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John Dean Interview: Inside the Nixon Administration & Watergate Scandal — Transcript

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0:01John, thank you so much for doing this.
0:03We can stop anytime you want. If you
0:05think something, edit yourself.
0:07Got it.
0:14I went to the Nixon White House to work
0:16because I was at the Justice Department.
0:19I had been selected to be the number 13
0:22man in about a 35,000 lawyer department
0:26and was serving as the Associate Deputy
0:28Attorney General in that post. I did a
0:31lot of work with the White House staff
0:33and that and particularly with the press
0:36because my bosses, the Attorney General
0:38John Mitchell and the Deputy Attorney
0:40General De Clawed Deans did not like to
0:43do backgrounders at the White House.
0:45They found I was a pretty fast study on
0:47these subjects and so they sent me over
0:48to do a lot of these backgrounders.
0:50That's when I started working with the
0:51White House with John Ehrlichman, Bud
0:53Krogh and the Domestic Council. And when
0:56Ehrlichman became the Assistant to the
0:59President leaving the White House
1:00Council chair open,
1:02that's when they asked me to come over
1:04and take the job. I actually played a
1:06little hard to get. I had friends at the
1:09White House who I realized were working
1:11around the clock with little reward.
1:14So I was pretty sure
1:17what the job would be before I
1:20took the job and
1:23they really persuaded me. I didn't
1:25realize until decades later when I saw
1:28the vetting they had done on me.
1:30The people they had sent to kind of
1:32privately interview me and see if they
1:34thought I'd fit in
1:36which they did and
1:39when they finally offered the job, they
1:41flew me out to California
1:44and helicoptered me down to San Clemente
1:47and the President asked me to take the
1:49job and that's pretty hard to turn down
1:50at that point.
1:57When I first asked my boss John Mitchell
2:01whether he thought I should take the
2:02job,
2:03both he and Kleindienst told me not to
2:05take the job.
2:07De Kleindienst was rather explicit. He
2:09said I wouldn't work at that zoo up the
2:10street if I was being paid five times
2:13what I am now.
2:15So I I got some feedback initially that
2:19to be careful about going up there.
2:21Mitchell
2:23said to me though he said I can
2:24understand at your age and at your
2:26position while you'll go up here in the
2:27department,
2:29the job the title of Council of the
2:31President is hard to not want on your
2:33resume
2:34and that really was what sold me.
2:42The first time I did meet Nixon is when
2:44he offered me the job.
2:46What did you think of him?
2:48When I walked in his office in San
2:51Clemente, he was rather theatrically
2:54looking out over the Pacific.
2:58He was wearing a casual
3:01sport jacket and he
3:04Haldeman and I sat down in the office
3:06before he turned and sort of
3:08dramatically
3:10came over and introduced himself. But it
3:12was
3:13from the very beginning I thought how
3:15theatrical he was with guests and even
3:17once I did become a member of the staff,
3:19I noticed that was a trend that he
3:21staged often appearances in the Oval
3:24Office. Not when you became a regular
3:26working staffer. You'd walk in and he'd
3:29have his feet on the desk and look at
3:31you around his shoes.
3:33But first impressions, he he certainly
3:35played it up in the Oval Office and his
3:37other offices.
3:44First I must say I really wasn't in the
3:47inner circle at the White House. I have
3:49out of Nixon's totality of meetings of
3:53each day,
3:54I have roughly 37 meetings with Nixon.
3:57They happen to be very key meetings
3:59later in history.
4:01But I was a middle level staff guy as
4:04White House Council.
4:06I reported through my predecessor John
4:08Ehrlichman or the Chief of Staff Bob
4:10Haldeman and typically my dealings with
4:13Nixon were in groups or I was in there
4:16with with several other people and it
4:19was a very late in the game before I
4:21start having one-on-one with Nixon. And
4:23that's after he's been reelected and he
4:25really doesn't want Haldeman and
4:26Ehrlichman being consumed by Watergate.
4:30So he wants to get it directly from me
4:31knowing they're coming to me to get
4:33updates because I've become sort of the
4:35desk officer on this issue and gathering
4:38all the information. So that's when I
4:40start having one-on-ones with Nixon. But
4:42I have definite impressions about the
4:45way the White House worked from the
4:47assignments I was given, the questions I
4:49was asked and I would say that Richard
4:52Nixon had great difficulty with the
4:55press and the media in general,
4:57the Washington Post in particular. That
5:00was quite evident to anybody who worked
5:02there. I don't think any president is
5:04very happy with negative coverage and
5:08Nixon always had a
5:10a well he could draw from and and drew
5:13deeply throughout his career. So it
5:17probably is part of it was with the job,
5:19part of it was from
5:21his own background where he felt
5:27that because of his his education was
5:29not Ivy League and he often thought that
5:32the press, particularly the columnists
5:33who were critical of him,
5:35were looking down on him. So there was
5:37no question that that that played into
5:40it. I never heard that.
5:43As it happens, I've listened to
5:45literally hundreds of tapes for one of
5:47my books
5:49and you certainly get it in listening to
5:52tape after tape. But from my personal
5:54meetings, I I didn't get much of it.
6:00There was one notable conversation in
6:03one of my first Watergate related
6:06meetings on September 15th of 1972,
6:11the day that the burglars and
6:15who were arrested in the Watergate and
6:17Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy, their
6:20handlers, were all indicted for the
6:22Watergate break-in. And in that
6:24conversation after talking briefly about
6:27the arrests,
6:28Nixon talks about how he is going to tee
6:31off on the
6:34on the press in in during his second
6:36term. He's very confident he's going to
6:38win reelection. It to me is one of my
6:41most probably the only embarrassing
6:43conversation I have with Nixon when I
6:46later listened to it.
6:47I'm new to it I and I really sort of
6:50brown nose and say oh that sounds great
6:53Mr. President because I know that's what
6:55he wants to hear. None of my other
6:56conversations that I play that way with
6:58him.
7:05Being as young as I was, I'm in my early
7:0830s. Here's a man who's been Vice
7:10President, he's been pre he's President.
7:14I had to be very I had to be very
7:16careful. I didn't know what he knew.
7:20I initially don't think we have any
7:22trouble and realize by the time I start
7:24dealing with him we're in a lot of
7:26trouble and have tried to convince my
7:28colleagues we're in a lot of trouble and
7:30I don't carry a lot of good news into
7:32him at that point and I play it very
7:35straight with him.
7:37So after the September 15th
7:39conversation, which is in fairly early
7:42in Watergate if you will,
7:44as opposed to my later conversations, I
7:47I pull no punches with him. In fact it
7:49gets down and where I really am trying
7:52to warn him and frighten him if you will
7:55to do the right thing.
8:02The Pentagon Papers were published
8:05the weekend of the Tricia Nixon wedding
8:09and
8:11I was I became aware of the President's
8:13reaction on Monday following the weekend
8:17of the wedding and the Sunday in which
8:20the headline of the release on the New
8:21York Times of this Vietnam study
8:26when it was on the front page of my
8:27paper as well and I got a call from
8:29Ehrlichman in the Oval Office wanting to
8:32know if
8:33the administration can prosecute the New
8:36York Times for this leak and I said for
8:40what? He said well how how about
8:42treason? I said well I don't think this
8:44is treason and I also don't think it's
8:48the policy of the Department of Justice
8:50to run this kind of prosecution, but
8:52I'll make some calls and get back to you
8:54which I did.
8:56I actually called Bill Rehnquist who was
8:59the Assistant Attorney General the head
9:01of the Office of Legal Counsel, later a
9:04Chief Justice,
9:06who was out. But his office sent back a
9:09very quick memo
9:11saying yes they could be prosecuted, but
9:14no it was not the policy of the
9:16Department of Justice
9:18to launch this kind of prosecution.
9:20I wasn't involved in the decision to go
9:23to the Supreme Court and try to enjoin
9:25the Times and really
9:27had little more than newspaper knowledge
9:29of that. I was White House Counsel at
9:31that point.
