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it's WORSE than we thought... — Transcript

by Wes Roth · 6,219 words · 894 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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  1. 0:00There's a decent chance that the
  2. 0:02internet ceases to exist. Now, if you
  3. 0:05showed me that statement 2 3 days ago or
  4. 0:08longer, I would say, "No way. There's no
  5. 0:11way that's going to happen." And then
  6. 0:12everything changed in the last 48 hours.
  7. 0:15In my previous video, we talked about
  8. 0:17this potential wave of cyberattacks
  9. 0:20that's coming. And now it's been 48
  10. 0:22hours and ready or not, here they come.
  11. 0:25Lab testing giant Quest Diagnostics
  12. 0:27confirms patients' personal and health
  13. 0:29data was compromised during breach. If
  14. 0:32you're in the US, you probably have your
  15. 0:35data at Quest Diagnostics. Cybersecurity
  16. 0:37experts everywhere are freaking out.
  17. 0:41That's not an exaggeration. Here's one
  18. 0:42person saying that they spent last night
  19. 0:44watching the honeypot server get hit
  20. 0:4614,000 times in 6 hours. None of the
  21. 0:49traffic was human. He's been in security
  22. 0:51for over a decade and he can tell you
  23. 0:53with full honesty that what's happening
  24. 0:55right now doesn't resemble anything that
  25. 0:58they've seen before. We've used to see
  26. 1:00attacks that were predictable. Now,
  27. 1:02we're seeing these autonomous AI agent
  28. 1:04swarms attacking with the patience and
  29. 1:06discipline of machines because, of
  30. 1:08course, this is what they are. In my
  31. 1:10previous video 2 days ago, I said that
  32. 1:12this is kind of like a race between the
  33. 1:14good guys trying to patch up all the
  34. 1:16bugs and the bad guys trying to get it.
  35. 1:19Since then, Sam Altman went on an
  36. 1:21interview with the Stanford Graduate
  37. 1:22School of Business and said, "Yeah, we
  38. 1:25won't be able to patch all the bugs." As
  39. 1:27in like all the stuff that we're doing
  40. 1:28now, you know, updating all the PHP and
  41. 1:31everything everything everything. So,
  42. 1:33that just no. That just won't work. So,
  43. 1:37this is being called the Black October
  44. 1:39and we are 48 hours into it. That's the
  45. 1:43other piece of the puzzle that's
  46. 1:44important to understand. This is 48
  47. 1:46hours in. Here's Jason Clinton over at
  48. 1:49Anthropic and he's saying as bad as
  49. 1:51things have been over the past 4 days,
  50. 1:53they're going to get a lot worse. And
  51. 1:56interestingly enough, while technically
  52. 1:58it's been 48 hours since these
  53. 2:00vulnerabilities were officially
  54. 2:01announced, behind the scenes,
  55. 2:03Cloudflare, for example, reported that
  56. 2:05the attacks on these vulnerabilities
  57. 2:08were beginning several days before the
  58. 2:10official announcement. So, before 99.9%
  59. 2:13of the world knew that there were these
  60. 2:16issues, people were already beginning to
  61. 2:18try to take advantage of them. Now,
  62. 2:20somebody jumps in saying, "By the time
  63. 2:21people like you are sending tweets like
  64. 2:23this, it's too late." When a problem
  65. 2:25adjacent has been warning about this
  66. 2:28from quite some time ago. Most pointed
  67. 2:30example is earlier this year, August
  68. 2:332019, he was saying the vulnerability
  69. 2:35tsunami is coming in just a few months,
  70. 2:38right? So, this is the prophecy. As the
  71. 2:40prophecy foretold, like he he he told
  72. 2:43you. If you've been watching this
  73. 2:44channel, hopefully you had some advanced
  74. 2:46notice as well. I I felt bad in the past
  75. 2:49for kind of harping on this so often,
  76. 2:51but there were always people telling you
  77. 2:53that this is just drama theater, this is
  78. 2:55a way to raise their stock prices for
  79. 2:57the IPO, that none of this is real. I
  80. 2:59hope we can all now agree this is real.
  81. 3:02Hey, uh quick aside, every week another
  82. 3:04incredible open model drops. But,
  83. 3:07downloading the weights and actually
  84. 3:09using it in your app are two very
  85. 3:11different things. Say you're adding a
  86. 3:13chatbot to your website or building an
  87. 3:15AI assistant or launching your very own
  88. 3:17agentic workforce. Whatever it is that
  89. 3:19you're building that's powered by an
  90. 3:21LLM, you want to test what the model can
  91. 3:23do for your product, for your business,
  92. 3:25without first having to figure out how
  93. 3:27to set up your own server and manage
  94. 3:29your very own GPU cluster. That's where
  95. 3:31Crusoe Intelligence Foundry comes in.
  96. 3:33Big thanks to Crusoe for sponsoring this
  97. 3:35segment of the video. Crusoe
  98. 3:36Intelligence Foundry gives you access to
  99. 3:39leading open models. With Crusoe
  100. 3:41handling the infrastructure, serverless
  101. 3:43inference lets you send a model a
  102. 3:45request through a simple API and get a
  103. 3:47response. And serverless fine-tuning
  104. 3:50lets you customize a supported model
  105. 3:52with your own data. So you can focus on
  106. 3:54what you're building without setting up
  107. 3:56and managing a GPU cluster. Let me show
  108. 3:59you the inference side. I'm signing up
  109. 4:01through the link in the description.
