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Donald Rumsfeld - Known and Unknown — Transcript

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0:02Good evening.
0:06Good evening.
0:09I'm David Eisner, president and CEO of
0:11the National Constitution Center, and it
0:14is a great pleasure to welcome you here
0:16tonight to hear a great program with
0:20Secretary Rumsfeld,
0:22uh the former Secretary of Defense. Um
0:26this exciting event marks the first stop
0:30in Secretary Rumsfeld's
0:33tour in support of his new book, Known
0:37and Unknown.
0:39And on behalf of the center, we are
0:41thrilled that this highly anticipated
0:44book tour is launching here.
0:48Donald Donald Rumsfeld um has
0:52a long and highly influential career in
0:55public service.
0:56He served as both the 13th Secretary of
0:59Defense under President Gerald Ford and
1:02as the 21st Secretary of Defense under
1:05President George W. Bush,
1:08making him the only person to hold this
1:11position twice and the second
1:14longest-serving defense secretary in
1:17history.
1:18Secretary Rumsfeld's career in
1:20government also includes four terms as a
1:24congressman for Illinois' 13th
1:27congressional district as well as a
1:29broad range of other prominent
1:32positions. Among them,
1:35a naval aviator,
1:37an ambassador to NATO,
1:40and in the private sector, a successful
1:43business executive.
1:46In Known and Unknown, Secretary Rumsfeld
1:49reveals previously undisclosed details
1:52and insights into the Bush
1:54administration,
1:56the attacks on September 11th,
1:58and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
2:03The book is both a fascinating narrative
2:07for today's readers and an unprecedented
2:10resource for tomorrow's historians.
2:14Please note that proceeds from the book
2:16sales will go to charities for veterans,
2:19a cause that is especially close to the
2:21our hearts here at the center,
2:23especially now as our own Art of the
2:26American Soldier exhibition is on
2:28display through March.
2:31Also joining us for this conversation is
2:33Michael Beschloss.
2:36Michael serves as NBC News presidential
2:40historian
2:41and as a contributor to the PBS NewsHour
2:45with Jim Lehrer.
2:47He's written eight books on American
2:50presidents and has become been called
2:53quote the nation's leading presidential
2:56historian by Newsweek.
3:00During the conversation, Michael and
3:02Secretary Rumsfeld will address
3:05questions from the audience that are
3:07written on note cards.
3:10And they will also be uh
3:13taking questions from our live audience
3:15online. Those questions have already
3:18been posted.
3:20Um we'll be collecting those questions
3:23on the note cards and those will be
3:24distributed during the program. If you
3:26need a note card, please raise your
3:29hand.
3:30And following the program, Secretary
3:32Rumsfeld will be signing books at a
3:35table to the left of the stage, and we
3:37ask that you line up in an orderly
3:39fashion in front of the stage.
3:43I want to note that we are thrilled as
3:45well tonight to have with us members of
3:48the World Affairs Council of
3:50Philadelphia, our partner in this event,
3:53who share the center's commitment to
3:56encouraging active and informed
3:58citizenship.
4:00And now I'd like to ask you all to
4:03silence your cell phones in
4:05consideration of your fellow guests.
4:08And I'd also like to note that
4:11um
4:12I'd also like to note that tonight
4:16we are expecting to have a lively,
4:18provocative, interesting discussion.
4:21I'm hoping that uh all of you will join
4:24us in making sure that everyone's able
4:27to enjoy our discussion tonight
4:29and that we'll all be able to hear
4:32everything that is said from the stage.
4:35With that, it is my great pleasure to
4:37introduce Donald Rumsfeld and Michael
4:41Beschloss.
4:55Thank you, sir.
4:57Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
5:00Feeling. Thank you.
5:07Thank you.
5:10Excuse my back.
5:14Uh we thought that we'd have this little
5:16gathering because Secretary Rumsfeld's
5:18book has not been getting very much
5:20attention,
5:21so we thought that we'd uh make up for
5:23that by at least having one of that. I
5:25know that you're not doing anything else
5:27uh
5:28to make sure that the book uh gets the
5:30attention it deserves.
5:32Uh it's appropriate that we're doing
5:33this here in the National Constitution
5:35Center because one of the things that
5:37the founders were serious about was,
5:40unlike the regimes in Europe that they
5:42were starting this country to be unlike,
5:45they wanted to make sure that we had a
5:47record of our leaders, what they thought
5:49about what they did in office, and also
5:51they hoped that that record would be
5:53open as soon as possible. You might want
5:55to
5:55Um wait and get him to quiet down. Uh I
5:58think We
5:59Everyone here, I think there's some
6:01question.
6:03There's so much noise over to the right.
6:07Yeah. Oh, is that what it is?
6:10Well, I guess it's a it's a
6:12big crowd of people trying to get
6:13upstairs, which for an author is news
6:15you'd like to hear, so I
6:17We'll just speak loudly.
6:20In any case, they hoped that uh we
6:23Americans would have access to what our
6:24leaders
6:26thought and what they did as soon as
6:27possible so that we can learn from their
6:29successes and their shortcomings. And as
6:31I was saying, Donald Rumsfeld's book is
6:34very much in that tradition. I'm glad
6:36it's published. I think you are, too.
6:38Thank you. Uh the book is on Mr.
6:41Rumsfeld's entire life, but thought we'd
6:44begin by talking about Iraq and then
6:46work backwards. Uh
6:48great deal of the book is about Iraq.
6:51And I guess maybe the way to get into
6:52this is, you know, here we are in the
6:54Constitution Center. We just passed by a
6:56statue of James Madison in the other
6:58room.
6:59As you know, Madison gave a lot of
7:01thought to war and what presidents
7:04should do and how often Americans should
7:06get into war.
7:07Uh if he came back and just asked you to
7:10tell him, "Why did we go to war in
7:11Iraq?" What would you say?
7:15The
7:17answer would be that the
7:21Congress of the United States passed a
7:24resolution overwhelmingly
7:26favoring regime change in Iraq
7:29uh in the 1990s uh by an overwhelming
7:33vote, and it was signed by President
7:35Clinton.
7:36The United Nations
7:38uh issued some 17 different resolutions
7:42uh advising Iraq that they should
7:46uh conform to the resolutions, the
7:49requests of the United Nations Security
7:51Council,
7:52to allow the inspectors into their
7:54country to
7:56provide the inspectors the information
7:58on their weapons of mass destruction,
8:01and uh
8:03the United Nations had been repeatedly
8:05rebuffed.
8:08President uh George W. Bush made a
8:11decision
8:12uh
8:13when he first came into office that he
8:15was concerned about the fact that Iraq
8:18was firing regularly at the United
8:21States and United Kingdom aircraft that
8:24were supporting the United Nations
8:27no-fly zones and patrolling in the
8:29northern and southern portion of Iraq.
8:32Those planes were being shot at almost
8:34every day. The only country in the world
8:36that was shooting at American and
8:37British aircraft,
8:39over 2,000 times they were fired on. The
8:43Joint Chiefs of Staff advised me and the
8:45president that they were concerned about
8:47the fact that eventually one of our
8:49planes, a British plane or our planes,
8:51would be shot down and the crews would
8:53be killed or
8:54or taken hostage.
8:56Third, the
8:58uh United States Department of State
9:01had listed Iraq as a one of the
9:04countries on the uh terrorist uh list.
9:08So, there were a series of things like
9:11that by way of background.
9:14Next, the United States Intelligence
9:16Agency spent a great deal of time uh and
9:20determined that they were convinced that
9:23the Iraqi government had weapons of mass
9:26destruction,
9:28had the competence
9:31to continue developing weapons of mass
9:33destruction, and had the capability to
9:36rapidly expand those capabilities in the
9:39event they decided to do so.
9:42You have a country in Iraq that had uh
9:44used chemical weapons on on its own
9:46people, the Kurds, a country that had
9:49used chemical weapons against its
9:51neighbor in Iran,
9:53and a behavior pattern that persuaded
9:56people that they not only had them but
9:59would use them.
10:00And it
10:02we were at a point in our country's
10:04history where
10:06the
10:08lethality of weapons
10:11had arrived at a point that
10:13it once you mix them with someone who
10:16was willing to proliferate those weapons
10:18and and once you give them allow them to
10:22with somebody who has demonstrated
10:24willingness to use them as well as
10:26proliferate them
10:27the danger the lethality was so great
10:30that President Bush went to the Congress
10:32and told the Congress what they
10:34believed. Was there ever a thought of a
10:37war declaration instead of going for
10:39resolution? They
10:41no I don't know I don't know that would
10:43have been something Department of State
10:44would have done with the president
10:45whether they considered that.
10:47a declaration of war since 1941.
10:49Exactly not since World War II.
10:52Not in the Korean War not in the Vietnam
10:54War not in the incursions that President
10:56Clinton was involved in. Does does a war
10:58declaration make any difference? I mean
11:00would it have brought Americans more
11:02into this?
