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Episode 4: The MOU Is Dead! Can a Blockade Save Us? — Transcript

by John Mearsheimer - Offensive Realism · 4,307 words · 720 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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0:00And if the first blockade failed,
0:03why should we expect the second blockade
0:06to succeed?
0:08What's changed here?
0:10>> The West is leading Ukraine down the
0:13primrose path.
0:14>> Israelis are executing a genocide in
0:18Gaza.
0:18>> It's not China's fault that it wants to
0:21be powerful. So, if you get into trouble
0:25and you dial 911, there's nobody at the
0:27other end.
0:29>> Hi, this is John Mearsheimer. Today is
0:32August 17th, 2026.
0:35And today is the day that the memorandum
0:38of understanding that was signed by Iran
0:41and the United States on June 17th
0:44expires. Uh the original memorandum of
0:48understanding called for 60 days of
0:51negotiation.
0:53And it was assumed that at the end of
0:54those 60 days, there would be an
0:56agreement. Uh and at that point, the uh
1:00uh the memorandum would expire. Well, 60
1:03days have gone by and there's obviously
1:06been no agreement. But the memorandum of
1:09understanding has definitely expired.
1:12Uh and there's no effort being made to
1:15extend it.
1:17So, the question is where are we today
1:20in the absence of the memorandum of
1:22understanding? And it seems quite clear
1:24that what
1:26uh has happened is that the United
1:28States has decided that it's going to
1:30depend on its [clears throat] naval
1:32blockade of Iran
1:34to achieve its goals. So, what I'd like
1:38to do today is just talk about um
1:42what a naval blockade today is likely to
1:46be able to achieve for the United
1:49States, given that we don't have any
1:51prospect of uh a new memorandum of
1:55understanding.
1:57Uh what can blockade do for the United
1:59States? Is it a viable alternative uh
2:02for getting our way? Now, the best way
2:05to start is just talk about what our
2:08goals are uh and then talk about what
2:11Iran's goals are. And you want to
2:13remember that when we talk about Iran's
2:15goals, we want to talk about the United
2:17States thwarting Iran's goals. So, the
2:20United States, in very important way,
2:22has two sets of goals here. One is to
2:24achieve what to achieve its own goals,
2:27and number two, to thwart Iran from
2:30achieving its goals. So, let me start by
2:33talking about what America's goals are,
2:36and then look at um Iran's goals, and
2:39then we can talk about how well suited
2:41blockade is at this point in time
2:44uh
2:45for us, the United States, achieving its
2:47goals.
2:49Uh when the war started back on February
2:5228th of this year, the United States had
2:54four goals.
2:56Uh
2:57number one was uh regime change. Number
3:00two was to put an end to Iran's nuclear
3:04enrichment capability.
3:06Number three was to put an end to Iran's
3:09long-range missile capability.
3:12And number four was to end Iranian
3:15support for the Houthis, Hezbollah, and
3:18Hamas. Those were the big four goals.
3:21The United States, uh of course, has
3:23achieved none of those goals. None of
3:27them have been achieved, and there is no
3:29chance that any of the four are going to
3:32be achieved. So, the question we then
3:34have to ask ourselves is what are
3:37America's goals at this point in time?
3:40And Vice President Vance said last week
3:43very clearly that we have two goals. He
3:46said that the first and most important
3:49goal
3:50is
3:51to open the strait.
3:53He said the second goal is to get a
3:57nuclear deal. This is actually quite
3:59remarkable because when we went into the
4:02war, what mattered more than anything
4:04else was the nuclear issue.
4:07And of course the strait was opened on
4:10February 27th, so the whole idea of
4:13opening the strait was not even on the
4:15table
4:17right before the war started.
4:19It was the nuclear issue that really
4:21mattered. So here's Vice President Vance
4:24saying that our principal goal is to
4:28open the strait and our secondary goal
4:31is to get a nuclear deal. By the way,
4:35President Trump's spokesperson
4:37has said that as far as President Trump
4:40is concerned, those two goals are
4:43co-equal. So he has a slightly different
4:45view of things than Vice President Vance
4:48does. But nevertheless, you can see how
4:50important it is for us
4:52to open the strait as soon as possible
4:55and that is obviously for economic
4:57reasons.