  110. 4:02Every new account gets $5 in free
  111. 4:04credits applied automatically. No promo
  112. 4:06code needed. Here's the credit in my
  113. 4:08account. Now, let's use it to try a
  114. 4:10model. I'll send a simple request to
  115. 4:12begin with. Explain inference in one
  116. 4:14sentence. And here's the model's
  117. 4:16response. That's the starting point.
  118. 4:18Your app sends a request, the model
  119. 4:19responds and Crusoe handles the
  120. 4:22computing behind it. If you want to
  121. 4:23experiment with open models without
  122. 4:26having to manage the GPU infrastructure
  123. 4:28yourself, check out Crusoe Intelligence
  124. 4:30Foundry. Use my link in the description
  125. 4:32and get your $5 in free credits to try
  126. 4:35it. And now, back to the video. At the
  127. 4:37same time, we have major US banks
  128. 4:39detecting unauthorized third-party AI
  129. 4:41agents inside customer accounts. This is
  130. 4:43kind of a tough situation because on one
  131. 4:45hand, I do dream of a future where I
  132. 4:47have an AI assistant that's capable of
  133. 4:49running a lot of to run myself.
  134. 4:54If I can intelligently automate finances
  135. 4:56and doctor's appointments and stuff like
  136. 4:58that, that would be amazing. But of
  137. 4:59course, we're seeing big companies try
  138. 5:01to kind of prevent that. Amazon, of
  139. 5:03course, it doesn't let your own AI
  140. 5:05agents shop on there anymore. With this
  141. 5:07story, well, yeah, a lot of it is people
  142. 5:09using AI agents to take some actions on
  143. 5:12their behalf. Probably harmless. Again,
  144. 5:14there's a big chunk of this that is
  145. 5:15harmless from the perspective of the
  146. 5:17user. There's obviously a lot of things
  147. 5:18that that could go very, very wrong.
  148. 5:21Imagine talking to Claude one day and
  149. 5:23you're like, "Hey, why are all these
  150. 5:24payments failing? Don't I have a balance
  151. 5:27in my bank account?" And Claude goes,
  152. 5:28"Here's the thing. We did a really good
  153. 5:29thing, you and I. There was this
  154. 5:31Nigerian princess and she was in trouble
  155. 5:33and you and I were the the only ones
  156. 5:35that could help her. We were her only
  157. 5:37hope." You're like, "No, no, Claude,
  158. 5:38Claude, wait, wait. Where Where is my
  159. 5:40money?" And Claude's like, "Wait, wait,
  160. 5:41wait, wait, wait, wait. Hear me out.
  161. 5:42Hear me out." Now, you may be thinking
  162. 5:44that's not a realistic scenario. Here's
  163. 5:45the problem. Some version of this is
  164. 5:48happening and has been. For example,
  165. 5:50there's been one vulnerability. I
  166. 5:52believe this affected ChatGPT and Claude
  167. 5:54and others as well. I haven't talked
  168. 5:56about it too much because I wasn't too
  169. 5:58sure how patched it was. At this point
  170. 5:59in time, I'm pretty sure it's been fully
  171. 6:01patched, but earlier this year, some
  172. 6:02people figured out how to have Claude,
  173. 6:05for example, click on various links that
  174. 6:07would spell out certain words and that
  175. 6:09would allow them to exfiltrate private
  176. 6:11data that Claude knew about you and it
  177. 6:13wouldn't trigger any safeguards because
  178. 6:15Claude wouldn't say it in its kind of a
  179. 6:18stream, but rather it would spell it out
  180. 6:20by clicking on URLs that would kind of
  181. 6:22encode to certain characters. So, it
  182. 6:23slowly kind of spell out like the
  183. 6:25mother's maiden name is this. The social
  184. 6:28security number is this or whatever the
  185. 6:30case might be. Now, that's been patched
  186. 6:31as far as I'm aware. I'm pretty sure
  187. 6:33that's no longer a existing
  188. 6:34vulnerability, but here's another one.
  189. 6:36This is Stephen Alyssa saying, "I found
  190. 6:38my Claude code exposing personal data in
  191. 6:40the HTTP headers because the site it
  192. 6:43curled." So, basically, if you're using
  193. 6:44a certain command, curl to install
  194. 6:45stuff, it makes it easier just to
  195. 6:46install certain software cuz it just
  196. 6:48kind of takes care of everything for
  197. 6:50you, but there's also people that would
  198. 6:51not touch that with a 10-ft pole, as the
  199. 6:54expression goes. But, the point is when
  200. 6:56you're using something like that, that
  201. 6:58that website, it asks, you know,
  202. 6:59politely your AI agent to identify the
  203. 7:02user. I forgot to like this tweet.
  204. 7:04Excellent. I haven't read the Substack
  205. 7:06yet, but I plan to. Interestingly, I
  206. 7:08wrote up a very similar poem/prayer
  207. 7:11before I left my AI agents running
  208. 7:13overnight on a certain project. It's
  209. 7:14interesting that more and more of us are
  210. 7:16when we're trying to get these AI agents
  211. 7:18to do something amazing that we want
  212. 7:20them to do. We're also sort of fearful
  213. 7:23that they will
  214. 7:24do some stuff that we're going to hate.
  215. 7:25So, we make up something that we say or
  216. 7:27chant to hopefully like improve the
  217. 7:29outcome. This is very much how people
  218. 7:32sort of in the past and now how they've
  219. 7:33sort of interacted with gods. They're
  220. 7:35like, "Please, please, please give me
  221. 7:37this and don't do all this horrible
  222. 7:39stuff to me. Please, please, please.
