How Saddam Lost The War To Ayatollah Khomeini | Iran-Iraq War Documentary — Transcript
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- 0:05In 1980, war broke out between the Middle East’s two preeminent powers, Iran and Iraq.
- 0:12Both countries were ruled at the time by leaders that recently come to power - Iraq’s long-serving
- 0:18Vice President Saddam Hussein had assumed the presidency the year before; whilst Iran had
- 0:23just emerged from the throes of a revolution that culminated in Ayatollah Khomeini becoming
- 0:29the supreme leader. Starting with an invasion of Iran, the war soon moved into Iraqi soil;
- 0:36before devolving into a deadly stalemate that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of
- 0:41soldiers on both sides. The conflict was one of the deadliest of the 20th century, with chemical
- 0:48weapons being used as well as WWI-style trench warfare. The two combatants fought a war for
- 0:55the very existence of their regimes, so it is no surprise that both sides made deals with countries
- 1:01they deemed their enemies. All the while the international community watched with bated breath,
- 1:08as the Persian Gulf, the home of much of the world’s supply of oil, became engulfed in war.
- 1:32In the 1970s Iran was a modernizing nation on the rise. Its huge oil reserves brought an
- 1:39influx of cash which was then used to rapidly develop the country. Its long-time ruler,
- 1:44Mohammad Reza Shah wanted Iran to recapture its past glory after seeing it be at the
- 1:50prey of European imperial powers for over a century. So he quickly sought to modernise
- 1:56the country’s military. Spending billions of dollars, the Shah bought advanced weaponry and
- 2:01equipment from countries like the USA and UK. With its vast array of tanks,
- 2:07state of the art fighter jets and impressive warships, Iran was well on its way to becoming
- 2:12one of the world’s most powerful military force. Regionally, it became the pre-eminent
- 2:18power in the Middle East, thanks to its GDP and military. But beneath this picturesque surface,
- 2:25the country faced serious fundamental issues. Despite the massive windfall from oil, Iran’s
- 2:31new-found wealth was only available to a select class as a result of the rampant nepotism that
- 2:37plagued the government. Those who were favoured by the regime received lucrative contracts and
- 2:43positions facilitated by the oil boom. At the same time, the traditional forces within society were
- 2:50alienated by the Shah’s ardent support for Iran’s westernisation. In 1978, tensions boiled over as
- 2:58huge protests, led by the Ulema, started gathering momentum. Ayatollah Khomeini, from his exile,
- 3:05soon emerged as the leader of the anti-regime movement. In a remarkable sequence of events,
- 3:11the Shah stepped down at the beginning of 1979, being replaced by Khomeini. The new
- 3:17Supreme Leader of Iran announced Iran was to be a theocracy, ruled by the Ulema itself.
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- 3:29are taken care of, for example food, healthcare, travel and training. Some of my accommodation
- 3:29is taken care off as well by the UFC. Due to the intense regiment of training required by
- 3:29a professional fighter, I don’t have the need or the time for any extra activity which may require
- 3:29extra expenditure. A significant chunk of my time that I spend is in Miami, where I train at a which
- 3:29provides me with accommodation and food. This allows me the opportunity to solely
- 3:30focus on my career whilst building my savings. I split my time between Las Vegas and Miami -
- 3:30in both places, my food is taken is care of because of the places I train at. My biggest
- 3:30living expense was rent which I have not been paying since August, since I’ve moved to Miami
- 3:30in which the gym I train at is supplying me with accommodation. I haven’t been paying car
- 3:30insurance since the first quarter of this year either. My food was taken care of by the UFC
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- 3:30my current gym. This means my living expenses can remain low whilst I increase my savings.
