Giáo sư chính trị Mỹ báo động: Ukraine đã bị khoá biển, Donbas tiến vào hồi kết | Thuyết minh — Transcript
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- 0:01Welcome back, everyone. Joining us
- 0:04today is Professor John Mimer to
- 0:05analyze and explain the developments
- 0:07happening around the world. Thank you
- 0:10for returning to the program, Professor
- 0:11. Great to see you again, Mr. Clennen.
- 0:14I will do my best, though I must say it
- 0:16is an incredibly difficult task at this
- 0:18moment. Yes, I completely agree.
- 0:23Wherever we look, everything seems to
- 0:25be growing more chaotic. I would like
- 0:28to start with a topic the West is
- 0:30praising highly, which is Ukraine's new
- 0:32attacks on Russian territory. From what
- 0:34we can see, these operations clearly
- 0:36receive significant support from NATO.
- 0:41Ukraine is currently striking deep into
- 0:43Russian territory. However, instead of
- 0:45just targeting oil refineries as before
- 0:47, major targets now also include
- 0:49warehouses of Wildberries, Russia's
- 0:51largest e-commerce group. The argument
- 0:54often made is that by attacking
- 0:56civilian targets, Ukraine not only
- 0:58harms the Russian economy but also
- 0:59makes the Russian people feel the war
- 1:01directly. From there, public pressure
- 1:04on the Kremlin will increase. I would
- 1:08like to ask how you view this strategy
- 1:10as well as the assumptions underlying
- 1:12it, Professor. I think there is no
- 1:23doubt that Ukraine's attacks are indeed
- 1:25causing certain difficulties for Russia
- 1:27. The effects you just described are
- 1:30real. The public will be more
- 1:32dissatisfied and will pressure the
- 1:33government to take countermeasures. But
- 1:35then, there are two big questions that
- 1:37must be asked. First, how will the
- 1:39Russian government respond? Second, how
- 1:45will Ukraine's long-range drone attacks
- 1:47impact the final outcome of the war?
- 1:50Those are the two important questions
- 1:52that need to be answered. First,
- 2:06regarding the initial question, the
- 2:08result of this campaign is that it has
- 2:10caused the president to prosecute the
- 2:12war much more aggressively against
- 2:14Ukraine. Most importantly, Russia has
- 2:16completely blockaded the Odessa port
- 2:18cluster on the Black Sea. Russia has
- 2:23also closed all of Ukraine's ports on
- 2:25the Black Sea. That means Ukraine has
- 2:28effectively become a landlocked country
- 2:30. This is a disaster for Ukraine.
- 2:37Before the war broke out, about 90%of
- 2:39Ukraine's agricultural exports were
- 2:41shipped through the Odessa port system.
- 2:50Let me correct that slightly, about 90%
- 2:52of agricultural exports went through
- 2:54Odessa, and about 70%of Ukraine's total
- 2:57export turnover was also conducted
- 2:59through this port. Those are extremely
- 3:01large figures. Odessa. Everyone surely
- 3:18remembers that Russia blockaded Odessa
- 3:20and the entire Black Sea from the
- 3:22outbreak of hostilities on February 24,
- 3:252022, until about July 2022. During the
- 3:28period from February to July of that
- 3:30year, Russia caused extremely serious
- 3:32damage to the Ukrainian economy.
- 3:34Fortunately for Ukraine, later, under
- 3:36the auspices of the United Nations and
- 3:39Turkey, an agreement was signed
- 3:40allowing the ports in the Odessa region
- 3:43to reopen in July 2022. For Ukraine, it
- 3:55was almost a miracle from heaven. But
- 3:58looking at the present, Russia has once
- 4:00again blockaded the entire Odessa port
- 4:02cluster as well as all of Ukraine's
- 4:04ports on the Black Sea. This will cause
- 4:06extremely heavy economic consequences.
- 4:09Meanwhile, the Ukrainian economy itself
- 4:11was already in a very dire state. After
- 4:13many years of war, the hostilities have
- 4:15caused enormous damage to the Ukrainian
- 4:17economy. The blockade of the seaports
- 4:20now only makes the already very serious
- 4:22situation even worse. No one denies
- 4:32that Ukraine's long-range UAV attack
- 4:33campaign has caused losses and created
- 4:36many difficulties for Russia. That is
- 4:38the truth. But the Russian side has
- 4:41retaliated, and they have the capacity
- 4:43to cause much greater losses to Ukraine
- 4:44than what Ukraine can cause to Russia.
- 4:59Therefore, this escalation does not
- 5:01bring any advantage to Ukraine. On the
- 5:03contrary, in my opinion, it creates an
- 5:05advantage for Russia. Actually, I have
- 5:07always wondered why Russia did not
- 5:08blockade the Odessa port cluster
- 5:10earlier? Why did they wait so long? And
- 5:13now, it is Ukraine's own attacks that
- 5:15have given Putin the motivation to do
- 5:17that. Back to my second question. In my
- 5:26view, this campaign will not improve
- 5:28Ukraine's chances of winning. On the
- 5:30contrary, it will only make Ukraine's
- 5:32outlook worse. And it's not just the
- 5:35Black Sea blockade that's notable; if
- 5:37you observe Russia's current air
- 5:39campaign, you can see they are
- 5:40targeting a wide range of critical
- 5:42Ukrainian infrastructure. Russia is
- 5:50striking drone manufacturing plants,
- 5:52military equipment facilities, and many
- 5:54other vital targets. Russia is also
- 5:57destroying gas stations across Eastern
- 5:59Ukraine, making motorized travel from
- 6:01place to place nearly impossible due to
- 6:03a lack of fuel. Additionally, Russia is
- 6:13attacking railway lines, locomotives,
- 6:15trains, and various other transport
- 6:17infrastructure. The ultimate result of
- 6:19the air campaign that Russia is
- 6:21intensifying in response to Ukrainian
- 6:22attacks is to accelerate Ukraine's
- 6:24defeat. In my opinion, there is no
- 6:33doubt that Russia will inevitably
- 6:35suffer some losses. But overall,
- 6:38Ukraine will bear much greater damage,
- 6:40and that will make Ukraine's failure
- 6:42come sooner. I believe the entire logic
- 6:55behind increasing pressure on Russia
- 6:56with the expectation that it will
- 6:58concede was flawed from the start. That
- 7:01is just like evaluating success in a
- 7:03war with Iran solely by the number of
- 7:04casualties or the level of destruction
- 7:06caused. In my view, that is the same
- 7:09mistake. Because if a nation views a
- 7:11conflict as an existential threat, its
- 7:13natural reaction will not be to back
- 7:15down, but to escalate in retaliation. I
- 7:17also find it quite notable that Ukraine
- 7:19has begun attacking Russian ships in
- 7:21the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. This
- 7:24surprises me because even though the
- 7:26Black Sea ceasefire agreement was never
- 7:28fully implemented, at least parts of
- 7:29the grain deal still remained. It
- 7:32stipulated that both sides must avoid
- 7:34attacking each other's vessels. From
- 7:36Ukraine's perspective, that was a
- 7:38beneficial agreement. So it is hard to
- 7:40understand why they would actively open
- 7:42a large-scale maritime front. It is
- 7:44also noteworthy that Western media has
- 7:46been unanimously praising the attacks
- 7:48on so many Russian ships. But in my
- 7:52opinion, the consequences of this were
- 7:54entirely predictable. Currently, in
- 7:56reality, Ukraine has almost become a
- 7:58landlocked country. So, what will be
- 8:01NATO's and Ukraine's next move? Will
- 8:04they try to restore the ceasefire in
- 8:05the Black Sea? Because if Ukraine
- 8:07continues to be blocked from the sea,
- 8:09its economy will be very difficult to
- 8:11sustain. Yes, economically speaking,
- 8:19this is truly a disaster, without a
- 8:21doubt. As I said, even before Russia
- 8:23intensified its campaign targeting the
- 8:25port of Odessa, Ukraine's economy was
- 8:27already in an extremely difficult
- 8:29situation. What will happen next is
- 8:31that under the impact of the air
- 8:32campaign, Ukraine's economy and
- 8:34infrastructure will continue to be
- 8:35devastated. At the same time, Russia
- 8:37will gradually improve its position on
- 8:39the battlefield. The fact is, they are
- 8:41already doing that. In my opinion, it
- 8:46is almost certain that Russia will
- 8:48control the entire Donbas region by the
- 8:50end of this year. Right now, the most
- 8:51concerning question is just how much
- 8:53more territory will Russia ultimately
- 8:55seize? I believe that in the long run,
- 8:57they will take Odessa as well. The
- 8:59motivation to do so is also very clear.
