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Guerre en Iran. Quelles questions stratégiques ? — Transcript

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0:18War in Iran: The Strategic Implications.
0:21Recent events have compelled a recalibration of our
0:24Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique agenda to concentrate on the ongoing situation in Iran.
0:29We’re recording this session on the sixth day into the ongoing airstrikes.
0:33Navigating the sheer volume of daily reports and the complexity of these
0:38rapidly changing circumstances, we have opted to explore this topic
0:43through the lens of key strategic questions, setting aside the immediate
0:46need for reactive analysis.
0:48The decision by Israel and the USA to attack Iran is
0:53significant and will inevitably have major geopolitical consequences.
0:56However, to understand these consequences, we should first examine the
0:59current strategic implications.
1:01We’ll tackle these issues with Fabrice Ravel.
1:04Hello, Fabrice. Hello, Olivier.
1:06Hello, everyone.
1:08As we are in the thick of current events, drawing lessons from
1:13unfolding events presents a challenge.
1:14We will thus take a slightly unconventional approach.
1:16Rather than providing immediate answers, we will pose questions that I am sure will
1:20prove to be highly instructive.
1:22By framing our discussion around the questions raised in the title:
1:27‘The Strategic Implications’,
1:29we simply want to highlight that it is
1:33far too early— as we are only
1:39on the sixth day of the war—
1:42to draw any lessons or definitive conclusions
1:46capable of standing the test of time.
1:52War takes a long time, and sometimes a very long time,
1:56whereas media reactions are often particularly short-lived.
2:01I’ll start with a quick
2:06clarification of terms before outlining the essential
2:11geopolitical and strategic questions we need to address.
2:14Regarding the term 'war': make no mistake, irrespective of the conflict's duration,
2:22we are indeed talking about a war.
2:25Given the direct confrontation between three states and the sheer scale of the
2:29military resources deployed, the current situation
2:32far exceeds the scope of the June 2025 operation.
2:37As we begin to outline the key strategic issues,
2:43we’ll soon realise just how many there are.
2:47This point is critical in its own right: the sheer scale alone of
2:52the conflict we are defining today illustrates the gravity of
3:00the consequences we should expect in geopolitical
3:03and geostrategic terms.
3:05I believe five aspects merit particular attention.
3:10Let’s start with an essential first one: what are the
3:15real objectives of the three main belligerents?
3:21Second, what can historical precedents teach us about the current geopolitical logic?
3:27In other words, what trends are already taking shape,
3:32and what are their likely outcomes
3:34as we map them out?
3:36Third, it’s also critical to wonder what will be
3:41the reaction of American society to
3:45the outbreak of a conflict in Iran.
3:47Fourth: what military resources are actually
3:51available to US forces in this conflict, and do they align with their stated objectives?
3:57Finally, we must consider the fifth, and perhaps
4:02most evident, question: what strategic shifts will this war in Iran
4:08trigger within China and Beijing’s outlook?
4:11This question clearly arises because the conflict will
4:15undoubtedly trigger a review of strategic posture,
4:22likely concentrated along a singular axis.
4:26Having established these objectives, let’s now examine
4:30them in greater detail.
4:31First: the objectives driving the belligerents.
4:34As I map out this hierarchy, I will begin with
4:39the belligerent whose objectives are most transparent,
4:43before moving on to address the belligerents
4:47whose objectives are more numerous, complex,
4:52but also less immediately apparent.
4:57For Israel, the objective is clear:
5:00the definitive dismantlement and eradication of the Islamic Republic’s
5:06political system as it exists in Iran.
5:08There’s no need to dwell on this at length.
5:10That objective is so clear it requires no elaboration.
5:15Turning to the Islamic Republic of Iran, however,
5:18the strategic reality is significantly more complex.
5:23There is an inherent symmetry that appears quite readily:
5:28for the Islamic Republic of Iran, the primary objective is to survive this
5:33war and these attacks, and to take up a long-term position.
5:37Among the events of the first six days,
5:42one in particular warrants close examination in
5:48this context of this question.
5:50Which event in particular?
5:52Notably, Iran initiated a broad series of airstrikes against
5:56numerous neighbours, demonstrating the full operational range of its
6:01ballistic missile and drone arsenal.