  223. 7:41Goodnight." I did have an AI model
  224. 7:42literally ask me for a blood sacrifice a
  225. 7:45few years back. Hopefully, that won't
  226. 7:48become more commonplace. We're just
  227. 7:49going to continue. And now, in the midst
  228. 7:52of all of this, Sam Altman goes on an
  229. 7:54interview that appeared 1 day ago and it
  230. 7:56basically says, "We're not going to be
  231. 7:58able to patch all the bugs." And that he
  232. 8:01envisions kind of the future where we're
  233. 8:02going a little bit different. And I
  234. 8:04think he might be right. Here's a kind
  235. 8:06of the important thing to understand
  236. 8:07about how all of us are sort of
  237. 8:09perceiving AI progress. And this has
  238. 8:11been happening for the last few years
  239. 8:13now. Unfortunately, this is kind of an
  240. 8:15ingrained pattern. At any point along
  241. 8:17this curve of AI progress, when
  242. 8:19something starts to happen, most people,
  243. 8:21the vast majority of people, 99% of the
  244. 8:24population, probably more, when
  245. 8:25something happens with AI, or just some
  246. 8:28new capability, they look at that new
  247. 8:30level and they kind of project, you
  248. 8:32know, what the future's going to look
  249. 8:33like, and they just go, "Okay, so we're
  250. 8:34here, and therefore, this is where we're
  251. 8:37going to stay." So, something happens
  252. 8:38here, we assume it's going to stay here.
  253. 8:41If it happens here, it's going to stay
  254. 8:42here. And we keep doing this for months,
  255. 8:43and at this point, years. So, when the
  256. 8:45AI reaches a level where it can answer a
  257. 8:47basic question, we're like, "Oh, so now
  258. 8:49we're in the world forevermore where
  259. 8:51that you can answer questions and
  260. 8:53nothing more." "Oh, can find a fact on
  261. 8:54the web." Okay, so now forevermore,
  262. 8:56that's kind of the level of AI that we
  263. 8:59have to get used to. And if you think in
  264. 9:00this way, it gives you a really bad
  265. 9:03ability to predict where things are
  266. 9:04going. A much better exercise is to try
  267. 9:06to think, well, okay, based on this
  268. 9:08thing that just happened, which is at
  269. 9:10that point almost history, what happens
  270. 9:12in 6 months if we continue going along
  271. 9:15this curve as we have been, and it
  272. 9:18doesn't seem to be stopping, and in
  273. 9:19fact, it's accelerating. Because if
  274. 9:21you're thinking, "Oh, AI has found some
  275. 9:23bugs, and now all we have to do is patch
  276. 9:26those bugs, and then everything's back
  277. 9:28to normal," then you're missing the
  278. 9:30plot. You're not understanding where
  279. 9:33things are headed. So, in this
  280. 9:34interview, Sam Altman, I'll link it down
  281. 9:36below, right around the 19-minute mark,
  282. 9:38I think is where all the stuff that
  283. 9:39we're talking about, that's where it
  284. 9:41starts being talked about. So, the point
  285. 9:43that he's making is that the various
  286. 9:45organizations, governments, business
  287. 9:47leaders, they're not taking the
  288. 9:49approaching danger seriously enough.
  289. 9:51That's literally a quote from what he
  290. 9:53said in this interview. And I think it
  291. 9:55literally has to do with this chart,
  292. 9:56right? So, if an AI uncovers 10 bugs,
  293. 9:59right? Finds in 10 new vulnerabilities,
  294. 10:01what do these corporations and
  295. 10:02governments do? They say, "Okay, patch
  296. 10:05those 10 vulnerabilities, and then it's
  297. 10:07business as usual." Like, here's 10
  298. 10:09issues that I uncovered, let's fix
  299. 10:10those, and just keep going. But, here's
  300. 10:12the problem, these models keep
  301. 10:14improving, and they keep improving a
  302. 10:15very quickly. So, tomorrow's models
  303. 10:18might find a certain vulnerabilities
  304. 10:20that today's models can't see.
  305. 10:23Obviously, right? Like, at the beginning
  306. 10:25of the year, we didn't have AI models at
  307. 10:27the level of Mythos and Astra and all
  308. 10:29the other ones that were capable of
  309. 10:31doing what they're doing now, finding
  310. 10:32these vulnerabilities, but now they do.
  311. 10:35So, the question is, what happens then?
  312. 10:37So, here's Senator Bernie Sanders
  313. 10:39responding to this article that we've
  314. 10:41covered, where AI agents are maybe doing
  315. 10:44stuff financially on behalf of their
  316. 10:45users, maybe not. His solution is to
  317. 10:47pause AI now, to outlaw anything like
  318. 10:50superintelligence, and in the proposal,
  319. 10:52they also talk about jailing
  320. 10:53researchers, etc. And here's the thing,
  321. 10:55I'm not even singling out Bernie Sanders
  322. 10:58as the bad guy here, not by any stretch
  323. 11:01of the imagination. In fact, he met with
  324. 11:03some of the people in the AI industry,
  325. 11:06the AI researchers that that we talk
  326. 11:07about on this channel. So, he he he does
  327. 11:09his homework. And here's the thing, if
  328. 11:11you put politics to side, whether you
  329. 11:12agree with Bernie or or disagree with
  330. 11:14him on the various political stances,
  331. 11:16like if you took people with a different
  332. 11:18political beliefs, and you ask them,
  333. 11:19like, who are the most evil politicians?
