with it
4:51:22i told him that i had learned that there
4:51:24had been pressure from coulson on
4:51:26magruder but i did not have all the
4:51:28facts on as to the degree of the
4:51:30pressure
4:51:31i told him i did not know if mitchell
4:51:33had approved the plans
4:51:35but i
4:51:36had been told that mitchell had been a
4:51:38recipient of wiretap information and
4:51:40then holloman had also
4:51:41received some information through strawn
4:51:44he then proceeded
4:51:46i then proceeded to tell him some of the
4:51:48highlights that it occurred during the
4:51:49cover-up
4:51:50i told him that kombuch had been used to
4:51:52raise funds to pay these seven
4:51:54individuals for their silence at the
4:51:56instructions of erlichmann haldeman
4:51:58mitchell and i had been the conveyors
4:52:00the conveyor of the this instruction to
4:52:02come back
4:52:03i told him that
4:52:04after this the decision had been made
4:52:07that magruder was to remain at the
4:52:08re-election committee i had assisted
4:52:10magruder in preparing his false story
4:52:12for presentation to the grand jury
4:52:14i told him that
4:52:16cash that had been at the white house
4:52:17had been funneled back to the
4:52:19re-election committee for the purpose of
4:52:20paying the seven individuals to remain
4:52:22silent
4:52:23i then proceeded to tell him that
4:52:25perjury had been committed and for this
4:52:27cover-up to continue would require more
4:52:29perjury and more money
4:52:31i told him that the demands of the
4:52:32convicted individuals continually
4:52:34increasing
4:52:35and it was sentencing eminent the
4:52:37demands had become specific
4:52:40i told him that the
4:52:42that on monday the 19th
4:52:44i had received a message from one of the
4:52:46re-election committee lawyers who had
4:52:48spoken directly with hunt and that hunt
4:52:50had sent a message to me demanding money
4:52:54i then explained to him that the message
4:52:56that hunt had been had told o'brien the
4:52:58preceding friday to be passed on to me i
4:53:01told the president i'd ask o'brien why
4:53:03to dean
4:53:04and o'brien had asked hunt the same
4:53:06question
4:53:07but hunt had merely said you just passed
4:53:10this message on to dean
4:53:12the message was that hunt wanted seventy
4:53:14two thousand dollars for living expenses
4:53:16and fifty thousand dollars for
4:53:17attorney's fees and if he did not get
4:53:18the money and get it quickly
4:53:21that he would have a lot of seeming
4:53:23things to say about what he'd done for
4:53:24john ehrlichman while he was at the
4:53:26white house
4:53:27if he did not receive the money he would
4:53:29have to reconsider his options
4:53:31i informed the president that i had
4:53:33passed this message to both haldeman and
4:53:34ehrlichman erlichman asked me if i
4:53:36discussed the matter with mitchell i had
4:53:38told erlichmann that i had not done so
4:53:41and erlichmann asked me to do so i told
4:53:43the president i had called mitchell
4:53:44pursuant to erlickman's request but i
4:53:46had no idea of what was happening with
4:53:48regarding the request
4:53:51i then told the president
4:53:53that this was just typical of the type
4:53:55of blackmail that the white house would
4:53:56continue to be subjected to
4:53:59and i did not know how to deal with it i
4:54:01also told the president
4:54:02that i thought
4:54:04that i would because i thought that i
4:54:06would as a result of my name coming out
4:54:08during the gray hearings be called
4:54:09before the grand jury and if i was
4:54:11called to testify before the grand jury
4:54:13or the senate committee i would have to
4:54:14tell the facts the way i knew them
4:54:17i said i did not know if executive
4:54:19privilege would be applicable to any
4:54:20appearances i might have before the
4:54:22grand jury
4:54:23i concluded by saying that this is going
4:54:25to take continued perjury and continued
4:54:28support of these individuals for to
4:54:30perpetuate the cover-up and i did not
4:54:32believe it was possible to so continue
4:54:34it rather i thought it was time for
4:54:36surgery of the cancer itself and that
4:54:38all those involved must stand up and
4:54:40account for themselves and the president
4:54:42himself get out in front of this matter
4:54:44i told the president that i did not
4:54:46believe that all seven defendants would
4:54:48maintain their silence forever in fact i
4:54:50thought that one or more would very
4:54:52likely
4:54:53break rank
4:54:55after i finished i realized i had not
4:54:57really made the president understand
4:54:59because he asked me a few questions
4:55:01and he discussed it would be an
4:55:03excellent idea if i gave some sort of
4:55:05briefing to the cabinet and that
4:55:07he was very impressed with my knowledge
4:55:09of the circumstances but not seem
4:55:10particularly concerned with their
4:55:11implications
4:55:13was after my presentation to the
4:55:15president and during our subsequent
4:55:16conversation the president called
4:55:18holloman into the office and the
4:55:20president suggested that we have a
4:55:22meeting with mitchell holloman and
4:55:23erlickman to discuss how to deal with
4:55:25the situation
4:55:26what emerged from that discussion after
4:55:28haldeman came into the office was that
4:55:30john mitchell should account for himself
4:55:31for the pre-june 17th activities and the
4:55:34president did not seem concerned about
4:55:36the activities which occurred after june
4:55:3817th
4:55:40after i departed the president's office
4:55:42i subsequently went to a meeting with
4:55:43harlem and erlickman to discuss the
4:55:45matter further the sum and substance of
4:55:47that discussion
4:55:49was the way to handle this now was for
4:55:52mitchell to step forward and if mitchell
4:55:54were to step forward we might not be
4:55:56confronted with the activities of those
4:55:58involved in the white house and the
4:55:59cover-up
4:56:00accordingly holloman as i recall called
4:56:02mitchell and asked him to come down the
4:56:04next day for a meeting with the
4:56:05president on the watergate matter
4:56:08in the late afternoon of march 21st
4:56:10holloman and ehrlichman and i had a
4:56:12second meeting with the president
4:56:14before entering this meeting i had a
4:56:16brief discussion in the president's
4:56:18outer office of the executive office
4:56:20building suite with holloman in which i
4:56:22told him that we now had two options one
4:56:25is
4:56:26that this thing goes all the way and
4:56:28deals with both pre and post activities
4:56:31or the second alternative if the
4:56:33cover-up was to proceed we would have to
4:56:35draw the wagons around in a circle
4:56:37around the white house and the white
4:56:39house protect itself i told holloman it
4:56:41had been the white house assistance
4:56:44to the re-election committee
4:56:45that had gotten us into much of this
4:56:47problem and now the only hope would be
4:56:49to protect ourselves from further
4:56:50involvement
4:57:00the meeting with the president that
4:57:01afternoon with holloman erlichman and
4:57:03myself was a tremendous disappointment
4:57:05to me because it was quite clear that
4:57:06the cover-up as far as the white house
4:57:09was was concerned was going to continue
4:57:13i recall that while holloman ehrlichman
4:57:15and i were sitting at a small table in
4:57:17front of the president in his executive
4:57:19office building office that i for the
4:57:22first time said in front of the
4:57:23president that i thought that halderman
4:57:25ehrlichman and dean were all indictable
4:57:27for instruction obstruction of justice
4:57:30and that was the reason i was
4:57:32disagreeing with all that was being
4:57:34discussed at that point in time
4:57:36i could tell that both holloman and
4:57:38particularly erlickman were very unhappy
4:57:39with my comment
4:57:41i had let them
4:57:42very clearly know that i was not going
4:57:44to participate in the matter any further
4:57:46and i thought it was time that everybody
4:57:48start thinking about telling the truth
4:57:50i again repeated to them i did not think
4:57:52it was possible to perpetuate the
4:57:54cover-up and the important thing now was
4:57:56to get the president out in
4:57:58front meeting on march 22nd
4:58:02the arrangements have been made to have
4:58:04a meeting after lunch with the president
4:58:05with ehrlichman holloman mitchell and
4:58:07myself
4:58:08mr mitchell came to washington that
4:58:10morning for the for a meeting in
4:58:11holliman's office in which ehrlichman
4:58:13mitchell halliman and myself were
4:58:14present
4:58:15i recall that one of the first things
4:58:18that ehrlichman asked mitchell was
4:58:20whether hunt's money problem had been
4:58:21taken care of mitchell said that he
4:58:23didn't think it was a problem any
4:58:25further
4:58:26they then followed a general discussion
4:58:28of the status of the senate hearings
4:58:30and the discussion never got down to
4:58:32specifics
4:58:33it had been my impression that holliman
4:58:35and erlickman were going to try to get
4:58:36mitchell to come forward and explain his
4:58:38involvement in the matter this did not
4:58:40occur
4:58:41mitchell said that he thought that
4:58:43everything was going along very well
4:58:44with the exception of the posture of the
4:58:46president on executive privilege
4:58:48he said that he felt that the president
4:58:50was going to have to back down somewhat
4:58:55somewhat or would appear he was
4:58:57preventing information from coming out
4:58:59of the white house i recall that
4:59:01ehrlichman left the meeting before it
4:59:03terminated because he was going to meet
4:59:05secretary schultz who was coming in from
4:59:07out of the country
4:59:08i also recall
4:59:10i was also called out of the meeting
4:59:12about noon time when a message was sent
4:59:14to me by mr ziegler
4:59:16that it was important he see me
4:59:17immediately this had to do with a
4:59:19statement that was running on the wires
4:59:21that gray had said that i had probably
4:59:23lied and ziegler wanted to know how to
4:59:25handle it
4:59:26accordingly i departed the meeting and
4:59:28went to a meeting with ziegler and moore
4:59:30to discuss gray's comment
4:59:32i returned to holloman's office where
4:59:34mitchell holloman and i had lunch
4:59:37during lunch there was some continued
4:59:39conversation about the general problems
4:59:41mr mitchell raised the fact that f lee
4:59:43bailey who had been very helpful in
4:59:45dealing with mccord
4:59:46had a problem
4:59:48that he would like to bring up he said
4:59:50that mr bailey had a client who had an
4:59:52enormous amount of gold in his
4:59:53possession he would like to make an
4:59:55arrangement with the government whereby
4:59:56the gold could be turned over to the
4:59:58government without the individual being
5:00:00prosecuted for holding the gold
5:00:02mitchell was addressing his request for
5:00:04assistance to holloman but holloman was
5:00:06non-responsive and the matter was
5:00:07dropped
5:00:08i again departed mr holliman's office to
5:00:10have further dealings with mr moore and
5:00:12mr ziegler and holliman told me that
5:00:14there would be a meeting in the
5:00:15president's executive office building
5:00:16office about 1 30 and i should come
5:00:19directly from ziegler's office when i
5:00:20got my problem worked out regarding
5:00:22gray's statement
5:00:23i arrived about 1 30 in the president's
5:00:26office but the president was not ready
5:00:27to hold the meeting yet
5:00:29the meeting with the president
5:00:30ehrlichman haldeman and mitchell and me
5:00:33was again a general discussion of the
5:00:35senate watergate hearing situation and
5:00:37did not accomplish anything
5:00:39rather was a further indication that
