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How Saddam Lost The War To Ayatollah Khomeini | Iran-Iraq War Documentary — Transcript

by Hikma History · 3,133 words · 204 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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  1. 0:05In 1980, war broke out between the Middle  East’s two preeminent powers, Iran and Iraq.
  2. 0:12Both countries were ruled at the time by leaders  that recently come to power - Iraq’s long-serving
  3. 0:18Vice President Saddam Hussein had assumed the  presidency the year before; whilst Iran had
  4. 0:23just emerged from the throes of a revolution  that culminated in Ayatollah Khomeini becoming
  5. 0:29the supreme leader. Starting with an invasion  of Iran, the war soon moved into Iraqi soil;
  6. 0:36before devolving into a deadly stalemate that  cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of
  7. 0:41soldiers on both sides. The conflict was one of  the deadliest of the 20th century, with chemical
  8. 0:48weapons being used as well as WWI-style trench  warfare. The two combatants fought a war for
  9. 0:55the very existence of their regimes, so it is no  surprise that both sides made deals with countries
  10. 1:01they deemed their enemies. All the while the  international community watched with bated breath,
  11. 1:08as the Persian Gulf, the home of much of the  world’s supply of oil, became engulfed in war.
  12. 1:32In the 1970s Iran was a modernizing nation  on the rise. Its huge oil reserves brought an
  13. 1:39influx of cash which was then used to rapidly  develop the country. Its long-time ruler,
  14. 1:44Mohammad Reza Shah wanted Iran to recapture  its past glory after seeing it be at the
  15. 1:50prey of European imperial powers for over a  century. So he quickly sought to modernise
  16. 1:56the country’s military. Spending billions of  dollars, the Shah bought advanced weaponry and
  17. 2:01equipment from countries like the USA  and UK. With its vast array of tanks,
  18. 2:07state of the art fighter jets and impressive  warships, Iran was well on its way to becoming
  19. 2:12one of the world’s most powerful military  force. Regionally, it became the pre-eminent
  20. 2:18power in the Middle East, thanks to its GDP and  military. But beneath this picturesque surface,
  21. 2:25the country faced serious fundamental issues.  Despite the massive windfall from oil, Iran’s
  22. 2:31new-found wealth was only available to a select  class as a result of the rampant nepotism that
  23. 2:37plagued the government. Those who were favoured  by the regime received lucrative contracts and
  24. 2:43positions facilitated by the oil boom. At the same  time, the traditional forces within society were
  25. 2:50alienated by the Shah’s ardent support for Iran’s  westernisation. In 1978, tensions boiled over as
  26. 2:58huge protests, led by the Ulema, started gathering  momentum. Ayatollah Khomeini, from his exile,
  27. 3:05soon emerged as the leader of the anti-regime  movement. In a remarkable sequence of events,
  28. 3:11the Shah stepped down at the beginning of  1979, being replaced by Khomeini. The new
  29. 3:17Supreme Leader of Iran announced Iran was to  be a theocracy, ruled by the Ulema itself.
  30. 3:29Customer declaration - sign Email: [email protected]
  31. 3:29Address: The Nottingham Building  Society, 3 Fulforth Street, NG1 3DL
  32. 3:29My savings are high because of my low living  expenses. As a UFC fighter, many of my expenses
  33. 3:29are taken care of, for example food, healthcare,  travel and training. Some of my accommodation
  34. 3:29is taken care off as well by the UFC. Due to  the intense regiment of training required by
  35. 3:29a professional fighter, I don’t have the need or  the time for any extra activity which may require
  36. 3:29extra expenditure. A significant chunk of my time  that I spend is in Miami, where I train at a which
  37. 3:29provides me with accommodation and food. This allows me the opportunity to solely
  38. 3:30focus on my career whilst building my savings. I split my time between Las Vegas and Miami -
  39. 3:30in both places, my food is taken is care of  because of the places I train at. My biggest
  40. 3:30living expense was rent which I have not been  paying since August, since I’ve moved to Miami
  41. 3:30in which the gym I train at is supplying me  with accommodation. I haven’t been paying car
  42. 3:30insurance since the first quarter of this year  either. My food was taken care of by the UFC
  43. 3:30Performance Institute when I was in Vegas, and  now that I am in Miami it is taken care of by
  44. 3:30my current gym. This means my living expenses  can remain low whilst I increase my savings.