4:58Now, what we want to do is switch gears
5:01and we want to talk about what Iran's
5:03goals are. And you want to keep in mind
5:05that what the United States wants to do
5:08is make sure that Iran does not achieve
5:11any of its goals if that's possible or
5:14all of its goals
5:16are denied.
5:18Now, let me put it differently. That we
5:19want to make sure that Iran doesn't
5:21achieve all its all of its goals and
5:25in the best case to minimize the number
5:27of goals that Iran achieves. Okay.
5:32The Iranians do want to open the strait.
5:34There's no question about that. Like us,
5:36they want to open the strait. Like us,
5:37they understand it's in their economic
5:39interest to open the strait.
5:41But the Iranians say that they won't
5:43open the strait unless the United States
5:47meets a number of other demands, not
5:51through negotiation, but right away. In
5:54other words, the Iranians say, "We'll
5:56open the strait if you agree to lift all
6:00sanctions on Iran.
6:02>> [snorts]
6:02>> If you agree to freeze all of unfreeze
6:07all of our frozen assets.
6:10If [snorts] you agree to pay
6:12reparations.
6:14If you agree that we control the strait.
6:18If you agree that we can collect fees.
6:21If you agree to remove American military
6:24forces from the Gulf region." These are
6:27the demands
6:29that the Iranians have. And the Iranians
6:32are saying
6:33the United States has to meet all those
6:34demands before they will open the
6:36strait.
6:38Now, obviously, the United States is not
6:41interested in accepting all of those
6:44demands.
6:46But the Iranians have made it clear that
6:48the United States has no choice. What we
6:51want to do is minimize the number of
6:53demands that we are forced to accept.
6:57The Iranians say, "There will be no
6:59minimization. You have to accept all of
7:02those demands before we will agree to
7:06open the strait." And again, you want to
7:07remember that America's principal goal
7:10is to open the strait.
7:12So,
7:14the question is, how can we achieve our
7:17goals?
7:19And uh
7:22blockade is the strategy of the day. But
7:26I want to say a few words about what our
7:28strategy has been in the
7:31entire war so that we can put where we
7:34are today with blockade into a broader
7:36context.
7:38As you remember, the war started on
7:42February 28th.
7:43And we started with a major strategic
7:46bombing campaign, an air campaign that
7:49lasted for 40 days. Went from February
7:5128th to April 8th.
7:54Then there was a ceasefire on April 8th.
7:57There were some negotiations that went
7:59nowhere. And then on April 13th, the
8:02United States moved to a naval blockade.
8:06So you see, this is the first time we
8:08tried blockade. And the blockade that is
8:11now in place is the second instance of a
8:13blockade.
8:15So, we went from an air war in the first
8:1740 days of the war up until April 8th.
8:20Then on April 13th, we moved to the
8:22first blockade. And that first blockade
8:25lasted from April 13th
8:28up [snorts] until June 17th, when the
8:30memorandum of understanding was signed.
8:33So that's a way of saying that the first
8:36blockade lasted about
8:40two plus months.
8:42And it did not work.
8:44We ended up signing a memorandum of
8:46understanding on June 17th, and that
8:48MOU, of course, is what put an end to
8:51the blockade, the first blockade. But
8:53that memorandum of understanding was
8:56extremely favorable to the Iranians. It
9:00was a memorandum of understanding that
9:02the United States did not like because
9:04the United States understood it was a
9:06surrender document. But nevertheless,
9:08the United States signed it. And the
9:10United States signed it because the
9:11blockade did not work. And before that,
9:14the air war did not work.
9:16Okay.
9:17Then what happens in early July is
9:22that the United States and Iran get
9:26involved in a tit-for-tat strategy.
9:30This starts on July 7th, and it lasts
9:32until about July 31st. And it basically
9:36involves the United States and Iran
9:39engaging in a limited air war where they
9:42bomb specific targets uh
9:46on each side. In other words, the United
9:49States bombs targets in Iran and the
9:51Iranians bomb targets in Kuwait,
9:55Saudi Arabia, and so forth and so on.
9:57And this lasts again from July 7th to
10:00July 31st.
10:02>> [snorts]
10:02>> Then the tit-for-tat campaign comes to
10:07an end.