11:04I doubt it.
11:05I think that uh
11:09it you never know. That was that's a
11:11road they didn't travel and and I can't
11:13really say but but I think the
11:15resolution passed by Congress and then
11:17the resolutions by the United Nations
11:21provided an underpinning. The the other
11:24thing I would add to the former
11:25president is that um
11:28President Bush and Colin Powell and
11:31Condi Rice and George Tenet and and
11:34the Vice President all of us discussed
11:36the hope that there would not be a
11:38conflict and that they
11:40Saddam Hussein could be persuaded to
11:42leave the country
11:44and not require a
11:46an invasion of the country.
11:48And there were messages passed and
11:51requests made and they were rebuffed.
11:55I think that uh
11:57Saddam Hussein very likely was
12:00purposely trying to make the world
12:02believe he had large stockpiles.
12:05I think that he felt that he had friends
12:07in the United Nations who might be able
12:10to stop the United Kingdom the United
12:12States and the various other countries
12:14that were supporting the coalition and
12:16prevent them from going in.
12:19And I also think that that because
12:22President George W. Bush's father
12:26had gone into Iraq after Iraq invaded
12:29Kuwait
12:31and caused them to be removed from
12:33Kuwait but did not change the regime. I
12:37there's good evidence that Saddam
12:39Hussein believed that America would not
12:42change the regime that he would survive
12:44even though the United States might come
12:46in. Interesting. So
12:49there were there were combination of
12:51things taking place that argued for it
12:53and there were a behavior there was a
12:55behavior pattern on the part of Iraq
12:57misguided as it turned out and he
13:00refused to to leave with his family
13:01which was offered and urged. And as as I
13:06mean war is the failure of diplomacy.
13:09Right as you quote in the book. One
13:11thing people I think will be very
13:13surprised to read about is that
13:15President Bush never asked you for for
13:17your advice on whether the country
13:19should go to war against Iraq.
13:21Would that be violate one of Rumsfeld's
13:24rules?
13:25No I don't think so. I think President
13:27Bush I don't know that he asked Colin
13:29Powell or Condi Rice or or the Vice
13:31President. He he was the president he
13:33was elected by the American people. He
13:36we had frequent meetings and discussed
13:39various aspects of the uh
13:41situation.
13:43They worked very hard with the United
13:45Nations to try to put additional
13:47pressure on Saddam Hussein so that uh
13:50that he wouldn't continue to resist. And
13:53the president did what a president has
13:55to do. He made the decision and uh
13:58and and
13:59I I
14:00assume that he assumed that everyone in
14:03that group would have argued vehemently
14:08if they disagreed which no one did. Mhm.
14:12How do you think people in the future
14:14will look back on that decision in Iraq?
14:17It's hard to know. Um
14:19you know the road not traveled is always
14:21smoother
14:22and one looks at it and thinks well what
14:24if and what if.
14:26I think that a little known fact is that
14:29Gaddafi the head of Libya at that point
14:32had a very aggressive nuclear program
14:34underway.
14:36And when the United States went in and
14:39changed the regime in Iraq
14:42Gaddafi
14:43who had been working very hard on a
14:45nuclear program
14:47very high on the terrorist list decided
14:49that he would forego his nuclear program
14:53and he contacted some Western leaders
14:56and indicated look I do have this
14:59nuclear program. I'm willing to stop it.
15:01I'm willing to have it inspected that
15:03I've stopped it because I do not want to
15:05be suffer the same fate as Saddam
15:08Hussein. So if you
15:10if you look at the
15:12the region
15:13there's some disadvantages that linger
15:17from the conflict. By the same token you
15:20have the country of Iraq that no longer
15:24has a a truly vicious brutal regime that
15:28had used chemical weapons against its
15:30own people and its neighbors. It's gone.
15:33The Iraqi people have fashioned a
15:36constitution had elections under the
15:38constitution
15:40and are finding their way towards away
15:43from the repressive system towards a
15:45freer political and a freer economic
15:47system.
15:48And other countries in the region
15:51in the region such as Libya
15:53are engaged in a behavior pattern that
15:55is is vastly better for the world and
15:57for the region. So there are
16:01minuses negatives and there are
16:05some pluses and
16:08I think it it you're you're an
16:09outstanding historian and I think it'll
16:12be people like you who over time will
16:14will weigh all those things and and with
16:17the benefit of some distance make some
16:19judgments. Mhm.
16:21I think a little while from now. Let's
16:24go back to the beginning. You were uh
16:27born Chicago grew up in Winnetka
16:29Illinois which was not quite as
16:31prosperous town as it is nowadays.
16:34Sleepy little village back then.
16:35Sleepy little village as you as you
16:36write about. And
16:39went to New Trier High School went on to
16:40Princeton. Was that a little bit of a
16:42culture shock coming from the Midwest?
16:44Oh my goodness it was indeed. I I was
16:47told by the dean of the school I was
16:49going to go to a Big Ten school and
16:51wrestle
16:52and the dean said no no you got to go to
16:55Princeton and I said well I I
16:58why? And he said well I'll that's where
17:00you belong and I said well I can't go
17:02there I don't have the money.
17:04He said I'll get you a scholarship which
17:06he did. And uh
17:08so I went and of course most of the
17:10people there had gone to private schools
17:12they'd taken the freshman courses before
17:14and and uh
17:16I got there and I worked my head off. I
17:18spent all the time in the library or at
17:20playing football or wrestling and uh
17:23never did much other than that. There
17:25were no women at the school. It rained a
17:27lot.
17:29Not my first choice.
17:31And Joyce my wife here was off at
17:34University of Colorado skiing her way
17:36through college and
17:38and and it was it was a totally
17:40different experience for me.
17:43And you also heard a little talk by a
17:46Princetonian who had run for president
17:48been nominated been nominated once. That
17:51I it's not in the book but I'm told you
17:52actually know some of those words almost
17:54by heart. I do.
17:56said. Tell tell who it was first of all.
17:58I was in it was my senior banquet in
18:011954
18:03and the former governor of Illinois
18:05named Adlai Stevenson
18:08had lost to Dwight Eisenhower already in
18:1052 and he later lost in 56 and it was it
18:14was our senior banquet in college and he
18:16came to speak at Princeton. He was a
18:18Princeton graduate.
18:20And he gave
18:23the
18:25the most eloquent and persuasive speech
18:28about public service that
18:31I had ever heard or will ever hear.
18:35It was
18:37an evening event
18:39and all of us just sat there listening
18:41to this brilliant he called himself an
18:45egghead and he as a joke used to say uh
18:50what was it something about
18:51Eggheads of the world unite you have
18:53nothing to lose but your yolks. But your
18:55yolks exactly. Yeah.
18:57And and I think all of us who were
19:01getting ready to go into the military
19:03all of us came away with a a a sense
19:08of responsibility.
19:10And one of the things he said was that
19:13that young people in our country have a
19:16responsibility to help guide and direct
19:18the course of our country.
19:20And that the power of the American
19:23political system is virtually without
19:25measurement and uh
19:27and and if America were to stumble the
19:30world would fall.
19:31And it
19:34it had an impact on me and
19:37I have put up a website and
19:41with hundreds of memos that that I
19:44believe support the book that that we've
19:47got here and you can go to an endnote
19:49and and go to the website and actually
19:52see the entire memo if I quote a
19:54paragraph, uh but I'm almost positive
19:56we've got Adlai Stevenson's speech on
19:59that website and I highly recommend it.
20:01It's uh it is a a wonderfully inspiring
20:04speech.
20:06Although he did not tempt you to become
20:07a Democrat, obviously uh
20:10was there any point in your early life
20:12that you would have been anything but a
20:13Republican? Oh my goodness, yes. During
20:15World War II as a young man, my father
20:18was in the Navy out in the Pacific on a
20:19carrier.
20:21And uh you know, Franklin Roosevelt was
20:24um about the only president in my
20:27lifetime up in between 1932 I and and
20:30yeah, I guess he was sworn in in '33,
20:32but and I was born in July of '32, but
20:35uh I never knew Herbert Hoover
20:36personally.
20:38Uh
20:40but but Franklin Roosevelt was was the
20:43president. He represented the United
20:45States of America at wartime.
20:48And uh my parents, uh I and everyone I
20:51knew, uh was
20:53uh looked to him as as the leader of our
20:56country and it was enormously
20:59uh important figure for a young man.
21:03And you were so taken with Stevenson and
21:06what he said, I assume that had some
21:07influence over the fact that you ran for
21:10Congress at the age of 29. Very dark
21:13horse, 1962.
21:15Uh most people don't run for Congress
21:17that early, at least they didn't in
21:18those days as you said. It it was
21:20younger than it is nowadays. What moved
21:23you to get in so soon?
