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Joe Rogan Experience #1368 - Edward Snowden — Transcript

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0:11and uh okay that'll just be
0:13you're very professional.
0:15Well, you know, people are like uh how
0:18do you live and and things like that.
0:20They're like you taking money from the
0:21Russians and of course the answer is no.
0:24But uh I I do this for a living. Like I
0:25I speak I'm I don't have a YouTube
0:27channel where it's you know I'm I'm Joe
0:29Rogan but I give speeches at
0:31universities and things like that. I do
0:33a lot of interviews and so
0:34we're recording now my own setup.
0:36Could is it possible that you could do a
0:39YouTube channel? Would that work?
0:42I mean if Yeah. Like I I mean if you
0:46introduce me so like I get followers.
0:47Yeah, we could do that.
0:48Dude, I'm all in. That that could
0:51absolutely happen. Do you want to do
0:52that? Is that something you want to do?
0:54No. No, I mean this is a big question.
0:56So I I came on um because I had just uh
0:59written a book uh called Permanent
1:01Record. Um which is the the story of my
1:04life because that's what publishers make
1:06you do when when you're writing your
1:08first book. Um but it it's more than
1:10that because I didn't just want to talk
1:12about me. It's actually about the
1:13changing of technology and the changing
1:15of government in this sort of post 911
1:18era which you know our generation just
1:20sort of happened uh to be growing up
1:23during and I was at the CIA and the NSA
1:25and all this stuff but the day that the
1:27book came out uh the government hit me
1:29with a lawsuit um and they hit the
1:31publisher of the books uh with a with a
1:34lawsuit
1:35because they don't want to see books
1:36like this get written. They especially
1:38don't want to see books like this uh get
1:41read. Um, and so the big thing was, you
1:43know, we we didn't know where this was
1:44going. We didn't know what was going to
1:45happen. Um, and my publisher, of course,
1:48wanted me uh very badly to let people
1:50know this book existed uh in case the
1:53government leaned harder and harder and
1:54harder and we didn't know where where
1:56that's going. Um, the government is
1:58still uh pursuing that case quite
2:00strongly. Um, they're more focused on
2:02the the financial censorship side of it.
2:05basically taking any money that I made
2:07from it uh kind of as a warning to the
2:09others um and getting a a legal judgment
2:12against the publishers saying, you know,
2:13you can't pay this guy, that kind of
2:15thing. More so than taking the book off
2:17the shelves, but that's not because uh
2:20they're okay with the book being on the
2:21shelves. It's because thankfully we
2:23we've got the First Amendment and so
2:25they can't. And that's a very rare and
2:27and and good thing. Um but anyway, in
2:30the context of that, um uh they were
2:33like, "Well, what about Joe Rogan?" And
2:35you know, I I I had heard about you, uh
2:38at this point, but you know, uh the only
2:40thing that I had really seen that I
2:42really understood um had familiarity
2:44with was like you talking to Bernie
2:46Sanders, which by the way, I very much
2:47appreciated uh hearing that because a
2:50lot of people don't give the guy time to
2:52talk.
2:52Yeah. to to hear him in those sound
2:54bites. You don't really get an
2:56understanding of who he actually is,
2:58right? And this is the other thing, like
2:59they're like, well, you know, you can go
3:01on all these, you know, major network
3:03shows. And I I did a couple of them. I
3:05did like uh a morning show. I did Brian
3:08Williams. Um but broadly, the media, the
3:12the the sort of more corporatized media,
3:15as we might say, um is exactly what you
3:17just described, right? They they want
3:19you to be able to answer in like 8 15
3:21seconds or less.
3:23Um, and when we're talking about big
3:25massive shifts in society, when we're
3:26talking about uh power, when we're
3:29talking about uh technology and how it
3:31controls and influences us uh in the
3:33future, um you you can't have a
3:35meaningful conversation within those
3:37constraints. Uh and so instead, these
3:39guys all want to say uh repeat these
3:41long discredited sort of criticisms. And
3:43you know, I'm sure you'll you'll you'll
3:45ask the same thing, and that's okay. um
3:47they're they're fair questions, but it's
3:48like we can't have the conversation if
3:51we can't have the space to think and
3:53breathe and have this this sort of
3:55discussion. Um so anyway, they they
3:57mentioned you and I was like Joe Rogan,
3:59Joe Rogan, Joe Rogan, where do I know
4:00this name from uh before Bernie Sanders?
4:04Um and I look back through my my Twitter
4:07mentions. Um and the funny thing is your
4:10fans have been uh harassing me to death
4:14for like the last years. wonderful
4:16people. Wonderful people. Uh but like go
4:18on Joe Rogan. Go on Joe Rogan. And I
4:20remember like after I had just made a
4:23Twitter account, uh Neil Degrass Tyson
4:24actually helped me get on Twitter. Um
4:27gave me that little initial boost and uh
4:31they said Joe Rogan. And so I they like
4:33linked you and you know I I mouse over
4:35your name because I use a desktop. I'm
4:36not mobile for this because security
4:38reasons. Uh and it pops up and I get
4:40your avatar man. And like I have to say
4:43your logo
4:45is the worst thing in the world for
4:47people who are like trying to be like
4:49politically serious and you know they're
4:50worried about the national security
4:52adviser condemning cuz like this bald
4:54guy with this maniacal grin and like the
4:56third eye on his forehead and I'm like
4:58oh man that show you know that that
5:01doesn't look good. But it's actually
5:02like when you watch you know when when
5:05you watch what you're doing it's great
5:06stuff man. And it's great, but that
5:07first impression like I
5:11this almost didn't happen. But everybody
5:13who has talked to you, you know,
5:16everybody who watches your show, I think
5:17they get a very different impression
5:19than how you're painted. And for me,
5:21it's a wonderful thing because nobody
5:22understands that better than I do,
5:23right? Like the government ran a smear
5:25campaign against me endlessly for six
5:28months when I came forward in June of
5:302013. I know we got way off topic here.
5:32I'll get back to it.
5:33Fine.
5:34Um,
5:34there's no such thing as off topic. We
5:36could do talk about whatever.
5:39Great. Great. Okay. So, for for those
5:41people first off who have no idea who
5:43the hell I am, um I'm the guy who is
5:46behind uh the revelations of global mass
5:49surveillance in 2013. Um I worked for
5:52the CIA. I worked for the NSA as a
5:55contractor at the NSA, staff officer,
5:57the CIA. I was undercover working at
5:59embassies. Um but uh and I talk about
6:02the difference between this in a book
6:04and contractor and government official
6:06and how it it's all sort of lost its
6:08meaning. Uh but I saw something wrong.
6:11Um and I saw basically the government
6:12was violating the law. Um and what I
6:15believed to be the Constitution of the
6:16United States and more broadly human
6:18rights uh for everyone in the United
6:20States and around the world. There were
6:21domestic surveillance programs. There
6:22were mass surveillance programs that
6:24worked internationally. Um, basically
6:26everything that they could monitor, uh,
6:28they were monitoring. Um, and this is
6:31actually like people go, "Isn't that
6:33obvious? Isn't that what they're
6:34supposed to do?" And this is weird, but
6:35the answer actually is no. Um, under the
6:38framework of our constitution, the
6:40government is only supposed to be
6:41monitoring people that it has an
6:43individualized particularized
6:46suspicion of wrongdoing for. Right? This
6:48is we think about this in the
6:50investigative means, right? Like all
6:52those TV shows where they're like, "Go
6:53and get a warrant." The reason they have
6:55to do that like we fought a a revolution
6:58o over this uh you know a couple hundred
7:01years back um is the idea that when we
7:04had you know kings when we had
7:06governments of absolute power uh they
7:08could simply go in your home and go you
7:10know is this guy a pot smoker get his
7:12diary you know whatever it is and just
7:13like if you find evidence of a crime you
7:15march them off to prison and it's all
7:17good you found evidence they're a
7:18criminal or you didn't find evidence
7:20well no harm no foul you're just doing
7:22what government does. Um
7:26we were trying to build a better system
7:28where when yes the government has
7:30extraordinary capabilities but it only
7:33uses them where they're they're
7:34necessary right uh where they're uh
7:38proportionate to the threat that is
7:39presented by this person. You know like
7:41we we shouldn't be afraid of the person
7:43who's got like a baggie of weed uh in
7:45their dresser or something like that.
7:47That is not a threat to national
7:48security. That is not a threat to public
7:50safety. Um, but what happened in the
7:54wake of 9/11 was a whole bunch of uh
7:56government officials got together behind
7:57closed doors. Uh, and this was actually
7:59led, interestingly enough, by the vice
8:01president of the United States, Cheney.
8:03Uh, everybody remembers that name or
8:05hopefully can look that name up. Um,
8:08Dick Cheney, and his personal attorney,
8:12uh, sort of the the Giuliani of Dick
8:14Cheney, um, a guy named David Addington.
8:19And this lawyer, David Addington, wrote
8:22a secret legal interpretation uh that no
8:25one else was allowed to see. Uh it was
8:27kept in the vice president's safe at the
8:28White House. Um they they weren't giving
8:31this even when they told people and it
8:33was just a couple people in Congress. Um
8:36Nancy Pelosi was one of them and a
8:38couple of these other folks. um when
8:40they talked uh to the heads of the
8:42agency at the NSA and the CIA and the
8:45FBI and all this stuff uh they told them
8:47the White House and the Office of Legal
8:49Counsel and you know this this uh the
8:51president's attorneys all of these guys
8:53had decided this would be legal to do
8:57but we can't tell you why. We can't show
9:00you the legal authorization for you just
9:01got to take our word for it. Um, and so
9:04they did this and this became a mass
9:05surveillance program called Stellar
9:07Wind, which they said was supposed to
9:09monitor the phone calls uh and internet
9:11communications, emails and things like
9:14that of everybody in the United States
9:15and around the world who they could get
9:17access to for links to al-Qaeda. Because
9:20if you remember in the the wake of uh
9:22the September 11th attacks, they were
9:25saying um
9:28we thought there could be sleeper cells
9:30of al-Qaeda that were just, you know,
9:32peppered all throughout the country and
9:33they were going to spring up at any
9:34moment. Of course, like weapons of mass
9:36destruction, it just didn't exist. It
9:37was all a power grab. Um but on that
9:40basis, they started doing this in secret
9:43and it was completely unconstitutional.
9:44It was completely illegal, even under
9:46the very loose requirements of the
9:47Patriot Act. Um but they did it for so
9:51long
9:52that they got comfortable with it and
9:54they thought this is you know this is a
9:55really powerful capability. What if we
9:57started using this for stuff that was
9:59other than terrorism because it wasn't
10:01finding any terrorists because there
10:02weren't any terrorists uh in this
10:05context they were looking for them. Uh
10:07and the ones who where there were
10:09terrorists the program wasn't affected
10:10because these were guys in Pakistan that
10:12that weren't using you know email and
10:14phone calls. they were getting on a, you
10:16know, moped with their cousin who was a
10:18courier who was bringing a letter to his
10:20guy, you know, who runs the the food
10:22stand or whatever. Um, but, uh, bit by
10:26bit over time, this grew and grew and
10:28grew, and there were scandals. And if
10:29you want to drill down to these later,
10:30I'll I'll go into them. But what
10:32happened was step by step by step, um,
10:37our constitutional rights were changed.
10:39Um, and we weren't allowed to know it.
10:42We were never granted a vote on it. And
10:44even the many members of Congress,
10:46right, 535 in the United States, uh they
10:49were prohibited from knowing this uh and
10:52instead they told only a few select
10:55people. In the original case, there were
10:57only eight members of Congress called
10:58the gang of eight who knew about this.
11:01Um then there were uh the people on the
11:04intelligence committees uh both in the
11:06Senate and the House who were told about
11:08this. Uh but they were only told
11:09partially about it. They weren't told
11:11the full scope of it. Uh, and now that
11:13they had been told about it, because
11:14they had security clearances and things
11:16like that, they weren't allowed to tell
11:17anybody else, even if they objected to
11:19it, and we had one senator, uh, Ron
11:22Weiden, um, and another one, I believe
11:24Tom Udall was the name of them, who did
11:25object to this and who wanted something
11:27to happen, but because they couldn't
11:29tell anybody that was happening, they
11:30were sort of doing these weird lassie
11:32barks, uh, to the press where they were
11:34like, "We have grave concerns about the
11:36way these programs are being carried
11:37out." Uh, but nobody knew what they were
11:40talking about. And so journalists were
11:41like, you know, they've got concerns.
11:42What is that, Lassie? What are you
11:44trying to say? Timy's in the well, but
11:45they were getting it wrong. They they
11:46couldn't tell what was happening. And so
11:48what had happened uh was that we, the
11:50American people, had sort of lost our
11:53seat at the table of government. Uh we
11:55were no longer partner to government. We
11:57had simply become subject to government.
11:58And I think everybody uh who's in the
12:01world today uh who is aware of what's
12:04going on, whether it's under this
12:06administration, the last administration,
12:08the one before that, right? uh they have
12:10seen a constant kind of uh shift where
12:14we have we the public have less say and
12:17less influence over the policy of
12:20government uh with each passing year.
12:22There's kind of a a new class that's
12:25being created a government class and and
12:27then the the the public uh civil class
12:29that are held to different standards of
12:31behavior. And when we start talking
12:32about leaking and whistleblowing, this
12:34becomes even more clear. So what I did
12:37was I wanted to clarify that kind of
12:39lassie mark, right? I just wanted
12:41everybody to know what was going on. I
12:44didn't want to say uh the government
12:46can't do this. I didn't want to say uh
12:49this is how you guys have to live
12:50because that's not for me to say. uh but
12:52I do believe that everybody in the
12:54United States and more broadly people in
12:55the world who are having their rights
12:57violated by a government uh should have
12:59at least an understanding of how that is
13:01happening, what the authorities uh sort
13:04of the policies and programs that are
13:05enabling that are so that they can
13:08protest them so that they can cast a
13:10vote about them who so that they can say
13:13you know what you guys say this is okay
13:15but I disagree this is not okay I object
13:18and I want things to change and so I
13:20gathered evidence of what I believe to
13:22criminal or unconstitutional activity on
13:24the part of the government. Um, and I
13:26gave this to journalists, right? Now, I
13:29gave this to journalists uh under a very
13:32strict condition here, which was that
13:33they publish no story in this archive of
13:36information simply because it was
13:38interesting, right? No clickbait, not
13:40anything just because, uh, they thought
13:42it would make news, it would get them
13:43awards. Uh, they would only publish
13:46stories that they were willing to make
13:47an institutional judgment and stand
13:49behind. uh and this was three different
13:51newspapers
13:53um that it was in the public interest to
13:56know. Um and so then beyond that there
14:00was additional because if you could see
14:02sort of what I was doing here what had
14:04happened what had led us into this uh
14:06pitfall was that um
14:11the system of checks and balances that's
14:13supposed to self-regulate our government
14:15had failed. uh the courts had uh
14:17abdicated their role in policing the
14:20executive in the Congress because
14:21terrorism was such a hot argument at the
14:25time. They were worried about being
14:26criticized and blamed if something went
14:28wrong and attack did go through and they
14:30didn't have access to the information
14:32that the programs were ineffective. So
14:34they were just taking the government's
14:35word for it and they didn't want to
14:36weigh it in. Uh Congress, most of them
14:39didn't even know, right? Um and the ones
14:42who did know, it was the same thing. uh
14:44they were getting their pockets stuffed
14:46with money by the defense contractors
14:48that were getting rich for building
14:49these systems that were violating the
14:51rights of each of us. Uh so they
14:53benefited by just saying nothing. And
14:55then the executive themselves, uh
14:57whether we're talking about Bush, right,
14:58whether we're talking about Obama or
15:00whether we're talking about Trump now,
15:02all these guys were okay with a
15:03constantly growing surveillance state
15:05because they're the ones whose hands
15:07were on the lever at the time. They got
15:09to aim it. They got to use it. Uh if you
15:11had a little search box in front of you,
15:13they would give you the email history
15:15and you know of everybody in the United
15:17States. Anybody you want if you could
15:19pull up their text messages, anybody you
15:21want, if you could see anything they've
15:22ever typed into that Google search box,
15:24right, Joe? What is the worst thing
15:26you've ever typed into that search box
15:29that lasts forever, right? And they have
15:31a record of that. They can get that from
15:33Google. And so this was this was the
15:36whole thing. Um how do we
15:39correct for that? So when you have
15:41somebody uh who wants to inform the
15:43public of something and we'll get into
15:45the proper channels arguments later. Um
15:48but you can't go through the institution
15:51to get these corrected because the
15:52institution knows it's wrong and is
15:55doing it anyway. Right? That's the whole
15:57uh origin of the program is they want to
15:59do something that they're not allowed to
16:01do. Uh what do you do? Right? And so I
16:04didn't want to say I'm the president of
16:06secrets. I didn't want to just put this
16:07stuff on the internet and I could have.
16:08I'm a technologist. Right. Um I worked
16:12with the journalists and then uh to
16:14create an adversarial step, right? Uh
16:16someone who would argue against what I
16:18believed and hopefully what the
16:20journalists believe once they consulted
16:22the documents and uh basically
16:24authenticated them. Um
16:27can we get the government to play that
16:30role? Right. Um and so before the
16:33journalist published any story, this is
16:35a controversial thing. People still
16:36criticize me for this actually. They
16:38say, "I was too accommodated in
16:39government." They they could be right.
16:41Um is that the journalist would go to
16:44the government and give them warning,
16:46say, "We're about to run this story
16:47about this secret program that says you
16:49did X, Y, and Z bad thing. One, is that
16:53right?" And the government will always
16:54go, "Oh, no comment." Right? Uh two, is
16:57this going to cause harm? Is anybody
16:59going to get hurt? Is this program
17:00effective? Is there something we don't
17:02understand? Right? Is there something
17:04Snowden doesn't understand? Does this
17:06guy just not get it? Right? Are these
17:08documents fake? Whatever you want, say
17:10we shouldn't run this story. And in
17:13every case I'm aware of, that process
17:14was followed. And that's why, right,
17:16because there's a lot of people out
17:17there who don't like me, who who
17:19criticize me, who go this was unsafe,
17:20this caused harm to people or whatever.
17:23We're in 2019 now. Uh I came forward uh
17:28and these stories won the Pulitzer Prize
17:29for public service journalism uh
17:31starting way back in June of 2013.
17:35Uh we've had six years to show bodies.
17:39We've had six years to show harm. And
17:41you know as well as I do. The
17:43government's happy to leak things when
17:44it's in in their interest. Uh nobody has
17:47been hurt as a result of these
17:48disclosures because everyone who was
17:50involved in them was so careful. We
17:53wanted to maximize the public benefit
17:55while mitigating the potential risks. Uh
17:58and I think we did a pretty good job of
18:00it. But just to get back to the the the
18:01main thing, the original thing that got
18:03us off uh on that trail, when I came
18:07forward in June of 2013, I I gave one
18:09interview to the people who were in the
18:11room uh with the documents, uh Laura
18:15Pus, Glenn Greenwald, Euan McCascal,
18:18and I said who I was. I said why I was
18:20doing this. I said what this was about,
18:21why it matters. Um and that we were
18:23constructing a system of turnkey
18:25tyranny. And even if you trust that to
18:27Obama, you never know whose hand is
18:28going to be on that key next. And all
18:30they have to do is turn it. And there's
18:32nothing we can do to stop it. Uh the
18:34only thing that's restraining these
18:35programs really is is policy more so
18:38than the law. And the president at any
18:40time can sign a napkin. And those
18:42policies change.
18:44Uh well, after that, I went six months
18:47uh without giving any interviews. Um
18:50because I didn't want people to talk
18:51about me. I wanted them to talk about
18:52what actually mattered. And the
18:53government of course was trying very
18:55hard to change the conversation as they
18:57always do to be about who is this guy,
18:59what have they done, right? What's wrong
19:01with them? What are their problems? Who
19:02is this this loony guy? Uh so they can
19:05controversialize the source of a story
19:07rather than having to confront the story
19:10itself.
19:12Uh, and that's why I said it's I I I
19:15really kind of appreciate
19:18uh
19:20your your take on the media and
19:22everything like that because uh when you
19:25don't tell your story, you know, other
19:27people will tell it for you. They'll say
19:29so many things about you and they'll
19:30have these misimpressions like I did
19:32because of something as stupid as as the
19:34avatar that you were using on Twitter,
19:36right? Where I think it's a certain kind
19:38of show with a certain kind of guy and
19:39it's this crazy stuff. But when I
19:41actually listen to you, when I actually
19:44look at the facts, right, and when I
19:46hear you just speak, I go, "Actually,
19:49this is a thoughtful guy. Actually, this
19:51is somebody who does care, who does want
19:52to look at these things deeply." Uh, and
19:54appearances, uh, and our first
19:56impressions uh, can be very misleading.
19:59Uh, I work hard on that. I try to
20:01mislead people. It's good.
20:04Works to my advantage.
20:04You're doing a good job, man.
20:06Thank you. Um, I want to bring it back
20:08to when you first started with the NSA.
20:11You started as a contractor, right? Uh,
20:13what was your initial impression and
20:15when did you know that things were
20:18really squirrely with the programs they
20:21wereing?
20:22So, I'm I'm not saying this to put put
20:24you on the spot. I know you've been a
20:25busy guy. I know you hadn't done uh uh I
20:29I think shows recently. You come back
20:30from a break, right? Um, but have you
20:33read the book? because it'll just help
20:35me uh put your book in frame. If you
20:36haven't got a chance to read it yet,
20:38no, I have not read your book or got a
20:39copy of it.
20:41Okay. Well, I will send you a signed
20:42copy, brother. Beautiful. And uh I hope
20:44you'll read it and I hope you enjoy it.
20:46But all right. So, uh I had a really
20:50weird um history in the intelligence
20:53community. Uh I grew up in a federal
20:55family
20:56um in the the shadow of Fort me, right?
20:59all these little suburban communities in
21:01Maryland where basically the the entire
21:03industry of the state is the federal
21:05government of all these different
21:06agencies and then all the
21:07subcontractors, all the defense
21:09industries uh that serve that government
21:11and really are kind of our our war
21:13making machine, our our system of
21:15control uh for the country and the world
21:18broadly. All that stuff spreads uh in
21:21you know a couple hundred mile radius
21:23out of DC.