6:02This entails two possible interpretations.
6:05What are these two interpretations?
6:08Some observers offer a somewhat simplistic
6:12interpretation: they argue that
6:19these attacks are disorganised and aimless.
6:23They suggest that the intensity of American and Israeli strikes,
6:29coupled with the disarray of the Iranian
6:32political establishment, has dismantled the coherence
6:36of the leadership, leaving individual units
6:40and commanders to act without
6:44any real consultation.
6:46That suggests a disintegrating Iranian regime, signalling the onset of collapse or panic.
6:53Perhaps.
6:54However, there is a second interpretation: that this
6:57is an entirely controlled and planned strategy, designed to
7:01achieve a series of objectives.
7:03There are at least four objectives that I would highlight.
7:08I can describe them as concentric circles;
7:11each successive layer possesses a broader and
7:16more general scope as it expands.
7:21The first circle is clearly
7:25the intention to try to destabilise all regional actors and,
7:30beyond that, international actors, by targeting in particular all energy
7:34facilities, whether they are production sites—which appear to be
7:38intended for export—but also consumption centres, in order to
7:44destabilise these societies and pressure them into urging the USA and Israel
7:50to end the war as quickly as possible.
7:52However, upon closer reflection, a second circle emerges.
7:57This second circle involves leveraging the sentiments of minority Shia
8:02communities within Iran's sphere of influence.
8:05Bear in mind that while I did say minority, the Shia community actually
8:09holds the majority in Iraq.
8:11The underlying intent clearly seeks to shatter
8:16the complacency of regional observers, compelling them to
8:20focus on what’s happening in Iran and ultimately
8:26entangling them in the broader conflict.
8:30There may also be a third circle that builds upon
8:34the one I have just outlined.
8:36Beyond mere Shia sensibilities, Iran appears to be cultivating a broader
8:41appeal to the imagination of the wider Muslim world, spanning both
8:46Shia and Sunni populations. Through these actions, they intend to
8:50underscore their status as a frontline combatant against the USA and Israel,
8:57effectively framing their operations within the context
9:03of civilisational solidarity.
9:04I would argue that this approach is highly sophisticated,
9:11as it aims to create a significant rift or drive a wedge between these populations
9:17and their political leadership. In particular, the Gulf monarchies
9:20—despite their close strategic alignment with the United States—could face
9:24a critical disconnect as their domestic public opinions begins to shift.
9:27Extending this framework, we should consider a fourth circle,
9:32one frequently disregarded, which posits a transition into
9:38total systemic disintegration. Should Iran’s state structure collapse, we face
9:45two distinct and divergent strategic trajectories.
9:48Either a revolution, or a civil war.
9:51A pertinent question is why the Gulf governments
9:56seem so wary of sudden revolutions
10:03or major schisms on their doorstep.
10:11They likely fear that such instability could, through
10:16a contagion effect, trigger similar domestic
10:20movements within their own borders.
10:23In my view, this interpretation is far more rational,
10:28considered, and strategic, particularly since
10:32it provides a framework that allows us to move beyond
10:35basic questions and derive more profound strategic insights.
10:40You’ve mentioned two belligerents, but there is still a third one
10:44that we haven’t addressed yet.
10:45It’s the USA, whose objectives seem less clear
10:47if one is to believe the comments.
10:49That’s putting it mildly.
10:51Because you might start by pointing out that we seem to be wavering between
10:57three different objectives.
11:00We could even imagine four if we combine these three objectives
11:03that I am about to outline.
11:05Because ultimately, what is Washington’s primary objective?
11:11Essentially, it’s to definitively prevent Iran from gaining access to,
11:16or developing, a nuclear weapon.
11:20First objective.
11:21Beyond that, is the objective not only to prevent Iran from
11:25having nuclear weapons, but also to stop Teheran from having
11:29intercontinental ballistic missiles —which would clearly escalate the existing
11:34threat by enhancing Iran’s military capabilities?
11:37That is a second possibility.
11:39Alternatively, is the third objective
11:43simply the famous ‘regime change’, in the mould of past American interventions
11:49—most notably the 2003 invasion of Iraq?
11:55That essentially defines the neoconservative approach.
11:58It’s an approach that has been notably criticised by Donald Trump.