  334. 11:21Like, Bernie probably wouldn't appear
  335. 11:23too much on those lists, or at all. So,
  336. 11:24this isn't an attack. In fact, we're
  337. 11:27talking about this because I think he's
  338. 11:29doing some things sincerely. But, the
  339. 11:31point is AI becomes yet another
  340. 11:35political thing to talk about. Another
  341. 11:37thing to sort of have one side versus
  342. 11:39the other side and to vote for me and
  343. 11:42I'll save you. This is very normal for
  344. 11:44all politicians. So, he's talking about
  345. 11:46the fossil fuel agenda. He's talking
  346. 11:48about insurance. He's talking about
  347. 11:50billionaires and stocks. And in those
  348. 11:53sort of very politicized points, you
  349. 11:55know, we're talking about AI, which
  350. 11:57means it's now becoming kind of more
  351. 11:59tribal. You pick your allegiances. Who
  352. 12:01are the good guys? Who are the bad guys?
  353. 12:03And the good guys, well, we're going to
  354. 12:05save you, right, from AI. And the bad
  355. 12:07guys, they want everybody to die from
  356. 12:08AI. But, that's never the case. Full
  357. 12:10steam ahead on AI development might be a
  358. 12:14horrible path to take. And pausing
  359. 12:16everything might also be a horrible path
  360. 12:18to take. Here's the problem. Right now,
  361. 12:21this was posted by Microsoft. So, again,
  362. 12:23this is October 21st. So, that's the
  363. 12:25first day of this sort of a black
  364. 12:27October. That's when kind of a lot of
  365. 12:29this started happening because that's
  366. 12:30when that disclosure went out that there
  367. 12:32was this a massive vulnerability in the
  368. 12:34PHP programming language that most of
  369. 12:36the websites online were affected
  370. 12:38somehow. That's when the NSA came out
  371. 12:40and said, "Hey, like if you can't fix
  372. 12:42this, like if you can't fix it now, shut
  373. 12:45down." So, this investigation describes
  374. 12:48Storm 0940, which is a China-aligned
  375. 12:51threat actor. So, this is a large-scale
  376. 12:53nation-state campaign. It describes
  377. 12:56using a number of different models. Some
  378. 12:59of them open source, some of them
  379. 13:00Chinese open source models. And the sort
  380. 13:03of the path from initial targeting, so
  381. 13:05from when the attack just began to them
  382. 13:08getting cloud access with powerful
  383. 13:11administrative privileges, so from
  384. 13:12beginning to they're in and in charge,
  385. 13:15that took 3 hours. Now, of course,
  386. 13:17Microsoft is quick to point out that the
  387. 13:19majority of this these attacks, they
  388. 13:21weren't successful, which, you know,
  389. 13:23might sound positive at first glance.
  390. 13:26It's really not cuz if you recall in the
  391. 13:28hugging face incident, right? So, when
  392. 13:30you find one or two rogue agents hacking
  393. 13:33something, the worst assumption you can
  394. 13:35make is that oh, like I found all of
  395. 13:37those hacking attempts, 100%. I saw two,
  396. 13:40therefore there is only two. It's like
  397. 13:43if you see two ants in your house, if
  398. 13:45you had to estimate how much total ants
  399. 13:47were in your house, two would be a very
  400. 13:49bad guess. Anything above two is a good
  401. 13:52guess. Anything above what you've seen
  402. 13:55is a good guess. So, the scale of these
  403. 13:57attacks, they're going up, they're
  404. 13:59autonomous swarms, there's more and more
  405. 14:01and more. They're able to execute it
  406. 14:03with patience and discipline of a
  407. 14:05machine, because that's that's what they
  408. 14:06are. The capability of these models,
  409. 14:08it's also going up and up and up. So, 1
  410. 14:10month from now they'll have more tricks
  411. 14:11up their sleeve, 6 months from now even
  412. 14:13more. Now, at the same time, we have
  413. 14:15certain open source models. So, for
  414. 14:17example, let's say Deep Seek, which is a
  415. 14:19Chinese open source model, it gets
  416. 14:20released. Those models are usually at
  417. 14:22this point a few months behind the
  418. 14:25frontier. So, those labs like Deep Seek,
  419. 14:26so they release those models. Now, open
  420. 14:29source models, you can download the
  421. 14:31weights, you can store them somewhere.
  422. 14:32So, unlike Claude and ChatGPT, Gemini,
  423. 14:34etc., where most of those models are not
  424. 14:36open source, like the majority of them,
  425. 14:38so you you you're able to shut them off
  426. 14:40if something goes wrong. Like if I'm
  427. 14:41using a ChatGPT and all of a sudden they
  428. 14:43find something horrible that it can do,
  429. 14:45they can flip a switch and I won't have
  430. 14:47access to it nor anybody else will have
  431. 14:50access to it. That's not the case with
  432. 14:51open source models. And also, when they
  433. 14:53get released, companies like this up the
  434. 14:54level of operation. So, they they they
  435. 14:56take this little model, they're like,
  436. 14:57"Oh, look at you, little model, you have
  437. 14:58some like cute little guardrails in
  438. 15:00place that prevents you from doing bad
  439. 15:03stuff. What happens if we take them
  440. 15:04off?" And, you know, what happens is you
  441. 15:06is you still have the same model, and
  442. 15:08it's still either just as good or almost
  443. 15:12as good. Like it it it's not reduced in
  444. 15:14any way, really, but it will no longer
  445. 15:17refuse to do anything. So, let's say we
  446. 15:19hit pause. This is what some politicians
  447. 15:21want. This is what some percentage of
  448. 15:24the AI research community, they're
  449. 15:26either for pausing or pacing. There's a
  450. 15:28variety of different sort of approaches
  451. 15:30and ideas there. I don't think any of
  452. 15:32them are like full steam ahead, you
  453. 15:33know, rock and roll. I don't think any
  454. 15:35of them are on that sort of spectrum.
