Jacek Bartosiak & zespół S&F o wojennym przemówieniu premiera Tuska w Sejmie i perspektywie wojny — Transcript
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- 0:16I encourage you to read my latest text
- 0:18on Strategy and Future and to read the
- 0:20Weekly Brief, which we publish every
- 0:22Saturday. You can find the link to the
- 0:24texts in the video description. Good
- 0:37morning. Good morning, or actually good
- 0:39evening, as I am recording this on
- 0:41Thursday evening, September 17, 2026.
- 0:43This is Jacek Bartosiak, Strategy and
- 0:45Future. With me are the team: Albert
- 0:47Świdziński, Marek Stefan, and Marek
- 0:49Budzisz. Hello, gentlemen.
- 0:51Good morning. We are recording this one
- 0:53day before publication. On the day that
- 0:57Prime Minister Donald Tusk gave a
- 0:59speech in the Sejm regarding the risk
- 1:01of escalation, conflict, or effectively
- 1:03dragging Poland into a war, be it
- 1:05hybrid or otherwise. He did not rule
- 1:09out the possibility of a drone and
- 1:10missile attack on the territory of the
- 1:12Republic. He suggested, or according to
- 1:14some, even said it outright. It depends
- 1:16on how you listen. I mean, it depends
- 1:18on how you listen, that intelligence
- 1:20services from various countries are
- 1:22presenting him with a consistent
- 1:24picture: that Poland and the entire
- 1:25eastern flank, meaning states helping
- 1:27Ukraine, could be dragged into this
- 1:29missile and drone campaign. Especially
- 1:31since the Russians have gained the
- 1:33advantage and want to finish the war.
- 1:35Tusk said winter is meant to destroy
- 1:37Ukraine, they will strike
- 1:38infrastructure, specifically road
- 1:40crossings, cutting Ukraine off from its
- 1:42strategic depth and rear support. So we
- 1:45must be mentally prepared. Every Pole
- 1:47must be prepared for the fact that
- 1:49things could go various ways. He
- 1:50suggested it directly, right? Services,
- 1:52the military, the alliance, and so on,
- 1:55and so forth. And so, many things and
- 1:57questions arise that I would like to
- 1:59ask. This time I will brief the matter
- 2:05because, with the Polish state framing
- 2:07the issue this way, a whole range of
- 2:09strategic questions will immediately
- 2:11arise, the answers to which will
- 2:12determine what happens next regarding
- 2:14our relations with the North Atlantic
- 2:16Alliance and the Baltic states. Here,
- 2:21Prime Minister Tusk also clearly stated
- 2:23that we will stand in solidarity. And
- 2:25our relations with Ukraine as well. And
- 2:29here, Prime Minister Tusk also railed
- 2:31against those who in any way undermine
- 2:33aid to Ukraine or attack Ukraine in any
- 2:36way, while also criticizing those who
- 2:38believe this is not our war. It was
- 2:42truly a speech like one I have never
- 2:44heard before. Well, no wonder. We have
- 2:47had peace for some 80 years now. I
- 2:50really felt...Especially since at
- 2:54Strategy and Future we have been
- 2:55talking about this for several months
- 2:57—and I would like to say this very
- 2:59clearly, because in my opinion, our
- 3:01elites still do not understand this,
- 3:03even if they receive the intelligence
- 3:05data—that after what Iran did to the
- 3:09Americans, Israel, and American allies
- 3:11in the Gulf, it was an obvious
- 3:13realization that the Russians
- 3:15understood that isolating only the
- 3:17Ukrainian-Russian war without the
- 3:19threat of horizontal escalation, or
- 3:21through a scalable threat of horizontal
- 3:23escalation, put Russia in a difficult
- 3:25wartime situation. That is why it has
- 3:27been struggling with this war for so
- 3:29many years, right? And it is also
- 3:31taking hits. It allowed for the
- 3:33building of new technology industries
- 3:34in Ukraine, consolidation, and calm
- 3:36assistance, even if initially meted out
- 3:38like medicine when it came to military
- 3:40equipment, and that was a mistake. In
- 3:44my opinion, the second factor that
- 3:46caused the structure of affairs to
- 3:47trend toward the scenario mentioned by
- 3:50Prime Minister Tusk is the stance of
- 3:51the United States this year. You see,
- 3:57the Americans 'flirtation with the
- 3:59Russians led to a situation in the
- 4:01minds of the Russians—and that is how
- 4:03I see it—which led me to the
- 4:05conclusions I spoke about a few months
- 4:07ago, that the threshold for an Article
- 4:095 response and the threshold for
- 4:11cohesion is potentially shifted much
- 4:13higher than the Russians could have
- 4:15feared a year, 2 years, or three years
- 4:17ago regarding the alliance's cohesion,
- 4:19because the Americans are positioning
- 4:21themselves as intermediaries in the
- 4:23conflict between Europe and Russia. By
- 4:28manipulating Europeans' sense of
- 4:29security, they want to be the brokers
- 4:32and decide the fate of Europe. In other
- 4:35words, American troops have no
- 4:37intention of participating in any war,
- 4:39provided the Russians scale it down
- 4:42accordingly. So, on one hand, it will
- 4:45expose the Europeans 'inability to deal
- 4:47with a security crisis, but at the same
- 4:49time, it will not force the Americans
- 4:51into a general war. Yes. For which, by
- 4:53the way, they have no appetite, nor the
- 4:55forces, nor the ground troops. In other
- 4:57words, the Americans, with their
- 4:59pilgrimages to Moscow and attempts to
- 5:01subordinate Ukraine's interests for the
- 5:03sake of a grand deal, have also created
- 5:06a structural situation where the
- 5:07Russians may be interested, may feel
- 5:09they have a green light for a drone and
- 5:12missile war of some controlled scale
- 5:14and intensity, which will demonstrate
- 5:16the weakness of Poland and the Baltic
- 5:18states, their inability to respond, and
- 5:20will, of course, divide risks and
- 5:22cohesion as well. For some, this will
- 5:24already be war; for others, it will not
- 5:26be war. We will say it already is.
- 5:28Those in the West will explain that it
- 5:29is not yet. They will call for
- 5:31restraint. And the third element. Our
- 5:33weakness, that is, poor military
- 5:35procurement, a lack of defensive
- 5:37capabilities against drones, and a lack
- 5:39of our own capabilities to respond via
- 5:42deterrence through punishment. Also
- 5:44encourages Russia to strike at this
- 5:46soft spot. Yes, it is an asymmetrical
- 5:48exploitation of the very niche where we
- 5:50are weak. It is practically begging for
- 5:52it. So, one could say that this is what
- 5:55the situation boils down to. Some
- 5:56consolation is that the North Atlantic
- 5:58Alliance formally exists. Because if it
- 6:00didn't exist, and there were only such
- 6:02agitated, general moral declarations
- 6:04from European leaders that we won't
- 6:06allow war in Europe and so on, I would
- 6:08be certain that the Russians would do
- 6:10it. There is still some uncertainty due
- 6:12to the existence of this North Atlantic
- 6:14Alliance, and here, for the first time,
- 6:16Jacek Bartosiak will say that it is
- 6:18very good that it exists, because it
- 6:20does complicate the Russians'
- 6:22calculations. But here I will move on
- 6:25to the second part of the briefing
- 6:27before Poland. Very difficult decisions
- 6:30, because now, since Prime Minister
- 6:32Tusk says so, we should have our own
- 6:34reaction scenario. Adopting and
- 6:36developing what the reaction to such
- 6:38Russian behavior should be is not easy.
- 6:41There are no good answers here because,
- 6:43well, how can we respond? Well, by
- 6:46preventing it. I think that will be
- 6:48difficult. Given how poorly Poland has
- 6:50managed so far. It might be difficult.
