France–États-Unis : la fin d’une relation exceptionnelle ? | RDVG — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:19France-USA: from unique bond to conventional relations.
- 0:22At RDVG, we’ve occasionally examined bilateral relations,
- 0:26for example: Franco-German relations.
- 0:28Our focus today is the bond between France and the USA, which is set to
- 0:31commemorate its 250th anniversary.
- 0:35This session belongs to a wider anniversary series on American strategic culture,
- 0:40but to provide the necessary context,
- 0:43we first need to explore the foundations of the Franco-American relationship
- 0:47with Fabrice Ravel.
- 0:48Fabrice, hello. Hello Olivier.
- 0:51Hello everyone.
- 0:53We are launching a dedicated series of videos,
- 0:55starting with an analysis from a uniquely
- 1:00French viewpoint to explore how the relationship
- 1:02with the USA has developed over time.
- 1:05I think we should start with a brief historical overview to set the scene.
- 1:09Indeed, starting with an historical overview is essential,
- 1:13as the very title of our session points to a bond often called unique
- 1:18—leaving us to wonder if it is now moving towards something more conventional.
- 1:23Something does seem to be changing.
- 1:25It is essential to understand the nature of this change.
- 1:29To do that, we need to look back at the key historical stages
- 1:34to see which events have either bolstered or altered
- 1:39Franco-American relations.
- 1:42I believe there are five key stages we should highlight
- 1:46to help us address this question.
- 1:51I would call the first stage
- 1:55an exceptional singularity, since the term ‘exceptional’ clearly
- 1:59carries a very strongly positive connotation and reinforces the initial period,
- 2:03spanning between 1776 and 1812.
- 2:08That would take us right into a second stage, which
- 2:12could be described as a close bond that was not undermined
- 2:19by occasional divergences.
- 2:21This stage covers the period from 1917 to 1956.
- 2:26Of course, I’ll explain the choice of this particular
- 2:29timeframe.
- 2:30This is followed by a third stage —a period of differentiation, notwithstanding
- 2:36a continued broader strategic agreement.
- 2:42This roughly spans between 1958 and 1989–1991.
- 2:47This leads to the penultimate stage, which marks a genuine turning point:
- 2:54a period between 2003 and 2005 defined by very pronounced differences.
- 3:00Finally, we move to the fifth stage, covering the contemporary
- 3:04period; this follows the theme of our title—a relationship that has
- 3:08now become ‘conventional’.
- 3:11I should point out that this term might instinctively be seen as a positive one.
- 3:17It is worth examining this from several angles, especially through
- 3:22a geopolitical lens, which may reveal that the title is
- 3:28not quite as positive as it may have appeared
- 3:33at first blush.
- 3:35Indeed. I wonder if you could take us back to
- 3:37that point, to the beginning so we can grasp the exceptional nature of the ties
- 3:41between France and the USA when the country was born.
- 3:45Lafayette, we are here.
- 3:48To illustrate this period, we should recall the words
- 3:53attributed to General Pershing on 4 July 1917
- 3:58at the Marquis de Lafayette’s graveside. The symbolism is
- 4:02immensely powerful and highlights
- 4:04—from the outset— the bonds forged
- 4:10between these two nations. These ties are on a different scale
- 4:16from any others; in other words, we are dealing with a truly unique bond.
- 4:21What makes this situation so unique right from the outset?
- 4:25We are looking at the American War of Independence of 1776;
- 4:31to get straight to the point, France was the only country
- 4:35willing to help the United States
- 4:39secure its independence in 1776.
- 4:42Obviously, there is a very strong bond here.
- 4:45It is crucial to address a common misconception from the start.
- 4:50We often rely on a retrospective narrative
- 4:53—particularly in the French context—which frames the
- 4:58intervention as a noble crusade to export
- 5:02democratic values to the United States. This doesn't quite align
- 5:07with the actual historical context.
- 5:10However, keep in mind that in 1776,
- 5:13it was the Marquis de Lafayette —and his title alone
- 5:18should tell you that the French monarchy was the one supporting the revolution.
- 5:23This is a key detail for later. We are essentially departing from the logic
- 5:28of classical geopolitics; rather than France simply
- 5:31helping the American rebels to spite the British
- 5:38—given their long-standing disputes— we must remember that the United States
- 5:45was, at its core, originally a British colony.
- 5:47That, too, is very important to emphasise.