21:25Uh my mother uh worked for the district
21:28courts um or rather the federal courts
21:31and uh it's kind of funny because she
21:33still works there and those are the
21:34courts that are trying to throw me in
21:36jail for the rest of my life now. Um my
21:38father worked for the Coast Guard uh
21:40retired after 30 years. My grandfather
21:42was an admiral and then he worked for
21:43the FBI. Um,
21:46as as far back as it goes, my my family
21:49uh my my whole line of family even
21:52generations back uh was working for the
21:55government. Um, so it was pretty
21:57ordinary, pretty expected for me to to
21:59to go into the same kind of work. down.
22:02I started I wasn't super successful in
22:05school um
22:08because uh
22:10it I felt and you know this is the most
22:13arrogant thing in the world than anybody
22:14says um
22:20that I had more to learn from computers
22:23than I did from you know biology class.
22:27Um and so I spent more and more time
22:29focusing on technology. And then I got
22:30mono uh and I drop out of high school.
22:33Um
22:34and now it's like, all right, how do I
22:37make this up? Uh I I say drop out of
22:40high school, but I'm actually going to
22:42community college, right? They they
22:43called it concurrent enrollment where
22:45I'm not taking any classes at high
22:46school. Uh I'm going to community
22:48college instead.
22:50Um and I'm not doing that great there
22:52either. Like it it's fine. You know, I'm
22:54enjoying it, but you know, school is
22:57school. I I want I can't wait to be
23:00grown.
23:00You were bored.
23:01Um and
23:02yeah, I mean I I think a lot of people
23:06um have have felt that, but I ran into
23:08somebody at the community college who
23:10ran their own homebased business uh
23:12doing web design and they could see I
23:14was kind of technical and they went,
23:16"Hey, do you want to work for me?" And I
23:18was like, "Well, that sounds great." Uh
23:20and so I started doing web design
23:22really, really early on. This is like uh
23:25gosh, I don't know, probably uh 1998
23:28uh vintage um during the big boom and
23:31then uh the collapse that followed.
23:34And the funny thing is she worked uh she
23:37was married uh to an NSA analyst, a
23:40linguist, right? Um and so she lived on
23:43Fort me and she ran uh her business out
23:48of their home on Fort me that's right up
23:50the street from the NSA.
23:51before I'm even working there, uh, I'm
23:54driving past this building all of the
23:56time, uh, and trying to figure out, you
23:58know, what the next step is going to be.
24:00And I I enjoy this. It's it's a good
24:02thing for me. And like it it works well.
24:04And I start, uh, getting trained and
24:07certified, all these little industry
24:09stamps you've got to get as a
24:10technologist to say, oh, you know, this
24:12program or whatever, and just start
24:14climbing the ladder.
24:16But then 911 happens. Uh, and I'm on
24:20Fort me. uh when 911 happens I'm I'm
24:22just going into work and I tell this uh
24:25in the book in some detail and I I think
24:28it's very much worth reading for people
24:30who don't know this because this is
24:31forgotten history that
24:32How old were you at the time?
24:33Nobody
24:35uh gosh I was uh I was born in 83. Uh so
24:38I was probably 18 years old. Um
24:42and uh
24:45yeah uh yeah I had I had just turned 18
24:48a couple months before. Um,
24:52and what people forget,
24:55um, is who knew what was going on before
24:58anybody else, uh, on September 11th, the
25:01intelligence community, right? Um, and
25:05what did they do, right? Did they, uh,
25:08give out a public warning? Did they tell
25:09you guys to evacuate? Did they say do
25:11this, that, or that? No. No. Um, not for
25:14everybody. Not for a long time. Uh
25:18but at the NSA
25:21uh then director uh Michael Hayden, he
25:25was a general, he later became a
25:26director of the CIA,
25:28ordered the entire campus evacuated of
25:32thousands, tens of thousands of people
25:34actually and just said go home, right?
25:37Uh the CIA did the same thing. They were
25:39running on skeleton crews. uh at the
25:42moment the country needed them more than
25:45they ever had, right? Uh and I get a
25:49call
25:51um well, I hear a call uh that's from my
25:54boss's wife uh her husband to her. He's
25:58calling from the NSA. He's saying, "Hey,
26:00you know, I think Ed should leave for
26:01the day because I'm I'm the only
26:03employee of this business besides her uh
26:05because I think they're going to close
26:06the base down." And I'm like, "This is
26:07crazy. It never closes down. We don't
26:09know what's happening." Then we start
26:10checking the news uh which is through
26:13websites, right? Because we're we're
26:15doing all this stuff and suddenly it's
26:17the big story everywhere. Uh and you
26:19know, nobody understands how big it is
26:22yet. U most of us are like, "Oh, it's
26:24going to mess with our workday. Oh, it's
26:26going to mess with our commute." Uh but
26:28when I'm leaving,
26:30I hear car horns all over the base. It's
26:32the craziest thing because this is a
26:33military base, right? It's right outside
26:34the NSA. Uh, and I enter just this
26:37absolute state of pandemonium as I go
26:39past K9 Road, which is the road that
26:41travels right in p in front uh of uh the
26:45NSA's headquarters. And it's just a
26:47parking lot as far as you can see. They
26:50have uh military police out under the
26:53stop lights directing traffic because
26:56it's this mass evacuation. And I I still
26:57have no idea what's happening. Like the
26:59the story is still developing. Um
27:03but I will never forget that image.
27:06uh
27:11why did these people have so much power
27:13and so much money and so much authority
27:15at that if at the moments we need them
27:17the most they're the first ones in the
27:20country that are leaving their buildings
27:24uh and you know later on um they said uh
27:27and this is uh covered in uh a book I
27:31believe um I think it's James Bamford
27:35uh who interviewed that director of NSA
27:37who gave that order about what was
27:40happening. He was going well, you know,
27:42he he uh called his wife and he was
27:44asking where their kids were and
27:45everything like that. And then after
27:46that, um he wanted to uh think about,
27:50well, where could these other planes
27:52that they knew were in the air that
27:53hadn't struck yet, where could they be
27:55headed? And this sort of shows how um
27:59self-centric the intelligence community
28:01is. Uh this is the DC metro area, right?
28:05They could hit the White House. They
28:07could hit Congress. They could hit the
28:09Supreme Court, right? And they go, "Oh,
28:12they're going to fly their planes into
28:13the CIA headquarters or they're going to
28:15fly their planes into the NSA
28:16headquarters." Uh and of course, it was
28:18never realistic uh that these would be
28:20the targets. Um but on that basis, they
28:24were like, "Oo, let's get our bacon uh
28:26out of the pan." But
28:27I don't say this.
28:28I'm sorry, but in in just in the
28:30interest of what wasn't it possible that
28:33they could have attacked those places? I
28:35mean, they attacked the Pentagon. They
28:37you know, they knew that there was
28:39Look, it's it's absolutely possible they
28:42could have attacked your Denny's, right?
28:44You know, um but it's a question of uh
28:47risk assessment.
28:49If you have planes in the air, uh if you
28:53believe there's an ongoing terrorist
28:54attack that's happening in the United
28:56States right now, and if you have built
29:01history's greatest surveillance
29:03agencies, right, the the most powerful
29:06uh intelligence forces in in the history
29:08of the species,
29:10you are going to take those off the
29:12board or at least the majority of their
29:14personnel off the board then in a chance
29:17that you have no uh sort grounds for
29:19substantiating that they could be
29:20targeting you uh to begin with simply
29:23because they could well somebody else
29:26will get hit with those. As you say,
29:28it's going to be the Pentagon, right?
29:30It's going to be at the World Trade
29:32Center, it's going to be someone
29:34somewhere. And the more minutes you're
29:36in front of that desk, the higher the
29:38chances, even if it's a very small
29:39chance, even if it's somebody who
29:41doesn't work on terrorism, right? Maybe
29:42if it's somebody who normally works
29:44finance in North Korea, right? But they
29:47go, "Look, this is an emergency.
29:49Everybody understands. You don't need to
29:50explain this. You just go stop what
29:52you're doing. Uh look at financial
29:54transactions related to who purchased
29:56these plane tickets. Do this. You just
29:58go full spectrum and go anything you can
30:00do right now. If the building gets hit,
30:02we get hit. That's what we signed up
30:04for. Nobody wants that, right? That
30:06that's not the desired outcome. But
30:10if they had asked the staff to do that,
30:13they all would have agreed. that's what
30:16these people signed up to do. And yet
30:18the director goes, "No, you know, we're
30:19we're just just no." Like we're not
30:22going to take that risk. And this is I
30:24think it says so much about the
30:27bureaucratic character of how government
30:30works, right? The people who rise to the
30:32top of of these governments. Um
30:36it's about risk management for them,
30:39right? It's about never being criticized
30:41for something. And this is if we want to
30:43get really controversial and this is
30:44something that'll
30:45that'll haunt me u because people will
30:47bring it up again and again and again.
30:50People ask about you know people still
30:52criticize me in the book you know I talk
30:55about aliens and chemtrails and things
30:56like that and the fact that there uh
30:58there's no evidence for that. I went
31:00looking on the network right um and I I
31:02I know Joe I
31:05know uh you want there to be aliens. Uh,
31:09I do.
31:09I know Neil Degrasse Tyson badly wants
31:11there to be aliens and there probably
31:14are, right? Uh, but the idea that that
31:16we're hiding them,
31:18if we are hiding them, I had ridiculous
31:20access to the networks of the NSA, the
31:22CIA, the military, all these groups. Um,
31:25I couldn't find anything, right? So, if
31:27it's hidden, and it could be hidden,
31:29it's hidden really damn well, even from
31:32people who are on the inside.
31:33Um, but the main thing is conspiracy
31:36theories, right? Everybody wants to
31:37believe in conspiracy theories because
31:39it it helps life make sense. It it helps
31:42us believe that somebody is control in
31:45control, right? That somebody is calling
31:47the shots that these things all happen
31:49for a reason. This that and the other.
31:51Uh there are real conspiracies.
31:55Uh but they're not typically, you know,
31:58they've got tens of thousands of people
32:00working on them unless you're talking
32:01about the existence of the intelligence
32:02community itself. uh which is basically
32:05uh constructed on the idea that you can
32:07get uh I I think there's uh 4 million or
32:101.4 million people in the United States
32:12who hold uh security clearances
32:15uh and you can get all of these people
32:17to to not talk ever the journalists or
32:19this that or the other. Um, but when you
32:23look back at the 911 report and when you
32:25look back at the history of what
32:27actually happened, what we can prove,
32:28right, not what we can speculate on, but
32:30what are at least the commonly agreed
32:31facts,
32:34uh,
32:37it's very clear to me as someone who
32:40worked in the intelligence community,
32:41not during this period of course I was
32:43too young, uh, but very shortly
32:44thereafter, um, that these attacks could
32:48have been prevented. And in fact, the
32:50government says this too. Uh but the
32:52government goes the the reason that they
32:55uh these attacks happen, the reason that
32:56they weren't prevented uh is uh what
32:59they call stove piping, right? There was
33:01there was not enough uh sharing. They
33:03needed to break down the walls and the
33:06restrictions that were chaining these
33:08poor patriots uh at the NSA and the CIA
33:11and the FBI from all working on the same
33:12team. And to some extent, they're
33:14they're correct on this, right? there
33:17were limits on the way agencies were
33:18supposed to play ball with each other.
33:21But I worked there and I know how much
33:23of this is and how much of this
33:24is not. Um
33:27those are uh procedural and policy
33:29limits in some cases legal limits on
33:31what can be shared uh without following
33:33a process without doing this that or the
33:35other without uh basically asking for
33:38permission without getting a sign off uh
33:40or anything like that. If the FBI wanted
33:43to send absolutely everything they had
33:44to the CIA, they could have done so. If
33:46the CIA wanted to send everything they
33:48had to the FBI, they could have done so.
33:51They didn't and people died as a result.
33:53Now, government goes bureaucratic
33:55proceduralism uh was responsible and
33:58it's because we had too many
33:59restrictions on the intelligence
34:00community. And this is what led to the
34:02world post 911 where all of our rights
34:04sort of evaporated was they went well
34:06restrictions on what these agencies can
34:07do are costing lives. Therefore,
34:10naturally, we just have to unchain these
34:12guys and everything will be better,
34:14right? And if you remember that post 911
34:18moment, you can understand how that
34:20actually could come off as persuasive.
34:22How that might be a kind of thing that
34:23go you go, "All right, well, well, that
34:25makes sense." Because everybody was
34:26terrified, right? Um, there were people
34:30quite quickly who got their heads back
34:32on their shoulders the right way. There
34:34were some of them who never lost their
34:35heads at all uh and who protested the
34:38Iraq war. At the same time, my dumb self
34:40was signing up to go fight it uh
34:43volunteering for the army. We'll get
34:44into that in a minute. Um but
34:50everything
34:52that has followed in the decades past
34:55came from the fact that in a moment of
34:58fear
34:59we lost our heads and we abandoned all
35:02the traditional constitutional
35:04restraints that we put on these agencies
35:07and we abandoned all of the traditional
35:09uh political restraints and just social
35:11constraints ideological
35:14uh systems of belief about the
35:17limitations that the secret police
35:19should have in a free and open society.
35:22And we went, look, you know, terrorists,
35:25we created shows like 24 and Jack Bower
35:28where he's like threatening to knife
35:29people's eyeballs out if they won't tell
35:30him this, that, or the other. Uh, and we
35:35entered this era of increasingly
35:37unlimited government as a result. And
35:39now in hindsight, we go, "Oh, we
35:41shouldn't have been surprised." Uh but
35:43at the time uh everyone everyone
35:45panicked right but if you go back to did
35:48that help and we know the answer now is
35:50in fact no it did not it made things
35:52worse. Uh I don't think any historian is
35:56going to look at the Bush administration
35:58and go this improved the position of the
35:59United States in the world. Um,
36:03but if you go back, you know, wind back
36:06the tape to that pre 911 moment, uh,
36:08wind back the tape to those silos and
36:10those walls that they said needed to
36:12come down because that was restraining
36:13government instead of the rules that
36:14said, well, you can share these things,
36:16but there's got to be a basis. There's
36:17got to be a justification. You've got to
36:19go, why are we trading people's
36:20information like baseball cards and all
36:22of this stuff? It's super easy as an
36:26intelligence officer to justify sharing
36:29information about a suspected terrorist
36:31who you think is planning to kill people
36:34or is even just in a country they
36:35shouldn't be or a place they shouldn't
36:37be or doing something you don't think
36:38they should be with another agency
36:41because no one's going to question that.
36:42A judge isn't going to question that.
36:43Any judge in the world will stamp that
36:45warrant without even thinking about it
36:46and then go to bed that night um uh you
36:49know without a care in the world uh
36:51because you're not spying on a
36:53journalist. you're not spying on a human
36:54rights defender, right? This is not an
36:55edge case. This is someone that you
36:58believe to be associated with al-Qaeda
36:59or whatever. Now,
37:02this is all a lot of preamble to say
37:04that essential fact. Um, government
37:07agrees, everyone agrees the attacks
37:09probably could have been prevented uh if
37:11information had been shared. So, why
37:15wasn't the information shared?
37:16Government says uh information wasn't
37:19shared u because of these restrictions.
37:21And it's half true because every
37:23important lie has has some kernel of
37:25truth to it. Uh and and there were these
37:27barriers. But the reality is why were
37:29those barriers respected in the case of
37:32a major terrorist plot?
37:35Why wasn't the CIA sharing information
37:37with the FBI? Why wasn't the FBI sharing
37:39information with the NSA? Why wasn't the
37:40NSA sharing information with the CIA in
37:42the case of a major terrorist plot?
37:45And if you've worked in government, if
37:47you worked in the intelligence
37:48community, if you worked in any large
37:50institution, you know, if you work at a
37:51company that sells batteries,
37:54you know that every office is fighting
37:56the other office for budget, for clout,
38:00for promotions. And this is the sad
38:02reality of what actually happened. Um,
38:06every one of those agencies wanted to be
38:08the guy who busted the plot. They wanted
38:10to be the one who got credit for it. and
38:13they didn't realize how serious it was
38:16until it was too late because they were
38:18competing with each other rather than
38:20cooperating with
38:21That's exactly what I was going to ask
38:22you if that was the issue. The
38:24competition between these agencies
38:26because they they are very proud of the
38:29CIA accomplishing something or the FBI
38:31accomplishing something and they they
38:33want to be the one to take credit for
38:35that.
38:36Yeah. Yeah. And I mean I think it's
38:37important like in their defense because
38:40nobody else here is going to provide a
38:42defense for them. Um is that that's
38:45actually uh darkly uh human. Uh again
38:49this happens in every industry. This
38:51happens in every sort of big corporate
38:53thing because you want to get promoted
38:54and you know everybody's putting in
38:56their like achievements at the end of
38:58the year for what they did and if you're
39:00the guy who does that you're going
39:01straight to the top. But their solution
39:03instead of
39:04the the
39:05So we we have a weird delay here for
39:07folks that are listening. So their
39:08solution instead of having someone be
39:11responsible for bridging the gap and
39:12providing that information to each
39:14individual agency. Their solution was
39:16mass surveillance.
39:19Well, no, they're they're they're
39:20different things. This is uh 911 is what
39:23woke these guys up, right? Um basically
39:26and they they went, "Well, we screwed up
39:30and Americans died as a result.
39:32um we really don't want to take the hit
39:35on that. Um and to be honest, the
39:37government had no interest in putting
39:38the hit on them. Uh to be honest, the
39:40public had no interest in putting the
39:42hit on them uh at the time. Um because
39:46everybody understood terrorism is a real
39:48thing. There are bad people in the
39:50world. And that's true, right? That will
39:52always be true. There's always going to
39:53be criminals. There's always going to be
39:54terrorists. uh whether they're at your
39:57church, whether they're across the
39:58ocean, there are people out there who
40:01are angry, they're disenfranchised,
40:03they're violent, and they just want to
40:07harm something. They want to change
40:09something even in a negative way. Uh
40:13because that's what they feel is all
40:16they have left, which these are
40:18criminals, right? These are people that
40:20we don't need to pity. Uh but if we ever
40:22want to stop it, we do need to
40:23understand it and where those things
40:25come from, where those those drives come
40:27from in the first place. But uh
40:31basically everybody went, "All right,
40:32how do we stop this?" Because nobody
40:34wants to feel unsafe. Nobody wants to
40:35feel like the building's going to come
40:36down the next time you go in it. And so
40:38everybody just went, "Um, I don't care
40:41who does it. Stop it." And they said
40:44this to Dick Cheney, which is a historic
40:47mistake, but because Dick Cheney knows
40:50how government works. Uh he was uh the
40:53person in that White House who was best
40:55placed to know all the levers of
40:57government, all the inter agency
40:58cooperation, where we were strong, where
41:00we were weak, what we could do, what we
41:02were not allowed to do. And what he did
41:06was he took that little dial on what
41:07we're not allowed to do and he changed
41:10it all the way until it broke and
41:12snapped off and then there was nothing
41:13that we couldn't do anymore.
41:16Um,
41:16and you were there while this was
41:18happening. This was this was
41:19No, I was I I was not. Again, this is uh
41:232001.
41:25Um, I was uh I was 18 years old. I was
41:28working on the base. I drove past the
41:29building, but that was it. This is all
41:31hindsight. This is biography. This is
41:32documented history. This is not, you
41:34know, uh, the gospel of Edward Snowden.
41:37I I don't know this, right? This is
41:38public record. This is what we all know.
41:42Um,
41:44what we have though, uh, the the reason
41:46that I bring this up is this is a
41:47teachable moment because there's so many
41:48people right now in the Trump
41:50administration,
41:52uh, who go, look, uh, this guy has too
41:54much power. Uh, he's abusing it against
41:56immigrants. He's abusing it against
41:57domestic opponents. He's doing whatever.
41:59He's, uh, trying to hurt political
42:01rivals in the next election. all of this
42:03stuff. And you know, we can get into
42:04this stuff later if you want uh in
42:06detail, but the bottom line is they're
42:08going, "This is a guy uh who's in the
42:11White House who's thrown elbows, right?
42:12He he doesn't really care. He wants to
42:14hurt people. Uh as long as he can
42:17convince the Americans that those are
42:19the bad guys, right? That's the enemy.
42:21Doesn't matter if they're far away. It
42:22doesn't matter if they're close at home.
42:24Um whoever he's against, he's going to
42:26harm." And the dark thing is this is
42:30actually why he was elected. Um in
42:33moments of fear where the world starts
42:36falling apart and this happens in
42:38authoritarian country after country. Uh
42:40this is why you have Vladimir Putin in
42:42Russia who's been there for 20 years,
42:45right? President for basically 20 years.
42:48Think about that. uh you know he he sort
42:50of skipped in in the middle there uh
42:52because he had to dodge the fact that
42:55presidents can only serve so many
42:56consecutive terms. So he dropped down to
42:58prime minister and then came back as
42:59president. But think about that. How do
43:02you get that kind of political
43:03longevity? Um and it's because if you
43:05know anything about Russian history,
43:07which you know even I don't know that
43:08much about it, the '9s after the
43:10collapse of the Soviet Union were an
43:11extraordinarily dark time. If you look
43:14at Russian cinema, all they had were
43:16gangster movies, right? All they had
43:18were the disintegration of society. How
43:19things are dark and broken. No one
43:21trusts each other. Pensions were no
43:23longer being paid. Social security is
43:25not there anymore. Like there's nothing
43:27to buy. There's nothing to do. There's
43:28no job. No one had a future. And so they
43:32went, if there's somebody who can lead
43:33us out of this, if there's somebody who
43:34will fix this, who will find us an enemy
43:37and defeat that enemy to restore
43:38prosperity, we'll put them in office. We
43:41see it happen in Turkey with Erdogan,
43:43right? uh we've seen it happen uh
43:45successively with bad governments even
43:47in western uh democracies. We see it
43:50happening sadly um in places like uh
43:54Poland and Hungary. Uh you can even
43:56argue it's happening uh in the United
43:58Kingdom, right? And now there are a lot
44:01of people arguing that's exactly what
44:03we're seeing with Donald Trump's White
44:04House in the United States. And this is
44:08the lesson that we didn't learn from
44:102001
44:11is when we become fearful uh we become
44:15vulnerable right uh to anyone who
44:18promises they will make things better
44:20even if they have no ability to make
44:22things better even if they will actively
44:23make things worse even if they will make
44:25things better for themselves and their
44:27buddies by taking from you. But if they
44:31tell you that they'll make things
44:33better, uh, and you believe them in a
44:35moment of fear, uh, that that typically
44:38leads to unfortunate outcomes. So,
44:40sorry, let me let me turn this back over
44:41to you because we got way off track
44:43there.
