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Edward Snowden: "If I end up in Guantánamo I can live with that" | Guardian Interviews — Transcript

by The Guardian · 2,221 words · 330 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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0:00I haven't been uncomfortable you know I
0:09haven't really been scared like I
0:12thought I might be you know there's
0:14always questions of asylum you know
0:16where I'm going to stay and how these
0:18things work out but regardless of what
0:21happens if I uh if I end up in Chains in
0:25Guantanamo I can move with that au hoppy
0:41in Russia or would you much rather be in
0:43Western Europe or back in the States
0:45you know I'm much happier here in Russia
0:48then I would be facing an unfair trial
0:51in which I can't I can't even present a
0:54public interest offense to a jury of my
0:56peers we've asked the government again
0:58and again to provide for a fair trial
1:01and they've declined and I feel very
1:05fortunate to have received asylum I've
1:08been totally open about the fact that I
1:09disapprove of the majority of the recent
1:12laws in Russia on Internet censorship
1:14and surveillance I think it's entirely
1:16inappropriate for any government in any
1:19country to insert itself into the
1:20regulation of a Free Press
1:22how good does your Russian do it give us
1:25a sentence in Russian I think I'm going
1:29to avoid that online because the last
1:30thing I want is float clips of me
1:32speaking Russian floating around the
1:34internet the context do you feel as if
1:37you're under surveillance
1:38I think it's reasonable to assume that I
1:40am under surveillance anyone in my
1:42position surely is subject to some
1:44surveillance but you take the
1:46precautions you can to make sure that
1:48even if you are under surveillance
1:49there's no sensitive information for you
1:51to expose you may not have the documents
1:54beefed all this knowledge in your head
1:57if I were providing information that I
1:59know that's in my head to some foreign
2:01government the US intelligence community
2:04would be able to detect that they would
2:05see changes in the type of information
2:07that's going through it they would see
2:09sources go dark that were previously
2:11productive they would see new sources of
2:13dissin
2:13information appearing within these
2:15channels and that hasn't happened did
2:17you read the book about you by Edward
2:19Lucas who works for the Economist which
2:21claims essentially that you're a Russian
2:23spy now do you know what I mean yeah
2:25it's crazy he's not credible at all I
2:32mean the claim is that this has got the
2:34Kremlin's fingerprints all over it and
2:36that if you're not actually a spy you're
2:38an unwitting agent of Russia I can give
2:42a blanket response to all of the Russia
2:44questions if the government had the the
2:48tiniest indication the tiniest shred of
2:50evidence that not even that I was
2:52working for the Russian government that
2:54I was associating with the Russian
2:57government it would be on the front page
2:58of the New York Times by lunchtime
3:02knowing what we know now what is the
3:05responsibility of professionals to
3:07change their behavior if they're dealing
3:09with sensitive information I mean
3:10journalists must know that if they carry
3:13a mobile phone on the way to meet a
3:16source that's going to be compromised
3:18the work of journalism has become
3:20immeasurably harder than it ever has
3:22been in the past journalists have to be
3:26particularly conscious about any sort of
3:30network signaling any sort of connection
3:32any sort of license plate reading device
3:36that they pass on their way to a meeting
3:38point any place they use their credit
3:40card any place they take their phone any
3:43email contact they have with the source
3:45because that very first contact before
3:48encrypted communications are established
3:50is enough to give it all the way what
3:53other forms of professionals should be
3:55changing their behavior as a result of
3:56what we now know it's a constantly
3:58increasing list and one that we're not
4:00even aware of today I would say lawyers
4:03doctors investigators possibly even
4:07accountants anyone who has an obligation
4:09to protect the privacy interests of
4:11their clients is facing a new and
4:14challenging world and we need new
4:17professional training and new
4:18professional standards to make sure that
4:21we have mechanisms to ensure that the
4:24average member of our society can
4:26have a reasonable measure of faith in
4:28the skills of all the members of these
4:29professions it is technology compatible