12:01This point is certainly worth reiterating.
12:05In fact, it could be all three at once.
12:06However, I think it is essential, right from
12:11the outset as we set out our arguments, to clarify this point
12:18and perhaps consider another possibility.
12:23I believe we must completely challenge the assumption that
12:29the United States is intervening in Iran
12:33to weaken China’s crude oil supply.
12:38This is quite simply a line of reasoning that is not only
12:44flawed, but also constitutes a serious geostrategic misinterpretation.
12:48Why?
12:49Firstly, because the ones who subscribe to this
12:53line of thinking often have a tendency to be overly swayed by an initial figure,
12:58namely the figure for Iran’s crude oil exports to China.
13:02And it is true that this figure is misleading at first glance because,
13:09in percentage terms, China accounts for over 80% of Iranian oil exports.
13:17But if we look closer at the data—where precision is vital—
13:20what do we see?
13:22While oil represents 80% of Iranian exports, it accounted for barely 11%
13:31of Chinese imports in both 2024 and 2025.
13:34This reinforces a point we emphasised in
13:38a previous session: Saudi Arabia & Iran from Another Lens.
13:43As I noted then, we must be wary
13:48of these figures; focusing on a single metric
13:52leads to a fundamental misinterpretation of the data and its underlying reality.
13:57I would add two additional points
14:02to further substantiate this approach.
14:06Firstly, let’s consider that for China,
14:09substituting 11% of their imports with Russian supplies deepens
14:14their alignment with Moscow, which, in turn, further helps finance
14:19Russia’s war in Ukraine.
14:20Moreover, it is far from clear how an deepening Russia-China alignment
14:24serves American interests.
14:27Finally, there is a third consideration:
14:30if the conflict persists, China might be tempted
14:37—either openly or covertly— to provide Iran
14:42with material support. Through such an
14:47agreement, Beijing could signal
14:52to Tehran that closing the Strait of Hormuz
14:57would be ill-advised, as it would not only disrupt
15:01Chinese imports but also cripple Iran’s own
15:05capacity to export.
15:07In fact, the geostrategic miscalculation is such
15:11that one may even argue that it is in the Chinese interest to ensure
15:15that this war between the USA and Iran drags on.
15:19We will have the opportunity to expand on
15:22this point later.
15:25Having made that clarification,
15:29we must now consider a possibility
15:33that may be less satisfying for
15:38the Iranian people:
15:43perhaps Washington is not actually seeking regime change,
15:48but simply wants to change its point of contact.
15:53Effectively, this means that Washington is
15:56orchestrating what is essentially a palace coup.
15:59What they are really aiming for is
16:04a situation where Iranian leaders will
16:10eventually say: OK, we’ve had enough of this war.
16:14Perhaps we should change some of our policies; we’ll
16:17drop the nuclear programme, end ballistic missile development, and
16:21to remain in power, we’ll perhaps even...
16:25change alliances’—Something we saw very often during the Cold War.
16:29Alliances are inherently dynamic, evolving as geopolitical interests shift.
16:34Ironically, this means that we now find
16:38Iran more closely aligned with the United States
16:45than with China or Russia.
16:48And it is clear from what I am saying that
16:52American objectives are manifold and as
16:57international dynamics take hold,
17:02they will drive shifts that will inevitably
17:06depend on how these events unfold.
17:11Rather than focusing on a single objective, we should recognise that there are
17:15actually many objectives. The real challenge lies in seeing how they interact in terms
17:19of context and geopolitical dynamics,
17:21which will influence the objectives.
17:23Yes.
17:24To fully understand how this conflict is developing,
17:28we must consider four distinct
17:31geopolitical logics. As these
17:34patterns have recurred throughout history
17:39—a process we established through our scenario method—
17:47they allow us to identify the major trends
17:51that are already beginning to emerge.
17:53First, there is a principle that I find essential, yet
17:57it is rarely discussed.
17:59Regardless of the justification put forward by a foreign army
18:05—even if the goal is to bring democracy
18:09or freedom— there is no example in
18:14geopolitical history where a prolonged conflict does not
18:18eventually lead the local population to view
18:23those forces as invaders rather than liberators.
18:28I believe this is a point of critical importance.
