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Iran After Ayatollah Khamenei: Mearsheimer and Marandi on the MOU, Lebanon, and the Road Ahead — Transcript

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0:02Welcome everyone. My name is Mahalaka
0:05Samani. I'm with the Community Alliance
0:06for Peace and Justice and I'm joined by
0:09my colleague and co-host Dr. Atika
0:11Badul. Today we're looking at the state
0:14of the Iran US relationship following
0:16the June 17th signing of the memorandum
0:19of understanding, current strains on
0:22theou and its regional implications. All
0:26this comes in the context of Ayatullah
0:28Kam's ongoing funeral in Iran that is
0:32already reshaping how we think about
0:34Iran's regional and global standing. To
0:38help us make sense of recent
0:39developments, we're very fortunate to be
0:41joined by two prominent and highly
0:44influential public intellectuals. First,
0:47we have Dr. John Mirshimer, professor of
0:49political science at the University of
0:51Chicago and Dr. Sayyad Muhammad Morandi,
0:55professor of English literature and
0:57Orientalism at the University of Thran.
1:00Thank you both so much for joining us.
1:03>> Glad to be here.
1:06>> Thank you. So Dr. Morandi, let me begin
1:09with you. Um, Ayatah Kam's state funeral
1:12is taking place in Iran right now with
1:15millions upon millions of people in
1:18attendance, making it perhaps one of the
1:20largest funerals in modern history. And
1:23there are ceremonies that are running
1:25through July 9th across the country. In
1:28addition, there are also international
1:30delegations representing nearly 50
1:33countries. Um, beyond the ritual of
1:36mourning, what does this moment tell us
1:39about Iran's internal stability, its
1:42succession under ayatab
1:45and its standing going into the next
1:47phase of talks with Washington.
1:52>> Well, thank you very much for inviting
1:55me. It's a honor and a pleasure being
1:57with the three of you. Uh I think today
2:00was a historic uh event. Uh the turnout
2:04was unprecedented. I uh spent uh hours
2:09just going there and trying to get back.
2:12And uh this is in addition to the fact
2:14that yesterday we had the prayers where
2:17again millions were participating and
2:20the day before people gathered uh to uh
2:24where he was uh placed. he and his
2:28family where he was placed in the Musla
2:30in Tehran uh to pay their respects and
2:33and to commemorate his uh his
2:36leadership.
2:38I think that u while for me these
2:41enormous crowds were not surprising and
2:45uh some estimates put it at above 10
2:47million today.
2:50I think that for many people outside
2:52Iran and perhaps many inside Iran, it
2:55has a special significance.
2:58the the perception in the United States
3:01among elites uh or at least elites who
3:04are in power, not people like Professor
3:06Mir Shimemer but elites who are close to
3:07power
3:09has been that Iran is is fragile, Iran
3:11is weak, Iran is vulnerable and uh every
3:16time Iran
3:18moved to uh show goodwill to the United
3:21States uh instead of interpreting that
3:25move as goodwill, The United States as a
3:28result would uh as a result of this
3:30perception would view Iran uh viewing
3:34Iran as vulnerable and weak would see
3:36this as a sign of weakness rather than
3:39as a goodwill gesture and that has been
3:42my understanding ever uh ever since I
3:46was involved in the nuclear negotiations
3:48in 2015.
3:50uh I was uh the foreign minister's media
3:53adviser, international media adviser and
3:55I was also the media adviser for the
3:57delegation four or five years ago when
3:59they tried to revive the nuclear deal
4:02and in on both uh uh instances in both
4:07in both these periods every time uh I I
4:10I witnessed firsthand every time Iran
4:13did make a goodwill gesture the United
4:16States simply became more aggressive and
4:19uh more hardlined in its approach. So I
4:22think the last four months uh in general
4:25have been uh very important in that uh
4:29inside the United States uh I don't want
4:32to go into that but across the world I
4:34think that perceptions on on Iran have
4:36changed dramatically. Uh I think that
4:38ever since the genocide in Gaza began
4:41this this uh be the views towards Iran
4:45began to evolve. uh but uh and also to
4:49to a degree after the 12-day war. But
4:52when this war began, the perception even
4:54among Iran's friends uh even in Moscow
4:58and Beijing,
5:00uh many people who I knew at least
5:03analysts and experts, friends of mine,
5:06sympathetic to Iran and in other
5:08countries, they thought Iran would fall
5:09very swiftly. And um
5:14those perceptions were shattered. And
5:17after the 39 days of fighting when the
5:20siege warfare began again they uh not as
5:25many but quite a few people thought that
5:27it would be Iran that falls first before
5:30Trump
5:32and then at when the at the negotiating
5:34table when Iran in my opinion got a
5:38pretty good deal although there are many
5:40in Iran including many people in the uh
5:42gatherings uh during the last two three
5:45days who said that the this deal is not
5:46enough and it's not the
5:53hard to make but any
6:00but in any case um
6:03the perceptions I think during this
6:06period of time changed gradually but
6:09today I think was uh
6:12a a major turning point because uh the
6:17this uh gathering of so many millions of
6:20people in Tehran at the height of summer
6:22and I think professor Mir Shimemer has I
6:25know he's been to Iran I don't know I
6:27don't remember what time of year it was
6:29but the summer in Thran is not the best
6:32time to be out on the streets and uh
6:35going to this gathering was is very
6:38difficult people wearing black
6:39particularly difficult women wearing
6:42black very difficult so people on the
6:45streets for many hours today and some of
6:48them were there since 3:00 in the
6:50morning, 4 in the morning, some were
6:52there last night. So exhausted,
6:56exhaustion, the heat, the gathering and
6:58trying to gather in one place in a place
6:59like Tehran during ordinary
7:02circumstances, it's not uh very easy.
7:05Perhaps we've all spent some time in
7:06Tehran, but it's it's it's not easy
7:09moving around in this city. So despite
7:12all that, these these unprecedented
7:15number of people on the streets in Iran,
7:18I think sends a strong message to Iran's
7:21adversaries, but also to Iran's friends
7:23about the strength and resilience and uh
7:28and power of the Islamic Republic of
7:30Iran, the high degree of uh legitimacy
7:34of the state in the eyes of ordinary
7:36Iranians. And so when you put all these
7:39together, the war, the siege, the
7:41negotiations, and Gaza and Lebanon, and
7:45who's siding with the victims, and who's
7:47siding with the with the genocidal
7:50forces, and then you add to all that the
7:54funeral, I think that brings about an a
7:57sea change in opinion at least among a
8:00significant segment of uh uh people
8:03across the world. even in the United
8:05States uh
8:07run have shifted based upon my own
8:10personal experiences uh to a degree.
8:14>> Sure. Thank you so much Dr. Mandi and I
8:16think um I'm sure you must have heard
8:18Trump's comments on this. I think he was
8:21perhaps most surprised when he didn't
8:24know who all of these people were
8:25because I thought everybody hated Ayat
8:29were his words of course. So I think he
8:32is perhaps most surprised by this
8:33incredible show of strength um and
8:36sincerity towards uh the late Ayatullah.
8:39Um Dr. Mshimer, I'd love to hear your
8:41response to Dr. Morandi, but I also um
8:45you know, let's talk a little bit about
8:47the memorandum of understanding as well.
8:50Since the June 17thou,
8:53uh we've seen significant obstacles um
8:56including the June 26th Israel Lebanon
8:59agreement which linked Israeli
9:01withdrawal from Lebanon to Hezbollah's
9:03disarmament. We've also seen continued
9:06low-level titat exchanges between Iran,
9:09the US, and Israel over the past couple
9:11of weeks. Taken together, do these
9:14developments suggest that there's merely
9:16a tactical pause before the risk of
9:19renewed conflict or do you believe that
9:22the Trump administration is actually
9:25looking for a broader strategic reset, a
9:28grand bargain of sorts with Iran as some
9:31in the administration have indicated?
9:35>> Thank you for the question. Uh let me
9:37make a number of points. First of all, I
9:40do not think that the United States is
9:43interested in restarting the air war,
9:48which is really what the fighting
9:50involved between Iran and the United
9:53States. It's very important to
9:55understand that between February 28th
9:59and April 8th, uh what you had was an
10:04air war. It was basically a 40-day air
10:07war. And then the air war stopped and
10:10what the United States then did was it
10:13imposed a blockade on the straight. So
10:16we went from this bombing campaign to a
10:19blockade. And except for a couple tit
10:23fortat incidents, there has been no
10:26serious bombing since April 8th.