- 6:52Well, what about greater industrial
- 6:54cooperation with Ukraine so the
- 6:56Ukrainians can show us how to defend
- 6:57against these drones? Well, firstly,
- 6:59it’s late, the hour is late, and
- 7:01secondly, the Ukrainians are struggling
- 7:03against these new jet ones. And they
- 7:05are also struggling against ballistics.
- 7:08Well, what else can we do? Well, we can
- 7:10ask the alliance. Well, as I said, the
- 7:12alliance will not respond through
- 7:14deterrence or punishment; it will hold
- 7:16us back. We don't have significant
- 7:18capabilities ourselves, although
- 7:19something will have to be done. Well,
- 7:21if, for example, a strike is carried
- 7:23out, say 100 drones fly into Poland,
- 7:25well, something will have to be done.
- 7:28Something will have to be done beyond
- 7:30appeals, because every loud appeal will
- 7:32only weaken that cohesion, which Prime
- 7:34Minister Tusk appealed for. His actual
- 7:36actions—that we will pointlessly
- 7:38appeal to allies while being unable to
- 7:40do anything ourselves, neither
- 7:42defending against it nor responding—
- 7:44will show the weakness of the alliance
- 7:46and the weakness of cohesion every day,
- 7:48losing a sense of direction, while the
- 7:50Americans still won't cross that
- 7:51threshold to enter the war, and the
- 7:53role of the Americans will increase.
- 7:55This means the Americans will get cards
- 7:57they didn't have in talks with the
- 7:59Russians. And this is a very dangerous
- 8:01situation here. I hope our leaders will
- 8:03grasp this, understand that right now
- 8:05the role of the Americans is not at all
- 8:07helpful for avoiding war in this
- 8:09structural setup. And it is a very
- 8:11dangerous situation, while at the same
- 8:13time the Polish state is objectively
- 8:15unprepared, yet it must have some
- 8:17strategies. I am curious about your
- 8:19opinion. Maybe let's have a
- 8:21brainstorming session too. What should
- 8:23this strategy be? Should we respond
- 8:25adequately and proportionally, or not?
- 8:27Should we coordinate with Ukraine and
- 8:29respond? Maybe, um, what is it, what
- 8:32can be taken? Because I will point out
- 8:36to you and our listeners: every appeal
- 8:38for even more in the event of such a
- 8:40strike on Poland, every additional
- 8:42appeal from Prime Minister Tusk, from
- 8:44our leaders to America or Western
- 8:45Europe for some help to get them to do
- 8:48something about these Russians, stop
- 8:50doing that, it will erode the deterrent
- 8:52power of the North Atlantic Alliance
- 8:54every day and deepen the security
- 8:55crisis even further. Who’s first?
- 8:59Marek Budzisz. Please. It seems to me
- 9:06that we should pay attention here to a
- 9:08few fundamental events that have taken
- 9:16place over the last week, which, in my
- 9:18opinion, quite fundamentally change the
- 9:20strategic map. First of all, we are
- 9:26dealing with
- 9:27And Marek, I will add, I'm sorry, I'm
- 9:29sorry, I rarely do this, but I forgot
- 9:31to say important things. And today we
- 9:33also had a statement by the Canadian
- 9:35Prime Minister, who was distancing
- 9:37himself from the United States, wanting
- 9:39to, well, in some form, join the
- 9:40European Union. This causes the
- 9:42Americans to potentially want to teach
- 9:44Europe a lesson, that it is unable to
- 9:46provide for its own security, and they
- 9:48may be interested in letting the
- 9:50Russians do something after all. I'm
- 9:52sorry, that, that is exactly what I
- 9:54wanted to talk about. You beat me to it
- 9:56a little bit.
- 9:56I'm sorry.
- 9:57No worries. No, it's not a race, is it?
- 10:01I mean, Trump's peace mission,
- 10:05regardless of how we evaluate it, has
- 10:08certainly ended in failure. That is the
- 10:11first fact. This is evidenced by
- 10:16Zelensky's statements, who speaks of
- 10:18the impossibility of achieving a
- 10:20win-win situation and the still
- 10:22unresolved issue of Donbas, which I
- 10:24understand as a refusal to withdraw
- 10:26Ukrainian forces to the administrative
- 10:28line. Such a withdrawal, especially in
- 10:32the current situation, where on at
- 10:34least two operational directions the
- 10:36Ukrainian side is on the offensive,
- 10:38would be all the more difficult. But in
- 10:41a similar spirit, commanders of
- 10:43Ukrainian corps spoke two days ago,
- 10:45both Biletsky, Prokopenko, and
- 10:48Obolensky. These are people who will
- 10:53decide the future of Ukraine at least
- 10:55to the same extent as the political
- 10:57class. And Biletsky conceptualized this
- 11:03Ukrainian theory of victory, saying
- 11:05that Ukraine must survive until April,
- 11:08and then the chance of victory will
- 11:10grow. I am not deciding if he is right;
- 11:15I am describing it as a fact. This
- 11:19means that if we do not have the
- 11:21prospect of a negotiated exit from the
- 11:23war, then we have, in turn, an
- 11:25escalation prospect, and an escalation
- 11:27on the part of the Russian Federation.
- 11:32I wrote a large piece about this, which
- 11:34I published on Monday. It actually
- 11:38contains all the theses that Prime
- 11:40Minister Tusk also mentioned, but I do
- 11:42not talk to the Prime Minister.
- 11:44Therefore, this is an independent, so
- 11:46to speak, assessment. I will reveal the
- 11:51material here. I wrote it last Saturday
- 11:53, and it was intended for a meeting
- 11:55that took place on Monday at the
- 11:57National Security Bureau. I could not
- 12:01participate in that meeting because I
- 12:03was in Zielona Góra, but I wrote the
- 12:05material and then published it, because
- 12:07I have always maintained and still
- 12:09maintain that public opinion must be
- 12:11informed, so we will have a high
- 12:13probability of an escalation scenario
- 12:15on the part of the Russian Federation.
- 12:19Because that is how Russia wants to win
- 12:21the war, by cutting off Ukraine.
- 12:25Meaning we can expect attacks on
- 12:27logistics and on critical
- 12:32infrastructure, not only in the western
- 12:34part of Ukraine but also in neighboring
- 12:36countries. I believe that the
- 12:38probability of such a scenario is
- 12:40significantly higher than before. And
- 12:42that is, as it were, the first fact.
- 12:45This is the outlook for the current
- 12:47winter. The second fact I wanted to
- 12:52draw attention to is a fatal strategic
- 12:54mistake that occurred recently. This is
- 12:57not only a declaration by the Prime
- 12:59Minister of Canada, but an enthusiastic
- 13:01reaction from the Brussels bureaucracy,
- 13:06Ms. von der Leyen, who is not fit for
- 13:09the position she holds, regarding this
- 13:11kind of proposal for closer ties
- 13:13between Canada and the European Union.
- 13:18If such an alliance were to occur, it
- 13:20would change the security situation of
- 13:22the United States. And significantly so
- 13:27. And significantly so.
- 13:28In a way, in a way...
- 13:30It turns out that Canada cannot choose
- 13:31its alliances, just like Ukraine.
- 13:33Of course it can't. Of course it can't,
- 13:37because even the theoretical
- 13:38possibility that the paths of Europe,
- 13:41broadly understood, and the United
- 13:43States will diverge—well, if Canada
- 13:45is on the side of the European camp,
- 13:47that means the American sanctuary no
- 13:49longer exists. Not only in terms of
- 13:55vulnerability to missile attacks, but
- 13:57also in terms of a land invasion. And
- 14:00that is a strategic revolution. The
- 14:04Americans certainly will not reconcile
- 14:07themselves to such a situation, as if
- 14:09three economic "Grossräume"—using
- 14:11Carl Schmitt’s terminology, Marek and
- 14:13I were just writing a chapter about
- 14:15this in our book—were created: the
- 14:17Chinese one with its periphery, and the
- 14:20American one, where the Americans would
- 14:22lose the Canadian-European periphery
- 14:24along with Canada, its raw materials,
- 14:26and access to the Arctic.
