YT YouTube2Text

YouTube2Text → Transcripts → Daniel Ellsberg (Part 1)

Daniel Ellsberg (Part 1) — Transcript

by UMD Policy Watch · 4,445 words · 624 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

Open in transcriber Summarize with AI Download SRT/VTT

Full transcript

0:00Brody Family Foundation is dedicated to
0:02exploring topics of national and
0:04international importance and is proud to
0:06support policy watch with Doug bashov at
0:09the University of
0:20Maryland from the University of Maryland
0:23this is policy watch with Doug bashov
0:26the Vietnam War was one of the most
0:28contentious conflicts in US history
0:30eventually becoming widely unpopular
0:33joining us to discuss how and why we
0:36entered the War and why it took so long
0:38to extricate American troops is Daniel
0:40ellberg famous for leaking the Pentagon
0:42papers at the risk of his career and
0:45freedom and now the host of policy watch
0:48Doug basro Dan Ellsberg welcome to
0:52policy watch and the University of
0:54Maryland thank you for having me we are
0:56just delighted to have you here you know
0:57you are best known uh of course for your
1:00role in the release of the Pentagon
1:02papers uh and in our next program we're
1:04going to talk about that uh but in
1:07preparing for this program I read your
1:09wonderful book Secrets A Memoir of
1:12Vietnam and the Pentagon
1:14papers
1:16and after reading it I realized what a
1:19long and intense relationship you had
1:22with Vietnam you know I think for most
1:25of us who read about the Pentagon papers
1:27this was just some Rand researcher who
1:30was releasing them but first time you
1:32were in Vietnam was 1961 correct now how
1:35did that happen what were you doing
1:36there well I was on a task force for the
1:40defense department on limited War
1:43research and development for the uh DDR
1:47defense research and engineering and it
1:48was to look into what possible
1:51Innovations uh might be made to help us
1:53fight insurgencies in various places one
1:57week in Vietnam we also went to Thailand
2:00and a few other places in Asia but one
2:03week in Vietnam talking to the colonels
2:05there who were advisers and reading
2:06their reports night and day actually
2:09with great interest was enough to teach
2:11me so quickly that this was not going to
2:15be a
2:16successful intervention we should we
2:18should set the stage a little bit this
2:19is
2:201961 John Kennedy is President and he
2:23had not yet decided to ascend to
2:26increase the number of advisers which
2:28were limited to the number that we'd had
2:30at the time of the Geneva Court so they
2:32had to have less than a thousand and it
2:33was 30 or 70 wasn't it it was a very
2:35small no no it wasn't that small it was
2:37about 600 600 now that was the
2:40first lie well that wasn't a that was a
2:44breaking through an international Accord
2:46you could say that was breaking a treaty
2:48commitment although we had not signed
2:51the treaty but we had undertaken not to
2:54uh not to break it and uh what the lie
2:57was that he said that the increase in
3:00advisers was all that had been
3:03recommended to him by his Council uh
3:05this was Maxwell Taylor Maxwell Taylor
3:07of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and
3:09Walt rostow who was uh then in the white
3:12house later on the policy planning
3:14Council of State they came back and he
3:17said that I am now following their
3:19recommendations going to increase the
3:20number of advisors that was very
3:22surprising to me because i' just been
3:24there a little over a month before and
3:27it had been made very clear to me by all
3:28the advisers who were there more
3:31advisors would not make any significant
3:34difference it would not prevent us from
3:35failing from defeat nothing other than
3:39combat units uh would do that and I uh
3:43couldn't understand how the president
3:44could have been persuaded just a month
3:46later that he would accomplish anything
3:48with advisors that's why I chose years
3:51later working on this research project
3:53the Pentagon later known as the Pentagon
3:55papers to study the 61 period as the
3:58part I was going to write about I wanted
4:00to find out how the president could
4:02possibly have made that decision and
4:04what I did find out was surprising to me
4:07then Taylor and rosow had in fact said
4:10nothing other than combat troops will