- 9:02As we have just analyzed, turning
- 9:03Ukraine into a landlocked country will
- 9:05provide a huge strategic advantage for
- 9:07Russia. However, in my opinion, Russia
- 9:17does not have the capacity to achieve a
- 9:19decisive victory by conquering all of
- 9:21Ukraine. If they push deep into Western
- 9:23Ukraine, that would be a very unwise
- 9:25choice. The most likely outcome is the
- 9:28formation of a shrunken Ukrainian state
- 9:30. And from the Russian perspective,
- 9:33they will want that remaining territory
- 9:34to be as economically weak as possible.
- 9:37Russia will want it to be a
- 9:38dysfunctional and ineffective state. In
- 9:51other words, Russia's goal will be to
- 9:53hold as much territory as possible,
- 9:54avoid getting bogged down in
- 9:56predominantly Ukrainian-populated areas
- 9:58, while ensuring the remaining part of
- 10:00Ukraine is a weak state with little
- 10:02capacity for recovery. Within that
- 10:05strategy, controlling the Black Sea
- 10:07ports is an extremely important step.
- 10:09Therefore, I believe the war will
- 10:11continue to unfold in its current
- 10:12direction. Ultimately, the situation
- 10:25will be decided right on the
- 10:26battlefield. Russia will win, but it
- 10:29will be a difficult and non-absolute
- 10:31victory, not an overwhelming one. At
- 10:34some point, it is highly likely that
- 10:36the war will transition into a frozen
- 10:38conflict. In my opinion, that is the
- 10:40scenario the war is gradually heading
- 10:42toward. As for the current moment, I do
- 10:44not see Ukraine as having the ability
- 10:46to turn the tide. As you know, Glenn,
- 10:59even the Ukrainian press is currently
- 11:01focusing heavily on the fact that the
- 11:03country's military is facing a severe
- 11:05manpower crisis. The cause is the
- 11:07increasingly common draft evasion along
- 11:09with a large number of soldiers
- 11:11deserting their units. This has left
- 11:13the fighting forces on the front lines
- 11:15severely short of troops. Almost
- 11:16everyone acknowledges that this is a
- 11:18major problem. If you look at the
- 11:25internal decision-making process in
- 11:27Ukraine right now, I see that
- 11:28everything is quite chaotic. President
- 11:30Zelensky just changed the Minister of
- 11:32Defense, and he also just replaced the
- 11:33commander-in-chief of the army. New
- 11:36personnel have been appointed, but no
- 11:37one yet knows how this entire apparatus
- 11:39will function and how these new
- 11:41positions will coordinate with each
- 11:42other. In my view, at such a pivotal
- 11:49moment in the war, the last thing
- 11:51Ukraine needs is a political crisis
- 11:53that causes the two most powerful
- 11:55figures in the defense and security
- 11:56apparatus. Second only to President
- 11:58Zelensky, to have to leave their posts.
- 12:00Yet that is precisely the reality they
- 12:02are facing. So when looking at the
- 12:14battlefield situation, where Ukraine's
- 12:16defensive lines are gradually weakening
- 12:18while Russia's air campaign has been
- 12:19stepped up and is increasingly giving
- 12:21Moscow a major advantage. And then
- 12:23looking at the political situation in
- 12:25Kyiv, especially the upheavals
- 12:26involving the military
- 12:28commander-in-chief and the Minister of
- 12:29Defense, it is hard to reach any
- 12:31conclusion other than that Ukraine is
- 12:33in an extremely dangerous position.
- 12:44That's right, it is indeed very
- 12:46dangerous. But what is notable is that
- 12:48throughout this time, Western media has
- 12:50collectively pushed a narrative that
- 12:52Ukraine has turned the tide of the war,
- 12:53and it seems that narrative has at
- 12:55least convinced President Trump. It
- 12:58appears that Mr. Trump has believed the
- 12:59assumption that Ukraine is gaining the
- 13:01upper hand. He has made several
- 13:03statements to that effect, while also
- 13:05signaling that the U.S. will increase
- 13:07its support for President Zelensky.
- 13:13However, this is quite strange because
- 13:15the so-called turning point of the war
- 13:17seems to be rapidly losing momentum. If
- 13:19it cannot be called a collapse yet, it
- 13:21is at least showing very clear signs of
- 13:23decline. I think that is further
- 13:25reinforced by the recent speech of
- 13:27President Putin, which you have likely
- 13:29also followed. In that speech, Putin
- 13:31appeared very confident and suggested
- 13:33that Russia is likely to accelerate its
- 13:35offensive pace in the coming time. So,
- 13:40in your opinion, as Ukraine's defensive
- 13:42lines are gradually cracking, the
- 13:44domestic political situation is
- 13:45unstable, and external support is
- 13:47becoming increasingly difficult, are we
- 13:49starting to see the end of the war, or
- 13:51will the situation continue to escalate
- 13:53and become even more disadvantageous
- 13:55for Ukraine? First of all, I would like
- 14:08to make a point and then ask you a
- 14:09question in return. In my opinion, it
- 14:11is currently very difficult to
- 14:13determine exactly how the war will end
- 14:14and at what point in time. The reason
- 14:17is very simple: drones. I believe that
- 14:20if this war did not have drones,
- 14:21Ukraine would have failed a long time
- 14:23ago. What has really helped them hold
- 14:25out until today is the very large
- 14:26number of drones on the front lines.