10:30And the blockade went from roughly April
10:3413th to June 17th when the memorandum of
10:38understanding was signed. So we really
10:41have not had a serious shooting war
10:45between Iran and the United States since
10:49April 8th. And I do not believe the
10:52United States wants to start that air
10:54war all over again because it would just
10:58lose the fight like it lost between
11:01February 28th and April 8th. The United
11:04States did not win with its bombing
11:07campaign. And of course, it was not just
11:09the United States. It was the United
11:11States and Israel. And then, as I say,
11:14we went to the blockade and the blockade
11:18didn't work. That's why you had a
11:21memorandum of understanding that was
11:24signed on the 17th of June, right? It it
11:30was signed because uh the blockade
11:34didn't work. So, the bombing didn't work
11:36and the blockade didn't work. The point
11:38here is that the United States doesn't
11:40have a military option. So what happened
11:43is that the United States signed the
11:45memorandum of understanding as I said on
11:47June 17th
11:49and in my opinion that represented a
11:53clear victory for Iran. It may be the
11:56case as Dr. Morandi said that Iran did
11:59not get all it wanted but it got most of
12:03what it wanted and in my opinion it
12:05looks like a surrender document from the
12:08American perspective. The Iranians won
12:11on almost every point. But the key here
12:15is that it's not a formal settlement to
12:18the conflict. It's just a memorandum of
12:21understanding. It's a basis for
12:24negotiations moving forward.
12:27And the question is, how is this going
12:30to play out? I think that's the question
12:32that you're asking me. What do I think
12:34is going to happen moving forward? And
12:37as you pointed out, there's some
12:39evidence that the Americans are
12:41interested in renegotiating the deal.
12:44And this is hardly surprising because,
12:46as I said, the June 17th deal looks like
12:50a victory for Iran. Now, let me say a
12:53few words about the specifics as I see
12:56it.
12:58The initial agreement was designed to
13:03open the straight and stop the war. But
13:07as I said, the war except for Lebanon,
13:09let's leave Lebanon aside for the
13:11moment. Except for Lebanon, the war had
13:13basically stopped on April 8th. There
13:15was not much shooting after April 8th.
13:19Uh but the blockade mattered greatly and
13:22the blockade went away. Now what's
13:26happened and this is reflected in some
13:28comments that JD Vance made is that
13:32because the strait is now opened the
13:35Americans feel or the administration
13:38seems to feel that the pressure on the
13:42United States to concede these various
13:47elements of the memorandum of
13:49understanding
13:51to Iran have lessened. there's not much
13:54pressure there anymore. So Vance seems
13:57to think and therefore maybe we can
14:01renegotiate the deal because the strait
14:04is likely to stay open. So that's the
14:08basic logic here. I would be curious to
14:11know what Dr. Mandi thinks, but I think
14:14this logic is fundamentally flawed
14:17because the Iranians made sure that the
14:21nuclear element of the deal would not
14:24come until the end. And the United
14:27States absolutely needs to get a nuclear
14:31agreement. And to get that nuclear
14:34agreement, the Iranians can force the
14:37Americans to make major concessions on
14:41all of those other elements that are
14:44clearly laid out already in the
14:47memorandum of understanding.
14:50One is the business of frozen assets
14:53being released. Two is the matter of
14:56reparations and this $300 billion fund.
15:00Four is total relief on sanctions and
15:05number five or number four is the toll
15:07booth. Th those are the four big issues
15:09floating around. Now the Americans will
15:12try as hard as they can not to
15:16accommodate, not to agree to those
15:20particular economic demands. But what
15:22the Iranians can simply do is say if you
15:25don't agree to those economic demands,
15:28we will not reach an agreement on the
15:30nuclear issue. And the Americans
15:32absolutely need an agreement on the
15:35nuclear issue. So I think the Iranians
15:37were very smart to put the nuclear issue
15:42at the tail end of the negotiations
15:45because that will give them continued
15:48leverage now that the strait has been
15:52opened and that Iranian leverage has
15:55been taken away. So, I would imagine,
15:59and it's very hard to say for sure, that
16:02moving forward, it's unlikely that the
16:05air war, the bombing campaign is going
16:08to start again because it just doesn't
16:10make sense from an American point of
16:12view. And number two, I think because of
16:16the importance of getting a deal on the
16:18nuclear issue, the various other
16:21economic issues which are all to Iran's
16:24advantage will be fulfilled and that at
16:28the end you will probably get an
16:32agreement that reflects what is in the
16:35memorandum of understanding. Am I sure
16:38this is going to happen? Of course not.
16:40But when I look at all the elements of
16:42the deal and what's happened so far,
16:45that's what it looks like to me.
16:48>> Right. Um, Professor Mirandi, I'm going
16:50to come towards you. Um, along the same
16:53lines um, regarding the memorandum
16:55memorandum of um, understanding from the
16:58perspective, what are the biggest
17:00threats that you perceive um, are um,
17:04halting its um, you know, coming into
17:06full effect or its overall survival? Um
17:09is it the US delivering the assets um uh
17:13the frozen assets of Iran um Israeli
17:16escalation uh which is a very important
17:18topic as far as uh Gaza or Lebanon are
17:20concerned um or Iran's own internal
17:23debates because we witnessed that the
17:25public mood seems to be a little
17:26uncompromising on the streets of Iran
17:28very much you know the sentiment is high
17:30and as you've mentioned many times um
17:33that they they do not want to have a
17:37deal like the JCPO PO A that has um
17:40actually hurt Iran in the past. So what
17:42would Iran need to see from the United
17:44States that would kind of sort of
17:47establish a grudging um you know trust
17:50um as to things moving forward in the
17:52right direction?
17:59Okay. Sorry about that. That's uh the
18:02internet they slowed the internet today
18:04for the for the funeral. I guess because
18:06of a fear of drones or some sort of
18:08assault. Uh I you raise a very important
18:12uh question. Uh the JCPOA or the nuclear
18:15deal of 2015
18:17did not go well for Iranians and uh in
18:21that deal the Iranians uh carried out
18:24their obligations but the United States
18:27refrained from uh doing the same. And
18:30this was not under Trump. This was under
18:32Obama. And uh despite many complaints
18:36from the Iranian government, the foreign
18:38minister uh and other uh high-ranking
18:41officials, uh the United States had no
18:44intention of fulfilling its obligations
18:47in full. It carried out some of them uh
18:52halfway and others uh less so, but uh
18:56for Iran that wasn't uh enough. It
18:59wasn't uh helpful. And uh so many
19:02believed that it was a a bad deal.
19:05Now uh whenever we speak of negotiations
19:09nowadays in Iran, the first thing that
19:11comes to mind for ordinary people is the
19:14JCPOA
19:15>> and that makes negotiating with the
19:18United States even more difficult
19:20because whatever agreement you get uh
19:24the mistrust towards the United States
19:26is very high and for very very good
19:29reason. So I understand the sentiments
19:33on the street. They are they make very
19:37in any case this is the deal we have at
19:39the moment. Um I I think the real issue
19:43the the number one issue that exists
19:45between Iran and the United States is
19:47the Israeli regime. I think that the
19:50Israelis do not want
19:53an improved relationship between Iran
19:55and the United States uh at any level.
19:59And so I think they will do whatever
20:00they can to undermine the uh agreement.
20:05So true Lebanon is uh a big part of this
20:08and uh the first article of theou or the
20:13very first sentences in theou deal with
20:16Lebanon. The Israeli regime is supposed
20:18to withdraw and end the war and end the
20:20killing. And uh at the moment we have a
20:24a ceasefire although today they murdered
20:27a a woman uh a school principal her
20:30husband and her uh maid I think uh in a
20:35in an air strike on their car. So it's
20:39not exactly a a a real ceasefire. It's
20:42sort of like the ceasefire in in Gaza
20:45where every day they kill a number of
20:47men, women, and children. But in
20:49Lebanon, it's not as uh as as murderous
20:54at at least for the moment. But they
20:57refuse to withdraw and um this is one uh
21:01way in which they can undermine the
21:03deal. Also, I have no doubt that uh they
21:07would not want to see the United States
21:09release Iranian assets or to cooperate
21:12with Iran in any way or form. Uh the
21:15issue of the trade of hormones is uh
21:17another problem. As we speak, the United
21:20States is violating theou by trying to
21:23or or or opening a corridor in the
21:27straight of hormones that is not
21:29controlled by Iran. And that violates
21:32the deal because in accordance with the
21:34deal for the first during the period of
21:36theou Iran is supposed to be the the the
21:39country that controls the movement of
21:41ships through the straight.