9:33I was I had the title of White House
9:35Counsel. John Ehrlichman gave up the
9:38title.
9:39He never gave up the position. I
9:41reported to two people. I reported to
9:43John Ehrlichman who had been White House
9:45Counsel and I reported to Bob Haldeman,
9:48the Chief of Staff. Liddy was brought I
9:50think Liddy was already on the staff
9:52when the Pentagon Papers were released.
9:55I hadn't I hadn't met Liddy at that
9:57time. During the time and shortly after
10:00the release of the Pentagon Papers,
10:02a fellow by the name of Jack Caulfield
10:04came in my office. He said, "I just came
10:06from Chuck Colson's office. Colson wants
10:09me to firebomb the Brookings Institute."
10:12I said, "Wait a minute. Give that to me
10:14again." He said, "He wants me to
10:16firebomb the Brookings Institute." I
10:18said, "What are you talking about,
10:19Jack?" He said, "Yes, he wants me to
10:20firebomb it and when the fire department
10:23responds, I'm to send in a team of
10:25burglars to get papers out of the safe
10:29in the
10:30in the Brookings that the president
10:32thinks belong to the government." I
10:34said, "Jack, this is crazy. Do nothing.
10:37Do nothing." And I then flew to San
10:40Clemente because I wasn't going to
10:42debate this on the phone with anybody
10:45and went in and told Ehrlichman, I said
10:48this is crazy, John. By that time I'd
10:50pulled down the DC code and realized if
10:53there's a death as a result of arson, it
10:56was a capital crime at that point. So, I
10:59wanted to be loaded with at least some
11:00law and went out and told Ehrlichman the
11:05story and he said he picked up the
11:06phone. He called Colson. He said,
11:08"Colson, young counsel Dean is out here.
11:11Doesn't think the Brookings is a very
11:12good idea. Cancel it." I learned later
11:15as a result of my doing that when they
11:18set up the Plumbers Unit to investigate
11:21Ellsberg and other leaks
11:24that I was they were were specifically
11:26told not to tell me what they were
11:28doing.
11:29Bud Krogh, who was one of the person who
11:31set it up, explained to me, he said,
11:34"John, a lot of people around here think
11:36there's some little old lady in you."
11:38Well, I wish there'd been more little
11:40old lady in a lot of people around
11:41there, but
11:44I don't think it was a
11:45sign of little old lady. It's just being
11:47sane
11:49and I had no trouble in in dealing with
11:50issues like that. So, that was was my
11:52first inkling of how far this thing
11:55might go. Today I know from listening to
11:57the tapes, on three occasion Nixon tells
12:00Haldeman to break into Brookings.
12:03He's not getting satisfaction, so he
12:05picks up the phone and calls Colson and
12:08tells Colson to do it. It's Liddy who
12:11cooks up the scheme to have his Cuban
12:15Americans that he is working with, will
12:18later break in the Watergate with,
12:20dress up as firemen and they will
12:23buy a fire truck and they'll go over and
12:26start this fire and pretend like they
12:28two are firemen entering the building
12:30and in the confusion they'll get in the
12:32safe. I mean, it was just it was
12:33outrageous, the whole scheme. So,
12:37I didn't know until many, many years
12:39later this was Gordon Liddy's idea,
12:41but not untypical of his thinking.
12:49In piecing it together after the fact,
12:52I've never
12:54at that time or in the years since seen
12:56any evidence that the Watergate break-in
12:59itself was something that the White
13:01House wanted or designated. Now, there
13:05was clearly an awareness in the White
13:07House that Liddy was over at the
13:09re-election committee and running some
13:11kind of intelligence operation. Had
13:15they not been arrested, the team that
13:18went into the Watergate, their real
13:20mission that night was to go to George
13:22McGovern's office, who was of course
13:24running against Nixon
13:26in that election and they were going to
13:28break into his headquarters, but because
13:30they were arrested they never got there.
13:32You can However, if you look at the
13:35McGovern break-in, you can literally
13:37trace that directly to the Oval Office
13:40on combination of papers and tapes.
13:43Nixon tells Haldeman they want to get
13:47they want to put a plant and he's not
13:49talking about a flower.
13:51A plant in the McGovern campaign.
13:54Haldeman in turn tells his aide, Gordon
13:57Strachan, to have Liddy start this as
14:01the focus of his investigation or his
14:03intelligence gathering. So, you can
14:05track then that that Strachan calls
14:08Liddy in, tells him to transfer his
14:11intelligence gathering from Muskie, who
14:14was the focus initially, Senator Muskie
14:17who they thought was going to be the
14:18opponent, to McGovern. But they never
14:21got there, but it it actually would have
14:23been traceable directly
14:26had that been
14:28the place they'd gotten arrested that
14:30night as surely they were as as
14:32ham-handed anywhere they went as they
14:34would have been at the Watergate.
14:37So, I've never seen any evidence,
14:39however, and once asked
14:42Jeb Magruder, who gave the orders to go
14:45into the Watergate, "What in the hell
14:46were you looking for?" And he in essence
14:49told me they were fishing. They were
14:51looking for financial documents,
14:53anything with numbers on. This is what
14:56Howard Hunt was told. This is what the
14:59Cuban Americans who were in there
15:01looking through the files just told to
15:03look for things that they were told to
15:04look for things for contributions from
15:07Cubans and they thought there was some
15:09Castro money, which was just as Hunt
15:12told me a cover for just finding papers
15:15with numbers where they might be able to
15:17find something that
15:19was of interest to them. So, that was
15:22It's always been to me a fishing
15:23expedition. Now, after the fact, people
15:26can't believe it was as stupid as it
15:29appears on its face. The problem is it
15:31was even stupider than it appears on its
15:34face and conspiracy theories have tried
15:37to fill the gap, which really are are
15:40fraudulent.
15:47At the time of the the arrest occurred
15:50on June 17th at the Watergate, I
15:53happened to have been in Manila, about
15:54as far away from Washington as you can
15:57be on the planet. My first mistake was
15:59probably coming home
16:01cuz I'd planned to stay in San
16:03Francisco.
16:04I'd gone over to give a speech and was
16:07coming back and was just going to spend
16:09an an extra day in San Francisco and my
16:12deputy told me, he said, "Ehrlichman and
16:14Haldeman are both looking for you, so
16:16you better get back." So, I'm in the
16:18office on the morning of June 19th and
16:22really read the front page of the
16:24Washington Post about what's happened. I
16:26don't have a clue what's happening.
16:29Ehrlichman calls me and
16:32excuse me, let me put the reverse that
16:34order. After looking at the Post, Jeb
16:37Magruder called me and told me he'd been
16:40asked to return to Washington.
16:43He said this was our operation, John. He
16:46said Liddy screwed it up and he said,
16:49"Would you talk to Liddy?" I said,
16:50"Well, what do you mean?" He said,
16:51"Well, I can't talk to him."
16:53I said, "Why can't you talk?" He said,
16:55"Well, a few weeks ago we had a little
16:57incident at the elevator. I was going
16:59off to play tennis and he was the as you
17:03know, the general counsel of the Finance
17:05Committee at that point and I in a very
17:07friendly way reached out and put my hand
17:09on his shoulder and said, 'Gordon, I
17:12need a memo
17:14that you'd promised me.' And he said
17:16Liddy looked at me and he with a hateful
17:18look and said, 'Jeb, if you don't take
17:20your hand off my shoulder, I'm going to
17:22rip your arm out of your body and beat
17:24you to death with it.' And he said,
17:26'John, I think he was actually serious.'
17:29He said, 'That's why I can't talk to
17:30him.' And so, I said, "Well, let me see
17:33what I can do."