- 14:28These drones force Russian troops to
- 14:30advance very slowly and extremely
- 14:32cautiously. At the same time, they also
- 14:34help Ukraine partially compensate for
- 14:36the disadvantage of having far fewer
- 14:37forces than Russia. Furthermore,
- 14:39Ukraine also does not have enough
- 14:41troops to deploy densely along the
- 14:42entire defensive line. Without drones,
- 14:45Ukraine's situation would be
- 14:46catastrophic. But thanks to the large
- 14:48number of drones on the battlefield,
- 14:50the Ukrainian military has done quite
- 14:51well in holding off the enemy.
- 14:53Especially considering that they are
- 14:55outnumbered, or more accurately, they
- 14:57have managed to slow down the Russian
- 14:58advance. Therefore, with the presence
- 15:18of drones, Russia is still making
- 15:20progress, but those are not very fast
- 15:22advances. Of course, Putin wants to
- 15:24accelerate the pace of the campaign.
- 15:26Whether that can be achieved or not
- 15:27remains to be seen. Because drones
- 15:30remain a significant obstacle. However,
- 15:32no matter what, I still believe Ukraine
- 15:34will ultimately fail on the front lines
- 15:36. That is my main assessment. Now, I
- 15:51would like to ask you a question. You
- 15:53said that President Trump seems to have
- 15:55decided to support Ukraine once again.
- 15:58As we both know, he has changed his
- 15:59position on this issue many times. But
- 16:03looking back at the G7 summit in France
- 16:05in June and then the NATO summit in
- 16:07Ankara in early July, it seems Trump
- 16:09was impressed by what Ukraine is doing.
- 16:13He seems to have bought into the
- 16:15propaganda campaign, believing Ukraine
- 16:16has put Russia on the defensive, and
- 16:18thus chose to side with Ukraine. But my
- 16:25question is, then what? What will Mr.
- 16:28Trump actually be able to do? Will he
- 16:30send more weapons to Ukraine? Or will
- 16:33he provide more Patriot air defense
- 16:35systems? I say this in jest. Does the
- 16:38U.S. even have enough weapons left to
- 16:40continue sending to Ukraine? Will Trump
- 16:44show any signs of spending tens of
- 16:45billions more dollars to support Kiev?
- 16:48In my opinion, no. What the U.S. will
- 16:50likely continue to do is just maintain
- 16:52intelligence support. But they have
- 16:54actually been doing that all along, as
- 16:55everyone knows. So even if Trump truly
- 16:58changes his stance, will it make any
- 17:00significant difference? And what about
- 17:04the European countries? Will they
- 17:06increase their support for Ukraine even
- 17:08further? What more can they actually do
- 17:10? They have already sent Ukraine as
- 17:12many drones as they possibly could.
- 17:14They have been sharing intelligence
- 17:15information. They also constantly cheer
- 17:17and encourage Ukraine to keep fighting.
- 17:19At the same time, they have contributed
- 17:21to building a propaganda campaign to
- 17:23give Ukraine an advantage. But as we
- 17:29said at the beginning of the show, that
- 17:31campaign has basically backfired. So
- 17:33what else can they do? If we set the
- 17:35Middle East aside for a moment, the
- 17:37current situation is very similar to
- 17:39the dilemma Trump is facing with Iran.
- 17:46What more can he do? Is there any magic
- 17:49formula? The answer is no. We can
- 17:52discuss this issue in more detail later
- 17:54. But the reality is that there is no
- 17:56magic formula to help Trump win in a
- 17:58conflict with Iran. Similarly, there is
- 18:02no magic formula for the West,
- 18:03including the US, to help Ukraine win
- 18:05against Russia. In fact, as we have
- 18:16argued for years, all the West is doing
- 18:18is causing Ukraine to lose more
- 18:20territory, suffer more casualties, and
- 18:22eventually become a failed state
- 18:24incapable of functioning. In other
- 18:31words, we are incentivizing Russia to
- 18:33destroy Ukraine to an even greater
- 18:35extent. Therefore, in my view, the West
- 18:37doing everything possible to keep
- 18:39Ukraine in the fight is a certainty.
- 18:45But that will not bring victory, unless
- 18:46you can point out a magic formula that
- 18:48I am missing. If not, everything taking
- 18:55place only forces Ukraine to bear
- 18:57incredibly heavy losses. I think that
- 19:08is a very noteworthy point. In my
- 19:10opinion, this is truly the core of the
- 19:12matter. In Europe, people often assume
- 19:14that US capabilities are almost
- 19:16infinite. They believe the only thing
- 19:18that matters is Washington's political
- 19:19will. As long as the US is determined
- 19:21to defeat Russia, everything will be
- 19:23solved. But they seem to have forgotten
- 19:25the years under Biden. Back then, the
- 19:26political will was certainly there. Yet
- 19:28, the problem lay in actual capacity.
- 19:31This has now become a massive problem.
- 19:35Previously, anyone saying the US was
- 19:37running low on missiles or interceptors
- 19:39was easily dismissed as repeating
- 19:41Russian propaganda. But after what we
- 19:47witnessed in the conflict with Iran, I
- 19:48think that is now accepted as the truth
- 19:50. It is no longer viewed as Russian
- 19:53propaganda. For example, the US
- 19:55granting permission for Ukraine to
- 19:57develop its own Patriot systems.
- 19:58Honestly, I do not see that becoming a
- 20:00reality in the near future. Even in the
- 20:03medium or long term, I do not see that
- 20:05possibility. Therefore, I have the
- 20:12feeling that it is more of a political
- 20:13performance than a useful plan. I am
- 20:16truly not sure what the ultimate goal
- 20:17is. But what I want to ask you is, how
- 20:20do you view the possibility that the
- 20:22war in Ukraine is now starting to link
- 20:23up with the war in Iran? As I just
- 20:25mentioned, the limited military
- 20:27capacity of the US is clearly a point
- 20:29of connection between these two wars.
- 20:35Furthermore, as you can see, Ukraine
- 20:37just attacked an Iranian vessel in the
- 20:39Black Sea. It seems this incident could
- 20:41spark a retaliatory campaign from the
- 20:43Iranian side. Tehran has declared that
- 20:46this attack cannot go without a
- 20:47response. It is currently unclear
- 20:49whether they will actually retaliate or
- 20:50not. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian side has
- 20:52signaled very clearly that they want to
- 20:54de-escalate tensions and claim the
- 20:56incident was not an intentional act. In
- 21:05your opinion, could the wars currently
- 21:07taking place on various different
- 21:09fronts gradually converge and connect
- 21:10into a larger conflict within the same
- 21:12geopolitical context? I do not believe
- 21:20the likelihood of these two wars
- 21:22merging into a single general war is
- 21:24high. It is true that they are linked
- 21:25to one another. In the sense that we
- 21:27have consumed too many valuable types
- 21:28of weapons in the Middle East, leaving
- 21:30not enough to transfer to Ukraine. The
- 21:32type of weapon that Ukraine wants most
- 21:34right now is Patriot missiles. If you
- 21:37compare US Patriot stockpiles before
- 21:39the 28 th—the time the war with Iran
- 21:41began—to today, they have used about
- 21:43two-thirds of their Patriot missiles.