- 14:32Of course, therefore, what happened
- 14:34this week is essentially...For some
- 14:36reason, it was welcomed with joy by the
- 14:39European media. It reminds me a bit of
- 14:44the joy of a turkey before Sunday
- 14:46dinner. And that is because it
- 14:53obviously weakens the alliance, the
- 14:55Atlantic ties, and creates a temptation
- 14:57for the current American political
- 14:59class to teach the Europeans a lesson.
- 15:04And the third trend, which I consider
- 15:06very disturbing. We are, of course,
- 15:09dealing with belligerent statements
- 15:11from representatives of the Russian
- 15:13administration or the ruling camp. We
- 15:16had the statement from Patrushev. We
- 15:18have a series of very belligerent
- 15:20declarations from Lavrov. In his
- 15:22message, we also have statements from
- 15:24Putin. These are, in my view,
- 15:29non-standard statements, and they lead
- 15:31me to this observation or conclusion. I
- 15:38believe that the Russian political
- 15:40elite—because their perception
- 15:42matters here, not objective facts,
- 15:44meaning how they perceive reality—
- 15:46thinks that Europe will continue to
- 15:48struggle to save Ukraine, and that this
- 15:50attempt at...isolating Ukraine by the
- 16:00Russian Federation could lead to an
- 16:02increase in European involvement. I
- 16:10think that is also how they interpreted
- 16:12Minister Sikorski's declaration,
- 16:14delivered in Kyiv, regarding the
- 16:16superiority of European aviation and
- 16:19NATO. I want to draw attention to this,
- 16:23which Minister Sikorski actually
- 16:25emphasized in a post, I believe today,
- 16:28claiming that this advantage is tenfold
- 16:30. This directly leads to the thesis
- 16:39that the Russians may believe that
- 16:41Poles and other Europeans have begun to
- 16:43consider the issue of establishing
- 16:45no-fly zones in order to build a
- 16:47sanctuary in Western Ukraine where the
- 16:49civilian population, pushed out of
- 16:51major cities by Russian attacks, can
- 16:53take shelter. Therefore, I believe that
- 17:03the Russians are convinced of an
- 17:05escalation readiness on the part of
- 17:06European states and, in their typical
- 17:08fashion, are thinking, in my opinion,
- 17:18of carrying out a preemptive strike,
- 17:20which they traditionally treat as a
- 17:22form of defense against expected
- 17:23aggression. Uh, this makes the entire
- 17:29situation a threatening, dangerous, and
- 17:32essentially hopeless one. In my view,
- 17:40we are facing either greater aggression
- 17:42from the Russian Federation if their
- 17:44diagnoses are confirmed, or lesser
- 17:46aggression if they are not and the
- 17:48scenario of isolating Ukraine is
- 17:50pursued. Either way, some form of
- 17:58escalation from the Russian Federation
- 18:00awaits us as a border state, one which
- 18:03is essentially key to Ukraine's
- 18:04survival. And that is how I interpret
- 18:09these statements by Prime Minister Tusk
- 18:11. The clear terror displayed by the
- 18:15head of our government also leads me to
- 18:17assess that he is aware of how poorly
- 18:19prepared we are. And I would like to
- 18:23draw attention to something that has
- 18:24not happened until now. Specifically,
- 18:27today an alarm was declared in one of
- 18:30the provinces, and sirens wailed in two
- 18:32cities, Rzeszów and Lublin. This means
- 18:37the authorities themselves already
- 18:39assess the situation as much more
- 18:41serious, meaning we will be entering,
- 18:43step by step, a state of, I would say,
- 18:46heightened readiness.
- 18:49Well, those sirens you mentioned are
- 18:51symbolic in the sense that people
- 18:56living in those areas are receiving
- 18:58notifications. And what are they
- 18:59supposed to do with that notification?
- 19:01This perfectly shows the state of,
- 19:03unfortunately, the Polish state's lack
- 19:05of preparation in the area of civil
- 19:07defense, shelters, and so on. I don't
- 19:09want to delve into this topic now,
- 19:10because I wanted to draw attention to
- 19:12something else.
- 19:12It's also worth, excuse me,
- 19:14you are muted. Jacek.
- 19:16It is also worth remembering what date
- 19:17it is today. The Russians love such a
- 19:19situation.
- 19:20Of course. Yes, yes, absolutely. Let's
- 19:23just remember to try to talk not about
- 19:25the diagnosis or a description of the
- 19:27situation. I don't deny the team the
- 19:30right to say that, but let's try to
- 19:32think about what to do, what the issue
- 19:34is.
- 19:37I would also like to relate what you
- 19:38outlined at the beginning to recent
- 19:40events, which in my opinion should be a
- 19:42clear point of reference for us. Namely
- 19:48, what happened recently in US-Saudi
- 19:50relations, also surrounding the clash
- 19:52with the Houthis, very well shows the
- 19:54position American policy finds itself
- 19:56in right now. You mentioned the
- 20:00isolation of Poland, right? That we are
- 20:05, or could potentially be, in such a
- 20:07danger of being isolated the moment the
- 20:09Americans and Russians have a free hand
- 20:11and talk about the security status of
- 20:13our region. That is exactly what
- 20:18happened between the Americans and the
- 20:20Houthis, who were supposed to meet.
- 20:28United States representatives and the
- 20:30Houthis in Oman reportedly communicated
- 20:32after the success of their offensive,
- 20:34where they captured practically the
- 20:36entire Yemeni coast along the Red Sea,
- 20:38taking full control of the Bab
- 20:39al-Mandab, that they would not attack
- 20:41American or Israeli ships. Our
- 20:52agreements from the previous year
- 20:54remain in effect, but Saudi ships are
- 20:55very much a target that we will
- 20:57continue to aim at. Yes. And the
- 21:02Americans reportedly agreed to this.
- 21:08Which perfectly shows that Washington
- 21:10is currently in a phase of its policy
- 21:11where the scenario you described as
- 21:13hypothetical for Poland is perhaps
- 21:15currently being realized in the Middle
- 21:17East with regard to Saudi Arabia. A
- 21:23state which, let us recall, has been a
- 21:25long-time client of the United States,
- 21:27buying massive amounts of
- 21:29state-of-the-art American weaponry. And
- 21:33this clash with the Houthis also shows
- 21:35another thing very well. Namely, even
- 21:39if we expect some support or help from
- 21:41allies, no one will help someone who is
- 21:43not able to help themselves. And Saudi
- 21:48Arabia perfectly demonstrates this. Yes
- 21:52, meaning the appeals from Mohammed bin
- 21:54Salman to Donald Trump to send air
- 21:55support and help bomb the Houthis were
- 21:57met with a refusal, right? Because
- 22:02Saudi Arabia is simply incapable of
- 22:03carrying out these types of operations
- 22:05effectively on its own and dealing with
- 22:07the Houthis. So what is happening right
- 22:11now on the Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Houthi
- 22:13front is very telling. It means that
- 22:17very detailed notes should be taken on
- 22:19this in Warsaw by our political
- 22:20decision-makers. I must point out that
- 22:25the rotational American presence and
- 22:26our strong attachment to the alliance
- 22:28with the States and their opinion may
- 22:30act as a major restraint on our
- 22:31scenario or manual on how to react. The
- 22:35Americans will be interested in keeping
- 22:37things quiet and showing the
- 22:38helplessness of the Europeans. To react
- 22:43.
- 22:43Can't hear you, Albert? I can't hear
- 22:45you.
- 22:45Now they can't hear me either.
- 22:47Better now.
- 22:48Okay. This doesn't just concern the
- 22:50Americans, what you're talking about,
- 22:52but concerns all our allies, because we
- 22:54have become dependent, we don't
- 22:56actually possess independent
- 22:57capabilities, and we don't think about
- 22:59the possibilities of self-defense, but
- 23:02rather perceive ourselves as an
- 23:06appendage, that is, an appendix of the
- 23:09alliance. Yes. Now you are muted.