  45. 3:30For neighbouring Iraq, 1979 was also a momentous  year. Saddam Hussein, having already been the
  46. 3:38de-facto ruler of the country for some years,  officially became the president. 2 weeks later,
  47. 3:44in July 1979, he publically purged his Ba’athist  party to assert dominance on the Iraqi political
  48. 3:51scene. In his capacity as Vice President, Saddam  had presided over Iraq’s remarkable growth in
  49. 3:57the 1970s. In many ways this progress mirrored  the same that was experienced by Iran in this
  50. 4:04time period. In 1972, the Iraqi Petroleum Company  was nationalised under the supervision of Saddam;
  51. 4:12a year later, both Iran and Iraq benefitted  hugely from the OPEC oil embargo which saw the
  52. 4:18price of oil triple within a year. Subsequently,  Saddam used the increased oil revenues develop his
  53. 4:25country by building roads, schools and hospitals.  To go hand-in-hand with all this material growth,
  54. 4:32Saddam sought to assert his will on all of Iraqi  society - leading him to invest heavily in his
  55. 4:39secret police. Similar to the Shah of Iran, Saddam  also signed a series of arms deals with foreign
  56. 4:45countries to modernise his military - buying the  latest tanks, fighter jets and attack helicopters
  57. 4:51from countries like France and the USSR. As  his emerging neighbour Iran was plunged into
  58. 4:58revolutionary frenzy, Saddam would watch with keen  interest. Saddam, like much of the ruling elite,
  59. 5:04was Sunni. Despite being excluded from the halls  of power, the Shia actually held a demographic
  60. 5:11majority. Therefore, the ascension of the  Ayatollahs to power in Iran particularly worried
  61. 5:17Saddam about the prospect of his own Shia Iraqis  rising up against him. Especially since Khomeini
  62. 5:24championed the exportation of his revolutionary  ideals abroad. The roots of the danger lay in
  63. 5:31Iraq’s demographics. Despite being ruled by an  entrenched Sunni minority, Iraq’s population was
  64. 5:37predominantly Shia (roughly 60%). For years, the  Shiites had been excluded from the halls of power,
  65. 5:43and they harbored bitter resentments about  the discrimination they endured under the
  66. 5:47Sunni tribal elite. Saddam took this threat  to his survival very seriously. In addition,
  67. 5:54the two countries had a long-standing feud over  the Shatt al-Arab Waterway at the mouth of the
  68. 6:00Persian Gulf. In 1975, Saddam had personally  been involved in the Algiers Agreement,
  69. 6:06which saw Iraq concede its right to the waterway  to the Shah. But he had signed this largely to
  70. 6:12put an end to a Kurdish Rebellion within Iraq,  which was sustained by Iranian support for the
  71. 6:17Kurds. Iran’s new government may have  been crackling with revolutionary zeal,
  72. 6:22but militarily, they were weak. Saddam  saw his opportunity to strangle the
  73. 6:27Ayatollah’s threatening vision in its  crib. As a result, on September 22nd,
  74. 6:331980, squadrons of Iraqi fighters swarmed into  Iranian airspace and attacked a collection of
  75. 6:39bases near Tehran. The Iran-Iraq War had begun. Saddam had envisioned his air attack would have
  76. 6:52the same effect as the Israeli strikes did in  the 6 Day War of 1967. Upon securing aerial
  77. 6:59superiority, he believed Iraqi victory would  be swift and inevitable. Unfortunately for him,
  78. 7:06this did not materialise - the aerial  attack was unsuccessful, only doing
  79. 7:11partial damage to the airbases and destroying an  insignificant number of aircraft. Nonetheless,
  80. 7:18Saddam launched a ground invasion the very next  day - attacking in three separate locations;
  81. 7:24in the north, centre and south. Much of the Iraqi  manpower was dedicated to the southern attack,
  82. 7:31which targeted Iran’s Arab-dominated Khuzestan  province, in the process fully securing the
  83. 7:36Shatt al-Arab. Almost immediately, the Kuzestani  cities of Khorramshahr and Abadan were besieged.