- 21:52February 28. Just think about how large
- 21:56that number is. Meanwhile, producing
- 21:58Patriots takes a great deal of time.
- 22:00Therefore, there are now almost no
- 22:02Patriots left to transfer to Ukraine.
- 22:04In that sense, it is clear the war with
- 22:06Iran has directly affected the war in
- 22:08Ukraine. But as for the argument that
- 22:16Ukraine attacking an Iranian ship will
- 22:18cause the two wars to merge into a
- 22:19single joint military front, I do not
- 22:21think that will happen. It is enough to
- 22:34just ask yourself two questions. First,
- 22:36does Ukraine have anything to gain by
- 22:38opening another war with Iran at this
- 22:40time? Does that make sense from the
- 22:42perspective of Ukraine's interests? In
- 22:44my opinion, no. Ukraine is currently
- 22:46struggling enough just to hold its own
- 22:48against Russia. To put it bluntly, if
- 22:59they were to actively provoke Iran
- 23:01right now, it would be a highly unwise
- 23:03decision. And the same goes for the
- 23:05Iranian side. Iran is currently using
- 23:07all its strength to deal with the US
- 23:08and Israel. In many cases, we see
- 23:18Tehran choosing to rely on allies like
- 23:20Hezbollah, the Houthis, or Iraqi
- 23:22militias to take on the bulk of the
- 23:23confrontation with the US and
- 23:25Washington's allies in the Middle East.
- 23:36In other words, Iran does not want to
- 23:37open any more fronts unless it is truly
- 23:39necessary. Therefore, initiating a war
- 23:42with Ukraine would be completely
- 23:44illogical for them. Thus, I believe
- 23:46this incident will not cause a serious
- 23:48escalation. However, I would like to
- 24:04return to what you just mentioned. You
- 24:05said that the situation on the front
- 24:07has turned unfavorable for Ukraine and
- 24:09the Donbas could fall within this year.
- 24:12It now seems that Ukraine's remaining
- 24:14vital defensive line will be the
- 24:15Sloviansk and Kramatorsk area. It is
- 24:18noteworthy that Russian forces are not
- 24:20only approaching this area, but after
- 24:22taking Kostiantynivka, they are
- 24:24advancing quite rapidly from the south.
- 24:32This means that Russia could gradually
- 24:33form an encirclement. Currently, the
- 24:36area is not completely sealed off, but
- 24:38they are getting very close to that
- 24:39goal. At the same time, west of
- 24:41Kostiantynivka, Russia is also moving
- 24:43north quite rapidly, opening the
- 24:45possibility of cutting off this area
- 24:47not only from the east and south but
- 24:49also from the west. The only direction
- 24:51where Russia is encountering more
- 24:52difficulty is from the north. According
- 24:54to the original plan, they would
- 24:55advance down from the Lyman area,
- 24:57thereby completing a full encirclement.
- 25:02However, Ukraine's counterattacks have
- 25:04somewhat slowed this northern pincer,
- 25:06at least for the time being. But if
- 25:09that scenario ultimately happens, and
- 25:11it currently seems to be just a matter
- 25:13of time, how do you think the US and
- 25:15Europe will react? Because Western
- 25:17political circles remain very steadfast
- 25:19in the message that Ukraine can turn
- 25:21the tide of the war. That is the
- 25:24narrative used to maintain support for
- 25:25the war. If that narrative collapses, I
- 25:34think the West will only have two
- 25:35options: either continue to escalate or
- 25:37turn to diplomacy to save the situation
- 25:40. In your opinion, will the US and
- 25:41Europe continue to act in unison, or
- 25:43will divisions start to appear? I would
- 25:55like to add one element to the scenario
- 25:57you just mentioned: the fact that many
- 25:59European countries and a significant
- 26:00part of the U.S. policy-making
- 26:02community believe Russia is an
- 26:03existential threat to them. Therefore,
- 26:05they do not just view the war from the
- 26:07perspective of Russia defeating Ukraine
- 26:09. They also believe that if Russia wins
- 26:11, Moscow will be in a better position
- 26:13to threaten Eastern Europe, and even
- 26:15other regions of Europe. Personally, I
- 26:27don't think that is true, but it is
- 26:29clear that many people in the West
- 26:30believe in that assessment. This very
- 26:33belief makes the situation the West
- 26:35would face if Ukraine fails in the
- 26:37Donbas much more alarming. That brings
- 26:40us back to your question. What will the
- 26:50West do if the Ukrainian military
- 26:52begins to collapse? This is a
- 26:54completely real possibility in
- 26:55multi-year wars like those in the past.
- 26:57This has happened many times before. A
- 27:10typical example is the German army in
- 27:12the late summer and early autumn of
- 27:141918. In March of that year, when
- 27:17launching the Ludendorff Offensive, the
- 27:19German army was still an extremely
- 27:20formidable fighting force. At that time
- 27:23, many were even worried that Germany
- 27:25might win the First World War. Yet by
- 27:37November 11, 1918, the war ended with
- 27:39Germany's heavy defeat because their
- 27:41army had ultimately disintegrated from
- 27:43within. I think the same thing could
- 27:46absolutely happen to Ukraine. In that
- 27:48case, the question would be what the
- 27:50West could do militarily? You mentioned
- 27:57two options: escalation or diplomacy.
- 27:59But what would escalation actually look
- 28:01like? Would NATO directly enter the war
- 28:02or not? In my opinion, no. First of all
- 28:20, the West does not have the military
- 28:22capability to do that. Most European
- 28:24militaries today have very limited
- 28:26combat strength, especially the British
- 28:28and German armies. If one were to say
- 28:30they could face the Russian army
- 28:32head-on and win, I would not bet on
- 28:33that possibility. More importantly, as
- 28:44you know, Russia possesses a massive
- 28:46nuclear arsenal. Do we really want to
- 28:48enter a war that risks pushing Russia
- 28:50to the point of using nuclear weapons?