21:26Well, it was a I was the longest of long
21:29shots. I'd been away from my home
21:31district for a decade. I'd gone 4 years
21:34to college, 3 and 1/2 years in the Navy,
21:36then I'd worked in Washington for two
21:38Congress congressmen, one from Ohio and
21:40one from Michigan. I'd never met a
21:41congressman before in my life.
21:44And then I'd gone back to Chicago, home,
21:46and uh
21:47suddenly out of the blue, a the woman
21:50who was the congresswoman who had
21:52succeeded her husband, and they had
21:54occupied that congressional district
21:56from 1932
21:58until 1960.
22:01And she announced she wasn't going to
22:03run for re-election.
22:05And I thought to myself, my goodness,
22:06that same family had owned that district
22:08for my entire lifetime.
22:10Either you run and
22:11Or you may not have the chance to
22:13you may not get another chance. So, I
22:15talked to Joyce and and she's game, she
22:18said, and we
22:19uh got a whole bunch of friends from
22:21high school and college and God bless
22:22them, they they went out there and and
22:25formed I think we had something like
22:261,500 volunteers helping and people
22:29running around with car tops on their
22:31cars saying Rumsfeld for Congress and
22:33earrings and buttons and
22:36bumper stickers and and sure enough
22:39I was fortunate. You know, one of the
22:41things that might have helped, Michael,
22:42is that President Kennedy had gotten
22:44elected 2 years before. Mhm.
22:46And he was so young. He had run for
22:49Congress at 29. Well, he'd run for
22:50Congress at 29, then he'd served in the
22:52Senate for uh part of a term, and then
22:55he ran for president, but he was a young
22:57president and he'd been elected and he
22:59was so attractive and charming and and
23:02humorous. And the first president you
23:04our second president you saw you posed
23:06for a picture with Eisenhower during the
23:08campaign and then as a new congressman,
23:10I think within your first couple of
23:12months went to the White House and met
23:14Kennedy. I did indeed. And
23:17but but the fact that we had such a an
23:19attractive young president had a a
23:22appeal in the district that made a a kid
23:2429 years old running for Congress look
23:26like maybe he could actually be a
23:28congressman. Mhm. Well, and so it proved
23:30to be.
23:32You came to Washington and among the
23:33things that you did in Washington, uh
23:35and you write about it in the book, was
23:37you attended a briefing by Lyndon
23:40Johnson on Vietnam. Mhm. And tell a
23:42little bit about that because you
23:44actually spoke up in that briefing in a
23:46way that I think very few people did.
23:49Well, this wonderful Vice President
23:51Hubert Humphrey, who was called the
23:52Happy Warrior and just a wonderfully
23:55energetic and appealing person, uh he
23:59was Vice President and he'd just come
24:00back from uh Vietnam and uh Vietnam was
24:05increasingly becoming a a major
24:07political factor in the country. It had
24:09not been when I first ran in '62,
24:11but by then, I suppose it was '64 or
24:13'66. I think '65. '65.
24:16Maybe '66. So, President Johnson
24:20was getting complaints
24:22that members of Congress didn't feel
24:23they were being informed
24:25about the war.
24:26And so he
24:27However could they have said such a
24:28thing? I beg your pardon. However could
24:30they have said such a thing?
24:31Yes, I know it.
24:33He invited the members of Congress down
24:35to the White House and we all went down,
24:37at least a large number went down, 100,
24:39150 of us,
24:40and it was uh winter as I recall, the
24:43invitation came late, and we went in and
24:46and it's not nothing for a young
24:47congressman to be sitting in the White
24:49House getting briefed by the president
24:50and the vice president who'd just come
24:51back from from Vietnam, and Hubert
24:55Humphrey started to give the briefing,
24:57and Lyndon Baines Johnson was
24:59commander-in-chief,
25:01and he was bigger than life. He would
25:04pop up every time someone would say
25:06something and answer the question and
25:08Hubert uh would just about be ready to
25:11answer and and stop, and Lyndon Johnson
25:14would take over. He was a a uh That's
25:17pretty much the way it usually was, too.
25:18Yes, indeed. He was a powerful figure.
25:22And and Johnson was was talking about
25:24the things he was doing to win the war,
25:26and you piped up and said, "Like bombing
25:28halts?"
25:30He he he he was, you know,
25:33as a congressman, listening to him, I
25:36was probably more critical than I would
25:38have been as a member of the executive
25:40branch being asked questions
25:42by members of Congress. So, where you
25:44stand kind of depends on where you sit.
25:47And
25:48but but he he was going through a period
25:52where he was trying to figure out what
25:53to do in the war in Vietnam, and he
25:56would go through a heavy bombing period,
25:58and then there'd be a bombing pause, and
26:00he would hope that that that would cause
26:03a positive reaction from the North
26:05Vietnamese uh or the Viet Cong, and it
26:08didn't.
26:10And uh
26:11he, in explaining what he was doing, uh
26:14was asked a question by a Democratic
26:16congressman named Young from Texas
26:19uh
26:19about why it wasn't working.
26:22And his answer uh
26:25was in effect that it would work. And
26:29and of course, the fact was if you
26:32do something for a period and then stop
26:35completely,
26:36it's confusing. It's confusing to our
26:38people, it's confusing to the enemy.
26:41And um I did ask a question and and uh
26:45tried to get a some response from him as
26:47to
26:48how that combination of off and on was
26:51going to work.
26:52And he said, "Well, the way it's going
26:55to work is more of the same."
26:57And at that point, he was in a bombing
27:00pause,
27:01which suggested that it might not work,
27:03and of course, it didn't uh
27:05he had a tough job as president and uh
27:08and he did his best. In retrospect, what
27:11do you think his big mistakes were on
27:12Vietnam and making the decision the way
27:14it was fought?
27:17Well, I wasn't in his shoes and it's
27:19hard to say for sure, but um
27:22the
27:24in the last analysis, that country was
27:26going to have to find its way itself.
27:29And the task we had was not to try to um
27:34go after the North Vietnamese or the
27:35Viet Viet Cong alone
27:38because they all they had to do was
27:40disappear. They didn't have to fight a
27:41single battle. They could just disappear
27:44and a week later show back up. They
27:46could go harvest the rice and then come
27:49right back. And you could have walked US
27:51forces from one end of the country to
27:52the other and they would have just
27:54disappeared into the countryside.
27:57And uh and then when you passed, they'd
27:59come right back. The in my view, in
28:02retrospect, with the benefit of
28:04hindsight, the task was really to try to
28:07get the
28:08uh South Vietnamese government
28:11in in capable of organizing and training
28:14and equipping their own forces
28:16and
28:17providing something for the people of
28:19South Vietnam and the rest of Vietnam
28:22that offered a promise for them for a
28:23future.
28:25And I think Ho Chi Minh
28:27was more successful in suggesting to the
28:30Vietnam Vietnamese people uh that that
28:33the future under him would be brighter
28:36for those people. And there was uh an
28:38argument made that the South Vietnamese
28:40government was corrupt and and out of
28:43touch with the people. That's not
28:45unusual in the world for governments to
28:47be
28:48labeled corrupt. Uh I think many of the
28:50governments in the world are corrupt.
28:52And I don't know that the North
28:54Vietnamese government under Ho Chi Minh
28:56was not corrupt. I just it that that was
28:59an argument. And and the combination of
29:01those things, I think, created a a very
29:04difficult circumstance for Lyndon
29:06Johnson and the United States of
29:07America.
29:09And in 1968, Richard Nixon was elected.
29:12He comes to you and asks you to take on
29:16the Office of Economic Opportunity, one
29:18of the crown jewels of the Great
29:20Society, not very popular with
29:22Republicans or Nixon, who basically
29:24wanted to dismantle it.
29:26Not a great career move for you, I
29:28think, but you did it. What what was
29:30your rationale?
29:33I had voted against the legislation when
29:35it was passed.
29:36Sargent Shriver, who recently passed
29:38away, uh had been the person who headed
29:41up the Office of Economic Opportunity.
29:44And and it started under President
29:47Kennedy, and and he and and his brother
29:50Bobby Kennedy in the Justice Department
29:51had fashioned a a program uh to try to
29:55assist the poor in the country and then
29:58President Johnson came in with his
30:01big Texas approach and enlarged it and
30:05and it became the war to eradicate
30:08poverty.
30:09And if you define poverty as a certain
30:11percentage of our population
30:14and then
30:16you try to eradicate it, it's not
30:18possible because there's always going to
30:19be a certain percentage that fits in
30:21that category.
30:23And they they
30:25um immediately started a host of
30:27programs
30:28um there was the Job Corps, there was
30:30Head Start, there were migrant programs,
30:33health care programs, drug programs um
30:36community action programs
30:38uh just there must have been 12 or 15
30:41different programs under this umbrella,
30:43the war on poverty.