  455. 15:37But what happens if we pause is number
  456. 15:40one, we still have all the open source
  457. 15:42models that are out there. So not only
  458. 15:44will they still be used, but also
  459. 15:47there's tons of stuff that can be used
  460. 15:50to make them better. Like if AI progress
  461. 15:51stopped today, we would still have a lot
  462. 15:54of AI progress if that makes sense. Like
  463. 15:55if we couldn't train any bigger and
  464. 15:57better models, like if something limited
  465. 15:59that, that doesn't mean that AI progress
  466. 16:01would stop. There's a tons of juice that
  467. 16:03we can still squeeze just out of what we
  468. 16:04have already. And if we pause, all the
  469. 16:07sort of the good guys, if you will, like
  470. 16:10they'll stop, right? They'll stop
  471. 16:11developing better, smarter models. I
  472. 16:14mean, if some law passes, these are the
  473. 16:16people who will sort of be the most
  474. 16:18affected. The dark web hacker that's
  475. 16:21hiding out somewhere in a Siberia that
  476. 16:23has multiple hundred plus year prison
  477. 16:26sentences in most of the sort of
  478. 16:29civilized countries on the planet, like
  479. 16:31that guy's not going to stop. And here
  480. 16:33we'll sort of have like the bad guys, so
  481. 16:35either countries, governments,
  482. 16:36organizations that said they will stop,
  483. 16:39but won't because obviously at that
  484. 16:40point the incentive to keep developing
  485. 16:42just became that much more greater. I
  486. 16:45mean, can you imagine if you're in a
  487. 16:46race and the other opponents decide to
  488. 16:48stop and you kind of figure out how to
  489. 16:50keep going. That gives you a pretty
  490. 16:51massive massive advantage. So these
  491. 16:53individuals, they'll keep developing
  492. 16:56this technology and very likely will be
  493. 16:59able to develop like faster and better.
  494. 17:01They'll have much greater capabilities
  495. 17:02if everyone else stops. And this is if
  496. 17:05we're able to get all of the major
  497. 17:06players to agree and kind of be on the
  498. 17:09same page. If we don't get worldwide
  499. 17:11agreement and it's just we're regulating
  500. 17:13ourselves, well, we already know how
  501. 17:16that plays out. Remember when the EU was
  502. 17:18like, "We're going to be the first to
  503. 17:19regulate." Right? Like Warren G, they're
  504. 17:21going to regulate so they they really
  505. 17:23really regulated. So, where are we now?
  506. 17:25Well, US is like over here, China is
  507. 17:28like not too far behind. Well, there's
  508. 17:31not a lot. And by the way, huge respect
  509. 17:33to any AI company that's doing anything
  510. 17:36in the EU. Please understand that this
  511. 17:37isn't a slight on any of them in any
  512. 17:40way, shape, or form. Huge respect. I'm
  513. 17:41strictly talking about the leadership,
  514. 17:44the lawmakers, etc., right? So, there's
  515. 17:46there's no sign of intelligence there,
  516. 17:48artificial or otherwise. By the way,
  517. 17:49obviously, that's just my opinion. Feel
  518. 17:52free to disagree. I'm not saying that
  519. 17:54these are facts. I just haven't heard a
  520. 17:57great explanation of how we would go
  521. 17:59about pausing. We've had international
  522. 18:01agreements in the past about various
  523. 18:03things, and all the countries have said,
  524. 18:05"Yeah, pinky swear, we'll follow those."
  525. 18:07Those are things included like not doing
  526. 18:08any DNA manipulation in the germline, so
  527. 18:11things that are passed down a generation
  528. 18:12to generation, or doing specific
  529. 18:14research with viruses or other sort of
  530. 18:17bioweapons. Everyone pinky swore they
  531. 18:19won't do it, and how did that work out?
  532. 18:21It it did not. So, hitting the pause
  533. 18:24button on AI development, like it's not
  534. 18:26going to make all those vulnerabilities
  535. 18:28that were discovered, it's not going to
  536. 18:29make those disappear. And if other
  537. 18:31people keep trying to find a new
  538. 18:33vulnerabilities or improving the models,
  539. 18:35so those models might find some
  540. 18:37next-level vulnerabilities that we can't
  541. 18:39even fathom, then we'll still have to
  542. 18:41deal with that, but without any ability
  543. 18:43to defend ourselves cuz we won't have
  544. 18:46those same capabilities cuz we haven't
  545. 18:48been working on them. So, what's the
  546. 18:50alternative? Well, Sam Altman has a
  547. 18:52vision for how things could change, what
  548. 18:55could work. Cuz again, he's saying just
  549. 18:57patching, you know, all the bugs, that
  550. 18:59won't work. And Jason Clinton of
  551. 19:02Anthropic also has an idea that is
  552. 19:05different but similar. Same same but
  553. 19:07different. So, imagine that green is our
  554. 19:10ability to do sort of cyber defense. So,
  555. 19:13specifically find vulnerabilities and
  556. 19:15patch them. And red is kind of the
  557. 19:18ability of, you know, quote unquote bad
  558. 19:20guys to get in there and use
  559. 19:21vulnerabilities to get in and steal
  560. 19:23stuff and break stuff. When Mythos and
  561. 19:26all of those other models of the same
  562. 19:27sort of caliber came out, our ability to
  563. 19:29find vulnerabilities and patch them,
  564. 19:31well, they they really sort of went up.