17:34I no more than hung up with Liddy than
17:39John Ehrlichman calls me and asks me if
17:43I am aware of what's happening. I said,
17:45"Only what I know in the newspaper." And
17:47he said, "Well, I've talked to Colson
17:51and as you know, Hunt worked for Colson,
17:54but denies any knowledge or involvement.
17:57Maybe you'll check in on Chuck and see
17:59what you can get from him." And I said,
18:01"Well, John, I've had a call from
18:03Magruder asking me to to
18:06meet with Liddy
18:08because this is Liddy's operation." He
18:09said, "We understand that." He said,
18:11"Probably a good idea if you do meet
18:13with Liddy." So, I called Liddy and told
18:16him to come over. Rather than have him
18:17come to my office, I walked down 17th
18:19Street with him and at that point he
18:22confesses the whole thing and said, "It
18:24was my operation. I screwed up. I should
18:26have never taken in somebody like Jim
18:29McCord, who was the head of
18:31campaign security, but I needed my They
18:34were kept cutting my budget
18:36and I had to have somebody to put the
18:38wiretaps in and we had multiple
18:40assignments." He said, He said, "I also
18:43should tell you there's a real problem
18:45here." I said, "What do you mean?" He
18:47said, "Well,
18:48the White House is involved in this." I
18:49said, "What do you mean, Gordon?" He
18:50said, "Well,
18:52I I when I was working at the White
18:54House did an operation under
18:56Ehrlichman's direction to break into Dan
18:59Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office." And
19:01he said, "The same men I used in that
19:03operation are I used in this operation
19:07and two of them at least are now in jail
19:11as a result of getting arrested at the
19:13Watergate."
19:14And he
19:16as we were walking back up 17th Street,
19:18he stopped me and he said,
19:20"Please don't shoot me at my home." I
19:24said, "What are you talking about,
19:25Gordon?" He said, "Well, I know I can
19:27understand why everyone will be upset
19:29with what I've done." But he said, "I've
19:32got children and I don't want somebody
19:33driving by with a shotgun and and and
19:35harming one of my children. So, you just
19:38tell me what street corner to be on and
19:41what night to be there and you can take
19:43me out." I said, "Gordon, I I don't
19:46think we're right there at this point."
19:49Probably another mistake.
19:57Early on, there is there is never a
19:59meeting where everyone sits down says we
20:01have to cover this up.
20:03In fact, it's
20:04it's it's really
20:06I start as sort of an information
20:10gatherer where they're trying everyone's
20:12trying to learn what has happened.
20:15Yes, it's known quickly that you know
20:17this is a Liddy operation and Liddy's
20:20budget I assumed had probably been
20:22approved by Mitchell if not Haldeman. I
20:26don't know where all the threads run and
20:28and how it's all going to turn out. I'm
20:32one of the ones for example when they
20:34they wanted learn that Hunt
20:37is involved and Colson is professing he
20:39has no knowledge of this thing and that
20:42I'm telling Ehrlichman
20:44in fact I report back right after my
20:47meeting with Liddy to Ehrlichman about
20:50what I said John, I understand
20:53that
20:53I told him the problem that this is an
20:55operation that Liddy says he is
20:56authorized
20:58is also connected to this which he is
21:00not very happy one to hear or two that I
21:03even have knowledge of
21:05and he's somebody who plays it very
21:08close to the vest but you I by then
21:10learned to read him pretty well.
21:12And I know he's upset with it. And one
21:15of the things I tell him I said John, I
21:17said listen I have no background in the
21:18criminal law to my knowledge you have no
21:21background in the criminal law. I have
21:22nobody on my staff who has that kind of
21:24background and I think we ought to bring
21:26somebody over here so we don't make
21:27foolish mistakes.
21:29He just blew that away. He said not
21:31going to do that. We don't we don't need
21:32that. We're not we don't have any intent
21:34to get in trouble. We're not going to
21:36get in trouble and
21:38said
21:39you just you know find out what happened
21:41for me. So that's my assignment which
21:44seemed like a perfectly legitimate
21:46assignment. Soon I'm finding out one of
21:48the things that Liddy had also told me
21:51he said you've got to get those men out
21:52of jail and I said Gordon, I have
21:55nothing to do with that. I can't get
21:56those men out of jail. And I learned
21:59later that Liddy had gone to see the
22:02Attorney General who was playing golf at
22:05Burning Tree
22:07over the weekend after his men were
22:09arrested and asked the Attorney General
22:12to get these men out of jail. I learned
22:14that directly from the Attorney General
22:15who told me how foolish Liddy was to
22:17come out and he said I told Liddy I
22:19couldn't help him either. They also
22:22Liddy said these men are going to need
22:23money for
22:25lawyers and and support and what have
22:27you. Again, I said nothing we can do
22:31but he does go back to the re-election
22:33committee and to Mitchell's aides and
22:36said we've got to get these guys out of
22:38jail, got to get money for them and then
22:40I learn from Mitchell
22:42that he needs help getting the money. So
22:44I'm I very quickly become sort of
22:48they all trust me. They I I
22:51I should put it in the larger picture.
22:54Ehrlichman and Haldeman got along
22:56wonderfully. They were close classmates
22:58at UCLA.
22:59Mitchell and Haldeman got along fine in
23:02a very professional good relationship.
23:05Apparently this started back during the
23:07'68 campaign. Mitchell and Ehrlichman do
23:11not get along at all. They could barely
23:14speak by this time. And they I had
23:18worked for Mitchell at Justice and I'd
23:19worked for Ehrlichman at the White
23:21House. I become the vehicle through
23:23which they talk. Sometimes oddly sitting
23:26in the same room they would turn to me
23:29to talk to each other. It was that
23:30strained. So the these personalities fit
23:34in also as to how this unfolds.
23:37And one of the things that I quickly
23:39discover is I am the you know sort of
23:42the the linchpin
23:44of all the information and what have
23:46you.
23:46And that becomes my role and why I have
23:49all end up with all this knowledge. I
23:51Nobody is volunteering much but I am
23:54being asked to report what I can find
23:57out.
24:03Well, the post report that there was a
24:07large slush fund. I never saw that.
24:10There was I knew that Haldeman had money
24:13that had gone over to the re-election
24:15committee
24:16but it really wasn't you know I never
24:18knew of a slush fund.
24:20There was always difficulty raising
24:23money to meet the demands of Hunt and
24:27Liddy
24:28who were demanding the money for
24:29themselves and for the others
24:31particularly Hunt
24:32and this got up this escalated very
24:35quickly.
24:36Like like we had endless sources. So
24:39that money wasn't there. It had to
24:42the president's private lawyer
24:44assisted in raising it. There was some
24:48think about 80,000 in campaign money
24:51but this large slush fund I I never
24:54knew of and and to this day don't know
24:56of. There was a lot of interesting
24:59reporting in the press that didn't bear
25:02out
25:03as as things went on. Some of it did.
25:12To put this in a on a larger frame and
25:16context.
25:17I never saw the post break a story that
25:21we didn't know about in advance at the
25:24White House.
25:25Sometimes I picked up details we didn't
25:27know
25:28particularly the early reports on the
25:30break-in where they had one of their
25:31police reporters who's literally on the
25:33scene. Some of that first information
25:35did inform the White House but very
25:37quickly we come up to steam.
25:40What the post so the post doesn't crack
25:43the case as far as we're concerned from
25:45our point of view nor are they even
25:47close to understanding what's really
25:49going on. What they're doing and what
25:52the tremendous effect they're having
25:54they're making it the biggest story in
25:56town by putting it on the front page.
25:59This is the newspaper that the
26:01prosecutors read, the FBI agents read,
26:04the members of Congress read and that's
26:06the tremendous impact this story has not
26:09on not on what Bob and Carl are picking
26:13up which is really long after the fact
26:16often which is new to them but it's way
26:20old in the investigation. So
26:23the story as it unfolds in the paper is
26:26often greatly delayed from where the
26:28investigators and prosecutors are and
26:31so that's why you know no one is
26:33particularly worried about the post at
26:35this point of them somehow cracking it.