- 3:30For neighbouring Iraq, 1979 was also a momentous year. Saddam Hussein, having already been the
- 3:38de-facto ruler of the country for some years, officially became the president. 2 weeks later,
- 3:44in July 1979, he publically purged his Ba’athist party to assert dominance on the Iraqi political
- 3:51scene. In his capacity as Vice President, Saddam had presided over Iraq’s remarkable growth in
- 3:57the 1970s. In many ways this progress mirrored the same that was experienced by Iran in this
- 4:04time period. In 1972, the Iraqi Petroleum Company was nationalised under the supervision of Saddam;
- 4:12a year later, both Iran and Iraq benefitted hugely from the OPEC oil embargo which saw the
- 4:18price of oil triple within a year. Subsequently, Saddam used the increased oil revenues develop his
- 4:25country by building roads, schools and hospitals. To go hand-in-hand with all this material growth,
- 4:32Saddam sought to assert his will on all of Iraqi society - leading him to invest heavily in his
- 4:39secret police. Similar to the Shah of Iran, Saddam also signed a series of arms deals with foreign
- 4:45countries to modernise his military - buying the latest tanks, fighter jets and attack helicopters
- 4:51from countries like France and the USSR. As his emerging neighbour Iran was plunged into
- 4:58revolutionary frenzy, Saddam would watch with keen interest. Saddam, like much of the ruling elite,
- 5:04was Sunni. Despite being excluded from the halls of power, the Shia actually held a demographic
- 5:11majority. Therefore, the ascension of the Ayatollahs to power in Iran particularly worried
- 5:17Saddam about the prospect of his own Shia Iraqis rising up against him. Especially since Khomeini
- 5:24championed the exportation of his revolutionary ideals abroad. The roots of the danger lay in
- 5:31Iraq’s demographics. Despite being ruled by an entrenched Sunni minority, Iraq’s population was
- 5:37predominantly Shia (roughly 60%). For years, the Shiites had been excluded from the halls of power,
- 5:43and they harbored bitter resentments about the discrimination they endured under the
- 5:47Sunni tribal elite. Saddam took this threat to his survival very seriously. In addition,
- 5:54the two countries had a long-standing feud over the Shatt al-Arab Waterway at the mouth of the
- 6:00Persian Gulf. In 1975, Saddam had personally been involved in the Algiers Agreement,
- 6:06which saw Iraq concede its right to the waterway to the Shah. But he had signed this largely to
- 6:12put an end to a Kurdish Rebellion within Iraq, which was sustained by Iranian support for the
- 6:17Kurds. Iran’s new government may have been crackling with revolutionary zeal,
- 6:22but militarily, they were weak. Saddam saw his opportunity to strangle the
- 6:27Ayatollah’s threatening vision in its crib. As a result, on September 22nd,
- 6:331980, squadrons of Iraqi fighters swarmed into Iranian airspace and attacked a collection of
- 6:39bases near Tehran. The Iran-Iraq War had begun. Saddam had envisioned his air attack would have
- 6:52the same effect as the Israeli strikes did in the 6 Day War of 1967. Upon securing aerial
- 6:59superiority, he believed Iraqi victory would be swift and inevitable. Unfortunately for him,
- 7:06this did not materialise - the aerial attack was unsuccessful, only doing
- 7:11partial damage to the airbases and destroying an insignificant number of aircraft. Nonetheless,
- 7:18Saddam launched a ground invasion the very next day - attacking in three separate locations;
- 7:24in the north, centre and south. Much of the Iraqi manpower was dedicated to the southern attack,
- 7:31which targeted Iran’s Arab-dominated Khuzestan province, in the process fully securing the
- 7:36Shatt al-Arab. Almost immediately, the Kuzestani cities of Khorramshahr and Abadan were besieged.
- 7:44Both sieges would be protracted and delayed the Iraqi offensive, thus giving Iran sufficient
- 7:50time to stabilise and calculate its strategy. Although Khorramshahr would be captured by the
- 7:56end of October, the Iraqi offensive was seriously delayed by outnumbered Iranian units who fought
- 8:02tooth and nail to defend the city. Abadan, the site of the famous refinery, took even
- 8:08longer - with the siege being dragged out until September 1981 and ending in an Iranian victory.
- 8:16Right from the get-go, Saddam was surprised by the Iranian response. Considering the political
- 8:22turbulence the country had experienced in the previous few years, he had assumed Iran would
- 8:28wither from the pressure of an external attack and internal upheaval from ordinary Iranians. Instead,
- 8:35what he found was a disjointed nation that was galvanised by a foreign aggressor. Domestically,
- 8:41Ayatollah Khomeini was facing threats from all directions - the MEK were launching attacks on
- 8:48high-ranking members of the regime; even amongst the Ulema, there was dissension
- 8:53with Khomeini’s strict vision; segments of Iranian society itself was becoming alienated
- 9:00with the Islamic Republic as it slowly realised they had replaced one dictator in the Shah with
- 9:05another in Khomeini. Rather than capitulating, Ayatollah Khomeini saw an opportunity to secure
- 9:12his Islamic revolution. The military investments made by the Shah in the previous few decades
- 9:18meant that the country still retained fairly sophisticated weaponry. The Iranian response
- 9:24was decisive - in fact just 2 hours after the initial Iraqi airstrike, Iranian fighter jets
- 9:30responded with their own attack. 2 months later in November, Operation Morvarid prevented Iraqi
- 9:37dominance over the Persian Gulf and destroyed much of the Iraqi Navy. This meant Iraq could
- 9:43not entirely blockade the port of Abadan, allowing Iran to re-supply it by sea and thereby directly
- 9:49contributing to the siege’s eventual failure. From early 1981 onwards, Iraqi offensives
- 10:00essentially stalled. In January of that year it was Iran’s turn to go on the offensive, launching
- 10:07Operation Nasr. The brainchild of President Banisadr, it was intended to drive the Iraqis
- 10:13out of Khuzestan. But internal turmoil within the new Iranian government meant that the operation
- 10:19would end up becoming a disastrous failure. Upon ascending to power, Khomeini had purged the
- 10:26military of officers whose loyalties he doubted - countless senior officers were imprisoned,
- 10:31executed or fled abroad. At the same time, he had established the Sepah-e Pasdaran, or the
- 10:38Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to ensure the protection of the Islamic Republic. This resulted
- 10:44in a rivalry between the army and the IRGC. To further confound matters, this rivalry took shape
- 10:51politically as the moderate President Banisadr supported the Army, whilst more hardliner members
- 10:57of the government supported the Revolutionary Guards. So when Operation Nasr failed, it set
- 11:03off a chain of events within Iran: Banisadr’s opponents were emboldened, soon after impeaching
- 11:09him in June 1981 - knowing firsthand what happened to those who fell afoul of the regime, Banisadr
- 11:16decided to flee the country. From this point on, Iran’s government was unified under Islamist
- 11:22hardliners who would intensify their grip on power over the next few years by eliminating all rivals.