- 5:50A second essential point is something that simply
- 5:56does not get enough airtime: throughout this 250-year history,
- 6:03France is the only major European power
- 6:08that has never engaged in a formal war against the USA.
- 6:11Because, obviously, Germany was at war with the United States
- 6:14twice, during the First and Second World Wars.
- 6:15That’s so obvious that I’ll move on quickly.
- 6:18The United Kingdom was at war with the United States twice: during the War of
- 6:21Independence in 1776, and again in 1812.
- 6:26It’s a little-known, yet very important fact.
- 6:29Italy was at war with the United States during the Second World War,
- 6:32and Spain was at war with the United States during a major geopolitical crisis
- 6:38in 1898 involving Cuba.
- 6:40It’s thus clear that Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy
- 6:44and Spain have all been at war with the United States at different
- 6:48times, but never France.
- 6:50This places the Franco-American relationship in a completely
- 6:55unique light from the outset. Not only was France the sole power
- 7:00to help the Americans achieve independence—hence
- 7:03Independence Day— but it is also the only European power
- 7:06never to have been at war with the USA.
- 7:08To truly underscore how unique these ties are, two
- 7:12other events are worth mentioning —both of which I find deeply significant.
- 7:16Firstly, there is the 1803 sale of Louisiana to the United States by Napoleon
- 7:22Bonaparte, who was then First Consul.
- 7:25It is worth clarifying that the historical Louisiana
- 7:30Territory that France sold the USA was vastly larger than
- 7:34the modern-day borders of the current
- 7:38US state of Louisiana.
- 7:40One might even argue that this forged an even stronger bond;
- 7:45after all, it is thanks to France that the United States
- 7:48added extra stars to its flag, and that is certainly no small matter.
- 7:51It’s worth noting that the French objective was as much
- 7:55to satisfy the Americans as it was to embarrass the British. Napoleon,
- 8:00in his strategic brilliance, understood that maintaining
- 8:04a French presence in these territories was impossible given the dominance of
- 8:09the British Royal Navy. Therefore, the only way to prevent the English
- 8:13from returning to the Americas was, paradoxically,
- 8:17to sell these territories to the Americans —a move that
- 8:20further strengthened the ties between France and the fledgling American state.
- 8:24The third point is a crucial one:
- 8:28in 1812, the United States suffered the
- 8:34only military defeat in its history when the British landed on the American
- 8:38coast during a major conflict.
- 8:41Why would that bolster ties between France and the USA?
- 8:45Because France and the USA were de facto allies in
- 8:491812, the year of Napoleon’s Russian campaign. Because Russia was allied with
- 8:55London, France and the USA were effectively in the same camp
- 8:58with a shared strategic outlook.
- 9:01We are therefore seeing the emergence of a relationship
- 9:07that is unparalleled in the history of nations within the realm of geopolitics.
- 9:14This first stage thus covers the years from 1776 to 1812.
- 9:20Clearly, the next stage entails a significant leap forward in time.
- 9:25Why?
- 9:25Because on 2 December 1823, James Monroe, the fifth US President,
- 9:29delivered a speech that articulated the Monroe Doctrine.
- 9:34In essence, this policy committed the USA
- 9:38to a path of isolationism.
- 9:40However, the fundamental relationship remained
- 9:43intact, despite inevitable frictions.
- 9:47A prime example is France's attempt to forge closer ties with Mexico under Napoleon III.
- 9:53We should also consider the concerns shared
- 9:59by both Britain and France during the
- 10:02American Civil War between May 1861 and May 1865.
- 10:06Yet, we are witnessing the emergence of a truly exceptional relationship
- 10:11—one which, as I have noted, established a demonstrably unique
- 10:16dynamic from the very outset.
- 10:18Let’s now turn to that close bond of the second stage.
- 10:22As your opening remarks suggested,
- 10:24this close bond was punctuated by real
- 10:27differences.
- 10:28This closeness is fairly easy to highlight since the
- 10:31period in question, as mentioned previously, is 1917–1956.
- 10:38Why 1917?
- 10:40Because, to follow on from my earlier point, this was when the USA moved away
- 10:44from the Monroe Doctrine and isolationism, becoming
- 10:48fully involved in the First World War.
- 10:50Naturally, they were fighting alongside
- 10:54the French. This was when General Pershing supposedly spoke with rare
- 10:58poetic flair—though the words are merely attributed to him—
- 11:03with the words: Lafayette, we are here.
