In memoriam Roger Boisjoly. — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:00hi this is Corey Franklin with
- 0:01remembering the past the show where we
- 0:03talk about people who've died recently
- 0:04who've had a profound effect on our
- 0:06history our society or our culture and
- 0:09tonight the entire program is devoted to
- 0:11Roger boal Roger boal died at the age of
- 0:1474 recently and he was an engineer at
- 0:17Morton thol who was a critical person in
- 0:20the Challenger disaster in 1986 Roger
- 0:24boet was a modern-day Cassandra the
- 0:26explosion after liftoff of the Space
- 0:28Shuttle Challenger caused the death of
- 0:30Seven astronauts the cause of the
- 0:32explosion was the failure of O-rings to
- 0:34seal on the space shuttle and Roger Bo
- 0:38was the engineer who realized that the
- 0:40O-rings would not seal at cold
- 0:41temperatures the temperatures at which
- 0:43the shuttle was launched on their
- 0:44January day for his work he won a prize
- 0:48for scientific freedom and
- 0:49responsibility by the American
- 0:51Association for the advancement of
- 0:53science but this was slim consolation
- 0:55for him because he could not prevent the
- 0:57actual disaster even though he predicted
- 0:59it and he was actually blackballed after
- 1:01the fact by Morton thall in NASA and his
- 1:05story is a tragic cautionary Tale the
- 1:07classic whistleblower dilemma I'm going
- 1:10to let him introduce it with a talk he
- 1:12gave on scientific ethics and then it
- 1:15will be carried through by the
- 1:16television program Challenger countdown
- 1:18to disaster which features some
- 1:20Recreations of him some live interviews
- 1:23with him the other main character is
- 1:25Richard Fineman a Nobel prizewinning
- 1:27scientist who is on the Rogers
- 1:28commission that investigat the
- 1:30Challenger disaster his words are based
- 1:32on the actual words he said during the
- 1:33commission report and his role is a
- 1:35recreation program begins with an
- 1:37introduction by Roger boal and then
- 1:39starts with him noticing o-ring damage
- 1:42on earlier space shuttle flights before
- 1:45I
- 1:46start I want to preface with a remark
- 1:48I'm going to show you the NASA feed
- 1:51video of the launch that was piped to
- 1:54all the contractors on the program I
- 1:55have to tell you it's the first time I
- 1:57actually saw a launch from my facility I
- 2:00didn't even know it was viewable for my
- 2:03facility I was about doing the business
- 2:06on the program for my whole
- 2:08career and uh this is the only one I
- 2:11actually saw from my
- 2:12PL but before I show it to you I want to
- 2:15press upon you several things and
- 2:17although this may sound like a crash
- 2:19statement it's not meant to be so the
- 2:21challenge of story and use as a case
- 2:23study to help students understand what's
- 2:26going to be coming up especially it's
- 2:28not about the death as and I know that
- 2:31sounds horrible but it's not about that
- 2:34that was a horrible horrible culmination
- 2:37of the event itself seven exceptional
- 2:39people forfeited their lives for such an
- 2:41irresponsible law Sy it's also not about
- 2:45the loss of over2 billion dollar worth
- 2:48of
- 2:49hardw what it's about is Professionals
- 2:52in the system who had the authority and
- 2:55responsibility and fiduciary interest to
- 2:58do the right thing and they abdicated
- 3:01that they abdicated that because they
- 3:03were pressured to do so by the agency
- 3:06called NASA as you will hear as the
- 3:09story unfolds the space shuttle program
- 3:11is in full swing one year from now NASA
- 3:14plans to launch Challenger at the
- 3:16engineering plant of Morton thol a NASA
- 3:19contractor in Utah Roger B discovers the
- 3:22primary o-ring has failed aut flight STS
- 3:2551b despite the O-ring damage NASA
- 3:27continues its launches as the summer
- 3:30progresses Roger Bo is still trying to
- 3:32have his concerns taken seriously on the
- 3:35rocket booster segments the joints
- 3:37between each segment have to withstand
- 3:39the vast forces produced during
- 3:42blastoff each segment is sealed against
- 3:45the next segment with two rubber seals
- 3:47called
- 3:49O-rings for the rocket boosters to work
- 3:51the joints have to function
- 3:54perfectly part of Roger Bo's job is to
- 3:57make sure they do 3 days after Mission
- 4:00STS 51c lands ojal starts his inspection
- 4:03of the joints even 20 years later the