26:37It's the fact that drawing such
26:39attention to it.
26:46Just like I don't think that there was
26:48I know of no meeting where there was
26:50ever sit down and how do we plan and and
26:53cover this up. It just happens
26:55incrementally in response from one
26:58matter to another matter where no one's
27:00going to volunteer or be forthcoming.
27:04They quickly the White House
27:06it's it's clear to me the reason they
27:08don't cut the re-election committee free
27:12is because of the Ellsberg break-in
27:14tie-in
27:15which they don't want to have revealed.
27:18When Mitchell first learns of this. In
27:21fact, I think Mitchell might have been
27:23prepared to step forward and say listen,
27:26I made a terrible mistake. I approved
27:28this nutcase Liddy's plan to gather
27:31intelligence. It got way out of hand
27:35and I'll take responsibility for that.
27:37But because of his dislike of Ehrlichman
27:41as soon as he hears of the fact of what
27:44Liddy has done at the White House which
27:45he thinks is actually potentially more
27:47serious than even this bungled break-in
27:50at the at the Watergate he does a 180.
27:55Over over the course of two days I saw
27:58Mitchell's whole attitude toward the
28:00thing change where he initially is
28:03concerned, he's he's taking
28:05responsibility and then he learns that
28:08you know that they have put this guy
28:10Liddy over in his office never telling
28:12them about what had happened. In fact,
28:15later years later Bud Krogh apologized
28:18to everybody for the plan they had when
28:21Liddy screwed up the Ellsberg break-in
28:25so badly where they went in and trashed
28:27the place and left actually it was
28:29directly traceable back to the White
28:30House at that time and they shut down
28:33Liddy's operation right after that in
28:35the White House. And then their next
28:37plan is to get rid of him. So what do
28:39they do? They they push him off. I'm
28:41looking for somebody to become General
28:42Counsel at the re-election committee and
28:45Krogh recommends Liddy. He said listen,
28:47this guy's a former FBI agent. He's a
28:50good lawyer and former prosecutor and so
28:53on and so forth and I pass him on to
28:55Mitchell and they hire him and nobody
28:57knows any of this background. So
29:00I see this whole change of attitude as
29:02this information surfaces and Mitchell
29:05learns what Ehrlichman has done to him
29:08and that this is why
29:10the White House can't cut them loose
29:12either. Otherwise I think it would have
29:14been a very different
29:15unraveling of the whole matter but the
29:17White House is worried about the
29:20Ellsberg break-in and that's their
29:22concern. That's the motivation for their
29:24cover-up. What's also interesting is
29:26Nixon himself doesn't even learn about
29:29what's driving Haldeman and Ehrlichman
29:32until very late in the game until the
29:34next spring in March when I tell him on
29:37March 17th I'm starting to give him
29:39background because I realize he doesn't
29:41know and I tell him about this this
29:44Ellsberg break-in.
29:45Ehrlichman claims that he told the
29:47president that in July of '72, whereas
29:51I'm telling him in March of '73.
29:55Uh
29:56he happened to tell him on the beach uh
29:59in San Clemente. Uh so there's no record
30:02of it.
30:03Uh and Nixon has both admitted that's
30:06possible and denied it's possible. So I
30:09don't know if that ever happened. Uh
30:11there's no record of it to for history
30:13to clear that point out. But I do know
30:16that's when the White House became
30:17concerned is because the fact that two
30:20of the men who were in jail from the
30:21Watergate break-in and arrest uh had
30:24also been involved in the Ellsberg
30:26break-in.
30:32I remember from the film All the
30:34President's Men how that tense moment of
30:37of the reaction of Mitchell to their
30:40call as to the potential fate of Katie
30:43Graham.
30:44Uh and
30:47what I see happening at that moment is
30:49probably different than most people. It
30:51wasn't a it wasn't particularly tense
30:54within side the cover-up at then, but
30:57what happened is Mitchell's drinking had
30:58increased. So he was obviously feeling
31:01his own set of tensions. And it sounds
31:03to me like they caught him when he
31:05obviously had fallen asleep and had a
31:07lot of booze and
31:10uh didn't have a very thoughtful answer.
31:12But I don't put that as a you know it's
31:14it's easy to kind of take these things
31:16and try to superimpose things later. I I
31:19can't you know I can't put any
31:21particular problem that Mitchell thought
31:24he was threatened at that point. Uh
31:27nobody was happy with the press coverage
31:30uh cuz the pressure it was putting on.
31:32But uh
31:35it really isn't until after the election
31:38that I even think we have trouble. I I
31:40realize we're on the wrong side of the
31:42law and what have you. Pre-election uh
31:45everyone's pretty comfortable. And as I
31:47recall that was a pre-election uh
31:50event. Not concerned that Nixon is going
31:52to be reelected outside of Washington
31:55and the Washington Post, almost nobody
31:58is covering this story. A kid The
32:00Washington The New York Times is in
32:01early and out early. Uh
32:04they don't have a clue uh of what's
32:06happening. The Post is the only one
32:08that's following the story. Uh
32:10occasionally in in the Evening Star at
32:12that point. But across the country? No.
32:15And we of course saw all those
32:17newspapers in the president's news
32:18summary, television, other than CBS
32:21picking up an occasional Washington Post
32:23story.
32:24Uh Walter Cronkite trying to dramatize
32:26it and bring it to the television
32:27audience. It's getting almost no
32:29coverage. So
32:32it's not a big problem pre-election.
32:34It's not a big problem at all.
32:42Well, what changes for me after the
32:44election is I realize we're on the wrong
32:46side of the law. Uh
32:49we had made stupid mistakes.
32:52Uh when I first thought of a defense
32:54fund, I didn't think in terms of keeping
32:57of paying hush money uh to keep these
33:00people silent. I thought they needed you
33:02know I knew there were many defense
33:03funds that existed. Uh
33:06they were something of of the of the
33:08era.
33:09Uh what happens though is Chuck Colson
33:11uh
33:12who had been responsible for Howard Hunt
33:15coming to the White House, Colson
33:16receives a call from Howard Hunt after
33:18the election.
33:19Colson, to my amazement, records the
33:22call. A lot of people in the White House
33:23recorded their calls. And he brings it
33:25down to me proud as punch to prove the
33:28fact that he had no advance knowledge of
33:31of the Watergate break-in. Which Hunt
33:33sort of reaffirms as as Chuck asks him
33:36some leading questions that you know
33:38indicating he had no advance knowledge.
33:41But what I hear is something very
33:42different in the tape. Uh as I listen to
33:45it he plays it on a little cassette for
33:47me. And what Hunt is asking for is he
33:50said, "Well, now that the election is
33:52over we have made great sacrifices and
33:56the promises and commitments that have
33:58been made to us haven't been kept. And
34:00we need a light in essence a lot more
34:02money and what have you." And he keeps
34:03he uses the term
34:05uh "There the ready isn't there." He
34:08doesn't so crudely say, "We want the
34:11money." He calls it the ready. But it's
34:12quite clear what he's talking about. And
34:16Chuck said says to me after he plays
34:18this tape, he said, "Well, what are you
34:19going to do with this?" I said, "I have
34:20no idea, Chuck." He said and and he he
34:23said, "Well, I'll leave it with you."
34:24And I in turn made a copy Actually it
34:28was on a a dictaphone belt,
34:31a early recording device. And I
34:34converted from that to a cassette uh
34:37that I then in turn took to Camp David
34:40where Haldeman and Ehrlichman were
34:42working on the president's plans
34:44post-election for the uh second term.
34:48And I play this tape and I say, "Listen,
34:50this is serious. What This is what this
34:53what Hunt and these others are asking
34:55for is quid pro quo. And this I'm sure
34:59is illegal." Uh
35:01they say, "Take it to John Mitchell and
35:03let him solve it."