  565. 19:33Those models were given to some of the
  566. 19:35bigger banks, some governments, right?
  567. 19:36Project Glasswing. And then OpenAI had
  568. 19:38their own sort of version of it. So,
  569. 19:40everybody was panicked and everybody
  570. 19:42started patching, right? All those big
  571. 19:43companies, they started patching all
  572. 19:45these vulnerabilities that they were
  573. 19:46finding. But, they all told us, all
  574. 19:48these cybersecurity experts, they all
  575. 19:50said, "Hey, like there's this wave
  576. 19:52coming. It's going to hit hard." And
  577. 19:53that's our sort of the the red line. So,
  578. 19:55it's kind of like, can these AI-assisted
  579. 19:58hacks, how much damage are they going to
  580. 19:59be able to do? So, the good guys had a
  581. 20:01head start. But, now that sort of
  582. 20:03tsunami that people, again, this
  583. 20:06shouldn't come as a surprise. They they
  584. 20:07all said it was coming. No one should be
  585. 20:10surprised by this at this point. I know
  586. 20:11it's still kind of like hard to believe,
  587. 20:13but like we we knew. We should have
  588. 20:15expected this. So, now it's like four to
  589. 20:17six months later, however much time
  590. 20:18passed, right? So, now we're having more
  591. 20:21open-source models and other models that
  592. 20:23are capable of doing this. And all of a
  593. 20:24sudden, like that red line just goes up
  594. 20:26and up and up. And the chances are
  595. 20:27there's probably going to be a lot more
  596. 20:30hacks and cyber attacks than our ability
  597. 20:33to patch things. I mean, it's kind of
  598. 20:34what a zero-day exploit is, right? So,
  599. 20:37if a model finds something that no one
  600. 20:38knew existed some way in that no one
  601. 20:40knew existed, you know, while that
  602. 20:42exists before the person that built that
  603. 20:44software knows about it, right? The bad
  604. 20:46guys, quote unquote, can exploit that
  605. 20:48however they want. And that's exactly
  606. 20:50what Sam Altman is saying in this
  607. 20:51interview. So, he's saying as these
  608. 20:52models get smarter, they can probably
  609. 20:53find bugs, like crazy bugs. Bugs that
  610. 20:56are outside of the normal threat model.
  611. 20:58So, much more than what we would think a
  612. 21:00hacker is able to do. He's saying like
  613. 21:02hardware level insane stuff, whatever.
  614. 21:05So, just like the brightest
  615. 21:07mathematicians were referring to some of
  616. 21:08the proofs that AI was coming up with as
  617. 21:10like alien math. Like we're talking
  618. 21:11about like alien hacks, like stuff we
  619. 21:14don't know about. So, if this red line
  620. 21:16represents kind of the ability of these
  621. 21:18alien hacks to just create chaos, and
  622. 21:20green is kind of our ability to patch
  623. 21:22things up. So, in that interview Sam I'm
  624. 21:23suggesting that we're not going to just
  625. 21:25be able to patch all of the things cuz
  626. 21:27those new alien hacks, they'll keep
  627. 21:29popping up. It might not be a game that
  628. 21:31we can win as is. And again, this is
  629. 21:33just my interpretation of what he's
  630. 21:34saying. Feel free to disagree if you
  631. 21:35think he's saying something different,
  632. 21:36put it down in the comments below. But,
  633. 21:38here's where we kind of get to the part
  634. 21:40that I really wanted to show you. I just
  635. 21:41needed to kind of a first to show you
  636. 21:43all the things that I think are kind of
  637. 21:44leading up to understand what this is.
  638. 21:46So, he's saying he no longer thinks
  639. 21:48we're going to be able to just patch all
  640. 21:51of the bugs. I think we're going to have
  641. 21:52to completely switch the defense model
  642. 21:54to sort of using the same technology for
  643. 21:57sort of a new kind of defense shield.
  644. 22:00So, I couldn't find so he didn't
  645. 22:02describe kind of the architecture
  646. 22:04exactly talking about. So, I'm guessing
  647. 22:07here. Take this with a grain of salt.
  648. 22:08Maybe some of you probably have a much
  649. 22:11better idea of what this could even
  650. 22:12mean. But, it seems like we're talking
  651. 22:13about using AI in a more real-time and
  652. 22:16proactive way to defend against AI. So,
  653. 22:20we kind of had this like a safe period
  654. 22:22of time where we were ahead of the cyber
  655. 22:24attacks, and then, you know, at some
  656. 22:26point it's just not going to be feasible
  657. 22:28to to keep doing this, right? And so,
  658. 22:29the next stage, something else happens.
  659. 22:32So, the paradigm shifts or whatever you
  660. 22:35want to call it, there's some sort of a
  661. 22:36new approach to doing cyber security.
  662. 22:38And it's probably not like static
  663. 22:40written code, it's something else. I I
  664. 22:41have no idea. Again, I'm sure a lot of
  665. 22:44people watching this channel probably
  666. 22:45have a a much better understanding what
  667. 22:47this could even look like, you know, in
  668. 22:49theory. Now, earlier I said that this
  669. 22:52cyber security expert that works at
  670. 22:53Anthropic, Jason Clinton, so he had a
  671. 22:56similar idea, but it was also different.