4:34with privacy absolutely technology can
4:37actually increase privacy but not if we
4:42sleepwalk into new applications of it
4:45without considering the implications of
4:48these new technologies the question is
4:51why are our private details that are
4:55transmitted online why are our private
4:58details that are stored on our personal
5:00devices any different than the details
5:04and private records of our lives that
5:06are stored in our private journals there
5:08shouldn't be this distinction between
5:11digital information and printed
5:13information but the government in the
5:15United States govern the United Kingdom
5:17in many other countries around the world
5:18is increasingly seeking to make that
5:21distinction because they they recognize
5:24that it vastly increases their their
5:27powers of investigation people use the
5:30analogy of the haystack and the needle
5:31that you need to collect all this
5:33information in order to look for the
5:36needle of specific intelligence that
5:38you're looking for I would argue that
5:41simply using the term haystack is
5:43misleading this is the haystack of human
5:47lives it's all the private records of
5:49the most intimate activities throughout
5:52our lives that are aggregated and
5:54compiled and stored for increasing
5:56frequencies of time it may be that by
6:01seizing all of the records of our
6:04private activities by watching
6:05everywhere we go by watching everything
6:08we do by monitoring every person we meet
6:10by analyzing every word we say by
6:14waiting and passing judgment over every
6:17Association we make and every person we
6:20love that we could uncover a terrorist
6:22plot or we could discover more criminals
6:25but is that the kind of society we want
6:27to live in that is the definition of a
6:30security state when did you last read
6:331984
6:38actually quite some time ago contrary to
6:41popular belief you know I I don't think
6:44we are exactly in the 1984 universe the
6:47technologies that are in 1984 now seem
6:50unimaginative and quaint you know
6:53nowadays we actually buy cell phones
6:56that are the equivalent of a networked
6:58microphone that we carry around in our
7:00pockets with us voluntarily as we go
7:03from place to place and move about our
7:04lives 1984 is an important book but we
7:11should not bound ourselves to the limits
7:13of the author's imagination you know our
7:15times have shown that the world is much
7:17more unpredictable and dangerous than
7:19that do you think this is the end of
7:23cloud computing I don't I think what
7:28cloud companies need to pursue in order
7:29to be truly successful is what's called
7:33a zero knowledge system which means the
7:36service providers host and process
7:39content on behalf of customers but they
7:42don't actually know what it is that's
7:44the only way they can prove to the
7:46customers that they can be trusted with
7:48their information well it's a good
7:49example of that there's a company called
7:51SpiderOak SpiderOak
7:53is a competitor to Dropbox but Dropbox
7:56is a targeted you know want to be prism
8:00partner they just put the belief
8:03Condoleezza Rice on their board of
8:05directors now who is probably the most
8:07anti privacy official you can imagine so
8:09they're they're very hostile to privacy
8:11SpiderOak in response has structured
8:13their system in such a way you can store
8:15all of your information on them but they
8:17literally have no access to the content
8:20of that information so well yeah they
8:21could be compelled to turn it over you
8:24know the law enforcement agencies still
8:26have to go to a judge and get a warrant
8:27to actually get your encryption key from
8:29you do you use Google no no I don't use
8:35go to use Skype no I have used Skype and
8:39Google Hangouts which are great but
8:43unfortunately security compromised
8:45services for public talks where they've
8:48been required but I wouldn't use it for
8:50personal communications we
8:52trust them without verifying what their
8:55activities are how they're using our
8:57data and deciding for ourselves whether
8:59it's appropriate where they draw the
9:00lines so you'll feel sitting there
9:06inside the NSA you're a young man leads
9:10dancer crowding in do you think other
9:12analysts had the same dance was this
9:14something where you ever shared your
9:16dance absolutely I mean the reality of
9:18working in intelligence communities that
9:20you see things that are deeply troubling
9:22all the time and it's not just one
9:24person as many of them so I raised
9:27concerns about these programs regularly
9:29and widely more than ten discreet
9:32colleagues that I had worked with and
9:34that's both laterally and vertically in