- 11:30From 1980 to 1983, the regime launched the Cultural Revolution, seeking to root out
- 11:36nonconformist thought amongst institutions of higher education. Universities were shut
- 11:41down for this period. Students and teachers were purged. Dissident groups like the MEK would fight
- 11:48back by unleashing a wave of high profile attacks on prominent figures of the regime - an attack on
- 11:55the Prime Minister’s office in August 1981 left both the new President Rajaii and Prime Minster
- 12:01Bahonar dead. Even the current supreme leader Ali Khameini was the target of an assassination
- 12:07attempt a few months earlier in June 1981. The MEK would even go on to collaborate with Saddam from
- 12:151983 onwards. This revolutionary crisis mode would come to pass by 1983, and it was to benefit Iran’s
- 12:24war effort against Iraq. The rivalry between the army and the IRGC would also dissipate,
- 12:30thereby making coordinated attacks between the two branches of the military smoother.
- 12:40Already by May 1982, Saddam’s forces had been driven out of Iranian land. At this point,
- 12:47Saddam’s strategy changed from holding territory within Iran to not losing any within Iraq.
- 12:54Immediately, Saddam tried to sue for peace. But Khomeini was uninterested, seeing the benefits
- 13:00the war had brought for his regime. The Iranians did have a major problem on their hands - ever
- 13:08since the Hostage Crisis of 1979, they had been facing severe international sanctions from the US
- 13:14and its allies. This meant replacing weapon parts was extremely difficult; an issue they sought to
- 13:21fix by cannibalising parts from other machinery and turning to the black market. To highlight the
- 13:27complexity of geopolitics, Israel became one of the biggest suppliers of arms to Iran during the
- 13:33war. The Israelis first got permission from the Americans for these arm sales, which totalled to
- 13:40tens of billions of dollars. When Israeli PM Menachem Begin launched an attack on Iraq’s
- 13:46Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, it was done with Iranian intelligence. So even though publically
- 13:54the Ayatollahs maintained an antagonistic stance towards Israel; and even though America publically
- 14:00supported the sanctions on Iran, through backdoor, clandestine means, they did the opposite. The US
- 14:06also secretly sold arms to Iran. In 1986, the Iran-Contra Affair came to light and shocked
- 14:12the world. Under the Reagan administration, America had been selling weapons to Iran,
- 14:18using the funds to finance the Nicaraguan Contras, right-wing rebels fighting against the Marxist
- 14:23Sandinista government. This was all the more embarrassing because of Operation Staunch in 1983,
- 14:30where the US tried to diplomatically pressure other countries to not sell Iran arms. Besides
- 14:36these clandestine transactions, Iran mainly relied on China, Libya and Syria mainly for support in
- 14:43arms, logistical and engineering equipment. Iraq, on the other hand, received much more
- 14:48international support. Around the time that the war moved from Iranian to Iraqi territory,
- 14:54the oil-rich Gulf countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia started providing Saddam with massive
- 15:00loans, fearing Tehran’s warlike and revolutionary regime would harm their own interests. Syria was
- 15:08one of the only Arab countries to stand behind Iran - shutting down the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline
- 15:13from 1982 onwards, resulting in a catastrophic loss of capital for Saddam, losing billions
- 15:20of dollars every month. But support from the Gulf countries prevented Iraq from bankruptcy,
- 15:26with some estimating Saudi Arabia loans alone to be $1 billion per month! In addition,
- 15:32Saddam also received a lot of support from western countries such as France and West Germany. In
- 15:391982, America normalised relations with Iraq and went on provide the Iraqi dictator with military
- 15:46intelligence and sold arms as well. It was crucial for the US interests in the Middle East for Iraq
- 15:52to not lose the war - because it would destabilise neighbouring countries which had pro-American
- 15:58governments; not to mention, the massive impact an Iranian victory would have on oil.