- 23:11Yes. An add-on, yes. And the only way
- 23:14to ensure our security is the
- 23:16fulfillment of alliance guarantees.
- 23:23Then we will be heavily burdened by the
- 23:25fear that our excessive assertiveness
- 23:27will be perceived as aggressive
- 23:29behavior, and because of this, we will
- 23:31either not try to implement it at all,
- 23:33fearing how it will be judged by other
- 23:35capitals, or it will take a limited
- 23:37form precisely because we will fear
- 23:39abandonment, knowing deep down that we
- 23:41are close to it anyway. Prime Minister
- 23:48Tusk said as much openly in his speech.
- 23:50He said it, while simultaneously
- 23:52stating that the credibility of the
- 23:54alliance must not be undermined; he
- 23:56said quite openly that many capitals
- 23:57have no desire for
- 23:58realizing alliance commitments.
- 24:01He said, he said it openly.
- 24:03However, you know, moving on, I think
- 24:05there is no point in dwelling on or
- 24:07summarizing the situation any longer—
- 24:09it has been summarized sufficiently. It
- 24:11is worth saying that we are talking
- 24:13about hybrid scenarios. Yes, it seems
- 24:17unlikely that Russia would have the
- 24:19capacity, even in the event of a
- 24:21collapse of the Ukrainian state, to
- 24:23manage or stabilize that state while
- 24:25requiring such large Russian resources
- 24:28that it would be hard to imagine
- 24:29mounting a full-scale aggressive
- 24:31operation. So we are talking about
- 24:36hybrid scenarios. And it is clear what
- 24:38we are unlikely to succeed at and what
- 24:41makes no sense, that is, deterrence by
- 24:43denial makes no sense. First of all,
- 24:45because we will not be able to
- 24:46implement it effectively. I do not know
- 24:48if these jet drones are that much of a
- 24:50game changer here, because non-jet ones
- 24:52were flying out before and they were
- 24:53flying too. However, denial, first of
- 24:56all, cannot be implemented, and
- 24:57secondly, even if they were shot down,
- 25:00the effect of those attacks would be
- 25:02achieved in some way anyway. So we are
- 25:05not talking about effective denial at
- 25:07the most direct level, nor about the
- 25:09effects. So punishment remains,
- 25:11regardless of what goal we would
- 25:12ultimately like to achieve. It seems to
- 25:15me that our goal should be independent
- 25:17management of escalation, even through
- 25:19drawing allies into a war, that is,
- 25:21through entrapment. And this is
- 25:26important not only because well, we
- 25:30want to set or dictate the pace of
- 25:33these potential operations, or
- 25:34proactively force an alliance reaction.
- 25:41But also because, if we wanted to
- 25:42engage in a dialogue with the Russians,
- 25:44we still have to demonstrate that
- 25:46discussions about our affairs must be
- 25:48conducted with us, and not through
- 25:50Washington, which will be Russia's
- 25:52preferred way of solving this problem.
- 25:55However, here we return to this, so
- 25:57this is what I think we should be doing
- 25:59, that is, deterring through punishment
- 26:01, and perhaps even disproportionately,
- 26:03only here we return to the problem of
- 26:05capabilities that we do not possess.
- 26:08Setting aside the fear of abandonment,
- 26:10we are afraid that this will be the
- 26:12result if we counter-escalate ourselves
- 26:14, and frankly, this could put a noose
- 26:16around our necks, meaning we could
- 26:18bring trouble upon ourselves this way.
- 26:21Beyond these psychological and
- 26:23strategic factors, we also lack the
- 26:25actual capabilities, as these assets we
- 26:28possess are, to a greater or lesser
- 26:30extent, controlled by the Americans,
- 26:32who certainly won't be interested in
- 26:34escalation.
- 26:38I have a doubt about that. I have this
- 26:42doubt because, let's put ourselves in
- 26:44the Russians 'shoes again. They will be
- 26:48interested in setting a scale of
- 26:49conflict that suits them. Meaning,
- 26:53parameterizing the terms of this hybrid
- 26:55conflict with Poland to push the limits
- 26:57of reaction, of the alliance, and of
- 26:59the risk for the Russians. Therefore,
- 27:05we must be cautious—and that is the
- 27:07difficulty, you know, with deterrence
- 27:09by punishment—because there could be
- 27:11provocations that the Russians might
- 27:13use, and that would tie the hands of
- 27:14Polish politicians more than it would
- 27:16mine. Because I have a certain
- 27:20temperament; I would strike back
- 27:22immediately, organize industry, and so
- 27:24on, but the point is that the Russians
- 27:31are very good at these provocations and
- 27:33later legitimizing them, blowing them
- 27:35up into circumstances where they can
- 27:37then bomb us with drones, claiming it's
- 27:39just a response to our prior escalation
- 27:41.
- 27:44Then, because you’re talking about
- 27:46brinkmanship, you respond to their
- 27:48brinkmanship by perhaps overscaling,
- 27:50aiming for an instant escalation to
- 27:52draw the rest in—entrapment.
- 27:56How to achieve the entrapment of the
- 27:57rest? Well, by having our drones fly
- 27:59over Orzysz, where the Americans are
- 28:01stationed.
- 28:02You know, to avoid normalizing this
- 28:04over a longer period of time. I'm just
- 28:07thinking out loud, but you see, because
- 28:09then you quickly overscale the response
- 28:11.
- 28:13They don't have the capacity either for
- 28:14, you know, excessive escalation,
- 28:16except for, well, continued hybrid
- 28:18attacks. They won't invade with their
- 28:20army now; they lack the capability for
- 28:21that.
- 28:21But some kind of terror, you know,
- 28:23crossing the Rubicon, they can—they
- 28:24can just do that, and they might.
- 28:25Yes, they might. That’s what I’m
- 28:27talking about, but I’m just saying
- 28:29that you then respond by overscaling,
- 28:30right? No.
- 28:31But what to do? What about escalation?
- 28:33What would you do now? Well, if you
- 28:34said that and went to the Chancellery
- 28:36of the Prime Minister right now. He is
- 28:37going to Ukraine tonight.
- 28:39Right now you can't afford a reaction,
- 28:41but I'm talking about a reaction to a
- 28:42specific hybrid attack by the Russians
- 28:44that hits our territory. Do you respond
- 28:47by escalating, hitting a power plant,
- 28:49leading to a very quick escalation so
- 28:51that everyone has an interest in
- 28:53suppressing it, or—or—
- 28:56Albert, to lead to escalation, you need
- 28:58to have the capabilities in
- 29:00capabilities, well yes, of course.
- 29:03Because we are theorizing a bit.
- 29:05Only since we don't have
- 29:10the entrapment capability is more of a
- 29:12theoretical option than a real one, I
- 29:14believe; I mean, we don't have the
- 29:16capacity for such a strong response to
- 29:19potential Russian aggression. Because
- 29:24what does a strong response mean? It
- 29:26means a sustained response, a response
- 29:32adequate to the scale of the Russian
- 29:34Federation's use of force and a
- 29:36response that is perhaps executed over
- 29:38a longer time sequence with the
- 29:45capability of moving up the escalation
- 29:47ladder. we do not have this kind of
- 29:49capability.
- 29:49But Marek, there is also the issue, no,
- 29:52it's not about adequacy,
- 29:53not just verticality,
- 29:54because there is also the issue of not
- 29:56normalizing the salami strategy,
- 29:58because I'm also talking about that,
- 30:00and there's also the issue of not just
- 30:02I am only referring to the entry issue.
- 30:04I believe that this is an option beyond
- 30:06our reach.