30:46The design was that it would bypass
30:49governors and mayors, elected officials.
30:52And of course that had the effect of
30:54angering Republican and Democrat mayors
30:58and and public officials because the
31:00money would come straight from the
31:02federal government to
31:04organizations, community organizations
31:06that were described as uh
31:09having maximum feasible maximum feasible
31:12participation of the poor was the was
31:14the concept. Uh bypassing the mayors and
31:17of course what they started to do was
31:19oppose local government. So local city
31:21councils and local state governments
31:24were constantly being harassed by there
31:26was a legal services program as well. So
31:28you had the federal government supplying
31:30money to the Office of Economic
31:31Opportunity which then filed lawsuits
31:34against mayors and governors and city
31:36councils, all of the people regardless
31:38of political party. It had nothing to do
31:40with politics.
31:41Uh it was against the structure that
31:43exists here. So it it by the time I went
31:46in there it was widely disliked in the
31:50Congress.
31:51here you are a promising Republican.
31:53People even then were talking about you
31:54as a possible future president. Isn't
31:57this sort of a uh graveyard for a career
32:00like that?
32:02Well, Joyce has a somewhat unusual sense
32:05of humor and one night I got home and I
32:07went to the icebox and there was a
32:10little sign that said
32:12he tackled the job that couldn't be done
32:14with a smile. He went right to it. He
32:17tackled the job that couldn't be done
32:19and couldn't do it.
32:23You laugh. At 10:00 at night when I was
32:25reaching in for a soda pop and reading
32:28that, that slows you down, I'll tell
32:30you.
32:32That's
32:33So you did that, you went on to the
32:35Nixon White House and you write in the
32:37book that you wanted to leave Washington
32:40after the election of 1972.
32:42Did you see Watergate coming? No.
32:45I didn't at all.
32:47Um
32:48it it you know one time someone wrote an
32:51I ended up going over to NATO as
32:52ambassador to NATO right after the 1972
32:55election. And uh the pundits in
32:58Washington couldn't believe that I would
33:00leave the seat of power. The I was a
33:02member of the cabinet, I was in the
33:03White House and I suddenly I'm going off
33:06to Brussels, Belgium. Uh that looked
33:08like Siberia to
33:10political people in the White House
33:12because it it it proximity to power is
33:15considered in Washington
33:17uh
33:17what one would want and I did just the
33:19opposite. I I went thousands of miles in
33:21the other direction.
33:24Some wag wrote in some magazine in
33:26Washington after Watergate broke, "Who's
33:29the smartest man in Washington? Answer,
33:32Don Rumsfeld."
33:33Statement, "But he's not in Washington."
33:36Answer, "That's right."
33:39And I got a reputation for being smart
33:41instead of lucky.
33:43I had no more idea what was going on. I
33:46mean Richard Nixon had just been
33:47reelected by one of the biggest margins
33:49in the history of the country. He won
33:51every state in the Union except
33:53Massachusetts and the District of
33:54Columbia.
33:56And and no one could imagine that I
33:59would want to get away, excuse me.
34:01That I would want to be away from that
34:03as opposed to right in the middle of it.
34:05But but we did. We took our family and
34:07went to Belgium and and I we had a truly
34:10wonderful experience representing our
34:12country overseas. And then Gerald Ford
34:14becomes president after the Nixon
34:16resignation, your your great friend and
34:19colleague in the House in the 1960s.
34:21He came in saying he wanted a staff that
34:24would be spokes of the wheel. Everyone
34:26would report directly to the president.
34:29You were brought in after a month when
34:30he thought that that was not working
34:32very well.
34:33Was that a time, you know, it's it's
34:35been said a lot that people who worked
34:37for President Ford were very much
34:39uh impressed with the fact that
34:41presidential power was so much at its
34:43nadir. Did you see signs of that?
34:48Gerald Ford was a legislator.
34:51And he was a minority leader.
34:53And he functioned on the spokes of the
34:56wheel concept where everyone could come
34:58to see him and he liked people. He was a
35:00gracious, wonderfully warm, decent man.
35:04And anyone who wanted to have access to
35:06him could. And as minority leader of the
35:08United States House of Representative
35:10that worked. In fact it was a positive.
35:13A president of the United States can't
35:14do that. It just doesn't work. It it's
35:17dysfunctional and uh
35:19he
35:21had watched the Nixon White House and I
35:23believe he believed that part of the
35:25reason for Nixon's downfall
35:27was that there was what was called the
35:30Berlin Wall, this this tight uh White
35:33House staff system run by Bob Haldeman
35:36and John Ehrlichman
35:38uh that they called the Berlin Wall
35:39because they both had names that that
35:42sounded Germanic.
35:44And
35:45so he did not want that.
35:48And he uh he said he'd establish this
35:51and he he asked back first he asked Al
35:53Haig to stay on and then it turned out
35:55he he felt he couldn't keep Al and Al
35:58went over as Allied Commander in Europe.
36:01Uh and he asked me to come in and I told
36:03him I I wouldn't do it. It couldn't be
36:05done. That the model he'd designed was
36:08was not going to work.
36:10And uh he said I know that now but I I
36:13want to have to get from where I am to
36:15where I want to be and just give me a
36:16little slack while we we navigate over
36:20to a a rational White House Chief of
36:22Staff system. What I'm thinking a little
36:24bit is Dick Cheney has said that you
36:27know, serving as Chief of Staff as your
36:29successor under President Ford he had
36:32saw so many signs of the fact that
36:34presidents were constrained in the wake
36:36of Watergate. Congress was moving in and
36:38the courts to some extent. And he said
36:40when he became Vice President that one
36:42of the things he hoped to do was expand
36:44presidential power and move the pendulum
36:47the other way. Did you feel the same
36:48way?
36:50When you have an embattled president
36:53uh
36:54functioning in a White House that at
36:56that point was deemed illegitimate.
36:59Watergate had had drained the reservoir
37:02of trust in our country.
37:04And for the first time in our history a
37:06president of the United States had to
37:08resign. It was a a
37:12a stunning event.
37:14Uh in our country, in the world.
37:17And um
37:19when when you drain the reservoir of
37:20trust
37:22which is how we govern in in our
37:24country. We don't govern by command, we
37:26govern by persuasion and and and through
37:28leadership and you simply you you have
37:31to be able to persuade.
37:33And and uh if there's no trust you can't
37:36persuade. People people won't don't
37:38respond. And the White House was in that
37:41terrible terrible terrible circumstance.
37:44The uh
37:45um
37:47The effect of that was that that he had
37:50a dilemma.
37:51Should he go for
37:54continuity
37:55which would reassure the American people
37:58that he, a total unknown who'd never
38:00been elected president or vice president
38:03with no campaign staff, no platform, no
38:06knowledge about the country having
38:08campaigned the country, no base of
38:11support um
38:13he felt a need to reassure the country
38:16that there would be continuity in
38:18policies.
38:19The alternative would have been, which I
38:21favored uh that he would favor change.
38:26Uh my view was that that if that
38:28institution of the White House was
38:30deemed illegitimate
38:32and not trustworthy then President Ford
38:36had to create sufficient change that it
38:38would be seen not as a continuum of a
38:42Nixon Ford White House but as a Ford
38:44White House. And he needed to make
38:46enough changes in the cabinet and the
38:48staff that people would see him as
38:50stepping forward with a new team.
38:53He opted for continuity and uh paid a
38:56penalty.
38:58You think he shouldn't have? I don't. I
38:59think he should have made enough
39:01changes. He was such a decent, kind man.
39:04He said, "I don't want to let anyone go
39:06and have it appear that they did
39:08something wrong." Because there were a
39:10handful of people who did something
39:12wrong in that White House. And it was
39:14not a large number and there were truly
39:16wonderful people there. Pat Moynihan was
39:18there and Alan Greenspan was there and
39:21George Shultz was there and a host of
39:24Dr. Stein and Dr. Whitman and and so
39:27many people of of you know wonderful
39:30reputations. And Gerald Ford just could
39:33not bring himself to firing anybody. He
39:35just didn't want to do it. Uh because he
39:38felt it would be a a tarnish on their
39:40their reputation.
39:41unlike him. Yeah. Uh you lay to rest in
39:44this book a little story that about how
39:47the elder President Bush, George H. W.
39:50Bush, went to the CIA Mhm. in 1975. You
39:53want to tell us briefly the story and
39:55what what you feel the real story was?
39:59What do you mean what I feel the real
40:00story was? Well, what
40:02What the real story was?
40:03Tell the the false story and then then
40:05God's truth. God's truth, now you're
40:07talking.
40:09Um
40:10George Herbert Walker Bush came to
40:12Congress, I think, in 1966. I'd been
40:14elected in '62. He came in with a
40:16wonderful group of people and
40:18and I knew him and served in the
40:19Congress with him and and he at some
40:22point ended up I think running for the
40:25Senate and losing and and then he went
40:27over to China as our representative.