4:12make a difference here and they
4:13recommended sending thousands of combat
4:16troops in units which Kennedy was
4:18determined not to do but what he did
4:21then was send only advisers and say that
4:24that was all they had recommended that
4:26was a lie and it gave a very false
4:28impression to the public of how
4:30impossible the situation really looked
4:33to people on the ground because when you
4:34had been there you came people told you
4:38that DM was corrupt and that there was
4:40little support for him and that only a
4:44very large number of American troops
4:47would prevent the government from
4:48falling very quickly and these these uh
4:51advisers had the feeling they were not
4:53recommending at that time combat troops
4:55that was a decision that Taylor Made and
4:57and The Joint Chiefs uh their attitude
5:00was that nothing other than combat
5:02troops would make a difference and even
5:03combat troops were unlikely to make all
5:06the difference what I learned later was
5:08that Kennedy had been there 10 years
5:10earlier when the French were there on
5:12his one trip to Asia he'd been there one
5:15day and in that one day he'd been told
5:17by a very well-informed uh Diplomat
5:20there Ed gulan the French are finished
5:23here he told him in 1951 it was he said
5:27the days of colonialism are over in Asia
5:30they can't win and if we replace the
5:33French the same thing will happen to us
5:36we'll be bogged down as prove the case
5:39with the French Kennedy apparently
5:41learned from that he was determined not
5:43to put combat troops in his brother
5:45Bobby told me that in person he wasn't
5:48anxious to lose especially while he was
5:50in office he wanted to give advisers a
5:53try but if they didn't work out he was
5:56prepared to negotiate out of Vietnam
5:59rather than to send combat troops and he
6:01told me that was his intention Bobby
6:04himself said if it had come to that if
6:06he had lived no one can say what he
6:08might have done in the end but it was
6:09intention never to send combat troops as
6:12of course Lyndon Johnson did do and
6:15that's because although the American
6:17public had the idea that it was a Civil
6:22War uh and as as you've written that we
6:25were quote on the side of the good guys
6:27it really wasn't a Civil War by the time
6:29we got there isn't that what you think
6:31the public was told actually something
6:32else they were told it was aggression
6:35from the north that the infiltration
6:37so-call that was going on from North
6:39Vietnam was itself violating the Geneva
6:42cords it was a kind of aggression and we
6:44were defending a Sovereign Nation from
6:46aggression by its neighbor the whole the
6:49very the one word neighbor which Rusk
6:51used over and over and which I'd
6:53accepted when I went over there as
6:55defining the situation was extremely
6:57misleading no Vietnamese no Vietnamese
7:00really saw it that way they all saw
7:02Vietnam as one and uh the northern
7:06troops coming down saw themselves as
7:08entering the southern part of one
7:10country of of Vietnam and really
7:12virtually all Vietnamese saw it that way
7:14in terms whether or not they liked the
7:16Communists but when you were there you
7:18didn't see it that way I didn't
7:19understand that I believe Rusk must know
7:21what he's talking about when he totally
7:22mischaracterize the Geneva Court well
7:24you were a cold war Warrior when you get
7:27right down to it right a Marine
7:30I was now of course at this point by the
7:3160s a civilian but I had been a Marine
7:34in the 50s in peacetime uh but I'd been
7:37a rifle platoon leader and a rifle
7:39company Commander which I was very proud
7:41of as a first lieutenant and I even
7:44extended to the Marines when I thought
7:45we might see combat during the Suz
7:47crisis for that so I had that background
7:50and I used that background in Vietnam as
7:53a civilian I felt able to walk with the
7:56troops in combat and did see a fair
7:59amount of the war closeup which also of
8:03course affected my understanding of this
8:05was a little later though right this was
8:06later when I went to Vietnam in 65 yeah
8:08before that let's I I almost feel as if
8:11you're this person who like zelik is
8:14always there right you were there a
8:15month before Maxwell Taylor and then in
8:191964 the very day that you started
8:22working in the Pentagon we had a major