44:43No, that's all right. Uh, I I want to
44:45bring it back to the initial question.
44:46So, you're working for the NSA. When do
44:48you realize there's a huge issue and
44:51when do you feel this responsibility to
44:53let the American people know about this
44:55issue? like when when do you contact
44:57these journalists and what was the
44:59thought process regarding this? Like
45:01what what steps did you go through once
45:03you realized that this was in violation
45:05of the Constitution and that even with
45:07the laws of the Patriot Act and the
45:09Patriot Act 2 things had changed so
45:11radically that you knew this was wrong
45:14and you had to do something about it or
45:16you felt a responsibility to speak out.
45:20Okay. So, since we gave so much
45:21historical preamble, let me just give
45:23the the cliffnotes version to get us up
45:25to that.
45:26Um, so after September 11th, I'm a
45:30little bit lost. I'm doing my technical
45:31stuff, but it doesn't really feel like
45:33it matters anymore. Like, I'm making
45:34more money. I'm becoming more
45:35accomplished,
45:37but the world's on fire, right? You
45:39remember there was a crazy mood of
45:41patriotism in the country because we
45:44were all trying to come together to get
45:45through it. You remember like people
45:46were sticking Dixie cups in the top of
45:48every chain link fence on every overpass
45:50that was like stand together, you know,
45:52never forget.
45:53Um, united we stand,
45:55flags on every car.
45:57Exactly. And you know, I was a young a
45:59young guy who is not especially
46:01political, right?
46:03Um, and I come from a military
46:06background. I federal family, all that
46:08stuff. And so that means I'm very
46:09vulnerable uh to this kind of stuff. I
46:11see it on the news and uh Bush and all
46:14his sort of cronies are going look uh
46:17it's al-Qaeda it's terrorism terrorist
46:19organization they have all these
46:21international connections uh there's
46:23Iraq you know dictators weapons of mass
46:25destruction they're holding the world at
46:27ransom you got Coen Powell at the UN
46:29dangling little vials of like fake
46:32anthrax
46:33um and so I felt an obligation to do my
46:35part and so I volunteered to join the
46:37army uh you you probably can't tell from
46:40from looking at me but I'm not going to
46:41be uh at the top of the MMA circuit
46:43anytime uh soon. Uh so it it didn't work
46:47out. I I joined a special program that
46:49was called the 18X program where they
46:51take you in off the street and they
46:52actually give you a shot at becoming a
46:54special forces soldier. Uh so you train
46:57harder in special platoon, you go
46:58further and I ended up breaking my legs.
47:01Uh basically so they put me out under
47:03special discharge.
47:04Uh yeah, it was basically what it was.
47:06They were shin splints uh that I was too
47:09dumb to get off of, right? Uh so I kept
47:12marching underweight and I'm a pretty
47:13light guy to begin with. I had a 24 inch
47:15waist uh when I uh when I joined the
47:18army.
47:18Girls are jealous.
47:19Um I
47:21think I weighed like 128 lbs. Uh I I got
47:25I was in great shape, you know, in boot
47:27camp because I I came up really quick
47:29because it was uh you know, all I could
47:32do was gain. Um, but uh it was it was
47:35just too much on my frame because I
47:36wasn't that that active. Um, and so uh
47:40when you keep running on a stress
47:42injury, right, and you're running
47:43underweight with like rucks sacks and
47:45things like that, you're running in like
47:46boots. Um, and then you're doing uh
47:49exercise and the army's like a whole
47:51chapter in the book. Uh, you you got
47:52your battle buddy, right? Because they
47:54never allow you to be alone. You always
47:55got to have somebody watching you. Uh
47:59they thought it was funny to put me the
48:01smallest guy in the platoon that the
48:02drill sergeants did uh with the biggest
48:04dude in the platoon who was like an
48:06amateur bodybuilder who was like, you
48:08know, 230 or 260 something like that. He
48:10was a big fellow. Uh and so, you know,
48:13he would uh when we're off in the woods
48:15doing these these marches and things
48:16like that, we have to practice buddy
48:18carries. He's like the fireman's carry
48:19and things like that. He throws me
48:21around his neck, you know, I'm like a
48:22towel. He's just skipping down like it's
48:24nothing. Uh, and then I got to put him
48:26on me and I'm just like, "Oh, God,
48:28dying." And it was it was it was weirdly
48:32fun. I I enjoyed it. Uh, but it was no
48:35good for my body. And so in a land
48:36navigation movement, I step off a log uh
48:39because I was on point. And on the other
48:41side of the log, because it's the woods
48:42in Georgia, I'm at Sand Hill. Um,
48:46I see a snake.
48:49And so in my my memory, you know, it's
48:51like time slows down because in North
48:54Carolina, you know, where I grew up, you
48:56think all snakes are poisonous.
48:58That's fine.
48:59Sorry. There's an issue. No, we're good.
49:01We're good. We're good.
49:02It's completely fine.
49:03No, we're fine. I just There was
49:04something that happened on the screen. I
49:05wanted to make sure it was okay.
49:07No, that's just the FBI joining the
49:09chat.
49:09That's what I was worried about. There's
49:10a second image opened up here.
49:14Yeah. So, anyway, I I try to take a a
49:16much longer step in midair. I land
49:19badly. Um, and it's it's just one leg is
49:23is like fire. I'm limping. I'm limping.
49:24I'm limping. Uh, but you know, everybody
49:27says don't go to sick call because you
49:28go to sick call, you'll lose your slot.
49:30You'll end up general infantry or
49:32regular infantry. Uh, and so I go back.
49:36Um, I just tough it out. Uh, I get in my
49:38rack and the next morning when I get out
49:40of the rack, which is the the top bunk
49:42bed, right? Um, I jump and my legs, they
49:45just give out underneath me. Uh, and I
49:48try to get up and I just can't get up.
49:50And so I go to sick call and I end up
49:52going to the hospital and they end up
49:54x-raying me and they also x-ray my
49:56battle buddy because I got to go there
49:57with somebody else and he has a broken
49:59hip uh where they have to bring him to
50:01surgery and it's in the book there's a
50:03lot more detail about it. It was kind of
50:05a dramatic moment. Um, but for me they
50:07just said I had bilateral tibial
50:09fractures right all the way up my legs.
50:11Uh they said I had spiderw webs and the
50:14next uh f phase of the training was jump
50:18school, right? Uh where you got to jump
50:20out of a plane and the doctor, you know,
50:22is like um son if you jump on those
50:26legs, they're going to turn into powder.
50:30And he's like, I can hold you back. Um
50:33you know, we can put you for like six
50:35months, you stay off them, then you can
50:36go back through uh through the whole
50:39cycle, right? start basic from scratch.
50:42uh but you'll lose your slot in the
50:44special forces pipeline um because of
50:47the way these things are scheduled and
50:48everything like that and then you'll
50:49basically be reassigned to the needs of
50:51the army or um which probably meant I
50:55was going back to it which was what I
50:57joined the army to kind of escape um uh
51:01or you can go out on this special kind
51:03of discharge that's called an
51:05administrative discharge right normally
51:06you got um honorable discharge
51:08dishonorable discharge things like that
51:10this is something for people who have
51:11been in for I think less than 6 months
51:13where it's like annulling a marriage. Uh
51:16it's as if it never happened. It's as if
51:18he never joined. Um and at the time I
51:22was like well you know that's very kind
51:23of him uh to do that. Uh and I took it.
51:26You know they they sent me to sick call
51:28uh or sorry the sick bay uh where you're
51:31in like the medical platoon and you do
51:33nothing for
51:35uh it was I I think about a month. Um,
51:39and then then they let you out once the
51:41paperwork all finishes. Uh, but in
51:43hindsight, uh, I realized that if you
51:45take an administrative discharge, uh, it
51:48exempts the army for liability for your
51:51injuries. So, actually, what I thought
51:53was a kindness, uh, was just, you know,
51:55now if I had future problems with my
51:57legs, uh, they they wouldn't have to
51:59cover it or health insurance or any of
52:00those things. And it was it was just a
52:02funny thing. Anyway, I get out of the
52:04army and here, uh,
52:08I'm on crutches for a long time and just
52:10sort of trying to figure out, all right,
52:13well, what's next in life? Um because I
52:17had gotten a basic security clearance uh
52:20just for going through signing up for
52:22the military process. Uh I applied for a
52:25security guard position uh at the
52:28University of Maryland because it said
52:30you had to get a top secret clearance
52:31which was a higher clearance than I had
52:33at the time. Um, and I went, "Well, that
52:36sounds good." Because I knew if I
52:37combine my IT skills, uh, which were now
52:40suddenly much more relevant again to my
52:42future with a top secret security
52:44clearance because of the way it works,
52:46uh, if you have a top secret security
52:47clearance and tech skills, you get paid
52:49a ridiculous amount of money for doing
52:51very little work. So it was like all
52:53right well you know I can basically make
52:55twice what I would be making in in the
52:57private sector uh working for government
52:59at this level at this phase because what
53:01we talked about earlier with September
53:0411th and how the intelligence community
53:05changed uh they no longer cared that I
53:08hadn't graduated from college right and
53:10I had gotten a GED just by going in and
53:12taking a test. So for government
53:15purposes it was the same as if I was a
53:16high school graduate. Um so now suddenly
53:19it was like these these doors are open.
53:21Uh now this University of Maryland uh
53:24facility turned out to be an NSA uh
53:28facility. Uh it was called a castle, the
53:32Center for the Advanced Study of
53:33Language at the University of Maryland,
53:35College Park.
53:37Um and all I was was literally a
53:40security guy walking around with with a
53:42walkie-talkie making sure nobody breaks
53:44in at night. Uh managing the electronic
53:46alarm system and things like that. Uh
53:49but once I had my foot in the door
53:52there, I could start climbing the ladder
53:54step by step. Um and uh I applied for or
53:59I went to a job fair actually that was
54:02only for people who had security
54:04clearances.
54:05Uh and I ended up going to the table for
54:07one of the technical companies. It was a
54:09little tiny subcontractor nobody's ever
54:11heard of. Um and they said, uh you know,
54:15we've got tons of positions for somebody
54:16like you. uh are you comfortable uh
54:19working nights? And I was like, yeah,
54:21you know, I I wake up in the middle of
54:23the day anyway. Um that's fine with me.
54:26Uh and suddenly I've gone from working
54:29uh for the NSA through a university in a
54:33weird way where it's like the NSA holds
54:34the clearance, but I'm formally an
54:37employee of the state of Maryland at the
54:38the college. And this is government,
54:40man. It's all these weird dodges and
54:42boondoggles for how people are employed
54:44there. Uh, now suddenly I'm working at
54:47CIA headquarters, right? The the place
54:50where all the movies show. You swoop
54:51over the marble seal and everything like
54:53that. Uh, I'm the king of the castle,
54:55right? I'm there at the middle of the
54:57night when no one else is there. Uh, the
54:59lights are on motion sensors. It's, you
55:01know, the creepiest thing in the world.
55:03There's like flags on the wall that are
55:05just like gently billowing in the air
55:08conditioning like ghosts. Uh the hallway
55:10lights up as you walk alongside it
55:12because it's like a green building. Uh
55:14and they disappear behind you.
55:16Uh and there's there's no one there. I
55:18can go down to the gym uh at like 2:00
55:21in the morning at the CIA. Uh and it's
55:24like not see a soul on the other side of
55:26the building, then go all the way back.
55:27Um and this kind of thing was was my end
55:31because they were like, "Look, it's the
55:32night shift. Uh nothing that bad is
55:35going to happen." Um but it was on a
55:37very senior technical team um that was
55:41basically handling systems
55:42administration for everybody in uh the
55:46Washington metropolitan area. Right? So
55:48every um basically CIA server
55:52uh this is a computer system that like
55:54data is stored on that reporting is
55:56stored on that uh traffic is moved on
55:59all of this stuff. Uh suddenly me,
56:04this is uh circa 2005 I think. Um
56:10I'm in charge of uh and it's just me and
56:13one other guy on the night shift. And if
56:15you're interested in the book, there's a
56:16lot of detail on this.
56:18Uh but I get sort of scouted from this
56:21position because they realize I actually
56:23know a lot about technology. They were
56:24expecting uh me just to basically make
56:28sure the building doesn't burn down. and
56:29all these systems uh don't uh go down
56:32overnight and then never come back up.
56:35Um but they go, "Well, are you willing
56:37to go overseas?"
56:40And to a young man at that age, that's
56:42actually like, "Hey, that sounds kind of
56:43exciting." You know, who who doesn't
56:44want to go work overseas for the CIA? Um
56:47and there's a lot of people listening to
56:50the podcast who are like, "Uh not me."
56:54Um
56:55they're like, "Wait, the CIA is the bad
56:57guys, right?" Yeah, exactly. They're
56:58like, "What are you going to go
56:59overthrow a government somewhere?" Uh,
57:01but you have to understand that I'm
57:02still uh very much a true believer. The
57:05government is like the living compressed
57:07embodiment of truth and goodness and
57:10light. You know, the shining city on the
57:12hill. Uh, so I want to do my part to
57:14spread that to the world. Um, I didn't
57:17have skepticism
57:19is really what I'm trying to to
57:20establish here.
57:22Uh, and so I sign up and I go through
57:24this special training school like people
57:26hear in movies about the farm, uh, which
57:29is down at Camp Perry in Virginia. Uh,
57:31I'm sent to this actually much more
57:33secret facility, um, called The Hill,
57:37uh, which is in Warrington, Virginia.
57:39Um, and, uh, this has been covered a few
57:43times in open source media. Uh but I I
57:47think this is one of the few uh
57:48booklength uh discussions of what what
57:50happens there in uh permanent record. Um
57:55but uh yeah, so I go through training
57:57and then I get assigned uh overseas and
57:59I end up in Geneva, Switzerland
58:00undercover as a diplomat, right? I think
58:02I'm uh uh my my formal title for the
58:05embassy is like something super bland
58:08like diplomatic ates.
58:10Um and what I am is I'm a forward
58:12deployed tech guy. They send you through
58:14this school to make you into kind of a
58:16maggyver, right? Uh yes, you can handle
58:19all the computers. Uh but you can also
58:21handle um the connections uh for the
58:24embassy's power systems, right? Uh the
58:27actual electric connections. You can
58:29handle the HVAC systems, right? Uh you
58:32can handle uh locks and alarms and
58:35security systems. Uh basically anything
58:37that's got an on button on it uh at the
58:39embassy that's secure now you're
58:41responsible for. And I traveled from uh
58:45Geneva to other countries uh in Europe
58:48um for sort of assignments and it was
58:50like it was an exciting time. Um I
58:53actually
58:55still uh enjoyed it. But this was where
58:57I first working with intelligence uh
59:00started to get doubts and the story's
59:01been told many times so I I won't go
59:03over in in in full detail here. Um
59:08but the CIA does primarily it's not the
59:12only thing they do uh what's called
59:14human intelligence.
59:16Um now there are many different types of
59:19intelligence uh that the intelligence
59:20community is responsible for. Um
59:24the primary ones are human intelligence
59:27and signals intelligence. You want to
59:28think of signals intelligence, right, as
59:31tapping lines, hacking computers, um all
59:35of uh these sort of things that provide
59:37electronic information. Anything that's
59:39a digital or analog signal uh that can
59:42be intercepted then turned into
59:43information. Human intelligence is, you
59:46know, all that fun stuff we've heard the
59:48CIA doing for for uh decades and
59:50decades. uh which is where they try to
59:52turn people um basically they say look
59:54we'll give you money if you sell out
59:56your country um they don't it's not even
59:59your country a lot of times it's your uh
1:00:02like organization these guys could be
1:00:03working for a telecommunications
1:00:05provider um and they want to sell
1:00:07customer records or they work at a bank
1:00:08which was the the thing that I saw and
1:00:10we wanted records on the bank's
1:00:12customers so we wanted a guy on the
1:00:13inside um but anyway uh that that's sort
1:00:17of how it works and what I saw was they
1:00:19were way more aggressive
1:00:22uh for the lowest stakes than was
1:00:26reasonable or responsible. They were
1:00:27totally willing to destroy somebody's
1:00:30life just on the off chance they would
1:00:33get some information that that wouldn't
1:00:34even be tremendously valuable. And so,
1:00:38you know, ethically that that struck me
1:00:41um as a bit off, but I I let it pass. Um
1:00:45because what I what I've learned over my
1:00:48life um short though it's it's been, you
1:00:52know, uh
1:00:54it's that skepticism is something that
1:00:56needs to build up over time. It's a
1:00:58skill uh something that needs to be
1:01:00practiced or you can think of it as uh
1:01:02something that you develop through
1:01:04exposure, right? kind of like uh
1:01:06radiation poisoning but in a positive
1:01:08way. Uh it's when you start to realize
1:01:12inconsistencies
1:01:14uh or hypocrisies
1:01:16or lies
1:01:18um and you notice them and you know you
1:01:21you give somebody the benefit of the
1:01:23doubt or you trust them or you think
1:01:25it's all right. But then over time you
1:01:27see it's not an isolated instance. It's
1:01:29a pattern behavior and over time that
1:01:31exposure to inconsistency builds and
1:01:34builds and builds until it's something
1:01:36that you can no longer ignore.
1:01:38Now, after the CIA, I went to the NSA um
1:01:42in Japan where I was working there in
1:01:44Tokyo. Uh and then from there, a couple
1:01:48years later, I went to um the CIA again.
1:01:52Uh now I was working as prime employee
1:01:54for Dell. Uh but I was the senior
1:01:56technical official on uh Dell's sales
1:01:58account to the CIA. You know people
1:02:00these big companies they have sales
1:02:02accounts to the CIA. And so this means
1:02:04I'm going in and now it's crazy because
1:02:06I'm still a very young man but I'm
1:02:08sitting across the table from chiefs of
1:02:10these enormous CIA divisions. I'm
1:02:12sitting across from their chief
1:02:14technology officer for the entire agency
1:02:17or the chief intelligence or uh chief
1:02:19information officer for the entire CIA.
1:02:22Um, and these guys are going, "Look,
1:02:24here's our problems. Here's what we want
1:02:25to do." And it's my job to pitch them a
1:02:28system, right? And I've I'm paired up
1:02:30with this sales guy, and the whole thing
1:02:32is to just go, "How much money can we
1:02:34get out of the government, right? That's
1:02:37the whole goal." And we'll build them
1:02:38what we were pitching was a private
1:02:40cloud system, right? Everybody knows
1:02:41about uh cloud computing now. It's like
1:02:44why your Gmail account is available
1:02:46wherever you go. It's why Facebook has
1:02:48this uh massive system of records for
1:02:50everyone everywhere. Uh the government
1:02:52wanted to have this these kind of
1:02:54capabilities too. Dell ended up getting
1:02:55beat out by Amazon. People, you know,
1:02:59some people aren't familiar with this.
1:03:00Many of them are, but Amazon runs uh a
1:03:03secret cloud uh system for the
1:03:05government. I I forget what they've
1:03:08rebranded it now. Um but this is just
1:03:10there's this massive connection between
1:03:13industry and government in the
1:03:15classified space that just goes deeper
1:03:16and deeper and deeper and deeper. Uh but
1:03:18at this point uh I I was already I I had
1:03:22misgivings because of what I'd seen in
1:03:24Japan about government but I was just
1:03:27trying to get by. I was trying to ignore
1:03:31uh the conflicts. I was trying to ignore
1:03:34the inconsistencies.
1:03:36Uh and I think this is the state that a
1:03:37lot of people uh in these large
1:03:40institutions uh not just in our country
1:03:43but around the world struggle with every
1:03:45day, right? They got a job, they got a
1:03:47family, they got bills, they they're
1:03:49they're just trying to get by. And they
1:03:51know that some of the things they're
1:03:53doing are not good things. They know
1:03:55some of the things they're doing are
1:03:56actively wrong, but they know what
1:03:59happens to people who rock the boat
1:04:04eventually. Um,
1:04:07I changed my mind
1:04:10and when I had gone to Hawaii, which was
1:04:14the final position uh in my career with
1:04:16the intelligence community, um,
1:04:22I was
1:04:24because of an accident of of history
1:04:25here. I wasn't supposed to be in this
1:04:27position at all. Um, I was supposed to
1:04:29be at a uh a group called uh the
1:04:32National Threat Operations Center,
1:04:34NDOCH. Uh, but because of the way
1:04:37contracting works, and again, this is
1:04:39covered in the book, um,
1:04:43I end up being reassigned to this little
1:04:46rinky dink office uh that nobody's ever
1:04:49heard of in Hawaii called the Office of
1:04:52Information Sharing. and I'm replacing
1:04:56uh this old-timer who's who's about to
1:04:58retire. Really really nice guy. Um but
1:05:00he spent most of his days just reading
1:05:02novels and doing nothing and letting
1:05:05people be content to the fact or letting
1:05:08people forget that his office existed
1:05:10because he was the only one in it. Uh
1:05:12there's there's a manager who's like
1:05:14over him, but it's actually over a
1:05:16larger group and he just looks over him
1:05:18as as sort of a favor. So now I come in
1:05:21and now I'm the sole employee of the
1:05:23office of information sharing, but I'm
1:05:25not close enough to retirement. Uh that
1:05:27I'm okay with just doing nothing at all.