- 11:06This is a crucial point that I may revisit:
- 11:11it shows a clear American consciousness of
- 11:16'repaying a debt' for past support.
- 11:20And even over a century later, we are here.
- 11:24We didn’t forget you; we are here.
- 11:26That’s really something I think we should bear in mind.
- 11:29In the subsequent Second World War, Washington came to the rescue a second time.
- 11:34This led into the Marshall Plan era —though we should be clear that the Plan was
- 11:39designed for all of Europe, not just France, and was
- 11:44framed by the onset of the Cold War.
- 11:46It was not, therefore, simply a matter of altruism; rather, the USA had a
- 11:51clear vested interest in the outcome.
- 11:53Despite these remarks, a deep bond clearly exists,
- 11:57underscored by the fact that France and the United States
- 12:01were aligned in both world wars.
- 12:04It is noteworthy, however, that several
- 12:08disagreements had begun to emerge.
- 12:11Frictions are becoming apparent —to borrow a Clausewitzian term,
- 12:16albeit one more traditionally associated with
- 12:21military tactics.
- 12:23For a start, we can see that various disagreements were already surfacing
- 12:29in the 1920s and 1930s over how
- 12:31the post-First World War era was being managed.
- 12:37A palpable sense of frustration existed on the French side,
- 12:43particularly rooted in the perception that the Americans
- 12:46failed to grasp France’s situation —particularly its demographic
- 12:50disadvantage relative to Germany.
- 12:53Then there were the issues that really soured relations between the two sides,
- 12:59specifically the scale of German reparations and the question of how to repay
- 13:03the massive loans the Americans had issued.
- 13:08Gérard Araud’s Nous étions seuls (We Were Alone), a diplomatic history
- 13:13of the 1919–1939 period,
- 13:15perfectly captures this sense of French isolation.
- 13:21There was clearly a shared
- 13:25'Anglo-Saxon' mindset between the Americans and the British;
- 13:30neither wanted to see Germany weakened so much that France would become
- 13:34a dominant power in Europe.
- 13:35That, in itself, is a significant point worth highlighting.
- 13:39Another noteworthy phenomenon, albeit one rooted in
- 13:44a psychological context, was
- 13:46the profound shock felt by the Americans at the Fall of France in 1940.
- 13:53We have to remember that, despite their isolationism,
- 13:58the Americans weren't closely
- 14:00following military developments. They still saw the French Army as the
- 14:04'great victor' of WWI and the gold standard of military power: the champions.
- 14:10When that image shattered, it led to a complete loss
- 14:15of confidence—a shift that is essential for understanding what followed.
- 14:19The Americans relied on the French Army to defend their interests in Europe.
- 14:24This is a crucial statement.
- 14:26When, in the five weeks from 10 May 1940 until the armistice at Rethondes on 22 June 1940,
- 14:33France collapsed in six weeks due to the Blitzkrieg,
- 14:38Paul Reynaud, then President of the Council
- 14:41(the Third Republic’s equivalent to a Prime Minister),
- 14:45found himself overwhelmed. He begged the Americans to set
- 14:49aside their neutrality and send ammunition, guns, and planes.
- 14:54Roosevelt’s reply was rather cryptic, essentially: We’re praying for you,
- 15:00yet he took no action.
- 15:02Crucially, 1940 was an election year; Roosevelt was bound
- 15:06by his pledge to keep the United States out of the war.
- 15:09So here we have a second wound, so to speak,
- 15:14which was only deepened by the fact that —considering the
- 15:20sheer weight of the US contribution to the victory—
- 15:24there was clearly going to be a shift in the hierarchy of
- 15:27military and geopolitical power. Moreover, differences
- 15:32of opinion were arising over how France should exit its empire. By 1945, it was
- 15:38obvious that the colonial system was doomed, De Gaulle’s Brazzaville
- 15:42speech notwithstanding. The real priority, therefore, was
- 15:46to create the best possible conditions to end the French colonial Empire.
- 15:50But it was also a source of friction. While the Americans were well aware
- 15:55that the Indochina War could be viewed through the lens of the Cold War,
- 15:59which allowed for Franco-American harmony, it was increasingly seen through a
- 16:05postcolonial lens instead; and one event would prove to be of major significance.
- 16:11That major event is the Suez Canal crisis between late
- 16:14October 1956 and 7 November 1956.