- 30:07Well yes, all the allies are spread too
- 30:09thin, but in general there is also a
- 30:11problem that it is not just about
- 30:12verticality. Pay attention, if the
- 30:14Russians, for example, strike us
- 30:16through Ukrainian territory with a
- 30:18hundred jet drones, where are we
- 30:19supposed to respond? At the Kaliningrad
- 30:22Oblast, at Russia proper, at Pskov, at
- 30:24Belarus, or send them through Ukraine?
- 30:27This is a very serious matter, they
- 30:29should be thinking about this right now
- 30:31, here in Aleje Ujazdowskie.
- 30:33I mean, I think Jacek, if I may, that
- 30:36they in Aleje Ujazdowskie should be
- 30:38thinking about something completely
- 30:40different, at least at this phase.
- 30:47namely, they should finally start
- 30:49thinking about a certain consistency of
- 30:51the narrative regarding the growing
- 30:53threat and the consistency of policy,
- 30:55both in the internal dimension and in
- 30:57the allied dimension. I mean, what do I
- 31:03have in mind? I mean, you cannot talk
- 31:06about a growing threat and at the same
- 31:08time conduct internal policy that,
- 31:10objectively speaking, weakens the unity
- 31:12of the threatened state. I mean, this
- 31:17is inconsistent and it also weakens the
- 31:19willingness to engage and make
- 31:21sacrifices on the part of the society,
- 31:23which sees this inconsistency. However,
- 31:27it must be admitted that for the first
- 31:29time today, both Kosiniak-Kamysz, the
- 31:31deputy prime minister and minister, and
- 31:33others, and Prime Minister Tusk himself
- 31:35, were a bit frightening and said it is
- 31:38high time to say so, right? And there
- 31:40was even a series of other people,
- 31:41General Struzik, you know, people from
- 31:43the government or, you know, from the
- 31:45circles of power started talking about
- 31:47what actually happened there. As I
- 31:49think,
- 31:50Jacek, I notice that they started
- 31:52talking and the tone of these
- 31:53statements has changed. However, a
- 32:01response to a real threat must be a
- 32:03non-rhetorical response, it must mean
- 32:05not devastating public institutions,
- 32:07which is happening all the time,
- 32:09because these institutions will be
- 32:11tested anyway in a situation of growing
- 32:14threat. Therefore, they must be
- 32:19resilient, they must be credible, and
- 32:21they must be trustworthy. And this
- 32:23trust must be granted to them by the
- 32:28entire population or the entire society
- 32:30. This implies a necessity. We can also
- 32:33escalate this reaction. We can dampen
- 32:39internal disputes in connection with
- 32:41the external threat, which should
- 32:43translate into speeding up procedures
- 32:45in a number of matters, even ones as
- 32:47basic as clarifying who will command
- 32:49and what is the mode of determining the
- 32:51commander-in-chief in a wartime
- 32:53situation. But there are so many of
- 32:58these areas, aren't there? We have been
- 33:00talking about this for years. This is
- 33:01the first, first step. If the threat
- 33:05continues to grow, in mature
- 33:07democracies, in a situation of
- 33:09escalating threat, a government of
- 33:11national unity is formed. Not because
- 33:15it sounds good, but precisely to
- 33:19silence disputes, declare a truce, and
- 33:22mobilize resources. And if that finally
- 33:26proves impossible for some reason,
- 33:28because the conflict is already so deep
- 33:31that nothing can be done, then one
- 33:33forms at least a government. I will say
- 33:38right away that, in my opinion, the
- 33:40conflict will intensify because the
- 33:42Americans will manipulate it. There
- 33:44will be a base, there won't be a base.
- 33:46There will be,
- 33:46we will have a crisis,
- 33:47there won't be a base and there will be
- 33:49, they will support,
- 33:51there will be a crisis next year around
- 33:53the parliamentary elections. The
- 33:59problem with the current government is
- 34:01that it sees this threat also as an
- 34:03opportunity for political opponents,
- 34:05both internal and external, to resolve
- 34:07internal struggles, and that will limit
- 34:09our capabilities and our commitment. If
- 34:20this diagnosis is correct, then to be
- 34:22honest, there is no mature policy that
- 34:25could be recommended, because it will
- 34:27always be insufficient, it will be
- 34:29contested, it will not mean the
- 34:30mobilization of full resources, it will
- 34:33be burdened by a crisis in allied
- 34:34relations, and it will be perceived by
- 34:37a significant part of society as an
- 34:39element of political maneuvering.
- 34:45internal. In this sense, there is no,
- 34:47there is no good, there is no good
- 34:49model. And in this sense, basically,
- 34:53the importance of non-governmental,
- 34:55social factors is growing. I do not
- 35:00rule out that this is the time that
- 35:02people having some influence on public
- 35:04opinion should use, because a
- 35:05well-functioning government should do
- 35:07something else. Meaning it should in an
- 35:12accelerated manner eliminate
- 35:14ambiguities and legislative barriers.
- 35:17That can be done in a few days. It
- 35:21should launch the entire B segment,
- 35:23which we have been talking about. the
- 35:24potential, the potential of the private
- 35:26Polish sector.
- 35:27Of course, we have been talking about
- 35:29this for at least a year; it should
- 35:31move away from the current procurement
- 35:33model. Moreover, there are tools for
- 35:35this; there is this urgent operational
- 35:37requirement formula. Well, when one
- 35:41moves away from the tender system and
- 35:43buys off-hand, well, when is this
- 35:45urgent operational requirement
- 35:48it would have a slightly deterrent
- 35:50character in its own way, because the
- 35:52Russians would see that there is total
- 35:54deregulation, and, well, only interest
- 35:56groups in Poland will not allow it.
- 35:57Simply put.
- 35:58Well yes, but that is what it comes
- 36:00down to.
- 36:01But in other words, in other words, I
- 36:03would also like to—maybe this is a
- 36:05good moment for an appeal—if Prime
- 36:07Minister Tusk is right and we are
- 36:09heading toward war, for those Polish
- 36:11entrepreneurs listening to us who have
- 36:13sufficient capital, organization, will,
- 36:16and so on, to be ready to set up
- 36:17high-tech industries if war breaks out,
- 36:20because deregulation will happen
- 36:22automatically with the delegitimization
- 36:24of existing state structures. Yes. Just
- 36:27as it happened in Ukraine, and for them
- 36:29to think about it, to calculate it for
- 36:31themselves—those who want to, of
- 36:32course—because in my opinion, this is
- 36:34the path that will happen if something
- 36:36like that occurs, or at least it should
- 36:38. Um, that's why
- 36:39only, I wasn't heading toward the kind
- 36:41of war that could cause that, like in
- 36:43Ukraine. For now, they are heading, it
- 36:45is within the continuum, they are
- 36:46heading toward the intensification of
- 36:48further hybrid operations, and that
- 36:50will not cause such a sense of shock,
- 36:52in my opinion, just as it didn't cause
- 36:53it in Ukraine.