- 4:06surprise at what he found that day is
- 4:08still Vivid in his
- 4:09mind I went around and on the first
- 4:13booster I found on one of the joints Hot
- 4:16Gas massive amount of hot gas from
- 4:19propulsion had actually compromised the
- 4:21primary o-ring so I thought my God we
- 4:25came within about 8 or 10 seconds of
- 4:27failure the O-rings are design designed
- 4:29to form a seal against the superheated
- 4:31rocket exhaust gases that are produced
- 4:33at incredible pressure during
- 4:35[Music]
- 4:37launch the first o-ring should do the
- 4:41job the second o-ring is a safety
- 4:45backup O's photos of flight 51 C's
- 4:48joints reveal hard evidence there is a
- 4:50major design
- 4:52flaw he discovers that hot gas has
- 4:55blasted past the first ring and burned
- 4:57the second backup o-ring why
- 5:00instantly in my mind thought oh this has
- 5:03to be caused by the cold weather that
- 5:06precede this launch boet immediately
- 5:09hones in on the one thing that made
- 5:11flight 51c different the temperature
- 5:14postflight analysis showed the O-rings
- 5:16were 53° F unusually cold for a launch
- 5:21the O-rings are supposed to be flexible
- 5:24on launch they squeeze and stretch to
- 5:26seal the Gap but on flight 51c the Dual
- 5:29o system
- 5:30malfunctioned the primary seal did not
- 5:33work and Hot Gas escaped luckily the
- 5:35second o-ring caught the leak if it
- 5:38hadn't the result might have been far
- 5:39more
- 5:41dangerous the next day boal reports his
- 5:44findings to NASA together NASA and
- 5:47Morton thol conclude that the condition
- 5:49is not desirable but acceptable shuttle
- 5:51launches continue but boal and his
- 5:53colleagues run further tests the results
- 5:56are shocking to their surprise they
- 5:59discovered that the O-rings could also
- 6:01be ineffective even at room temperature
- 6:03Bo takes his findings to his boss when
- 6:06we went to our manager who was my boss
- 6:09and told him about this he said this
- 6:11material was too sensitive to release to
- 6:13anybody so he kept it secret do you have
- 6:16any idea you have any idea what that
- 6:18does to somebody who's trying to put
- 6:21flight safety first and foremost on the
- 6:24program and to have a manager do that to
- 6:27you throughout 198 5 NASA has a very
- 6:31ambitious launch schedule flight 51c is
- 6:34the first of nine planned launches and
- 6:37the pressure is on to keep the shuttle
- 6:39flying any delays would ultimately cost
- 6:41money and jobs were at stake they didn't
- 6:44want to hear because I
- 6:46believe they wanted to
- 6:49ensure for the company they would get
- 6:51the follow on contract that was in
- 6:53negotiations with NASA at that point in
- 6:55time that contract was worth over a
- 6:58billion dollars
- 7:00as the weeks pass Bo's frustration at
- 7:03the lack of action continues to eat away
- 7:05at him Bo requests a Tas Force to
- 7:08investigate how to fix the problem his
- 7:10memos become increasingly desperate and
- 7:12aggressive in tone subject SRM erosion
- 7:17possible failure
- 7:20criticality this letter is written to
- 7:23ensure that management is fully aware of
- 7:26the seriousness of the current o-ring
- 7:29erosion problem it is my honest and very
- 7:32real fear that if we do not designate a
- 7:36team to solve the problem with the field
- 7:39joint having the highest priority that
- 7:42we stand in Jeopardy of losing a flight
- 7:44Bob did you read my memo the o- Rings
- 7:47Bob I I I really feel there's some
- 7:49urgency here but the erosion was pretty
- 7:52bad after the last flight I'll leave it
- 7:54with
- 7:57you while Bo struggles to be heard NASA
- 8:00has already announced the crew for the
- 8:02Challenger flight we were writing these
- 8:04memos to try and start a little flame
- 8:07underneath it to be able to get
- 8:10something done because we were concerned
- 8:13we were extremely concerned I think
- 8:16that's what those memos reflect they
- 8:19reflect frustration and concern Bo's
- 8:22tactics are beginning to alienate the
- 8:24management of Morton thol I have been
- 8:26described as a giant pain in the ass
- 8:29okay but the same people who described
- 8:31me that way were the same people who
- 8:33called me when they had a problem after
- 8:35they got to know who I was and what I
- 8:37could do in the experience I had
- 8:38throughout the spring of 1985 boal
- 8:41struggles to get Morton thol management