- 16:18Here, it is essential to recall the facts. This was the final occasion
- 16:23—as I shall discuss later, as it is precisely how André Fontaine frames the
- 16:26matter—on which France and the UK acting in concert, took
- 16:29a unilateral initiative without consulting the Americans.
- 16:33They did so in the belief that they were still major world powers, capable
- 16:36of decision-making.
- 16:37To summarise: after Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, Paris and London signed
- 16:43a secret treaty, allied themselves with Israel, which then launched an attack.
- 16:52Officially, France and Britain were meant to be separating the warring parties. But
- 16:56in truth, their paratroopers were dropped directly over the Suez Canal with
- 17:00the goal of retaking it.
- 17:02Facing pressure from Moscow and Washington, London and
- 17:07Paris were told to withdraw with the utmost haste
- 17:10—within 48 hours. The Americans pointed out that, for one thing, they weren’t warned; and
- 17:14here, clearly the term ‘warn’ carries a weightier underlying implication
- 17:20—specifically, of ‘seeking permission’. Having attempted to cast off
- 17:24the tutelage of the pre-eminent Western power, as it were, the USA was
- 17:30essentially saying: since you have taken this liberty, we won’t protect you any longer.
- 17:34Consequently, France and the UK —facing a threat from the USSR,
- 17:39then allied with Egypt—withdrew in haste, turning a clear military success into
- 17:44a political defeat.
- 17:46That’s a very deep wound.
- 17:48It is becoming increasingly evident that this will
- 17:52fast-track European integration.
- 17:54While this is a separate subject, its geopolitical implications are often
- 17:58understated; we should recall that the Treaty of Rome dates back to 25 March 1957.
- 18:04We’re clearly proceeding along a similar path.
- 18:06To appreciate the full magnitude of this crisis,
- 18:11I should mention André Fontaine’s two-volume history
- 18:18of the Cold War, which maps how much relations
- 18:23between the two countries are deteriorating.
- 18:30The second volume on the Cold War, the Korean War to the Alliance Crises,
- 18:33is a key starting point here.
- 18:36It covers the history of the Cold War broadly from 1950 to 1963.
- 18:41What is striking about the subtitle ‘Alliance Crises’ is
- 18:44that it encompasses more than just Franco-American relations,
- 18:48it also covers Sino-Soviet relations, pointing to a broader
- 18:53realignment of international ties.
- 18:57His third volume, ‘One Bed for Two Dreams:
- 19:02A History of Détente’, is of particular interest as
- 19:05it provides a retrospective analysis of the foundations of détente from 1962 through to 1981.
- 19:13The fourth chapter of the third volume, titled with specific
- 19:19reference to France—and indeed, France alone — is especially noteworthy
- 19:24(page 67 of the French edition).
- 19:26The title is: The World’s Troublemaker.
- 19:30So, when a French person highlights this, it naturally
- 19:35makes one wonder what
- 19:39the US perception of France’s stance on the matter was.
- 19:45At this point, however, it’s clear that a major
- 19:50event is unfolding—a transition that is set to take us
- 19:53into a third stage.
- 19:54Yes, because we began with a closeness marked by differences.
- 19:59Now, there is a distancing between the two, despite the backdrop of
- 20:04strategic agreements between the United States and France.
- 20:07The term ‘distancing’ is very important.
- 20:09Crucially, we must also explain the roots of this distancing,
- 20:14as it was driven largely by France's domestic political situation.
- 20:19Perhaps in the subsequent stages, it will be due more to
- 20:24domestic politics in the USA.
- 20:26Why?
- 20:27Why, then, should this new phase begin in 1958
- 20:32rather than 1956, where we last left off?
- 20:35France was in the midst of a profound political crisis
- 20:38—one so severe that the Fourth Republic’s President called on
- 20:41General de Gaulle to return to power as
- 20:47President of the Council. The National Assembly ratified
- 20:52the appointment on 3 June 1958.
- 20:55This shift is a vital point of emphasis; it marks
- 20:59the implementation of General de Gaulle’s signature foreign
- 21:05policy—the principle that France should be an ally
- 21:09of the United States without being subservient to American hegemony.
- 21:15The consequences were far-reaching: on 7 March 1966, de Gaulle withdrew France
- 21:21from NATO’s integrated military command.
- 21:26This move was made possible by the fact that France
- 21:30had already tested its first nuclear weapon in 1960.