5:00:41there would be no effort to stop the
5:00:42cover-up from continuing i recall that
5:00:45mitchell told the president that he felt
5:00:47that the only problem
5:00:48he now had was the fact that he was
5:00:51taking a public beating on his posture
5:00:52and executive privilege
5:00:54that the statement on executive
5:00:55privilege was too broad and probably
5:00:57something should be done to change his
5:00:59posture on the matter
5:01:01mitchell was not suggesting that members
5:01:02of the white house staff go to the hill
5:01:04to testify rather some more cooperative
5:01:06position be developed to avoid adverse
5:01:08publicity
5:01:10it was at this time that the president
5:01:11said that kleindince was supposed to be
5:01:13working these things out with senator
5:01:15baker and he apparently had not been
5:01:17doing so the president said that timmons
5:01:19had told him
5:01:21that
5:01:22member a member of senator baker's staff
5:01:24was very desirous of a meeting to get
5:01:26guidance
5:01:27it was at this point that the president
5:01:29called the attorney general and told him
5:01:30that he should get up to meet with
5:01:33senator baker as soon as possible and
5:01:34get some of these problems regarding the
5:01:36executive privilege and the turning of
5:01:38documents over resolve with the
5:01:40committee immediately
5:01:42after the conversation with the attorney
5:01:43general there was a continuing
5:01:44discussion on how to deal with the urban
5:01:46committee
5:01:47i asked the president to to excuse me
5:01:49from the meeting for a moment because i
5:01:50was working with ziegler on a response
5:01:52to the statement that gray had made the
5:01:54president asked me
5:01:56what the what that was about and i then
5:01:58explained to him about gray's statement
5:02:00i told him what gray had said and also
5:02:03told him what the facts were
5:02:05he excused me to use the telephone in
5:02:07his office and said i should get that
5:02:10resolved as quickly as possible
5:02:13when i returned to the conversation with
5:02:15the president mitchell holliman and
5:02:16erlichmann
5:02:17they were still talking about dealing
5:02:19with the urban committee
5:02:21the president told me that the white
5:02:22house should start directly dealing with
5:02:24a committee and i should go up and
5:02:26commence discussions with senator irvin
5:02:28as to the parameters of executive
5:02:30privilege i told the president i did not
5:02:32think it would be wise because i was
5:02:34very much a party in issue with regard
5:02:36to the judiciary committee hearings
5:02:38it'll be very unwise for me to go to the
5:02:40hill and negotiate my own situation the
5:02:43president agreed and erickman said that
5:02:45he would commence discussions
5:02:47the meeting was almost exclusively on
5:02:49the subject of how the white house
5:02:50should posture itself vis-a-vis the
5:02:52urban committee hearings there was
5:02:54absolutely no indication of any changed
5:02:56attitude
5:02:57and it was like one of many many
5:02:58meetings i had been in before in which
5:03:00the talk was of strategies for dealing
5:03:02with the hearings rather than any effort
5:03:04to get the truth out as to what had
5:03:06happened before june 17th and after june
5:03:0817th
5:03:10following this meeting with the
5:03:11president it was apparent to me that i
5:03:12had failed in turning the president
5:03:14around on this subject but ehrlichman
5:03:16and holloman began taking over with
5:03:18regard to dealing with a new problem
5:03:20which had become john dean as they were
5:03:22aware of the fact that i was very
5:03:24unhappy about the situation
5:03:27on friday morning
5:03:28march 23rd
5:03:30my house was surrounded by camera crews
5:03:32as a result of the gray's statement the
5:03:33day before that i had probably lied
5:03:36accordingly i decided to wait until the
5:03:38camera crews departed before going to
5:03:40the office
5:03:41it was mid-morning
5:03:43when paul o'brien called to tell me
5:03:45about judge sirica's reading mccord's
5:03:47letter in open court
5:03:49o'brien gave me the high points of the
5:03:51letter as they had been reported to him
5:03:54by someone from the courthouse
5:03:56he also told me that mccord had only
5:03:58hearsay knowledge
5:04:00i then called ehrlichman to tell him
5:04:02about it he said he had a copy of the
5:04:04letter
5:04:05and read it to me i asked him how he'd
5:04:07received a copy of the letter so quickly
5:04:09he responded it just came floating into
5:04:11my office
5:04:13he asked me what i thought about it and
5:04:15i told him that i wasn't surprised at
5:04:17all and repeated to him what o'brien had
5:04:20told me that mccord probably had only
5:04:23hearsay knowledge
5:04:25he asked me if i was in my office and i
5:04:27informed him that i was a prisoner of
5:04:29the press and would be in shortly
5:04:32after my conversation with erlichmann
5:04:34the president called
5:04:36referring to our meeting on march 21st
5:04:39and the mccord letter he said well john
5:04:42you were right in your prediction
5:04:44he then suggested i go
5:04:46up to camp david and analyze the
5:04:48situation he did not instruct me to
5:04:50write a report rather he said go to camp
5:04:52david take your wife and get some
5:04:54relaxation
5:04:55he then alluded to the fact that
5:04:58that he'd been under all right
5:05:01decisions because i got this
5:05:04five minutes get over that this is a
5:05:06good training deal
5:05:10the committee has been working against
5:05:11the clock to get dean's prepared
5:05:13testimony completed today
5:05:15the problem this afternoon has been roll
5:05:16call votes on the senate floor senator
5:05:18irvin left to vote at this point
5:05:20confusing dean who thought a recess was
5:05:22called however other senators continued
5:05:24to run the hearing
5:05:40right here
5:05:57mr dean we're not trying to hurry you
5:05:59along but i stayed on the floor of the
5:06:00senate until this roll call began
5:06:02because in the last
5:06:04short roll call votes senator weiker i
5:06:07believe missed the vote i missed a vote
5:06:09and one or two others did so we're
5:06:10trying to interchange
5:06:12in the interest of time if you don't
5:06:13mind you might continue now thank you
5:06:15senator
5:06:18he then alluded to the fact that i've
5:06:20been under some rather intense public
5:06:22pressure
5:06:24lately but that he'd been through this
5:06:26all of his life and you can't let let it
5:06:28get to you
5:06:29he said that he was able to do his best
5:06:31thinking at camp david and i should get
5:06:33some rest and then assess where we are
5:06:35and where we go from here and report
5:06:37back to him i told him i would go
5:06:39my wife and i arrived at camp david in
5:06:41mid-afternoon as we entered the cabin in
5:06:44which we were staying the phone was
5:06:46ringing the operator said it was the
5:06:47president calling but holderman came on
5:06:49the phone
5:06:51holloman said that while i was there i
5:06:53should spend some time writing a report
5:06:55on everything i knew about the watergate
5:06:58i said i would do so i asked him if it
5:07:01was for internal use or public use he
5:07:03said that would be decided later i spent
5:07:06the rest of the day and the next day
5:07:08thinking about this entire matter i
5:07:10reached the conclusion based on earlier
5:07:12conversations i'd had with erlichman
5:07:14that he would never admit to his
5:07:15involvement in the cover-up i didn't
5:07:17know about haldeman but i assume that he
5:07:19would not because he would believe a
5:07:21higher duty to protect the president
5:07:23the more i thought about it the more i
5:07:25realized i should step forward because
5:07:26there was no way this situation was
5:07:28going to get better rather could only
5:07:30get worse
5:07:31my most difficult problem was how to end
5:07:33this mess without mortally wounding the
5:07:36president i had no answer because i felt
5:07:38that once i came forward the matter
5:07:40would be for the american people to
5:07:41decide and not for me to decide
5:07:44i finally concluded that i would have to
5:07:46think of some way for the president to
5:07:47get out in front of this matter despite
5:07:49what happened to everybody else
5:07:51i called mr moore and talked with him
5:07:53about it
5:07:54we talked about a presidential speech
5:07:57where the president would really lay the
5:07:59facts out we talked about immunity for
5:08:01everyone involved we talked
5:08:03about a special warrant type commission
5:08:06that would put the facts out
5:08:08we talked about some half measures that
5:08:09might satisfy the public interest
5:08:12but we both realized that nothing less
5:08:15than the truth would sell
5:08:17as i mentioned earlier moore and i had
5:08:19talked about some of these concepts on
5:08:21previous occasions but we still did not
5:08:23have an answer that would bring the full
5:08:25truth out because of the criminal
5:08:26implications of the behavior of those
5:08:28involved
5:08:30on saturday i began reconstructing all i
5:08:33knew and began writing a report i spent
5:08:35saturday afternoon and evening sunday
5:08:37and monday reconstructing and writing on
5:08:40monday i asked my secretary to come to
5:08:41camp david
5:08:43bring certain documents that i had
5:08:44requested and commenced typing i did not
5:08:47realize how difficult it would be to
5:08:49reconstruct my knowledge from memory
5:08:52i had not kept a diary or even a
5:08:53calendar of all my activities thus i had
5:08:57have been reconstructing my knowledge
5:08:59this matter since march 23rd to this day
5:09:02on sunday evening march 25th i was
5:09:04informed that the la times and the
5:09:06washington post were going to print a
5:09:08story that magruder and i had prior
5:09:10knowledge of the june 17th bugging of
5:09:12the democratic national committee i
5:09:14considered the story liable as then as i
5:09:16do today
5:09:17upon learning that the story was going
5:09:19to be printed i contacted an attorney mr
5:09:22tom hogan who was familiar with libel
5:09:24law we discussed the matter he then
5:09:26decided to put the newspapers on notice
5:09:28to preserve a libel suit in the event
5:09:30they printed the story
5:09:31i also told mr hogan that when i
5:09:33returned from camp david that i wanted
5:09:35to talk with him about the entire matter
5:09:38and ask him to think about someone who
5:09:40was a good criminal lawyer because i was
5:09:42planning to take certain steps in the
5:09:43near future
5:09:45i might add it was my thinking at that
5:09:47time that i would explain all the facts
5:09:50to a knowledgeable criminal lawyer to
5:09:51determine the potential problems of
5:09:53everyone involved from the president on
5:09:55down
5:09:56to get in to get independent advice on
5:09:58what i should do
5:10:00on monday morning march 26th i had a
5:10:03conversation with harlem about the story
5:10:05in the la times
5:10:06i told him i was prepared to file a
5:10:09libel suit and retained a lawyer to put
5:10:11the newspapers on notice i told him that
5:10:14he knew that i had not known of the june
5:10:1617th watergate break-in in advance
5:10:18that my knowledge of the entire matter
5:10:20ended with the second medium mitchell's
5:10:21office i told holloman that magruder
5:10:23knew that i had no prior knowledge but i
5:10:26didn't know if he would admit it public
5:10:29holloman concurred in the fact that i
5:10:31had no prior knowledge and suggested i
5:10:32call magruder and tape his conversation
5:10:36i did call magruder and by using a
5:10:37dictaphone held to the receiver i
5:10:39recorded the call i have submitted a
5:10:41transcript of this conversation to the
5:10:43committee exhibit number 36.