- 8:43to take his o-ring seal concerns
- 8:45seriously it was like I was talking to a
- 8:48solid piece of granite no
- 8:50response no reaction no emotion no
- 8:55anything we all knew that the joint was
- 8:57defective and we had no choice but to
- 8:59fly because that's what the managers
- 9:01insisted on and so it was our job to
- 9:04keep it flying as safe as possible but
- 9:05we didn't take that lightly oing is
- 9:07right it will only be a matter of time
- 9:10before something will fail on July 19th
- 9:131985 oal get some good
- 9:18news I uh thought you'd be pleased to
- 9:20hear we're putting together a task force
- 9:22he believes he can do something about
- 9:23the
- 9:25O-rings and we were thrilled and working
- 9:28our taals off try because we finally got
- 9:31a chance to do what we've been trying to
- 9:33get done now for about 5 and A2 years a
- 9:36few weeks later Bo's excitement with the
- 9:38task force is crushed one month one
- 9:42lousy month later we all realized that
- 9:46we had no power No Authority no
- 9:50resources and no management support well
- 9:53how in the heck can you get anything
- 9:54done if you don't have any of those
- 9:56items that I just mentioned you can't
- 9:59and the frustration was just absolutely
- 10:02going up minute by minute day by day the
- 10:05launch is rescheduled once again for
- 10:07Tuesday the 28th even though the weather
- 10:09forecast predicts extremely cold
- 10:11temperatures down in the low
- 10:1420s I first heard about the cold
- 10:16temperatures prior to the launch at 1:00
- 10:20on the day before the
- 10:21launch and from past experience it it
- 10:24just concerned me
- 10:27terribly and so we began to quite
- 10:29questioned the feasibility of launching
- 10:31at such a low
- 10:34temperature and we spent the rest of the
- 10:37day raising these questions the night
- 10:40before the launch there was a desperate
- 10:42struggle to stop Challenger from taking
- 10:45off the temperature the next day is
- 10:47predicted to be more than 10 below
- 10:50freezing a shuttle has never launched in
- 10:53temperature so low before and that's
- 10:55when it really hit the fan big time uh
- 10:58we rushed into a meeting and four or
- 11:00five of us decided that we're going to
- 11:02make an attempt to stop the launch the
- 11:04fact of the matter is O-rings don't work
- 11:06with a dam at freezing
- 11:08temperatures you don't have to be a
- 11:10rocket scientist to figure this out all
- 11:12you have to have is a monum of Common
- 11:15Sense boj and Thompson alert the
- 11:17management at Morton thall of the
- 11:19dangers posed by launching at such a
- 11:21cold
- 11:23temperature by early afternoon their
- 11:25bosses are
- 11:26convinced they get on the phone with
- 11:28NASA to voice their concern
- 11:30terms morn thol recommends against
- 11:33launching but NASA is reluctant to abort
- 11:36again unless there was hard
- 11:39evidence they need proof and want to
- 11:41scrutinize Morton th Call's oing Data
- 11:43before calling it off a conference call
- 11:45between Morton thall and NASA is planned
- 11:47for 8:15 p.m. Eastern Standard time we
- 11:50ran literally to our offices and
- 11:54basically rumag through reports and file
- 11:56cabinets just grab the current data and
- 11:59go
- 11:59go we had 45 lousy
- 12:03minutes to prepare for the most
- 12:06important technical meeting of our
- 12:09careers it was now quitting time
- 12:12everybody left we were on our
- 12:14own never before in history of space
- 12:16flight had them in a company stand up
- 12:18and try to stop a launch other
- 12:21anything I'm talking about unmanned as
- 12:24well as manned nobody no company's ever
- 12:27done that this is the moment Bo has been
- 12:29waiting for finally after a year of
- 12:32memos and calls he has a chance to be
- 12:35heard as they gather in the meeting room
- 12:37the Morton thool team are confident they
- 12:39will be able to stop the
- 12:41launch yes they know NASA would not go
- 12:45against a contractor's
- 12:47recommendation by 8:45 p.m. the call
- 12:49from NASA is connected launch is just 13
- 12:52hours away the success of this Mission
- 12:55and the lives of the Seven astronauts
- 12:57hang on one simple question
- 13:00how will the O-rings react to the cold
- 13:02temperatures predicted for launch the
- 13:04next morning at low temperatures the
- 13:06O-rings are not so elastic they won't