- 21:34We can clearly see here that France is following a unique trajectory.
- 21:40It continues to assert its own international role—distinct from
- 21:45that of the United States— by occasionally adopting stances that are
- 21:51at odds with American policy.
- 21:55On the other hand, it is worth noting that while the previous stage
- 22:01saw a synergy of overlapping interests, we still remained
- 22:06within a single framework.
- 22:08While a certain distance is emerging here, France and
- 22:14the USA remain in close alignment —and are very much
- 22:18on the same page— when it comes to the most crucial issues.
- 22:22I believe we can illustrate this through two examples and three specific actions.
- 22:30The first is the Cuban Missile Crisis in the autumn of 1962.
- 22:33General de Gaulle explicitly informed Kennedy that France supported
- 22:39the United States throughout the standoff, assuring the US President
- 22:42of his total personal support.
- 22:44This is vital, echoing an earlier point:
- 22:46de Gaulle did not hesitate for a moment. In the frozen grip of the Cold War,
- 22:50and faced with such consequential stakes, any hesitation or tempering of his support
- 22:53was simply out of the question.
- 22:58Another event of interest here is one shaped by the hand of
- 23:03François Mitterrand.
- 23:05François Mitterrand stressed this twice in 1983.
- 23:10What am I referring to? Specifically, his famous
- 23:12speech at the German Bundestag on 20 January 1983.
- 23:17Remember that François Mitterrand had Communist ministers in his government and
- 23:22we were in the midst of the Cold War.
- 23:25Addressing an assembly of hesitant German MPs —the footage is quite telling—
- 23:31Mitterrand insisted that peace
- 23:34can only be maintained through a balance of power.
- 23:39This is a crucial point in geopolitical
- 23:41dialectics. He argued that it was essential to
- 23:45deploy American Pershing missiles, marking what is truly one of history’s great ironies.
- 23:51These American Pershing missiles —named for General Pershing—
- 23:55were intended to restore strategic nuclear parity against the Soviet SS-20s.
- 24:01On 13 October 1983, during
- 24:04a state visit with King Baudouin in Brussels, Mitterrand delivered
- 24:12a speech that remains overshadowed by
- 24:17his Bundestag address, yet contains a devastatingly sharp insight:
- 24:23The pacifists are in the West, but the missiles are in the East.
- 24:26Clearly, at these defining moments,
- 24:32France stands its solidarity with the USA.
- 24:37There is a final event in this sequence worth mentioning:
- 24:40the First Gulf War. When the conflict
- 24:43broke out, lasting from August 1990 to February 1991, President François Mitterrand
- 24:49fully committed France to the operation, joining Washington
- 24:54in the war effort.
- 24:55France was not alone, but it stood firmly with the Americans.
- 24:59It is clear that while a rift was developing, on the major strategic
- 25:03and geopolitical issues, the alliance remained intact.
- 25:08Ultimately, despite the friction,
- 25:16there was continuity.
- 25:19Looking to the next stage, however, I am far from certain that
- 25:24we can maintain our previous trajectory.
- 25:28Deep and genuine differences are now emerging, and the distance
- 25:31between the two sides is growing.
- 25:34Indeed, this fourth and penultimate stage—as
- 25:39previously outlined— signals not merely a distancing,
- 25:43but a genuine divergence in underlying logic.
- 25:47We are seeing a shift in the strategies and solutions deemed
- 25:53necessary for geopolitical order.
- 25:54Why start this stage in 2003?
- 25:59Because as many of you will realise, the decade following the Cold War
- 26:04felt like a time when the very idea of geopolitics
- 26:08had vanished. Whether you date the end of that era to the fall of
- 26:12the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, or
- 26:15to Mikhail Gorbachev’s resignation
- 26:17on 25 December 1991, we entered a period famously
- 26:20summarised by Francis Fukuyama as ‘the end of history’
- 26:25in his work: The End of History and the Last Man.
- 26:31We believed the power struggle was over;
- 26:34and therefore, there was no reason for relations between the USA and
- 26:37France to be particularly strained.
- 26:40However, by the start of 2003, the situation had changed completely.
- 26:46Why?
- 26:47The reason lies in the American plan to invade Iraq for a second time.
- 26:51On this occasion, France took a position famously defined by
- 26:56the Foreign Minister’s speech to the UN Security Council
- 27:02on 14 February 2003.