18:31Secondly, there is no precedent in modern
18:36history for a war being won solely through the use of air power.
18:40In fact, we already demonstrated this point in
18:43a previous Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique session back in June 2025 on
18:48whether air power was enough to secure victory.
18:53The answer is no.
18:55This is best summarised by Liddell Hart’s incisive observation:
19:02you cannot take prisoners with a bomber flying through the sky.
19:06Thirdly, I must emphasise a point that warrants further attention:
19:15if the conflict is protracted, even if we were to achieve the objective of
19:21weakening or dismantling the Iranian regime,
19:27how would we manage the inevitable centrifugal forces
19:30that would follow?
19:32Such forces are particularly likely to manifest in Iran,
19:35where two groups stand out: the Kurds and the Baluchis.
19:40It would be a strategic error, in my view,
19:44to assume that Washington would view such an outcome as desirable.
19:48We have touched on this point several times before
19:51in various sessions, and it is a recurring theme
19:56in our analysis.
19:59It is worth revisiting the concept introduced by Zbigniew Brzezinski in
20:04The Grand Chessboard, published in the 1990s.
20:07We could call it: Geopolitical Anarchy;
20:10or even: Strategic Vacuum.
20:12In chapter four, Brzezinski called it: the Black Hole.
20:16Essentially, this would mean replacing a region of relative stability.
20:22Such an outcome is a realistic geopolitical risk: the implosion
20:28of a nation that is the world’s 18th largest by area, with 90 million
20:33inhabitants, would plunge it into instability. This would involve a
20:37multitude of peoples whose actions one can legitimately understand,
20:42yet whose actions will inevitably bring disorder to the region,
20:47one capable of triggering a seismic shift with
20:52aftershocks extending into the Middle East
20:56and Pakistan.
20:59Clearly, this instability would derail Washington’s ambitions
21:04to achieve the objectives mentioned previously.
21:10The fourth factor—which will have the greatest influence on
21:16the course of events— is the question of time:
21:22who controls the temporal dimension, and who could gain the advantage with time?
21:28Certainly. Our next questions will reveal that this is
21:33indeed a critical consideration.
21:35Indeed, this question of time sits at the intersection of geopolitical logics
21:39and domestic affairs, since the American public’s reaction
21:42will significantly impact the objectives set by Washington.
21:46In this regard, what aspects should be considered?
21:48There are two key indicators that we must monitor throughout
21:54the entire duration of the war.
22:00The first indicator is the public approval ratings
22:04concerning the US President’s decision.
22:08We can turn to the initial polling —and we know how closely Americans
22:11monitor such data, don’t we, Olivier?—
22:13Initial polls indicate that the level of support from the
22:19American people concerning this war in Iran is 21%.
22:24I believe there are two factors that can
22:30explain this figure. First, it’s really low.
22:33Extremely low, especially for the outset of a war;
22:36it indicates that four out of five Americans
22:40opposed the United States entering this war.
22:43Another point worth highlighting is that qualitative data
22:47suggests that among the specific segments of the population
22:54that supported and
22:57voted for Donald Trump, this level of opposition
23:00is even more pronounced.
23:03This stems from Donald Trump’s repeated campaign
23:08emphasis that —unlike his predecessors—
23:12he did not want to commit the United States to
23:17"forever wars": conflicts like the twenty-year war
23:22in Afghanistan that drag on indefinitely.
23:24This prospect of protracted warfare
23:30leads me to our second key indicator:
23:35How will the American public react to casualties in the long term?
23:42We must be very careful with our
23:46assumptions here. While the quantitative dimension is clearly significant,
23:53the emotional and communicative impact is paramount.
24:00This brings us to the legacy of the Vietnam War:
24:04what crippled the US position there wasn't just the death toll,
24:08but the fact that the victims were no longer faceless.
24:12We will return to this in another session.
24:16As the names and stories of the fallen emerge, they rapidly erode
24:22public approval ratings.
24:25A proliferation of such instances would further destabilise
24:29an electorate already hesitant to
24:35support this war.
24:39In this regard, you may remember
24:43John F. Kennedy’s famous quip: Defeat is an orphan,
24:47but victory has a hundred fathers.
24:51In other words, for the US President,
24:55this war must be won.