- 13:09seal properly it'll be like putting a a
- 13:14brick into a crack versus a
- 13:16sponge the grease too will be affected
- 13:20it will be thicker and not as
- 13:23slick we will have a higher o-ring
- 13:26actuation time and if that happens we
- 13:28will approach the threshold of secondary
- 13:31seal pressurization
- 13:33capability so we have a situation where
- 13:35neither the primary seal nor the
- 13:37secondary seal will function after half
- 13:40an hour the presentation is finished and
- 13:42Spirits among the engineers at Morton
- 13:44thol are high I'm a little confused by
- 13:48your presentation thall you're telling
- 13:51me that we can't launch under 53° yet
- 13:54your own data suggests that you had Blow
- 13:56by on the O-rings when we launched it
- 13:5975° the blowby was definitely worse at
- 14:03the lower
- 14:04temperature then Malloy asked for Morton
- 14:06th Call's launch
- 14:09recommendation their decision comes down
- 14:11to Joe
- 14:12kilminster I have maximum the 10%
- 14:15confidence that he's going to stand by
- 14:18what we went into the meeting with and
- 14:19that was everybody was totally
- 14:21supportive of not launching and much to
- 14:23my surprise kilmin answers and says so I
- 14:28guess our conclusions are that we should
- 14:31not fly outside of our database which is
- 14:3453° and metaphorically inside of my body
- 14:37I went yes and I was absolutely on top
- 14:42of the
- 14:43world that lasted for about 10 seconds
- 14:48the engineers at Morton thall are
- 14:50confident NASA will stop the Challenger
- 14:52launch they now wait for the official
- 14:55response for God's sake Morton F call
- 14:58when do you want me to launch next April
- 15:01you guys are generating new launch
- 15:03criteria
- 15:06here
- 15:08Joe we have been flying for 4 years with
- 15:12a known condition in these joints
- 15:14considered and accepted by thol accepted
- 15:17by me and all levels of NASA management
- 15:21think about
- 15:22this think about your data to the late
- 15:25person that might not mean much but to
- 15:27us inside in the program fully
- 15:29knowledgeable what's going on those are
- 15:32metaphorical buzzwords for you screwing
- 15:34up my launch schedule only NASA can
- 15:37postpone a launch all Morton thol can do
- 15:39is make a recommendation now Larry
- 15:41Malloy at Kennedy ask George Hardy at
- 15:43Marshall for his opinion when George
- 15:45speaks everybody listens because George
- 15:48is one of the most highly recognized
- 15:51engineer managers on the
- 15:54program di call I am appalled but I
- 15:58won't go against the
- 15:59contractor in that case I can't
- 16:01recommend launch it's the second no vote
- 16:05because he would not overrule the
- 16:07contractor but it's also something else
- 16:11and he said he was appalled that was a
- 16:13killer absolute killer with their next
- 16:16multi-million dollar contract still
- 16:17under negotiation with NASA the morn
- 16:19thol managers are under intense pressure
- 16:22at this point senior Vice President
- 16:24Gerald Mason
- 16:25[Music]
- 16:27intervenes Joe
- 16:29ask him going can take a 5 minute caucus
- 16:31offline we have to make a management
- 16:34decision let's look over the data again
- 16:37and consider Larry malloy's
- 16:39points if we launch at the predicted
- 16:42temperatures we are out of our
- 16:44experience base even if we take 40° as
- 16:48the temperature floor we are still way
- 16:51out of our database and launching at
- 16:53these low temperatures we are moving
- 16:56away from goodness to the engineer
- 16:59dismay the managers ignore them and hold
- 17:01a private conversation it's clear the
- 17:03managers are changing their minds I am
- 17:06so angry and so mad and so frustrated
- 17:09that I slam the photographs down and I'm
- 17:11screaming at them cuz I saw what they
- 17:13did to Arie to look at
- 17:15them avoid what they're telling us it's
- 17:18very the lower the temperature the more
- 17:21hot gas gets past the joint as you see
- 17:24in this photograph of the January 1985
- 17:27flight by angry Al picked up the
- 17:29photographs and returned to my position
- 17:31at the table and I basically put my head
- 17:33down on my arms and I didn't I just I
- 17:36was I was I was so close to losing it
- 17:40let's take a vote do we recommend a
- 17:42launch every stinking piece of data we
- 17:45had 14 charts one of which was the title
- 17:48page pointed to a reason not to launch