1:05:31So I get ambitious and I come up with
1:05:33this idea for a new system called the
1:05:36heartbeat. Uh and what the heartbeat is
1:05:38going to do is uh connect to basically
1:05:44every information repository in the
1:05:47intelligence community both at the NSA
1:05:50and across network boundaries which you
1:05:52normally can't cross but because I'd
1:05:54worked at both the CIA and the NSA I
1:05:56knew the network well enough both sides
1:05:59of it sides that normal workers of the
1:06:01NSA would never have seen because you
1:06:02have to be in one or the other. I could
1:06:04actually connect these together. I could
1:06:06build bridges across this kind of uh
1:06:08network space
1:06:11um and then draw all of these uh records
1:06:16into a new kind of system uh that was
1:06:18supposed to look at your digital ID uh
1:06:21basically your
1:06:24uh your sort of ID card that says this
1:06:26is who I am. I work for this agency. I
1:06:28work in this office. Uh these are my
1:06:31assignments. These are my uh group
1:06:33affiliations. And because of that the
1:06:36system would be able to uh eventually
1:06:38aggregate records that were relevant to
1:06:41your job uh that were related to you and
1:06:43then it could provide them and basically
1:06:45you could hit this site it would be uh
1:06:46an update of what we used to call read
1:06:48boards uh which were manually uh created
1:06:52that would go look uh you work in uh
1:06:56network defense right these are all the
1:06:58things that are happening on network
1:06:59defense you work on I don't know
1:07:01economic takeovers in Guatemala you
1:07:04know, this is uh what's going on for you
1:07:06there. Uh but in my off time,
1:07:11um I helped the team that sat next to
1:07:13me, which was a systems administration
1:07:15team for for Windows networks because I
1:07:17had been a Microsoft certified systems
1:07:19engineer. Uh which means uh basically I
1:07:22knew how to take care of Windows
1:07:23networks. Um and this was all those guys
1:07:26did. And they always had way too much
1:07:28work, uh, way too much work. And I had
1:07:31basically no work that I needed to do at
1:07:33all. Um, because, uh, all I was supposed
1:07:36to do was share information, uh, which
1:07:39was not, uh, something that was
1:07:41particularly, um, in demand,
1:07:45uh, because most people already knew
1:07:46what they wanted or what they needed.
1:07:47So, it was basically my job was to sit
1:07:49there and collect a paycheck unless I
1:07:51wanted to get ambitious.
1:07:53And so I did some side gigs uh for these
1:07:56other guys and one of them was running
1:07:58what were called dirty word searches.
1:08:01Uh now dirty word searches are
1:08:07let me let me dial this back because I
1:08:08know we're uh sort of
1:08:12this is hard to track.
1:08:15Everything that the NSA does
1:08:18uh in large part is classified.
1:08:22Everything the CIA does in large part is
1:08:25classified. Um
1:08:28if I made lunch plans with other people
1:08:30in my office, it was classified. That
1:08:33was the policy. It's dumb. Uh they this
1:08:35overclassification problem uh is one of
1:08:38the central flaws in government right
1:08:40now. This is the reason we don't
1:08:41understand what they're doing. This is
1:08:42why they can get a way This is why they
1:08:45can get away with breaking the law or
1:08:47violating our rights for so long. you
1:08:49know, five years, 10 years, 15, 50 years
1:08:52uh before they see before we see what
1:08:54they were doing. And it's because of
1:08:56this routine classification, right?
1:08:59But every system, computer system has a
1:09:03limit uh on what level of classified
1:09:06information is supposed to be stored on
1:09:08it. uh and we've got all these
1:09:10complicated systems for code words and
1:09:12caveats uh that establish a system of
1:09:17what's called compartmentation. And this
1:09:19is the idea when you work at the CIA,
1:09:21when you work at the NSA, you're not
1:09:22supposed to know what's happening in the
1:09:25office next to you, right? Um because
1:09:28you don't have need to know, right?
1:09:30Again, that thing from the the movies.
1:09:32Um,
1:09:34and the reason they have this is they
1:09:36don't want one person to be able to go
1:09:37and know everything, right? And tell
1:09:39everybody everything. Um, they don't
1:09:41want anybody to know too much,
1:09:43particularly when they're doing lots of
1:09:45bad things, because then there's the
1:09:47risk that you realize they're doing so
1:09:48many bad things that it's past the point
1:09:51that we can justify and they might
1:09:53develop sort of an ideological objection
1:09:56to that.
1:09:59Well, in the office of information
1:10:00sharing, uh, and actually in basically
1:10:02every part of my career before that, I
1:10:05had access to everything. Um, I had what
1:10:10was called, uh, a special caveat on my
1:10:13accesses, uh, called privac, which means
1:10:15privileged access. Uh, what this means,
1:10:18you're kind of super user. You know,
1:10:20most people have all of these controls
1:10:22on the kind of information they can
1:10:23access, but I'm in charge of the system,
1:10:25right? People who need information, they
1:10:27have to get it from somewhere. They
1:10:28don't know. Even the director of the
1:10:30CIA, right? He says, "I need to know
1:10:32everything about this." Well, he doesn't
1:10:34know where to get it. He's just a
1:10:35manager. Somebody has to be able to
1:10:37actually cross these thresholds and get
1:10:39those things. That guy was me. And so
1:10:42dirty word searches uh were these kind
1:10:44of automated queries that I would uh set
1:10:47up to go across the whole network and
1:10:50look at all of the different levels of
1:10:52classification and compartmentation and
1:10:54exceptionally controlled information. Uh
1:10:56that's kind of you can think of it as
1:10:57above top secret uh in these special
1:11:00compartments, right? Where you're not
1:11:02even supposed to know what these
1:11:03compartments are for. You only know the
1:11:05code word uh unless you work in them,
1:11:08unless you have access to them, unless
1:11:09you read into them.
1:11:11Well, one day I got a hit on the dirty
1:11:14word search for a program that I'd never
1:11:17heard of called Stellar Wind. It came
1:11:20back uh because the um
1:11:25the uh little caveat for they're called
1:11:28handling caveats, which is like, you
1:11:30know, you can think of like burn after
1:11:32reading or for your eyes only. Uh but
1:11:34this one's called STLW, which means
1:11:36stellar wind. Unless you know what
1:11:37stellar wind is, you don't know how to
1:11:38handle it. All I knew is it wasn't
1:11:40supposed to be on my system. And I went,
1:11:42this is a little bit unusual. And it
1:11:44turned out uh this document was placed
1:11:47on the system because one of the
1:11:49employees who had worked on this program
1:11:51years before had come to Hawaii and this
1:11:54person was a lawyer uh I believe uh and
1:11:57they had worked in the inspector
1:11:58general's office and they had compiled a
1:12:00report part of the inspector general's
1:12:03report which is when the government is
1:12:05investigating itself.
1:12:08um into uh the operations and activities
1:12:13of this program. Well, this was the
1:12:15domestic mass surveillance program that
1:12:18I talked about in the very beginning of
1:12:19our conversation that started under the
1:12:21Bush White House. Um Stellar Wind uh was
1:12:24no longer supposed to be really
1:12:26operation. Um it had been uh unveiled in
1:12:30a big scandal in uh December 2005 in the
1:12:34New York Times uh by a journalist James
1:12:37Ryzen. Uh and I I I'm not going to name
1:12:40him because I don't want to get it
1:12:41wrong. Another journalist. You can look
1:12:43up the by line if you want to see their
1:12:45involvement. But uh and there's there's
1:12:48a lot of history here too. But um what
1:12:51they had found was uh of course uh the
1:12:55Bush White House had constructed a
1:12:56warrantless wiretapping program. If you
1:12:58remember the warrantless wiretapping
1:12:59scandal uh that was affecting everyone
1:13:01in the United States. Um well the Bush
1:13:05White House
1:13:06uh
1:13:08was
1:13:10really put in a difficult position by
1:13:12this scandal. um they would have lost
1:13:14the election over this scandal because
1:13:16the New York Times actually had uh this
1:13:19story uh in October 2004 uh which was
1:13:23the election year they were they were
1:13:24ready to go um with it uh but at the
1:13:28specific request of the White House uh
1:13:31talking to the publisher of the New New
1:13:33York Times uh Sberger and um Bill Keller
1:13:36then the executive editor of the New
1:13:37York Times uh the New York Times said we
1:13:41won't run the
1:13:43because uh the president just said if
1:13:46you run this story a month before the
1:13:48election that's very tight margin if you
1:13:50recall um you'll have blood on your
1:13:52hands and it was so close to 2001 uh the
1:13:56New York Times just went you know what
1:13:57fine
1:13:59Americans don't need to know uh that the
1:14:01Constitution is being violated they
1:14:03don't need to know uh
1:14:06that the Fourth Amendment doesn't mean
1:14:08what they think it means uh if the
1:14:11government says it's all Right? And it's
1:14:12a secret and you shouldn't know about
1:14:13it. That's fine. Now, December 2005, why
1:14:17did that change? Why did the New York
1:14:18Times suddenly run this story? Well,
1:14:20it's because James Ryzen, uh, the
1:14:23reporter who found this story had
1:14:25written a book and he was about to
1:14:27publish this book and the New York Times
1:14:29was about to be in a very uncomfortable
1:14:31position of having to explain why they
1:14:33didn't run this story and how they got
1:14:37scooped by their own journalist. And so,
1:14:39they finally did it, but it was too
1:14:40late. Bush had been reelected and now it
1:14:42was sweeping up the broken glass of our
1:14:44lost rights. So, Congress
1:14:48uh the Bush White House was very
1:14:50effective in as I said before telling a
1:14:52very few select members of Congress that
1:14:55this program existed and they told them
1:14:57this program existed in ways uh that
1:14:59they wouldn't object to uh but made them
1:15:02culpable for hiding the existence from
1:15:05the program uh the existence of the
1:15:06program from the American people. And
1:15:08this is why someone like Nancy Pelosi uh
1:15:10who you wouldn't exactly think would be
1:15:12buddy buddy with George Bush was
1:15:14completely okay in defending this kind
1:15:16of program in fact. And you know later
1:15:18she said oh well she had objections to
1:15:20the program that she wrote in a letter
1:15:22to the White House but she never showed
1:15:24us the letter. She went oh well that was
1:15:25that was classified right. Um and this
1:15:28is not to to bag on her individually.
1:15:30It's just she's a great example in here
1:15:33a named example everyone knows of how
1:15:35this process works. the White House will
1:15:38implicate certain very powerful members
1:15:41of Congress in their own criminal
1:15:42activity. And so when the when then when
1:15:45the White House gets in trouble for it,
1:15:47the Congress has to run cover for the
1:15:49White House. Uh and so what happened was
1:15:52Congress uh passed an emergency law in
1:15:56uh 2007
1:15:57called the Protect America Act, which
1:16:01should have been our first indication.
1:16:03This is a very bad thing because they
1:16:05never name a law something like that
1:16:06unless it's something terrible.
1:16:08And what it did was it retroactively
1:16:12immunized all of the phone companies in
1:16:15the United States that had been breaking
1:16:18the law millions of times a day uh by
1:16:22handing your records over to the
1:16:25government, which they weren't allowed
1:16:26to do uh simply on the basis of a letter
1:16:28from the president saying, "Please do
1:16:30this." Uh and these companies went,
1:16:34"Look, now that we've been uncovered,
1:16:35now that we've been shown that we're
1:16:37breaking or now that uh these
1:16:40journalists have shown that we've broken
1:16:42the law and violated the rights of
1:16:44Americans in a staggering scale that
1:16:47could bankrupt our companies because we
1:16:49can be sued for this. We will no longer
1:16:52cooperate with you unless you pass a law
1:16:55that says people can't sue us for having
1:16:58done this." And so we get the protect
1:17:00America act which they say you know as
1:17:02an emergency.
1:17:03This is all public history too. You can
1:17:05look this up on Wikipedia you know.
1:17:08Um and so then uh
1:17:11they um they go it's an emergency law.
1:17:15We have to pass this now. We have to
1:17:17keep this program active. Bush is going
1:17:19to end the warrantless wiretapping
1:17:20program and continue it under this new
1:17:23authority where it's going to have some
1:17:25special level of oversight and these
1:17:26kind of things eventually, but for now
1:17:29we just have to make sure people are
1:17:30safe. Again, they go to fear. They say
1:17:33if we don't have this program, terrorist
1:17:34attacks uh will continue. You know,
1:17:37people will die. Uh blood on your hands.
1:17:39Blood on your hands. Blood on your
1:17:40hands. Think of the children.
1:17:43Protect America Act passes. Uh the
1:17:46companies get off the hook. the Bush
1:17:47White House gets off the hook. The
1:17:49Congress uh that was then sharing in
1:17:51criminal culpability for authorizing or
1:17:55rather letting these things go by
1:17:57without stopping them. Uh then passes in
1:18:002008 uh the Foreign Intelligence
1:18:02Surveillance Act amendments of 2008. Uh
1:18:07this is called the the FAA FISA
1:18:10amendments act of 2008.
1:18:12And rather than stopping all of the
1:18:15unlawful and uh sort of uh
1:18:18unconstitutional activities that the
1:18:20intelligence agency was doing,
1:18:23they continued it in different ways
1:18:26simply by creating a few legal hoops for
1:18:29them to jump through. Uh now this is not
1:18:32to go say, you know, these things aren't
1:18:33helpful at all. It's not to say they're
1:18:35not useful at all. Uh but it's important
1:18:37to understand when the government's
1:18:40response to any scandal and this applies
1:18:42to any country is not to uh make the
1:18:46activities of the person who is caught
1:18:49breaking the law comply with the law but
1:18:52instead make the activities of the
1:18:54person who is breaking the law uh legal,
1:18:57right? They make the law comply with
1:18:59what the agencies want to do rather than
1:19:02make the agencies comply with the law.
1:19:04Uh that's a problem and that's what
1:19:06happened here. Now uh the intelligence
1:19:09community's powers actually grew in
1:19:12response to this scandal in 2008 because
1:19:15Congress was on the hook and they just
1:19:16wanted to move on and get this uh over
1:19:19with. There were objections. There were
1:19:20people who knew this was a bad idea, but
1:19:22it it passed on. Now, what the public
1:19:25took away from this, because a part of
1:19:26these laws
1:19:28uh was a requirement that the inspector
1:19:30general uh of all of these different
1:19:34intelligence community elements and the
1:19:35director of national intelligence submit
1:19:37a report saying
1:19:40uh this is what happened under that
1:19:43warrantless wiretapping program. Uh this
1:19:46is how it complied with the law or how
1:19:48it didn't comply with the law. uh and
1:19:50basically look back at how this program
1:19:54was constituted, what it did, what the
1:19:57impacts and effects were. Uh and that
1:20:00was supposed to be sort of the truth and
1:20:02reconciliation council right
1:20:06now. Why am I talking about all this
1:20:08ancient history? Well, I'm sitting here
1:20:11in 2012 uh with a classified inspector
1:20:14general's report, draft report from the
1:20:16NSA uh that names names uh that says uh
1:20:21Dick Cheney, that says David Addington,
1:20:23that says Nancy Pelosi, that says all
1:20:24these people who are involved in the
1:20:25program, the Tik Tok of how it happens,
1:20:28it says the director of the NSA, that
1:20:30guy who was evacuating the building uh
1:20:32at the beginning of our our our podcast
1:20:34here. Um,
1:20:37that guy was asked by the president of
1:20:40the United States if he would continue
1:20:42this program after being told uh by the
1:20:46White House and the Department of
1:20:47Justice uh that these programs were not
1:20:49lawful, that they were not
1:20:50constitutional. And the president said,
1:20:53"Would you
1:20:55continue this program on my say so
1:20:58alone, uh, knowing that it's risky, uh,
1:21:01knowing that it's unlawful?" And he
1:21:03said, "Yes, sir, I will. if you think
1:21:05that's what's necessary to keep the
1:21:06country safe. And at that moment, I
1:21:09realized
1:21:12these guys don't care about the law.
1:21:13These guys don't care about the
1:21:14Constitution. These guys don't care
1:21:15about the American people. They care
1:21:17about the continuity of government. They
1:21:18care about the state. Right? And this is
1:21:20something that people have lost. Uh we
1:21:23hear this phrase over and over again,
1:21:24national security, national security,
1:21:26national security. And we're meant to
1:21:28interpret that to mean public safety.
1:21:31But national security is a very
1:21:33different thing from public safety.
1:21:34National security is a thing that in
1:21:36previous generations we referred to as
1:21:38state security. Uh national security was
1:21:41a kind of term uh that came out of the
1:21:43Bush administration
1:21:44um to run cover for the fact that we
1:21:48were elevating a new kind of secret
1:21:50police across the country. Um
1:21:54and what does it mean uh when again in a
1:21:58democracy in the United States the
1:22:01public is not partner to government. The
1:22:03public does not hold the leash of
1:22:05government anymore but we are subject to
1:22:07government. Right? Uh we are subordinate
1:22:09to government
1:22:11and we're not even allowed to know that
1:22:13it happened. Now, uh, in in the book, I
1:22:16I tell the fact that I had access to the
1:22:20unclassified version of this report back
1:22:22in Japan.
1:22:24And what's interesting is the
1:22:26unclassified version of a report, and
1:22:27we've all seen this today with things
1:22:28like the Mueller report and all of the
1:22:31intelligence reporting that's happened
1:22:32over the last several years. When the
1:22:34government uh provides a classified
1:22:36report to the public, it's normally the
1:22:39same document. the unclassified version.
1:22:41The classified version are the same
1:22:42thing. It's just the unclassified
1:22:44version has things blacked out or
1:22:46redacted that they say, "Oh, you're not
1:22:47allowed to know this sentence or this
1:22:48paragraph or this page or whatever."
1:22:51The document that the public had been
1:22:54given
1:22:55about the warrantless wiretapping
1:22:57program um was a completely different
1:23:01document. It was a document tailor made
1:23:04to deceive and mislead the Congress and
1:23:09the public of the United States. Uh, and
1:23:11it was effective in doing that. And in
1:23:132012, what I realized was
1:23:18this is what real world conspiracies
1:23:20look like, right? Um, it doesn't have to
1:23:24be uh smoking men behind closed doors,
1:23:28right? It's lawyers and politicians.
1:23:32It's ordinary people from the the
1:23:33working level to the management level uh
1:23:36who go if we don't explain this in a
1:23:40certain way we're all going to lose our
1:23:43jobs.
1:23:44Uh
1:23:46or the other way they go we're we're
1:23:48going to get something out of this if we
1:23:49all work together.
1:23:52Civilization is the history of
1:23:54conspiracy, right? What what is
1:23:55civilization but a conspiracy for all
1:23:57all of us to do better by working
1:23:59together, right? Um, but it's this kind
1:24:02of thing, uh, that I think too often we
1:24:06forget because it's boring as hell. I
1:24:08want all your listeners, right, uh, to
1:24:10go to the Washington Post because this
1:24:12document that I discovered that that
1:24:13really changed me, uh, has been
1:24:15published courtesy of the Washington
1:24:17Post. Uh, it's called the the Inspector
1:24:19General's report on on Stellar Wind. Um,
1:24:22and you can look at the actual document
1:24:23that I saw that was uh, unredacted,
1:24:26right? I had no blacked out pages on
1:24:28mine. Um, and what I believe it shows,
1:24:32uh,
1:24:34is that some of the most senior
1:24:36officials in the United States, elected
1:24:38and unelected,
1:24:40uh, worked together to actively
1:24:44undermine the rights of the American
1:24:46people uh, to give themselves uh,
1:24:49expanded powers. Uh, now in their
1:24:53defense, uh, they said they were seeking
1:24:55these powers for a good and just and
1:24:57noble cause, right? They say they were
1:24:59trying to keep us safe,
1:25:01but that's what they always say. That's
1:25:03what every government says. That's no
1:25:05different than what the Chinese
1:25:06government says or the Russian
1:25:07government says. Um, and the question
1:25:11is, if they are truly keeping us safe,
1:25:15why wouldn't they simply just tell us
1:25:17that? Why wouldn't they have that debate
1:25:19in Congress? Why wouldn't they put that
1:25:22to a vote? uh because if they were and
1:25:24they could convince us that they were um
1:25:28they'd win the vote. Uh and particularly
1:25:31we all know like the Patriot Act passed
1:25:33one of the worst pieces of legislation
1:25:35in modern history passed. Um
1:25:40why didn't we get a vote? And I think if
1:25:43you read the report the answer will be
1:25:44clear. So I'm I'm sorry Joe I went on
1:25:46for very long.
1:25:46No, it was amazing. It's don't don't
1:25:48apologize at all. It's just completely
1:25:51fascinating that the continuation of
1:25:53this policy came down to one man and the
1:25:56president having this discussion. That
1:25:59is so
1:26:01well it it it's it's much it's much more
1:26:03much more much more but
1:26:05right right
1:26:05literally the president
1:26:06at at the heart of it. Yes. at at the
1:26:09heart of it in every expression of
1:26:12executive power, right? And by executive
1:26:14we mean the White House here, uh the
1:26:17CIA, the NSA, the FBI, the DOJ, right?
1:26:21The these guys exist
1:26:23as a part of the executive branch of
1:26:25government. Uh in a in a real way, they
1:26:27work for the White House. Now, there are
1:26:30laws and regulations and policies that
1:26:32are supposed to say they're supposed to
1:26:33do this, and they're supposed to say
1:26:34they're not supposed to do that. Um, but
1:26:36when you look at federal regulations,
1:26:38when you look at policies as an employee
1:26:39of government, when you violate these
1:26:42policies,
1:26:44the worst thing that happens to you is
1:26:46you lose your job because there's no
1:26:48criminal penalty for the violation of uh
1:26:50of these laws. Uh and so it's very easy
1:26:55um for for people who exist in these
1:26:58structures particularly the very top
1:27:00levels of these structures to go look we
1:27:02have a given set of lawful authorities
1:27:05and these are defined very broadly
1:27:08um to to give us leeway to do whatever
1:27:11it is we think is proper and appropriate
1:27:12and just.
1:27:14Now take that proper and appropriate and
1:27:17just from the perspective of any given
1:27:20individual, right? Any given president
1:27:23and now intersect that with what's good
1:27:26for them politically.
1:27:28Uh and that's where problems uh begin to
1:27:31arise. Now the safety measure that's
1:27:34supposed to protect us from this uh in
1:27:36the US system and any democracy broadly
1:27:40is these people are supposed to be what
1:27:41are called public officials. That means
1:27:44we know their decisions. That means we
1:27:46know their policies. That means we know
1:27:48their programs and prerogatives and
1:27:50powers like what they are doing both in
1:27:53our name and what they're doing against
1:27:56us. And because they are transparent to
1:27:59us, we the people can then police their
1:28:02activities. We can go, I disagree with
1:28:04this. We can protest it. Uh we can
1:28:06campaign against it, right? We can try
1:28:08to become the president, do whatever.