35:05So I fly to New York the same day and uh
35:08take it to Mitchell who's at the uh
35:11meets me at the University Club in New
35:12York and play the tape for him. I never
35:16forget his response. He said, "You never
35:18have any good news, do you?" And I never
35:21did have any good news. And he said he'd
35:23take care of it. And but that's when I
35:25also went back to my office and started
35:28my fingers walking in the law books and
35:30discovered a statute uh
35:33under 18 US Code 1503, which is the
35:38obstruction of justice statute. And
35:41reading the annotations in in the the
35:43code I had in my office, I realized very
35:46quickly that we're we're obstructing
35:48justice.
35:55I'm not aware of aware of Segretti until
35:58after he surfaces in the Post. That's
36:00the first I hear of him uh and
36:02uh my office is asked to how we should
36:05deal with that and what have you. And to
36:07my to to my knowledge that Segretti has
36:10committed no criminal acts from what uh
36:13I you know I myself and Fred Fielding,
36:16my deputy, talked to him and what he's
36:18done is not nice, but uh it doesn't
36:22appear to be criminal activity. Uh
36:25so we're not particularly concerned
36:26about Segretti. Uh and I he said, "What
36:29should I do?" I said, "Take a long trip
36:31home to California." He gets on a train
36:33and goes back to California. Uh
36:36cuz he was it was really the press that
36:38was after him more than uh law
36:40enforcement. In fact, very early in the
36:42investigation
36:44like 2 days after I
36:46you know the arrest I go over to the
36:48Attorney General's office. That's when
36:50he tells me
36:51uh about Liddy coming out and wanting to
36:54get his men out of jail.
36:56Uh and he I he also has Henry Petersen,
36:59who's the head of the criminal division,
37:00come up and and and report to me. And I
37:04I had worked at the Justice Department.
37:06I knew Petersen very well. I'd Henry and
37:09I'd had long conversations. I'd ask him
37:11about things like the Bobby Baker
37:13investigation of Lyndon Johnson and how
37:16they
37:17somehow had miraculously steered that
37:19around the Johnson White House back when
37:22long before there's Watergate or any
37:24kind of criminal activity, just when we
37:25were lunching together at the at the
37:27Justice Department as colleagues. And so
37:30I knew Henry very well. And I said,
37:31"Henry, I don't think the White House
37:33can take a wide-open investigation." He
37:35said, "You won't be subject to a
37:36wide-open investigation." He said, I
37:39said, "To the best of my knowledge we
37:40had nothing to do with Watergate. So I
37:42don't think there's a problem there." He
37:44said, but I said "Campaign Act
37:45violations? I have no idea what could go
37:48have gone on." And he said, "Well,
37:50John," he said, "the department's had a
37:52long-standing policy. We do not
37:54investigate in until at least a year
37:57after the campaign within the statute of
37:59limitations Campaign Act violations. So
38:02they're not going to be investigated.
38:04They're not part of this investigation."
38:05I know that's one of the things the Post
38:07was
38:08in September was writing and focusing on
38:11heavily is they had uncovered Segretti
38:13and nothing was happening on the
38:15Segretti investigation. Well, that was
38:17standard Department of Justice policy at
38:19that time.
38:26Watching the theater of
38:29say the movie All the President's Men uh
38:32is that's a dramatized account. Uh
38:36it wasn't that tense. It particularly
38:37wasn't that tense in the White House.
38:39May have been that tense in the
38:41newsroom,
38:42uh but I can't speak to that. I doubt
38:44it. But I I I I know how newsrooms rooms
38:48operate as well. But it makes for great
38:51theater and the story holds up even to
38:53this day to watch the movie.
38:55Uh but it just wasn't that tense
38:58uh
38:59when it was unfolding.
39:00Now, I'm sure it got tense at the White
39:03House when things started falling apart.
39:06I'm sure it got tense when the president
39:08was waiting to hear if the Supreme Court
39:10would rule that he had to turn over his
39:12tapes. I'm out of there by then. Uh
39:16and not I'm responsible for that
39:18happening.
39:24My immediate reaction to realizing I'm
39:28on the wrong side of the law
39:31is not what
39:33I would have logically thought it would
39:34be.
39:35Uh
39:36what I did at that point when I realized
39:39I was in trouble was I decided I had to
39:43get deeply involved and make the
39:44cover-up work.
39:46Uh that we were all going to sink,
39:47including me.
39:49Now, today I understand
39:52what happened.
39:53Uh the psychology behind that hadn't
39:56even been developed at that point, but
39:58people like Daniel Kahneman
40:00uh has has developed uh the loss frame
40:04that shows what I did was just very
40:06typical. In fact, when I later listened
40:09to many of the tapes, I heard my
40:10colleagues entering the loss frame,
40:13where you don't think logically. You do
40:15not make a rational judgment. You were
40:19more inclined to double down on the loss
40:22than try to lessen it and step away from
40:24it. Uh it's a it's a classic it's almost
40:28human nature, I'm convinced, since so
40:30much science has shown in support of
40:32this these these theories. Good example
40:34of that is I would have never imagined
40:36destroying documents or tapes or
40:38anything. Uh but after I learn we're in
40:41trouble and I discover that we have not
40:45by accident turned over everything we
40:48had on Hunt. I found a notebook that has
40:51been stuck in my file,
40:54uh and I realize it may have some of the
40:57information relating to the Ellsberg
40:59break-in in it. How do I solve that? I
41:02put it in my shredder.
41:04And that's a typical bad
41:08loss frame type decision. Uh
41:11and then basically forget about it. And
41:14and
41:14and do not recall it when I I don't
41:17think I even testified about that in in
41:18the Senate. It had just escaped me. I
41:20mean, uh
41:22it it's amazing how when you're even
41:24trying to tell all,
41:26uh you'll suppress things. But anyway,
41:28uh that I saw is a very common thing
41:31that happened where people
41:33uh double down uh when they knew they
41:35were in trouble. I saw Richard Nixon do
41:36it. And go for broke. He decided I'm
41:40going to hang you know, I'm going to
41:41find a scapegoat and uh and just lie my
41:45way through this.
41:51What happened on March 21st of 1973
41:56is I'd reached a point where I realized
42:00we had to do something. We had to
42:03stop the cover-up. I was out of the loss
42:06frame, if you will.
42:08Uh I realized that it was only going to
42:10get worse and I first tried to convince
42:13Haldeman and Ehrlichman, particularly
42:15Ehrlichman, who had such an influence on
42:17Haldeman as
42:19a lawyer that he listened to.
42:21Uh I wasn't sure he would follow my
42:23advice or he believed that we were as in
42:26deep trouble as I was trying to tell
42:27him. I had arguments with with uh
42:31Ehrlichman about the law and in fact I
42:34didn't till decades later when I
42:36listened to all the tapes realized that
42:38too had gotten onto the tapes where
42:41uh Haldeman excuse me Ehrlichman is
42:42telling the president that counsel here
42:44has been been reading the the statutes
42:47and and sort of makes fun of me for for
42:51being overreacting to some of this
42:52stuff.
42:53Uh but he his argument was we were not
42:56violating the law because he didn't have
42:58a criminal intent. Nobody had a criminal
43:00intent. Well, that's a a not that's
43:03isn't even a law school 101 concept.
43:08Uh and I don't know if he missed that at
43:10Stanford when he went to law school
43:12there, but it was very clear to me that
43:14we had the proper intent uh to be on the
43:17wrong side of the law, but he actually
43:19tried that defense throughout his trials
43:22and said he had no criminal intent. He
43:24had a good motive. Well, motive and
43:26intent are something are very different
43:28animals. Uh
43:30and even if you have a good motive, uh
43:32you can still be a thief as uh
43:35as much literature has
43:37explained to us.
43:38Anyway, when I go in on the 21st to tell
43:42the president I'm convinced I got to get
43:45him to step in and end the cover-up that
43:48it's going to it's going to get us all.