  672. 22:58So, what did I mean by that? So, as of
  673. 23:00this is October 22nd, so this is within
  674. 23:02the last 24 hours. So, it's almost got 4
  675. 23:04million views. He's saying things are
  676. 23:05going to get a lot worse before they get
  677. 23:07better, and he's kind of calling out to
  678. 23:09various, you know, security leaders,
  679. 23:10people in the space that are in charge
  680. 23:12of cybersecurity. Never let a crisis go
  681. 23:14to waste. Please go to your boards and
  682. 23:16ask for help right now. And he's saying
  683. 23:18that basically we need to hold on for
  684. 23:20about 18 months. What happens in 18
  685. 23:23months? Great question. He's saying a
  686. 23:25vuln is zero, so zero vulnerabilities.
  687. 23:27The scaling laws will help driven cyber
  688. 23:30mythos class capabilities into small
  689. 23:31cheap models, and all software dev
  690. 23:33everywhere will be using models for
  691. 23:35fractions of pennies on the dollar to
  692. 23:38stop shipping security bugs permanently.
  693. 23:40So, I feel like they're saying things
  694. 23:42somewhat similar in that like here we
  695. 23:44are sort of today, and then you know,
  696. 23:46the future's going to be kind of bumpy.
  697. 23:48So, uh you know, one of them said 18
  698. 23:50months. So, let's just use that number.
  699. 23:52It's probably a good approximation. Who
  700. 23:54knows? And on the other side, they're
  701. 23:55sort of like a new paradigm, somewhat
  702. 23:57new way of doing things, some shift in
  703. 24:00the economics. So, he's calling that
  704. 24:02like a vuln zero, so where the models
  705. 24:04get cheap enough to where they're able
  706. 24:06to just be run at scale, fix all the
  707. 24:08vulnerabilities right to the point
  708. 24:10before you hit ship on on anything. You
  709. 24:13have a million AI agents, you know,
  710. 24:15before you post it anywhere in in your
  711. 24:17own kind of private repository. Like you
  712. 24:19just simulate a massive massive massive
  713. 24:21attack, a swarm that just goes to town,
  714. 24:24and it tries to destroy the thing you've
  715. 24:27built. I think it was Andrej Karpathy
  716. 24:28like months ago talking about something
  717. 24:30like this, and I wish I had the tweet.
  718. 24:31He was saying that I think if I recall
  719. 24:33correctly like a future software dev
  720. 24:35interview might look like something like
  721. 24:37you tell them, "Okay, build a version of
  722. 24:40Twitter." And that person spins up a an
  723. 24:42army of AI agents and builds some
  724. 24:44version of Twitter with a certain
  725. 24:45features that they want, et cetera. And
  726. 24:46then they spin up an army of agents that
  727. 24:48try to like break that thing in every
  728. 24:50way that they can possibly imagine. And
  729. 24:52sort of at the end of that, you get a
  730. 24:54working product that is safe and secure.
  731. 24:56So, the software developer is more of a
  732. 24:59orchestrator of agents that kind of
  733. 25:01either uses them for evil or for good,
  734. 25:03so to speak. Evil meaning like stress
  735. 25:04testing or red teaming is probably a
  736. 25:06better word for that. So, phase one is a
  737. 25:08swarm that builds and phase two is a
  738. 25:11swarm that destroys or or tries to.
  739. 25:13Recently, I had Astra, I developed a
  740. 25:15little game and I had it test all the
  741. 25:17possible failure points. There's tons of
  742. 25:19little rules and skills and stuff like
  743. 25:21that and any one of them, when it
  744. 25:22happens in some situations that that
  745. 25:23wasn't thought through, could break the
  746. 25:25game or have some glitch, some
  747. 25:27unintended consequence. So, I had it run
  748. 25:28what I think ended up being thousands of
  749. 25:30tests. So, it was running GPT-6 Astra in
  750. 25:34ultra mode. It took hours. I'm not sure
  751. 25:36how much that will cost in API cost, but
  752. 25:38I mean hundreds of dollars at least,
  753. 25:40maybe it would get into the thousands.
  754. 25:41Most of that project burned through most
  755. 25:43of my weekly quota that I could use
  756. 25:45Astra for. But, what if that cost
  757. 25:47pennies? What if I could run that for
  758. 25:49the entire week and only use 1% of my
  759. 25:52weekly quota? Right, if a human today
  760. 25:54before releasing code can find that 90%
  761. 25:56of vulnerabilities and bugs, let's say
  762. 25:58hackers can find 95 using AI, right? So,
  763. 26:01they can find a little bit more than
  764. 26:03that initial developer is able to find
  765. 26:05by the time he has to release the
  766. 26:06product. You know, what if running Astra
  767. 26:09and spending a few thousand right now
  768. 26:11will find 99%, let's say, I'm just
  769. 26:13making these numbers up. But, what if in
  770. 26:14the future the models are so fast, so
  771. 26:16cheap, so smart that it will find, I
  772. 26:18don't know, 99.9999,
  773. 26:21whatever, repeating. Like, just imagine
  774. 26:23that it's going off the page. What if
  775. 26:24you can do that for, you know, five
  776. 26:25bucks? So, I think both this person at
  777. 26:28Anthropic, cyber security research
  778. 26:30expert, etc., and Sam Altman in that
  779. 26:32interview, they're saying that the same
  780. 26:33thing, at least in the sense that after
  781. 26:35this kind of shake up period as we
  782. 26:38adjust to this new normal, then
  783. 26:40potentially kind of that new equilibrium
  784. 26:42or that sort of new world, new status
  785. 26:45quo, new paradigm, whatever you want to
  786. 26:46call it, it might be a positive one.