40:30And he wanted to come back.
40:32And he told President Ford that he
40:34wanted to come back and serve in an
40:35executive position.
40:37And um
40:39I was chief of staff of the White House
40:41and periodically I would be asked by the
40:43president to send in a group of names to
40:46be attorney general or director of CIA
40:48when Bill Colby said he wanted to leave
40:50or some other cabinet office
40:52department of Housing and Urban
40:53Development or what have you. And so the
40:56staff in the White House would produce
40:57these documents of here are six or eight
41:00names of people and here are the pros
41:01and cons and here are the people who
41:03favor these, where they rank them, and
41:06then the president would look at them
41:07and ask to have the FBI take a check or
41:09ask other people to
41:11vet them out. And that kind of a thing
41:13went in when the president said that
41:15Director Colby wanted to leave the CIA.
41:19And um
41:20Bush's name was on that list
41:23that the staff produced and uh
41:26people had him first, second, third,
41:27fourth, above a line or below the line.
41:30And uh
41:31and for whatever reason
41:34the there was a myth that was created
41:36that that because
41:39I had been considered for vice president
41:41when President Ford picked Nelson
41:43Rockefeller.
41:44Uh and As he had been. And George Bush
41:47Herbert Walker Bush had been considered
41:49that that we were competitive.
41:51And um
41:53so the myth came out that when he was
41:55sent to the CIA, the Senate said we
41:58won't confirm you unless you
42:01agree that you will not be vice
42:03president. So, it kind of ruled him out.
42:06And I told President Ford I thought he
42:07shouldn't do that, that he should
42:09definitely not allow the Senate to tell
42:12him who the country should have as a
42:13vice presidential nominee and I urged
42:16him not to agree to it. Uh the the facts
42:19are that that
42:20George Herbert Walker Bush begged the
42:23president to
42:25tell him he would not be VP. He wanted
42:27to be director of the CIA.
42:29His wife, I think, wrote a book and said
42:31he was thrilled to be nominated for that
42:34and uh
42:36and somehow the myth came around that I
42:38was the one who masterminded all of this
42:40and and arranged for him not to be
42:42considered for vice president. Um And
42:45you write in the book that he believed
42:47that. I don't know that he believed
42:48that. I know that he he that the myth
42:50persisted.
42:51Uh-huh. And um
42:53I finally was tired of it and I wrote
42:55President Ford and said
42:59what give me a letter that tells me what
43:01the facts are and he wrote back and said
43:02you're quite right, George Herbert
43:04Walker Bush begged to be head of the
43:06CIA, wanted to be head of the CIA, was
43:08delighted to be head of the CIA and you
43:10had nothing to do with it. And that's
43:13that's the long and the short of it.
43:15Okay. The in in our world narratives and
43:18theories get strung out over a period of
43:21time until it's like they're chipped in
43:23stone and true notwithstanding the fact
43:25that they are totally
43:27based in midair without any any roots or
43:30substance to them at all. In this case.
43:32So, let's move the clock up just since
43:34we don't have a lot of time. 2000,
43:37George Bush's son is elected president
43:39and you go to see him. Did you have any
43:41thought that you would be asked to go
43:42into the cabinet? Oh goodness, no. I was
43:44an old man.
43:47I I had my Joyce and I had gone to our
43:5050th high school reunion in in Illinois
43:53and in the year 2000, I think, in
43:55September and Joyce with her
43:59perception and wisdom and and foresight
44:02announced to our friends that this was
44:04the beginning of our rural period.
44:06This was in September of 2000.
44:09And
44:11we I we had no more idea in the world
44:13that that I would end up back in
44:15government. Had no particular desire to
44:18and we were happy and life was good. I'd
44:20been in business for a period of years
44:22and And very successful and tells about
44:24that in the book.
44:26And served as chairman of several
44:28government commissions, one on the
44:29ballistic missile threat and one on
44:31space and and felt that I was
44:33contributing in in a volunteer way.
44:37When you became Secretary of Defense,
44:39how have things changed at the Pentagon
44:42and just Washington in general since
44:441977?
44:47I wish I knew the the actual numbers,
44:49but for one thing congressional staffs
44:52had ballooned and were had grown by a
44:55multiple of I'm got to believe two,
44:56three, or four.
44:58The Defense Authorization Bill is the
45:00piece of legislation
45:02that the Congress passes each house and
45:05then they have a conference and then
45:06there's a piece of paper papers that
45:09represent the
45:11the authorization bill telling the
45:13Department of Defense what it can do for
45:15the next year.
45:17When I left as Secretary of Defense in
45:201976,
45:21the Defense Authorization Bill had 74
45:25pages.
45:28When I came back in the year 2001,
45:31the Defense Authorization Bill had
45:33something like 574
45:36pages.
45:37That's going to be off by a few, but
45:40it's good enough for government work.
45:43So, you you get a sense of of what had
45:45changed. What had changed is that the
45:48the Department of Defense is enormous.
45:51And there's there's no way it can be
45:54efficiently run. Government is almost
45:56inherently inefficient because it can't
45:59die. It doesn't go away unlike a
46:01business.
46:02I mean, you drive down any street in
46:04Philadelphia and you'll see a retail
46:06operation that was there one day and
46:08it's gone the next. It can fail.
46:10Government just stays there and so the
46:12inefficiencies compound.
46:15And um
46:17the the effect of it is that that it
46:20isn't efficient and to the extent
46:22something's not efficient, then the
46:24Congress, concerned about representing
46:26their constituents,
46:28feeling a responsibility for oversight,
46:31legislative oversight, sees something
46:33wrong and decides the way to fix it is
46:35to require another report or to hire
46:38more people to monitor something. Uh or
46:41to have more hearings and to look into
46:42it. And so what you see is is
46:46How many people are old enough to
46:47remember Gulliver's Travels?
46:50Remember Gulliver? He was a great big
46:52guy and the Lilliputians were this big.
46:55And Gulliver finally all the
46:57Lilliputians put so many threads over
46:59Gulliver that he couldn't move.
47:02And no one of those threads was was
47:04doing the job. It was the thousands of
47:07threads that prevented Gulliver from
47:09moving. And that's where we've arrived
47:11in government. We have so much oversight
47:13and so many pages of of micro
47:18requirements and so many reports to be
47:20filed that it consumes just an enormous
47:24amount of time.
47:25And
47:26there are 10 over 10,000 lawyers in the
47:29Department of Defense.
47:32Imagine.
47:33I've got nothing
47:35I've got nothing against lawyers, but I
47:37don't know how any organization
47:39out of the room right now.
47:41I don't know how any organization can
47:43function with 10,000 lawyers.
47:47Okay.
47:48Now, we're
47:49just kidding. Okay.
47:52I'm going to push you to skip through
47:53the rest of this cuz we haven't got much
47:55time and I want to
47:56get to the other things that happened,
47:58obviously, during that decade.
48:009/11.
48:02In retrospect, do you think that 9/11
48:04could have been averted, let's say, if
48:05you were able to sort of rewind the tape
48:08and
48:08if earlier presidents had behaved
48:11differently. Was that to some extent the
48:13result of things that presidents did or
48:14did not do?
48:18You know, I'm I'm I'm not one who
48:21who can
48:25answer a question like that. Yeah,
48:27in the on the one hand just logically
48:29you you say to yourself, well, there
48:31must have been some things that might
48:33have been done differently.
48:35Um
48:36On the other hand, the task of the
48:38intelligence community
48:40is truly difficult. It is just a a very
48:43very tough job.
48:46The world is a big place.
48:48Uh the the terrorist networks and the
48:51closed societies in many countries
48:54make it enormously difficult to
48:57gather intelligence that can be useful
49:00and actionable.
49:03In my adult life, I've seen
49:06literally dozens of instances
49:09where our intelligence community has
49:10failed to predict something.
49:13There was a a
49:15a very fine book called Pearl Harbor
49:18by Roberta Wohlstetter
49:20and the the forward to that book was
49:23written by a
49:24I think he was at Harvard at the time
49:26named
49:27Dr. Thomas Schelling.
49:29And he wrote this forward and and about
49:32surprise.
49:33And and he characterized Pearl Harbor
49:37as a failure of imagination.
49:41Um
49:42And And of course there was so many
49:44hearings after Pearl Harbor, what might
49:46have been done, who might have known
49:48this, was it right to have a
49:50concentration of our battleships uh
49:53immobilized and and vulnerable as they
49:55were with all of our planes on the
49:57ground on a on a Sunday morning.
50:01Um
50:03It It It uh
50:05I I look back on 9/11 and I'm I'm aware
50:08of the
50:10um reappraisals and the lessons learned
50:13studies that have been done and there's
50:15there's no question but that the fact
50:18that that the United States of America
50:21in the case of Somalia
50:23after being attacked pulled back
50:26uh in an instance in Haiti was attacked
50:29and some ships pulled away. In I think
50:31it was Bosnia some folks went across a
50:34line and and were captured and we pulled
50:37back several kilometers.