43:51And the night before I'd been talking to
43:53another aide who was involved in some of
43:56the PR of this, a lawyer, and
44:00we talked about it it it's like a cancer
44:02the way it's spreading. So, to get the
44:04president's attention, uh cuz sometimes
44:07when I walked in there, he was relaxed
44:08enough with me that he sometimes
44:11I he'd look at me around his shoes
44:13they're up on the desk and what have
44:14you. And and that morning that they were
44:16up there and I wanted to make sure I had
44:18his full attention, so I began by
44:20telling him there was a cancer on the
44:21presidency and using that symbolism and
44:24and and to try to get his attention,
44:27which it did. And then took him through
44:30a hour and 40-minute conversation of how
44:33bad things were. The first hour and it's
44:36it's just he and I alone. He later calls
44:38in Haldeman for about the last 50
44:40minutes of the conversation. And I
44:43really try to take him through one
44:45problem after another problem after
44:46another problem. And I'm somewhat
44:48stunned that he has an answer for
44:51everything. He
44:52I tell him that Bud Krogh, who had been
44:54involved with the plumbers, uh thinks he
44:56might have committed perjury. And
44:58Nixon's response was, "Well, perjury is
45:01a tough rap to prove, John.
45:03Uh why you know, he can probably get
45:05away with that." In essence.
45:07One response after another. I think in
45:09hindsight, this is the first time I
45:12really meet Richard Nixon. Uh he knows
45:15I'm deadly serious.
45:17Uh he he is following every word. I have
45:20his full attention and I am drawing out
45:22of him who he is and how we deal with
45:24this. He later admits, he said, "You
45:27know, Dean clearly came in to warn me
45:30and he obviously didn't get the the
45:32responses he was expecting." And I
45:34didn't. Uh but that's pretty much put me
45:37out of business as the desk officer for
45:39the cover-up uh that conversation.
45:48The what happened is nobody if you look
45:51at the FBI investigation today,
45:54the only person who was under any
45:56suspicion at all at the at the White
45:58House was Chuck Colson. And he satis he
46:02gave two interviews or more to the FBI
46:06agents and they were concluded based on
46:08those that indeed he he was not
46:11involved. And
46:13uh to this day we don't you know,
46:14there's no evidence he was involved in
46:15the Watergate that he could say with
46:17some
46:19uh
46:20validity indeed that he hadn't had
46:22advanced knowledge and hadn't been
46:24instrumental. Now, if they'd have asked
46:26him the right question, had was he aware
46:28there was an intelligence gathering
46:29operation at the re-election committee,
46:31uh and started on that avenue,
46:34uh they would have probably found he had
46:36some problems. But the way it was
46:37handled uh and nobody else
46:40uh
46:41was ever the target of the FBI when the
46:45Segretti matters came up, uh
46:48Haldeman was never interviewed. Uh
46:51Dwight Chapin was.
46:53Uh later he would commit perjury. I
46:56don't think he did gave false statements
46:58to the FBI cuz it wasn't that probing
47:00and he was able to handle the the
47:01questions. Uh so, no, these really were
47:05I'm telling you pre-election the White
47:07House didn't think they had any problems
47:09at all.
47:10And thought and and thought it would
47:12actually go away after the election.
47:21One of the things I on a long flight
47:23once actually flying to Australia, it
47:25was about a 17-hour flight. I
47:28to pass the time I took a copy my copy
47:31of All the President's Men and pulled
47:34out every statement that Deep Throat
47:38Mark Felt had given to Woodward and made
47:41made, you know, I had a laptop and had
47:43made a
47:44a long list. I'm this long after the
47:46fact. Uh and I realized at that time
47:50that it about 50% of what Felt gave
47:54Woodward, and I have no doubt that Bob
47:56got it right. Well, you know, he wrote
47:58it down quickly after the conversation,
48:00was false. They just pure fabrication.
48:04Nowhere will you find this information
48:06in the FBI's investigations. Uh he you
48:09know, where Felt was getting this stuff,
48:11I have no idea cuz you can't find it
48:13today. Bob and I have agreed to disagree
48:17on this.
48:19Uh but I
48:21you know, if somebody does what the
48:22drill I do and goes through and tries to
48:25find in the historical record some of
48:26this information, it's just not there.
48:29What I'm saying is that I think that
48:31maybe if Felt indeed warned them that
48:34their life was in danger, he was
48:36dramatizing this for his own reason
48:38because there was nothing coming out of
48:40the White House that I'm aware of that
48:42would ever have put their life in
48:43danger. They weren't being followed,
48:45they weren't being investigated, uh they
48:48weren't being threatened in any way.
48:49They weren't seen as a great threat. Uh
48:52so, the White House has a whole
48:54different view of this.
49:01There's no question that Liddy
49:04uh and Hunt
49:06overplayed this sort of thing. They did
49:07the same sort of thing apparently with
49:10the Ellsberg break-in, where they had
49:12tools that they dropped off at and and
49:15hid in this psychiatrist's office. They
49:18were going to later go back. They had
49:20promised uh
49:22Krogh that they would not
49:25get involved personally at all. Yet
49:27Liddy stands as the lookout.
49:29Uh and when he's later asked by Krogh,
49:32uh "Well, what would you have done if
49:33the police spotted you?" And Liddy said,
49:35"I could outrun the police." And Krogh
49:37said, what about a police car? He said,
49:39I can outrun a police car. I mean, this
49:41is crazy stuff. And that's when they
49:43shut down Liddy's operation. So, uh
49:46you know, the fact that he got
49:49you know, that got the kind of money he
49:50got to put out the kind of operation is
49:53not being directed by the White House. I
49:55mean, the White House is stunned as it
49:58learns some of these details. Uh
50:01the fact they used Jim McCord, I mean,
50:03it's just insane.
50:10The closest I ever saw to a threat was
50:13on that September 15th conversation
50:15where he said, we're you know, these
50:17people are we're going to get them after
50:18the election. We're going to nail them.
50:20Uh going to go after them.
50:22Uh
50:24And then listening to some of the other
50:26tapes, I never heard Nixon threaten
50:28anybody physically. Um
50:32and not sure he would.
50:34Uh
50:34you know, he he he's he's he's he's no
50:36patsy, but I also
50:38uh he didn't seem to play that way.
50:41Uh the closest I came to dealing with
50:43him on those sort of issues was My Lai,
50:46which he was very unhappy with. I mean,
50:48uh
50:48he didn't have a high tolerance for that
50:50kind of activity. I've often said, you
50:52know, when George Bush, for example,
50:54Bush two, called for torture, I don't
50:56think Richard Nixon would have gone
50:57there. He's somebody who served in the
51:00Pacific, uh who was aware what
51:01waterboarding was about. And uh you
51:04know, I think there're lines Nixon would
51:06draw and wouldn't cross.
51:14To my knowledge, the Washington Post uh
51:16fun phones were not bugged, certainly
51:18not by anybody that I've ever seen
51:20either contemporaneously or historically
51:23uh that would indicate that to be the
51:25case. Um
51:28The only surveillance that I'm aware of
51:31uh that was ever authorized by the White
51:34House was really legitimately authorized
51:37uh and was run by the FBI. Stuff that
51:40Liddy and Hunt were doing
51:42uh
51:43was learned about after the fact and not
51:44directed from the White House.
51:47I I I was pretty quickly s- stunned by
51:51the stupidity of what they had done. Um
51:55the
51:56the curious investigation for me was
51:58when
51:59the bug later turned out they found a
52:02a second bug that the
52:04the uh was found by the DNC itself
52:08uh that apparently the FBI had missed in
52:10their first sweep. Um
52:12so, uh
52:14but the whole, you know, it was just,
52:16you know, this was very amateur
52:18operation where uh
52:20they had soldered together their own
52:23smoke detector to be a bugging device
52:25and stuff like this. This This was not
52:27high
52:28sophistication uh but rather uh
52:32to me it was something that uh
52:34guys with too much imagination and too
52:36much money
52:37had cooked up uh pretending to be
52:39something that they really weren't. When
52:41Nixon asked for a plant on George
52:44McGovern, I think what he envisioned is
52:46something that was not unusual for any
52:49campaign is to put somebody in that
52:51campaign where they would report back
52:55uh not unlike what they had done uh with
52:58the press. They had people Lucianne
53:00Goldberg was following around and
53:02reporting back to Murray Chotiner on
53:05what was happening with with the press
53:07and other people in the press.