21:44So um I I'm I'm not totally optimistic
21:49about the deal to be very blunt. um but
21:54somewhat pessimistic that
21:59lead to a comprehensive agree
22:03I I
22:05think professor M shimmer is absolutely
22:07correct when he said that the Iranians
22:10very smart in leaving the the issue of
22:14the nuclear program and the
22:17comprehensive sanctions or the maximum
22:19pressure sanctions for the second phase.
22:23so that uh that leverage would remain
22:26for the time being because right now the
22:28United States has partially fulfilled
22:31its side of the bargain. It has uh
22:34lifted the siege. It has lifted the
22:37sanctions on Iran's oil related exports.
22:40But as I said, it's violating the deal
22:43in the straight. it's violating the deal
22:46in Lebanon because effectively in
22:48accordance with theou they are
22:50responsible for the Israeli regime
22:53leaving and also they've so far uh
22:56refrain from releasing Iran's frozen
23:00assets. Now um some say that there has
23:04been some movement on that front but uh
23:07at least for now they're the assets
23:10still remain beyond the control of the
23:12Iranians. So uh the nuclear program is
23:18important leverage and uh unless the
23:21Americans resolve these issues uh in
23:24theou for the first phase the Iranians
23:27are not going to negotiate the the
23:29nuclear program. So that is important
23:31leverage. Another um important
23:36point that has to be
23:39kept in mind is that Iran controls the
23:41straight of foremost and it can make the
23:45movement of ships through the strait
23:47more difficult. So Iran in accordance
23:50with the deal uh in the second month of
23:53the deal it uh the strait is supposed to
23:56be normalized in the in the in the with
23:59regards to the number of ships that go
24:00through. In other words, in a couple of
24:03weeks from now uh the strait should look
24:06a bit like what it was four or five
24:08months ago or let's say 5 months ago.
24:10So, the Americans have their own
24:12leverage. the Iranians have their own
24:14leverage, but I think that uh well, I
24:18don't think I'm I'm very confident that
24:20the Iranians are not going to be
24:22compromised
24:24and after the events today
24:27and uh what we're going to see in Iraq
24:29because we were going to have a funeral
24:31procession in uh the holy cities of
24:34Najaf and Kvala as well as later in as
24:38well as in Kum in Iran and then
24:40ultimately in this Chad the holy the
24:42city of Mashad in north eastern Iran. So
24:46I think that the events today and in the
24:49subsequent days are going to uh Iran's
24:54result when it comes to the negotiating
24:57table in the in the next stage and I
25:00don't think we're going to have actually
25:01in and I don't think we're going to have
25:03negotiations at high level for the time
25:06being for this very same reason. Uh we
25:09we've had technical negotiations in um
25:13Atar and we may have I think technical
25:16negotiations next week perhaps
25:20but since there's no movement in Lebanon
25:24the Iranians have said that for now for
25:26for the time being uh they're not
25:28interested in having direct negotiations
25:30between Dr. Khalib and Vance.
25:36>> Right. Uh, Professor Misham, I'm going
25:38to bring this back to you. Um, and
25:40you've spoken extensively on the
25:41regional hegemony and um, Israel um, you
25:45know, trying to make sure that some part
25:47some forces of United States remain
25:49within the region just so as to have as
25:51what you called I think a fire
25:53department ready for call um, in many
25:56ways but United States has its own
25:58interests there as well that it would
26:00like to protect. So given the position
26:02of a straight of Hermoose is Iran
26:06emerging as a fourth center of global
26:08power and does the changing relationship
26:11with between the Saudis and Turkey,
26:13Pakistan, Egypt, the block that seems to
26:15be forming um is it an opportunity um uh
26:19or a strategic problem for Iran as well
26:22as the United States um Israel um you
26:25know unity and then what is your take on
26:27the Saudi propos proposal to host a
26:30summit between the region powers um or
26:32the regional Muslim or Arab blocks that
26:35are that are present in the region.
26:39>> Well, I think uh it's uh too strong to
26:44say that Iran is emerging as sort of the
26:48fourth great power in the world. Uh I
26:51think there are three great powers in
26:53the world. The United States, China, and
26:55Russia. Uh and I do not think Iran is a
26:59great power. uh or will be a great power
27:02anytime soon. I do think however that
27:08today Iran is in a much more powerful
27:12position in its neighborhood in the
27:16Persian Gulf or in the Middle East more
27:18generally than it was on February 27th.
27:22Uh I think that if you look at what's
27:26happened over the course of the war, uh
27:29there's no question that Iran's position
27:32has improved greatly. Uh as I said
27:35before, if you look at the June 17th
27:38memorandum of understanding between the
27:40United States and Iran, uh remember the
27:43United States is the most powerful state
27:45on the planet. And the memorandum of
27:49understanding in my opinion is a victory
27:51for Iran. So this tells you that Iran
27:54has done very well in this war. I
27:58actually think that before the war
28:00started, most people in the world, and
28:05this includes inside Iran, didn't
28:08appreciate how much potential power Iran
28:12had. And once the war started and the
28:16fighting began, it became clear that
28:20Iran had significant coercive leverage
28:23over the United States. Uh and it had
28:27significant military capability in terms
28:30of attacking uh American bases in the
28:33region uh the Gulf States and Israel
28:36itself. Uh so there's no question that
28:40today almost everybody recognizes that
28:44Iran is an impressive military power in
28:48the region in ways that they did not
28:51understand that on February 27th. But
28:55again, I think it's too much to say that
28:57Iran is on the verge of becoming a great
29:00power or anything like that. Now, what
29:04about the diplomatic environment? We're
29:06talking about the strategic environment
29:08or the military balance of power uh at
29:11the start here, but what about the
29:13diplomatic environment? This is a
29:15complicated situation, but I think that
29:19here there's no question that um Iran is
29:23in a much better position today than it
29:27was uh on February 27th. First of all,
29:31on February 27th, it looked like the
29:35United States had a formidable alliance
29:39structure in place with the Gulf States,
29:43with the six GCC states. There were
29:46American bases all over the region that
29:49looked like they were excellent
29:52platforms for projecting US military
29:55power. The United States apparently had
29:59a security umbrella over all of the Gulf
30:02States. Uh but once the war started, it
30:06became very clear that the Iranians had
30:09the capability, the military capability
30:12to destroy or badly damage those bases.
30:16And furthermore,
30:17the reliability of the United States
30:22uh as a security ally for those six Gulf
30:26States uh melted away. It became clear
30:30to almost all those Gulf states that if
30:33anything, the United States with its
30:35bases on their territory acted like a
30:39giant magnet that attracted Iranian
30:42ballistic missiles and drones. So I
30:46think you have a situation now where the
30:50six Gulf states have a vested interest
30:53in working out some sort of modus vendi
30:56with Iran and distancing themselves
31:00somewhat from the United States. the
31:03close relationship between the United
31:05States and the Gulf States that existed
31:07on February 27th has gone away and
31:11you're going to have a new set of
31:13relations between the United States and
31:15the Gulf States. And furthermore, those
31:17Gulf states have a deep-seated interest
31:20in not getting into another war with
31:22Iran because Iran's missile capability
31:26and drone capability is only going to
31:29increase over time and that is going to
31:32be more threatening than ever to the
31:34Gulf States. So I think the Gulf States
31:36will have a much more positive approach
31:41in their dealings with Iran than they
31:44had before February 28th. So that is
31:48very very important. I would also add
31:52that since October 20, October 7th, 2023
31:57uh when the Gaza conflict started and
32:02the Israelis uh launched the genocide,
32:06uh Israel's position in the Middle East
32:11has deteriorated significantly.
32:14Countries like Turkey uh and countries
32:18like Egypt are deeply fearful of Israel.
32:23States all over the region see Israel in
32:26many ways as a greater threat than Iran.