- 17:52you can't launch with this data it's
- 17:54impossible the vice president of
- 17:56engineering is on the fence and now he's
- 17:58being pressed to change his mind Bob you
- 18:01have to take off your engineering hat
- 18:04and put on your management hat our
- 18:06position is that although temperature
- 18:10effects are a concern the data
- 18:12predicting blowby are inconclusive are
- 18:16there any disagreements or any other
- 18:18comments concerning the thol
- 18:21recommendation at Nasa the silence means
- 18:24go for launch when I open the door from
- 18:28the garage to my house in
- 18:30will the first thing that my wife said
- 18:33to me is what's
- 18:35wrong I said oh nothing honey I said I
- 18:38had a great day but I says we ended it
- 18:40ended up in a meeting I says we're going
- 18:42to launch tomorrow and kill the
- 18:43astronauts but outside that it was that
- 18:44great day the temperature
- 18:49plummets the astronauts pass the time
- 18:51thinking that tomorrow will be another
- 18:53scrub out on the Launchpad icicles as
- 18:56long as 18 in are forming on the shuttle
- 18:59despite the low temperatures Challenger
- 19:02will launch the next
- 19:09[Music]
- 19:14morning
- 19:16jar big smiles today ready
- 19:20today the uh teacher Observer uh
- 19:25Christen moli has been handed an apple
- 19:27by the uh close out
- 19:30through good hope we go
- 19:34today the temperature hits
- 19:3636° 30° colder than any previous shuttle
- 19:40long 2 1 and lift
- 19:44off the 25th Mission and it is
- 19:50toling up three now
- 19:53104% throttle
- 19:5915 seconds
- 20:00velocity I was sitting there and the
- 20:03vehicle ignites and clears the launch
- 20:05Tower and I turned the Bob and Whisper
- 20:07looks like we dodged the Bullet cuz we
- 20:10had all expected it to blow up in the
- 20:11pad cuz that's what the propelling
- 20:13experts and Engineering had told us FL
- 20:15controllers here looking very carefully
- 20:16at the situation obviously a major
- 20:20[Music]
- 20:22malfunction we have a report from a
- 20:24flight Dynamics officer that the vehicle
- 20:26has exploded by director confirms that
- 20:29President Reagan cancels his State of
- 20:31the Union Address to speak to a shocked
- 20:35world the crew of space shuttle
- 20:37Challenger honored us for the manner in
- 20:39which they Liv their lives we will never
- 20:41forget them nor the last time we saw
- 20:44them this morning ladies and
- 20:48gentlemen I now would like to call this
- 20:51first meeting of the presidential
- 20:53commission on the space shuttle
- 20:55Challenger accident to
- 20:57order I
- 20:59want to start with just a couple of uh
- 21:01preliminary remarks as you know NASA
- 21:04presents the commission with various
- 21:06possible reasons for the shuttle failure
- 21:08Roger Bo is one of the engineers called
- 21:10to the hearings to explain how the solid
- 21:12rocket boosters
- 21:14operate according to Bo Morton th Call's
- 21:17lawyers have told him to answer
- 21:19questions but to not offer any extra
- 21:23information he decides not to be
- 21:26silenced my name is r boal and I'm in
- 21:30the structur
- 21:32section and I've been involved with
- 21:34these seals and the Rings basically
- 21:37since coming to thol some 5 and 1/2
- 21:39years
- 21:40ago NASA and Morton thol already suspect
- 21:43that the solid rocket boosters are
- 21:45somehow to blame boet tells the
- 21:47commission he knew a year ago that the
- 21:49O-rings and the solid rocket boosters
- 21:51can fail under some
- 21:53circumstances and that if the primary
- 21:55and backup O-rings both fail the whole
- 21:57launch system could explode it's a
- 22:00revelation to the commission but in
- 22:02hindsight it is no
- 22:04surprise the weekend after the start of
- 22:06the commission the New York Times breaks
- 22:08the story it just concerned me terribly
- 22:11and the O-ring was your concern
- 22:14yes pinan and his colleagues learn of
- 22:17the teleconference the night before
- 22:18launch between NASA and Morton fire call
- 22:21and that the engineers concerns were
- 22:23overruled they start to piece the
- 22:25evidence together it soon becomes clear
- 22:28that the engine Engineers warned about
- 22:29the extreme low temperatures and wanted
- 22:31to postpone the launch the commission
- 22:33focuses on the decisions made the night
- 22:35before the disaster first fan questions
- 22:38Robert lond the chief engineer at Morton