- 28:53In my view, no. Therefore, I do not
- 28:55believe the West has any viable
- 28:57military options left. I also do not
- 29:02see how they could escalate the
- 29:04conflict in any way that would yield
- 29:05significant strategic results. In that
- 29:07case, only the path of diplomacy
- 29:09remains. But the problem is that from
- 29:11the West's perspective, diplomacy in
- 29:13such circumstances is tantamount to
- 29:14negotiating an admission of their own
- 29:16defeat. It must be remembered that this
- 29:18war is not just Ukraine against Russia;
- 29:20it is Ukraine and the entire West
- 29:22confronting Russia. If Russia continues
- 29:28to defeat the Ukrainian army and
- 29:30capture more territory, and the West
- 29:32then proposes a ceasefire or
- 29:33establishes a frozen conflict like the
- 29:35Korean Peninsula after 1953, that would
- 29:37effectively be an agreement
- 29:39acknowledging Western failure. In other
- 29:50words, if at some point the Ukrainian
- 29:52army collapses or Russia pushes them
- 29:54back much faster than now, then the
- 29:55West and Ukraine will have almost no
- 29:57good options left. What I find truly
- 30:11difficult to understand is NATO's
- 30:12current stance. If NATO truly believes
- 30:14that Russia is pursuing the goal of
- 30:16expanding its territory into Europe,
- 30:18then why are they not choosing the
- 30:20diplomatic path? Because if a peaceful
- 30:22solution or a security guarantee
- 30:23agreement for Russia is not reached,
- 30:28then from Moscow's perspective, the
- 30:30only way to maintain peace would be to
- 30:32expand territorial control to push NATO
- 30:34further away from Russian borders. This
- 30:38means Russia will seek to ensure that
- 30:40Donbas and, ideally, Sumy, Kharkiv,
- 30:42Mykolaiv, and Odesa are all under their
- 30:44control. If that scenario occurs, the
- 30:48risk of Ukraine entering NATO's orbit
- 30:50will be significantly reduced in
- 30:51Russia's calculations. Therefore, I get
- 30:58the feeling that the West's refusal to
- 31:00engage in dialogue with Russia is
- 31:01leaving Moscow with only one choice,
- 31:03which is to seize more territory. That
- 31:06would be their way of creating what
- 31:07they call peace. It is truly baffling
- 31:10if our primary goal is indeed to stop
- 31:12Russia, especially as the war is
- 31:14developing in the direction it is now.
- 31:24Even if NATO wanted to escalate, there
- 31:26remains a big question. To what extent
- 31:28would Russia tolerate direct NATO
- 31:30involvement? For example, just
- 31:32yesterday or this morning, there were
- 31:34reports from Poland claiming that a
- 31:36Russian KH-101 cruise missile had
- 31:38violated Polish airspace. I have no way
- 31:41to verify if that information is true
- 31:43or false, but there is clearly a sense
- 31:45that Russia is acting more boldly than
- 31:47before. I also saw reports stating that
- 31:49Russia had struck the honorary
- 31:51consulate of Latvia in Sloviansk. All
- 31:53of this gives me the feeling that
- 31:55Russia is sending a message to NATO
- 31:56that enough is enough. Even assuming
- 32:09NATO had the capacity to escalate and
- 32:10political leaders were willing to do so
- 32:12, the response from the Russian side
- 32:14would likely no longer be as restrained
- 32:16as before. The entire current situation
- 32:18really does not make sense to me.
- 32:32Hearing what you just presented, I am
- 32:34reminded of the discussion between you
- 32:35and Alas Group a few days ago. If I
- 32:37remember correctly, you were the one
- 32:39who made that remark. And A agreed with
- 32:41you. You both said that whenever the
- 32:44West enters a war, they tend to
- 32:45demonize their opponent. Meaning they
- 32:48build an image that the other side is
- 32:49the embodiment of evil. In that way,
- 33:02Vladimir Putin is compared to Adolf
- 33:04Hitler, and Russia is equated with Nazi
- 33:06Germany. What you both emphasized is
- 33:08completely correct; if you build an
- 33:10image of the opponent that way, when it
- 33:12comes time to negotiate, everything
- 33:14becomes almost impossible. Because then
- 33:25it is no different than saying you have
- 33:27to sit down and negotiate with the
- 33:28devil or with Hitler. Recall World War
- 33:31II with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan
- 33:33; the U.S. pursued a policy of
- 33:35unconditional surrender. Think about
- 33:37that phrase. Unconditional surrender.
- 33:51If your goal is to force the opponent
- 33:53to surrender unconditionally, there is
- 33:55no room left for diplomacy. That means
- 33:57the other side must surrender
- 33:58completely. The reason is that at that
- 34:00time, we considered Nazi Germany and
- 34:02Japan to be the embodiment of evil. And
- 34:04once you believe that, there is no
- 34:05longer any possibility of negotiation.
- 34:07That is exactly what is happening today
- 34:09. Just as you and Alex analyzed on your
- 34:12show. Especially in Europe, even more
- 34:23so than in the US, we have built an
- 34:25image of Russia as the embodiment of
- 34:27evil, and Putin as the source of all
- 34:29sins. That doesn't necessarily close
- 34:31the door to diplomacy, but it makes
- 34:33negotiations incredibly difficult. Yes,
- 34:43I am referring here to Walter Lippmann.
- 34:45He is someone who conducted extensive
- 34:47research on political propaganda. One
- 34:50of his key arguments was that to
- 34:52mobilize public support for war, you
- 34:53must frame it as 'us versus them.' That
- 34:57is how you create a boundary between
- 34:58your own group and the opposing group.
- 35:00When everything is framed as a battle
- 35:02between good and evil, it is a very
- 35:03effective way to mobilize public
- 35:05opinion. But at the same time, it makes
- 35:08reaching a peace that all parties can
- 35:10accept almost impossible. Walter
- 35:12Lippmann initially made this
- 35:14observation while studying the
- 35:15Bolshevik Revolution. At that time, the
- 35:18Bolsheviks were portrayed as the
- 35:19absolute embodiment of evil. But then,
- 35:22when it became clear they would win,
- 35:23people were forced to consider reaching
- 35:25an agreement. At that point, turning
- 35:28back to tell your own public that the
- 35:30adversary also has valid arguments
- 35:31becomes extremely difficult. I think
- 35:34perhaps Donald Trump is one of the very
- 35:36few politicians who can do that. I once
- 35:39saw him, after repeatedly describing
- 35:41Iran as an evil force, suddenly
- 35:43acknowledge that Iran also had
- 35:44legitimate security concerns and
- 35:46reasons for wanting to possess
- 35:47ballistic missiles. I don't know of any
- 35:50other politician who can shift their
- 35:52message in such a way. Walter Lippmann
- 35:54also extended this argument to World
- 35:56War I to convince the American public
- 35:58to join the war in 1917. The
- 36:01administration at that time had to
- 36:03depict the Germans as completely
- 36:04inhuman. But the problem was that at
- 36:06that time, there were still many
- 36:08opportunities to seek diplomatic
- 36:09solutions—that is, peace through
- 36:11negotiation—instead of having to
- 36:13defeat Germany completely, even after
- 36:15Germany was already failing. If I
- 36:17remember correctly, Lippmann argued
- 36:18that once you define the enemy as
- 36:20absolute evil, then after winning, you
- 36:22are also forced to keep them in a state
- 36:24of permanent subjugation. Therefore,
- 36:27Germany suffered a humiliating defeat,
- 36:29which laid the groundwork for another
- 36:31great war later on. Consequently,
- 36:34demonizing the opponent is always a
- 36:36very dangerous thing. It does not serve
- 36:38our long-term interests. Yet it seems
- 36:40we have still not learned that lesson
- 36:42from history. Glenn, I want to make two
- 36:49points from a historical perspective.