32:31And I think this works to Iran's
32:34advantage. Uh, I think up until February
32:3828th, the Israelis and the Americans
32:40were very effective at portraying Iran
32:45as the font of all evil, as the devil
32:48incarnate, as the cause of all trouble
32:50in the Middle East. And they did a quite
32:53good job of portraying Israel as the
32:56good guy. I think those days are over
33:00with. And I think fear of Israel across
33:04the region, all you have to do is look
33:06at what's happening in Lebanon, what's
33:08happening in Syria, what's happening in
33:10the West Bank, and of course, there's a
33:12genocide going on in Gaza. All these
33:15things make it manifestally clear that
33:17Israel is a threat to stability in the
33:20region in ways that Iran is not. Iran
33:23has not started any wars. Iran did not
33:26start the war on February 28th. Iran did
33:29not start uh the 12-day war in June
33:322025. Right? So, I think overall
33:38Iran's diplomatic
33:40situation in the Middle East has
33:43improved significantly. This is not to
33:46argue that they're in a perfect
33:48environment because it's a very
33:50complicated world in the Middle East and
33:53there are all sorts of coalitions and
33:55alliances and hatreds and friendships
33:58that you know make life difficult from a
34:02diplomatic point of view for Iran. But I
34:04think generally speaking, Iran is in a
34:07much better diplomatic situation today
34:11and it's in a much better military
34:15situation today. And again to repeat
34:17myself, I think this is reflected in the
34:20memorandum of understanding which was
34:23signed on 17 June which I think in many
34:27ways from an American perspective is a
34:30surrender document.
34:33Thank you Dr. May. Dr. Morandi, let me
34:35just sort of uh build on that and just
34:37sort of ask you for the perspective on
34:41um relations with the Gulf States since
34:44um June 17th. Have you seen some kind of
34:49um reaching out by some of the Gulf
34:52States, especially the UAE, or do you
34:54believe that the UAE is still very much
34:57solidly in Israel's camp? And again, how
35:01do you feel about this emerging block? I
35:03think there was an article in foreign
35:06policy that dubbed it this sura
35:09access that includes Qatar, Pakistan,
35:12Turkey and Egypt in trying to sort of
35:15create some kind of a repro with Iran.
35:19Do you also see it that way? Um and I'll
35:21also come back to another question about
35:24um Ayatam's
35:26um response to this um memorandum of
35:29understanding. You were your internet
35:31was slightly glitching when you were
35:32responding to Aika. So we can come back
35:34to that.
35:36>> Sure.
35:37uh the Iranians and these five countries
35:40in the Persian Gulf meaning Kuwait,
35:43Bahrain, Qatar, the Emirates, Saudi
35:45Arabia
35:46and uh uh Kuwait, Bahrain,
35:51Gatar, Saudi Arabia and Emirates. Uh
35:55negotiations have been going on between
35:57Iran and these five countries. Uh but
36:00they're basically one-on-one
36:02negotiations. They're not uh Iran is not
36:05dealing with them as a collective.
36:07Iran's relationship with Oman is a is
36:10different. Oman refused to participate
36:13in the war against Iran.
36:16Bases in Oman were not used to attack
36:18Iran uh to bomb Iran. So Iran's will so
36:22Oman has benefited a lot from this
36:25relationship and Iran has also offered
36:27to uh work together with Oman uh with
36:32regards to the straight of Hormos. Of
36:35course Oman is under a lot of pressure
36:37from the United States. You recall Trump
36:39threatened to destroy Oman or bomb Oman
36:42and that forced them to pull back. But
36:45the Iranians have continued to say that
36:47the offer still stands. But Iran also
36:49warned Oman. said if you do not want to
36:51participate we will control the strait
36:53ourselves. So that shows Iran's
36:57determination to to continue controlling
37:00the the the straight of horrors.
37:02I think we can based on
37:06public knowledge we can see that there
37:08has been some change. First of all, we
37:11saw the Saudi delegation in Tehran uh
37:15for the uh funeral, but also when the
37:20United States would violate the
37:21ceasefire against Iran during the past
37:24few weeks which uh uh we all recall on I
37:29think a number five six occasions at
37:30least the United States violated the
37:32ceasefire and then Iran struck back.
37:36On these occasions, Iran struck did not
37:39strike Saudi Arabia. It did not strike
37:42Preta and it didn't even strike the
37:45Emirates with all the difficulties that
37:48exist between Iran and the UAE. So, I
37:51think that does indicate that some some
37:53changes are being made. And I do know
37:57that uh when the Iranians went to the
37:59UAE to negotiate, the Emiratis were uh
38:04very flexible in
38:07in uh conceding certain uh issues to or
38:11at least repairing some of the damage
38:14that was done
38:16relationship with Iran. and were saying
38:19that the Israelis desperately trying to
38:22divide our country for us, meaning the
38:26Iran, which of the question
38:43and uh
38:46and on the last occasion they also hit
38:49uh uh uh Jordan, US assets in Jordan,
38:54which Jordan is another case. It's a
38:57different a separate file. So I I would
39:00say that relationship between Iran and
39:04uh the more the more important countries
39:06in the Persian Gulf have improved. That
39:09doesn't mean that there will not be some
39:11sort of relapse. Uh that's quite
39:14possible. We saw when Iran broke the
39:17siege in um
39:19>> Yemen and a passenger plane flew to San,
39:24the capital of Yemen, the Saudis tried
39:26to block the the plane from landing and
39:29apparently Yemeni anti-aircraft systems
39:34uh drove them away and the Iranian
39:35aircraft landed and second Iranian plane
39:37landed later. But the fact that the
39:39Saudis tried to uh again this is based
39:42on public information. The Saudis tried
39:44to prevent the Iranian uh civilian
39:46aircraft from landing shows that the
39:49problems between Iran and Saudi Arabia
39:51uh are are very much uh there in place.
39:57So uh we can say that there has been
40:00some improvement and there is a history
40:02of this after the uh 8-year war but when
40:07Saddam invaded Iran with the
40:09encouragement of the United States and
40:12near the end of the war during the last
40:14few months the United States entered the
40:15war directly on behalf of Saddam uh and
40:19downed and they downed an Iranian
40:21airliner killing 29
40:27uh just a couple of the the anniversary
40:28was just two three days ago.
40:31>> So in after that war and during that war
40:34these countries especially Saudi Arabia
40:36and Kuwait uh but all of them were
40:39involved they funded Saddam's war
40:41machine and hundreds at least 200 over
40:45$200 billion uh were provided and back
40:48then of course $200 billion was worth a
40:51lot more than it is today. So when
40:54Saddam invaded Kuwait uh and uh
40:59foolishly
41:00destroyed his own country and uh brought
41:04the region
41:07into created a new environment in the
41:09region where the United States was able
41:10to have a permanent presence. At that
41:13time these countries in the Persian Gulf
41:15decided or wanted Raproma with Iran and
41:18Iran encouraged it. relations improved
41:21and during the 1990s rel the relations
41:24between Iran and these countries were
41:25relatively they were relatively good not
41:28ideal but they were a lot better than in
41:31the 1980s. So it is possible for Raproma
41:35to um to envisage Raproma again and to
41:40have a a better uh relationship between
41:43Iran and these countries.
41:45After all, they do recognize that Iran,
41:47as Professor Mir Shimemer pointed out,
41:49Iran is in a much stronger position
41:51today. Uh I don't know what rank Iran
41:54would be in world powers, but uh to
41:56today Iran is more assertive. You can
41:58already see that. For example, the
42:00Taliban is more flexible about uh girls
42:05going to school in areas which are
42:07culturally closer to Iran u in like the
42:11Tajik areas or the Hezore areas. uh at
42:15least uh at least to a point um or for
42:19example
42:20um the uh Iran will not is more
42:23assertive about uh Armenia uh because
42:27there's a lot of talk uh that Armenia
42:29may uh allow the United States to create
42:32a corridor and uh as a result uh Armenia
42:37may lose sovereignty over its border
42:40region with Iran. Iran has said it won't
42:42tolerate that in the past, but now
42:45Armenia, the Republic of Azaran, Turkey
42:48know that if Iran says it will not
42:50tolerate that, Iran has the means to
42:54prevent it. And and also in northern
42:57Iraq, we see that Iran constantly
42:59strikes at uh uh the separatist groups
43:03and uh that are based there funded by
43:05the West and the Israelis. And in the
43:09past, they wouldn't do that. And the
43:10Iraqi government would constantly
43:12protest, but Iran is literally uh
43:16sometimes on a daily basis striking
43:18these bases, the bases of these groups.