10:09And what happens is the United States
10:13moves to the second blockade. The second
10:17blockade actually starts on July 14th,
10:21which is in the middle of the
10:23tit-for-tat campaign. So, there's a
10:25period there where you have the
10:26tit-for-tat campaign taking place and
10:29you have the second blockade. But as I
10:31said before, on July 31st, the
10:34tit-for-tat campaign comes to an end.
10:37The United States has basically had
10:40enough. So, all that's left is the
10:42blockade, the second blockade, and
10:45that's where we are today.
10:49Now,
10:50the question we have to ask ourselves is
10:53given that the memorandum of
10:54understanding has expired and there's no
10:57prospect of a new memorandum of
10:59understanding, and given that we've
11:01given up on tit-for-tat, given up on a
11:05major bombing campaign, given that
11:07there's not going to be a land option,
11:09the question is
11:11what will blockade do for the United
11:14States in terms of achieving its
11:16objectives?
11:18Now, we know that the first blockade
11:20didn't work. So, the question is what
11:22about the second blockade? Now, it's
11:24important to start by saying that at the
11:26end of last week, the Secretary of the
11:28Treasury, Scott Bessent, said that this
11:31week, starting today, we are going to
11:34inflict unprecedented
11:37economic hurt
11:39on uh
11:41the Iranian economy. So, in effect, what
11:44he was saying is that in addition to the
11:46blockade, and this naval blockade is
11:49designed to inflict economic hurt on
11:53the Iranian economy, we're going to do
11:55something special this week, and we're
11:58going to deliver unprecedented economic
12:01hurt.
12:02Now,
12:04let's evaluate how well this is all
12:06likely to work.
12:08First of all, it's hard to believe that
12:12there's more economic hurt that we can
12:15inflict on Iran. We've really maxed out
12:20at this point.
12:22What is the United States going to do to
12:24damage further the Iranian economy that
12:28it hasn't already done?
12:30Uh Bessen hasn't told us. He's made this
12:33vague claim, but he hasn't told us how
12:36this process works.
12:38I would argue that there's virtually
12:40nothing the United States can do
12:43to create unprecedented
12:46economic hurt.
12:49So, this brings us back to the question
12:51of the blockade.
12:53What is the likelihood that this
12:55blockade is going to produce a favorable
12:58outcome for the United States? In other
12:59words, what is the likelihood that this
13:01blockade is going to allow us to achieve
13:04our own goals and limit
13:07the number of goals that Iran has that
13:10it can achieve.
13:12The first point you want to keep in mind
13:14is that the first blockade failed.
13:17Uh
13:18and if the first blockade failed,
13:21why should we expect the second blockade
13:24to succeed?
13:26What's changed here? And by the way, you
13:28want to remember that the first
13:30blockade, as I said, lasted
13:32a little over 2 months. Went from April
13:3513th to June 17th. So, a little over 2
13:38months, and it didn't work. Again, we
13:40signed the memorandum of understanding,
13:42which is basically a surrender document.
13:45Well, the present blockade has gone on
13:48since July 14th. It's a little over 1
13:51month. So, we haven't even reached the
13:532-month period here. And you want to
13:55keep in mind, as I talk here, that
13:58blockades only work over a long period
14:02of time. Almost everybody agrees that
14:05blockades do not produce instant
14:07results. So, for this blockade to work,
14:10it's going to have to be in place for a
14:12long period of time.
14:14Uh
14:15we're not going to get instant results.
14:18Now, there are very good reasons to
14:21think that we, the United States, are in
14:25a worse position today in terms of
14:28implementing this blockade than we were
14:30when we started the first blockade on
14:34April 13th. Now, why is that the case?
14:37One reason is the state of the US Navy.
14:40It's quite clear that the US Navy is
14:43suffering in significant ways from the
14:46wear and tear of being deployed to the
14:50Gulf for a long period of time.
14:54And we see this with the case of the USS
14:56Abraham Lincoln. This is the large
14:58aircraft carrier, where there has been
15:01huge dissatisfaction
15:03among the crew members, uh because of
15:08the demands of this naval campaign
15:11against Iran, the United States has been
15:14forced to deploy ships like
15:19this carrier, the Lincoln, and
15:21destroyers and ships as well for
15:24extended periods of time in the area or
15:28in the waters around Iran. And those
15:33troops on these ships have not been
15:36getting proper food,
15:39uh and they have not uh
15:43been in very good living conditions, and
15:48all sorts of trouble has broken out on
15:51the Lincoln. There's evidence that some
15:54of the sailors were thinking about
15:56jumping off the side of the uh carrier.