50:39Uh in Lebanon after the Marines were
50:41killed
50:42uh in the barracks there at the airport
50:44in Beirut uh the United States withdrew
50:47their forces
50:48uh after the Khobar Towers
50:51and the USS Cole were attacked by
50:53terrorists the reaction of the United
50:56States was uh
50:59um
51:00minimal I would say. There were some um
51:04cruise missiles launched uh on a couple
51:06of occasions but if you think about it
51:08the terrorists that that organized these
51:11kinds of activities
51:12uh they don't have uh countries to
51:14defend. They don't have populations to
51:16defend. They don't have
51:18um real estate and infrastructure that
51:20they want to protect. They operate in
51:22the shadows and you can launch an awful
51:25lot of cruise missiles and drop an awful
51:27lot of bombs and do precious little
51:30damage to a terrorist net network. And
51:32they came away having drawn a lesson.
51:36Uh and and have said as much. Uh
51:39Osama bin Laden has said on many
51:41occasions on video that that uh that the
51:44United States was a paper tiger and and
51:46if the United States is hit it will it
51:48will react it will with withdraw. It
51:50won't
51:52it won't reach out and and do damage to
51:54the people imposing that damage on our
51:56country.
51:57So you someone could make a case that
52:00that pattern
52:02uh that that weakness is provocative.
52:05That to the extent uh we behave in a
52:08manner that is weak and allows those
52:11kinds of things that it provokes people
52:13into doing things they might otherwise
52:15not do.
52:16They wouldn't think of doing it if they
52:18felt that there would be instantaneous
52:20uh punishment for sure for doing it. But
52:23But
52:24listen the last thing I would do would
52:26be to say that that there was something
52:28somebody could have done to have
52:29prevented September 11th. I just
52:32I I would say it like Pearl Harbor it
52:34was a failure of imagination and
52:37probably a a relatively understandable
52:40failure of imagination.
52:42Uh maybe a couple questions from the
52:44audience. Uh
52:46one is about Iraq and Vietnam. Do you
52:48think that that's a fair comparison?
52:51There are certainly similarities and
52:53there are certainly notable differences
52:55between the two.
52:57Um
52:58the
53:01The Vietnamese
53:03were not likely to come and attack the
53:05United States of America.
53:08The
53:10terrorist threat
53:12uh the dangers of
53:15an an an Iraq and it was on the
53:17terrorist list. Uh
53:20the the terrorist threat was a very real
53:22one to our country.
53:24And Al-Qaeda had demonstrated that it
53:26would come and attack America.
53:29Um
53:30Now there was no direct link between
53:32Al-Qaeda and Iraq that certainly was
53:35between Afghanistan and Iraq and Iraq
53:38was on the terrorist list.
53:40Uh and Iraq had a pattern of having
53:43developed weapons of mass destruction.
53:45And so there was there was there were
53:48these things that affected it. Uh but I
53:52I would say that that uh or
53:56I think the differences were greater
53:59than the similarities but there
54:00certainly were similarities.
54:02Mhm.
54:03How about in case of Johnson you and I
54:05both know a lot of people who worked for
54:07Lyndon Johnson and one thing they often
54:09say is the tough thing for them is when
54:11someone comes to them and says I lost my
54:14son in Vietnam why did he die? What
54:17would you say for Iraq? Yeah.
54:20It is the hardest thing. I I think
54:22anyone who's in a position of
54:24responsibility when
54:26when a conflict occurs
54:28uh and
54:30you as Joyce and I would go to the
54:32hospitals and meet with the wounded
54:34whose lives are changed forever.
54:36Uh meet with their families and and meet
54:38with the families of those who'd who'd
54:40been killed.
54:42You you we would think to ourselves
54:45we're going in
54:47what is it that we could say or do that
54:50would help them understand the
54:52the
54:53um
54:54appreciation that that we and America
54:57have for the sacrifice.
55:01The the individual sacrifices and the
55:04sacrifices of families as well because
55:06they sacrifice
55:08and they serve. Um
55:10And we would come out of those meetings
55:13almost invariably inspired.
55:16Not feeling that we had helped them but
55:18feeling that they had helped us.
55:22The the pride they have
55:25in their service. The uh
55:29cohesion they feel with the units they
55:31were in. Their desire to get back to
55:33their units.
55:35Um it it uh you you just could not fail
55:39to come out of those meetings inspired
55:41by the young men and women.
55:45The big difference between the Vietnam
55:48War and the conflicts today is that
55:52uh thanks to Milton Friedman and Richard
55:55Nixon
55:56and the Congress we have a an
55:58all-volunteer military.
56:00Every single one of those people who
56:02serve our country
56:04uh serve because they wanted to serve.
56:07They serve because they consciously
56:09decided they wanted to raise their hand
56:11and and and go and help protect our
56:14country.
56:15And and that dedication and that
56:17patriotism and that pride that they feel
56:21uh is is so powerful.
56:24Um Now how does one answer that? I guess
56:27the answer is that there there
56:30And I think that what the Johnson people
56:31say is they'll push us to tell exactly
56:34what the sacrifice is made for.
56:36Mhm. Is that I mean does anyone ever do
56:38that when you see them? Oh sure. And And
56:41what do you say I mean World War II I
56:43assume would be that's not hard. But war
56:46like Iraq or Vietnam or something that's
56:49not you know full
56:51you know full throttle.
56:52What do you say?
56:55A war that is armies against navies, air
56:58forces against air forces uh
57:01that's clear. That's understandable. It
57:04starts and it ends.
57:06It ended in World War II on a on the USS
57:08Missouri the battleship with a signing
57:10ceremony.
57:11What What we went through in the Cold
57:13War was quite different. It was many
57:15decades long. It was a ideological
57:18competition of ideas.
57:19And there was never going to be a
57:20signing ceremony.
57:21And there was never going to be a
57:22signing ceremony. What we're in today is
57:24much more like that. It is a longer
57:27period of time. It's a marathon not a
57:29sprint. It is a competition of ideas but
57:33for whatever reason
57:36we are hesitant and not skillful in
57:39engaging in the competition of ideas.
57:43We we recognize that the overwhelming
57:45majority of the Muslims on the face of
57:47this earth are fine people who who have
57:50a religion that may be different from
57:52Christianity or Judaism or other
57:54religions but they are they are not
57:56radicals. They're not terrorists.
57:58They're fine people. And yet there's a a
58:00small minority
58:03of Muslims that have engaged in
58:05terrorist acts that organized to do
58:07those things.
58:09And and we're we're reluctant as
58:12Americans to to take up that debate and
58:15and compete with those ideas. They're
58:18not reluctant. They are out recruiting.
58:21They are out raising money. They are out
58:23uh organizing and they are out planning
58:26attacks against the nation-state concept
58:30because they have a conviction that that
58:32it is their calling to do that.
58:36So the fact that we aren't willing to
58:39engage in that debate or or not skillful
58:42at it or reluctant to do it
58:44leaves people with a vagueness as to why
58:47why people have to do things.
58:50The wonderful thing I found with the men
58:52and women in the armed forces is that
58:54they are there whether they're
58:57serving in Korea or in Bosnia or in Iraq
59:00or Afghanistan
59:02they know what they're doing. They
59:04understand it. They're proud of what
59:06they're doing.
59:08And thanks to modern communications and
59:10emails they're able to communicate with
59:12their families and their families end up
59:15having a sense of what they're doing and
59:17why they're doing it. And and and when
59:20there's a loss of life it is
59:22heartbreaking.
59:24When there's a loss of limb it's
59:27heartbreaking.
59:28And yet you talk to those families and
59:30you talk to those people,
59:32and they don't ask why was I there.
59:36They know why they were there, and
59:38they're proud that they were there, and
59:40we are a very fortunate country. That's
59:43for sure. You are a very close student
59:45of leadership as well as a leader
59:46yourself.
59:56Indeed, and and you've seen a lot of
59:58leaders. Um I guess what I was thinking
1:00:00of is Here's the leading scholar on
1:00:02presidential leadership, and he's going
1:00:04to ask me a question on leadership.
1:00:07Well,
1:00:07some do. I feel like I'm back in school.
1:00:11Some do, some just write about it.
1:00:13But uh when people in my line of work
1:00:15write about George W. Bush, uh what do
1:00:17you think would be the shortcomings that
1:00:19mention what what achievements?
1:00:24Well, I'm 78 years old.
1:00:27I've lived a third of our country's
1:00:29history.
1:00:31And almost every Republican president
1:00:35was considered not very swift.
1:00:39Dwight Eisenhower played too much golf,
1:00:41they said. He had a poor syntax.