53:09Uh I suspect that is, you know, I don't
53:12I don't really know that much about
53:13campaign operations other than what I've
53:16read, so I have no firsthand knowledge
53:17of any of this. And uh
53:20I but the the sort of the very highly
53:23untoward or the the drama that Bob and
53:26Carl
53:27uh were threatened physically, I've
53:29never seen a scintilla of evidence to
53:31support that.
53:38Well, we know that Bob went in and got
53:41the names of the grand jurors and that
53:44Carl followed up and and they uh talked
53:47to a number of the grand jurors.
53:48Which is not something that uh I think
53:51grand jurors are allowed to do under the
53:55federal rules of criminal procedure. Uh
53:59what is it? 8E, I think is the rule that
54:01prohibits uh
54:02uh grand jurors from talking. And that
54:05would be a very fast way to get in
54:06contempt of court if not uh even deeper
54:09criminal problems, obstruction of
54:11justice.
54:18I initially tried to convince my
54:21colleagues we were in trouble and we had
54:22to had to end it. And uh
54:25really from March 21st on,
54:28the I the I I set that conversation up.
54:31As it was ending, I realized I was not
54:33carrying the day with the president. I
54:35put him in a position I knew was an
54:37impossible position for him. I said, Mr.
54:40President, I think
54:41people are going to go to jail
54:43uh here in the White House. He said,
54:45like who? I said, like me. And really
54:48laid it out that I I had personal
54:50jeopardy and knew he really had had to
54:54deal with that himself in some way. Uh
54:57the way he dealt with it is just
54:58distance himself from me.
55:00Uh and I know today what happened is
55:03they had conversation after conversation
55:06after conversation with how to deal with
55:08it. And they go in they're circular
55:10conversations. It was the toughest part
55:13of the book I wrote about this was to
55:14take these to see where these repeating
55:17conversations added something new and
55:20spun out to a little bit further step.
55:21And it's very they just keep going in
55:24one circle after another. And where they
55:26keep coming out is they realized that uh
55:29the solution is to lay it all on me.
55:32Everything that happened up till June
55:3417th, when the arrests occurred, they'll
55:37lay on Mitchell. And everything that
55:39happened post June 17th, they will lay
55:42off on me. I mean, it becomes very clear
55:44from the tapes. Mitchell, or excuse me,
55:46Nixon will defend himself by saying, I
55:48knew nothing about Watergate until Dean
55:51told me on March 21st. I couldn't prove
55:55that for years until I went through the
55:57tapes. I knew it was a lie. Uh I knew it
55:59based on my September 15th conversation
56:02with him. Uh but there were countless
56:04conversations where he's deeply involved
56:07in the cover-up. Indeed, uh so deeply
56:10that when we're having trouble raising
56:12money, Nixon himself is selling
56:14ambassadorships to raise money. Uh
56:18stunning conversations
56:20uh that he knows exactly what he's
56:22doing. So, uh
56:24it just became it became evident to me
56:27that they were setting me up. I'd seen
56:29it happen with other things at the White
56:31House uh
56:32where somebody had to take the fall. But
56:35I wasn't inclined to do that. I just
56:37didn't think this I thought we all had
56:39to come stand up and that was the only
56:42chance the president would have if he
56:44got us all to come forward and admit our
56:46mistakes because I didn't know how deep
56:48or not deep he was. Uh
56:51and at one point, because they stopped
56:54talking to me,
56:56uh the only time I ever talked to the
56:57press uh was I had my secretary call the
57:01Post and the AP and and the New York
57:04Times and read a message
57:06uh to them that if they thought I would
57:07be the scapegoat, uh they didn't
57:09understand how the system worked or or
57:12me. And I indeed I got through with it
57:15that message. They read it in the paper.
57:17Uh
57:18but after that, uh
57:21they became even more protective and uh
57:25that's when I decided I had to break
57:27rank. And it's the only way it was going
57:29to end.
57:35First of all,
57:37that would solve nothing if I went to a
57:39newspaper and and and spilled the story.
57:42Uh there by that time, it was clearly
57:45going to be a Senate Watergate
57:46investigation. There were ongoing grand
57:49juries. And the only way to everyone had
57:51criminal liability. Uh this wasn't going
57:54to solve itself uh short of the
57:56completion of the criminal process. And
58:00so, I tried to convince them that we all
58:03had to go in to grand juries and tell
58:05the truth. And they at one point are
58:07saying, well, you go ahead. And I did.
58:09And uh
58:11uh that's where it all starts to unravel
58:12then.
58:19After the March 21st conversation, the
58:21president wants me to go to Camp David
58:23and write a report, a written report of
58:26everything I've told him. Well, I knew
58:28writing this report, which I start
58:30drafting actually,
58:32uh is just going to nail everybody. And
58:34and and this isn't the the way to do it.
58:36Um but it's the first time I started
58:39really kind of collecting my thoughts
58:40about, you know, who had done what and
58:42when and how it all had unfolded was up
58:45at Camp David. While I'm up there,
58:47McCord
58:49uh actually the day McCord sends his
58:51letter to Judge Sirica
58:53uh where he's trying to crack a deal by
58:56saying he thinks there's been perjury at
58:58at his trial where he and Liddy had gone
59:01to trial uh for their role in the
59:03bugging and break-in. And he put he
59:07Liddy has told McCord
59:10a surprising amount about what's going
59:12on. But much of it Liddy doesn't know
59:14what actually happened. He doesn't know
59:16who at the White House is involved or
59:19who uh
59:20has done what or what have you. But
59:22McCord put some of this hearsay out, for
59:24example,
59:25that that I'm aware of the Watergate
59:27break-in, which is totally untrue. I had
59:30tried to kill Liddy's plan when I heard
59:33about them at at initially.
59:35I thought they were
59:37you know, just as crazy as the Brookings
59:38thing. As everybody would later testify
59:41that I had indeed had done that. But
59:45when McCord puts this in the post and
59:48and elsewhere,
59:49I realize I I need a lawyer to put these
59:52people on notice. So I called one of my
59:54classmates from law school and asked him
59:57to represent me and and put any papers
59:59to carry this on notice
1:00:01that this is false and untrue.
1:00:04Which he did. And
1:00:07fellow named Tom Hogan who later became
1:00:09the chief judge of the Federal District
1:00:12Court of the District of Columbia. Good
1:00:14judge. Good lawyer.
1:00:17But when I decided, you know, I I really
1:00:21need to
1:00:22go to the prosecutors and start
1:00:24unraveling this thing. That I need a
1:00:27criminal lawyer cuz Tom is not a
1:00:30that point has very little criminal law
1:00:31experience. And we have a mutual friend,
1:00:34Charles Shaffer.
1:00:35That had been in the assistant US
1:00:38attorney in the Southern District and is
1:00:41a very
1:00:42experienced criminal defense lawyer. And
1:00:45so I
1:00:47Tommy arranges for me to meet with
1:00:49Charlie and we start that whole process.
1:00:52Have It's a very interesting story in
1:00:54itself how
1:00:56Charlie has his own ideas about how to
1:00:58handle this and and I I know the
1:01:01political side of it. I know the
1:01:02congressional side of it having worked
1:01:04up on on the hill for a number of years,
1:01:06whereas he knows the criminal law side
1:01:08of it and uh
1:01:10that's a whole other story. You could do
1:01:11another documentary on, but we're not.