5:10:46the long and short of the conversation
5:10:47was the magruder acknowledged that new
5:10:49newspaper accounts were a bum wrap for
5:10:51me because i had not had prior knowledge
5:10:54of the break-in
5:10:56my secretary arrived at camp david on
5:10:58monday afternoon and began typing the
5:11:00report
5:11:02on monday night i had given additional
5:11:04thought to how the president might get
5:11:05out in front of this matter and how we
5:11:07could get everyone involved to speak the
5:11:09truth
5:11:10i called moore who was fairly
5:11:11conservative and
5:11:12conservative in his solution to problems
5:11:15and told him of my idea
5:11:17which i said was so far out that i
5:11:18thought it might solve the awful problem
5:11:21i have submitted to the committee
5:11:23exhibit number 37 a copy of my notes
5:11:25outlining my concept
5:11:27in brief the president would create an
5:11:29independent panel
5:11:31that would be investigator prosecutor
5:11:34judge and jury for everyone involved it
5:11:36would have would have the power to
5:11:37remove officials from office levy fines
5:11:40and imposed criminal sanctions
5:11:42it was designed to give every man a fair
5:11:45and full hearing and proceed in a manner
5:11:47where people would not be tried publicly
5:11:50finally after all the facts were in the
5:11:52panel would render its judgment on the
5:11:54individuals involved and report to the
5:11:56public
5:11:57i might note that if the special
5:11:58prosecutor and this committee were
5:12:00merged made independent and proceeded in
5:12:02camera he'd be very close to the concept
5:12:04i had proposed back on march 26th
5:12:09moore liked the idea and suggested i
5:12:11call haldeman
5:12:12which i did he was intrigued but not
5:12:14overwhelmed
5:12:16it was becoming increasingly clear that
5:12:17no one involved was willing to stand up
5:12:19and account for themselves
5:12:23after i had read the newspaper on
5:12:25tuesday march 27 the president had
5:12:28called me on monday morning march 26
5:12:30which he hadn't
5:12:31and expressed great confidence in me and
5:12:33the fact that i had not had prior
5:12:35knowledge of the break-in at the
5:12:36democratic national committee i decided
5:12:39to attempt to contact mr liddy who was
5:12:41the one man who could document the fact
5:12:43that we had never talked about his plans
5:12:45following the february 4th meeting in
5:12:46mitchell's office
5:12:48i called paul o'brien and asked him how
5:12:50i could get in contact with mr maroulis
5:12:52mr liddy's attorney
5:12:54o'brien gave me morales phone number but
5:12:57told me i could not reach him until late
5:12:58in the afternoon
5:13:00i called mr morales about 5 30 and asked
5:13:03him if i might get some sort of sworn
5:13:05statement from liddy regarding my lack
5:13:06of prior knowledge of the break-in at
5:13:08the democratic national committee
5:13:10i told him of the two meetings in
5:13:11mitchell's office and that mr liddy and
5:13:14i had never talked about his plans after
5:13:16the second meeting to this day i am
5:13:18convinced that if and when mr liddy ever
5:13:19talks he will tell the truth as he knows
5:13:21it
5:13:22i was hopeful that he would give me some
5:13:24sort of affidavit attesting to the facts
5:13:26but his lawyer was concerned about his
5:13:28fifth amendment problems
5:13:30mr marules called me back on march 29th
5:13:33after i had returned from camp david
5:13:36after he had talked with mr liddy i
5:13:39requested o'brien to
5:13:41make a memorandum of the call as he was
5:13:43with mr maroulis when he made the call
5:13:46i have submitted to the committee a copy
5:13:48of this document exhibit number 38 in
5:13:50which marulus advised me
5:13:53his client could not make such a
5:13:54statement because it might result in a
5:13:56waiver of his fifth amendment privileges
5:13:59that to give such a statement could be
5:14:00detrimental to others but that liddy did
5:14:02wish to convey that his reason for not
5:14:04providing such a statement was not
5:14:06because he disagreed with the facts but
5:14:08because of the advice of counsel
5:14:11it was the day before i had received
5:14:13this call march 28th that holloman had
5:14:15called me at camp david and requested
5:14:17that i return to washington
5:14:19he told me that there was a meeting with
5:14:21that he was meeting with mitchell and
5:14:22magruder and if they wish to meet with
5:14:24me
5:14:25i told holloman that i really did not
5:14:27wish to meet with mitchell and magruder
5:14:29but he was insistent that i return and
5:14:31meet with him i returned from camp david
5:14:33about 3 30 and went directly to
5:14:34holloman's office he told me that
5:14:36mitchell and magruder were waiting in
5:14:38another office for me i asked him why
5:14:40they wanted to talk to me and he said
5:14:42that they wanted to talk to me about my
5:14:44knowledge of the meetings in mitchell's
5:14:45office i told holloman that they were
5:14:47both aware of the situation and i wasn't
5:14:50going to lie if asked about those
5:14:51meetings holloman said that he didn't
5:14:53want to get into it but i should go in
5:14:55and work it out with mitchell magruder
5:14:58before discussing the meeting with
5:15:00mitchell and magruder i feel i should
5:15:02comment on my reaction to the discussion
5:15:04i had just had with mr haldeman
5:15:13knowing how freely and openly
5:15:16we had discussed these matters in the
5:15:18past i could tell that he was
5:15:20backpedaling fast
5:15:22that he was now in the process of
5:15:24uninvolving himself but keeping others
5:15:25involved
5:15:27this was a clear sign to me that mr
5:15:29haldeman was not going to come forward
5:15:31and help end this problem rather he was
5:15:33beginning to protect his flanks it was
5:15:35my reaction to this meeting with mr
5:15:37holloman and the
5:15:39evident changed attitude in my earlier
5:15:42dealings with ehrlichman where we
5:15:44where he had told me how i should handle
5:15:46various areas of my testimony should i
5:15:48be called before the grand jury
5:15:50that made me decide not to turn over to
5:15:52them the report i had written at camp
5:15:54david i have submitted to the committee
5:15:56a copy of the camp david report exhibit
5:15:5939 part of which was typed by my
5:16:01secretary at camp david the remainder in
5:16:03longhand which
5:16:05i had not put in final narrative form
5:16:07because i was called back to washington
5:16:11after departing mr holliman's office
5:16:14i went to meet mitchell and magruder
5:16:17after an exchange of pleasantries they
5:16:18told me they wish to talk to me about
5:16:20how i would handle
5:16:22any testimonial appearances regarding
5:16:23the january 27th and february fourth
5:16:26meetings which had occurred in
5:16:28mitchell's office
5:16:30i told them
5:16:31that we had been through this before and
5:16:33they knew well my understanding of the
5:16:35facts as they had occurred at the time
5:16:38mitchell indicated that if i so
5:16:39testified it could cause problems
5:16:42magruder then raised the fact that i had
5:16:43a previously agreed in an earlier
5:16:45meeting that i would follow the
5:16:47testimonial approach that they had taken
5:16:48before the grand jury
5:16:50i told them i recalled the meeting
5:16:52magruder then said it had been i who had
5:16:55suggested that the meetings be treated
5:16:57as dealing exclusively election laws and
5:17:00that explained my presence
5:17:01at this point in time i decided i did
5:17:03not wish to get into a debate regarding
5:17:05that meeting
5:17:06they both repeated to me
5:17:08that if i testified other than i
5:17:11other than they had it would only cause
5:17:14problems i said i understood that i told
5:17:16them that there was no certainty that i
5:17:19would be called before the grand jury or
5:17:20the senate committee and if i were
5:17:22called i might invoke executive
5:17:24privilege so the question of my
5:17:25testimony was still moot i did not want
5:17:27to just i did not want to discuss the
5:17:30subject further so i tried to move them
5:17:31off of it
5:17:32they were obviously both disappointed
5:17:34that i was being reluctant and agreeing
5:17:36to continue to perpetuate their earlier
5:17:38testimony
5:17:39the only other matter of substance that
5:17:41came up during that meeting was when i
5:17:43made the point
5:17:45that i had never asked mitchell about
5:17:47his involvement in the matter and i had
5:17:49no intention
5:17:51of asking him at that time
5:17:53i said
5:17:54to
5:17:55i said to this day i do not fully
5:17:57understand
5:17:58how the lady plan got into operation can
5:18:00only speculate based on the tidbits of
5:18:02information i know i then offered my
5:18:05hypothesis of what had happened that is
5:18:08that at some point after the second
5:18:10meeting in mitchell's office there had
5:18:11been pressure put on to get the plan
5:18:13approved that had been approved without
5:18:15anyone really understanding its full
5:18:17import mitchell said something to the
5:18:19effect that my theory was not far from
5:18:22wrong only they thought it would be
5:18:23three or four times removed from the
5:18:25committee
5:18:27the meeting terminated shortly
5:18:28thereafter it was not a lengthy meeting
5:18:30as far as magruder and mitchell were
5:18:32concerned it was certainly less than
5:18:34satisfactory for them
5:18:37on either march 28th or 29th
5:18:40mr krogh came to my office because he
5:18:42happened to be in the executive office
5:18:44building he said he had come to express
5:18:46sympathy for me as a result of the
5:18:47adverse publicity i had received during
5:18:49the grey hearings
5:18:50he then began telling me
5:18:52that he had not himself had a good day
5:18:54since his own confirmation hearings and
5:18:56he had been haunted by his experiences
5:18:58at the white house
5:19:00i told krog that i thought that
5:19:03there was a very likely possibility that
5:19:05senate watergate committee could stumble
5:19:07into the ellsberg burglary
5:19:09i told him that there were documents in
5:19:11the possession of the justice department
5:19:14which had been provided by the cia
5:19:16in connection with the watergate
5:19:18investigation which contained pictures
5:19:20of liddy standing in front of ellsberg's
5:19:22doctor's office in california i told him
5:19:24that i had learned from the cia that the
5:19:26pictures had been left in a camera
5:19:27returned by hunter the cia and the cia
5:19:29had developed the pictures
5:19:31i said i did not believe that the
5:19:32justice department knew what the
5:19:33pictures were all about
5:19:35but that any investigator worth his salt
5:19:37would probably track down the incident
5:19:39as a result of the pictures
5:19:41i told him that ehrlichman had requested
5:19:43that i retrieve the documents from the
5:19:45justice department and get them back to
5:19:47the cia where they might be withheld
5:19:49from the committee investigators but the
5:19:51cia had been unwilling to do so
5:19:53krog was very distressed to hear this
5:19:55news but said that maybe it was best
5:19:58in that he had been personally haunted
5:20:00by the incident for so long that he
5:20:02would like to get it out in the open
5:20:04we then entered into a discussion about
5:20:06the incident
5:20:07and i asked him if he had received his
5:20:09authorization to proceed
5:20:11with the burglary from ehrlichman
5:20:13knowing well that croak would not
5:20:15undertake such a mission
5:20:16himself
5:20:18kroger responded that no he said
5:20:22krog responded that no he did not
5:20:24believe that ehrlichman had been aware
5:20:25of the incident until shortly after it
5:20:27occurred
5:20:28rather he had received his orders right
5:20:30out of the oval office
5:20:32i was so surprised to hear that i said
5:20:35you must be kidding he repeated again
5:20:37that he received his instructions out of
5:20:39the oval office
5:20:41mr kroger also indicated to me that he
5:20:43thought that he might have purged
5:20:45himself during the confirmation hearings
5:20:47and was very bothered by that he said
5:20:49that
5:20:49he thought that he had been asked some
5:20:51questions about the cubans
5:20:53that he probably could have answered was
5:20:55afraid to open up the whole area the
5:20:56plumber's operation so he did not
5:20:58properly answer the question
5:21:00he had never really studied his
5:21:02transcript to determine if he had or had
5:21:04not purged himself but was concerned
5:21:05about it
5:21:07i told him there might be a possible
5:21:09solution to his problem if there was
5:21:11some way we could get him immunized on
5:21:13national security basis and get the
5:21:15matter out in the open on that basis or
5:21:17some sort of procedure that would remedy
5:21:18his plight i said i did not have
5:21:20anything specific in mind
5:21:22but it was something that we might talk
5:21:24about talk to henry peterson about
5:21:26sometime in the future
5:21:28shortly after kroger left my office
5:21:30i had a call from erlichmann who told me
5:21:33that kroge had been
5:21:34in to see him about the matters we had
5:21:37just talked about
5:21:38he said he was convinced the crow had
5:21:40not perjured himself but he requested
5:21:42that i call peterson to explore how we
5:21:44might deal with krog's situation
5:21:46i told erlickman that i did not think it