- 36:51When the U.S. entered World War I, it
- 36:53declared war in April 1917. At that
- 36:56time, the U.S. had a very large number
- 36:58of immigrants. Among the five largest
- 37:09European immigrant communities, those
- 37:11from Germany were first, and Ireland
- 37:13was second. This meant that as the U.S.
- 37:16military was sent to fight in France,
- 37:17there would certainly be many
- 37:19German-Americans and Irish-Americans.
- 37:32President Woodrow Wilson was
- 37:33particularly worried that
- 37:35German-Americans would not want to take
- 37:36up arms against Germany, and
- 37:38Irish-Americans would not want to fight
- 37:40for the British side. For this reason,
- 37:42the U.S. government launched an intense
- 37:44anti-German propaganda campaign of
- 37:46massive scale and scope to ensure that
- 37:48German-Americans and Irish-Americans
- 37:50would participate in the war
- 37:51enthusiastically. German By the way,
- 38:05looking back at what happened, the
- 38:07anti-German campaign in the U.S. during
- 38:09the First World War was truly
- 38:11unbelievable. There are many studies
- 38:13written about this period because
- 38:15German-Americans were the largest
- 38:17immigrant community among the five
- 38:18European ethnic groups that poured into
- 38:20the U.S. from about the 1830s until
- 38:22before World War I. That is the first
- 38:24point. The second point is about Walter
- 38:37Lippmann. I recall he graduated from
- 38:39Harvard University in 1909. By the time
- 38:42the U.S. entered the war in 1917,
- 38:44Lippmann was already a prominent figure
- 38:46in public debates and an influential
- 38:48intellectual in the U.S. before the war
- 38:50. At that time, he was seen as a
- 38:53progressive with great faith in human
- 38:55nature and many other idealistic values
- 38:57. But witnessing the propaganda
- 39:00campaign during the First World War
- 39:01completely changed Lippmann's view of
- 39:03the world. He was truly shocked to see
- 39:06how propaganda could stifle rational
- 39:08thinking and make people ignore very
- 39:10obvious facts. And so It exerted a
- 39:27profoundly deep influence on his entire
- 39:29later philosophy, from how he viewed
- 39:31people and politics to the
- 39:32relationships between individuals
- 39:34within a nation as well as between
- 39:35nations themselves. That was truly a
- 39:48fascinating generation because, before
- 39:50that time, the concept of political
- 39:52propaganda did not carry the negative
- 39:54connotation it has today. In my opinion
- 39:56, it was the Germans who made this
- 39:57concept toxic, especially after the
- 39:59First World War and even more so after
- 40:01the Second World War. In fact, when
- 40:04Walter Lippmann and Edward Bernays
- 40:06wrote their famous works on political
- 40:07propaganda, their initial argument was
- 40:09that propaganda was a necessity. They
- 40:12argued that as the world became
- 40:14increasingly complex and voting rights
- 40:16were expanded, how would democracies
- 40:17function? How can everyone have a
- 40:20relatively unified understanding of the
- 40:21world and reach a consensus on
- 40:23important issues? It is unreasonable to
- 40:26expect an average voter to understand
- 40:27everything from Brazil's agricultural
- 40:29policy and Indonesia's human rights
- 40:31situation to the history of the dispute
- 40:33between Russia and Georgia. That is
- 40:35almost impossible. But we are
- 40:37witnessing a very interesting free
- 40:39market. When Russia launched its
- 40:41military campaign in Ukraine, in almost
- 40:43a short period of time, the entire
- 40:45Western society suddenly knew exactly
- 40:47what that war was. They did not need to
- 40:49know where Ukraine was on the map, nor
- 40:50did they need to understand the
- 40:52historical context or the root causes.
- 40:57But almost everyone was provided with a
- 40:59ready-made formula, which is that this
- 41:00is a war between liberal democracy and
- 41:02authoritarianism. Or as people often
- 41:05say, a battle between good and evil, an
- 41:07unprovoked invasion, and Putin is no
- 41:09different from Hitler. Once that
- 41:11formula was widely disseminated, almost
- 41:13everyone simultaneously accepted and
- 41:14adopted the same perspective. That is
- 41:19also the reason why, initially, people
- 41:21like Lippmann argued that political
- 41:23propaganda was necessary. But after
- 41:25witnessing its dark side, I think
- 41:26Lippmann himself changed his point of
- 41:28view. I also want to add one point.
- 41:44Actually, I teach a course called War
- 41:46and the Nation-State, which includes an
- 41:48entire lecture on this topic. If you
- 41:50study propaganda during the First World
- 41:52War, you will notice something quite
- 41:54remarkable. Britain and the United
- 41:56States used propaganda on a much larger
- 41:58scale than France, Germany, or Russia.
- 42:06In my view, the reason is that Britain
- 42:08and America, especially America, were
- 42:10separated from the European continent
- 42:12by vast bodies of water. Therefore,
- 42:13many people in these two countries
- 42:15believed that what was happening on the
- 42:17European continent did not affect them
- 42:18directly. The British thought they were
- 42:25protected by the English Channel.
- 42:26Americans believed that the Atlantic
- 42:28Ocean was a natural shield. That was
- 42:30the foundation of isolationist ideology
- 42:32. Why did isolationism flourish in the
- 42:39U.S. during the 1930s and early 1940s?
- 42:43Simply because many people felt that we
- 42:44did not need to go to Europe. The war
- 42:46there did not threaten the security of
- 42:48the United States. A similar logic once
- 42:55existed in Britain with the concept of
- 42:57"splendid isolation." So, if you are
- 42:59the U.S. or British government and want
- 43:01to send troops to fight Nazi Germany in
- 43:03World War II or the German Empire in
- 43:05World War I, you must convince the
- 43:07public to be ready to fight and
- 43:09sacrifice. That is the nature of war.
- 43:21Many people will have to go to the
- 43:23front and might lose their lives. To do
- 43:24that, you need a large-scale propaganda
- 43:27campaign, especially in the U.S., to
- 43:29persuade people to cross an ocean, set
- 43:31foot on the European continent, and
- 43:32fight against the Germans or any other
- 43:35adversary. That is why Britain and the
- 43:45U.S. used propaganda so intensely.