1:00:44Goodness, Gerald Ford, they said, was a
1:00:46played too much football without a
1:00:48helmet.
1:00:50Didn't matter that he'd gone to Yale Law
1:00:52School. Didn't matter that he was one of
1:00:53the world's leading experts on the US
1:00:55budget, having served on the
1:00:56Appropriations Committee.
1:00:58Not to mention the best athlete in the
1:01:00White House.
1:01:01Exactly, and they contended that he was
1:01:03a stumble bum.
1:01:05Um
1:01:05I mean, you go from one to another.
1:01:07Ronald Reagan, he was characterized by
1:01:09Clark Clifford as an amiable dunce.
1:01:13And then people read his letters
1:01:16and saw that this man was thoughtful,
1:01:20knowledgeable,
1:01:22and while not
1:01:24a micro-manager, a strategic leader.
1:01:27And and a superb and highly successful
1:01:30strategic leader.
1:01:31George W. Bush was was described as not
1:01:34curious,
1:01:35uh not knowledgeable, and uh he'd gone
1:01:38to
1:01:39Harvard Business School, he'd gone to
1:01:41Yale, I guess, and and was a clearly an
1:01:45is an intelligent human being.
1:01:47And uh I mean, I I didn't know the man.
1:01:51Um I'd worked with his father in
1:01:52Congress, but I didn't know uh George W.
1:01:55Bush.
1:01:55And I watched him as a president, and he
1:01:58clearly
1:01:59uh asked penetrating questions. He
1:02:02worked his way with foreign leaders in a
1:02:04in a skillful and
1:02:07uh engaging manner that that developed
1:02:09relationships that were constructive for
1:02:11our country.
1:02:13And and yet um
1:02:15he was people made fun of it
1:02:18of all of those presidents. And uh
1:02:22I don't know quite what it is about our
1:02:23society that that does that, but um
1:02:27I must say I've I've um
1:02:30I've I've watched a lot of presidents,
1:02:31and and I would say that George W. Bush,
1:02:34I mean, you think what he did with the
1:02:36surge in Iraq.
1:02:38Um
1:02:41Is that something that you would have
1:02:42supported had you stayed on?
1:02:44Indeed, he what he did was interesting.
1:02:47A lot of things can combine to make it
1:02:49work. Uh
1:02:51Anbar awakening took place. The um
1:02:54training equipping of the Iraqi military
1:02:57had come to a very advanced point where
1:02:59we had hundreds of thousands of Iraqis
1:03:00trained and and ready to participate.
1:03:04The Iraqi government had matured and and
1:03:07was beginning to provide more skillful
1:03:09political leadership in the country. But
1:03:11what he did, when he added, I forget
1:03:14what it was, 20, 25,000 additional
1:03:16troops, we'd done that two or three
1:03:17times. It wasn't the additional troops
1:03:19that made the big difference. He
1:03:21galvanized the situation in Iraq by his
1:03:25boldness. When when the Congress was
1:03:27about ready to cut off the funds, he
1:03:29made a decision to increase the number
1:03:31of troops, and it caused the the people
1:03:34in Iraq to say, "Oh my goodness, he
1:03:37means business. He's not looking for a
1:03:38way out, he's looking to win."
1:03:41And that caused the political situation
1:03:43in that country to gel and coalesce, and
1:03:46and the um Maliki government went into
1:03:48the south and took took care of some of
1:03:50the uh
1:03:52dissidents.
1:03:53The Sadr uh p- army, the so-called Mahdi
1:03:56army, the Saudi Sadr army, which wasn't
1:03:58an army, it's a group of people they can
1:04:00get out in the street and to make
1:04:01demonstrations, they went quiet cuz they
1:04:04didn't know what would happen.
1:04:06But the center of gravity of that war
1:04:07had shifted from Iraq to the United
1:04:09States.
1:04:10As they say in the military, the center
1:04:12of gravity, the real the real locus of
1:04:14the problem was in the United States,
1:04:15and the Congress was about ready to to
1:04:17pull the plug and cancel funding as they
1:04:19did on Vietnam.
1:04:21And uh and the boldness of what George
1:04:24W. Bush did galvanized the political
1:04:26situation in the United States.
1:04:27possible for the war to be successful in
1:04:29the end.
1:04:30Exactly, and he deserves a lot of credit
1:04:31for that. How much should a war be
1:04:33judged by its success? For instance,
1:04:35let's say that Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam
1:04:38War had ended in victory in late '66,
1:04:41would we be looking at him as a great
1:04:43war leader and someone who did this the
1:04:45right way?
1:04:47You're the historian. It seems to me
1:04:49that that that that
1:04:51I don't know who said it, but wars are a
1:04:53series of catastrophes ended by success
1:04:56or victory. Uh
1:04:59they are untidy, they're difficult,
1:05:01they're hard, the enemy has a brain.
1:05:04Uh I Eisenhower, I think, said uh the
1:05:07plan is worthless. Planning is
1:05:09everything, and the plan is worthless.
1:05:11Because the enemy has
1:05:12That's actually one of Rumsfeld's rules,
1:05:14too. Well, when I say Rumsfeld's rules,
1:05:16it it's a rule that I quote from someone
1:05:18more intelligent than I am. And and
1:05:21With with with full credit, I must get
1:05:23it get it. Uh but it's true. Uh the
1:05:26every time you try to do something, for
1:05:28every offense there's a defense. For
1:05:30every defense there's an offense, and
1:05:32and there's a constant change that takes
1:05:34place on the battlefield. Um
1:05:37I I think that that
1:05:40the
1:05:43we are unlikely for a period of time to
1:05:47end up with the kind of clarity we had
1:05:49in World War II
1:05:51because of the nature of the world we're
1:05:53living in.
1:05:54It it it is asymmetric, it's not
1:05:56symmetric. It is it is ever-changing,
1:06:00and it is going to be a challenge for
1:06:02our leadership, it's going to be a
1:06:04challenge for our country.
1:06:06But the growing lethality of those
1:06:08weapons,
1:06:10what what President Bush was faced with
1:06:13uh when he made his decision on Iraq
1:06:16was there was a
1:06:17study by Johns Hopkins University called
1:06:19Dark Winter.
1:06:22And if my memory serves me correctly, I
1:06:24I uh
1:06:26what the a series of experts got
1:06:29together,
1:06:30and they said, "What if we took smallpox
1:06:33and put it in three locations in the
1:06:35United States of America?"
1:06:38And in a relatively short period of
1:06:40months,
1:06:41the Dark Winter exercise done by Johns
1:06:43Hopkins University concluded,
1:06:47and I'm going to be wrong by a bit, but
1:06:49include concluded that something in the
1:06:51neighborhood of 800,000
1:06:54Americans would be dead.
1:06:56Uh someone here knows that exact number.
1:06:58Is that
1:07:02Where's Keith?
1:07:04No Keith. That's close enough.
1:07:08And that something a multiple of that
1:07:10would be infected with smallpox.
1:07:13And imagine in our country if that
1:07:15happened. Think of the martial law that
1:07:17would be imposed. Think of the un-
1:07:19inability to move from state to state.
1:07:21We we I mean, free people, that's what
1:07:23we are.
1:07:25Uh we are people who want to get up in
1:07:26the morning and go where we want, and
1:07:28say what we want, and think what we
1:07:29want. And and the purpose of terrorism
1:07:32is not to kill people, the purpose of
1:07:34terrorism is to terrorize.
1:07:36It's to alter your behavior.
1:07:38And imagine this country if we had
1:07:41800,000 people dead from smallpox
1:07:45and martial law imposed across our
1:07:47country.
1:07:49And that study exists, it's available.
1:07:52And it is it is that
1:07:54concern that caused George W. Bush and
1:07:57his administration
1:07:59to step up and decide that that you
1:08:02couldn't wait to be attacked again.
1:08:04The only thing you could do would be to
1:08:07decide to try to put pressure on
1:08:09terrorist states
1:08:11and put pressure on terrorist networks,
1:08:13and make every single thing they do
1:08:15harder.
1:08:17Harder to raise money, harder to move,
1:08:19harder to communicate with each other,
1:08:21and and keep that pressure up so that
1:08:23they can't collect themselves to the
1:08:25point where they can engage in an act
1:08:26like that against our country.
1:08:29Uh we've got just a couple more minutes,
1:08:31so I'll ask two more questions. One is
1:08:34uh what should a historian write about
1:08:35Donald Rumsfeld's time his second time
1:08:38at the Pentagon?
1:08:41I think I'd give it 10 or 20 years.
1:08:44Uh
1:08:46I I I think perspective is good.
1:08:48Um journalists like to think that they
1:08:51write the first draft of history.
1:08:56I don't know that I'd use the word
1:08:58history with with that first draft.