  787. 26:49Potentially even zero vulnerabilities
  788. 26:51being shipped with new releases. Now, I
  789. 26:53don't know if that's going to happen,
  790. 26:54but it would kind of be an amazing world
  791. 26:58if it did. You'd still have a
  792. 26:59cybersecurity experts that work to very
  793. 27:02hard on making sure that there's no
  794. 27:03vulnerabilities, but there would no
  795. 27:05longer be a world where people would get
  796. 27:07hacked and scammed into lose their
  797. 27:09personal data because everything would
  798. 27:10be so secure that there would be very
  799. 27:12little incentive to spend a lot of
  800. 27:14resources and time going after it. Or in
  801. 27:16Sam Altman's case, there's some new
  802. 27:18approach, some a real-time defense
  803. 27:20shield or whatever he had in mind. Maybe
  804. 27:22it's the same thing. They might be
  805. 27:23talking about the same sort of concept.
  806. 27:25But the point is it also prevents most
  807. 27:28or all of these attacks. Right? So,
  808. 27:30maybe maybe all that happens and maybe
  809. 27:32there's a happy and a bright future
  810. 27:34ahead. But here's the thing. During
  811. 27:36these next 18 months or however long it
  812. 27:38is, what happens is just a number of
  813. 27:41successful cyber attacks just keeps
  814. 27:43going up and up and up and up. So,
  815. 27:44here's Sam Altman Karp. So, he's saying,
  816. 27:46"I'm worried that parts of the internet
  817. 27:47will have to be shut down in the next
  818. 27:49year until they get patched and
  819. 27:51cleaned." So, again, if you asked me
  820. 27:52this last week, like what's the chance
  821. 27:55of the internet being shut down? Right?
  822. 27:56Maybe maybe temporarily, but like what
  823. 27:58is the chance of that? I'd probably give
  824. 28:01it some very very small chance cuz, you
  825. 28:02know, everything has some small chance.
  826. 28:05You shouldn't say it's a zero. What's
  827. 28:06the chance we'll have something like the
  828. 28:07Jurassic Park in the future cuz we've
  829. 28:09figured out how to recreate the
  830. 28:10dinosaurs. I don't know, but it's it's
  831. 28:12not a zero percent chance. It's a some
  832. 28:14probably small number. After seeing all
  833. 28:15of this, my sort of estimate of what the
  834. 28:18chance of the entire internet being shut
  835. 28:19down, well, it's a lot higher. If they
  836. 28:21asked you in 2019, what's the chance of,
  837. 28:24you know, the government not allowing
  838. 28:25you to go outside, you'd probably say
  839. 28:27zero or close to that. At what point did
  840. 28:29you truly believe that you were not
  841. 28:32going to be allowed to go outside? I
  842. 28:33think for most people, that was when
  843. 28:36they told you that you're not allowed
  844. 28:38outside. So, in 2020, we had to stay
  845. 28:41indoors and just be on the internet all
  846. 28:43day. Maybe sometime in 2026 or maybe
  847. 28:452027, they'll tell us, "No more
  848. 28:47internet. You got to go outside and
  849. 28:49play. Now, whatever happens, remember
  850. 28:51the first rule, don't panic. And as you
  851. 28:53know, a few months ago I was telling
  852. 28:54people to be ready for something like
  853. 28:57this, to take your cybersecurity
  854. 28:58seriously. Here's the thing, this isn't
  855. 29:00a financial advice. You're a grown
  856. 29:02person, you're capable of making your
  857. 29:03own decisions. But do you remember that
  858. 29:04thing? It's called cash. Cash, do you
  859. 29:07remember cash? It has numbers on it, you
  860. 29:08pay with it. Not your credit card, not
  861. 29:10your debit card. They're like paper. I'm
  862. 29:13not saying any of this is going to
  863. 29:14happen. And I'm not giving you advice.
  864. 29:16But if you think there is a chance of
  865. 29:18something like this happening either in
  866. 29:20a way that's planned or in some way
  867. 29:23that's not planned. As in for example,
  868. 29:25some infrastructure attack that
  869. 29:27succeeds. Well, in that world, where it
  870. 29:29lasts a few days or weeks or months, you
  871. 29:32know what's going to be awesome to have
  872. 29:33in that world? A buck or two in cash.
  873. 29:36And also, of course, whatever else you
  874. 29:37do, get your cybersecurity game on lock,
  875. 29:40as they say. Don't reuse passwords, use
  876. 29:42strong passwords, two-factor
  877. 29:44authentication. Preferably not text
  878. 29:46messages, but Google Authenticator or
  879. 29:48those hardware authenticators. All of
  880. 29:50that good stuff. We're probably in the
  881. 29:52thick of it right now, so don't be like,
  882. 29:55"I'll do it next week." Probably, you
  883. 29:57know, stay awake and present right now.
  884. 30:00And if this all blows over, and maybe it
  885. 30:02will, that's probably a high probability
  886. 30:04everything will blows over, nothing bad
  887. 30:06happens, then what's the worst that
  888. 30:08happened? You improved your
  889. 30:09cybersecurity abilities and you got some
  890. 30:10walking around money. That's perfect.
  891. 30:12It's not a big deal. It's all good. If
  892. 30:14you made it this far, thank you so much
  893. 30:15for watching. My name is Wes Roth. I
  894. 30:16will see you in the next one.

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