8:25Milestone or turning point in the war
8:28yes by coincidence I started uh reading
8:30the cables uh following minute by minute
8:33what's going on in
8:35Vietnam on the morning when we got a
8:37cable that had no precedent really since
8:39the second world war and I would say
8:41none since that was that there was an
8:43attack on an American warship uh two
8:47warships late at night uh in the tonen
8:50Gulf 12 time zones away and this was in
8:53the morning in Washington and the
8:56Commodore of a two Destroyer flotilla
8:59captain her was reporting that he was
9:01under continuous torpedo attack he
9:03reported 1 2 5 7even from the bridge as
9:06he was taking a vasive action he got up
9:08to 21 Torpedoes which was very
9:11impressive because it seemed to be more
9:12than we had estimated with in the entire
9:14inventory of the Vietnamese Navy and
9:18then uh an interiew while my boss was
9:22with the Secretary of Defense Robert
9:24mcnamer picking targets for
9:27retaliation uh a message came in that I
9:30got that all the previous accounts of
9:35torpedoes except perhaps the first one
9:38had been false or should be looked at
9:40questionably and then later uh he
9:43decided definitely there had been no
9:44further Torpedoes uh they were
9:47mishearing the beat of the ship's
9:49propeller against its own weight uh as
9:52it took a vase of action from the
9:54Torpedoes as incoming torpedo tracks and
9:58uh the the captain did feel there had
10:00been one torpedo but you had to take
10:01that with a grain of salt because he had
10:03been just as sure of the previous 21 you
10:07had to I had and we had to but the US
10:10government didn't uh they knew in other
10:13words that there was great question and
10:15the and the captain himself recommended
10:17no action be taken until morning in the
10:20tonen Gulf uh till they could do a
10:22reconnaissance and see if there was any
10:24wreckage or oil Slicks or survivors from
10:27the boats they believed they had
10:28actually sh shot out of the water and
10:31actually there was a reconnaissance
10:32later there was no wreckage because
10:34there had been no attack it was clear
10:36it's it's absolutely clear now for the
10:38last 10 or 15 years within days it was
10:42clear that it was almost sure that there
10:45had been no attack but when I heard the
10:47president say that night as the planes
10:50were heading toward Hanoi or toward
10:54actually North Vietnam not Hanoi heard
10:57him say that there was unequivocal
10:59evidence of an unprovoked attack I saw
11:02that on television I knew that was
11:04untrue nothing could have been less
11:07unequivocal more more ambiguous or
11:09uncertain at that point as to what had
11:11actually happened there unprovoked that
11:14was also untrue if there had been an
11:17attack we had been very provocative by
11:19attacking North Vietnam covertly that
11:22very night and previous nights and yet
11:25your knowledge of this didn't prevent
11:28you from still being a supporter of
11:31the of America's position in the war no
11:34no I it i' had been a consultant by this
11:37time to the defense department for a
11:38number of years and I was familiar with
11:41lies uh if you can't stand the thought
11:44that your president is lying uh you
11:46can't stay in the government very long
11:49weeks let's say and I had I was in over
11:5210 years or about 10 years altogether 12
11:54with the Marines you're used to lying
11:57for reasons of State for reasons of
11:58politic politics for reasons of uh
12:01avoiding embarrassment for all kinds of
12:03reasons uh the uh in this case I didn't
12:07pay as much attention or any attention
12:10to what I wish I had and that was that
12:14this was a case of lying the Congress
12:16into a war and although uh I did not
12:21regard it as illegitimate that we should
12:23be helping what I thought was a
12:25sovereign country under attack South
12:28Vietnam at the same time I felt that the
12:30bombing campaign was totally wrong that
12:33Congress was being fooled into
12:35supporting a bombing campaign that they
12:37did not know was in the offing when they
12:39were told before the campaign and before
12:42they passed the tonan Gulf resolution we
12:45the president seek no wider War I knew
12:49that was false the president believed we
12:51had to have a wider War all our planning
12:53was toward that it was exactly like I
12:56would say how we got into Iraq uh just