43:21And the Iraqi government is much more
43:24tolerant. And the Kurdish government in
43:26Arabil in northern Iraq, the local
43:28government is much more tolerant about
43:30it than before. And I think it's
43:31reflective of the fact that they they
43:34see that Iran has uh the power to uh to
43:41uh to to carry out such uh attacks and
43:46not to be feel threatened by the other
43:49side. So I I I you do see a lot of
43:52changes and also when the Iranians
43:56begin uh claiming fees in the straight
43:59of hormones that'll also be very
44:01problematic for the sanctions regime
44:03because during the few weeks that Iran
44:05was uh before theou because during theou
44:08Iran has promised not to take fees for
44:10the for the two months before
44:14was getting fees from ships. They were
44:17to
44:20get whatever they needed
44:26dollars if they wanted yan if whatever
44:28they needed the the ships would have to
44:30provide otherwise they'll just not have
44:33access to the Persian Gulf or they would
44:35not be able to leave the Persian Gulf
44:37and that causes a lot of damage to the
44:40sanctions regime and the maximum
44:42pressure sanctions that the United
44:44States has worked so hard to impose on
44:47Iran during the last few decades. So
44:49when ships in order to simply pass
44:52through the strait, they have to adhere
44:54to Iran's demands. Of course, the
44:57demands are the the Iranian fees, it's
44:59well structured, but in some instances,
45:03uh they have the the Iranians say we'll
45:06pay in dollars or pay in yuan or pay in
45:09I guess Bitcoin or whatever it is that
45:11they do. it makes it much more easy for
45:14Iran to uh to circumvent US sanctions in
45:18in many many ways. And finally, going
45:21back to what said about the u the the uh
45:26the agreement and negotiations, it's not
45:29clear to me exactly what he was
45:31referring to in his letter because
45:34obviously there's a context and the
45:36communications between uh the leader and
45:39the supreme national members of the
45:41Supreme National Security Council are
45:42are top secret. uh so I don't know the
45:46nature of uh of of of his concerns but
45:53there are different interpretations in
45:55in broader society some of which I don't
45:58I don't uh believe to be accurate uh
46:01some say that he was heavily attacking
46:03the negotiators there's no mention of
46:06the chief negotiator in the letter uh
46:09but what it does say is that what it
46:12does show is that there is a lot of
46:13debate in Iran Iran in the letter
46:16effectively the leader was saying that
46:18uh despite me despite having in
46:21principle a different position it's not
46:23clear on what his position was different
46:26but he will uh allow the supreme
46:29national security council to go forward
46:30with the negotiations but he expects
46:33that all of the Iranian demands in the
46:37agreement be fulfilled and the letter
46:38itself shows that the internal
46:41discussions and debates in Iran are are
46:44are very uh um um are very much a part
46:49of daily life. They're very normal and
46:53that uh the leader too when he sees that
46:56a strong majority have a differing view
46:58than he does, he will go along with
47:02their position and allow them to push
47:04forward the agenda.
47:07>> Thank you Dr. Morandi. Dr. Mia Sha,
47:09would you like to respond at all to Dr.
47:12Miranda before I ask my next question to
47:14you.
47:14>> No, you should ask your next question.
47:17Uh
47:18>> all right. Um so u you know nearly 50
47:23delegations attended Ayatah's funeral
47:26this week um including Russia, China,
47:29India and others while Western
47:32governments were pointedly not invited.
47:35from a great power politics lens, what
47:38does this kind of gathering actually
47:40tell us about a hardening nonwestern
47:43block? And could you also um sort of
47:46talk about China and Russia's role going
47:49forward given that a bilateral Iran US
47:52track has now been established? Do you
47:55think they have been sidelined or will
47:57they continue to play a role and have
47:59leverage?
48:01Well, I think that there is no question
48:05that over the past few years, both China
48:10and Russia have come to realize that the
48:14United States is a mortal enemy,
48:18uh it's very important to understand
48:20that although Trump has emphasized,
48:23President Trump has emphasized that he
48:25would uh like to improve relations with
48:28Putin and that he's interested ed in
48:31shutting down uh the war in Ukraine. Uh
48:35he has nevertheless continued to support
48:38Ukraine. The United States has continued
48:41to support Ukraine under President Trump
48:44uh in ways that are designed to uh knock
48:48Russia out of the ranks of the great
48:50powers. uh the United States and the
48:52Europeans and the West more generally is
48:55interested in uh seeing Russia defeated
49:00in its war with Ukraine. The Russians
49:03now realize that I think Putin for a
49:06while had hoped that uh he could improve
49:10relations with the United States and uh
49:13settle the Ukraine war on terms that
49:15were favorable to Russia. But I think
49:17that Putin now understands that's not
49:19possible. And of course the Chinese view
49:22the United States as a mortal threat as
49:24well. So what's happened here is that
49:27both uh China and Russia have come
49:31closer together over time. They're
49:34actually quite close allies. They work
49:37together. Now a country like Iran is in
49:40a similar situation to China and Russia
49:44as is North Korea. All four of these
49:47countries understand that the United
49:49States is a mortal enemy. Uh just
49:52listening to Dr. Morande talk, there's
49:55no question that the Iranians understand
49:58that uh the United States uh has its gun
50:01sites in Iran and would like to destroy
50:04Iran if it could. It would like to break
50:06Iran up into pieces the way Syria uh was
50:10broken up into pieces. Uh so you have
50:14this situation where the Russians and
50:18the Chinese understand that Iran is a
50:22natural ally and the Iranians understand
50:25that the Chinese and the Russians are
50:27natural allies. So you've had a coming
50:31together of those three countries in
50:34recent time. Uh and I believe that there
50:38is evidence that the Chinese and the
50:40Russians are helping the Iranians with
50:42intelligence and with weaponry and I
50:45believe that with the passage of time uh
50:48Chinese and Russian assistance to Iran
50:52will increase. Furthermore, in the case
50:54of China, China is growing increasingly
50:58powerful with the passage of time.
51:00There's even talk that at some point in
51:02the not tooistant future, China may
51:05surpass the United States as the most
51:07powerful country in the world. If that
51:10is the case, China will try to increase
51:12its influence greatly in the Middle
51:15East, especially in the Persian Gulf. As
51:18we all know, China gets lots of oil from
51:20Iran. Uh, China and Iran have a vested
51:23interest in having very good relations.
51:26So my basic point here is that once you
51:30get outside the nonwestern world and you
51:34talk about balance of power politics,
51:36nitty-gritty balance of power politics,
51:39you want to think long and hard about
51:41the fact that China, Russia, and Iran
51:44all have a deep-seated interest in
51:47working together as much as possible to
51:50deal with the United States. And of
51:53course in the case of Iran, uh it's not
51:56just dealing with the United States,
51:58it's dealing with Israel as well. As Dr.
52:01Morandi said, uh the Israelis uh have uh
52:07no interest in seeing the United States
52:10work out any kind of accommodation with
52:13Iran. and the Israelis will go to great
52:15lengths to do everything they can uh to
52:18undermine any possible raw promont
52:21between Iran and the United States.
52:23There's no question about that. Uh so
52:26from an Iranian point of view, you're
52:29not only dealing with the United States,
52:31you're dealing with Israel as well. As I
52:33like to say, Israel and the United
52:35States are basically a tag team. Uh but
52:38the fact is that the United States is uh
52:41the key foe uh for Iran, for Russia and
52:45for China. So I think moving forward uh
52:48if Iran plays its cards smartly uh it
52:54will have a significant opportunity
52:57uh to get help from the Russians and to
53:00get help from the Chinese
53:03uh in its dealings with the United
53:07States and with Israel. And when you
53:10marry that to the fact that the US
53:13alliance with the six Gulf states is in
53:16tatters and US military bases in the
53:21Gulf are badly damaged if not destroyed.
53:25Again, I think Iran is in a position
53:28where it can uh enhance its security
53:32moving forward uh by forming alliances
53:36or by forming close relations with these
53:38various great powers and with countries
53:42uh in the Gulf as well.
53:44>> I have a quick followup to that, Dr.
53:46Mshimer, and that's about Israel and
53:48America's relations. You said that
53:51America's relations with it Gulf allies
53:53is in tatters. Um do you think there has
53:56been somewhat of a rupture that this war
53:59has created between Israel and the US
54:03given um Trump and Netanyahu's
54:06recent conflictrations and being sort of
54:08very public about um you know telling
54:12Netanyahu who the boss is especially
54:14when it comes to Trump.