- 36:54You may, you may be right. I hope, I
- 36:56don't know, maybe I
- 36:58I hope you are right, but
- 37:00you know, I hope I am right, but you
- 37:02may be right. That's how it should be,
- 37:04right? Well, I don't know what could
- 37:06cause a greater need. Well, that would
- 37:08confirm the theory I mentioned recently
- 37:10, that Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski wrote in "
- 37:12Disproportions," that thousands of
- 37:14small interests do not allow for
- 37:16changes in Poland that are required by
- 37:18the circumstances, right, geopolitical
- 37:20ones, external to the country. Will
- 37:23there be some shock? And now the
- 37:25question is: will it be a shock that
- 37:28paralyzes us, or a shock that mobilizes
- 37:30us? Because I believe some shock will
- 37:36occur, and we should make efforts to
- 37:38ensure it is a mobilizing shock,
- 37:39because such things also happen. States
- 37:44are subject to crisis situations, and
- 37:46quite a lot can be done here quite
- 37:48quickly, well for instance scaling the
- 37:56production that is already being
- 37:58carried out in Ukraine. One of the
- 38:03Ukrainian enterprises producing Bars
- 38:05missiles declares capabilities at the
- 38:11level of producing a thousand such
- 38:13systems. These are not very complicated
- 38:16structures. Monthly, they formed a
- 38:20company with German firms, as I
- 38:22understand it, in order to produce key
- 38:24components. This most likely concerns
- 38:27engines. I'm not saying which company
- 38:30it is either, because its name is not
- 38:32being disclosed. Well, and such
- 38:34companies must be created in Poland. We
- 38:37must quickly acquire retaliatory strike
- 38:40capabilities
- 38:42on a mass scale. On a serious, mass
- 38:48scale, because that is the deterrent
- 38:50element, and that is the element of
- 38:52deterrence by punishment, which we also
- 38:54simply do not have today, so I believe
- 38:57quite a lot of these steps can be taken
- 38:59. I am not even mentioning civil
- 39:05defense, I am not mentioning all that
- 39:07we have been discussing for years. It's
- 39:12also worth mentioning this and delving
- 39:14deeper into this thread, because
- 39:16recently in Finland, the largest civil
- 39:18defense exercises since World War II
- 39:20took place, involving over 2,000 people
- 39:22, from primary school students to
- 39:24retirees, and it's a country of a
- 39:26completely different scale than Poland.
- 39:34The fact that regarding shelters and
- 39:36real civil defense, rather than just
- 39:38understood as the fire department
- 39:40buying extra equipment with public
- 39:42money, nothing has really been done
- 39:44over the last four years. This is that
- 39:50entire segment of non-military affairs.
- 39:52The diagnosis, because here, you know,
- 39:55everyone knows it de facto. The problem
- 39:57is what to do in this situation, right?
- 39:59Meaning, what decisions to make,
- 40:01because well, for example, we still
- 40:05have to talk. I have two questions for
- 40:08you. Well, we've said it, right:
- 40:09deregulation here, launching the
- 40:11problem of deterrence through Ukraine,
- 40:13but okay, Prime Minister Tusk is going
- 40:16to Ukraine. So what? Is this a new
- 40:18opening with Ukraine, especially since
- 40:20he castigated those who criticize
- 40:21Ukrainians and so on? Did he also say
- 40:23there would be cooperation in the field
- 40:25of counter-systems, right? Or
- 40:27technological cooperation? And what
- 40:29does that mean? What to do with Ukraine
- 40:31? What to do with the Baltic states? He
- 40:33was threatening now that we will help
- 40:34the Baltic states. Well, specifically
- 40:36how will we help?
- 40:37That is exactly what he said, that one
- 40:39cannot say we will not help.
- 40:40Ah, I see. Fine.
- 40:42Okay then. But wait a moment, and okay.
- 40:45And so what? And there will be strikes
- 40:46on the Baltic states. And what are we
- 40:48doing?
- 40:48What should we do?
- 40:50But we should preventively deploy or or
- 40:56organize exercises. Together with our
- 41:01allies on all key strategic islands in
- 41:03the Baltic Sea. From Hiiumaa and
- 41:08Saaremaa to Bornholm, through Gotland
- 41:10and the Åland archipelago, which
- 41:12cannot remain neutralized. We must move
- 41:16away from that, and the Finns must
- 41:18finally swallow it. Uh, so this kind of
- 41:21let's remind everyone that according to
- 41:23the treaty after the First World War,
- 41:25it is impossible to have military bases
- 41:27there on the Åland Islands, such
- 41:28numerous thousands of islands between
- 41:30Sweden and Finland in the Gulf of
- 41:32Bothnia, that's what that bay is
- 41:34but this treaty was concluded because
- 41:36at the end of the First World War,
- 41:38there was a war between the Finns and
- 41:40the Swedes for control of the Åland
- 41:41Islands. And whoever controls these
- 41:45islands poses a direct threat to
- 41:47Stockholm. And that was a result, so to
- 41:50speak, forced by the Swedes. But let's
- 41:53leave history aside. I think we could
- 41:57point out, perhaps we should as
- 41:59Strategy and Future create a whole
- 42:01sequence of actions that should be
- 42:03taken, graduating our reaction and our
- 42:05response. But one thing won't change—
- 42:14we live in a democratic state, and the
- 42:16mechanisms of power can either
- 42:18facilitate our reaction and preparation
- 42:20, broadening our range of capabilities,
- 42:23or they can diminish them. And until we
- 42:33untie this Gordian knot at the level of
- 42:35state policy, all our advice will
- 42:37remain more or less theoretical. I
- 42:43emphasize, we will be put to some test,
- 42:45we don’t yet know how large or
- 42:47intense, and our state apparatus must
- 42:49withstand it. It would also be good if
- 42:53it were more efficient than it is today
- 42:55.
- 43:00Alright, but how do we convince allies
- 43:02in the Baltic states to show up
- 43:03properly as well? Yes. We won't
- 43:07convince the Americans, no way,
- 43:08especially since, in my opinion, the
- 43:10Americans will further instrumentalize
- 43:12this situation. My theory is that the
- 43:14Americans going in first will
- 43:16absolutely not happen from the start,
- 43:18because they won't go in first anywhere
- 43:20. The Americans might even be pleased
- 43:22with this low-scale aggression against
- 43:24Europe.
- 43:25Prime Minister Tusk touched on this
- 43:27somewhat by stating that if we don't
- 43:29demonstrate determination, others won't
- 43:31move either. But you won't get anyone
- 43:33to go in first there. As I suspect,
- 43:36this...You explain to allies: this is a
- 43:42huge lesson for the future, for
- 43:44generations to come, that it's crucial
- 43:46to set the pawns in place before
- 43:48economic shifts in given years change
- 43:50political attitudes. And those
- 43:54Americans should have been sitting on
- 43:56their hands right near Tartu, or Dorpat
- 43:58, since 2015, since the Warsaw summit.
- 44:03Daugavpils and Rezekne too. Simply put.
- 44:05Well, that's why it was easy for Poland
- 44:07to give Article 5 guarantees. It's much
- 44:09harder for Ukraine, because the
- 44:11situation was such that nothing
- 44:12indicated that the U.S. would actually
- 44:13implement them.
- 44:14But we are talking about history, and
- 44:16we're saying we shouldn't have been so
- 44:19foolish to believe in Article 5
- 44:20throughout all those years after 2015.
- 44:24Even though we had been talking about
- 44:26it for at least five years. He’s
- 44:28right.
- 44:29Our entire pool of experts thought we
- 44:31were wrong.
- 44:31Moving forward. And now, fine. But
- 44:34regarding drone and missile strikes. I
- 44:36understand you want an effect in
- 44:38Lithuania, Marek, so that Polish troops
- 44:40are stationed not in Kaliningrad or
- 44:42Marijampolė, to keep the Kaliningrad
- 44:44and Grodno regions in check. Yes, so
- 44:46that it wouldn't be checked or held at
- 44:48bay through combat. To respond to a
- 44:52drone strike, you need the capability
- 44:54to recognize that the strike is
- 44:56happening at all. And we don't have
- 45:01that capability today, as evidenced by
- 45:03the discovery of that drone on the
- 45:05beach in Jarosławiec, which ended up
- 45:07there. Deus ex machina. Uh, I won’t
- 45:13mention that I urged General Bodnar a
- 45:15year ago to go to Kyiv, uh, to meet
- 45:17with a company making acoustic
- 45:19detectors, well, because he didn't find
- 45:21the time, as you know, official duties
- 45:23must be tended to. So when there is,
- 45:27when there is such a scale of delays,
- 45:30our prescriptions are very interesting
- 45:32and, and look nice. It’s just that
- 45:34some things cannot be done. You have to
- 45:36take the systems that are available.