- 22:40thall could you tell me sir the names of
- 22:42your four top seal experts in order of
- 22:45their ability
- 22:47Roger
- 22:49B I think would be first what is your
- 22:52opinion Mr Bo about the seals about the
- 22:54decision that was made were you in
- 22:56agreement with the result of the caucus
- 22:58that decided it was okay to fly no I was
- 23:01not it's now clear to the commission
- 23:03that boet and Thompson's last minute
- 23:05attempts to stop the launch were
- 23:08overruled NASA's Senior Management made
- 23:10the final
- 23:12decision feineman is convinced that the
- 23:14engineers were right and that the cold
- 23:16is at the root of the problem with the
- 23:17media watching closely the Nobel Prize
- 23:20winner is about to use a high school
- 23:21experiment to demonstrate the Fatal
- 23:23design flaw if this material weren't
- 23:26resilient for say a second or to that
- 23:29would be enough to be a very dangerous
- 23:32situation yes sir I took this stuff that
- 23:36I got out of your seal and I uh put it
- 23:38in ice water and I discovered that when
- 23:42you put some pressure on it for a while
- 23:44and then undo it it it doesn't stretch
- 23:46back it stays the same dimension in
- 23:49other words for a few seconds at least
- 23:51there is no resilience in this
- 23:53particular material when it's at a
- 23:55temperature of 32°
- 23:59I believe that has some significance for
- 24:01our problems it is a memorable moment
- 24:04fineman's simple experiment has made the
- 24:05technical problem easy for everyone to
- 24:08understand what is not easy to
- 24:09comprehend is why NASA allowed
- 24:11Challenger to
- 24:12launch they knew the danger took a
- 24:15calculated
- 24:16risk and lost on May 2nd 1986 the
- 24:20presidential commission investigating
- 24:21the Challenger disaster comes to an end
- 24:23it finds that the cause of the explosion
- 24:25is the faulty design of the solid rocket
- 24:27booster joint
- 24:28combined with other factors primarily
- 24:31the effects of cold
- 24:32temperature the commission concludes
- 24:34that no one person is to blame Richard
- 24:38feinan is unhappy he believes the truth
- 24:41has been glossed over and insists that
- 24:43his own conclusions be added to the
- 24:45official report he states that NASA is
- 24:47not communicating effectively with its
- 24:49suppliers and failed to recognize the
- 24:51importance of the oing problem I don't
- 24:54think we've uncovered any Grand
- 24:55conspiracy theories here the truth is
- 24:58much simpler and what we found is that
- 25:00engineers and managers are not
- 25:02communicating effectively it might be
- 25:04that NASA is understating the risks to
- 25:06ensure the supply of government funds or
- 25:09they may simply believe that the shuttle
- 25:10is safer than their Engineers claim NASA
- 25:13owes it to the citizens from whom it
- 25:15asks support to be frank honest and
- 25:18informative so that these citizens can
- 25:20make the wisest decisions for the use of
- 25:22their limited resources for a successful
- 25:26technology reality must take press Ence
- 25:28over public relations because nature
- 25:31canot be fooled 2 years later Richard
- 25:34Fineman dies but with his work on the
- 25:36commission he has done his country one
- 25:38last great service no one at Nasa is
- 25:41held accountable for the disaster Roger
- 25:43Bo's testimony irreparably damages his
- 25:46relationship with his managers and his
- 25:48co-workers he leaves Morton th call just
- 25:50a few months after the commission
- 25:54hearings he never returns I did nothing
- 25:57wrong I did everything right along with
- 25:59my
- 26:01colleagues and we paid a horrific price
- 26:04and and uh that's
- 26:06unfair and I would do it again in
- 26:08heartbeat that's the story of Roger boal
- 26:11a modern day Cassandra he foresaw
- 26:13disaster he foretold disaster but he was
- 26:16incapable of preventing disaster Seven
- 26:19astronauts died in the Challenger
- 26:20accident in 1986 it's a memorable event
- 26:23in the lives of most of us and Roger
- 26:25boal was punished for being a
- 26:27whistleblower I want to thank my
- 26:29producer SIDS and in memory of the seven
- 26:31Challenger astronauts and Roger boal we
- 26:34will close tonight with a little of the
- 26:35funeral March from Pier gint by Edvard
- 26:38Greek
- 26:44[Music]
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