54:17>> Yeah, there's no question there's been a
54:18rupture uh in terms of public opinion in
54:22the United States. There's actually been
54:24a sea change. It's remarkable how much
54:28hostility there is towards Israel in the
54:31body politic. And you even see evidence
54:35of this inside the Democratic party for
54:38sure, but even inside the Republican
54:41party. Uh, and I think Tucker Carlson is
54:45a bellweather on this. Although Tucker
54:47Carlson has just abandoned the
54:49Republican party, but he's been a
54:51lifelong Republican, but at the policy
54:55level, hardly anything has changed. It's
54:58just very important to understand that
55:00there's no question that President Trump
55:03has used very hot rhetoric when talking
55:07about Israel itself and Prime Minister
55:10Netanyahu in particular. There's no
55:13question about that. But in terms of the
55:15actual policy of the United States
55:18towards Israel, there has been hardly
55:21any change at all. And the reason for
55:24that is that the lobby is enormously
55:27powerful. You just cannot underestimate
55:31how powerful the Israel lobby is inside
55:33the United States when it comes to
55:37influencing the policy of the
55:40administration that controls the White
55:42House. Now again, there's no question
55:45that Israel and the lobby have lost
55:49their ability to control the discourse.
55:52The discourse is gotten away from them.
55:55And the discourse is amazingly critical
55:59of Israel these days compared to what it
56:02has been in the past. There's no
56:03question about that. But that's just the
56:05discourse at the policy level. When you
56:08talk about what's happening in Congress,
56:10what's happening inside of the White
56:12House, the lobby is still deadly
56:15effective at getting the United States
56:17to support Israel. And this is what
56:21makes the whole question of what's going
56:23on in southern Lebanon so interesting.
56:26Uh I mean it's quite clear that the
56:29Iranians have told uh the United States
56:33and you see this in the memorandum of
56:35understanding
56:37uh that uh Israel uh has to get out of
56:40southern Lebanon and it has to stop its
56:43military campaign against Hezbollah. And
56:47of course the Israelis are refusing to
56:50do that. And the Iranians have said that
56:53they will not have ne direct
56:54negotiations with uh the United States
56:58uh in terms of settling the memorandum
57:01of understanding until the Israelis
57:04leave southern Lebanon. Now whether that
57:06happens or not is a very interesting
57:08question because again the lobby and
57:11Israel itself will go to great lengths
57:13to make sure that the United States does
57:16not force Israel to leave southern
57:19Lebanon. So that in many ways is the key
57:24issue that is looming out there
57:28regarding how effective Israel will be
57:32uh at thwarting American efforts uh to
57:36make the memorandum of understanding
57:38work.
57:39>> Sure.
57:40>> Thank you. Um Dr. Morandi, I'm going to
57:42pick up on a few points that you
57:44mentioned and uh Professor May Shimmer
57:46talked about public perception. I think
57:48there's been a you know a big change
57:50that we see in United States and across
57:52the globe and Iran has often often been
57:55discussed in the west through the lens
57:57of sanctions or caricatures of their um
58:00you know their leader. So yet despite
58:03these decades of pressure, we've seen
58:06major gains being made within Iran uh
58:08whether it's you know their education or
58:11science or technology with adult
58:13literacy of 85 to 89% and the youth
58:16literacy I think which was staggering in
58:1898 to 99%. So um one of the fears in the
58:23global south um or the Gulf countries in
58:25particular has been the spillover effect
58:27where people or countries which are so
58:31as to say developing or third world when
58:34they see that you can outlast or grow
58:36independent um in face of adversaries
58:40they may want to take that road as well.
58:42So what is how would you explain that or
58:45what lessons um and experience these
58:48countries may take uh from this recent
58:50war? Um and I also want to talk about uh
58:54a little bit about the supreme leader uh
58:56who you know you have his admirers and
58:58his critics. Um but uh you know his
59:02political and leadership style I think
59:04is often being misconceived um in the
59:07sense that people uh saw him in the
59:09robes and the turban and that brings an
59:11automatic uh sort of stereotype to their
59:14head. But what people didn't realize was
59:16how well he well read he was or that he
59:19was familiar with western literature or
59:21that uh more recently I found it
59:23fascinating that he had seen prison
59:25break which people were the young
59:28Iranians were talking about online as
59:30well. He is a historical complex layered
59:33uh figure. How would you describe him to
59:36people who do not know him?
59:40Well, first um I I I'd like to point out
59:44one thing and that is that uh what
59:46professor Mir Shimeimer has said is I
59:49think something that for decision makers
59:53in Iran is very important and that is
59:57that and this is something that I've
59:58been uh talking about here in Iran as
1:00:02well and that is that on on the one hand
1:00:04there has been as professor Mshimer
1:00:07pointed out a sea change in public
1:00:08opinion. The body politic of the United
1:00:10States has changed dramatically uh both
1:00:14among uh supporter of the Democratic
1:00:17Party increasing among supporters or
1:00:20former supporters of the Republican
1:00:21party and independents.
1:00:24But the elites, the ruling class in the
1:00:28United States, they've remained
1:00:30completely unchanged
1:00:32or at least almost completely unchanged.
1:00:35And um what Iran should do and what I
1:00:40think it's trying to do is that by using
1:00:44leverage and that's economic pressure
1:00:47mostly military pressure accompanies it
1:00:49but ultimately it's economic pressure.
1:00:52It is attempting to use to to push the
1:00:58elites who are already under some
1:01:00pressure from
1:01:02society at large which has turned
1:01:04against the Israeli regime. It wants to
1:01:06put pressure on the the state or on the
1:01:09elites to make a decision between
1:01:13America's priorities and Israeli
1:01:15priorities.
1:01:16So when there's economic pressure on the
1:01:20United States, the United States agreed
1:01:22to theou
1:01:24uh and actually they agreed to the in
1:01:27particularly after Iran was
1:01:30when
1:01:33Iran decided to fire missiles at the
1:01:36Israelis and Trump immediately gave the
1:01:40concessions that were blocking that were
1:01:42necessary in order to come to an
1:01:44agreement because there was
1:01:46uh the the two sides were far apart on a
1:01:49number of issues. He gave those
1:01:51concessions and we had the deal. Why?
1:01:54Not I don't think it was because he was
1:01:55worried about a few missiles or some
1:01:57missiles striking uh Israel. I think he
1:02:00was mostly concerned that this would
1:02:01lead to further uh
1:02:05strikes and and warfare and that would
1:02:08uh prevent the any agreement and thus
1:02:11the straight of homos would be closed
1:02:14for a longer period of time. And as you
1:02:16recall when he agreed when he was
1:02:19justifying theou uh and his agreement
1:02:22and and agreeing to this uh to this deal
1:02:25he said that we are four weeks away from
1:02:28a fuel shortage or an oil crisis. Uh so
1:02:32I think the Iranians appreciate that and
1:02:34that is uh the leverage that they have
1:02:38over the United States to force the
1:02:39United States to make a move on in
1:02:43Lebanon or to abide by its commitments
1:02:47in uh despite
1:02:50the wishes of the Israeli regime. I'm
1:02:53not saying it will happen but I'm saying
1:02:55that um that is I think the objective
1:02:58and of course professor m
1:03:02point out it is all the nuclear issue if
1:03:04the United States wants a deal with Iran
1:03:07because they have no deal and Trump
1:03:10always talks about how he's going to
1:03:12have a deal if they want a deal then
1:03:15again that's leverage and uh the United
1:03:17States will have to do certain things
1:03:19that the Israeli regime uh would not
1:03:21like. So, uh, w with the public with
1:03:25public opinion as it is in the United
1:03:27States and the economic pressures that
1:03:29exist, the Iranians, I think, have the
1:03:32opportunity perhaps to uh to create some
1:03:36sort of slight wedge or somewhat
1:03:41significant wedge between uh its uh its
1:03:45decision- making its decision that the
1:03:47the course it tooses to take and the
1:03:50chores the the course of action that the
1:03:53Israeli regime would uh uh would rather
1:03:56take instead. So that is one issue with
1:04:00regards to
1:04:02uh Iran's successes. Yes, I think it's
1:04:04going to have an enormous impact. uh the
1:04:08fact that the United States has failed
1:04:09in this war and uh Robert Kagan uh for
1:04:13example the godfather of the neocons
1:04:18calling this a catastrophic defeat an
1:04:20unprecedented defeat or military defeat
1:04:24uh for the United States. I think that
1:04:26this is going that uh is indicative of
1:04:29how uh important this the events of the
1:04:32past few months have been and I think
1:04:34what what we see what we saw today
1:04:37contributes to that. So you are going to
1:04:40see countries uh across the world
1:04:43rethink to different degrees. You're not
1:04:45I don't think you're going to see
1:04:46Venezuela suddenly tomorrow morning uh
1:04:48revoling against the uh against US
1:04:51domination. But I think it's going to be
1:04:53much more difficult for the Americans to
1:04:55retain control such as we see in the
1:04:58Persian Gulf and I think also in the
1:05:00caucuses. In fact, um, all the countries
1:05:04that participated in the funeral
1:05:06ceremony in Iran, they were threatened
1:05:08by the United States, the US State
1:05:10Department warned them not to
1:05:11participate. And heads of states uh,
1:05:14heads of state from multiple countries
1:05:17participated at a time when Iran is
1:05:20being threatened with military action by
1:05:21the Israeli regime and and by Trump. Uh,
1:05:24he constantly threatens Iran. So despite
1:05:26that you see that heads of state or
1:05:29high-ranking officials from numerous
1:05:31countries but largely from central Asia
1:05:34from the caucuses from the subcontinent
1:05:37uh from the Middle East participating in
1:05:40Thran and that is that these are the
1:05:42areas that are most important for Iran
1:05:44whe you know China. So uh these are the
1:05:48the countries that are are of priority
1:05:50for Iran because they're neighboring
1:05:52countries. Iran does business with them.