  84. 7:44Both sieges would be protracted and delayed the  Iraqi offensive, thus giving Iran sufficient
  85. 7:50time to stabilise and calculate its strategy.  Although Khorramshahr would be captured by the
  86. 7:56end of October, the Iraqi offensive was seriously  delayed by outnumbered Iranian units who fought
  87. 8:02tooth and nail to defend the city. Abadan,  the site of the famous refinery, took even
  88. 8:08longer - with the siege being dragged out until  September 1981 and ending in an Iranian victory.
  89. 8:16Right from the get-go, Saddam was surprised by  the Iranian response. Considering the political
  90. 8:22turbulence the country had experienced in the  previous few years, he had assumed Iran would
  91. 8:28wither from the pressure of an external attack and  internal upheaval from ordinary Iranians. Instead,
  92. 8:35what he found was a disjointed nation that was  galvanised by a foreign aggressor. Domestically,
  93. 8:41Ayatollah Khomeini was facing threats from all  directions - the MEK were launching attacks on
  94. 8:48high-ranking members of the regime; even  amongst the Ulema, there was dissension
  95. 8:53with Khomeini’s strict vision; segments of  Iranian society itself was becoming alienated
  96. 9:00with the Islamic Republic as it slowly realised  they had replaced one dictator in the Shah with
  97. 9:05another in Khomeini. Rather than capitulating,  Ayatollah Khomeini saw an opportunity to secure
  98. 9:12his Islamic revolution. The military investments  made by the Shah in the previous few decades
  99. 9:18meant that the country still retained fairly  sophisticated weaponry. The Iranian response
  100. 9:24was decisive - in fact just 2 hours after the  initial Iraqi airstrike, Iranian fighter jets
  101. 9:30responded with their own attack. 2 months later  in November, Operation Morvarid prevented Iraqi
  102. 9:37dominance over the Persian Gulf and destroyed  much of the Iraqi Navy. This meant Iraq could
  103. 9:43not entirely blockade the port of Abadan, allowing  Iran to re-supply it by sea and thereby directly
  104. 9:49contributing to the siege’s eventual failure. From early 1981 onwards, Iraqi offensives
  105. 10:00essentially stalled. In January of that year it  was Iran’s turn to go on the offensive, launching
  106. 10:07Operation Nasr. The brainchild of President  Banisadr, it was intended to drive the Iraqis
  107. 10:13out of Khuzestan. But internal turmoil within the  new Iranian government meant that the operation
  108. 10:19would end up becoming a disastrous failure.  Upon ascending to power, Khomeini had purged the
  109. 10:26military of officers whose loyalties he doubted  - countless senior officers were imprisoned,
  110. 10:31executed or fled abroad. At the same time, he  had established the Sepah-e Pasdaran, or the
  111. 10:38Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to ensure the  protection of the Islamic Republic. This resulted
  112. 10:44in a rivalry between the army and the IRGC. To  further confound matters, this rivalry took shape
  113. 10:51politically as the moderate President Banisadr  supported the Army, whilst more hardliner members
  114. 10:57of the government supported the Revolutionary  Guards. So when Operation Nasr failed, it set
  115. 11:03off a chain of events within Iran: Banisadr’s  opponents were emboldened, soon after impeaching
  116. 11:09him in June 1981 - knowing firsthand what happened  to those who fell afoul of the regime, Banisadr
  117. 11:16decided to flee the country. From this point  on, Iran’s government was unified under Islamist
  118. 11:22hardliners who would intensify their grip on power  over the next few years by eliminating all rivals.