1:28:11They are public officials and we are
1:28:13private citizens. They're not supposed
1:28:15to know anything about us, right? Um
1:28:17because we in relative terms hold no
1:28:19power and they hold all the power. So
1:28:22they have to be under the tightest
1:28:23constraints. We need to be uh in the
1:28:25freest circumstances. And yet
1:28:29the rise of the state secrets doctrine,
1:28:32right? This whole classification system
1:28:34that goes all the way back uh to last
1:28:36century, about the middle of the last
1:28:38century, I believe, is is when it really
1:28:39started getting tested in court. And I
1:28:42think you know more about this uh in
1:28:44many cases than I do when you start
1:28:45talking about um what happened in uh the
1:28:50FBI and the CIA and the NSA's sort of
1:28:53old dirty work um in the the 20th
1:28:58century is uh
1:29:01they abused their powers repeatedly and
1:29:03continuously. Uh they did active harm um
1:29:06to domestic politics in the United
1:29:08States. the FBI was spying on Martin
1:29:10Luther King um and trying to get Martin
1:29:12Luther King to kill himself uh before
1:29:15the Nobel Prize uh was going to be
1:29:17awarded. Uh in fact, after uh MLK gave
1:29:20his uh I have a dream speech,
1:29:23two days later, uh the FBI classified
1:29:26him as the greatest national or I think
1:29:29it was the greatest uh national security
1:29:31threat in the United States. Um and
1:29:34again, this is the FBI. This is the the
1:29:36the group that everybody's applauding
1:29:37today saying, "Oh, these these wonderful
1:29:39patriots and heroes." Uh, now I'm not
1:29:41saying everybody at the FBI is bad. I'm
1:29:43not saying anybody everybody at the CIA
1:29:45and the NSA is bad. Uh, I'm saying that
1:29:47you don't become a patriot based on
1:29:49where you work. Um, patriotism is not
1:29:52about loyalty to to government. Um,
1:29:57patriotism, in fact, is not about
1:29:59loyalty to anything.
1:30:01uh patriotism is a constant effort to do
1:30:04good for the people of your country,
1:30:08right? It's not about the government.
1:30:10It's not about the state.
1:30:12Uh and this is we we'll get into loyalty
1:30:16uh later because, you know, I I think
1:30:18one of the big criticisms against me
1:30:20that should be uh talked about is they
1:30:22go, "Look, this guy is disloyal. He
1:30:25broke an oath. He did whatever."
1:30:28Uh loyalty,
1:30:31loyalty is a good thing
1:30:34when it's in the service of something
1:30:35good. But it is only good when it's in
1:30:38the service of something good. If you're
1:30:40loyal to a bad person, if you're loyal
1:30:41to a bad program, if you're loyal to a
1:30:43bad government, uh that that loyalty is
1:30:46actively harmful. Uh and I I I think
1:30:48that's overlooked. Yeah, when you get
1:30:50back into this whole thing about um sort
1:30:53of where it came from, uh
1:30:56why it happened, how it could come out
1:30:59of just this small group, and then they
1:31:01could slowly kind of poison by
1:31:04implication, by complicity, by bringing
1:31:07them into the conspiracy and then having
1:31:09them not say anything about it, a wider
1:31:11and wider broad uh body of people. And
1:31:15then once you've got enough people in on
1:31:17it, it's much easier to convince other
1:31:18people that it's legitimate because they
1:31:20can go, look, we've got 30 people who
1:31:22know about this and none of them have
1:31:24objected to it. Why are you going to
1:31:25object to this? Uh all of this derives
1:31:29from that original sin which is in a
1:31:33democracy uh creating a system of
1:31:36government
1:31:38that is in fact a secret government, a
1:31:40body of secret law, a body of secret
1:31:42policy. um that is far beyond what uh
1:31:46legitimate government secrets could be.
1:31:48This is not to say like government has
1:31:49can have no secrecy at all. If the
1:31:52government wants to investigate someone
1:31:54uh without having them respond, right?
1:31:56We're talking traditional law
1:31:57enforcement. Sure, you're not going to
1:31:58tell this mobster, hey, you know, we're
1:32:00going to start investigating you. Uh we
1:32:02the public don't need to know the names
1:32:04of every terrorist suspect out in the
1:32:06world, right? Uh but we do need to know
1:32:10again the powers and programs the
1:32:12policies that a government is asserting
1:32:14at least the broad outlines of it
1:32:16because otherwise how can we control it?
1:32:18How do we know if the government is
1:32:19applying its um
1:32:23authorities that are supposed to be
1:32:24granted to it by us if we don't know
1:32:28what it is that that they're doing? And
1:32:30so this is the the main thing uh and
1:32:32really the the story behind the title
1:32:34permanent record. um
1:32:37is look Joe when when you were a kid uh
1:32:39you know when I was a kid um when you
1:32:42were a teenager right like what's the
1:32:43worst thing you ever said
1:32:46uh you know did did you say anything you
1:32:49weren't proud of? Did you do anything
1:32:50that you weren't proud of? Something
1:32:51that today uh in like the wokest of
1:32:54Twitter land uh you would get in trouble
1:32:56for.
1:32:57I'm sure. Um,
1:32:58and that's one of the horrible things
1:33:00about kids growing up today is that they
1:33:02do have all this stuff out there on
1:33:04social media forever and they can be
1:33:06judged horribly by something they did
1:33:09when they were 13.
1:33:11It's exactly that. Um,
1:33:15our worst mistakes, our deepest shames
1:33:19uh were forgotten. Uh, right? They were
1:33:21lost. They were ephemeral. Even the
1:33:24things we did get caught for, they were
1:33:25known for a time. Maybe they're still
1:33:27remembered by people who are closest to
1:33:29us, whether we like them or dislike
1:33:31them. Um, but they were people connected
1:33:33to us. Now,
1:33:35uh, we're forced to live in in a real
1:33:38way naked before power. Whether we're
1:33:41talking about Facebook, whether we're
1:33:43talking about Google, whether we're
1:33:44talking about the government of any
1:33:46country, they know everything about us
1:33:50or much about us rather. And we know
1:33:53very little about them. And we're not
1:33:55allowed to know more. Everything that we
1:33:57do now lasts forever. Not because we
1:34:00want to remember, but because we're not
1:34:04allowed to forget. Just carrying a phone
1:34:07in your pocket is enough for your
1:34:09movements to be memorialized because
1:34:11every uh cell phone tower that you pass
1:34:13is keeping a record of that. And uh AT&T
1:34:16keeps those records uh going back to
1:34:192008 under a program called Hemisphere.
1:34:21If you search for Hemisphere in AT&T,
1:34:24you'll get a story in the Daily Beast
1:34:25about it. AT&T keeps your phone records
1:34:28going back to 1983.
1:34:31If uh any of your listeners were born
1:34:33after 1983, right? Born after me or it
1:34:36might be 1987, excuse me, 1987. Uh if
1:34:39they're born after 1987 and they're an
1:34:41AT&T customer or their calls cross
1:34:43AT&T's network, AT&T has every phone
1:34:46call they ever made, uh rather the the
1:34:48record that it happened, not necessarily
1:34:50the content that's on the phone call. Um
1:34:52and so I mean, let me turn this around
1:34:53for you, Joe, because I feel like I've
1:34:55just been uh given a given a speech. Um,
1:34:59when you look at this stuff, right, when
1:35:01you look at what's happening with
1:35:04government, when you look at what's
1:35:05happening with the Trump White House,
1:35:08the Obama White House, the Bush White
1:35:09House, you could see this trend
1:35:11happening, when you look at what's
1:35:13happening with Facebook, when you look
1:35:14at what's happening with Google, when
1:35:15you look at the fact that you go to
1:35:17every restaurant today, uh, and you see
1:35:19people looking at phones, you know, you
1:35:21get on a bus, you get on a subway, you
1:35:23know, you see somebody sitting next to
1:35:24you in traffic, you see people looking
1:35:27at phones.
1:35:28These devices are connected all the
1:35:30time. Now people are getting Alexa right
1:35:32now. Now people have uh okay Google,
1:35:34they have uh you know Siri on their
1:35:36phones that are in their house. Uh
1:35:38they've always got these connected
1:35:39microphones.
1:35:41Um where do you think this leads and
1:35:44what is it that gives you uh sort of
1:35:46trust in the system, faith in the
1:35:48system? Like how just just just so we
1:35:51can start a conversation here. What
1:35:53strikes you about this? Well, it's
1:35:56completely alien and it's new. This is
1:35:58something that's unprecedented. We don't
1:36:00have a long human history of being
1:36:03completely connected via technology.
1:36:05This is something we're navigating right
1:36:07now for the first time. And it's
1:36:09probably the most powerful thing that
1:36:13the human race has ever seen in terms of
1:36:15the distribution of information. There's
1:36:16nothing that even comes close to it in
1:36:19all of human history. And we're figuring
1:36:21it out as we go along. And what you
1:36:24exposed is that not only are we figuring
1:36:27out as we go along, but that to cover
1:36:31their ass, these cell phone companies in
1:36:33cahoots with the government have made it
1:36:35legal for them to gather up all of your
1:36:38phone calls, all of your text messages,
1:36:40all of your emails, and store them
1:36:43somewhere so that retroactively if you
1:36:45ever say anything they don't like or do
1:36:47something they don't like, they can go
1:36:49back, find that, and use it against you.
1:36:52and we don't know who they are. We don't
1:36:54know why they're doing it. And we didn't
1:36:55know they could do it until you exposed
1:36:58it. The the connection of human beings
1:37:00via technology is is both amazing and
1:37:04powerful and incredible in terms of our
1:37:06access to knowledge, but terrifying in
1:37:10terms of the government's ability to
1:37:12track our movements, track your phone
1:37:15calls, track everything. and under the
1:37:17guise of protecting us from terrorists
1:37:19and protecting us from sleeper cells,
1:37:21protecting us from attacks. Look, if
1:37:23they really are attack protecting us
1:37:25from these attacks, that's great. But
1:37:27there's
1:37:29there's no provision in the Constitution
1:37:32that allows any of this. And this is
1:37:35where it gets really squirly because
1:37:37they're making up the rules as they go
1:37:39along. And they're making up these rules
1:37:41the way you're describing it. This is
1:37:42step by step. this has happened to sort
1:37:45of protect their ass and keep themselves
1:37:47from being implicated in what has been a
1:37:50violation of our rights and our
1:37:52privacies and the Fourth Amendment.
1:37:55Yeah. I mean, I I think I I think one of
1:37:57the things that that
1:38:00everybody needs to understand um when
1:38:02you look at these things um and the
1:38:05reason, you know, we talked about before
1:38:07when I got this information, why I
1:38:09didn't just put it on the internet and
1:38:10people criticize me for this. to go I
1:38:11didn't share enough information uh
1:38:14because the journalists are gatekeeping
1:38:15right they've got a big archive and they
1:38:17haven't published everything from it and
1:38:18I told them not to publish everything
1:38:21following my instructions
1:38:22why did you do that
1:38:24because so again it gets back to
1:38:26legitimate secrets and illegitimate
1:38:28secrets um
1:38:30some spying from my perspective you know
1:38:33career spy is okay right
1:38:36agreed
1:38:36if you have hacked a terrorist's phone
1:38:39right and you're getting some
1:38:40information about that useful.
1:38:41Agreed. Yeah.
1:38:42If you're spying on a Russian general in
1:38:45charge of a, you know, rocket division,
1:38:48useful, right? Um, but there there are
1:38:51lines and and degrees in that where it's
1:38:54not useful. Now, the examples that I
1:38:57just gave you, these are targeted. This
1:38:59is where you're spelling on an
1:39:00individual. They're known person uh that
1:39:03is being monitored for a specific reason
1:39:05that is related
1:39:07to the people.
1:39:09Right. Well, even for foreign
1:39:11intelligence in some uh indications you
1:39:13don't need a warrant strictly although I
1:39:17think they should have warrants for all
1:39:18of these investigations because they
1:39:20established a court for precisely this
1:39:22reason called the foreign intelligence
1:39:24surveillance court right and there's not
1:39:26a judge in the world who wouldn't stamp
1:39:28a warrant saying hey uh spy on Abu Jihad
1:39:32over here right um and if you want to uh
1:39:36spy on another guy uh Boris Badenov off
1:39:40of the rocket division, right? That
1:39:41that's okay. They're going to go with
1:39:42that. Um, but then you look at uh these
1:39:48edge cases and in the archive that I
1:39:50provided to journalists, there have been
1:39:52stories that have come out where they've
1:39:53spied on journalists, right? They've
1:39:55spied on uh human rights groups and
1:39:57these kind of things I I think uh people
1:40:01miss. I'm going to throw up some slides
1:40:03here, so forgive me if this gets weird
1:40:05and I put up the wrong ones. Uh but
1:40:09since I came forward uh this foreign
1:40:11intelligence uh surveillance court that
1:40:13the government says authorized these
1:40:16programs 15 different times uh was
1:40:20overruled by the first open courts to
1:40:22look at the program. These are federal
1:40:24courts here right that said no actually
1:40:26these programs are unlawful. They're
1:40:28likely unconstitutional. When you start
1:40:30looking at the facts, you see even
1:40:32within the context of the very loose
1:40:34restrictions and laws that apply to the
1:40:36NSA and surveillance, they say uh they
1:40:40broke their own laws, you know, 2,776
1:40:44times in a single year. And then you ask
1:40:47about that thing that motivates me like
1:40:48why I came forward. Um,
1:40:51we had been trying as a country uh
1:40:55before I came forward to prove the
1:40:58existence of these programs legally uh
1:41:02because this is our this is our uh means
1:41:04of last uh sort of recourse in our
1:41:08system, right? We got the executive, we
1:41:10got the legislature, we got uh the
1:41:12judiciary, right? Uh so Congress makes
1:41:14the laws, the executive is supposed to
1:41:16carry them out, the courts are supposed
1:41:17to play referee.
1:41:20The executive uh had broken the laws. Uh
1:41:23Congress was turning a blind eye to the
1:41:25laws. Uh and the courts were and this is
1:41:29just months before I came forward going
1:41:32well it does appear
1:41:35uh the the ACLU and Amnesty
1:41:37International like all of these um
1:41:41uh human rights groups and
1:41:42non-governmental organizations uh had
1:41:45established that you know these programs
1:41:49are likely unlawful. They likely exist.
1:41:53Um they're simply classified. But the
1:41:54government responded uh with this
1:41:56argument that you just saw uh saying
1:41:59that well it's a state secret if they do
1:42:01exist. You the plaintiffs don't have uh
1:42:04hard concrete evidence that they do
1:42:07exist. And the government is saying
1:42:09legally you have no right to discover
1:42:12evidence from the government. write
1:42:13documents, demand documents, or demand
1:42:15an answer from the government as to
1:42:16whether things these or as to whether or
1:42:19not these things exist because the
1:42:21government's just going to give uh its
1:42:22standard what they call glomar response.
1:42:24We can neither confirm nor deny that
1:42:26these things exist, which leaves you out
1:42:29in the cold, which leaves the courts out
1:42:31in the cold. The courts go, uh, look,
1:42:34the government could be breaking the law
1:42:35here. Look, they could be violating the
1:42:37Constitution here, but because you can't
1:42:39prove it uh and because the government
1:42:41doesn't want to play ball and the
1:42:43government says if we were uh doing
1:42:46this, it would be legal and it would be
1:42:49necessary for national security or
1:42:51whatever. The court can't presume to
1:42:54know national security better uh than
1:42:56the executive because the courts aren't
1:42:58elected. Um, and so this leads to this
1:43:01fundamentally broken system where okay,
1:43:04the only way to have the courts review
1:43:06the legality of the programs is to
1:43:08establish the programs exist. But the
1:43:11programs are classified. So you can't
1:43:13establish they exist unless you have
1:43:15evidence. But providing that evidence to
1:43:17courts, to journalists, to anyone uh is
1:43:21a felony, right? That's punishable by 10
1:43:24years per count under the Espionage Act.
1:43:26uh and the government has charged every
1:43:29uh source of public interest journalism
1:43:31uh who's really made a significant
1:43:33difference in these kind of cases since
1:43:35Daniel Ellsberg really going back to
1:43:37that under the same espionage act it's
1:43:39always the same law uh and this is
1:43:41there's no distinction uh to government
1:43:44between whether you sold information to
1:43:46a foreign government for private benefit
1:43:48right uh or whether you provided
1:43:52information only to journalists for the
1:43:54public interest and that that's a
1:43:57fundamentally harmful thing. I I think
1:44:00when you look at
1:44:03uh things that have come in the wake of
1:44:05this, we're talking about the the post
1:44:062013 court rulings that that found what
1:44:09the government was doing was unlawful.
1:44:11Um you see the courts saying actually
1:44:15that that leaks or uh air quotes leaks
1:44:19uh can actually be uh beneficial.
1:44:22uh leak is used in the governance and
1:44:25this you know this is from a federal
1:44:26court. These are not exactly my biggest
1:44:28uh supporters. They are recognizing that
1:44:30although leak implies harm, it implies
1:44:33something that's broken. It it's
1:44:35actually helpful. It's a leak that's
1:44:36letting in daylight. Uh in this context,
1:44:39uh that is the only thing that allows um
1:44:44the system to operate in a context where
1:44:47uh one year before I came forward, we
1:44:50had the NSA saying this kind of stuff
1:44:52didn't happen. Um, we had uh hang on
1:44:56this famous exchange which more than
1:44:58anything made me realize this was a
1:45:00point of no return because I've told you
1:45:02this, you've heard this. Um, but if you
1:45:04haven't seen it, uh, you might not
1:45:07believe me, right? Maybe I'm a sketchy
1:45:09guy. Whatever. Um, one of those senators
1:45:12I told you that objected to this stuff
1:45:13that was doing the lassie barks for all
1:45:15those years, Ron Weiden, uh, was
1:45:18confronting the most senior spy in the
1:45:20United States, uh, General James
1:45:22Clapper, who was then, uh, the director
1:45:24of national intelligence, right? Uh,
1:45:26there's no guy higher than him. Uh, the
1:45:29buck stops with him when it comes to
1:45:30intelligence.
1:45:32He is testifying under oath in front of
1:45:33Congress, right? But more broadly, in
1:45:36front of the public. This is televised.
1:45:38And Ron Weiden asks him a very specific
1:45:40question about a program, mind you, that
1:45:43Ron Weiden knows exists because he has
1:45:46security clearance. He sits on the
1:45:47intelligence committee. Uh, and he knows
1:45:50there's domestic mass surveillance. And
1:45:51this is how it goes. This is how the top
1:45:53spy responds under oath.
1:45:58So, what I wanted to see is if you could
1:46:01give me a yes or no answer to the
1:46:02question, does the NSA collect any type
1:46:06of data at all on millions or hundreds
1:46:09of millions of Americans?
1:46:12No, sir.
1:46:14It does not.
1:46:17Not wittingly.
1:46:19There are cases where they could
1:46:20inadvertently
1:46:22perhaps uh collect but not not
1:46:25willingly.
1:46:26All right.
1:46:29So that was a lie. Uh Widen knew it was
1:46:32a lie. Clapper knew it was a lie. He
1:46:35actually admitted it was a lie after um
1:46:38I came forward, you know, 3 months
1:46:39later. uh but he said it was the least
1:46:43untruthful thing he could think of to
1:46:46say uh in the context of of being in the
1:46:48hot seat there.
1:46:50But what does it mean for a democracy
1:46:52when you can lie under oath to Congress
1:46:54and the congressman even knows you're
1:46:56lying to them uh but they're afraid to
1:46:58correct you? Uh and Widen uh by the way
1:47:00it wasn't a surprise. We widen gave him
1:47:02those questions 24 hours in advance and
1:47:05he wrote a letter afterwards asking for
1:47:07Clapper to amend his testimony. Right.
1:47:09not not even at a press conference, but
1:47:11just say uh this was incorrect,
1:47:13whatever, so he could go through the
1:47:15legal process and show his fellow
1:47:17congressman uh that there was a problem
1:47:19and that they needed to do it. But all
1:47:21of that was refused to us. All of it was
1:47:23uh denied to us. And here I am sitting
1:47:26at the NSA uh next to my buddies who
1:47:29I've talked to about these programs. You
1:47:31know, I've gone, "Look at this." And
1:47:33they're laughing at it. You know, I'm
1:47:35laughing at it. And it's not it's not
1:47:37that we go, "Oh, haha, he's getting away
1:47:39with it." It's like, "What are you going
1:47:40to do? These guys are, you know, they're
1:47:42they're bullshitters." That the system
1:47:45is built on lies. Uh that even many
1:47:49people, many experts who have studied
1:47:51this know are lies. But if you can't
1:47:54prove they are lies, how do you move
1:47:57beyond that? And that's really a
1:47:59question that has never been more
1:48:01relevant uh than I think it is today
1:48:03under the current White House.
1:48:05So, you're in this position where you
1:48:07have this information and you you know
1:48:10that these surveillance systems are in
1:48:12place and they're unconstitutional
1:48:15and you feel this deep responsibility to
1:48:17let the American people know about this?
1:48:20What what makes you take the leap?
1:48:25So this is um covered uh extensively in
1:48:29the book um because it took a long time
1:48:33I would imagine
1:48:35people people you know Yeah. Right.
1:48:37Exactly. People like to think it's like
1:48:39a cinematic moment um where I find this
1:48:43golden document like the stellar wind
1:48:44report and that's the closest thing to a
1:48:46smoking gun right that that exists.