1:05:53Iran does trade with them and um and so
1:05:58I think that this itself is indicative
1:06:01of the changes that are taking place
1:06:05um
1:06:07with regards to harmony.
1:06:10Yes, I think there of course is a is an
1:06:13understanding of Iran in the west. It's
1:06:16a dystopia and life is horrible and it's
1:06:19extremely impoverished.
1:06:22that is is not a it's not a huge
1:06:25exaggeration to to say that a lot of
1:06:28people think that this is what Iran is
1:06:30like. Uh whereas in in reality Iran has
1:06:33a very very uh sophisticated
1:06:37uh it's a very sophisticated country
1:06:40very complicated and complex society we
1:06:43have uh Azaris we have Persians we have
1:06:46Kurds we have Arabs we have Turkmans I
1:06:48mean
1:06:50Kam is a Azeri city and Kame means from
1:06:55K. So he is he is Ozeri. President
1:06:58Pzishkan his mother is Kurdish and his
1:07:02father is Turkish. He's from Tabri is an
1:07:04Ozeri city. Marandi means from Marand.
1:07:07Marand is a is an Azeri city in Iran. So
1:07:13um Iran is a is a very mixed society
1:07:17with multiple languages and um and it is
1:07:21a country where where its constitution
1:07:23is u has created very strong state
1:07:26institutions that uh have worked
1:07:29effectively. I've made I given this
1:07:32example on multiple occasions when
1:07:36was martyed at the beginning of the war.
1:07:39We didn't have a leader for at least a
1:07:41week and uh
1:07:46yet the country functioned very well. So
1:07:49the and they also attacked the armed
1:07:51forces. It was it was not normal
1:07:53conditions but the state functioned. So,
1:07:56so we saw that of course there was a
1:07:58leadership council but it's the
1:08:01president and the head of the judiciary
1:08:05and um a member a representative from
1:08:09the guarding council who form a
1:08:10leadership uh committee until a new
1:08:14leader is chosen. But that's not an
1:08:16effective means for ruling a country.
1:08:18That's just to immediately transit
1:08:20power. they couldn't have the meeting
1:08:22for the council of uh experts to choose
1:08:26a new leader because the Israelis and
1:08:28the Americans wanted to bomb them. So,
1:08:30it was delayed for a while. Yet, the
1:08:33country functioned. The the armed forces
1:08:35were striking back at the Americans at
1:08:37the Israelis. Uh the uh you didn't see
1:08:41uh people running into supermarkets and
1:08:44taking all the goods. Everything was
1:08:46normal. uh at I didn't go to any I
1:08:51didn't see any um gas stations during
1:08:53the last during the first last first
1:08:55couple of days but let's say on day
1:08:58three or four when I was I drove by uh
1:09:02different through different
1:09:03neighborhoods I saw gas stations I
1:09:05didn't see any shoes or lines uh at
1:09:09these stations so Iran was very normal
1:09:11and I think that shows how sophisticated
1:09:13society is and how strong the state
1:09:16institutions are the war itself. Uh he
1:09:20uh of course he was popular before the
1:09:22war but um people in Iran saw that in
1:09:26Iranian in the Iranian political sphere.
1:09:30He was criticized heavily for decades
1:09:33because of his drone program because of
1:09:35the drone program that he supported. He
1:09:38was criticized for his missile for the
1:09:40missile program that he promoted.
1:09:42different um administrations tried to
1:09:46cut the budget for the military in order
1:09:49to hamper these programs and uh during
1:09:53the well during one administration
1:09:56was very heavily and he uh
1:10:02difficult time in moving it forward or
1:10:05the underground bases that were being
1:10:08created were ridiculed
1:10:10uh by many in political
1:10:14I mean the leader is not in in media in
1:10:17Iran he's not openly v viciously in
1:10:20attack but he's criticized or or if he's
1:10:24if they're going to insult him they'll
1:10:26they'll insult him in a way which is uh
1:10:29is subtle but it's clear it was always
1:10:31clear that he was being attacked for for
1:10:33these programs and then ultimately it
1:10:36turns out that it was these programs
1:10:38that saved the country that prevented
1:10:39the the superpower from defeating Iran
1:10:42and which led Iran to defeat the
1:10:44superpower during the fir after it
1:10:46became clear that Iran was not going to
1:10:49fall. Let's say after a week or so, I'm
1:10:53just making up these numbers. I mean I
1:10:54think probably that's not completely
1:10:56inaccurate but after a week or so let's
1:10:59say when it was clear that Iran was not
1:11:01going to fall then they began to say
1:11:05well um if Iran can survive this will be
1:11:09this will constitute a victory but
1:11:12that's not how it ended. By day 39 or 40
1:11:16Iran was bomb was striking US and
1:11:19Israeli targets and retaliating in the
1:11:22Persian Gulf. uh day and night uh 24
1:11:27hours a day uh destroying US bases
1:11:30across the Persian Gulf region or bad
1:11:32and badly damaging others. So uh he it
1:11:36was his leadership I think uh
1:11:40with hindsight was
1:11:45seen as uh as as quite is very wise uh
1:11:51when military matters and those who
1:11:54attacked him turned out to be wrong and
1:11:56some of them actually came on television
1:11:58and said that admitted that that we were
1:11:59wrong. if if one of one uh politician
1:12:03who was on television during the war or
1:12:05I think maybe after the war I'm not
1:12:06quite sure when but uh one of his
1:12:09critics was saying that if the country
1:12:11was in our hands if the armed forces was
1:12:13in our hands Iran would have been
1:12:15destroyed which was a you know very
1:12:18interesting comment for me and a very
1:12:19intellectually honest comment for him to
1:12:22say but uh he was a very eloquent
1:12:24speaker very well-versed in literature
1:12:28um his his command of Ozeri literature.
1:12:32Extraordinary hit. He was a very close
1:12:34friend of the most important Ozari poet
1:12:38perhaps in history
1:12:41and um but also his command of Arabic
1:12:46and Arabic literature
1:12:48and he speak English.
1:12:51I said this one. I I've never said this
1:12:54before until just very recently, just I
1:12:56think maybe yesterday and I'll just say
1:12:59it again. Maybe uh Professor Mia
1:13:01Shimemer and you would the two of you
1:13:03would be interested. Um
1:13:07um
1:13:08when I first I I I I was I I I got
1:13:12involved with media by accident and uh
1:13:16it's a long story but anyway at some
1:13:18point after the 2009 elections in Iran,
1:13:21the presidential elections which were
1:13:23disputed and President Ahmed won and it
1:13:26was clear that he won. there was no uh
1:13:28uh fraud even though I didn't vote for
1:13:30him and I was no fan of his but uh I I
1:13:33went in public in international media
1:13:36and said that the the this is a valid
1:13:39election the the the results are valid
1:13:42and uh then I was invited by um Fatt
1:13:45Zakario on CNN and it was supposed to be
1:13:48a 20-minute debate and it was and they
1:13:50were supposed to show it in full but
1:13:52they only showed 8 minutes of it um and
1:13:55the really good parts were deleted. But
1:13:56it it's still those I those 8 minutes I
1:13:59don't think went very well for him and
1:14:01but he was very aggressive towards me
1:14:03insulting me attacking me making it very
1:14:06personal and I'm not even in the
1:14:08government but in case I never was
1:14:17uh a few weeks later and
1:14:21uh he he said he he sort of
1:14:23congratulated me on a job well done. And
1:14:27uh I I don't remember exactly what he
1:14:29said, but he he he he praised me, I
1:14:31guess, in a subtle way. And then he
1:14:33said, "I'm surprised at Mr. as at the
1:14:36hosts of the program, uh I from what
1:14:39I've from what I've read of him, uh from
1:14:43what I've read, from his writings, he
1:14:46didn't seem to be such an emotional and
1:14:49angry person." And I thought he was uh I
1:14:52I'm I'm again I'm these are my words
1:14:55that I I expected him to be better than
1:14:57that something like that. And uh so he
1:15:01reads he reads in well he read in
1:15:03English he would read novels in English
1:15:06and uh uh
1:15:10so he had this is the sort of person he
1:15:12was. uh he was of course um a major
1:15:17religious scholar and in Shia Islam
1:15:20because the gates of juristprudence are
1:15:24open or the gates of tad are open uh he
1:15:30as a mushahed he uh his uh he has had a
1:15:35very important impact on Jewish prudence
1:15:40especially since he deals with uh
1:15:43today's issues because in Shia
1:15:46juristprudence time and place are very
1:15:48important. In other words, the uh the
1:15:51the literature the tradition that exists
1:15:54is of course key but uh time and place
1:15:58is also very important. A ruling in
1:16:00Brazil from a ruling in Thran and the
1:16:04ruling today could be different than
1:16:06ruling uh five years from now or 30
1:16:10years ago.