5:21:48was an appropriate time to call right
5:21:50now
5:21:50but that maybe we could call in the near
5:21:52future before the senate committee came
5:21:54across the documents and the justice
5:21:56department
5:21:57in at the justice department it would
5:21:58unravel the entire matter i never called
5:22:01peterson on this matter
5:22:11following my meeting with mitchell
5:22:13magruder on march 28th
5:22:15i realized that i was under pressure
5:22:17from both within the white house and
5:22:19without
5:22:20to either not testify or falsely testify
5:22:23i had earlier discussed with erlickman
5:22:25that if i was called upon to testify
5:22:28that i would probably be asked questions
5:22:30about the dean investigations my
5:22:32dealings with the fbi
5:22:33the handlings of the material and hunts
5:22:35safe and the like
5:22:37i recall testing erlichman's reaction to
5:22:39my testimony and got the result i
5:22:41expected
5:22:42he asked me for example of a problem
5:22:44area i then told him
5:22:48that i would probably have to explain
5:22:50the delay of turning over materials
5:22:52to the fbi from hunt's office
5:22:55i said that the reason that i had
5:22:56delayed was because of his instruction
5:22:58that i deep six and shred the evidence
5:23:00harlequin told me that he didn't think
5:23:02that i would have to explain the delay
5:23:03that way rather i could say that i was
5:23:05making an inventory
5:23:07i told him that i had not made an
5:23:09inventory and he said well i'm sure you
5:23:11can think of something
5:23:13i have mentioned that i received what i
5:23:15considered an indication from holloman
5:23:17when i had met with him regarding
5:23:19magruder and mitchell's meeting on the
5:23:2028th
5:23:22and that he was protecting himself
5:23:25i also realized that when erlechmann
5:23:27called me after the conversation with
5:23:28kroger that he was trying to tell me
5:23:30that what kroger early told me might not
5:23:32be correct and i felt that he was
5:23:34somewhat unhappy that crow had given me
5:23:36the information he had
5:23:38by march 29th erlichman and holloman
5:23:41fully realized that i was not playing
5:23:43ball and in fact could present a serious
5:23:46problem to them
5:23:47it was also evident to me that they were
5:23:49doing everything they could to protect
5:23:50themselves against my knowledge
5:23:53i had been in continuous contact since
5:23:55march 25th with my attorney thomas hogan
5:23:58regarding
5:24:00whom he felt was the best available man
5:24:02in the criminal law field that i might
5:24:04discuss this entire matter with
5:24:06we had talked on several occasions about
5:24:08charles schaffer
5:24:10whom i met several years ago
5:24:13and regarded highly as a criminal lawyer
5:24:15on march 28th and 29th however i made
5:24:18several other calls to friends to ask
5:24:20them for suggested names of
5:24:21knowledgeable criminal lawyers but
5:24:23decided on march 30th the 30th that i
5:24:26would retain mr shaffer if i if he were
5:24:28available
5:24:29mr hogan informed me that he was and we
5:24:32arranged to meet with him
5:24:37the president along with holloman and
5:24:38erikman were going to be in california
5:24:40for a week or more in connection with
5:24:41president twos
5:24:43or the meeting
5:24:44along with the president's meeting with
5:24:45president two of south vietnam and i
5:24:48felt that this would give me an
5:24:49opportunity to decide how best i could
5:24:51come forward and in this matter
5:24:53i decided that i was going to inform the
5:24:56prosecutors of what the case was all
5:24:58about but before i did so i felt i
5:25:00should consult with council to determine
5:25:02the scope of my own problems
5:25:05on march 30th shortly after lunch i met
5:25:07mr hogan and mr shaffer i spent five
5:25:10hours telling them everything that i
5:25:11could remember and telling them
5:25:13that i was unwilling to continue to the
5:25:15cover-up mr shaffer advised me to avoid
5:25:17further conversations regarding this
5:25:19subject
5:25:20and said that
5:25:22he would like to talk to me again on
5:25:23monday morning prior to seeing the
5:25:25prosecutors accordingly we met on monday
5:25:28morning april 2nd and discussed the
5:25:30matter for several hours more
5:25:32that afternoon my attorneys went to the
5:25:34government prosecutors and told them
5:25:36that i was willing to come forward with
5:25:38everything i knew about the case
5:25:40they then followed a number of meetings
5:25:42between my attorneys and the prosecutors
5:25:44and myself and the prosecutors
5:25:49and myself and the prosecutors in which
5:25:51we began to unfold everything i knew
5:25:53about the case from the outset
5:25:55i was confronted with the problems of
5:25:57executive privilege attorney-client
5:25:59privilege and national security thus it
5:26:01was agreed until these problems were
5:26:02resolved that i would exclude matters
5:26:05involving the president from these
5:26:06conversations
5:26:08i was also one
5:26:10i was also uncertain of many of the
5:26:12dates and details of the facts that i
5:26:14had general knowledge of so i began
5:26:15reconstructing the chronology of the
5:26:17events
5:26:18as each section session progressed i was
5:26:20able to provide more information more
5:26:22leads and more explanations of the inner
5:26:24relationships within the white house and
5:26:26the relationships of persons who were
5:26:27involved
5:26:29during the period of april 2nd until
5:26:31april 15th the meetings i had with the
5:26:33prosecutors were initially focusing on
5:26:35the activities
5:26:37which had led up to the june 17th
5:26:39break-in at the democratic national
5:26:40committee and all the knowledge i had
5:26:42regarding the events before june 17th
5:26:45but as our discussions evolved and i
5:26:47began telling them more and more of the
5:26:48cover-up their interest began to focus
5:26:50more and more in that area
5:26:52as i as i began explaining what i knew
5:26:56what i knew it was evident that the
5:26:57prosecutors had no conception of how
5:26:59extensive the cover-up was
5:27:01so i tried to provide them with all the
5:27:03details that i could remember
5:27:05also
5:27:06as the conversations regarding the
5:27:08cover-up began getting into more and
5:27:10more specifics we moved into areas that
5:27:13came closer and closer to the president
5:27:15but prior to april 15 i did not discuss
5:27:18any of the areas of presidential
5:27:20involvement
5:27:22during the time i was having conferences
5:27:24with the government prosecutors i was
5:27:26avoiding conversations with mitchell
5:27:27erlichman and holloman as much as i
5:27:29could
5:27:30however on several occasions i did talk
5:27:32with erlichmann while he was in
5:27:33california
5:27:35at one point he called me to ask me if i
5:27:37completed my report that i had been
5:27:38working on a camp david i told him it
5:27:41was still incomplete
5:27:42he said that i should send him whatever
5:27:44i had completed i told him that a
5:27:46section dealing with sigretti's
5:27:48activities which have been prepared by
5:27:50dick moore but which i had not reviewed
5:27:52myself was complete as far as i was
5:27:54concerned and i would send it to him
5:27:57he said i should send it to california
5:27:58immediately on the dex machine
5:28:00he said that holloman was interested in
5:28:02getting these facts out now because the
5:28:04timing might be right i sent the report
5:28:07that had been written by moore a copy of
5:28:09which i've submitted to the committee
5:28:10exhibit number 40.
5:28:20i also had a conversation with mitchell
5:28:22about paul o'brien going out to visit
5:28:23holloman in california
5:28:26mitchell told me that he wanted o'brien
5:28:27to go out and visit with haldeman and
5:28:29that he had worked out the meeting
5:28:32i felt like telling mitchell
5:28:34that i thought that when i learned that
5:28:35the meeting had been switched from
5:28:37holloman to ehrlichman that o'brien was
5:28:39being set up that ehrlichman would probe
5:28:41him on everything he knew about mitchell
5:28:43dean and anyone else involved i did not
5:28:46know if
5:28:47if this in fact occurred but knowing
5:28:48that ehrlichman and haldeman were very
5:28:50busy protecting their flanks
5:28:52i would have to believe that it did
5:28:53occur
5:28:54i have never talked with o'brien about
5:28:56what did occur during his meeting with
5:28:58erlickman
5:28:59relichman also asked me if i knew when i
5:29:02would be called before the grand jury
5:29:04i told him i did not
5:29:06but that my lawyers were discussing the
5:29:08matter with the prosecutors i did not
5:29:10tell him that i had already met with the
5:29:12prosecutors
5:29:13but he told me that he wanted to know
5:29:17when i was going to be called because he
5:29:18wanted to talk to me before i appeared
5:29:21i believe that the president returned
5:29:22from california on sunday april 8th i
5:29:25was scheduled to meet with the
5:29:26prosecutors that afternoon
5:29:28my attorneys have been discussing my
5:29:30testimony with the prosecutors and they
5:29:33had worked out an arrangement whereby i
5:29:35could give the prosecutors my knowledge
5:29:36directly and what i told them would not
5:29:39later be used against me if they should
5:29:40prosecute me
5:29:42i felt that i should tell haldeman that
5:29:44i was going to meet with the prosecutors
5:29:46personally so i called
5:29:48him in california on the morning of
5:29:49april 8th before they departed for
5:29:51washington
5:29:53i made the call from mr shaffer's office
5:29:56and when i told him this he said that i
5:29:58should not meet with the prosecutors
5:30:00because as he said once the toothpaste
5:30:02is out of the tube it's going to be very
5:30:04hard to get it back in
5:30:06after this comment i did not tell
5:30:08holloman whether i would or would not
5:30:10meet with them and in fact the meeting
5:30:12went up forward
5:30:13during the meeting and while the
5:30:15president was flying east i received a
5:30:17call from air force one from mr higbee
5:30:22who asked me to be in wisdom's
5:30:24ehrlichman's code name office
5:30:26at a certain time for a meeting i
5:30:28believe the meeting was set for four or
5:30:30five o'clock
5:30:31i departed from the meeting with the
5:30:32prosecutors to go into the white house i
5:30:35went to ehrlichman's office
5:30:37there i found erlichmann and halderman
5:30:40who had just arrived from anders air
5:30:42force base and were
5:30:44and we chatted for a brief moment about
5:30:46their trip
5:30:47i raised the fact that i had read in the
5:30:49paper that morning that coulson had
5:30:50taken a lie detector test i said that i
5:30:53hope everyone is willing to take such
5:30:55lie detector test because it will
5:30:56probably be necessary now that coulson
5:30:58has taken a test
5:31:00they asked me if i had met yet with the
5:31:01prosecutors or knew when i would be
5:31:03called before the grand jury i avoided a
5:31:06direct answer to the question by saying
5:31:08that my lawyers were still having
5:31:09discussions with the prosecutors about
5:31:11my appearance before the grand jury
5:31:14i was then asked some questions about
5:31:16testimonial areas
5:31:17but i gave them evasive answers even
5:31:20these evasive answers which related
5:31:22raised matters which related to them
5:31:24brought forth responses they did not
5:31:26remember it quite as i did
5:31:29during the week of april 9th to april
5:31:3114th i had several conversations with
5:31:33erlichmann and holloman but tried to
5:31:35avoid them as much as possible
5:31:37i recall some discussions however
5:31:38regarding getting mitchell to step
5:31:40forward the theory that had been
5:31:42discussed before they went to california
5:31:44was becoming the policy if mitchell
5:31:47takes the rap the public will have a
5:31:48high level person and be satisfied and
5:31:50the matter will finally end
5:31:52i felt during each encounter i had with
5:31:55them
5:31:56that i was very much a problem for them
5:31:58but they did not want me to know that
5:32:00they felt so however
5:32:02after having been involved with them for
5:32:03months on end in this matter was very
5:32:05easy for me to recognize the changed
5:32:07attitude and on occasion they were
5:32:09almost patronizing and dealing with me
5:32:12on monday april 9th mitchell called me
5:32:15and told me he was coming to washington
5:32:17and wanted to meet with me
5:32:18i informed
5:32:20erlichmann and haldeman of mitchell's
5:32:22request and they both wanted me to meet
5:32:24with him i also discussed this with
5:32:26council and there was some discussion
5:32:28with the government about the meeting
5:32:30the prosecutors were interested in my
5:32:32taping the conversation but i told them
5:32:35i thought that was most unfair to do to
5:32:36mitchell and i would not go in and set
5:32:39him up
5:32:40after discussing this further
5:32:43with my attorney and rejecting the
5:32:44suggestion that i record the
5:32:46conversation
5:32:47i agreed to meet with mitchell but i
5:32:49have been instructed by council to
5:32:50prepare a memorandum of the meeting as
5:32:52soon as the meeting was over
5:32:54i agreed to do this
5:32:55and i have submitted a copy of the
5:32:57memorandum of to the committee exhibit
5:32:59number 41.