1:48:50But look if you found that you you can
1:48:52read that later. Look at that. And like
1:48:54imagine yourself being like, "Oh, I'm
1:48:55going to go outside on the courthouse
1:48:56steps and wave this thing and burn my
1:48:58life to the ground. Burn my family to
1:49:00the ground. I'm never going to be work
1:49:01again. I'm going to jail for the rest of
1:49:03my life." Um,
1:49:06the question is, what would it take for
1:49:08you uh to light a match and burn your
1:49:10life to the ground? Um,
1:49:14for a long time,
1:49:16uh, too long, um, the answer was
1:49:20nothing. And I'm I'm I'm ashamed of
1:49:22that. It took me uh so long
1:49:29uh to get over that hump because I was
1:49:31waiting for somebody else to do it. Uh
1:49:32when I saw uh people like Von Widen on
1:49:36this uh when I saw people like the court
1:49:38case that I showed before where people
1:49:39were actively challenging these
1:49:41programs, right? Journalists had the
1:49:43scent of it. Uh, and you know there are
1:49:46a lot of people who are gonna be in, you
1:49:48know, the YouTube comments or whatever
1:49:49and go, "Oh, I knew this was happening."
1:49:51No, you didn't.
1:49:52Well, Bill Biminy,
1:49:53you had
1:49:54he Bill Benny. Bill, excuse me. Bill
1:49:56Benny, he initially was the one that
1:49:59came out and spoke about this issue. And
1:50:02so
1:50:04yeah, Bill Benny uh is uh part of, shall
1:50:08we say, the group of early NSA
1:50:09whistleblowers who came with Thomas
1:50:11Drake, Bill Benny, uh Kirk Weebi, I
1:50:14believe, and Ed Lumis. Uh and these guys
1:50:16all got their doors kicked in, you know,
1:50:18they they got harassed um by the FBI.
1:50:20Tom Drake uh who was a senior executive
1:50:23at the NSA. This is a guy who had a lot
1:50:24to lose. Um was charged under the same
1:50:27law was the Espionage Act. And these
1:50:28guys were doing it earlier during the
1:50:30Bush administration. Some of them were
1:50:32talking to the journalists uh that
1:50:34didn't, you know, maybe it's alleged. I
1:50:36don't want to put them on the spot.
1:50:37Maybe they deny it, maybe they don't.
1:50:39Leave that to them. Um but uh somebody
1:50:43somewhere was informing this reporting,
1:50:46right, that got into the New York Times
1:50:47about the Bush era warrantless
1:50:49wiretapping program. And eventually
1:50:50journalists put this out there. People
1:50:52knew these capabilities existed. Um but
1:50:55yeah, then then there's the person in
1:50:57the YouTube comments of like, "Oh, we
1:50:58knew all about this. It's nothing new."
1:51:00And the thing is, you can know about
1:51:01some programs and not know about others.
1:51:03You can have a suspicion. You can know
1:51:05with a certainty that this stuff is
1:51:06capable or is is possible. The
1:51:08capability exists. You can know that the
1:51:10government has done this stuff in the
1:51:12past. You can know they are likely to do
1:51:13it again. You can have all these
1:51:15indications. You can have um like the
1:51:17Juul versus NSA case uh that's um run by
1:51:20the EFF which is about the ATN or it's
1:51:23about AT&T
1:51:25setting up uh secret rooms in their uh
1:51:28telecommunications facilities where they
1:51:30basically drag uh all the fibers for
1:51:33their domestic internet uh
1:51:35communications and like phone
1:51:36communications into a room that's
1:51:39purpose-built for the NSA and then they
1:51:40bring it out. Um, but AT&T denies it's
1:51:44the NSA. Uh, the NSA denies that these
1:51:47things uh happen or that are done at
1:51:49all. Right? And so this is the context.
1:51:52Uh, you say, you know, and you know,
1:51:54let's put it the other way. Maybe you do
1:51:56know, right? Maybe you are an academic
1:51:58researcher. Maybe you're a technological
1:52:01specialist. Uh, maybe you're just
1:52:03somebody who reads all the reporting and
1:52:05you actually know. Uh, you can't prove
1:52:08it, but you know this is going on. But
1:52:10that's the thing in a democracy.
1:52:12The distance between speculation and
1:52:15fact. The distance between what you know
1:52:19and what you can prove to everybody else
1:52:21in the country is everything in our
1:52:24model of government. Because what you
1:52:26know doesn't matter. What matters is
1:52:28what we all know. And the only way we
1:52:30can all know it is if somebody can prove
1:52:32it. If you can prove it. And if you
1:52:33don't have the evidence, you can't prove
1:52:35it. And of course, when we talk about
1:52:37the earlier stuff, right, like the sort
1:52:39a more corporatized media, they've got a
1:52:42thousand incentives not to get involved
1:52:44in this stuff. They need access to the
1:52:46White House. They need these officials
1:52:47to sit down with them uh and give
1:52:49interviews, right? That's constant
1:52:51content that they need. That's access
1:52:53that they need. They need to be taken
1:52:54seriously. They need to be, you know,
1:52:57admitted to briefers. Uh it is a
1:52:59codependent relationship. And yet
1:53:03uh
1:53:06rather and so the only way to make sure
1:53:10people understand this broadly is if we
1:53:13all work together, right? Um if we
1:53:16collectively can establish a corpus of
1:53:19evidence, right? a body of facts that is
1:53:22so large and so persuasive. It overcomes
1:53:28uh the natural and understandable
1:53:30resistance of the these more
1:53:31corporatized media groups. Um it
1:53:34overcomes uh the political and partisan
1:53:37uh sort of loyalties that that all of
1:53:39these political factions in the country
1:53:41do where they go, you know, it's it's my
1:53:43president. Even if I don't like this
1:53:45stuff, even if I don't agree with this
1:53:46stuff, I don't want to say it exists. I
1:53:48want to deny it until it's proved, you
1:53:51know, uh, in HD on video, you know,
1:53:54signing the order to do this, that, or
1:53:56the other. Um, because otherwise there's
1:53:58a chance my guy might not get reelected.
1:54:00And that's the only way this kind of
1:54:02stuff can happen. And the sad fact is
1:54:05the opportunities that we have to prove
1:54:07this like the moments in history where
1:54:09we do prove something anything uh beyond
1:54:12a reasonable doubt are so few uh and so
1:54:17rare that they almost always only come
1:54:20from whistleblowers uh and I think
1:54:23that's uh one of the problems that we
1:54:25have particularly in the the climate
1:54:28movement
1:54:29uh today. Look go ahead.
1:54:31I'm sorry. Did you take any comfort from
1:54:34knowing that Obama when he was running
1:54:36for office and in his hope and change
1:54:38website, he had provisions to protect
1:54:41whistleblowers and provisions to to
1:54:45reward people, right? I mean, do you
1:54:48remember all that? I mean, it was
1:54:49eventually redacted, eventually deleted
1:54:51it from the website, but
1:54:52disappeared it from the website.
1:54:54Yes. But that was a big part of his
1:54:56program or what he was running on was
1:54:58that when people were exposing unlawful
1:55:01activity, he was going to protect those
1:55:03people. Did that Did you take any
1:55:05comfort in that?
1:55:06Also campaigned.
1:55:08Well, Obama also during his campaign
1:55:10said uh he campaigned actively against
1:55:12the warrantless wiretapping the Bush
1:55:15administration because remember Bush is
1:55:17in the scandal the height of this in
1:55:192007. you know, the election's coming up
1:55:21right after. And he's going, uh, Obama's
1:55:24saying, uh, you know, that's not who we
1:55:28are. That's not what we do.
1:55:30Um, and yet within a 100 days of him
1:55:33becoming a president, uh, now he's
1:55:35sitting in that chair. Rather than
1:55:37extinguishing these programs, he
1:55:39embraces them and expands. Why do you
1:55:41think that become more entrenched?
1:55:43I think it's actually again what we
1:55:45talked about earlier.
1:55:47First thing, uh, every time a new
1:55:49president comes into the White House,
1:55:51uh, they get their clearances, right?
1:55:54They get read into all this stuff. Uh,
1:55:56during the campaign, they get clearances
1:55:57and they get written on stuff. But when
1:55:59they finally become president, right
1:56:01now, they're the only people who can
1:56:02sign what these are called the covert
1:56:04action findings and things like that.
1:56:07Um, which are basically, you know, the
1:56:09intelligence community wants to
1:56:10assassinate somebody. They want to run
1:56:12this illegal program here, there, or
1:56:14everywhere. Um, and they can't do it
1:56:17because they're executive agencies
1:56:19without that top level executive
1:56:20signoff. And so they got to open the
1:56:22vest, right? They got to get these guys
1:56:24on on side. Um
1:56:27and
1:56:29basically every president uh since
1:56:32Kennedy um they have been successful in
1:56:35uh what they call fearing up uh where as
1:56:37soon as they come in uh they lead you
1:56:40read you the litany of horribles. They
1:56:42go these are all the threats uh that
1:56:44we're facing and let's be real it is a
1:56:47dangerous world. It's not just all
1:56:49madeup BS. Uh some of it is right where
1:56:52it's inflated. It's not that it's
1:56:54completely false, but they make it sound
1:56:56more serious than it actually is. Um,
1:56:59but there are real bad people out there
1:57:01who are trying to do real bad things,
1:57:03and you have just gone through a hellish
1:57:05election. Um, because our our electoral
1:57:08politics are so diseased. Um, and uh,
1:57:13now after you've crawled through fire,
1:57:15you're already thinking four years
1:57:17ahead. You know, how how do I stay in
1:57:19this seat? And these guys are basically
1:57:22saying, uh, if you don't do X, Y, and Z,
1:57:26this is going to fall on your lap. And
1:57:28the implication, which I I don't think
1:57:29they actually say, but every president
1:57:31knows, uh, is these guys can undermine
1:57:34you to death. Um, if you've got the IC
1:57:37against you, right? Uh, they can
1:57:40stonewall you. They can put out stories
1:57:42that are going to be problematic for you
1:57:44every day of your presidency. Um, and
1:57:48it's it's not that it's necessarily
1:57:49going to going to cast you out of the
1:57:51White House, but it's a problem that as
1:57:53a president you very much don't want.
1:57:55Uh, so in the most charitable
1:57:57interpretation of this, you've got a new
1:57:59guy coming in. In Obama's case, this is
1:58:01a pretty young guy. Um, doesn't focus in
1:58:05this kind of national uh, security,
1:58:07foreign policy stuff throughout his
1:58:08earlier career. He's more interested in
1:58:10domestic policy and always has been.
1:58:12That's actually one of the positive
1:58:13things to say about Barack Obama. um
1:58:16he's just trying to make things better
1:58:17at home. And now suddenly they go,
1:58:19"Look, you need to worry about this
1:58:21country. You need to worry about this
1:58:23group that you've never heard of. You
1:58:24need to worry about, you know, this
1:58:25technology. You need to do all this
1:58:27stuff." Uh and the only reason we can
1:58:30tell you this stuff and the only thing
1:58:33dividing America and the abyss are these
1:58:37terrible, terrible, terrible, terrible
1:58:39programs, right? uh that are in fact
1:58:42wonderful things because they keep back
1:58:44the darkness.
1:58:46And so here's here's the the the real
1:58:49problem.
1:58:50Uh every president hears that and every
1:58:52president, you know, first off, they've
1:58:53got so many other things to do is they
1:58:55they just kind of nod their head and
1:58:56they'll go, I'll deal with this later in
1:58:58my administration. And this this is one
1:59:00of the ironies. Uh when I come came
1:59:02forward in 2013, right, this is now
1:59:04Barack Obama's second term president.
1:59:07Uh, one of the responses that they had
1:59:09to the mass surveillance scandal was,
1:59:11"Yes, we think they went a little too
1:59:13far." This is after the initial thing
1:59:15where they went, "Nobody's listening to
1:59:16your phone calls, you know, uh,
1:59:18data,
1:59:20right? Nobody nobody can have uh,
1:59:23perfect privacy and also have perfect
1:59:25security. So, we got to sort of divide a
1:59:27line here between the Constitution and,
1:59:30you know, what the government wants to
1:59:31do." Um, but they said, uh,
1:59:36we were going to get to it. We knew
1:59:39these programs were problematic, but if
1:59:41they just gave us more time, we would
1:59:43have fixed them. Maybe it's true, right?
1:59:46See, seems awful convenient in hindsight
1:59:49that throughout the entirety of the
1:59:50first term.
1:59:50Well, it seems like what you would say
1:59:52if you got caught,
1:59:54right? Right. Right. Um, but look, uh,
1:59:58in, if we're being the most generous,
2:00:01uh, that we are here, the president is
2:00:04briefed on real and legitimate threats,
2:00:06and they scare the hell out of them,
2:00:08I'm sure.
2:00:09Um, and we can we can all imagine being
2:00:12there, right? Those those of us who
2:00:13remember what the world was like post
2:00:14911, fear is a powerful thing. But the
2:00:17guys who are doing that briefing,
2:00:21they're no longer scared of it. Uh,
2:00:23because they've been dealing with this
2:00:24for years. This is the oldest thing.
2:00:26They've given this briefing times
2:00:27before. You know, when we talk about
2:00:29people talk about the deep state, right?
2:00:31They they they talk about it like some
2:00:33conspiracy of lizard people. It it's not
2:00:35that. It's something much simpler. The
2:00:37deep state is simply the career
2:00:39government. It's the people who are in
2:00:41the same offices who outlive and outlast
2:00:44presidencies, right? They've seen
2:00:45Republicans, they've seen Democrats,
2:00:47they don't really care. Uh and they give
2:00:50that same briefing again and again, and
2:00:52they get good at it. They know what they
2:00:54want.
2:00:55uh they know what this person's saying.
2:00:57Uh whereas the president, they they
2:00:58don't know who these people are. Uh the
2:01:00these people have been there before the
2:01:02president, they're going to be there
2:01:03after the president. And so they give
2:01:06this very effective uh very fearinducing
2:01:08speech. And then they followed up with
2:01:10their asks, which are really demands
2:01:14um just politely provided. uh and anyone
2:01:18in that position who is not an expert on
2:01:20this stuff uh who is not ready for this
2:01:23uh uh sort of tradeoff and who you have
2:01:27to understand as a career politician
2:01:29is entirely used to the horse trading
2:01:32game right and going I'll deal with this
2:01:33later or not now or uh what are the this
2:01:36cost benefit here and the intelligence
2:01:38community goes if you give us what we
2:01:40want
2:01:42no one will ever know about it because
2:01:44it's classified
2:01:46It's obviously the easy answer. Uh and
2:01:49maybe uh Barack Obama honestly did want
2:01:52to get to this later, but what we can
2:01:54say today is uh
2:01:58for all the good that may have been done
2:02:00in that White House, uh this is an issue
2:02:02where the president went through two
2:02:04full terms and did not fix the problem,
2:02:06but in fact made it worse.
2:02:08Well, it seems like the president has a
2:02:11job that's absolutely impossible. And if
2:02:13you come across someone who has been in
2:02:15the position like, you know, someone
2:02:16who's the head of an intelligence agency
2:02:18for a long time and is very persuasive
2:02:21and has some, you know, legitimate
2:02:23credentials that show that he's very
2:02:25good at his job and he tells you this is
2:02:27important for national security. We need
2:02:29to keep these things in place.
2:02:31It it doesn't seem like any one person
2:02:34can run the country and be aware of
2:02:36every single program that every single
2:02:38agency is implementing. It it seems
2:02:40completely unrealistic. and the the job
2:02:42itself, it just it doesn't seem like any
2:02:45person can do it adequately. And when it
2:02:47comes to something like this mass
2:02:49surveillance state,
2:02:51I could see a president being persuaded
2:02:55by someone who comes to him and says,
2:02:57"This is why we need to do this."
2:03:01Yeah. I mean it one of the things that I
2:03:04think is uh the underlying problem in
2:03:08everything that you just described is
2:03:09the president has too much power,
2:03:11right?
2:03:12Um and because they have too much power,
2:03:14that means they have too much
2:03:14responsibility. And I I don't think
2:03:17people understand um if they haven't
2:03:19lived outside the United States, if they
2:03:21haven't sort of traveled or studied
2:03:23broadly uh just how exceptional uh the
2:03:26American presidency is. uh most
2:03:28countries uh don't have a single
2:03:30individual with this level of power. Um
2:03:34it's really only the superstates. Um and
2:03:36and that may be uh by design perhaps
2:03:40that's why they're they're super states.
2:03:43Um but when we look at uh sort of
2:03:46complex advanced democracies uh that are
2:03:49more peaceful uh they tend to have a
2:03:51more multilateral system uh that has
2:03:53more people involved in smaller
2:03:55portfolios and a lot of this derives
2:03:58from just the size of the government
2:03:59like like you said you know the
2:04:00president is responsible for basically
2:04:02everything executive branch and the
2:04:03executive branch is basically every
2:04:04agency that actually does any work. Um,
2:04:08and so how do you how do you correct for
2:04:12that uh without breaking it up where you
2:04:15have uh smaller ministers and ministries
2:04:17and things like that that have um
2:04:18different levels of responsibility?
2:04:20Having a smaller government overall, you
2:04:22know, back in 1776,
2:04:25uh the federal government, you know, was
2:04:27pretty much a dream. Uh we weren't even
2:04:30uh interested in having standing armies.
2:04:33uh the idea of an army that existed from
2:04:35year to year uh was a terrifying
2:04:37forbidding thing. Um and then when you
2:04:42uh move to this idea that we have a
2:04:44president that they have these
2:04:45extraordinary powers, it's okay because
2:04:47the government's very small. The federal
2:04:49government especially is seen as sort of
2:04:50this small and toothless and weak thing.
2:04:52Can you pause for one second?
2:04:54Pause for one second cuz my AirPods are
2:04:56about to die and I'm going to swap over
2:04:58to another pair. These these suckers are
2:05:00good for a couple hours, but we're uh
2:05:02two hours and 15 minutes here.
2:05:05We'll have a little bit of a weird uh
2:05:07audio issue with the last half of it,
2:05:09but Jamie Jamie will take care of it. Um
2:05:11I wanted to talk about you like where
2:05:13you are right now in your life and how
2:05:15you're handling this cuz you've been in
2:05:18exile for how many years now?
2:05:21Uh it's been more than six years since
2:05:24June of 2013. Yeah. I mean well actually
2:05:27I I left uh May. So
2:05:29what is life like?
2:05:32I mean
2:05:32are you in constant hiding? I mean what
2:05:36what are the issues like
2:05:38in in the beginning? Um
2:05:42my operational security level uh as we
2:05:45would call it was was very high. Uh I
2:05:48was concerned uh about being recognized.
2:05:51I was concerned about being followed.
2:05:52And I was concerned uh really uh about
2:05:55very bad things happening to me because
2:05:57the government made it very clear that
2:05:58from their position I was the most
2:06:00wanted man in the world. Um they
2:06:03literally brought down uh the president
2:06:05of Bolivia uh his aircraft and would not
2:06:09let it depart uh as it tried to cross
2:06:11the airspace of Europe, not even the
2:06:13United States. Uh they wouldn't let it
2:06:16leave until they confirmed I was not on
2:06:17board. Um, so yeah, that that made me a
2:06:20little bit nervous, but you can't live
2:06:23uh like that forever. And although I was
2:06:25as careful as I could be, um, I still
2:06:29lived uh pretty happily because I was an
2:06:32indoor cat to begin with, right? I've
2:06:34always been a technologist. I've always
2:06:35been uh pretty nerdy. Um, so as long as
2:06:38I have a screen and an internet
2:06:39connection, I was pretty happy. Um, but
2:06:43in the years past, my life has become
2:06:45more and more open. You know, now I I
2:06:47speak openly. I live openly. I go out. I
2:06:50ride the metro. I go to restaurants. I
2:06:51go, you know,
2:06:52how often are you recognized park?
2:06:55So, this is a funny thing is I'm almost
2:06:57never recognized. Um, one of those
2:06:59things is I don't give uh Russian
2:07:01interviews um because I I don't want my
2:07:04face all over the news. Um, which is
2:07:07nice because it just allows people to to
2:07:10sort of forget about my face. Um, and I
2:07:13can uh go about my life. But uh I it's
2:07:17one of the weird things that I'm I'm
2:07:18recognized a couple times a year uh even
2:07:22when I'm I'm I'm not wearing my glasses
2:07:25uh in a museum or a grocery store or
2:07:28something like that or out on the street
2:07:30just by somebody who I swear like these
2:07:32people are are you might have read a
2:07:35story about them like super recognizers
2:07:36the people who just have a great memory
2:07:38for faces.
2:07:39Yeah. Uh because I can be like wearing a
2:07:44hood and like a jacket. I can have a
2:07:46scarf around my face like in the winter
2:07:48and it like you can barely see my face.
2:07:51And they'll come up to me and they're
2:07:52like, "Are you Snowden?" And I'm like,
2:07:55"Whoa." You know, that's what you say.
2:07:57That's pretty impressive.
2:07:58I'd say, "Yeah, it's nice to meet you."
2:08:02Um and uh yeah, they've it's I've I've
2:08:05never had a negative interaction um from
2:08:07being recognized. But for me, because
2:08:10I'm a privacy advocate, like I would I
2:08:11would much rather go unrecognized. Like
2:08:14I don't want to be a celebrity. Um, but
2:08:17the other thing is, uh, I'll get
2:08:19recognized in computer stores and I I
2:08:22think there's just like a mental
2:08:23association, uh, where people are like
2:08:26their brain when it's cycling through
2:08:29faces that it recognizes, it's going
2:08:30through like the subset of nerdier
2:08:32people or something like that when
2:08:33you're in a computer store because for
2:08:35whatever reason, um, I'm recognized much
2:08:38more frequently when there's some kind
2:08:40of technological like locust. M um so
2:08:45you're living freely. Did you had to
2:08:47learn Russian? Did you learn it?
2:08:50Yeah, I mean my my my Russian is still
2:08:52pretty crappy. Um to to to my great
2:08:54shame because all of my life, all of my
2:08:57work is primarily in English, right?
2:08:59Did Now you've talked about returning
2:09:03home if you could get a fair trial. Is
2:09:06is that a feasible thing? A fair trial
2:09:10for someone like you? Is that such a
2:09:12Well,
2:09:13is that Yeah.
2:09:14Is that even possible?
2:09:15That's a good question.
2:09:16I mean, look, if if we're being frank,
2:09:20uh I I think all your audience knows, uh
2:09:23the chance of me getting a fair shake in
2:09:26the Eastern District of Virginia, a
2:09:28couple miles from the headquarters of
2:09:29the CIA, uh is probably pretty slim, uh
2:09:33because that's where they draw the jury
2:09:34pool from, right? Um but uh my objection
2:09:39here is on a a larger uh principle,
2:09:42right? What what happens to me is less
2:09:44important, right? If I spend the rest of
2:09:46my life in jail, that that's less
2:09:47important uh than what I'm actually
2:09:50requiring the government to agree to
2:09:52which is a single thing, right? They
2:09:54say, "Face the music. Face the music."