- 16:06Iran’s invasion of Iraq convinced Saddam that he had to pursue a policy of total war, gearing the
- 16:13entire society for Iraq’s defence. So he drafted even more soldiers into both the regular Iraqi
- 16:19army and the Iraqi Popular Army, a paramilitary force consisting of civilian volunteer. At the
- 16:27start of the war, Iran held a clear manpower advantage; but by 1984, the forces were equal
- 16:34in numbers. Just 2 years later, Iraq’s forces were significantly higher than their foe. By the end of
- 16:41the war in 1988, Iraq’s army numbered a million soldiers, perhaps more; whilst Iran had almost
- 16:48half that number. Saddam used this numerical advantage by employing a defence in depth strategy
- 16:55- creating multiple lines of defence that intended to bleed the Iranians through attrition. This was
- 17:02especially effective against the Iranian strategy of human wave attacks, whereby Iranian infantry
- 17:07would try to overwhelm Iraqi defence lines with sheer numbers. Once parity in army sizes was
- 17:14reached, these attacks were favoured less by the Iranian high command anyway. The Iranian
- 17:20objective to break the Iraqi resolve to fight, but buoyed funding and weapons from the west and
- 17:26the Gulf monarchies, Iraq remained resolute. Even when the Iranians teamed up with the Peshmerga,
- 17:33the Iraqi Kurdish resistance movement, to open up a new front in the north, the deadlock could not
- 17:38be broken. From 1982 until 1988, the conflict consisted of constant Iranian offensives that
- 17:46were rebuffed by a determined Iraqi defence. Unconventional warfare became normalised as
- 17:53the two sides settled into a WWI-like trench warfare. The two sides began targeting civilians,
- 18:00with both air forces attacking major cities from the opposing side in order to terrorise the
- 18:06civilian population. From 1984 onwards, the two countries began targeting each other’s ability to
- 18:13export oil in the Persian Gulf, as the global financial system watched nervously. By 1987,
- 18:21American warships intervened by escorting Kuwaiti tankers which were being attacked by the Iranians.
- 18:27Saddam also gave the green light for the use of chemical weapons; with his close relationship
- 18:33to the USA emboldening him to do so without fear of consequences. The most deadly usage of these
- 18:40came just before the war ended, when Saddam decided to address the Kurds living in the
- 18:45north. Accusing them of being a fifth column for collaborating with Iran, he unleashed a
- 18:51brutal campaign against them in 1987. The height of this operation was in March 1988, in the town
- 18:58of Halabja, where Iraqi planes dropped chemical munitions on defenseless inhabitants who could
- 19:04not outrun the roiling clouds of gas. In a single day, 5,000 men, women and children were killed;
- 19:1110,000 more were injured. Whilst it did earn him the ire of the international community, the Kurds
- 19:18were pacified for the time being. Saddam could now turn his attention back to the Iranian front.
- 19:27By 1988, Iran was exhausted - unable to keep up with Iraq and its powerful allies. By July of
- 19:34that year, Iraq had reversed the small Iranian gains within the country; the key southern port
- 19:41city of Basra, which had been besieged multiple times, was now out of danger. Later that month,
- 19:48Khomeini begrudgingly accepted a ceasefire and by August 1988, the war was over. Up to
- 19:55a million Iraqis and Iranians were dead. 700,000 were injured. Neither side gained any territory or
- 20:03anything else for that matter. But both sides lost a great deal. For Iran, whilst the war solidified
- 20:10the Ayatollahs grip on power, they had lost human capital as well as a tremendous amount of money,
- 20:17which was compounded by the heavy sanctions already placed on them from the international
- 20:21community. For Iraq, it had entered the war as a rapidly modernising country that was the envy of
- 20:28most of its neighbours; but now found itself as yet another war-torn 3rd world country. To make
- 20:35matters worse, the loans given to it by its rich Gulf neighbours were going to be recalled, meaning
- 20:42that it was now going to face bankruptcy. Saddam’s response to Kuwait asking for its money led to
- 20:48the Gulf War just 2 years later, at which point Iraq suffered the same fate as Iran - becoming an
- 20:55international pariah, as its erstwhile ally America turned on Saddam by vilifying him.
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