13:00recently everyone in the government it
13:02seems now knew that we were heading for
13:04a war with Iraq many of them knew it as
13:06early as the fall of 2001 or even the
13:09spring of 2001 and yet like me they
13:13didn't feel compelled to tell Congress
13:16or the public I wish they had yeah let's
13:18explore that you know you you quote uh
13:21Senator Fulbright who was chairman of
13:22the Foreign Relations Committee in9 and
13:25he was the um sponsor of the gulf and or
13:28he voted for he well he didn't just vote
13:30he was the flooor sponsor he guided it
13:33through a passage with only two
13:35descending votes he later said that was
13:37the greatest regret of his life and
13:39something that he felt ashamed of I
13:41complimented him for using the word
13:43shame not many people in political life
13:45are are ever willing to say they're
13:47ashamed of anything they did so I don't
13:49ask you this question to embarrass you
13:51but because I I think you must have
13:53thought about this what do you think
13:54would have happened if instead of
13:57leaking the Pentagon papers in 19 1971
14:00yeah you had taken those cables the next
14:03day or 3 days later and gone into full
14:07Bright's office and said look this is
14:09not as clear have you thought about that
14:12oh very much so in part because when
14:14they did come out in in
14:1671 uh seven years later Senator Morris
14:19who was one of the two senators along
14:22with senator gring who had voted against
14:24the tonen Gulf resolution told me at a
14:27at a meeting if you had come to me on
14:30the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
14:31under f with those that's those same
14:34cables that were being introduced at
14:37last you know by the Pentagon papers if
14:39you had given those to me in
14:4264 the tonen Gulf resolution would never
14:45have gotten out of committee that was
14:46his judgment and if it had if they
14:48brought it to the floor it would never
14:51have passed and of course that's given
14:53me a lot to think about uh very
14:55regretfully now at the time I didn't
14:58think of doing such a thing but why not
15:02uh I can't excuse myself for that nobody
15:04had done such a thing but I wish I had
15:08and what I've been saying now for
15:10several years is I've been asking people
15:13in the government who are in the same
15:14position as in Iraq or a possible war in
15:16Iran who know that lies are being told
15:19to the Congress to legitimate the
15:21involvement falsely don't do what I did
15:26don't wait till the war is started don't
15:28wait until the bombs are falling and
15:31thousands more have died before you go
15:33to the press and Congress and uh tell
15:37the truth at whatever consequences to
15:39yourself tell the truth with documents
15:42but to go right back to that period and
15:44answer you I believe that if I'd put it
15:46out in the fall of 64 not just a few
15:49cables but say a drawer full of
15:51documents from my several safes in my
15:54office just one drawer a few thousand
15:57Pages there would not have been a
15:59Vietnam War the there was a different
16:02political climate then the leaders in
16:04the Congress including fbite but the
16:06majority leader
16:08Mansfield uh and the uh number of others
16:12even some Republicans like Aken and
16:14Cooper were very critical skeptical of
16:17the War uh McGovern was another church
16:20and had they known the degree to which
16:22they were being
16:24manipulated the president could not have
16:26escalated that war well because the key
16:27of the key of the Johnson strategy as I
16:30understand it correct me if I'm wrong
16:32was to never say how much wider a war
16:36this was going to be I not to defend you
16:39you don't need defending but in 1964 who
16:42could have pictured that we would have
16:43hundreds of thousands of troops on the
16:46ground that we would lose 55,000 young
16:48people hundreds to thousands of people
16:51in the Pentagon would have predicted
16:54exactly that I myself had written a
16:57draft of a speech to be given by
16:59secretary mcnamer which he didn't give
17:01in the end but it was okayed by mcnamer
17:04Rusk and MC George Bundy in the White
17:06House in my draft announced that we were
17:09sending 100,000 immediately this was in
17:11July of 1965 we already had about
17:16100,000 there and he was sending another
17:18100,000 which would be followed I Knew