- 43:47Conversely, if you are France, Germany,
- 43:49or Russia, the enemy is right at your
- 43:51border, there is no ocean separating
- 43:53the two sides, and in many cases, the
- 43:55opponent has even entered your
- 43:57territory. You do not need too much
- 44:04propaganda to encourage the French. In
- 44:061914, the German army implemented the
- 44:08Schlieffen Plan and poured into French
- 44:10territory. In such circumstances,
- 44:12people naturally understand that they
- 44:14must rise up and fight. The same can
- 44:16also be applied to the Eastern Front of
- 44:17the First World War. Therefore, it
- 44:23should be understood that the two
- 44:25English-speaking liberal democracies,
- 44:27the UK and the US, are the nations
- 44:29especially proficient in the use of
- 44:30propaganda. And in the US specifically,
- 44:32that capability has almost never
- 44:34disappeared. There are also many other
- 44:43studies showing that the US and UK
- 44:45deployed propaganda more effectively
- 44:47than the Soviet Union during the Cold
- 44:48War. One of the core elements of
- 44:50political propaganda is making
- 44:52information appear objective, credible,
- 44:54and in the public interest. In
- 44:55communication theories, the credibility
- 44:57of the information source is always
- 44:59emphasized. If all information comes
- 45:03from state media as in the former
- 45:05Soviet Union, the public immediately
- 45:06knows who is telling the story, so the
- 45:08level of persuasion decreases
- 45:10significantly. Meanwhile, the US and
- 45:12the UK have more advantages. They can
- 45:15use private organizations, research
- 45:17institutes, or NGOs that are
- 45:18essentially government-funded. Thanks
- 45:23to this, political messages transmitted
- 45:25through these intermediary channels
- 45:27sound much more objective and reliable.
- 45:29In other words, they can package or
- 45:31legitimize political messages in a way
- 45:33that makes them more acceptable to the
- 45:35public. I want to add one more point
- 45:48before I forget. If you look at
- 45:51programs like our conversation today,
- 45:52essentially what we are doing is
- 45:54countering the propaganda within our
- 45:56own worldview. What the US government
- 45:59and many Western European governments
- 46:01are saying about Russia and the
- 46:02Russia-Ukraine war is largely
- 46:04propaganda. That is how we see it. So,
- 46:10what we are trying to do is use facts
- 46:12and logical arguments to counter those
- 46:14messages. I believe that if the US
- 46:17truly entered a full-scale war with
- 46:19Russia, our show would be taken off the
- 46:21air immediately, and we could even be
- 46:22imprisoned. In fact, this has happened
- 46:25before during World War I and World War
- 46:27II. At that time, freedom of speech was
- 46:33restricted very strictly. If you
- 46:35publicly criticized the government or
- 46:36tried to undermine the administration's
- 46:38propaganda campaign, you could
- 46:40absolutely be arrested. As we both know
- 46:42, state power is already vast, and in
- 46:45wartime, that power expands even
- 46:47further. Therefore, we should realize
- 46:54how fortunate we are right now to
- 46:56express our views without facing the
- 46:57risk of imprisonment. If it were an
- 47:00all-out war between the U.S. and Russia
- 47:02, that would certainly no longer be
- 47:04true. I agree that, officially, the
- 47:16U.S. is not yet directly involved in
- 47:19the war. That still creates a certain
- 47:20amount of space for freedom of speech.
- 47:22If the U.S. actually enters the war, I
- 47:24think freedom of speech will be quickly
- 47:26tightened. But what I want to emphasize
- 47:28, returning to Walter Lippmann’s
- 47:30ideas, is that wartime propaganda does
- 47:32not serve our own long-term interests.
- 47:34According to Lippmann, propaganda has
- 47:36one very clear benefit. It helps
- 47:38mobilize public support for the war.
- 47:40But the cost is that the chance for
- 47:42achieving a lasting peace becomes
- 47:44almost non-existent. That is also why I
- 47:46believe it is necessary to counter
- 47:47propaganda. Take Iran, for example; as
- 47:50you often say, in diplomacy, there are
- 47:52often no perfect deals, only the
- 47:54least-bad deals we are forced to accept
- 47:56. Yet, it is currently almost
- 48:00impossible to reach a serious deal with
- 48:02Iran because it has been demonized to
- 48:03the point where many believe it is just
- 48:05a nation of extremists obsessed with
- 48:07destroying the U.S. That view has
- 48:09gradually become a matter of course.
- 48:11Russia has fallen into a similar
- 48:13situation. Many people today view
- 48:15Russia simply as a continuation of the
- 48:17former Soviet Union. Meanwhile, ever
- 48:19since the end of the Cold War, there
- 48:20have been voices warning about this
- 48:22danger. For instance, Aleksandr
- 48:24Solzhenitsyn once asked why you do not
- 48:26distinguish between opposing communism
- 48:28and opposing the Russian people
- 48:30themselves. In his view, Russians could
- 48:33have become great friends of the West
- 48:35because they themselves did not wish to
- 48:37live under the communist regime any
- 48:39longer. Even George Kennan once
- 48:41expressed a similar view. He said, "Why
- 48:44are we now turning to confront the
- 48:45Russians?" Our goal was always to end
- 48:48the communist regime, and it was Russia
- 48:50that was the primary force contributing
- 48:52to the dismantling of that system. That
- 48:56is what I find concerning. I mean, I no
- 48:59longer think that our current
- 49:00propaganda activities serve or provide
- 49:02any real benefit to us anymore. But
- 49:05anyway, I agree with you; if the West
- 49:07directly intervenes in this war, this
- 49:09podcast of ours would likely come to a
- 49:11quick end. I also have one final
- 49:20question. In your view, what would a
- 49:22Russian victory ultimately look like?
- 49:25You previously said that it would be an
- 49:26ugly victory. I understand that
- 49:30Russia's initial goal was to change the
- 49:32government in Ukraine so it would no
- 49:33longer be a NATO satellite state used
- 49:35to threaten Russia in the future. If
- 49:38they fail to achieve that, they would
- 49:40want Ukraine to be permanently neutral
- 49:42so they can trust it. And if even that
- 49:45goal is not reached, it is highly
- 49:46likely that Russia would want the
- 49:48remaining territory of Ukraine to
- 49:50become a landlocked, weakened state
- 49:51that can hardly function effectively.
- 49:55But assuming that is indeed Russia's
- 49:56victory scenario. Is there still any
- 49:59diplomatic path that could prevent such
- 50:01an outcome? If there is still a chance
- 50:04for diplomacy, what do you think is the
- 50:06path to ending the war without facing
- 50:08such an ugly victory? Because, in my
- 50:10view, if they want to truly feel secure
- 50:12, Russia might demand much more than
- 50:14that. It seems what they are aiming for
- 50:16is an entirely new security framework
- 50:18for all of Europe. In my opinion, at
- 50:29this moment, the best deal Ukraine and
- 50:31the West can reach is for Russia to
- 50:33only annex the four regions they have
- 50:35already claimed, plus Crimea, and not
- 50:37advance further into places like
- 50:39Kharkiv or Odessa. In exchange, Ukraine
- 50:49and Western countries must commit to
- 50:51Ukraine becoming a completely neutral
- 50:53state. If that can be done, the
- 50:54motivation for Russia to continue
- 50:56expanding its territory would decrease
- 50:58significantly. I emphasize that it is a
- 51:00possibility, not a certainty, that
- 51:02Russia would agree to stop after those
- 51:03four regions and Crimea. But to achieve
- 51:06that, the West would have to provide
- 51:08extremely credible guarantees that
- 51:10Ukraine will truly maintain long-term
- 51:12neutrality. Furthermore, if the
- 51:19remaining territory of Ukraine
- 51:21maintains economic relations with the
- 51:23West, then Russia must also be allowed
- 51:24to have normal economic relations with
- 51:26that Ukraine. In other words, the West
- 51:37and Ukraine would have to completely
- 51:38change their vision of Ukraine's future
- 51:40. In my opinion, that is the most
- 51:42feasible deal. But let's look at what
- 51:51is happening. This brings us back to
- 51:53our earlier discussion about Ukraine
- 51:55and the West increasing long-range UAV
- 51:57attacks. That only gives Russia more
- 52:00incentive to escalate. We have talked
- 52:12about Russia blockading the port of
- 52:14Odessa and the entire Black Sea port
- 52:16system, turning Ukraine into a
- 52:17landlocked country. But that is not all
- 52:20. If the West and Ukraine continue to
- 52:33escalate, they will also give Russia
- 52:35more motive to seize even more
- 52:37territory. At the same time, Russia
- 52:39will also be more determined to turn
- 52:41the remaining Ukrainian territory into
- 52:42a weakened and dysfunctional state.