24:56It is a point I made during a past RDVG session,
25:01which, ironically, took up
25:06a rather paradoxical question:
25:09Must one, paradoxically, be bold to prevail in geopolitics?
25:13I invoked the Dukes of Burgundy to highlight that, ultimately, the
25:17line between boldness and recklessness is a fine one, and that history
25:22judges this distinction solely through the prism of
25:26victory or defeat.
25:28This distinction will also be a defining issue
25:33as this war unfolds.
25:34To determine whether strategic objectives are achievable, we must weigh them
25:39against the resources made available to achieve the objectives.
25:43This leads me to consider the current state of United States military deployment.
25:46How should we assess it today?
25:49There are four characteristics, or four aspects if you like,
25:53which I believe to be essential to raise or highlight for our
25:57audience, even if it means returning later to see how these characteristics
26:03or elements will evolve.
26:06The first, obviously, is the question of ammunition.
26:10This is hardly a trivial matter.
26:12In just a few days, we’ve already
26:17seen a massive burn rate of ammunition.
26:22The question that naturally arises is: how long
26:27can the US, in particular, keep up this
26:33breakneck pace of firing cruise missiles and dropping
26:37laser-guided and conventional bombs?
26:40To grasp the full scale of this issue, I feel it would obviously be too
26:44tedious to list every single statistic.
26:47Besides, it wouldn’t make much sense.
26:49But at the very least, I feel it is essential to give an example so that we can
26:55better and more accurately gauge the significance of the factor
27:00currently under consideration.
27:02Let’s take the famous Tomahawk missiles as an example.
27:07According to US military data, over 100
27:10Tomahawk cruise missiles were expended within
27:15the first five days of the conflict. One hundred Tomahawk missiles is
27:21a particularly significant figure, since it effectively exceeds the
27:29total annual US production capacity.
27:34In fact, the initial 2026 forecast
27:37procurement plan only called for
27:40the production of 57 Tomahawks for the whole of 2026.
27:45All this evidence is clear: within four or five days,
27:50the military went through the equivalent of
27:53a full year’s production.
27:55Furthermore, it is important to remember that a Tomahawk missile
27:59can take nearly two years to manufacture.
28:01As for the Patriot missile, looking at this from a
28:05defensive perspective, we must focus on
28:08factors other than cost, because it is clear that, far more than
28:11the cost, it is the quantity that can be produced and the time required to
28:15produce them that will be the decisive variable.
28:19For a defensive weapon like the Patriot, we’re looking at a two-to-three-year production time.
28:25There is a further development
28:31that reinforces this point:
28:34the US Central Command (CENTCOM) has begun
28:38explicitly showcasing imagery of Rockwell B-1 and
28:45the famous B-52 bombers in the region.
28:49Some of you might be
28:53wondering why this detail is important.
28:56The reason is that these are heavy strategic bombers
29:00designed for massive payloads.
29:05Their deployment implies two things: one, that
29:10the airstrike campaign has a long way to go before objectives are met, and two,
29:14the sheer volume of ammunition required
29:19to keep them in the air.
29:22That’s the first point.
29:23The second is something we rarely hear about,
29:30which is just as thought-provoking: the operational
29:34readiness of the pilots.
29:36If we examine the figures for fighter aircraft
29:41—excluding support assets such as tankers,
29:44transport, reconnaissance, counter-warfare,
29:48electronic platforms, etc.—
29:50and if we calculate the ratio between the number of these fighter aircraft and the
29:54missions already concluded, what would we reveal?
29:57That most US pilots are already being required to carry out practically
30:00three sorties a day.
30:01That is enormous.
30:03It means that if the war is of medium duration,
30:06they would need a very high level of rotation
30:11to ensure continuity.
30:13I will set aside the hypothetical scenario of casualties among
30:18these American pilots, which would inevitably exacerbate tensions
30:22regarding this issue.
30:25There is a third point, however, that I feel is essential to highlight.
30:31If we look closely at the dramatic events of
30:368 and 9 January 2026 —which we should not forget;
30:42as I even feel compelled to remind some observers that they are
30:47events of profound significance in the history
30:50of geopolitics, given the scale of human losses—
30:54how long did it take the Americans to assemble the resources they deemed necessary?