- 27:05It is worth noting that in France, this speech is held in very high esteem;
- 27:13it is both passionate and lyrical. In it, France took the opportunity
- 27:19to advise the United States, suggesting that the 'old' European nations
- 27:24—with their long history of conflict— were well-placed to offer
- 27:29lessons to the Americans, and that the USA
- 27:32would be better off staying out of the Iraqi conflict.
- 27:37Except that in this case, the form is overshadowing the substance.
- 27:43Why do I say this? Well,
- 27:44I am rather more sceptical about the significance of this argument than most.
- 27:50After all, what can we expect from friends and allies?
- 27:54Do we expect them to publicly denounce you,
- 27:58so ostentatiously, before the entire United Nations?
- 28:02Or do we rather expect them to leverage a quiet moment of complicity to say:
- 28:08Listen, you know how important our ties have been throughout history.
- 28:13‘You know our history of standing by you, but in
- 28:17this instance, we must tell you frankly: we believe you are making a mistake’.
- 28:21To be perfectly clear, would it not have been better for the French President to have said
- 28:24this himself? He did eventually attempt to do so, but the moment had already passed.
- 28:28The American response was immediate—an exchange frequently
- 28:31overlooked in the French narrative.
- 28:33The US representative may well have pointed out that, in terms of
- 28:37the age of democracy, the United States predated France.
- 28:40We arrive once again at a famous turning point: France only became a democracy 13
- 28:45years later, in 1789.
- 28:47In my view, the timing was
- 28:50exceptionally clumsy, particularly after 11 September 2001, as the
- 28:57Americans were still in no state to hear such a speech.
- 29:01Even if we were right on the substance, we should have waited
- 29:06for the right moment. Once the operation was underway and the Americans began to face
- 29:11their first real difficulties, we could have
- 29:13said to them: ‘Look, we are now ready
- 29:16to offer you a way out’.
- 29:18Geopolitics requires a keen sense of timing; one must know precisely
- 29:22when a message will resonate.
- 29:23Here, it was flawed in both form and timing.
- 29:27Moreover, beyond this initial friction, which inevitably
- 29:33carried substantial consequences,
- 29:38we must acknowledge that the USA ultimately ignored the French intervention
- 29:44and proceeded with the invasion anyway.
- 29:46I would further suggest that in geopolitics, when a
- 29:50nation is powerless, it is not necessarily wise to stubbornly
- 29:55highlight that impotence to the global stage.
- 29:58France’s actions served only to demonstrate that its rhetoric,
- 30:01however impassioned, exerted zero influence over Washington.
- 30:03That was a dramatic situation.
- 30:05I highlight it here because it is a viewpoint seldom
- 30:10discussed within France itself.
- 30:13Furthermore, an additional layer will soon
- 30:18exacerbate these evident frictions: the shifting nature of
- 30:22America’s own strategic priorities.
- 30:25US strategic choices will shift during the Obama presidency.
- 30:31The implications here are profound, rooted in what we know as the 'pivot' strategy.
- 30:36The 'pivot' is a metaphor drawn from Barack Obama’s passion for
- 30:41basketball: it entails a player who, while facing one way, suddenly
- 30:46wheels around to find a clear path to the basket.
- 30:50What are we actually seeing here?
- 30:52While the US had at one time been focused on Europe,
- 30:56the rise of China is now the primary concern.
- 31:00Consequently, Washington is pivoting towards the Pacific
- 31:05—shifting its gaze away from Europe to focus more on Asia in general,
- 31:10and China in particular.
- 31:13We are now seeing a trend that naturally leads to an even
- 31:19greater distancing of relations.
- 31:24We should also consider Donald Trump’s first term between 2016 and 2020;
- 31:30we’re well aware of how critical he was of NATO and the nature of his relations
- 31:36with European countries in this context.
- 31:38It’s also worth noting that during the Biden presidency, even though the tone was
- 31:44much more conciliatory, it was made quite clear that
- 31:47the focus remained very much on China.
- 31:50Let's look back at Biden’s speech where he justified withdrawing from Afghanistan
- 31:56by the need to focus more on China.
- 31:59We actually highlighted this in two sessions we dedicated
- 32:03to Afghanistan.
- 32:06This represents a USA that is distancing itself from previous commitments, driven by
- 32:12a new strategic framework.