5:33:00the sum and substance of the meeting was
5:33:02that if and when i were called to
5:33:04testify
5:33:05i would testify fully and honestly
5:33:08mitchell said that he understood and did
5:33:10not suggest that i do otherwise he did
5:33:12however believe that my testimony would
5:33:14be very harmful to the president and
5:33:16said he felt that i should not testify
5:33:18if at all possible i reported my meeting
5:33:21with mitchell to harlem and erickman
5:33:22later
5:33:24there were other discussions that week
5:33:25in which holderman and ehrlichman talked
5:33:27about pinning the entire matter on
5:33:28mitchell i listened with some interest
5:33:30because i did not feel that they would
5:33:33succeed at this and i felt that also
5:33:35they would have to be thinking about how
5:33:37to handle the cover-up tech activities
5:33:39and felt that i would undoubtedly be a
5:33:41target for them to pin everything
5:33:43with regard to the cover-up on
5:33:45as holloman and ellickman began to
5:33:47discuss more and more about getting
5:33:49mitchell to take the blame for
5:33:50authorizing this plan in the first
5:33:52instance i began to increase my
5:33:54conversations with the prosecutors about
5:33:56the cover-up
5:33:57the more i told the prosecutors about
5:33:59the cover-up the more interested they
5:34:00became in it
5:34:02at this time holdem and erlichmann were
5:34:05still unaware of my direct dealings with
5:34:06the prosecutors on friday april 13th
5:34:09fred larue came to my office to see me
5:34:11before he arrived in my office i again
5:34:14contacted my attorney to advise him that
5:34:16larue wanted to see me
5:34:17and ask me what i should do
5:34:21and i asked him what i should do
5:34:23he again said that he thought i ought to
5:34:25meet with larue not to get into
5:34:27testimonial areas but to make a
5:34:29memorandum of the meeting
5:34:31i have submitted a copy of that
5:34:32memorandum to the committee exhibit
5:34:34number 42
5:34:36when larue and i met larue told me he
5:34:38thought he was going to be called before
5:34:39the grand jury shortly
5:34:41and he wanted to know what i was going
5:34:43to do
5:34:44if i was called i told him i was going
5:34:46to tell the truth i told him i did not
5:34:48believe we should talk about testimony
5:34:50because
5:34:51we could be asked that very question in
5:34:53and of itself before the grand jury
5:34:55larue said
5:34:56let me just ask one question
5:34:59he asked me if i had made any decisions
5:35:01on the money and i told him that i had
5:35:03not but i had merely passed messages
5:35:05along and returned messages
5:35:08he said that he had assumed that to be
5:35:10the case
5:35:11and asked me how i was going to handle
5:35:13the persons above me who were involved i
5:35:16told him again that i was going to
5:35:17withhold nothing from the grand jury and
5:35:19if asked i would respond
5:35:21mr larue also said that he needed some
5:35:23legal advice and i suggested that rather
5:35:25than getting it from me that he ought to
5:35:27get independent counsel
5:35:29i liked fred larue very much and felt
5:35:32very sorry for him realizing that this
5:35:33is probably the last conversation we'd
5:35:35have for some time
5:35:37and he was in the middle of the matter
5:35:38not necessarily by his own choice but by
5:35:40the circumstances he found himself in at
5:35:42the time
5:35:44the strategy that was
5:35:45now developing
5:35:47was a partial uncovering of the cover-up
5:35:50that is to get mitchell to step forward
5:35:53on friday april 13th i went to
5:35:54ehrlichman's office where erlichmann and
5:35:56haldeman
5:35:58were present and discussing a meeting
5:36:00they had just had with colson and his
5:36:02attorney mr shapiro
5:36:04they informed me that coulson had
5:36:05developed a plan to deal with the matter
5:36:07and that mitchell should be smoked out
5:36:10ehrlichman said that coulson had
5:36:12concluded that obviously mitchell had
5:36:14signed off on this matter and that he
5:36:16should take the responsibility for it to
5:36:18end this thing
5:36:19herlockman also said that coulson had
5:36:21made had had some other ideas including
5:36:24the fact that the gray hearings have
5:36:25been very damaging to me publicly
5:36:27and i certainly should not take any
5:36:29position out in front
5:36:31dealing with the urban committee
5:36:32hearings because of this i might add
5:36:34that erlichman and holloman were most
5:36:36cynical about colson's suggestion and
5:36:38said to me that he was really scrambling
5:36:40to protect himself
5:36:42after discussing the colson plan they
5:36:44told me that mitchell would be coming
5:36:45down to talk about this entire matter
5:36:48there was some discussion as to how to
5:36:50smoke mitchell out
5:36:52by the week's end it had been decided
5:36:54that the president would meet with
5:36:55mitchell and ask him about his knowledge
5:36:57and hopefully the president would be
5:36:59able to get mitchell to come forward
5:37:01i told him i doubted very seriously if
5:37:03mitchell would say anything to anyone
5:37:05about this matter
5:37:07while these discussions were going on
5:37:08the president called ehrlichman and they
5:37:10had a brief discussion about the matter
5:37:13i also recall that at one point in the
5:37:15conversation erlichman said that he's
5:37:17right here referring to me
5:37:20on saturday april fourteenth i requested
5:37:22my attorney mr shaffer to come to my
5:37:24office
5:37:25i told him that mitchell was coming down
5:37:27to meet with the president that there
5:37:28was going to be an effort to smoke him
5:37:30out
5:37:31i asked him if he had any ideas that
5:37:33ehrlichman and holliman had asked me if
5:37:35i had any ideas mr shaffer gave me a
5:37:38former prosecutor's answer that what
5:37:40mitchell needs is a good
5:37:41cross-examination
5:37:43i told him i did not think it was
5:37:44possible by the president because the
5:37:46president was not the cross-examining
5:37:48type
5:37:49he also made a couple of other
5:37:50suggestions which would have resulted in
5:37:52the president having to appear before
5:37:53the grand jury if he got any admissions
5:37:55from mitchell i passed these suggestions
5:37:57along subsequently to erlachmann and
5:37:59holloman but they were not viable
5:38:01suggestions
5:38:09mr shaffer and i then sat down and began
5:38:12reviewing all of the facts that i had
5:38:13related to him i told him i wanted his
5:38:16opinion based on conversations with the
5:38:18prosecutors and his own knowledge of the
5:38:20criminal law
5:38:21as to who had problems and who could be
5:38:23indicted
5:38:24and who were targets of the grand jury
5:38:27mr shaffer and i discussed this for a
5:38:29while and then i prepared a list of who
5:38:31was likely to be indicted as the
5:38:33investigation proceeded
5:38:36i had guests for lunch and it was after
5:38:38lunch that i met with dick moore
5:38:40i had a list in front of me and thought
5:38:42that i would see what moore's reaction
5:38:44to it was because i was planning to take
5:38:46it to erickman and holloman later i
5:38:48showed the list to dick moore and told
5:38:50him that he'd been prepared based on
5:38:51conversations with my attorney and his
5:38:53knowledge of the involvement of various
5:38:55persons
5:38:56i told him i felt that everybody on the
5:38:58list was a potential subject of an
5:38:59indictment
5:39:00when i showed moore the list he was
5:39:02quite upset he said that if indeed that
5:39:05occurred it would be a tremendous
5:39:06tragedy to this country
5:39:08he was shaken by the list and the
5:39:10seriousness with which i discussed it
5:39:11with him but i was very serious in my
5:39:14desire to stop the cover-up with
5:39:15erlichmann and holdemon so i appreciated
5:39:18moore's reaction
5:39:19i have submitted a copy of the document
5:39:21i referred to to this committee exhibit
5:39:2343.