30:59Because operations did not begin until 28 February.
31:03So, this means that, regardless of the size and actual power attributed to
31:09the US military—and I emphasise ‘actual’— the fact remains that if we look
31:16closely at the timeline outlined here, it took the Americans at least 5 to 6 weeks
31:20to assemble their resources.
31:24This poses a question regarding the
31:29operational readiness of American aircraft carriers.
31:34Olivier, we also recorded a RDVG session on the characteristics
31:39of these aircraft carriers.
31:42During that session, it was easy to see that
31:45the USA is, by far, the world’s leading
31:49naval aviation power, with eleven aircraft carriers in its fleet.
31:55This raises an immediate question:
31:59where are those 11 US aircraft carriers?
32:01As previously mentioned, only two are currently operational
32:05—among them, the Gerald R. Ford in the Mediterranean.
32:08This brings us to a significant realisation.
32:11The fact is, some of them are not currently deployable because
32:15they are undergoing refit, refurbishment, repairs,
32:19or resupply.
32:21What’s more, other parts of the world should also be taken into account,
32:25which brings me to a fourth point:
32:27we should never forget that it is impossible to wage a war
32:38—or even remain vigilant against tensions— on two fronts simultaneously, even for
32:44the US military today.
32:47We previously addressed this limitation during our two
32:53sessions assessing the post-withdrawal conflicts
32:56in Afghanistan.
32:58I previously highlighted that the United States, already
33:03engaged in Afghanistan by late 2001 (December 2001),
33:09launched an ambitious operation in Iraq in March 2003.
33:15By the 2009–2010 Obama administration,
33:20the US was facing a very delicate situation requiring hard
33:24trade-offs regarding priority sectors.
33:28I’ll illustrate this with an analogy that may come as a surprise:
33:31it was the terrifying context that the German General Staff
33:37faced during the First World War, as it had to divide its forces between
33:42the Eastern and Western Fronts —an operational nightmare.
33:46Which means, of course, that what is happening in Iran has consequences
33:52in other parts of the world.
33:55Let’s broaden our perspective.
33:56How can we not think of the Pacific?
33:59We have touched on this in relation to the oil issue, but we are looking at China,
34:03and they, in turn, are watching what is happening in Iran and this US deployment.
34:07There are inevitably geopolitical repercussions for China,
34:10affecting its view of geopolitics and its future course of action.
34:14So, in reality, the answer on this particular question is
34:23quite clear: the primary impact
34:26of the war launched by the United States in Iran will be
34:34to bring the Taiwan factor even more prominently
34:40to the fore in the Pacific.
34:42And to put it plainly, a strategic window of opportunity is
34:47opening up for China.
34:50Given everything I have said previously regarding American society
34:56and the resources required by
35:00the US military, it is clear that the United States will not be able to
35:05be as influential or as present in the face of the challenge that China might
35:13pose, whatever that challenge may be —particularly in Taiwan.
35:17Which means, let us be clear, that US involvement in Iran was
35:23indeed the point I was implying in my previous question
35:26when I said: one might even think that the Chinese have an interest in
35:30this war dragging on. Clearly, with the US preoccupied by the war in Iran on one front
35:35and—let’s not forget—still needing to monitor the ongoing war
35:41between Ukraine and Russia on the other, Beijing may feel
35:45emboldened to take more daring, or even
35:48overtly military, actions in the Pacific.
35:55The assertion that Iran
35:58stands alone
35:59is technically accurate regarding formal alliances
36:05—akin to the Triple Entente or Triple Alliance
36:09of 1914.
36:12There exists no automatic mutual
36:16defence pact between Iran, Russia, and
36:19China that would compel Chinese intervention.
36:23That’s not where the danger is.
36:25Firstly, while Russia is certainly relieved
36:30to see American attention shifting elsewhere, it is forced to focus all its
36:34resources on the war it has been waging against Ukraine since 24 February 2022.
36:40China, however, is better positioned to supply
36:44radar systems and anti-aircraft batteries,
36:52which allows it not only to support Iran
36:57more or less openly, but also to test its equipment to see how effective it is
37:02against American weaponry.
37:04This warrants close attention, even without direct front line engagement.