16:02Uh there's evidence that fights had been
16:04breaking out and so forth and so on. So,
16:07actually what's happened is that the uh
16:11the Lincoln has been taken off station
16:13and it's being replaced by another
16:15carrier, by the USS George Washington.
16:18>> [snorts]
16:18>> Now, it's very important to emphasize
16:20that it's not only the Lincoln that is
16:23suffering from these problems.
16:24Destroyers and other ships that have
16:26been deployed for extended periods of
16:28time are also having all sorts of
16:31logistical problems.
16:34Uh so, my point here is that for
16:39purposes of implementing a protracted
16:43blockade, and blockades by definition
16:45are protracted, the US Navy is in
16:48terrible shape to accomplish that
16:51mission.
16:53There's just been so much wear and tear
16:55on the US Navy that it's not clear that
16:59it can keep in place a successful
17:02blockade for many more months. There's
17:05an additional additional
17:08issue at play here.
17:10And that is that uh
17:13the Navy at this point in time is small
17:16enough
17:17that it is
17:19only capable of focusing on one theater
17:23of operations at a time in a major way.
17:28And [snorts] what this means is that
17:30because we are focusing
17:32uh laser-like
17:35on the Middle East or on the Persian
17:36Gulf or on Iran,
17:38uh
17:40what we are doing is weakening ourselves
17:44in East Asia.
17:45And you want to remember that in East
17:47Asia, where the United States is
17:49interested in containing China, naval
17:53forces matter greatly. Naval and air
17:55forces matter much more than land forces
17:58in East Asia when you talk about
18:00containing China. But what's happening
18:03here is that the United States is being
18:05forced to pull forces out of East Asia
18:08and send them to the Persian Gulf. And
18:11this is true with regard to naval
18:13forces. As I said before, given the
18:16consequences of the logistical problems
18:18that the Abraham Lincoln faces, it's
18:21being taken off station. And it's being
18:24replaced, as I said, by the USS George
18:26Washington. The question you want to ask
18:28yourself is where is the George
18:30Washington coming from? And the fact is
18:33it's coming from East Asia. It's
18:35normally stationed in Japan. This means
18:39there's going to be no aircraft carrier
18:42in East Asia.
18:44This is not good from a strategic point
18:48of view when you think about containing
18:51China.
18:52So, not only is the wear and tear on the
18:56US Navy limiting its overall
19:00capabilities,
19:02the focus on Iran
19:05keeping a blockade on Iran is also
19:07weakening America's position in East
19:10Asia vis-a-vis its most important
19:13threat, which is China.
19:17There are additional problems with the
19:19blockade.
19:21One is that as long as we keep the
19:23blockade on, and the Iranians keep the
19:26blockade on, what we are doing is
19:29greatly limiting the amount of oil that
19:33comes out of the Persian Gulf
19:36because both sides are in effect
19:38blockading the Strait of Hormuz.
19:41This means that there's less oil
19:44to
19:45appear on
19:48global or in global markets.
19:50Furthermore, because there has been a
19:52huge conflict
19:54between the Houthis and the Saudis, and
19:57the Houthis have basically shut off
20:02the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which is where
20:04Saudi oil comes out of the Red Sea.
20:08Saudi oil is now not only coming out
20:13of
20:14the Persian Gulf through the Strait of
20:15Hormuz, it's not coming out of the Red
20:19Sea through Bab-el-Mandeb. And it is
20:22imperative to have lots of Saudi oil on
20:27or in global markets.
20:29But that's no longer the case. This is
20:31not to deny, of course, that some ships
20:33do get through
20:35either the Strait of Hormuz or the
20:38Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Some Saudi ships
20:40do, but not many. So, the amount of
20:42Saudi oil that was coming out of the
20:46Gulf on February 27th has been greatly
20:49reduced.
20:51And this is a huge problem for the
20:54international economy.