1:09:01I
1:09:03served a lot of years in government, and
1:09:05now I've been out for four,
1:09:07and I debated whether I should write a
1:09:08short book in a year and use my memory,
1:09:11or whether I should digitize uh this
1:09:14incredible archive that I've accumulated
1:09:16over my lifetime,
1:09:18and and start inviting people in to
1:09:21discuss the phases of my life and the
1:09:24events that I've been involved in.
1:09:27And if you look in the acknowledgement
1:09:28section, I don't know how many people
1:09:30are listed there, but it's it's many
1:09:32many many dozens.
1:09:33And we would talk and transcribe, and
1:09:36then we'd go back to the records, and
1:09:38then I said, "If I've got that archive,
1:09:41why shouldn't we digitize it
1:09:43and see if we can make it available to
1:09:45the reader?"
1:09:46And I'm told that that maybe for the
1:09:48first time we now are going to be have
1:09:51available an e-book, which means
1:09:53electronic book, I'm told.
1:09:59They didn't used to have those when I
1:10:00was a kid.
1:10:02And you can read the book, and you can
1:10:04look at the endnote and see the source
1:10:07where where I've cited something, and
1:10:09then you can go to the website and pull
1:10:12up the entire document and see right
1:10:15there
1:10:16whether or not the context or the
1:10:18perspective that I've provided, which I
1:10:22worked my just like the dickens to try
1:10:24to make it accurate and fair and and
1:10:28correct. You can then look at the entire
1:10:30document and say to yourself, "Gee,
1:10:32it either I would have done it this way
1:10:35or I would have done it that way." But
1:10:36there are thousands of pages of
1:10:38documents, hundreds of different
1:10:40documents, many of which have been
1:10:41recently declassified
1:10:44that are available on this website.
1:10:46Which is great. Okay, we'll have the
1:10:48documents, but what should we write in
1:10:4920 years about your time at the
1:10:51Pentagon?
1:10:5220 years, I'll be 98 years old.
1:10:55You can write whatever you want.
1:11:08Uh final question. Uh this book, as I've
1:11:11mentioned, has very detailed accounts of
1:11:13Secretary Rumsfeld's
1:11:15uh encounters with all sorts of public
1:11:17figures, world leaders,
1:11:19uh people in very influential and
1:11:21important positions.
1:11:23But maybe one of the most intriguing is
1:11:25your your encounter with Elvis. Why
1:11:26don't you tell us about that?
1:11:30Oh my goodness, Elvis Presley.
1:11:38He
1:11:38A lot of his songs were really not my
1:11:40thing.
1:11:43Now why does that not surprise me?
1:11:47But on any given Sunday
1:11:49today,
1:11:50if Joyce and I can't get to church,
1:11:54we
1:11:55we have some Elvis Presley tape singing
1:11:58gospel,
1:11:59and they are wonderful. And we play them
1:12:02Sunday after Sunday after Sunday. Now,
1:12:04how did all this happen?
1:12:06When I was running the so-called war on
1:12:07poverty, Sammy Davis Jr. was on the
1:12:09advisory board.
1:12:11And he cared about the country and he
1:12:13cared about the poor and and uh
1:12:16he I was out in Las Vegas giving a
1:12:19speech, and it happened to coincide with
1:12:21his hundredth performance at one of
1:12:23those casinos, uh the Sands or
1:12:25something.
1:12:26And um so we went to see his show.
1:12:30And and he and his wife, Altovise, were
1:12:32there, and he performed, and he was
1:12:34spectacular. I mean, it wasn't an
1:12:36accident they called Sammy Davis Jr. the
1:12:38the world's greatest entertainer. He
1:12:40just was a superb entertainer.
1:12:43And he said to Joyce and me,
1:12:45"The next night I'm off.
1:12:47I'm going to take you to see the best
1:12:49entertainer in Las Vegas."
1:12:52And he didn't tell us who it was.
1:12:54So the next night we went and he went to
1:12:56the another casino, and and uh we went
1:12:59in, and he got a dinner table. Needless
1:13:01to say, it was right up front. If you're
1:13:02Sammy Davis in Las Vegas, you get a good
1:13:04table.
1:13:05And the four of us sat down, and it was
1:13:07Elvis Presley's. And and Sammy believed
1:13:09that Elvis was the best performer in
1:13:12town.
1:13:13And he was in his later years, and he
1:13:15was large, and he was
1:13:18he was wearing a sequin jumpsuit.
1:13:22And he
1:13:23quite the uniform of the next White
1:13:25House.
1:13:25No, no. No, no. And I course I'd never
1:13:28seen the man, and I'd never heard the
1:13:29man.
1:13:31Um
1:13:32and he had these uh what color is it?
1:13:34Chartreuse?
1:13:36Uh scarf, red, pink?
1:13:39Scarlet?
1:13:41He had scarlet
1:13:43uh scarves, and he would wipe his face.
1:13:45He'd stand up there and sing.
1:13:47And and it was fantastic. He'd sing the
1:13:49most ridiculous thing in the world, and
1:13:51people would cheer and yell and love it.
1:13:54And I'd sit there and go like this. Oh
1:13:56my god.
1:13:57Then he would sing a ballad, and it was
1:14:00absolutely beautiful. I mean, this man
1:14:02had a voice that was spectacular.
1:14:06And I love country music, and I love
1:14:08ballads, and he would sing, and it would
1:14:10just you'd be carried away with it. Then
1:14:13he'd take the scarf, wipe his face,
1:14:15the sweat off, and throw it out in the
1:14:17crowd, and everyone would scream.
1:14:20So he threw one to Altovise Davis,
1:14:22and Altovise gave it to Joyce,
1:14:25and it's framed.
1:14:30Well, what happened was afterwards Sammy
1:14:32said to Joyce and me, "Come on, we're
1:14:34going to go back into the dressing
1:14:35room." Well, now,
1:14:36you know, I I'm not the type who hangs
1:14:38around
1:14:39Las Vegas dressing rooms.
1:14:43And you go in this place, and it's
1:14:44large, and here are all these people.
1:14:46Sammy is getting dressed, and he's
1:14:48walking around, and all of the showgirls
1:14:50are there, and there are are very
1:14:52attractive women with trays selling
1:14:55cigarettes and selling uh western
1:14:57jewelry and turquoise and what have you,
1:15:00and all the hangers-ons and the staffs
1:15:02and everyone, and they're all milling
1:15:03around, and Joyce gets carried away, and
1:15:06she's talking to somebody, and she
1:15:07couldn't find me.
1:15:09And and she finally looked around the
1:15:11room, and way off in the corner Elvis
1:15:13Presley had me cornered. I was against
1:15:16the corner, and he was he's big, and he
1:15:19was like this, and I was kind of hidden
1:15:21right behind him.
1:15:23He was talking about the United States
1:15:26Army.
1:15:27If you remember,
1:15:29there was a draft during that period,
1:15:32and some of the people did not go in the
1:15:34draft. They went to Canada or they
1:15:36refused, and he went in
1:15:39and served in the United States Army,
1:15:41and he served in Germany, and he wanted
1:15:43to talk about it. He loved the Army.
1:15:46He valued his time serving, and he was
1:15:49sitting there going back and forth with
1:15:52me about this and that and the other
1:15:54thing, and I just found it fascinating
1:15:56that here was this man who a minute ago
1:15:58had been up there
1:15:59uh wiping the sweat off his face and
1:16:01throwing these things, and everyone's
1:16:02screaming, and here were all these
1:16:04gorgeous women walking around this
1:16:06dressing room, and he was standing there
1:16:09asking me question after question about
1:16:11the United States Army. It says a lot
1:16:13for the man.
1:16:15Indeed.
1:16:16Uh what can I do after that but say
1:16:18thank you, Mr. Secretary?
1:16:21Thank you all for being here.
1:16:23That was super. Thank you.
1:16:25I don't think I could have never
1:16:26expected you enough.
1:16:31Please join me in thanking Michael as
1:16:34well. What a great interview, and
1:16:36Secretary Rumsfeld.
1:16:47Now,
1:16:48a podcast
1:16:50We have We have been privileged to have
1:16:53Michael Best loss here doing what he
1:16:55did. He is A STAR.
1:17:04A
1:17:05A PODCAST OF TONIGHT'S program will be
1:17:07available on our website on Friday, and
1:17:10you should be sure to check out our
1:17:11blog, Constitution Daily, for a
1:17:13follow-up blog post that features a
1:17:16webcast of the event by 4ATV.
1:17:20And now uh Secretary Rumsfeld will be
1:17:23signing books. He'll be signing them to
1:17:25the left of the stage. We ask everyone
1:17:28that's interested in getting a book to
1:17:29line up. You can line up along this
1:17:32line, and then the line and then the
1:17:34line will continue along the window.
1:17:36Yes, I should wind it over there. Thank
1:17:38you so much.
1:17:38Have a good night.
1:20:18Mhm.

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