37:09Clearly, the war between Iran,
37:14the USA, and Israel has repercussions across all the questions we have
37:19just raised. These are matters of major significance, unfolding
37:26within an international context that is, as we have seen
37:30elsewhere, already dense —if not volatile.
37:34At this stage, do these geostrategic questions help us to even begin formulating
37:38a geopolitical answer?
37:41There are at least three readily at hand.
37:44Our aim is to underscore the
37:47importance of these issues and draw your attention
37:53to them so that we may continue to monitor
37:58their development, as we are, as always, focused on the long term.
38:02Conversely, three clear answers to them have already emerged
38:06from this war, barely six days after its outbreak.
38:10The first, ironically, is the risk of nuclear proliferation.
38:15It may seem incredible —and frankly shocking—
38:23but current events are actually proving North Korea right.
38:27Ultimately, from an objective and rational standpoint,
38:32the most effective deterrent against any sort of external
38:35intervention, is having your own nuclear arsenal.
38:38Furthermore, for the sake of remaining objective, it is also
38:43worth noting that the March 2003 US intervention surely reinforced
38:48the Iranian regime’s belief that they needed a nuclear arsenal
38:53to avoid exactly what they have been
38:56facing over the past six days.
38:59Therefore, the assertion that this will diminish the influence of nuclear
39:05weapons seems ambitious, if not fundamentally flawed; since I have the
39:13impression that we’re heading in the opposite direction.
39:16A second response that has certainly been reinforced concerns the idea
39:21that the concept of the
39:24West as a monolithic entity has effectively dissolved. We have
39:30development, which we have previously analysed this in
39:34several sessions—most notably in our assessment of Donald Trump.
39:38I should also highlight the US strategic document
39:43published last 8 December. It is telling that the
39:49first chapter covers the Western Hemisphere yet excludes
39:53Europe entirely. This distinction was so pronounced
39:57that a separate chapter was
39:59dedicated to Europe, proving that, in the American
40:02view, these represent two fundamentally
40:04different spheres.
40:06Furthermore, it should be noted that
40:11the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle
40:15was forced to turn back while docked in Malmö,
40:18near Sweden, and not far from the Baltic.
40:22This suggests that Washington, in preparing the operation,
40:26deliberately avoided informing their allies—if they can
40:31still be termed as such—including the French.
40:34This leads to a third point:
40:37Europe is currently floundering, appearing more fragmented than ever.
40:48Admittedly, one could argue
40:53—with a degree of strategic objectivity—
41:02that the Italian government’s decision to bolster the air defences
41:09of certain Gulf monarchies serves a specific purpose. By providing the
41:14necessary equipment for
41:16these objectives, Rome is taking an active role while
41:21remaining firmly within a defensive and restrained
41:29framework.
41:32I must emphasise that it is a defensive approach.
41:37Conversely, how should we view
41:41those European governments that appear to use
41:47international law as a convenient smokescreen
41:51to mask a lack of strategic vision
41:58—or perhaps even outright cowardice?
42:01These governments should be reminded of a simple fact:
42:08while they may pride themselves on upholding international law,
42:12Iran is hardly a model
42:14of compliance when it comes to international law, particularly
42:20regarding its nuclear aspirations.
42:22Secondly, we should remind these governments that they are often the
42:29the very same people who, only
42:33thirty years ago, championed the
42:35'right to intervene'. It was then considered
42:39a magnificent principle: the idea that
42:44there was a duty —not merely an option—
42:47to intervene against a government that is ostensibly oppressing and destroying
42:53its own people, even outside the strictures of international law.
42:59We saw this clearly during the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.
43:05In response to this, I must admit that I would be quite inclined to offer some advice.
43:11I think it they would benefit from reading Jean Anouilh’s drama: Antigone.
43:17Antigone might help them realise that something stands higher than law:
43:22justice.
43:24Isn’t it wonderful to point out, in this conclusion to today’s
43:28Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique, that in reality, it is geopolitics...
43:33though it may be more accurate to say: it is realpolitik,
43:38with its strength and power, that serves justice far better
43:44than international law.
43:46Fabrice, I suggest we stop here with this conclusion.
43:49Thanks. Thank you.
43:51That wraps up this session of Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique.
43:54Thank you all for following us.

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