- 45:38They aren't perfect, they aren't ideal,
- 45:41they aren't even the most
- 45:42technologically advanced, but they
- 45:44exist. And those others, the perfect
- 45:46ones, either don't exist or we have to
- 45:48wait years for them. And that is the
- 45:53discussion we’ve been having for
- 45:55years, having with our great strategic
- 45:57minds who believe that American toys
- 45:58are the only option. Of course,
- 46:03that’s true. Only nobody, nobody is
- 46:05selling them to us. And if the
- 46:08Americans came up with the idea to
- 46:10agree to sell them to us, they still
- 46:12wouldn’t produce them until 2030 or
- 46:14'31 at the earliest. So we are talking
- 46:18about a post-war perspective, not, not,
- 46:21not today. Well, today you have to take
- 46:23what is available. And what is
- 46:26available is primarily, first and
- 46:28foremost, Ukrainian solutions,
- 46:30secondarily Turkish ones, and thirdly
- 46:32perhaps, well, that would require
- 46:35better relations, Israeli ones. I
- 46:38don’t see any other options. If there
- 46:42are no tools, then all theories about
- 46:44response are theories par excellence
- 46:46detached from reality. And that means
- 46:52the only thing we will be testing is
- 46:53our endurance. Meaning, will we
- 46:57withstand intensifying Russian attacks
- 47:00as a society, as a state? Remember,
- 47:05remember that the Foreign Minister and
- 47:07the whole group of techno-enthusiasts
- 47:09claim that our F-35s are capable of
- 47:12penetrating, destroying, launching
- 47:14JASSMs, and generally all that,
- 47:17but ours, meaning the three we have,
- 47:19I don’t know how many, six or eight
- 47:21have arrived, I think. Well yes, but
- 47:22that means we have no answer, because
- 47:24what you said, Marek, is a matter of a
- 47:26year, not the next two or three months,
- 47:28so that’s not an answer either. So
- 47:30there is no, our resilience will be
- 47:32tested
- 47:34and our endurance. And one of the key
- 47:38elements of testing that resilience is
- 47:40the durability of the political system,
- 47:43because the obvious intention of the
- 47:45Russians will be to deepen divisions
- 47:47and exploit various peace parties, etc.
- 47:49, various idiots. They have done that
- 47:56many times and succeeded. Do you think,
- 47:59do you think Marek, that a decision was
- 48:01made in the Kremlin for Operation X to
- 48:03be launched against Poland? I believe
- 48:06that a decision was made in the Kremlin
- 48:08regarding an escalation scenario
- 48:10against Ukraine.
- 48:11Explain what you mean by Operation X.
- 48:16Well, I just came up with a code name
- 48:18for concrete aggression against Poland,
- 48:20of course scalable and measured, so as
- 48:22not to trigger a general war in Europe,
- 48:25but enough to highlight all those
- 48:26deficiencies, those asymmetric
- 48:28imperfections, right? Uh, well, well,
- 48:32well, because what happened is that in
- 48:34France, there’s, you know, Macron’s
- 48:37sudden meeting with the intelligence
- 48:39chiefs. The Italian Prime Minister is
- 48:41talking about it. Tusk is talking about
- 48:43it in the Sejm. Uh,
- 48:44Germany is also talking about it. The
- 48:47biggest takeaway is that this is not an
- 48:49existential threat, and I wouldn't
- 48:51count on the state surviving, but
- 48:53rather, I’d count on getting
- 48:55face-planted onto the asphalt as a tool
- 48:57for sobering up. Well, that could be
- 49:00the upside. Yes, once again we are
- 49:01talking about existential threats, we
- 49:03are talking about the continuation of
- 49:05hybrid warfare. That is actually
- 49:06interesting, it is actually an
- 49:08interesting thing, Albert, because if
- 49:10that's the case, aren't the Russians
- 49:12calculating that too? Meaning, even if
- 49:14they reach a certain tipping point,
- 49:16okay, they do it, and what will the
- 49:18reaction be? Or, well, they might be
- 49:21afraid too—maybe they’re
- 49:22overestimating us—but they might fear
- 49:24that if they do it, we’ll pull
- 49:26ourselves together, to put it
- 49:27colloquially. We’ll draw conclusions,
- 49:29if they push it too far. Just like that
- 49:31. Yes.
- 49:32That’s why it will be boiling the
- 49:34frog. Besides, we aren’t the target;
- 49:36the target is Ukraine. To win against
- 49:38Ukraine, you have to isolate it. To
- 49:40isolate it, you have to attack
- 49:43logistics, the grid, i.e., power
- 49:45transmission networks, and so on. You
- 49:48have to do it effectively and also
- 49:50intimidate those who might help Ukraine
- 49:52and provide them with the means to
- 49:55fight. In this context, the provinces
- 50:00east of the Vistula are the most
- 50:02vulnerable, and therefore, our
- 50:03authorities should place great emphasis
- 50:06on preparing these provinces. But I
- 50:10also don't know what can be done in
- 50:12such a short time. You can’t just
- 50:14suddenly build shelters, right? So that
- 50:19people have somewhere to go when they
- 50:21get another RCB alert, because since I
- 50:23have family in the Lublin region, I
- 50:25know how that’s simply treated, right
- 50:27? People get these alerts and what,
- 50:30what are they supposed to do? Like,
- 50:33that in itself shows, right, that...
- 50:37the fiction of it all,
- 50:39right?
- 50:41Like I said, either there is endurance,
- 50:43or if you want to suddenly speed things
- 50:45up, you’ll end up with two ends of
- 50:47the spectrum.
- 50:51Exactly, either endure what Marekisz
- 50:53was saying, or you trigger a rapid
- 50:55escalation, not to slowly boil the frog
- 50:57, but to turn up the heat immediately,
- 50:59before the Europeans fully realize how
- 51:02much they shouldn't and don't want to
- 51:04take part in some mess here. But, of
- 51:08course, the latter is extremely risky.
- 51:13No one will take it, it’s extremely
- 51:15risky, but the question is whether the
- 51:17circumstances that will arise in the
- 51:19coming months won't actually make such
- 51:21a stronger escalation seem, from the
- 51:23Russian point of view, something that
- 51:29might appear desirable. Well, take note
- 51:32, next year we have elections in France
- 51:34, we have elections in Italy, right?
- 51:37This is the worst moment for all these
- 51:39countries to make any radical decisions
- 51:41. Like, oh please, we're sending our
- 51:43boys to the eastern flank, right?
- 51:45Mers is wavering. There is talk of
- 51:47Chancellor Tausz, right? Meaning a
- 51:48change of chancellor. And perhaps also
- 51:51snap elections. We talked about Germany
- 51:55in detail recently, so there's no point
- 51:57in going into that here, right? But
- 52:01there are really a lot of these
- 52:03circumstances, plus, of course, winter,
- 52:06which for Ukraine will again be a very,
- 52:08very difficult experience. So,
- 52:14it's also an interesting observation by
- 52:16Western media and commentators in
- 52:18general, because Poland appears there
- 52:20as some great monster that will unleash
- 52:22the hussars and is generally preparing
- 52:24for war. I don't know if the citizens
- 52:28of the Republic of Poland realize that
- 52:30in the centers of command,
- 52:32everyone is placing their hope in us.
- 52:34Hope in us. So, really, take note, just
- 52:36as they placed hope in the Ukrainians
- 52:38—that they would hold back the
- 52:40Russians so they could continue to live
- 52:42their lives, driving Volkswagens to
- 52:44McDonald’s—they will soon be
- 52:46placing their hope in us. Do you
- 52:48understand what that means? Yes.
- 52:51Well, Jacek, it’s like this: today in
- 52:54Ukraine there are 110 brigades,
- 52:56weakened, tired, but still fighting.