2:09:55And I'm saying, "Great, let's pick the
2:09:57song." Um, the thing is
2:10:01the law that I've been charged under,
2:10:03the one that all these whistleblowers
2:10:04have been charged under, Thomas Drake,
2:10:06uh, Daniel Ellsberg, Chelsea Manning,
2:10:08Daniel Hail, the drone whistleblower who
2:10:10is in prison right now going through a
2:10:13trial that is precisely similar to what
2:10:15I would be facing. Uh, his lawyer uh is
2:10:20asking the court or or telling the court
2:10:22uh that we want to tell the jury why he
2:10:25did what he did. uh that the government
2:10:28is violating the laws. Uh the government
2:10:30is violating human rights. Um that these
2:10:33programs are immoral, that they're
2:10:34unethical. Um
2:10:37this is what motivated this guy to do
2:10:40it. And the jury should be able to hear
2:10:42why he did what he did. And the jury
2:10:44should be able to decide whether that
2:10:46was right or wrong.
2:10:48And the government has responded, you
2:10:51know, to this whistleblower argument
2:10:53basically saying, "We demand the court
2:10:56forbid this guy from breathing the word
2:10:58whistleblower in court." He cannot talk
2:11:01about what motivated him. He cannot talk
2:11:03about uh what was revealed, why it was
2:11:05revealed, what the impacts and effects
2:11:07were. He can't talk about whether the
2:11:09public benefited from it or was harmed
2:11:11by it because it doesn't matter. Now,
2:11:14this might surprise a lot of people
2:11:15because to a lot of us, we think that's
2:11:17what a jury trial is. We think that's
2:11:18what a fair trial is. Uh but the
2:11:21Espionage Act that the government uses
2:11:23against whistleblowers, uh meaning
2:11:25broadly here, the sources of journalism,
2:11:28um is fairly unique in the legal system
2:11:32in that it is what's called a strict
2:11:34liability crime. a strict liability
2:11:37crime uh is what the government
2:11:40considers to be basically a crime worse
2:11:41than murder because if you if you
2:11:44murdered somebody like if you just I
2:11:46don't know beat Jamie with the
2:11:47microphone stand right now um
2:11:52you would be able to go to the court and
2:11:54say it was self-defense right like
2:11:57you you felt threatened you were in
2:11:59danger for your life even if you weren't
2:12:01right even if you obviously weren't even
2:12:03if you were on tape you could still
2:12:05argue that and the jury could go,
2:12:07"You're full of crap." Right? And they
2:12:09could convict you. But if you were in
2:12:11fact acting in self-defense, and if the
2:12:13jury did in fact believe you, they could
2:12:15take that into consideration in
2:12:17establishing their verdict, right?
2:12:20Strict liability crimes forbid that. The
2:12:22jury is not allowed
2:12:24uh to consider why you committed a
2:12:27crime. They're only allowed to consider
2:12:30if you committed a crime. Uh they are
2:12:33not allowed to consider if the murder
2:12:34was justified. They're only allowed to
2:12:36consider if the murder took place. And
2:12:38the funny thing in this case is that the
2:12:40murder that we're talking about is
2:12:43telling the truth. The Espionage Act in
2:12:47every case is a law the government
2:12:50exclusively uses against people who told
2:12:53the truth. Right? Like that. That's what
2:12:55it's about in the context of journalism.
2:12:57They don't bring the Espionage Act
2:12:59against people who lied. Then they would
2:13:01use fraud or some other statute. Uh they
2:13:04say the government is arguing in the
2:13:06context of whistleblowing that telling a
2:13:09uh telling a important truth to the
2:13:12American people by way of a journalist
2:13:15is a crime worse than murder. And I
2:13:18believe and I think most Americans would
2:13:19agree this is fundamentally indefensibly
2:13:23wrong. And so my whole argument with the
2:13:26United States government since the very
2:13:27beginning was been I'll be back for a
2:13:29jury trial tomorrow, but you have to
2:13:32agree to permit uh whistleblowers a
2:13:34public interest offense. It doesn't
2:13:36matter whether they are a whistleblower
2:13:37or not. Uh it's just they argued it's
2:13:40the jury that decides whether they are a
2:13:41whistleblower or not. Uh they have to be
2:13:44able to consider the motivations of why
2:13:46someone did what they did. The
2:13:47government says we refuse to allow that
2:13:51because that puts the government on
2:13:53trial and we don't trust the jury to
2:13:55consider those questions.
2:13:57Wow. So you have had these conversations
2:14:00then. So this has been discussed.
2:14:01Oh yeah. No, this is this is from the
2:14:03Obama administration. there's been no
2:14:05contact uh since since the Trump
2:14:07administration uh because the government
2:14:09basically when they got to this point
2:14:11they went we have no good argument
2:14:13against this uh and we will never permit
2:14:15this to happen and again I just want to
2:14:17make clear this is not uh speculation
2:14:20this is not um me thinking this is
2:14:23actively happening in the case of Daniel
2:14:25Hail right now I hope you guys can pull
2:14:27up
2:14:28a graphic for it because this story just
2:14:30hit the papers like two or three weeks
2:14:33ago
2:14:34um saying the government is forbidding
2:14:35this guy from from making this argument.
2:14:37So you're situ you're you're seemingly
2:14:41in a state of limbo then you're they're
2:14:43not actively pursuing you. It seems that
2:14:46you if you're able to move around
2:14:47freely. They they haven't discovered
2:14:49where you are. You're just free to live
2:14:51your life. You
2:14:53Well, yeah. Yeah. I mean, it's it's one
2:14:55of these things where, you know, whether
2:14:57they they know where I am or whether
2:14:59they don't know where I am, where I put
2:15:01my head on the pill, it doesn't matter
2:15:02so much. I'm in Russia, right? And and
2:15:05we should lean into that because I think
2:15:07people uh they hear Russia, particularly
2:15:09in the context of today's news, and you
2:15:11see like what people are saying about
2:15:12Tulsi Gabbard and things like that.
2:15:15uh any kind of uh association, any
2:15:19anytime your name appears in the same
2:15:21sentence, same paragraph, same story uh
2:15:24as the word Russia, it's considered a
2:15:26negative thing. Now, um and don't get me
2:15:28wrong, I've been a longtime critic of
2:15:29the Russian government. I just actually
2:15:32had a major story uh written about me in
2:15:35a Russian state news uh outlet called
2:15:38Ria Novasti. Uh you guys could could
2:15:40probably pull it. It's only in Russian,
2:15:42though. um that saying because I spoke
2:15:47favorably about a member of the Russian
2:15:50opposition uh Alexi Noni um which I I
2:15:54wasn't even speaking uh positively about
2:15:56this guy. I was saying look uh I think
2:15:58people have a right uh to express their
2:16:02opposition in a country uh and they
2:16:04should be able to do that without
2:16:05fearing retaliation in the future. uh
2:16:08because the background here is this this
2:16:10opposition figure has been a long time
2:16:13thorn uh in the Russian administration
2:16:15side and uh they've just suddenly
2:16:19magically uh been accused of being
2:16:22foreign agents or something like that.
2:16:24Um and so everyone connected to this
2:16:27which is like a big civil society body
2:16:29had their doors like simultaneously
2:16:31kicked in across the country and they're
2:16:33being investigated for some kind of
2:16:34corruption or something. It it doesn't
2:16:35even matter. Um, and you know, I I said
2:16:39I oppose that just like I was tweeting,
2:16:41you know, um, footage of, uh, ballot
2:16:43stuffing in the Russian elections, just
2:16:45like I've criticized the Russian
2:16:46president by name. I've criticized um,
2:16:49Russian surveillance laws. Uh, so many
2:16:52things again and again and again and
2:16:53again and again. Um, but yeah, so look,
2:16:56it it does not make my life uh, easier
2:17:00uh, to be trapped in a country that I
2:17:01did not choose. And people don't
2:17:03remember this. I was actually on route
2:17:04to Latin America uh when the US
2:17:06government canceled my passport which
2:17:08trapped me in Russia. And for those who
2:17:10are interested again I wrote an entire
2:17:12book uh that has a lot of detail on this
2:17:15um but uh yeah it's difficult to be uh
2:17:21basically engaged in civil opposition uh
2:17:25to policies of the United States
2:17:26government at the same time as the
2:17:28Russian government. Um,
2:17:31and it's it's a hard thing, you know,
2:17:33and it's not a happy thing, but I I feel
2:17:35like it's a necessary thing. The problem
2:17:37is nobody wants to talk about that.
2:17:39Nobody wants to engage in that kind of
2:17:40nuance. Nobody wants to consider those
2:17:42kind of conversations. Um, in the
2:17:44current world, people believe, and this
2:17:46is actually one of the worst things that
2:17:49uh, Western media does in the context of
2:17:51discussing Russia is they create this
2:17:54aura of invincibility around the Russian
2:17:56president. They go, you know, this guy's
2:17:57calling all the shots. he's pulling all
2:17:59the strings, you know, this guy's in
2:18:00charge of the world. Um, and that's very
2:18:03useful
2:18:05uh for the Russian government broadly uh
2:18:08because they can then take that and
2:18:09replay that on their domestic media and
2:18:11they can go look how strong we are. You
2:18:12know, the Americans are afraid of us,
2:18:14the Chinese are afraid of us,
2:18:15everybody's afraid of us, the French are
2:18:16afraid of us. Uh we are strong, right?
2:18:20Um there's no question that Russia's
2:18:24going to be interfering in elections.
2:18:26There's no question that America is
2:18:28going to be interfering in Russian
2:18:29elections, right? Nobody nobody likes to
2:18:30talk about this. And again, I need to
2:18:32substantiate that now that I've said
2:18:33that. I've got an old note that I've
2:18:35cited a billion times. Um the New York
2:18:38Times uh published a story in the wake
2:18:41of, you know, this contested 2016
2:18:43election uh where they looked into the
2:18:46history of electoral interference uh in
2:18:49Russia and the Soviet Union. Um and they
2:18:52found in uh roughly 50 years 36
2:18:55different cases uh of election
2:18:57interference by Russia or the Soviets,
2:18:59right? This is not a new thing. This is
2:19:01something that always happens because
2:19:02that's what intelligence services do.
2:19:04That's what they think they're being
2:19:06paid for. Uh which is a sad thing, but
2:19:08it's a it's a reality because we aren't
2:19:10wise enough to separate covert action
2:19:13from intelligence gathering.
2:19:16Uh but in that same uh study that they
2:19:19found 36 different cases uh by the
2:19:21Russians and the Soviets, they found 81
2:19:23different cases uh by the US and this
2:19:26was published by Scott Chain in the New
2:19:28York Times and both uh the Washington
2:19:30Post as well. But this is this is the
2:19:32thing like there is a way to criticize
2:19:36the Russian government's policies
2:19:39without criticizing the Russian people
2:19:42who are ordinary people who just want to
2:19:45have a happy life. They just want to do
2:19:47better. They want the same things that
2:19:48you do. Right? And every time people go,
2:19:50"Oh, Russia, Russia, Russia." Every time
2:19:52people go, "Russia bad." Every time they
2:19:53go, "Russia's doing this, they go,
2:19:54"Russia's doing that." Russian people
2:19:57who have nothing to do with the
2:19:58government feel implicated by that. like
2:20:00do you feel
2:20:02uh like you're in charge of Donald
2:20:03Trump? Like do you want to be have
2:20:06Donald Trump's legacy around your neck?
2:20:09And then people go, "Oh, well, you know,
2:20:10you could overthrow Donald Trump. You
2:20:12know, you could overthrow Putin. Can you
2:20:14really? Like is that how it works?" Uh
2:20:16so yeah, I mean, look, I have uh no
2:20:20affiliation. I have no love uh for the
2:20:22Russian government. It's not my choice
2:20:24to be here. Um and I've made it very
2:20:26clear I would be happy to return home.
2:20:28Is there any concern that they would
2:20:30deny you visa? I mean, how how are you
2:20:33staying there?
2:20:34It's it's a good question. So, I have a
2:20:36permanent residence. People think I'm
2:20:38under asylum, but I'm no longer under
2:20:39it's like a a green card now. Um, it's
2:20:42got to be renewed every 3 years. Uh, so
2:20:44yeah, sure, it's possible they could
2:20:46kick me out. And this was what the story
2:20:47I was telling you about before in
2:20:48Russian media was. They were saying, you
2:20:50know, the Russian government should take
2:20:51some action against me or I shouldn't be
2:20:54welcome here or I should go home. Uh
2:20:56because why is he criticizing the
2:20:58Russian government, right, when they're
2:20:59the people?
2:21:00Is that like the Russian version of Fox
2:21:01News?
2:21:03Is that what they have over there?
2:21:04I don't know enough about Russian media
2:21:06to tell you.
2:21:07I think it's supposed to be more like a
2:21:09Reuters or Associated Press, but the
2:21:11hell if I know.
2:21:12Um
2:21:14but uh the the the the thing is this,
2:21:19what's the alternative, right? Um, yes,
2:21:22the Russian government could screw me,
2:21:25but they could screw me even if I didn't
2:21:27say anything. Uh, and so should I shut
2:21:29up and be quiet uh in the face of things
2:21:32that I think are injustices
2:21:34uh because it makes me safer? Well, a
2:21:37lot of pragmatic people would say,
2:21:38"Yeah, they say you've done enough."
2:21:40They've said, "You've done your part."
2:21:41You know, they say whatever. Uh, be
2:21:43safe, live long, be happy. Um, but I
2:21:47didn't come forward to be safe. If I
2:21:48wanted to be safe, I'd still be sitting
2:21:50in Hawaii making a hell of a lot of
2:21:52money to spy on all of you, right? And
2:21:55nobody ever would have known about this.
2:21:56The system would have gotten worse. Uh
2:21:59but the system, the world, the future
2:22:03gets worse every day that we don't do
2:22:06something about it. Every day that we
2:22:07stay silent about all the injustices we
2:22:09see, uh the world gets worse, things get
2:22:11worse. And yeah, it's risky. Yeah, it's
2:22:14uncomfortable. But that's why we do it.
2:22:17Because if we don't, no one else will.
2:22:20All those years I was sitting hoping for
2:22:22someone else to come forward and no one
2:22:24did, right? That's because I was waiting
2:22:26for a hero. But there are no heroes,
2:22:29right? There's only heroic decisions.
2:22:31You are never further than one decision
2:22:33away from making a difference. Doesn't
2:22:35matter whether there's a big difference,
2:22:36doesn't matter if it was a small
2:22:37difference because you don't have to
2:22:38save the world by yourself. And in fact,
2:22:41you can't. All you have to do is lay
2:22:44down one brick, right? All you have to
2:22:46do is make things a little bit better in
2:22:48a small way so that other people can lay
2:22:50their brick on top of that or beside
2:22:52that and together,
2:22:54step by step, day by day, year by year,
2:22:57we build the foundation of something
2:22:59better. But yeah, it's not going to be
2:23:01safe. But it doesn't matter because
2:23:05individually it's it's not, you know,
2:23:10me, whoever you are, that's the iron
2:23:13man, right? I don't care if you're the
2:23:15biggest doomsday prepper with cans full
2:23:17of beans. Uh if the world ends, it's
2:23:19going to affect you. We make things
2:23:22better. We become safe together, right?
2:23:25Collectively, that is our strength. That
2:23:27is the power of civilization. That is
2:23:29the power that shapes the future.
2:23:31Because even if you make life great for
2:23:32you, you're going to die someday. You're
2:23:35going to be forgotten someday. Your cans
2:23:38of beans are going to rot someday. You
2:23:41can make things safer.
2:23:44Uh you can be more careful, right? You
2:23:47can be more clever. And there's nothing
2:23:48wrong with that. But at the end of the
2:23:50day, you have to recognize if you're
2:23:52trying to eliminate all risks from your
2:23:54life, what you're actually doing is
2:23:57eliminating all possibility from your
2:23:59life. You're trying to collapse the
2:24:02universe of outcomes uh such that what
2:24:05you've lost is freedom. You've lost the
2:24:07ability to act because you're afraid.
2:24:09That's a beautiful way to put us into
2:24:11this mess.
2:24:11That's a beautiful way to put it. Um,
2:24:14are you aware at all of the current
2:24:16state of surveillance and what if
2:24:19anything has changed since your
2:24:21revelations?
2:24:23Yeah, I mean the the big thing that's
2:24:25changed um since I was uh in in in in
2:24:292013
2:24:31is now it's mobile first everything. Um,
2:24:35mobile was still a big deal, right? Um
2:24:39and the intelligence community was very
2:24:40much grappling uh to to get its hands
2:24:44around it and to deal with it. Um but
2:24:46now people are much less likely to use a
2:24:48laptop than use a desktop than than use
2:24:52you know god any kind of wired phone um
2:24:55than they are to use a smartphone.
2:24:57Uh and both uh Apple and Android devices
2:25:00unfortunately
2:25:02uh are not especially good in uh
2:25:04protecting your privacy. I think right
2:25:06now um
2:25:10you got a smartphone, right? You you
2:25:11might be listening to this on a train
2:25:13somewhere in in traffic right now. Um or
2:25:16or you Joe right now. You you got a
2:25:18phone somewhere in the room, right? Uh
2:25:21the phone is turned off or at least the
2:25:24screen is turned off. It's sitting
2:25:25there. It's powered on. And if somebody
2:25:29sends you a message, the screen blinks
2:25:31to life.
2:25:34How does that happen? Right? Uh how is
2:25:37it that if someone from any corner of
2:25:39the earth dials a number, your phone
2:25:41rings and nobody else's rings? How is it
2:25:43that you can dial anybody else's number
2:25:44and only their phone rings? Right? Uh
2:25:47every smartphone, every phone at all is
2:25:51constantly connected uh to the nearest
2:25:53cellular tower. Um every phone, even
2:25:55when the screen is off, you think it's
2:25:57doing nothing, you can't see it because
2:25:59radio frequency emissions are invisible.
2:26:01Um it's screaming in the air saying here
2:26:05I am here I am here is my uh IMEI I
2:26:10think it's individual manufacturers
2:26:12equipment identity uh and IMEI uh
2:26:16individual uh manufacturers um
2:26:18subscriber identity I I could be wrong
2:26:21on the breakout there but the the
2:26:22acronyms are uh the IMEI and the IMSI
2:26:25and you can search the for these things.
2:26:27There are two globally unique
2:26:29identifiers that only exist anywhere in
2:26:32the world uh in one place, right? This
2:26:35makes your phone different than all the
2:26:36other phones. Uh the IMEI is burned into
2:26:39the handset of your phone. No matter
2:26:41what SIM card you change to, it's always
2:26:44going to be the same and it's always
2:26:45going to be telling the phone network.
2:26:46It's this physical handset. And the IME
2:26:49SI uh is in your SIM card, right? And
2:26:52this is what holds your phone number,
2:26:54right? is the basically the key, the
2:26:55right to use that phone number. And so
2:26:57your phone is sitting there doing
2:26:59nothing, you think, uh, but it's
2:27:02constantly shouting and saying, "I'm
2:27:03here. Who is closest to me?" That's a
2:27:06cell phone tower. And every cell phone
2:27:08tower with its big ears, uh, is
2:27:11listening for these little cries for
2:27:12help, uh, and going, "All right, I see
2:27:15Joe Rogan's phone, right? I see Jaime's
2:27:18phone. I I see all these phones, uh,
2:27:20that are here right now." and it
2:27:23compares notes
2:27:25uh with the other uh network towers and
2:27:28your smartphone compares notes with them
2:27:29to go who do I hear the loudest and who
2:27:33you hear uh the loudest is a proxy for
2:27:37uh proximity for closeness distance
2:27:39right they go whoever I hear more loudly
2:27:42than anybody else that's close to me so
2:27:44you're going to be bound to this cell
2:27:46phone tower and that cell phone tower is
2:27:47going to make a note a permanent record
2:27:50uh saying this phone uh this phone
2:27:53handset with this phone number at this
2:27:57time was connected to me, right? And
2:28:00based on your phone handset and your
2:28:01phone number, uh they can get your
2:28:04identity, right? Um because you pay for
2:28:07this stuff with your credit card and
2:28:08everything like that. Uh and even if you
2:28:11don't, right, it's still active at your
2:28:13house uh overnight. It's still active,
2:28:15you know, on your nightstand when you're
2:28:16sleeping. It's still whatever. Uh the
2:28:19movements of your phone are the
2:28:21movements of you as a person and those
2:28:22are often uh quite uniquely identifying.
2:28:25It goes to your home. It goes to your
2:28:27workplace. Uh other people don't have
2:28:29it. Sorry. Um
2:28:32and anyway, it's constantly shouting
2:28:34this out and then it compares notes with
2:28:35the other parts of the network. And when
2:28:37somebody is trying to get to a phone, it
2:28:40compares notes. The network compares
2:28:42notes to go where is this phone with
2:28:44this phone number in the world right
2:28:47now? and to that cell phone tower that
2:28:50is closest to that phone, it sends out a
2:28:52signal saying we have a call for you,
2:28:55make your phone start ringing so your
2:28:57owner can answer it and then it connects
2:28:59it across this whole path. But what this
2:29:00means is that whenever you're carrying a
2:29:03phone, whenever the phone is turned on,
2:29:05uh there is a record of your presence at
2:29:07that place that is being made and
2:29:09created by companies. It does not need
2:29:12to be kept forever. And in fact, there's
2:29:13no good argument for it to be kept
2:29:15forever. But these companies see that as
2:29:17valuable information, right? This is the
2:29:19whole big data problem that we're
2:29:21running into and all this uh information
2:29:23that used to be ephemeral, right? Where
2:29:25were you when you were 8 years old, you
2:29:27know? Um where were where'd you go after
2:29:29you had a bad breakup? You know, who'd
2:29:31you spend the night with? Who'd you call
2:29:32after? All this information used to be
2:29:34ephemeral, meaning it disappeared,
2:29:37right? Like like the morning dew, it
2:29:38would be gone. No one would remember it.