5:39:25later that afternoon
5:39:27i went to ehrlichman's office where
5:39:29eliquid and holloman were discussing
5:39:30mitchell's visit i learned that mitchell
5:39:32had me met briefly with ehrlichman
5:39:35but not with the president ehrlichman
5:39:37said that mitchell was not talking
5:39:39and certainly that did not surprise me
5:39:47and i certainly was not surprised he
5:39:49would not talk with erlichmann either i
5:39:51then pulled the list i had prepared out
5:39:53of my pocket
5:39:55and told
5:39:56them
5:39:57that i discussed everyone's problem with
5:39:59my lawyers and my lawyers had had
5:40:01conversations with the prosecutors as
5:40:03well
5:40:04and i thought that the following persons
5:40:06would be indicted i then read them the
5:40:08list
5:40:10i told them that my attorney had learned
5:40:12from the prosecutor from his discussions
5:40:14with the prosecutors that not only was
5:40:17dean
5:40:18a target of the grand jury but
5:40:19ehrlichman and holloman were also very
5:40:21much targets of the grand jury
5:40:23erlichman said that he had just talked
5:40:25with klein a few days earlier about the
5:40:27grand jury
5:40:28and that he had no knowledge he had no
5:40:30such report from findings
5:40:33i said that my lawyer appears to know
5:40:35more
5:40:36than the attorney general does because i
5:40:38believe he's probably more informed in
5:40:40that he has had direct conversations
5:40:43with the prosecutors
5:40:44i did not tell them at that point that i
5:40:47had had private meetings with the
5:40:48prosecutors or that i had told the
5:40:50prosecutors of the extent of the
5:40:51involvement of holloman and arlington
5:40:53when this meeting ended it was quite i
5:40:56was quite confident that i had gotten
5:40:57the message through to ehrlichman and
5:40:59haldeman that they had a serious problem
5:41:01themselves and i put them on final
5:41:03notice that i wasn't playing cover-up
5:41:06playing the cover-up game any
5:41:08longer it was late that night that i
5:41:12realized that indeed my message had
5:41:13gotten through about one o'clock on
5:41:16saturday night or sunday morning i
5:41:19received a call from mr shaffer
5:41:21he said the prosecutors had called him
5:41:23and that they were going to have to
5:41:25breach the agreement that they had made
5:41:27regarding keeping all my conversations
5:41:30with them private
5:41:31the prosecutors had reported to mr
5:41:33shaffer that the attorney general had
5:41:35called mr peterson and then wanted a
5:41:37full report on everything that was going
5:41:39on
5:41:40before the grand jury and where the
5:41:42grand jury was headed
5:41:44the meeting with the attorney general
5:41:45was to occur about two o'clock
5:41:48or about two a.m at the attorney
5:41:49general's home
5:41:51the prosecutors also reported that the
5:41:53reason they felt they had to breach
5:41:56the agreement was because
5:41:58the attorney general was being summoned
5:42:00to the president's office the next
5:42:01morning to discuss the entire matter
5:42:03i told mr shaffer that i had hoped to
5:42:05tell a president personally that i had
5:42:07gone to the prosecutors several weeks
5:42:08ago but that i had not that i had
5:42:11understood why this was occurring and
5:42:13obviously there was nothing we could do
5:42:14about it now
5:42:16i told shaffer
5:42:18that we certainly had gotten the message
5:42:19through to ehrlichman holderman that
5:42:21they have problems and that the cover-up
5:42:24may now begin to
5:42:25unravel at last
5:42:28on sunday april 15th i went to mr
5:42:31shaffer's office for an all-day meeting
5:42:33i learned during the day that erlickman
5:42:35had been trying to reach me during the
5:42:37better part of the day but i decided not
5:42:38to return his call when i returned home
5:42:41about 7 30 the white house operator
5:42:43called me again and said that ehrlichman
5:42:44had been trying to reach me
5:42:46i then returned his call he told me
5:42:49that he was going back to his office to
5:42:51do some work that night
5:42:53would be in about eight o'clock and
5:42:54would like to meet with me very much i
5:42:56told him i would meet with him
5:42:58i was quite aware of the reason that
5:42:59ehrlichman wanted to meet with me was
5:43:01because i was sure that he had learned
5:43:02from the president what was going on as
5:43:04a result of the president's meeting
5:43:06with clint easton peterson and the fact
5:43:08that i had been to the prosecutors and
5:43:10had obviously come out
5:43:13as i had noted earlier i had not at any
5:43:16time discussed presidential involvement
5:43:18with the prosecutors so the discussions
5:43:21that peterson and kleindiest had with
5:43:22the president obviously focused on the
5:43:24involvement of holloman ehrlichman dean
5:43:26mitchell magruder strong and others that
5:43:28i had discussed
5:43:31after erlickman's call i called mr
5:43:32shaffer and we discussed the wisdom of
5:43:34the meeting
5:43:35i told him i did not want to meet with
5:43:36erlickman and he agreed subsequently i
5:43:39tried to reach her lichmann to turn the
5:43:41meeting off but learned he is already in
5:43:43route to the office
5:43:44i called mr shaffer back and told him
5:43:46that i thought i ought to meet with the
5:43:47president and i should call rosemary
5:43:49woods and have her give a message to the
5:43:51president
5:43:52he said he saw no problem with my
5:43:54talking with the president to tell him
5:43:55why i had gone to the prosecutors i
5:43:58attended i attempted to reach rosemary
5:44:00woods but she was out of the city
5:44:02i then wrote out a message for the
5:44:04president and phoned mr higbee and
5:44:06requested that higbee relate the matter
5:44:08to haldeman erlichmann and on to the
5:44:10president i have submitted a copy to the
5:44:13committee of the message i sent the
5:44:14president at 8 15 sunday april 15th
5:44:17exhibit number 44.
5:44:26in short
5:44:28i told the president
5:44:29i hope that he did not interpret my
5:44:31going to the prosecutors as an act of
5:44:33disloyalty that i did not wish to speak
5:44:35with ehrlichman at this time that i
5:44:37would meet with him if he wished to
5:44:38discuss the matter with me and that i
5:44:41thought
5:44:42that he should get his legal advice from
5:44:43henry peterson
5:44:45within 45 minutes of sending the message
5:44:47i had a call from the white house
5:44:48operator informing me that the president
5:44:50wished to meet with me at nine o'clock
5:44:53it was shortly after nine when i arrived
5:44:54at the president's eob office
5:44:57as i was driving into the white house i
5:44:59wondered to myself if the meeting was a
5:45:01setup by a setup i mean was the
5:45:04president going to try to smoke out of
5:45:05me what erlichmann and holloman had
5:45:07obviously been trying to do
5:45:09and been unable to do
5:45:11and knowing the fact that i would not
5:45:13play games with the president
5:45:15that the information would come out
5:45:17i decided
5:45:18i couldn't worry about that and i had a
5:45:20duty to explain to the president why i
5:45:22was doing what i had done
5:45:26meeting with the president on april 15th
5:45:29the president was very cordial when we
5:45:31met i was somewhat shaken when i went in
5:45:33to meet with him because i knew i had
5:45:35taken it upon myself to end the cover-up
5:45:38and what i had started was going to
5:45:40cause serious problems for the president
5:45:42i shall attempt to recall the highlights
5:45:44of the conversation that transpired
5:45:46on the meeting which occurred about nine
5:45:48o'clock on april 15th
5:45:50i told the president that i had gone to
5:45:52the prosecutors and i did not believe
5:45:54that this was an act of disloyalty but
5:45:55rather in the end would be an act of
5:45:57loyalty i told him i felt this matter
5:46:00had to end i informed the president
5:46:02that i told the prosecutors of my own
5:46:04involvement in the involvement of others
5:46:06at one point in the conversation i
5:46:08recall the president asking me about
5:46:10holloman's knowledge of the ladies of
5:46:11liddy's plans
5:46:13he asked me if i had told him earlier
5:46:15about the fact that i had met with
5:46:17haldeman after the second meeting in
5:46:18mitchell's office and told holloman what
5:46:21was going on and my reaction to what was
5:46:23going on i told the president i had
5:46:25reported this fact to him earlier the
5:46:27president then made some reference to
5:46:28henry peterson
5:46:30asking
5:46:31about why holderman had not turned
5:46:34turned it off at that point and told me
5:46:36to testify that i had told holloman
5:46:38about the meeting in mitchell's office
5:46:40the president almost from the outset
5:46:42began asking me a number of leading
5:46:44questions which was somewhat unlike his
5:46:47normal
5:46:48conversational relationships i'd had
5:46:50with him which made me think that the
5:46:52conversation was being taped and a
5:46:54record was being made to protect himself
5:46:57although i became aware of this because
5:46:59of the nature of the conversation i
5:47:01decided i did not know it for a fact and
5:47:03that i had to believe that the president
5:47:05would not
5:47:06take such a conversation
5:47:08some question came up by the president
5:47:11as to whether i had immunity as best i
5:47:13can recall i told
5:47:15him my lawyers had discussed this with
5:47:17the prosecutors but certainly i had no
5:47:19deal with the government
5:47:21he told me that he did not want to do
5:47:23anything to hurt my negotiations with
5:47:24the government
5:47:26i do recall i do not recall commenting
5:47:29on his comment regarding that
5:47:31i also recall that the conversation
5:47:33turned to the matter of litty not
5:47:35talking
5:47:36he said something about liddy is waiting
5:47:38for a signal and i told him that
5:47:40possibly he was waiting for a signal
5:47:42from the president
5:47:43i discussed with him the fact that maybe
5:47:45if liddy's lawyer met with him
5:47:48that liddy would begin to open up and i
5:47:50said that i thought that it would be
5:47:51very helpful if that he did talk
5:47:54it was during this part of the
5:47:55conversation the president picked up the
5:47:56telephone and called henry peterson and
5:47:58pretended with peterson that i was not
5:48:00in the room but that the matter had
5:48:02of ladies coming forward and talking had
5:48:04arisen during our conversation
5:48:07the president relayed to peterson that
5:48:09if liddy's lawyer wanted to see him to
5:48:11get a signal from the president the
5:48:12president was willing to do this
5:48:14the president also asked me about
5:48:16peterson and i told him that if anyone
5:48:17could give him good advice henry
5:48:19peterson could
5:48:20the president also asked me if i
5:48:22remembered what day it was in march
5:48:25that i had reported to him on some of
5:48:26the details of the watergate matter
5:48:29he said that he thought it was the 21st
5:48:31but wasn't certain
5:48:32i said that i could not recall for
5:48:34certain without checking
5:48:36at another point in the conversation
5:48:39the matter of the degree
5:48:41of discussions that i had had with the
5:48:43prosecutors came up and i informed the
5:48:45president that i had had no discussions
5:48:47with the prosecutors relating to
5:48:48conversations i'd had with him or
5:48:50anything in the area of national
5:48:52security
5:48:53the president told me
5:48:54that i could not talk about national
5:48:56security areas and i should not talk
5:48:58about conversations i'd had i had had
5:49:00with him
5:49:01because they were privileged
5:49:03conversations
5:49:04toward the end of the conversation the
5:49:07president
5:49:08recalled the fact that at one point we
5:49:09had discussed the difficulty of in
5:49:12raising money and that he said that one
5:49:14million dollars was nothing to raise to
5:49:16pay to maintain the silence for the
5:49:17defendants
5:49:19he said that he he had of course only
5:49:21been joking when he made that comment
5:49:24as the conversation went on
5:49:26and is impossible for me to recall
5:49:28anything other than the high points of
5:49:29it i became more convinced that the
5:49:31president was seeking to elicit
5:49:32testimony from me and put in perspective
5:49:37put his perspective on the record and
5:49:39get me to agree to it the most
5:49:41interesting thing that happened during
5:49:42the conversation was very near the end
5:49:44he got up out of his chair
5:49:46went behind the chair to the corner of
5:49:48the executive office building off office
5:49:51and in a
5:49:52nearly audible tone said to me
5:49:56he was probably foolish to have
5:49:58discussed hunt's clemency with colson
5:50:01i do not recall that i responded
5:50:03the conversation ended shortly