20:56Uh
20:57So, there are all sorts of economic
21:00incentives
21:02uh to open the strait. Uh I might also
21:06note that if you look at the strategic
21:08petroleum reserve in the United States
21:11and the strategic petroleum reserve in
21:13other countries, it's quite clear that
21:16we have significantly drawn down those
21:19reserves uh, to uh,
21:23make up for the fact that so much oil is
21:25now not coming out of the Gulf. Uh, and
21:30the question is how long can we depend
21:33on taking oil out of those strategic
21:36petroleum reserves in places like the
21:38United States uh, to deal with this
21:41problem of um,
21:44of uh,
21:45uh, of missing oil coming out of the
21:49Persian Gulf.
21:50Now, another
21:53very important dimension to this is that
21:57uh, if you look at what's happened
21:59inside of Iran,
22:01uh, the hardliners are now in control.
22:05Uh, and uh, the hardliners are not
22:08interested in reaching any kind of
22:11accommodation with the United States.
22:13They are interested in driving a hard
22:15bargain. They interest They are
22:17interested in telling the United States
22:19that it has to meet
22:21all of Iran's demands, which I described
22:25before, before Iran will agree to open
22:30the Strait of Hormuz. And in addition to
22:34that, these hardliners who are in charge
22:39inside of Iran
22:40are making it perfectly clear that they
22:45want to initiate military
22:49action against the United States and its
22:52allies in the Persian Gulf. They believe
22:56that the best defense is a good offense.
22:59So, if you look at the hardliners who
23:01are now in control in Iran,
23:05they are
23:07bent on causing the United States more
23:10trouble than ever. They are interested
23:13in taking the initiative.
23:15They are interested in being proactive.
23:18So, the United States now faces a more
23:21dangerous adversary in Iran.
23:24In addition to the fact that the
23:26economic situation is deteriorating for
23:30the reasons I just described, and in
23:32addition to the fact that the US Navy is
23:36in
23:37bad shape
23:39for purposes of implementing a
23:42protracted
23:44naval blockade of Iran. So, the
23:47situation does not look good at all.
23:51Now, one might say,
23:53"Okay, you've convinced me that the
23:55blockade is not likely to work, but
23:58maybe what the United States can do here
24:00is a tit-for-tat
24:03strategy, or maybe the United States can
24:05go back
24:07to a major bombing campaign like we saw
24:09in the first 40 days. In other words, we
24:13do have an escalation option."
24:15But, this is not true. We don't have an
24:18escalation option. Uh
24:21In fact, we don't even want to go back
24:23to a tit-for-tat strategy, and there are
24:25basically three reasons for that.
24:28One is we have a significant shortage of
24:31munitions, and the last thing we want to
24:34do is get involved in a tit-for-tat
24:37campaign where we have to use up even
24:39more of those precious munitions.
24:42Furthermore, our Gulf allies have zero
24:46interest in seeing the war start back up
24:48again because they understand full well
24:51that they will be targeted. Uh the
24:53Iranians have made that clear, and of
24:55course in the past the Iranians have
24:57targeted our Gulf allies.
25:00So, our Gulf allies are saying, "No more
25:02escalation." And then finally, there's
25:04the economic consequences. At this point
25:07in time, President Trump cannot afford
25:10to restart the 40-day bombing campaign
25:14or even engage in a tit-for-tat
25:16campaign. He's got to open the strait.
25:18That's why Vice President Vance said our
25:20principal goal is to open the strait. Uh
25:24we have to open that strait for economic
25:26reasons. So, tit-for-tat is not even a
25:30viable option for the United States,
25:32much less starting the 40-day campaign.
25:35And to drive that point home, let me
25:38tell you a story that shows you uh how
25:41little interest we have even in
25:43escalating to a tit-for-tat campaign.
25:47As I said before, the tit-for-tat
25:49campaign started on July 7th, and it
25:51lasted until July 31st. Remember, we had
25:54first the strategic bombing campaign,
25:57then we had the first naval blockade,
25:59then we had the tit-for-tat campaign. It
26:01started on July 7th. Now, why did it
26:05start? How did the How did the
26:07tit-for-tat campaign begin?