  119. 11:30From 1980 to 1983, the regime launched the  Cultural Revolution, seeking to root out
  120. 11:36nonconformist thought amongst institutions  of higher education. Universities were shut
  121. 11:41down for this period. Students and teachers were  purged. Dissident groups like the MEK would fight
  122. 11:48back by unleashing a wave of high profile attacks  on prominent figures of the regime - an attack on
  123. 11:55the Prime Minister’s office in August 1981 left  both the new President Rajaii and Prime Minster
  124. 12:01Bahonar dead. Even the current supreme leader  Ali Khameini was the target of an assassination
  125. 12:07attempt a few months earlier in June 1981. The MEK  would even go on to collaborate with Saddam from
  126. 12:151983 onwards. This revolutionary crisis mode would  come to pass by 1983, and it was to benefit Iran’s
  127. 12:24war effort against Iraq. The rivalry between  the army and the IRGC would also dissipate,
  128. 12:30thereby making coordinated attacks between  the two branches of the military smoother.
  129. 12:40Already by May 1982, Saddam’s forces had been  driven out of Iranian land. At this point,
  130. 12:47Saddam’s strategy changed from holding territory  within Iran to not losing any within Iraq.
  131. 12:54Immediately, Saddam tried to sue for peace. But  Khomeini was uninterested, seeing the benefits
  132. 13:00the war had brought for his regime. The Iranians  did have a major problem on their hands - ever
  133. 13:08since the Hostage Crisis of 1979, they had been  facing severe international sanctions from the US
  134. 13:14and its allies. This meant replacing weapon parts  was extremely difficult; an issue they sought to
  135. 13:21fix by cannibalising parts from other machinery  and turning to the black market. To highlight the
  136. 13:27complexity of geopolitics, Israel became one of  the biggest suppliers of arms to Iran during the
  137. 13:33war. The Israelis first got permission from the  Americans for these arm sales, which totalled to
  138. 13:40tens of billions of dollars. When Israeli PM  Menachem Begin launched an attack on Iraq’s
  139. 13:46Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, it was done with  Iranian intelligence. So even though publically
  140. 13:54the Ayatollahs maintained an antagonistic stance  towards Israel; and even though America publically
  141. 14:00supported the sanctions on Iran, through backdoor,  clandestine means, they did the opposite. The US
  142. 14:06also secretly sold arms to Iran. In 1986, the  Iran-Contra Affair came to light and shocked
  143. 14:12the world. Under the Reagan administration,  America had been selling weapons to Iran,
  144. 14:18using the funds to finance the Nicaraguan Contras,  right-wing rebels fighting against the Marxist
  145. 14:23Sandinista government. This was all the more  embarrassing because of Operation Staunch in 1983,
  146. 14:30where the US tried to diplomatically pressure  other countries to not sell Iran arms. Besides
  147. 14:36these clandestine transactions, Iran mainly relied  on China, Libya and Syria mainly for support in
  148. 14:43arms, logistical and engineering equipment. Iraq, on the other hand, received much more
  149. 14:48international support. Around the time that  the war moved from Iranian to Iraqi territory,
  150. 14:54the oil-rich Gulf countries like Kuwait and Saudi  Arabia started providing Saddam with massive
  151. 15:00loans, fearing Tehran’s warlike and revolutionary  regime would harm their own interests. Syria was
  152. 15:08one of the only Arab countries to stand behind  Iran - shutting down the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline
  153. 15:13from 1982 onwards, resulting in a catastrophic  loss of capital for Saddam, losing billions
  154. 15:20of dollars every month. But support from the  Gulf countries prevented Iraq from bankruptcy,
  155. 15:26with some estimating Saudi Arabia loans alone  to be $1 billion per month! In addition,
  156. 15:32Saddam also received a lot of support from western  countries such as France and West Germany. In
  157. 15:391982, America normalised relations with Iraq and  went on provide the Iraqi dictator with military
  158. 15:46intelligence and sold arms as well. It was crucial  for the US interests in the Middle East for Iraq
  159. 15:52to not lose the war - because it would destabilise  neighbouring countries which had pro-American
  160. 15:58governments; not to mention, the massive  impact an Iranian victory would have on oil.