5:50:05thereafter
5:50:08as i was on my way out of the office
5:50:10after exchanging partying pleasantries i
5:50:12told the president that i hoped that my
5:50:15going to the prosecutors and telling the
5:50:16truth would not result in impeachment of
5:50:19the president he jokingly said i
5:50:21certainly hope so also
5:50:24and he said that it would be handled
5:50:26properly
5:50:27meeting with the president on the 16th
5:50:31i received word on monday morning april
5:50:3216th that the president had requested i
5:50:35come to the oval office
5:50:36i arrived at his office at 9 45
5:50:40and rather than going to the reception
5:50:42entrance normally used by other members
5:50:44of the staff and myself
5:50:47i went into steve mr steve bull's office
5:50:50mr bull is the one who had informed me
5:50:51that the president wanted to see me so i
5:50:53went into his office
5:50:54mr bull told me i would have to wait a
5:50:56few minutes because the president was in
5:50:58another meeting
5:50:59a few minutes later holliman and
5:51:00erlickman emerged laughing from the
5:51:02president's office
5:51:04and when they saw me in mr bull's office
5:51:06their faces dropped i said hello
5:51:08they put on serious a serious look or
5:51:11they said hello put on a serious look
5:51:13and departed
5:51:14i went into the president's office
5:51:17the president told me that he'd been
5:51:18thinking about this entire matter and
5:51:20thought it might be good if he had in
5:51:22his drawer a letter from me requesting
5:51:25that
5:51:29requesting he had a letter from me
5:51:30requesting my resignation
5:51:33that he accept my resignation
5:51:35or in the alternative an indefinite
5:51:37leave of absence
5:51:39he said that he had prepared two letters
5:51:40for my signature and would not do
5:51:42anything with him at this time but
5:51:44thought it would be good if he had them
5:51:47he then passed me a vanilla folder with
5:51:50two letters in them
5:51:51the president said that he had prepared
5:51:53the letters himself and that no one
5:51:54would know i had signed them i read the
5:51:57letters and was amazed at what i was
5:51:58being asked to sign i have submitted
5:52:01to the committee copies of the letters
5:52:03exhibit number 45 but since they are
5:52:05very brief i'll read them the first
5:52:07letter dated april 16th read dear mr
5:52:10president
5:52:11in view of my increasing involvement in
5:52:13the watergate matter my impending
5:52:15appearance before the grand jury and the
5:52:17probability of its actions i request
5:52:19immediate and indefinite leave of
5:52:21absence from my position on your staff
5:52:24the second letter which was even more
5:52:26incriminating read
5:52:28dear mr president as a result of my
5:52:30involvement in the watergate matter
5:52:32which we discussed last night and today
5:52:34i tender you my resignation effective at
5:52:37once
5:52:38after reading the letters i looked the
5:52:40president squarely in the eyes and told
5:52:41him i could not sign the letters
5:52:44he was annoyed with me
5:52:45and somewhat at a loss for words
5:52:48he said that maybe i would like to draft
5:52:50my own letter
5:52:53i told him that the letters
5:52:56that he had asked me to sign
5:52:58were virtual confessions of anything
5:53:00regarding the watergate
5:53:02i also asked him if holliman or
5:53:04erlichmann and holloman had signed
5:53:05letters of resignation
5:53:07i recall that he was somewhat surprised
5:53:10at my asking this and said that no
5:53:13he said that they had not but they had
5:53:15given him verbal assurances to the same
5:53:17effect
5:53:18he then elaborated that harlem and
5:53:20arlington had said that if they were
5:53:22called before the grand jury they would
5:53:23seek an indefinite leave of absence
5:53:26they had given
5:53:28him their verbal assurance
5:53:31i then told
5:53:32the president that he had my verbal
5:53:34assurance to the same effect
5:53:36it was a very tense conversation
5:53:38but i was not going to sign a letter
5:53:40under any circumstances
5:53:42as i sat there talking with the
5:53:43president i had very much on my mind the
5:53:46laughter in erlichmann and holloman's
5:53:47voices when they walked out of the
5:53:49office before they realized that i was
5:53:51waiting outside to see the president
5:53:53to break the impasse the president said
5:53:56leader would like me to draft my own
5:53:57letter and report back to him later he
5:54:00said that he was working on a statement
5:54:02regarding the watergate and the recent
5:54:04developments that had come to his
5:54:05attention as a result of his meetings
5:54:07with clinton peterson would appreciate
5:54:09my thoughts
5:54:10he said that he would also like to
5:54:12suggest like a suggested draft letter
5:54:15for holloman and ehrlichman or maybe a
5:54:17form letter that everyone could sign
5:54:20i told him i would draft a letter and
5:54:23would report back
5:54:26the president called me to come to his
5:54:29executive office building office about
5:54:31four o'clock that afternoon he asked me
5:54:34if i had drafted a letter i said i had
5:54:37as well as i had prepared some thoughts
5:54:39first for his statement
5:54:41he asked to see the letter a copy of
5:54:43which i submitted to the committee
5:54:44exhibit number 46 but again shall read
5:54:47because it's very brief
5:54:49dear mr president
5:54:51you have informed me that bob holloman
5:54:52and john ehrlichman have verbally
5:54:54tendered their request to be given an
5:54:56immediate and indefinite leave of
5:54:57absence from your staff
5:54:59by this letter i also wish to confirm my
5:55:01request that i'd be given such a leave
5:55:03of absence from your staff
5:55:06after the president read the letter he
5:55:07handed it back to me and said that it
5:55:08wasn't what he wanted
5:55:11i then told him
5:55:15audience to please refrain from a
5:55:17lifetime
5:55:22i then told him
5:55:24that i would not resign unless holloman
5:55:26and erickman resigned
5:55:28i told him that i would was not willing
5:55:29to be the white house scapegoat for the
5:55:31watergate
5:55:32he said that he understood my position
5:55:34and he wasn't asking me to be a
5:55:35scapegoat
5:55:36i then gave him my recommendations of a
5:55:38draft statement before he read the draft
5:55:41statement he said that he had checked
5:55:42his records and had been on march 21st
5:55:45that i had met with him and given him
5:55:47some given him the report on the
5:55:48problems of the watergate
5:55:50and its cover-up i have submitted to the
5:55:52committee exhibit number 47
5:55:54a copy of the draft statement i prepared
5:55:57for the president
5:55:59the gist of the statement was twofold
5:56:01first the president had learned of new
5:56:03facts in the case over the weekend as a
5:56:05result of this information
5:56:07uh
5:56:09coming to his staff and had directed
5:56:11henry peterson to take charge and leave
5:56:13no stone unturned
5:56:15secondly that he had accepted requests
5:56:17from holdemon ehrlichman and dean to be
5:56:19placed on leave of absence
5:56:21the president said virtually nothing
5:56:22about the statement and after reading it
5:56:24told me to talk to lynn garment who he
5:56:26said was also preparing a draft
5:56:28statement
5:56:29after departing from the president's
5:56:30office i called mr garment and told him
5:56:32that the president had requested i give
5:56:35him my input on a draft he was
5:56:36developing mr garman said he would come
5:56:38by my office which he did
5:56:41i
5:56:42i gave him
5:56:43a copy of the draft statement
5:56:46and he told me that he and i were
5:56:47thinking along similar lines that is
5:56:49that holloman ehrlichman and dean had to
5:56:51resign
5:56:52i told him i was ready and willing but
5:56:54only if holliman and erickman
5:56:56resigned as well
5:57:00the next time i heard anything about the
5:57:01draft statement was on april 17th when
5:57:03the president called and informed me
5:57:06that he had decided
5:57:07not to request any resignations until
5:57:10after the grand jury took action
5:57:12and he would issue a statement very
5:57:14shortly
5:57:15that statement on april 17th is a matter
5:57:17of public record
5:57:18i would only like to point out one or
5:57:20two items about the statement the
5:57:22president said on march 21st
5:57:24as a result of serious charges
5:57:27which came to his attention some of
5:57:29which were publicly reported
5:57:31he began
5:57:34a an intense new inquiry
5:57:36into the whole matter
5:57:38i would merely refer the committee's
5:57:39attention back to my earlier statement
5:57:41as to what the president did after my
5:57:43report
5:57:44to him on march 21st as to the white
5:57:47house's deep involvement in the cover-up
5:57:49in short the president commenced no
5:57:51investigation at all
5:57:54rather the president holloman and
5:57:55erlickman commenced to protect
5:57:56themselves against unraveling the
5:57:58cover-up
5:58:00secondly i would also like to raise the
5:58:03paragraph that had been put in the
5:58:04statement that no one in the position of
5:58:06major importance in the administration
5:58:08should be given immunity from
5:58:09prosecution
5:58:10while a statement went virtually
5:58:12unnoticed in the public it was very
5:58:14evident to me what the president was
5:58:16saying
5:58:16dean will not be a witness against
5:58:18anyone so the government might as well
5:58:20stop dealing with him
5:58:22on monday night april 16th i learned
5:58:25that the president had informed the
5:58:26government that he allegedly had taped a
5:58:28conversation in which i had told him i
5:58:31was seeking immunity from the government
5:58:33in exchange for testimony on harlem and
5:58:35arlington i have no recollection of ever
5:58:37telling the president that
5:58:39i was so negotiating with the government
5:58:40and the president told me
5:58:43very specifically that he did not want
5:58:45to do anything to interfere with any
5:58:46negotiations i was having with the
5:58:48government
5:58:49when i learned this from my attorney i
5:58:51suggested that he request that the
5:58:52government call for the tape and listen
5:58:54to the tape because i told him it must
5:58:56be
5:58:57a reference to to a meeting i'd had with
5:59:00the president on april 15th
5:59:02and if the conversation were taped the
5:59:04government would have a pretty good idea
5:59:05of the dimensions of the case it was
5:59:07dealing with i was referring to the fact
5:59:09that the president had mentioned the
5:59:10million dollar conversation and the fact
5:59:12that he had talked to coulson about
5:59:14clemency for hunt
5:59:16i do not in fact know if such a tape
5:59:18exists
5:59:20but if it does exist and has not been
5:59:21tampered with and is a complete
5:59:23transcript of the entire conversation
5:59:24that took place in the president's
5:59:26office i think this committee should
5:59:27have that tape because i believe would
5:59:30be it would cooperate many of the things
5:59:33that this committee has asked me to
5:59:34testify about
5:59:36when the president issued his statement
5:59:39on april 17th
5:59:41in which he was quite obviously trying
5:59:42to affect any decisions i was having
5:59:44with the government regarding my
5:59:45testimony by
5:59:46inserting the phrase
5:59:48there regarding no immunity and combined
5:59:50with the fact that he had requested that
5:59:52i sign a virtual confession on monday of
5:59:54that week
5:59:55i decided that indeed i was being set up
5:59:58and it was
6:00:00time that i let the word out that i
6:00:02would not be a scapegoat
6:00:04accordingly on april 19th i issued a
6:00:06statement to that effect
6:00:08after my statement of april 19th i had
6:00:10virtually no contact with the members of
6:00:12the white house staff
6:00:13i did have occasion
6:00:15to speak with mr leonard garment
6:00:17i recall asking him who had placed the
6:00:19no immunity paragraph in the president's
6:00:21statement
6:00:22garmin said that while he did not know
6:00:24for certain he believed that ehrlichman
6:00:25had placed it in the draft because it
6:00:27had not been there in earlier drafts
6:00:29but in the draft that emerged from
6:00:31ehrlichman's consideration when erickman
6:00:33went over the final statement with the
6:00:34president
6:00:35on april 22nd easter sunday the
6:00:38president called me to wish me happy
6:00:39easter
6:00:40it was what they referred to at the
6:00:41white house as a stroking call
6:00:44on april 30th while out of the city i
6:00:47had a call from my secretary in which
6:00:49she informed me that the wire services
6:00:51were carrying a story that my
6:00:52resignation had been requested and
6:00:54accepted and that holloman and
6:00:56ehrlichman were also resigning