- 53:00Poland is capable of fielding 25
- 53:02brigades. I'm not judging whether this
- 53:05is a good army or a bad one. I assume
- 53:08it's very good. Germany, France, and
- 53:12Great Britain, in my opinion, if they
- 53:14were able to field 10 brigades, that
- 53:16would be a good result. And so we
- 53:21effectively have an answer regarding
- 53:23the war scenario. And here, by the way,
- 53:27a comment—I checked Twitter, look,
- 53:29because it flashed that there is a huge
- 53:31Ukrainian attack on Moscow right now.
- 53:33Several hundred Ukrainian drones are
- 53:35flying toward Moscow. Yes, it's already
- 53:38in the Moscow air space, several
- 53:39hundred, and missiles will be flying,
- 53:42because the Ukrainians also have to
- 53:44escalate. I am also pointing that out.
- 53:46The Ukrainians, the Ukrainians promise
- 53:48that by this year, even before winter,
- 53:49they will have ballistic missiles that
- 53:51will reach Moscow, right? And they will
- 53:53bomb each other on a mass scale. Yes.
- 53:57This causes the threat of an escalation
- 54:00scenario to rise very seriously,
- 54:02including to the level of using
- 54:03tactical nuclear weapons, because both
- 54:10states participating in the war will
- 54:12escalate. Only differently, of course,
- 54:16both Ukraine will escalate and Russia
- 54:18will escalate. Russian escalation also
- 54:21means, in my opinion, attacks on
- 54:23neighboring states, primarily Poland.
- 54:28We do not have a response system, do we
- 54:30? Neither entrapment is in play,
- 54:33therefore, nor deterrence by punishment
- 54:36. Well, because for that, please, you
- 54:39have Kaliningrad,
- 54:42but we didn't build that, Albert. Well,
- 54:44simply put, in my opinion, we didn't
- 54:46build it. Maybe I am overly critical in
- 54:48assessing our capabilities.
- 54:50No, no.
- 54:52So we will be tested, we will be tested
- 54:54, and our resilience will be put to the
- 54:57test. Well.
- 55:01And we must endure this, but use it as
- 55:03a certain impulse for action. And not
- 55:08as a reason to, I don't know, contest
- 55:10reality. An impulse for action, both in
- 55:15the scope of state policy, internal
- 55:17policy, institutional order, not
- 55:19destroying institutions, mobilizing
- 55:22resources, activating segment B,
- 55:24deregulation, and initiating
- 55:26preparation of the population for
- 55:28crisis situations. Even a few months,
- 55:33uh, is already something. I don't claim
- 55:37that this is an optimal amount of time,
- 55:39but it is more than a few days, and
- 55:41these few months must be used. A
- 55:44scenario if Ukraine holds out. The
- 55:50fundamental question is whether we and
- 55:53our political class are proponents of
- 55:55increased involvement, for example, by
- 55:57establishing no-fly zones over Western
- 55:59Ukraine, because I think this is being
- 56:01discussed and cannot be ruled out. This
- 56:07scenario of involvement is a sort of
- 56:09entrapment formula, because we won't
- 56:11establish such zones ourselves. It
- 56:15could only be possible in a situation
- 56:17where the air forces of our allies
- 56:18would get involved in it. I consider
- 56:23that relatively unlikely, but perhaps
- 56:25it is worth doing. Why is this
- 56:28important? Well, because if Ukraine
- 56:31does not survive, then those 110
- 56:33brigades will not survive. Not in the
- 56:36sense that Russia will occupy all of
- 56:38Ukraine, but it will change the
- 56:39political regime, which is already very
- 56:41weakened in Ukraine. Then those 110
- 56:44brigades and that production potential
- 56:49for new military technologies that is
- 56:52in Ukraine, not 100%of course, but in
- 56:54part the Russians will certainly take
- 56:56over and use and turn against the West.
- 57:02I remind you, which is not a great
- 57:04secret after all, how the Russian
- 57:06fronts were organized, where NKVD
- 57:08divisions went in the second line, and
- 57:10those who were on the first line didn't
- 57:12have much of a choice. Therefore, they
- 57:18had to advance. Even in the Donbas,
- 57:23they took and recruited those Russian
- 57:25or Ukrai or Russian-speaking, but
- 57:27citizens of Ukraine, and that is a very
- 57:30likely scenario, very likely, so this
- 57:32time is shrinking and should be used
- 57:34well in my opinion. We are using it
- 57:39poorly for now, well, maybe some
- 57:41sobriety will come now. But Marek, you
- 57:44are speaking in the context of
- 57:45Ukraine's collapse, you are talking
- 57:47about the collapse of the entire state
- 57:49and regime change.
- 57:51I am talking about the collapse of the
- 57:52already very weakened Zelensky
- 57:54government
- 57:55and internal chaos, internal fighting.
- 57:58Exactly as it was in the 17th century
- 57:59before the Treaty of Pereyaslav and
- 58:01around it. Yes. Warring factions,
- 58:03having different views. Disintegration,
- 58:05special services are already shooting
- 58:07at each other in Ukraine. Also, well,
- 58:10maybe not so much the services as
- 58:12special units controlled by those
- 58:14services, but that makes no difference.
- 58:16It is the same thing. Consequently,
- 58:20that will still cause chaos on our
- 58:22border. I won't even describe it,
- 58:24because we are already accused of
- 58:26scaring people anyway. However, well,
- 58:30there are no easy and quick solutions
- 58:32here. What can be done quickly is
- 58:36actually related to legislation, the
- 58:38legal order, and internal policy. I
- 58:42mean, if we enter a crisis phase being
- 58:44so deeply divided and conflicted, we
- 58:47won't withstand it. I mean, I am a
- 58:49pessimist here. I mean, if we continue
- 58:54the current policy, where the Ministry
- 58:57of Justice, sorry, the Ministry of
- 58:59Justice is devastating public
- 59:01institutions, lowering the level of
- 59:03social trust in the state, well, we
- 59:05have no chance of surviving this test
- 59:07for the simple reason that resilience
- 59:09means acting to increase trust of the
- 59:18public in public institutions, because
- 59:20otherwise, we will have to deal with
- 59:22chaos. Well, how on one hand can you
- 59:25think that, I don't know, courts are
- 59:27politicized and do not guarantee
- 59:29justice, and on the other hand, listen
- 59:31to recommendations regarding, I don't
- 59:33know, staying at home and preparing for
- 59:36a crisis situation, which are issued by
- 59:38representatives of a government that is
- 59:40also in a large part responsible for
- 59:42what is happening in internal politics?
- 59:45It is internally contradictory and must
- 59:48be broken. I don't know if Donald
- 59:49Tusk's government is capable of doing
- 59:51that. The previous government was not
- 59:55able to do it, which was, by the way,
- 59:57the constant subject of our criticism.
- 1:00:02So here, our political class does not
- 1:00:04give many reasons for satisfaction for
- 1:00:06now. It is busy with its own affairs
- 1:00:10and I fear that it will stay that way.
- 1:00:12That, by the way, is also nothing new.
- 1:00:16In 1939, we had plenty of proof of that
- 1:00:18, and in the following years, and I
- 1:00:21fear that history is repeating itself
- 1:00:23in this sense. Well, we shall see. So,
- 1:00:30maybe that's enough, gentlemen. Marek
- 1:00:32Stefan, Albert Świciński, Marek
- 1:00:35Budzisz, Jacek Bartosiak. Stay with us,
- 1:00:37dear listeners. Strategy and Future,
- 1:00:40just as promised many years ago. it
- 1:00:44lets you sit in the front row of the
- 1:00:46systemic war being fought over the
- 1:00:47future of Eurasia and the entire global
- 1:00:49order. From AI to kinetic warfare, from
- 1:00:54geoeconomics to geopolitics, from
- 1:00:56Poland to the Western Pacific, the war
- 1:00:59in Ukraine, the Gulf wars, our future.
- 1:01:02You will find all of this here at
- 1:01:04Strategion Future. Thank you, gentlemen
- 1:01:06. Thank you very much. P
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