17:21by at least several more
17:23100,000 uh we were going up toward
17:26300,000 The Joint Chiefs were already
17:29talking 500,000 to a million as a
17:32possibility and moreover he uh very
17:35crucially he was told by this recurrent
17:38presidential adviser Clark Clifford who
17:40worked for Harry Truman and advised
17:42president after president later
17:44Secretary of Defense uh for Johnson he
17:47had predicted to Johnson I see nothing
17:50ahead but catastrophe for my country he
17:53said that in that month he said 500,000
17:57troops 50,000 dead this is not for us
18:03and why it was for it was for us he had
18:04predicted exactly what was going to
18:06happen 500,000 troops 50,000 this is
18:08Johnson's decision in the end it remains
18:11mysterious how Johnson could have
18:14brushed aside predictions that strong
18:18which were not only from Clifford his
18:20own vice president hu Humphrey uh was
18:23saying much the same thing also using
18:25the word catastrophe the head of
18:27intelligence in the state department Tom
18:29Hughes was making those predictions he
18:31helped Humphrey draft a memo to that
18:33effect uh really it wasn't that hard to
18:36Fore on the contrary it's it's the kind
18:39of prediction that was being made the
18:41president did two things he went ahead
18:44anyway and he lied to the public about
18:47why he was doing it and how much
18:50repeatedly I was saying the the speech
18:52that I wrote described the 100,000 we
18:54were sending and I gave a rationale for
18:56it that I had to make up as far as I was
18:59concerned we were confronting China we
19:01were containing China I thought only
19:03that would justify forces of this size
19:06the president didn't want to dramatize
19:08it that much so instead of giving the
19:11speech that had I'd written it had been
19:12okay by at the top levels he decided to
19:15make a very low-key announcement uh
19:18himself in a press conference which was
19:20mainly devoted to other things and as we
19:23watched this press conference on July I
19:25think it was 28th or so of 19 1965 I
19:30heard him say we are sending actually
19:32what he said we're going from
19:3475,000 to
19:37125,000 50,000 more troops and I said to
19:41my boss MCN has he changed it only
19:4450,000 not 100,000 so he sent me down to
19:47the Joint staff headquarters to find out
19:50if the order had been changed and they
19:52told me no it's 100,000 he just chose to
19:55say 50,000 now today
19:59right what are the chances that a
20:01president could do that and someone
20:03wouldn't leak what are the chances that
20:05today we could be carrying on a secret
20:08bombing of Cambodia with two sets of
20:11books and no one would leak it hasn't
20:14that all changed no no the chance is
20:17very high uh as a matter of fact Sai hch
20:20has been saying now for at least two
20:23years that we have had during that
20:25period active special forces units
20:28operating in Iran stirring up uh local
20:32uh tribes and groups there against the
20:35majority Shiites and picking targets for
20:37bombing including possible nuclear
20:40bombing now saiers is quoting sources
20:43high level sources which are however
20:45Anonymous when he says that I know of
20:48almost no other press who has picked
20:50that up who has asked the question there
20:52have been no hearings on it as there
20:54should be it's as if he weren't saying
20:56it it's effectively secret but but he
20:59even assuming the truth of that I think
21:01I want to push you for a moment um
21:04that's the kind of lie that
21:07governments maybe have to make a covert
21:10action a covert action type yeah okay
21:13the uh again saiers has been talking
21:16about plans fully prepared and kept up
21:19to the minute operational plans not just
21:22on the Shelf contingency plans for for
21:25the last two years for if allout aerosol
21:29on U Iran and possible use of nuclear
21:34weapons again a failure of hearings no
21:37hearings that's not pursued by other
21:39people uh it's that's not a covert
21:42operation if they're carried out it will
21:45be uh very very open it will be
21:48catastrophic there to answer your
21:50question more directly there have been
21:52leaks on such matters uh and that's
21:55creditable what we haven't had is people
21:58testifying and bringing documents that
22:00will make the information unequivocal
22:03and we'll and they'll talk about it