- 32:15Suddenly, we’ve reached a stage that marks a significant turning point;
- 32:21it might partly explain the situation we find ourselves in today.
- 32:25We started out with a unique relationship, but in this current stage, we are
- 32:29moving towards a conventional relationship.
- 32:32Framed like that, you might assume that a conventional relationship is synonymous
- 32:35with uneventful, and thus peaceful.
- 32:38This final stage I want to cover is obviously the most important, since it’s the one
- 32:46that brings us right up to the present day, from 2025 onwards.
- 32:49I’ll explain why up to the present day.
- 32:52Naturally, the term 'conventional relationship' implies
- 32:58a cooling of tensions. We might even instinctively assume that,
- 33:06following the preceding stage, which seemed marred by turbulence, we’ve gone back to
- 33:13the norm—a return to the status quo.
- 33:16I should point out that this isn’t a normalisation at all.
- 33:21It’s actually a banalisation.
- 33:24So now, this concept suddenly takes on a distinctly pejorative
- 33:27tone in geopolitics, since what defines a conventional
- 33:31relationship between two states?
- 33:33It is a relationship that is governed solely by respective interests
- 33:39and geopolitical calculations, stripped of any unique bond between
- 33:43the two nations.
- 33:45Ultimately, then, we have moved from a singular bond to a banal one.
- 33:53But that’s hardly positive at all.
- 33:56So, how can we explain this situation?
- 33:59To understand this shift, we should return to our
- 34:04retrospective of the Trump administration’s
- 34:09first year in office, where, in our previous sessions,
- 34:14we brought up the strategic document adopted
- 34:21by Washington in December 2025.
- 34:24The most revealing aspect of this document is its first chapter dedicated
- 34:27to the Western Hemisphere. Europe was pointedly excluded from this
- 34:33grouping. Europe—and, by extension, France— was relegated to a separate chapter entirely.
- 34:37And not only that, as we established in that session
- 34:39—and I would suggest watching it again, if necessary—
- 34:44the United States no longer presented itself as a providential power with a historic mission
- 34:53to spread democracy and freedom, but rather just another conventional player
- 34:58in the geopolitical arena.
- 35:00This goes to the heart of the matter:
- 35:03the United States is lapsing into banality, reinventing itself as
- 35:07a purely conventional actor, which is a far cry from
- 35:11the eras of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt.
- 35:14The relationship is becoming increasingly banal because the role Washington
- 35:18wants to play in geopolitics actually reflects its own
- 35:22internal situation and US domestic politics.
- 35:25Even the Americans are viewing themselves as having a more conventional role.
- 35:31Will the Americans and the French be capable of preserving a bond
- 35:38that is as singular as it is unique, a relationship that remains without parallel
- 35:44in the history of modern civilisation?
- 35:47This is indeed the vital question we must pose in 2026, as the
- 35:52United States celebrates the 250th anniversary of its founding.
- 35:57This question becomes all the more vital because, frankly,
- 36:01the current geopolitical landscape is desperate for solutions. It is a
- 36:07reality that will place immense strain on every nation currently
- 36:12grappling with a climate increasingly fraught
- 36:15with anxiety and, more crucially, hostility.
- 36:21Thank you, Fabrice.
- 36:22Another observation struck me during this session: the
- 36:24question of diplomacy—or rather, the art of diplomacy—
- 36:27as inextricably linked to historical depth and a refined sense of tact in geopolitical
- 36:32dealings and relations between states.
- 36:35I suggest that, at some stage, we take the opportunity to reflect on
- 36:38diplomacy and geopolitics. Thank you, Fabrice.
- 36:41Thank you.
- 36:42That wraps up this session of Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique.
- 36:45Thank you all for following us.
About this transcript
This page contains the full transcript of France–États-Unis : la fin d’une relation exceptionnelle ? | RDVG by ESCE , generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 4,686 words across 529 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.
What you can do with it
Use the transcript to take notes, quote the speaker, build a study guide, generate a summary with ChatGPT or Claude via the YouTube Summary tool, or export it as a timed subtitle file with YouTube to SRT. You can also re-open it in the transcriber to choose a caption track available on the video.
Free YouTube transcript tool
YouTube2Text is a free YouTube transcript generator — no signup, no daily limit. Paste any YouTube link and get the full transcript instantly, with timestamps, click-to-jump, caption language selection, AI prompts for ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, and exports to TXT, SRT, VTT, or Markdown.