- 52:45That means destroying Ukraine's economy
- 52:47to the maximum extent. That is why
- 53:02Russia wants Ukraine to lose its access
- 53:04to the Black Sea. A country without
- 53:06seaports will find it very difficult to
- 53:07develop its economy. The more territory
- 53:09, grain-producing regions, industrial
- 53:11zones, and major cities of Ukraine they
- 53:13seize, the weaker the remainder of the
- 53:15country will be. What the West is
- 53:30actually doing is encouraging Russia to
- 53:31seize more territory and make the
- 53:33remaining Ukrainian state as weak as
- 53:35possible. That is why I said the best
- 53:38deal now is to accept the reality that
- 53:40Russia has annexed those four provinces
- 53:41and focus on building a neutral Ukraine
- 53:43. But clearly, we are not heading in
- 53:46that direction. So in my view, if
- 53:57Russia continues to maintain its
- 53:59military superiority—and I believe
- 54:01they can do so despite the UAV attacks
- 54:03—they will ultimately control
- 54:04significantly more territory than the
- 54:06regions they have claimed to annex. But
- 54:17I think the bigger problem with the
- 54:18neutral Ukraine option is that Europe
- 54:20itself today has almost completely
- 54:22abandoned the concept of neutrality. As
- 54:24early as the 1990s, many predicted that
- 54:26sooner or later, a conflict like the
- 54:28current one would occur. The argument
- 54:31then was: where would NATO stop its
- 54:33expansion? If NATO continues to expand
- 54:35right up to Russia's borders, it
- 54:37becomes hard to explain why other
- 54:39nations cannot join. That is exactly
- 54:41the difficulty with the model of a
- 54:43neutral Ukraine. In today’s Europe,
- 54:54there is almost no room left for the
- 54:56concept of neutrality. After the Cold
- 54:58War, a new European order was
- 55:00envisioned around NATO and the EU,
- 55:02where almost all nations would become
- 55:04members, except for Russia. In that
- 55:06context, neutrality almost became a
- 55:08term with a negative connotation. If
- 55:11you listen to Swedish politicians, they
- 55:13often say that their past neutrality
- 55:14was naive, and that the current path is
- 55:16the only way to ensure security. I,
- 55:27however, do not find that argument very
- 55:29convincing. What I mean is that the
- 55:31commitment to bloc politics today seems
- 55:33to have become absolute. There are
- 55:35almost no dissenting voices left.
- 55:37Concepts like indivisible security,
- 55:38which were once important principles
- 55:40during the Cold War. Now, almost no one
- 55:43mentions them anymore. Therefore, it is
- 55:45very difficult to solve the Ukraine
- 55:47issue with a neutrality model when
- 55:48Europe itself no longer accepts that
- 55:50idea. In Europe, neutrality is often
- 55:59viewed as an act of concession to
- 56:01Russia. Thus, I am quite pessimistic
- 56:03about the ability of European leaders
- 56:04to agree on such a solution. But I
- 56:07would love to hear your final thoughts
- 56:08before we finish. I would like to offer
- 56:20a suggestion for you. You are young and
- 56:22an excellent political scientist. I
- 56:25think one day you should write a good
- 56:27book to explain why Western leadership
- 56:29and public opinion think so
- 56:30unrealistically. In strategic terms.
- 56:33For me, this is truly difficult to
- 56:35comprehend. Many things that you and I
- 56:37find reasonable, very normal, and
- 56:38actually most beneficial for the
- 56:40Ukrainians themselves. Yet, they are
- 56:42not chosen. As we have discussed many
- 56:44times, neither you nor I are against
- 56:46Ukraine. If people had listened to our
- 56:49arguments back then, Ukraine would be
- 56:51in a much better position today. That
- 56:54holds true even now. The two of us
- 57:08often wonder what on earth those in the
- 57:09West are thinking. Actually, the same
- 57:12could also be applied to Iran. But
- 57:14let's set that topic aside for now.
- 57:16What has happened to the West,
- 57:17especially in Europe? To be honest, I
- 57:19cannot understand it. I could offer a
- 57:21few theories, but this is truly a
- 57:23subject worthy of a serious and deep
- 57:25research book. And I think you are the
- 57:28perfect person to write that book. Of
- 57:36course, you probably don't have the
- 57:38time right now because you have to do
- 57:39constant podcasts and chase events that
- 57:41are unfolding too quickly. But I hope
- 57:43that one day things will calm down.
- 57:46When that happens, I truly hope you
- 57:48will write an excellent book to answer
- 57:49the question that has always troubled
- 57:51both of us.
- 58:01Yes, let's try to imagine. If we could
- 58:03go back to 2014, if the Ukrainian
- 58:05government at that time hadn't been
- 58:07overthrown, perhaps Ukraine would still
- 58:09be whole today. That would have been a
- 58:12much better outcome, but back then,
- 58:13opposing the overthrow of President
- 58:15Yanukovych was seen as anti-Ukrainian.
- 58:18Or suppose later, during the 2015-2022
- 58:20period, the parties had fully
- 58:21implemented the Minsk agreements,
- 58:23granting Donbas a certain level of
- 58:25autonomy; that might have been enough
- 58:27to keep Ukraine out of the NATO orbit.
- 58:29However, at that time, that view was
- 58:31considered anti-Ukrainian by the US.
- 58:38Looking back today, a settlement was
- 58:40clearly a much better option. The same
- 58:43goes for the Istanbul agreement in 2022
- 58:45. But things just keep getting worse.
- 58:48The only thing that hasn't changed is
- 58:50the mindset that any deal is a betrayal
- 58:52of Ukraine. Meanwhile, those who claim
- 58:54to be the greatest supporters of
- 58:56Ukraine are driving this country closer
- 58:58to destruction. That truly makes me
- 59:00very frustrated. But as you said, this
- 59:03is indeed a topic worth writing a book
- 59:04about. I will look forward to that book
- 59:12of yours. It will certainly be a huge
- 59:16challenge. But I will give it serious
- 59:18thought. Anyway, thank you very much
- 59:20for your time and for sharing your
- 59:22perspective. A pleasure as always. is
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