1:16:12So he had an impact on Jewish prudence
1:16:15because he was dealing with a lot of
1:16:17issues. Uh he uh promoted for example
1:16:22uh he he promotes high-tech. He's been
1:16:25promoting high-tech. I keep seeing he
1:16:27does he promoted high-tech industries
1:16:29stem in stem cell research. Iran wasn't
1:16:32was one of is I guess one of the most
1:16:34advanced countries in the world
1:16:35nanotechnology and so on. So he he was a
1:16:38person who was very sophisticated. He um
1:16:43was a person who tried to keep everyone
1:16:46on board this ship.
1:16:49In other words, when one faction in Iran
1:16:52would be elected,
1:16:54he would try to make sure that the
1:16:56opposing faction would stay on the same
1:17:00ship that they would cooperate together.
1:17:03So you had Mr. Raf Sanjani and then you
1:17:06had Mr. Katami who was a reformist and
1:17:09then you had Ahmed Nhad who was very
1:17:12different from Mr. Katami and then after
1:17:14that you so you had Roani and then Reci
1:17:17and then now President Pzishkan. So
1:17:21during these years he has tried very
1:17:24hard
1:17:25to keep the different factions in Iran,
1:17:28the different political parties working
1:17:30together
1:17:32and um the result is what you see what
1:17:36you saw on the streets of Tehran today.
1:17:40>> Thank you very much um Dr. Mandi. Um Dr.
1:17:44Commission just to wind up um as a final
1:17:47question. United States just celebrated
1:17:50its 250th Independence Day and it has
1:17:53been sort of a beacon um sort of a role
1:17:56model in terms of freedom, democracy, uh
1:17:59you know, freedom of speech, social
1:18:01justice, um and how well we've done, you
1:18:04know, people debate, but at least we've
1:18:06tried. So if you had to distill a
1:18:09central lesson of US foreign policy or
1:18:11policy in general and one principle or
1:18:13if you how would you um you know state
1:18:16that and going forward what are the
1:18:19changes you think United States should
1:18:21make um as far as Iran or broader you
1:18:25know global south or Middle East is
1:18:26concerned so that we keep this power
1:18:30intact moving forward.
1:18:32Well, I've been paying serious attention
1:18:35to security affairs for probably about
1:18:3860 years now.
1:18:40>> Uh, and over the course of those 60
1:18:44years, I would say I've learned two
1:18:48lessons that really matter in terms of
1:18:53thinking how the United States should
1:18:55approach foreign policy.
1:18:58Um and the first is I think that it's
1:19:02very important to understand the limits
1:19:05of military power and I think that many
1:19:09people inside the United States uh at
1:19:12the elite level uh do not fully
1:19:16appreciate
1:19:17uh the limits of military power. Uh I'm
1:19:21somebody who spent 10 years of my life
1:19:23in the American military. uh I went to
1:19:26West Point uh and I am a realist and
1:19:30realist believe that the balance of
1:19:32power really matters. So it's not like I
1:19:35don't think that military power matters.
1:19:38It does matter. But I think it's very
1:19:40important for any country to understand
1:19:43the limits of power. And I think if you
1:19:46don't understand the limits of power,
1:19:47you get yourself into trouble. Uh and
1:19:51this is what happened to the United
1:19:52States when I was young in Vietnam. It's
1:19:54what happened in Afghanistan. It's what
1:19:58happened in Iraq. And it's what's now
1:20:00happened in Iran. Uh Donald Trump
1:20:04thought that the United States certainly
1:20:07working with the Israelis uh was in a
1:20:10position where it could use its awesome
1:20:12military power uh to get the Iranians to
1:20:17surrender and to do what the Americans
1:20:20wanted. And here we have a situation
1:20:23where if anything Iran won the war. And
1:20:26this is just another illustration to me
1:20:29uh of the limits of military power. And
1:20:32I think that the United States uh uh
1:20:35here on its 250th birthday should pay
1:20:38very important
1:20:41pay attention to the very important
1:20:43argument that you can only do so much
1:20:46with military power. The second thing
1:20:49I've learned over the years that I think
1:20:51is very relevant for the United States
1:20:53today is that it is not a good idea to
1:20:57run around the world uh and interfere in
1:21:01the domestic politics of other
1:21:03countries. Uh it's not a good idea to
1:21:07engage in social engineering.
1:21:10Uh I think there's no question that the
1:21:12United States is in many ways an
1:21:15admirable society. It has some
1:21:18deepseated flaws for example. Uh but I
1:21:22personally think that liberal democracy
1:21:25when it works is a wonderful political
1:21:28system. But I think you get yourself
1:21:30into a whole heck of a lot of trouble
1:21:33when you go into other countries and you
1:21:36try to facilitate regime change. you try
1:21:39to do social engineering and you try to
1:21:42make those countries uh look like the
1:21:45United States. If you go back to the
1:21:48Bush doctrine which was formulated right
1:21:50before we uh uh invaded uh Iraq, that
1:21:56was on March 19th of 2003.
1:22:01Uh
1:22:03the Bush doctrine basically called for
1:22:06democratizing the entire Middle East
1:22:08including Iran and Syria. Uh it's very
1:22:12important to understand that Iraq was
1:22:16just the first stop on the railroad
1:22:18line. We were going to bring social
1:22:22change, political change to all sorts of
1:22:25other countries. Of course, we never got
1:22:27beyond
1:22:29Iraq at the time. But later on in 2026,
1:22:35we decided that we were going to ferment
1:22:38regime change in Iran. And by the way,
1:22:42we were engaged in regime change in
1:22:45Syria and helped bring down Assad.
1:22:49My basic point here is that the United
1:22:51States should get out of the business of
1:22:54regime change. It should get out of the
1:22:56business of social engineering and it
1:22:59should understand the limits of military
1:23:01power. And you asked the question, how
1:23:03does this apply to the Middle East? As
1:23:06I've tried to make clear in my previous
1:23:08comments here, I think it applies in
1:23:10spades to the Middle East. It applied to
1:23:14Iraq. It applied to Syria. It applied to
1:23:16Iran and other countries in the region
1:23:19as well. The United States should
1:23:22understand that using military power in
1:23:25the Middle East should be kept at a
1:23:27minimum. And number two, we should let
1:23:31people inside those countries decide for
1:23:33themselves what kind of political system
1:23:36they want to have just like we would
1:23:38expect them to allow us to have the kind
1:23:40of political system we would like to
1:23:42have and then get out of the business of
1:23:45social engineering. So, those would be
1:23:48sort of the two lessons I've learned uh
1:23:51over the years uh that I think uh should
1:23:54be put up in bright lights on America's
1:23:57250th birthday.
1:24:00>> Well, thank you so much. Um those are
1:24:03indeed two very important points and we
1:24:05discuss amongst ourselves as well as
1:24:07well as our interactions with uh you
1:24:09know intellectuals like yourself. I'd
1:24:11like to thank Professor Mirandi uh Dr.
1:24:13Shimmer um and we hope to continue these
1:24:16discussions in future. I think it's very
1:24:18important for the people of our regions
1:24:21uh to kind of get over the obstacles uh
1:24:24you know that hinder peace um or you
1:24:26know that that have been leading to
1:24:28constant wars. Thank you very much.
1:24:31>> Thank you very much for having me. Thank
1:24:33you both so

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