  161. 16:06Iran’s invasion of Iraq convinced Saddam that he  had to pursue a policy of total war, gearing the
  162. 16:13entire society for Iraq’s defence. So he drafted  even more soldiers into both the regular Iraqi
  163. 16:19army and the Iraqi Popular Army, a paramilitary  force consisting of civilian volunteer. At the
  164. 16:27start of the war, Iran held a clear manpower  advantage; but by 1984, the forces were equal
  165. 16:34in numbers. Just 2 years later, Iraq’s forces were  significantly higher than their foe. By the end of
  166. 16:41the war in 1988, Iraq’s army numbered a million  soldiers, perhaps more; whilst Iran had almost
  167. 16:48half that number. Saddam used this numerical  advantage by employing a defence in depth strategy
  168. 16:55- creating multiple lines of defence that intended  to bleed the Iranians through attrition. This was
  169. 17:02especially effective against the Iranian strategy  of human wave attacks, whereby Iranian infantry
  170. 17:07would try to overwhelm Iraqi defence lines with  sheer numbers. Once parity in army sizes was
  171. 17:14reached, these attacks were favoured less by  the Iranian high command anyway. The Iranian
  172. 17:20objective to break the Iraqi resolve to fight,  but buoyed funding and weapons from the west and
  173. 17:26the Gulf monarchies, Iraq remained resolute. Even  when the Iranians teamed up with the Peshmerga,
  174. 17:33the Iraqi Kurdish resistance movement, to open up  a new front in the north, the deadlock could not
  175. 17:38be broken. From 1982 until 1988, the conflict  consisted of constant Iranian offensives that
  176. 17:46were rebuffed by a determined Iraqi defence.  Unconventional warfare became normalised as
  177. 17:53the two sides settled into a WWI-like trench  warfare. The two sides began targeting civilians,
  178. 18:00with both air forces attacking major cities  from the opposing side in order to terrorise the
  179. 18:06civilian population. From 1984 onwards, the two  countries began targeting each other’s ability to
  180. 18:13export oil in the Persian Gulf, as the global  financial system watched nervously. By 1987,
  181. 18:21American warships intervened by escorting Kuwaiti  tankers which were being attacked by the Iranians.
  182. 18:27Saddam also gave the green light for the use of  chemical weapons; with his close relationship
  183. 18:33to the USA emboldening him to do so without fear  of consequences. The most deadly usage of these
  184. 18:40came just before the war ended, when Saddam  decided to address the Kurds living in the
  185. 18:45north. Accusing them of being a fifth column  for collaborating with Iran, he unleashed a
  186. 18:51brutal campaign against them in 1987. The height  of this operation was in March 1988, in the town
  187. 18:58of Halabja, where Iraqi planes dropped chemical  munitions on defenseless inhabitants who could
  188. 19:04not outrun the roiling clouds of gas. In a single  day, 5,000 men, women and children were killed;
  189. 19:1110,000 more were injured. Whilst it did earn him  the ire of the international community, the Kurds
  190. 19:18were pacified for the time being. Saddam could  now turn his attention back to the Iranian front.
  191. 19:27By 1988, Iran was exhausted - unable to keep up  with Iraq and its powerful allies. By July of
  192. 19:34that year, Iraq had reversed the small Iranian  gains within the country; the key southern port
  193. 19:41city of Basra, which had been besieged multiple  times, was now out of danger. Later that month,
  194. 19:48Khomeini begrudgingly accepted a ceasefire  and by August 1988, the war was over. Up to
  195. 19:55a million Iraqis and Iranians were dead. 700,000  were injured. Neither side gained any territory or
  196. 20:03anything else for that matter. But both sides lost  a great deal. For Iran, whilst the war solidified
  197. 20:10the Ayatollahs grip on power, they had lost human  capital as well as a tremendous amount of money,
  198. 20:17which was compounded by the heavy sanctions  already placed on them from the international
  199. 20:21community. For Iraq, it had entered the war as a  rapidly modernising country that was the envy of
  200. 20:28most of its neighbours; but now found itself as  yet another war-torn 3rd world country. To make
  201. 20:35matters worse, the loans given to it by its rich  Gulf neighbours were going to be recalled, meaning
  202. 20:42that it was now going to face bankruptcy. Saddam’s  response to Kuwait asking for its money led to
  203. 20:48the Gulf War just 2 years later, at which point  Iraq suffered the same fate as Iran - becoming an
  204. 20:55international pariah, as its erstwhile ally  America turned on Saddam by vilifying him.

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