1:01:20First of all, there is good coverage of
1:01:22the trial in January of the original
1:01:25burglars. In fact,
1:01:28Sy Hersh writes a story that is probably
1:01:30was for me as I've told Bob and Carl one
1:01:33of the most troubling where he picks up
1:01:35the fact that the burglars are being
1:01:37paid. And puts that in in the New York
1:01:40Times
1:01:41long before the post has
1:01:44this material. That's a story that did
1:01:45give the White House heartburn for sure.
1:01:48And
1:01:51as as
1:01:54post trial
1:01:55and as sentencing approach approaches
1:01:59the media itself begins to sense there's
1:02:01more going on here
1:02:03than they initially had thought. That
1:02:06not withstanding Nixon's overwhelming
1:02:09re-election
1:02:10that something big is a stir and at that
1:02:13point in April
1:02:15you start getting
1:02:18increasing coverage of Watergate and
1:02:20soon it's wall-to-wall coverage of
1:02:22Watergate. And by the time you get into
1:02:25this hearings before the Senate in May,
1:02:29you've got a worldwide coverage of
1:02:31Watergate. So it becomes the biggest
1:02:34story of its era for
1:02:37some you know, total from start to
1:02:39finish it's about 900 days
1:02:42which is remarkable.
1:02:44I'm not sure it could last that long
1:02:46today with the way the media cycles move
1:02:49so much faster, but it went for a long
1:02:52time.
1:02:58The story that
1:03:01was a
1:03:03important story in Watergate for Carl
1:03:05and Bob and and Ben Bradley
1:03:08was the story they did in the fall on
1:03:12Haldeman and
1:03:15the purported grand jury testimony by
1:03:17Hugh Sloan which they had had a
1:03:19misunderstanding.
1:03:20And it was at this point that the White
1:03:23House is actually chuckling at the post
1:03:25getting things wrong
1:03:27and Ziegler would go out and just hammer
1:03:29them in the briefing room for getting it
1:03:32wrong and be on firm ground in in his
1:03:36doing it and a certain delight in being
1:03:38able to do that. But that was
1:03:39short-lived. It was not a particular
1:03:42story that ever really bothered the
1:03:45White House. It was the cumulative
1:03:47effect of the post where
1:03:50the everyone in the White House knew
1:03:53that what
1:03:54this story was important because the
1:03:56post had made it important. It made it a
1:03:59talking point. Made it something people
1:04:00read about at breakfast and that's why
1:04:03I'm convinced that the Senate decided to
1:04:06continue with hearings to set up a
1:04:08special select committee to investigate
1:04:11it. It's why the prosecutors decided
1:04:13they were going to continue to unravel
1:04:15it and see where else would happen after
1:04:17the initial trial. It's because of the
1:04:21post. There's just no question
1:04:24that it was gutsy of them to take on a
1:04:28president who had been you know, clearly
1:04:31overwhelmingly elected. Carried every
1:04:34state but Massachusetts and the District
1:04:36of Columbia. So it was a gutsy play and
1:04:41it turned out they they got it right in
1:04:43the long run, but they didn't know it
1:04:45and
1:04:47wasn't any one story that made that ring
1:04:50home. It was just the daily drip drip
1:04:54drip drip drip of the whole thing.
1:05:02I don't think that Nixon intentionally
1:05:04created an enemy out of the press.
1:05:07The fact that he had an enemies list was
1:05:10revealed through my testimony.
1:05:13Actually set up with with Weicker who
1:05:15was my neighbor. Senator Weicker was a
1:05:17member of the committee. And decided not
1:05:20to put it in my testimony rather we
1:05:21should save that for the for a Q&A where
1:05:24we knew it would come out the second day
1:05:27and I had no idea it would become such a
1:05:29big story, the enemies list. It was
1:05:32somewhat overplayed in fact because
1:05:35while there were enemies projects
1:05:39most of them were bungled and little was
1:05:41actually done. Larry O'Brien's tax
1:05:44returns.
1:05:46Nixon had Haldeman all over that,
1:05:48but there was not a widespread
1:05:52there were
1:05:52you know, you took these cumulative
1:05:54lists
1:05:55that were in my actually just got tossed
1:05:58in my desk drawer and that's why I
1:06:00happen to have them.
1:06:02Never did anything with them.
1:06:05But
1:06:06so I had them all and then that became a
1:06:09badge of pride for people after this all
1:06:12came out for people to have been on the
1:06:15enemies list.
1:06:21Then what happened at one point is
1:06:23Ehrlichman called me to his office and
1:06:25gave me this sheet of papers, hundreds
1:06:28of names
1:06:30and he said he said, "You know Johnny
1:06:32Walters, don't you?" Who's then the head
1:06:35of the Internal Revenue Service. I said,
1:06:37"Yes, I do." He said, "Well, uh
1:06:40I'd like to have you take this and give
1:06:42it to John and have him start audits on
1:06:45all these people." I said,
1:06:48"Okay."
1:06:49And what I did is called Walters in and
1:06:52said,
1:06:53"John Ehrlichman gave me this list and
1:06:55he would like you to start tax audits on
1:06:58it."
1:06:59Fortunately, John Walters had a good
1:07:01memory. He wrote down what I said. He
1:07:03would later testify in front of Congress
1:07:06exactly how it happened.
1:07:08I was sort of just stuck in the middle
1:07:10of it and
1:07:13did not think much of it. Most is when
1:07:15these things were in my control, they
1:07:17went in the desk drawer.
1:07:23By the time Nixon
1:07:26resigns, it's it's been pretty much my
1:07:29word versus his word. As well as he's
1:07:31called me a liar on national television
1:07:33several times. Said I'm the only one who
1:07:35testified he was involved and what have
1:07:37you. Uh
1:07:40I'm relieved
1:07:42and I thought, you know,
1:07:44what worried me at that point was that
1:07:46he would defy the court. That he would
1:07:49say this is all trumped up and and
1:07:52these are tapes were never made for this
1:07:54purpose and
1:07:56he never claimed a privilege that he
1:07:58might have gotten away with which was
1:08:00the state secrets privilege and later
1:08:03Bush too would use that very
1:08:04effectively. It's much more sweeping
1:08:07than executive privilege.
1:08:10I thought something like that would come
1:08:11into play and that he wouldn't resign.
1:08:14So I was very relieved when he resigned.
1:08:16I I had agreed by that time to assist
1:08:19the prosecutors. I had
1:08:22just
1:08:23before he just before he fired Cox
1:08:26agreed to I had watched Cox. My my
1:08:29attorney Charlie Shaffer happened to be
1:08:31a good friend of Jim Neal. They had
1:08:33tried Jimmy Hoffa together. So I
1:08:37I actually had formed a lifetime
1:08:39friendship with Jim Neal. Uh As a result
1:08:42of that,
1:08:43you know, he and I
1:08:44I I was I was very surprised when
1:08:47shortly before he died, I'm one of the
1:08:48people he called and I didn't know he
1:08:50was dying, but he
1:08:52it was a trumped up conversation, but he
1:08:54wanted to call me about the procedures
1:08:56for clemency which he could have found
1:08:57out a dozen places and I
1:09:00few days later realized he was calling
1:09:02to say goodbye. But anyway, I I I
1:09:05I was I was a little bit uh
1:09:07annoyed and surprised cuz it was not
1:09:10clear what was going to happen next when
1:09:12Cox disappeared. That was a huge story.
1:09:15Much more threatening than anything
1:09:17else. So I I was I was I was relieved
1:09:20when Nixon resigned. I you know, it to
1:09:22me uh
1:09:24that was the only thing he got right.
1:09:32Let me end on this note.
1:09:34I I'm sure Ben is smiling at how well
1:09:39the post is running today and how
1:09:42important the post and its work is going
1:09:44to be
1:09:45to President Trump.
1:09:47And how unhappy President Trump is going
1:09:50to be with the Washington Post. I think
1:09:53that's very important.

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