6:00:59mr chairman this concludes my rather
6:01:01lengthy statement i apologize again for
6:01:03its length
6:01:04but i've sought to comply with the
6:01:06committee's request to provide the
6:01:07committee with the broad overview of my
6:01:09knowledge of this matter
6:01:12without objection on the part of any
6:01:13member of the committee
6:01:16the chairman at this time will
6:01:18admit into evidence
6:01:21all of the exhibits identified by the
6:01:23witness
6:01:24in the course of his testimony
6:01:26except exhibits five
6:01:28six
6:01:30seven and eight
6:01:32which um
6:01:33will be that
6:01:34whose admissibility would be considered
6:01:37later by the
6:01:39committee
6:01:40i guess
6:01:49and
6:01:49just identifying without putting them in
6:01:51their house
6:02:00the committee will stand in recess till
6:02:0110 o'clock in the morning
6:02:03[Music]
6:02:06oh that's good we finished
6:02:08it well
6:02:10that is how the longest day of the
6:02:12hearings yet came to an end the
6:02:14committee will probably spend many more
6:02:16hours questioning john dean all the
6:02:19leaked bombshells about presidential
6:02:21involvement in the watergate cover-up
6:02:22were there as predicted
6:02:24and there were a number of side lights
6:02:26that may be temporarily lost as the
6:02:28committee concentrates on white house
6:02:30involvement there is the charge that the
6:02:32judge hearing the civil cases against
6:02:34the nixon campaign apparatus cooperated
6:02:37with the white house to prevent anything
6:02:39major from happening before the election
6:02:41the judge has issued a blanket denial
6:02:43there was an explanation of how top
6:02:45white house aides were spared the
6:02:46embarrassment of appearing directly
6:02:48themselves before the grand jury and how
6:02:51one witness was handled very gingerly
6:02:53before that grand jury by the federal
6:02:55prosecutor but spilled the beans when
6:02:57questioned by a curious member of the
6:02:59grand jury
6:03:00and there were also the recollections of
6:03:02how the white house tried to influence
6:03:03the senate watergate committee including
6:03:05ranking minority member howard baker who
6:03:08says dean's recollections were generally
6:03:10accurate
6:03:11of course there are two parts to that
6:03:13the white house's perception of that
6:03:15and then mr dean's account of the
6:03:17conversation that actually transpired i
6:03:19think by and large mr dean's
6:03:21recollection of that account is
6:03:22essentially correct in all its material
6:03:24details
6:03:26the account of mr wally johnson of the
6:03:28white house staff
6:03:30calling me when i was in tennessee and
6:03:32asking if the white house could have a
6:03:34say-so on the selection of
6:03:36minority council i told them they could
6:03:38not
6:03:39that accords with my understanding
6:03:42mr dean's recollection of my brief
6:03:45meeting with the president
6:03:47shortly before reception that i was
6:03:49attending
6:03:50at which time i recommended the
6:03:52president against the claim of executive
6:03:54privilege
6:03:56is essentially correct i do not recall
6:03:58the president indicating that he would
6:04:00rely instead only on written
6:04:02interrogatories but
6:04:04that isn't a major point
6:04:06now beyond that i think that mr dean has
6:04:10pretty generally stated the situation as
6:04:12i recall senator let me read a memo from
6:04:14me i've said let me read a memo from
6:04:17[Music]
6:04:18h.r haldeman to john dean on their
6:04:20portion of it he says it was written
6:04:22february 9th and it pertains
6:04:23specifically he says obviously the key
6:04:26on the urban committee is a minority
6:04:28staff and more importantly the minority
6:04:30council
6:04:31we've got to be sure we get a real tiger
6:04:33not an old man or a soft head
6:04:36and although we let the committee
6:04:37membership slip out of our grasp we've
6:04:39got to find a way to be sure we get the
6:04:41best man we can for council
6:04:43uh does that pretty well jibe also with
6:04:46uh
6:04:47your recollection of their putting
6:04:48pressure on you to get a counselor no
6:04:49they didn't put any pressure on it it
6:04:51was a simple request by wally johnson on
6:04:53the telephone he
6:04:54said that he wanted to come to tennessee
6:04:56to talk to me about it and i said well
6:04:58that's not necessary you don't need to
6:04:59come to tennessee he said well can we
6:05:01have some input
6:05:02into the hiring of council and i said no
6:05:05and obviously your memorandum goes much
6:05:07further than that but i have an idea
6:05:09that ended the conversation as far as
6:05:11they were concerned so that's the end of
6:05:12my personal knowledge do you think they
6:05:14got a real tiger or an old man i know
6:05:17they got a bright young man who's
6:05:18formerly in the u.s attorney's office in
6:05:20nashville who was a trial lawyer who i
6:05:23knew personally and they never heard of
6:05:25i've evidenced the fact that the
6:05:26president asked me that same day who is
6:05:28fred thompson
6:05:30and i explained to him he's a big tall
6:05:31tough tennessee and who's going to do a
6:05:33good job
6:05:35all right watching the story unfold with
6:05:37us today we're former white house aides
6:05:39stephen hess and john kramer of the
6:05:42georgetown university law center and
6:05:44we're curious of course about their
6:05:46reactions to what john dean said first
6:05:48mr kramer from a legal standpoint what
6:05:51did dean's testimony do to president
6:05:52nixon for any kind of criminal
6:05:55conviction there must be proof of a
6:05:56criminal act and a criminal intent
6:05:59in this case the particular crime i
6:06:00think at stake is obstruction of
6:06:02criminal investigation and there you
6:06:04have to show a willful endeavor by means
6:06:06of bribery or misrepresentation to
6:06:09prevent the communication of information
6:06:11relating to a violation of of a statute
6:06:14here as far as the criminal act is
6:06:15concerned i think you have several
6:06:17factors that john dean pointed to if you
6:06:18believe his testimony first of all the
6:06:20president was apparently involved in two
6:06:22discussions with mr ehrlichman and mr
6:06:24coulson about the grant of executive
6:06:25clemency to mr hunt
6:06:27there was also the question of the
6:06:28payment of cover-up money up to the a
6:06:30million dollars which the president said
6:06:32could easily be done
6:06:34and there are indeed other suggestions
6:06:36that perhaps the president was not very
6:06:37open about precisely what he learned
6:06:39about from john dean learned about the
6:06:41cover-up at one point in a resignation
6:06:43letter that he gives mr dean he refers
6:06:45to an april date other times he refers
6:06:47to a march 21st day
6:06:48but that is only the criminal act the
6:06:50criminal intent the willful endeavor is
6:06:52very significant and it seems to me that
6:06:54mr dean's testimony points up some
6:06:56questions about the president's intent
6:06:58for example the president tries to
6:07:00indicate that the one million dollar
6:07:01reference was a joke and that the
6:07:03discussions about clemency were foolish
6:07:05that he wasn't therefore intending to
6:07:07obstruct criminal justice and that
6:07:09raises some questions about his intent
6:07:11mr hess uh legal culpability aside what
6:07:14about the american public and the
6:07:15president now
6:07:17well
6:07:18mr nixon
6:07:20has to do something i would think now in
6:07:22response to very serious charges that mr
6:07:25dean
6:07:25made he may choose on the other hand to
6:07:27think that the time is on his side that
6:07:29the best thing to do is to keep a low
6:07:32profile as it regards to watergate after
6:07:34all we did see
6:07:36last week with the brezhnev summit visit
6:07:39that there are tremendous recuperative
6:07:41powers of the presidency he may choose
6:07:43to take a legalistic approach as he did
6:07:46in his may 22nd statement of four
6:07:49thousand words uh in which he talked
6:07:51about national security where he
6:07:53attempts in writing to rebut mr dean
6:07:56point by point
6:07:58he may choose a counter-attack strategy
6:08:00there were hints of it in in mr dean's
6:08:02testimony today the talk about uh mr
6:08:05nixon's campaign being bugged in 1968
6:08:09we might choose a mia copa
6:08:12feeling there was some of that tone in
6:08:14his may 22nd statement when he talked
6:08:17about uh how he should have listened
6:08:19more to the danger signs and less to the
6:08:21reassurances
6:08:22but i hope that what he does is respond
6:08:25personally and forthrightly to the
6:08:26american people mr kramer you said if
6:08:29you believe his testimony how does dean
6:08:32stack up on the credibility scale
6:08:34compared with other witnesses
6:08:36well all we really have to go on at this
6:08:38point is what's come before us and i
6:08:39would say that at least the early part
6:08:41of his testimony jibes almost completely
6:08:43with what we heard last week for a week
6:08:45before last from mr magruder so on that
6:08:47score we have some corroboration it's
6:08:49going to take the rest of the hearings
6:08:51really to corroborate piece by piece
6:08:53every other meeting that he describes
6:08:54although i guess critical there
6:08:56certainly is that tape if it exists of
6:08:58that meeting with the president seemed
6:08:59to me with mccord there was some uh
6:09:01quite a lot with the mccord testimony in
6:09:02fact i don't really see any significant
6:09:04inconsistencies yet with mr dean those
6:09:06may develop as the days go on how do you
6:09:08feel about the credibility issue mr hess
6:09:10well i think mr dean was an attractive
6:09:12witness he spoke for six hours today in
6:09:15a very low almost a monotone voice he's
6:09:18an attractive
6:09:20man appears to be personally uh i think
6:09:23that'll be very hard to uh to paint him
6:09:26as some sort of uh villain or or demon
6:09:29uh at least based on
6:09:32his own
6:09:33presentation
6:09:35well what do what would you think uh of
6:09:37tomorrow's hearings uh in terms of who
6:09:40would or tomorrow's session who would
6:09:42really go after him uh as a political
6:09:44observer
6:09:45uh he kind of threw down the gauntlet to
6:09:48senator gurney
6:09:49uh do you think anybody will really go
6:09:50after him tomorrow and who would you
6:09:52guess it would be
6:09:53well i don't think he's in for an easy
6:09:55time for any of the members of the
6:09:56committee they've all developed a
6:09:58different style of attack
6:10:01but it's it's been a very
6:10:03useful sort of committee with very
6:10:05interesting regional contrasts and
6:10:08differences and ways of getting at it mr
6:10:11baker has opened up questions of the
6:10:14morality involved
6:10:18and so i think um
6:10:20i think we're not going to see any any
6:10:22surprises in the avenue of attack from
6:10:25the the seven persons on the committee
6:10:27all right gentlemen thank you very much
6:10:29all right the question of course is what
6:10:31more is there to say at this point
6:10:33regardless of the time zone where you
6:10:35live it's very late and the testimony of
6:10:38john w dean iii has been very hot
6:10:41despite the several gallons of water he
6:10:43consumed while reading that lengthy and
6:10:45very historical document of his tomorrow
6:10:48the questions begin now let's talk about
6:10:50that march 15 meeting with the president
6:10:53some senator will say and on and on it
6:10:55will go and even more details if that's
6:10:58possible will come out
6:10:59john dean's memory will be tested and
6:11:01retested and challenged and worked over
6:11:04like a piece of putty and when it's all
6:11:06over tomorrow or the next day a lot of
6:11:08people in this country including all of
6:11:10us and all of you and most importantly
6:11:13the president of the united states will
6:11:15digest and judge what john w dean iii
6:11:18had to say
6:11:19and we'll all decide whether or not to
6:11:21believe him
6:11:22right now maybe the best thing for all
6:11:24of us to do is to go on to bed so we'll
6:11:26be fresh for tomorrow and until then for
6:11:29robert mcneill and peter kay i'm jim
6:11:31lehrer thank you and good night
6:11:35from washington you've been watching
6:11:36gavel to gavel videotape coverage of
6:11:38hearings by the senate select committee
6:11:40on presidential campaign activities
6:11:43this coverage is made possible by grants
6:11:45for special events coverage from the
6:11:47corporation for public broadcasting and
6:11:49the ford foundation and has been a
6:11:51production of mpact a division of the
6:11:53greater washington educational
6:11:55telecommunications association
6:12:01[Music]

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