2:29:41But now these things are stored. Now
2:29:43these things are saved. And it doesn't
2:29:45matter whether you're doing anything
2:29:46wrong. Doesn't matter whether you're the
2:29:47most ordinary person uh on earth. Uh
2:29:50because that's how bulk collection,
2:29:53which is the government's euphemism for
2:29:54mass surveillance, works. They simply
2:29:57collect it all in advance in hopes that
2:29:59one day it will become useful. And that
2:30:03was just talking about how you connect
2:30:05to the phone network. That's not talking
2:30:07about all those apps on your phone that
2:30:10are contacting the network even more
2:30:12frequently, right?
2:30:14uh how do you get a text message
2:30:16notification? How do you get an email
2:30:17notification? How is it that Facebook
2:30:19knows where you're at? You know, all of
2:30:21these things, these analytics,
2:30:23uh they are trying to keep track through
2:30:26location services on your phone, through
2:30:28GPS, through even just what wireless
2:30:30access points you're connected to
2:30:32because there's a global constantly
2:30:33updated map. There's actually many of
2:30:35them of wireless access points in the
2:30:37world because just like we talked about,
2:30:38every phone has a unique identifier
2:30:40that's globally unique. uh every
2:30:42wireless access point in the world,
2:30:44right? Your your cable modem at home, uh
2:30:46whether it's in your laptop, every
2:30:47device that has a radio modem has a
2:30:50globally unique identifier in it. Um and
2:30:55uh this is standard term, you can look
2:30:56it up. Uh and these things can be mapped
2:30:59when they're broadcasting in the air
2:31:01because again like your phone says to
2:31:03the cell phone tower, I have this
2:31:05identifier. The cell phone tower
2:31:07responds and says, I have this
2:31:08identifier. And anybody who's listening,
2:31:11uh, they can write these things down.
2:31:13And all those Google Street View cars
2:31:14that go back and forth, right? They're
2:31:16keeping notes, uh, on whose, uh, Wi-Fi
2:31:20is active on this block, right? And then
2:31:22they build into a giant map. So even if
2:31:24you have GPS turned off, right? Uh, as
2:31:27long as you're connected to Wi-Fi, uh,
2:31:29those apps can go, well, I I'm connected
2:31:32to Joe's Wi-Fi, but I can also see his
2:31:35neighbor's Wi-Fi here, and the other one
2:31:37in this apartment over here, and the
2:31:38other one in the apartment here, and you
2:31:40should only be able to hear
2:31:43those four globally unique Wi-Fi access
2:31:46points from these points in physical
2:31:49space, right? The intersection in
2:31:51between, the spreads, the domes of all
2:31:54those uh, wireless access points. It's a
2:31:56proxy for location and it just goes on
2:31:58and on and on. We could talk about this
2:32:00for four more hours. We don't have that
2:32:01kind of time.
2:32:02Can I ask you this? Is there a way to
2:32:03mitigate any of this personally? I mean,
2:32:05is shutting your phone off doesn't even
2:32:08work, right?
2:32:10Well, so it it it it does in a way. It's
2:32:12yes and no. Um the thing with shutting
2:32:14your phone off that is a risk is how do
2:32:16you know your phone's actually turned
2:32:17off? Um, it used to be, uh, when I was
2:32:21in Geneva, for example, uh, working for
2:32:22the CIA,
2:32:25um, we would all carry like drug dealer
2:32:28phones, uh, you know, the old
2:32:30smartphones or sorry, old dumb phones.
2:32:33They're not smartphones. Uh, and the
2:32:35reason why was just because they had
2:32:38removable backs where you could take the
2:32:40battery out, right? And
2:32:42the one beautiful thing about technology
2:32:44is if there's no electricity in it,
2:32:46right? If there there's no go juice
2:32:48available to it, if there's no battery
2:32:50connected to it, it's not sending
2:32:52anything because you have to get power
2:32:53from somewhere. You have to have power
2:32:56in order to do work. Um, but now your
2:32:59phones are all sealed, right? You can't
2:33:01take the batteries out. So, there are
2:33:04potential ways that you can hack a phone
2:33:06where it appears to be off, but it's not
2:33:08actually off. It's just pretending to be
2:33:10off, whereas in fact, it's still
2:33:11listening in and doing all this stuff.
2:33:13But for the average person, that doesn't
2:33:16apply, right? And I got to tell you
2:33:17guys, they've been chasing me all over
2:33:19the place. I don't worry about that
2:33:22stuff, right? Um, and it's because if
2:33:24they're applying that level of effort to
2:33:26me, uh, they'll probably get the same
2:33:29information through other routes. Um, I
2:33:31am as careful as I can and I I use
2:33:34things like fairy cages. I turn devices
2:33:36off, but if they're actually uh
2:33:39manipulating the way devices display, um
2:33:42it's just too great a level of effort
2:33:43even for someone like me to keep that up
2:33:45on a constant basis. Also, um if they
2:33:48get me, I I only trust phones so much.
2:33:51So, there's only so much they can derive
2:33:53from the compromise. And this is how
2:33:54operational security works. um you think
2:33:58about what are the realistic threats
2:34:00that you're facing that you're trying to
2:34:01mitigate and the mitigation that you're
2:34:05trying to do is what would be the loss
2:34:07what would be the damage done to you uh
2:34:10if this stuff was exploited much more
2:34:13realistic than worrying about these
2:34:15things that I call voodoo hacks right
2:34:16which are like next level stuff and
2:34:18actually just a shout out for those of
2:34:20your readers who are interested in this
2:34:22stuff um I wrote a paper on this
2:34:25specific problem How do you know when a
2:34:27phone is actually off? How do you know
2:34:29when it's actually not spying on you? Uh
2:34:31with a brilliant, brilliant guy named
2:34:33Andrew Bunny Huang. Uh he's an MIT PhD
2:34:36and I I think electrical engineering. Um
2:34:40uh called the introspection engine uh
2:34:43that was published in the journal of
2:34:44open engineering. You can find it
2:34:46online. Um and it'll go as deep down in
2:34:49the weeds, I promise you, as you want.
2:34:51We take an iPhone 6. Uh this was back
2:34:54when it was fairly new. Uh and we
2:34:56modified it so we could actually uh not
2:34:58trust the device uh to report its own
2:35:00state but physically monitor its state
2:35:02to see if it was spying on you. But for
2:35:04average people, right, uh this is
2:35:06academic. Uh that's not your primary
2:35:09threat. Your primary threats are these
2:35:12bulk collection programs. Your primary
2:35:14threat is the fact that your phone is
2:35:17constantly squawking to these cell phone
2:35:18towers. that's doing all of these things
2:35:20because we leave our phones in a state
2:35:22that is constantly on. You're constantly
2:35:25connected, right? Airplane mode uh
2:35:27doesn't even turn off Wi-Fi really
2:35:29anymore. It just turns off the cellular
2:35:31modem. Um but the whole idea is
2:35:35we need to identify the problem. And the
2:35:38central problem with smartphone use
2:35:40today is you have no idea what the hell
2:35:42it's doing at any given time. Like the
2:35:44phone has the screen off. You don't know
2:35:46what it's connected to. you don't know
2:35:47how frequently it's doing it. Uh Apple
2:35:50and iOS unfortunately makes it
2:35:51impossible to see uh what kind of
2:35:53network connections are constantly made
2:35:55on the device and to intermediate them
2:35:57going I don't want Facebook to be able
2:35:59to talk right now. You know, I don't
2:36:00want Google to be able to talk right
2:36:02now. I just want my uh secure messenger
2:36:05app to be able to talk. Uh I just want
2:36:07my weather app to be able to talk, but I
2:36:09just checked my weather and now I'm done
2:36:11with it. So I don't want that to be able
2:36:13to talk anymore. And we need to be able
2:36:14to make these intelligent decisions uh
2:36:17on not just an appbyapp basis but a
2:36:19connection by connection basis right you
2:36:22want let's say you use Facebook because
2:36:25you know for whatever judgment we have a
2:36:28lot of people might do it you want it to
2:36:31be able to connect to Facebook's content
2:36:33servers uh you want to be able to
2:36:35message a friend you want to be able to
2:36:37download a photograph or whatever but
2:36:39you don't want it to be able to talk to
2:36:40an ad server you don't want it to talk
2:36:42to an analytics server that's monitoring
2:36:44your behavior, right? You don't want to
2:36:45talk to all these third party things
2:36:46because Facebook crams their garbage uh
2:36:49into almost every app that you download
2:36:51and you don't even know what's happening
2:36:53because you can't see it, right? And
2:36:55this is the problem with the data
2:36:56collection use today is there is an
2:36:59industry that is built on keeping this
2:37:01invisible. uh and what we need to do is
2:37:04we need to make the activities of uh our
2:37:07devices whether it's a phone whether
2:37:09it's computer whatever uh more visible
2:37:12and understandable to the average person
2:37:14and then give them control over it. So,
2:37:16like if you could see your phone right
2:37:17now and at the very center of it is a
2:37:20little green icon that's your, you know,
2:37:22handset or it's a picture, your face,
2:37:24whatever. And then you see all these
2:37:26little spokes coming off of it. That's
2:37:29every app that your phone is talking to
2:37:31right now or every app that is active on
2:37:34your phone right now and all of the
2:37:35hosts that it's connecting to. And you
2:37:37can see right now once every three
2:37:40seconds your phone is checking into
2:37:42Facebook and you could just poke that
2:37:44app and then boom, it's not talking to
2:37:46Facebook anymore. Facebook's not
2:37:47allowed. Facebook's speaking privileges
2:37:49have been revoked. Right? You would do
2:37:51that. We would all do that. If there was
2:37:53a button on your phone that said, "Do
2:37:56what I want but not spy on me." You
2:37:58would press that button, right?
2:38:01That button is not does not exist right
2:38:03now. And both Google and Apple,
2:38:05unfortunately, Apple's a lot better at
2:38:07this than Google. Uh but uh neither of
2:38:11them allow that button to exist. In
2:38:13fact, they actively interfere with it
2:38:15because they say it's a security risk.
2:38:17And from a particular perspective, they
2:38:19they actually aren't wrong there. Um but
2:38:21it's not enough to go, you know, we have
2:38:24to lock that capability off from people
2:38:26because we don't trust they would make
2:38:28the right decisions. We think it's too
2:38:30complicated for people to do this. We
2:38:32think there's too many connections being
2:38:33made. Well, that is actually a
2:38:36confession of the problem right there.
2:38:38If you think people can't understand it,
2:38:40if you think there are too many
2:38:42communications happening, if you think
2:38:43there's too much complexity in there, it
2:38:45needs to be simplified. Just like the
2:38:48president can't control everything like
2:38:49that, if you have to be the president of
2:38:51the phone and the phone is as complex as
2:38:53the United States government, we have a
2:38:55problem, guys. Uh this should be a much
2:38:57more simple process. It should be
2:38:58obvious. And the fact that it's not and
2:39:01the fact that we read story after story
2:39:03year after year saying all your data has
2:39:05been breached here. Uh this company's
2:39:07spying on you here. This company's
2:39:09manipulating your purchases or your
2:39:11search results or they're hiding these
2:39:13things from your timeline. uh or they're
2:39:16influencing you or manipulating you in
2:39:18all of these different ways that happens
2:39:22as a result of a single uh problem and
2:39:26that problem is an inequality
2:39:29of available information. They can see
2:39:32everything about you. They can see
2:39:33everything about what your device is
2:39:34doing and they can do whatever they want
2:39:35with your device. You on the other hand
2:39:38owned the device. Well, rather you paid
2:39:41for the device, but increasingly these
2:39:44corporations own it. Increasingly these
2:39:46governments own it. And increasingly we
2:39:48are living in a world where we do all
2:39:50the work, right? We pay all the taxes.
2:39:53We pay all the costs. Uh but we own less
2:39:58and less. And nobody understands this
2:40:00better than the youngest generation.
2:40:01Well, it seems like our data became a
2:40:03commodity before we understood what it
2:40:05was. It became this thing that's
2:40:08insanely valuable to Google and Facebook
2:40:10and all these social media platforms.
2:40:13Before we understood what we were giving
2:40:14up, they were making billions of
2:40:16dollars. And then once that money is
2:40:19being earned and once everyone's
2:40:20accustomed to the situation, it's very
2:40:23difficult to pull the reinss back. It's
2:40:24very difficult to turn that course
2:40:26around.
2:40:27Precisely. Because the money then
2:40:29becomes power, right? The information
2:40:31then becomes influence. That also seems
2:40:33to be the same sort of situation that
2:40:34would happen with these mass
2:40:35surveillance states. Once they have the
2:40:38access, it's going to be incredibly
2:40:40difficult for them to relinquish that.
2:40:43All right. Yeah. No, you're you're
2:40:45exactly correct. And this is the the
2:40:47subject of the book. I mean, this is
2:40:48this is the permanent record and this is
2:40:50where it came from. This is how it came
2:40:51to exist.
2:40:53Um the story of our lifetimes is how
2:40:58intentionally
2:41:00by design a number of institutions uh
2:41:04both governmental and corporate uh
2:41:06realized it was in their mutual interest
2:41:08to conceal their data collection
2:41:10activities to increase uh the breadth
2:41:14and depth of their sensor networks that
2:41:17were sort of spread out through society.
2:41:19Remember back in the day, intelligence
2:41:21collection uh in the United States, even
2:41:23in Sigan, used to mean sending an FBI
2:41:26agent, right, to put alligator clips on
2:41:28an embassy building or or sending in
2:41:30somebody disguised as as a workman uh
2:41:33and they put a bug in a building or they
2:41:36built a satellite uh listening site,
2:41:39right? We we called these foreign sat or
2:41:41foreign satellite collection. Uh we're
2:41:44out in the desert somewhere. They they
2:41:45built a big uh parabolic collector. um
2:41:48and it's just listening to satellite
2:41:50emissions, right? But these satellite
2:41:53emissions, these satellite links were
2:41:55owned by militaries. They were exclusive
2:41:57to governments, right? It it wasn't
2:41:59affecting everybody broadly. All
2:42:02surveillance was targeted because it had
2:42:04to be.
2:42:06What changed with technology is that
2:42:08surveillance could now become
2:42:10indiscriminate. It could become uh drag
2:42:12net. it could become bulk collection
2:42:15which should become one of the dirtiest
2:42:17phrases in the language uh if we have
2:42:19any kind of decency. Uh but we were
2:42:22intentionally
2:42:24um this was intentionally concealed from
2:42:26us, right? Uh the government did it.
2:42:28They used classification. Um companies
2:42:31did it. Uh they intentionally didn't
2:42:33talk about it. They denied uh these
2:42:35things were going they they said uh you
2:42:37agreed to this and you didn't agree to
2:42:39nothing like this. I'm I'm sorry. Right.
2:42:42They go, "We put that terms of service
2:42:43page up and and you clicked that." You
2:42:46clicked a button that said, "I agree."
2:42:48Because you were trying to open an
2:42:50account so you could talk to your
2:42:52friends. You were trying to get driving
2:42:53directions. You were trying to get an
2:42:55email account. You weren't trying to
2:42:56agree to some 600page legal form uh that
2:42:59even if you read, you wouldn't
2:43:01understand. And it doesn't matter even
2:43:03if you did understand because one of the
2:43:04very first paragraphs in it said, "This
2:43:06agreement can be changed at any time
2:43:08unilaterally without your consent by the
2:43:10company." right? Uh they have built a
2:43:14legal paradigm that presumes records
2:43:18collected about us do not belong to us.
2:43:22This is uh sort of one of the core
2:43:25principles on which mass surveillance
2:43:27from the government's perspective in the
2:43:28United States is legal. And you have to
2:43:30understand that all the stuff we talked
2:43:32about today, the government says
2:43:33everything they do is legal, right? And
2:43:35they go so it's fine. Our perspective as
2:43:38a public should be, well, that's
2:43:40actually the problem because this isn't
2:43:42okay. The scandal isn't how they're
2:43:44breaking the law. The scandal is that
2:43:46they don't have to break the law. And
2:43:49the way they say they're not breaking
2:43:50the law is something called the third
2:43:52party doctrine. And third party doctrine
2:43:54is a um
2:43:58legal principle derived from a case in I
2:44:00believe the 1970s uh called Smith versus
2:44:03Maryland. Um, and Smith was this
2:44:07knucklehead uh who was harassing this
2:44:09lady, making uh phone calls uh to her
2:44:11house. Uh, and when she would pick up,
2:44:14he just, I don't know, sit there heavy
2:44:15breathing, whatever, like a classic
2:44:17creeper. Um, and you know, it was
2:44:20terrifying this poor lady. So, she calls
2:44:23the cops uh and says, "One day, I got
2:44:25one of these phone calls and then I see
2:44:27this car creeping past my house on the
2:44:29street and she got a license plate
2:44:32number. So, she goes to the cops and she
2:44:34goes, "Is this the guy?" And the cops,
2:44:36again, they're trying to do a good thing
2:44:38here. Uh they look up his uh license
2:44:42plate number uh and they find out where
2:44:44this guy is and then they go, "Well,
2:44:46what phone number is registered to that
2:44:47house?" And they go to the phone company
2:44:49and they say, "Can you give us this
2:44:50record?" And the phone company says,
2:44:51"Yeah, sure." And it's the guy. The cops
2:44:54got their man, right? Uh so they go
2:44:57arrest this guy and then in court uh his
2:45:00lawyer brings all this stuff up and they
2:45:01go um
2:45:08you did this without a warrant. Uh that
2:45:10sorry that was that was the the problem
2:45:11was they went to the phone company and
2:45:13they got the records without a warrant.
2:45:14They just asked for it or they
2:45:16subpoenaed it, right? Some lower
2:45:17standard of legal review and the company
2:45:20gave it to him and got the guy. They
2:45:21marched him off to jail. Uh, and they
2:45:25could have gotten a warrant, right? But
2:45:27it was just expedience. They just didn't
2:45:28want to take the time. The small town
2:45:30cops, you can understand how it happens.
2:45:32They know the guy's a creeper. They just
2:45:33want to get him off to jail. Um, and so
2:45:36they made a mistake, but the government
2:45:38doesn't want to let it go. They fight on
2:45:39this. And they go, uh,
2:45:43it wasn't actually, they weren't his
2:45:45records. And so because they didn't
2:45:48belong to him, he didn't have a fourth
2:45:50amendment right. uh to demand a warrant
2:45:54be issued for them. They were the
2:45:56company's records and the company
2:45:58provided them voluntarily and hence no
2:46:00warrant was required because you can
2:46:01give whatever you want without a warrant
2:46:03as long as it's yours. Now, here's the
2:46:05problem. The government extrapolated a
2:46:09principle in a single case of a single
2:46:12known suspected criminal who had they
2:46:14had real good reasons uh to suspect was
2:46:17their guy. um and used that to go to a
2:46:22company and get records from them and
2:46:24establish a precedent that these records
2:46:26don't belong to the guy uh they belong
2:46:28to the company and then they said well
2:46:30if one person doesn't have a fourth
2:46:32amendment interest in records held by a
2:46:34company no one does and so the company
2:46:37then has absolute proprietary ownership
2:46:40of all of these records about all of our
2:46:42lives and remember this is back in the
2:46:431970s you know the internet hardly
2:46:46exists in in these kind of contexts
2:46:48Smartphones, you know, don't exist.
2:46:50Modern society, modern communications
2:46:52don't exist. This is the very beginning
2:46:55of the technological era. Uh, and flash
2:46:59forward now 40 years.
2:47:03Uh,
2:47:05and they are still relying on this
2:47:07president about this one, you know,
2:47:09pervy creeper to go, nobody has a
2:47:11privacy right for anything that's held
2:47:13by a company. And so long as they do
2:47:15that, companies are going to be
2:47:17extraordinarily powerful uh and they are
2:47:19going to be extraordinarily abusive. And
2:47:20this is something that people don't get.
2:47:22They go, "Oh, well, it's data
2:47:24collection, right? They're exploiting
2:47:25data. Uh this is data about human lives.
2:47:28Uh it is data about people. These
2:47:31records are about you. It's not data
2:47:34that's being exploited. Uh it's people
2:47:37that are being exploited. It's not um
2:47:40data that's being manipulated. it's you
2:47:44that's being uh manipulated and this
2:47:48this is this is something that I think a
2:47:50lot of people are beginning to
2:47:52understand. The problem is the companies
2:47:54and the governments are still pretending
2:47:55they don't understand or or disagreeing
2:47:57with this. And this is reminds me of
2:47:59something that uh one of my old friends
2:48:01uh John Perry Barlo
2:48:03um who served with me uh at the Freedom
2:48:05of the Press Foundation. I'm the
2:48:07president of the board.
2:48:08Uh used to say to me um
2:48:12which is uh you can't awaken someone
2:48:14who's pretending to be asleep.
2:48:17He said it's an old Native American
2:48:18saying.
2:48:19That's a great expression. That's a good
2:48:21way to
2:48:22I think that's a good way to end this.
2:48:24Um Ed, thank you very much for doing
2:48:26this. I really appreciate it. Please
2:48:28tell everybody the title of your book
2:48:29and it's it's available right now.
2:48:32Sure. Yes, it is. It's on shelves
2:48:34everywhere at least until the government
2:48:36finds some other way to ban it. Uh it is
2:48:38called uh Permanent Record. Um and I I
2:48:42hope you will read it.
2:48:43I will read it. And I I think what
2:48:45you've done is incredibly brave and I
2:48:47think you're a very important part of
2:48:48history. I think when all is said and
2:48:51done, what you did and what you exposed
2:48:54is going to change the way we view mass
2:48:58surveillance, change the way we view
2:49:00government oversight, and change the way
2:49:02we view the distribution of information.
2:49:04I I really think it's very very
2:49:06important and uh it was an honor to talk
2:49:08to you, man. Thank you.
2:49:10Oh, it was my pleasure. Thank you so
2:49:11much for having me.
2:49:12Take care of yourself, man. Stay safe.
2:49:15No, no, no, no, no, no, no,
2:49:16no. Don't stay safe.
2:49:17Don't stay safe. Open stays free. Open
2:49:20to possibilities.
2:49:22Take care.
2:49:24Take care.
2:49:26[Music]

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