9:36my work I went to when I show these
9:38programs I said what do you think about
9:39this is this unusual how can how can we
9:42be doing this isn't this
9:44unconstitutional isn't this a violation
9:46of Rights you're talking about patterns
9:49of behavior and just to rephrase the
9:52question were there specific interesting
9:54things where you where you actually felt
9:57uneasy that X was being targeted with a
10:00simple a simple example that everybody
10:02can relate to is you've got young
10:05enlisted guys 18 to 22 years old they've
10:09suddenly been thrust into a position of
10:11extraordinary responsibility where they
10:12now have access to all of your private
10:14records now in the course of their daily
10:16work they stumble across something that
10:18is completely unrelated to their work in
10:22any sort of necessary sense for example
10:24an intimate nude photo of someone in a
10:29sexually compromising situation but
10:32they're extremely attractive so what do
10:34they do they turn around in that chair
10:36and they show their co-worker and their
10:38co-worker has says oh hey that's great
10:40send that to bill down the way and then
10:43bill since it's George George sense it's
10:45Tom and sooner or later this person's
10:48whole life has been seen by all of these
10:51other people it's never reported nobody
10:55ever knows about it because the auditing
10:56of these systems is incredibly weak the
10:58fact that your private images records of
11:01your private lives records of your
11:03intimate moments
11:05have been taken from your private
11:08communication stream from the intended
11:10recipient and given to the government
11:12without any specific authorization
11:14without any specific need is itself a
11:17violation of your rights why is that in
11:19a government database and useful
11:21instance is that happening absolutely
11:22yeah numerous all its routine enough
11:25depending on sort of the company you
11:28keep it could be more or less frequent
11:30but these are seen as sort of the fringe
11:33benefits of surveillance positions you
11:35see the old to the auditing is not that
11:37good that it would pick up on the
11:40sharing of that kind of a 29 year old
11:41walked in out of the NSA with all of
11:44their private records what does that say
11:46about their auditing there's something
11:49particularly about this area of life
11:50when almost nobody understands it when
11:53we first sat down the documents I got
11:54some very very good reporters who were
11:58in their sort of 50s and 60s who had
12:00done in endless great stories and at
12:04some points they just literally couldn't
12:07understand what they were looking at and
12:08it took the sort of 25 year-old who
12:11would say look was a great story there
12:12and I was always had a great story if
12:14you're a an MP and you're in your late
12:1860s and you spent your whole life
12:20thinking about economics or politics or
12:23farming the notion that you could you
12:26even understand what questions to ask
12:27that's probably the a single most
12:30important factor that explains the
12:32failures an oversight that we've seen in
12:34almost every Western government we need
12:36to think of it in terms of literacy
12:38because technology is a new system of
12:43communication it's a new set of symbols
12:46that people have to intuitively
12:48understand it's like something that you
12:49learn but just like how you learn to
12:51write letters at school you know you
12:53learn to use computers how they interact
12:56how they communicate and technical
12:58literacy in our society is a rare and
13:02precious resource are you confident that
13:07if you went back to the US and were
13:09tried in front of a jury of your peers
13:11that you would be acquitted you know I
13:13think it would be very difficult to find
13:14any 12 Americans in the United States
13:17right now
13:18who would uniformly agree that the last
13:20year's revelations about the NSA's
13:22unconstitutional surveillance programs
13:24did not serve the public interest I'm
13:30not going to presume to know what a jury
13:34would think or to say what they should
13:37or should not think but I think it's
13:39fair to say that are reasonable and
13:41enduring questions about the extent of
13:44these surveillance programs how they
13:45should be applied and that should be the
13:47focus of any trial recently we found out
13:51that Google and Apple don't just know
13:52where you are right now but no way
13:54you've been over the past week the past
13:56month the past year and how long you've
13:59been there this could have a massive
14:01impact on your life

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