26:10On July 6th,
26:13the Iranians attacked
26:16three
26:18cargo vessels
26:20that were trying to come out of the
26:22Strait of Hormuz
26:24through the Omani Channel. That was the
26:27channel that's close to Oman that the
26:30United States in effect helped control.
26:34The Iranians made it clear to us that
26:36that was unacceptable. No ships coming
26:39out of the Gulf could go through the
26:42Omani Channel, said the Iranians. Well,
26:46on July 6th, there were three ships
26:48coming through the Omani Channel in the
26:51Strait of Hormuz.
26:53And the Iranians opened fire on all
26:56three of those ships. This is July 6th.
27:00The next day, the United States started
27:03the tit-for-tat campaign by attacking
27:06targets inside of Iran. The Iranians, of
27:10course, retaliated. We retaliated, and
27:13so forth and so on. And this tit-for-tat
27:15campaign lasted from the 7th of July to
27:18the 31st of July. The key point that I
27:20want to make here is what started it was
27:23that the Iranians attacked cargo ships
27:26going through the Strait of Hormuz. And
27:29the United States said that is
27:30categorically unacceptable, and
27:32therefore we went to the tit-for-tat
27:34campaign.
27:35Well, if you look at what's happening
27:38today,
27:39the Iranians are attacking
27:43cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz on
27:48an almost daily basis. They make no
27:51bones about it.
27:53And the question you want to ask
27:54yourself is, what is the United States
27:56doing? Is the United States retaliating?
28:00Is the United States shown any interest
28:02in going back to a tit-for-tat strategy?
28:04The answer is no.
28:06And the reason is that the United States
28:09has zero interest in escalating to a
28:13tit-for-tat strategy.
28:15So, what we have here is a very
28:17interesting situation if you think about
28:19it.
28:21If escalation does take place
28:24in the Gulf,
28:26it's not the United States that is
28:29likely to initiate
28:32that escalation. It is the Iranians who
28:36are likely to initiate
28:38that escalation because
28:42the leadership in Iran, very clearly
28:45now, is interested in playing hardball
28:48with the United States from a military
28:51perspective. As I said before, from an
28:53Iranian point of view, they believe that
28:56the best defense is a good offense. So,
28:59they are willing to escalate because
29:02they believe that the United States will
29:05not retaliate. Now, it is possible the
29:07United States will retaliate at some
29:10point, but that will not solve our
29:12problem.
29:14So, you see what's happened here
29:16is that over time
29:19the United States has failed to achieve
29:23any of its objectives, whether we're
29:25talking about the four big objectives
29:27that it started the war with or opening
29:30the straight
29:32or getting a nuclear deal, which are its
29:34two objectives today.
29:37And at the same time
29:39it's in a situation where it looks like
29:41it has little choice
29:44but to cave in to Iran's major demands
29:50because the United States has no
29:52strategy. It has no military option
29:57for achieving its goals and preventing
30:00Iran from gaining its goals. It's been
30:05forced into a situation where it has to
30:08rely on blockade. And as I said before,
30:11blockade didn't work the first time and
30:14there's no reason to think it's going to
30:16work this time.
30:18Because the situation for the United
30:20States in terms of implementing a
30:22blockade now is worse than it was
30:25between April 13th uh and June 17th.
30:30And if you think about it, what's
30:31happened here
30:33is that the Iranians have really turned
30:37the table
30:39tables
30:40in the sense that the Iranians
30:44are now
30:46the party in this conflict that is most
30:50likely to cause escalation.
30:53In the beginning, that obviously looked
30:56like the United States. It looked in the
30:58very beginning like the United States
31:00held all the cards.
31:03But as this conflict has worn on and as
31:07we've come to understand here on August
31:1017th,
31:12we have no military option.
31:15Escalation would be disastrous for us.
31:18And if anything,
31:20it's the Iranians who believe they have
31:23a military option and they believe they
31:27can escalate.
31:29All of this is to say that it's hard to
31:32see how the United States can
31:37achieve even a limited victory in this
31:40conflict with Iran. It looks to me here
31:45on August 17th like the United States
31:48has little choice but to surrender to
31:54virtually all of Iran's demands if it
31:57hopes to open the strait and avoid an
32:00economic catastrophe.
32:03That concludes my
32:06video for today.
32:07Thank you all for listening. And I look
32:11forward to the next time that we talk.

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