22:05under oath and with cross-examinations
22:07to really convince the people but take
22:09the example of a very important leak
22:11it's sort of an exception that proves
22:13the rule uh the New York Times does get
22:16leaks from people in the National
22:18Security Agency NSA that the president
22:21has blatantly illegally and
22:24unconstitutionally been carrying out
22:27massive warrantless wir Taps they get
22:30this in December in October of 2004 for
22:33the previous three years 2001 the White
22:37House asks them not to put it out so
22:40they don't a year goes by and when they
22:43when their reporter James ryzen is about
22:45to print that in a book and reveal that
22:47the times has been sitting on this for a
22:49year sitting on it they then do put it
22:51out and they get a pullitzer priz for it
22:54but meanwhile during that year how many
22:57people knew how many thousands of people
22:59in NSA knew of this blatantly illegal
23:02program which they were involved in
23:04which wasn't getting out and the answer
23:06is as I say probably hundreds maybe
23:08thousands of people know let's go so
23:10let's take this to the context of the
23:12Vietnam War for a
23:14second as I
23:16remember the players then there was a
23:19designated anti-war person at State
23:23George
23:24B that was a cover given to him by the
23:27way he was absolutely sinere the
23:29president gave him a little cover to
23:31raise antiwar arguments inside on the
23:34price that he would say nothing to that
23:36to the outside and in fact that he would
23:38be a proar hawk on the outside but as
23:41ball has always said the notion that I
23:43was The Devil's Advocate was quite
23:45untrue as everyone knew I was against
23:47the war and it was to his credit he was
23:50making extremely good predictions he was
23:52another one who predicted catastroph but
23:54he was the only one when that designated
23:56public role public or private role the
23:58only one who risked his career to a
24:01small extent very small extent uh by
24:05saying this openly to the president my
24:07impression is that most of your fellow
24:10analysts whether it ran felt exactly the
24:12same way that this was there was no way
24:15to win this well my boss John MCN agreed
24:17with Paul entirely but uh his boss John
24:20M Robert mcnamer did not want him to
24:23express that opinion in any group he
24:25wanted him to back up mcnamer so he did
24:28and even ball uh I say interesting in
24:31his Memoirs he describes that uh with
24:34some pride that he told the president at
24:37one point you know Mr President that
24:39whatever decision you make I will back
24:42it up to the hillt loyally you know I
24:44will support you and whatever even if
24:46you take this uh criminal disastrous
24:50murderous aggressive War uh which you
24:53know I'm recommending against you can
24:55count on me to Advocate it in public and
24:58the that's a paraphrase and the
25:00president said I know that George and he
25:03did uh he did know that and ball in fact
25:07his criticisms inside saved not one
25:11American or Vietnamese life shortened
25:13the war by not one day he did keep his
25:16mouth shut and did not I would say I
25:19would say that no more than I did he
25:22fulfill the oath that we had both taken
25:26of office and that was to support and
25:29defend the Constitution of the United
25:32States this is a thoroughly depressing
25:35conversation well and I I hope you'll
25:37come back the fact that we did try to
25:39change that 200 years ago was a very
25:42positive move for the world and we
25:44should really try to carry that on but
25:46now we have to end we'll continue in
25:48another show but for now uh Dan ellsburg
25:51thank you for being with us at policy
25:53watch at the University of Maryland and
25:55for our audience if you have any
25:57questions or suggest questions or want
25:58to write complaining it's policy watch
26:01at umd.edu thank you very
26:06[Music]
26:24much this program was produced by the
26:27University of Maryland which is solely
26:29responsible for its
26:31content the Norman and Florence Brody
26:33Family Foundation is dedicated to
26:35exploring topics of national and
26:37international importance and is proud to
26:40support policy watch with Doug bashov at
26:42the University of Maryland

About this transcript

This page contains the full transcript of Daniel Ellsberg (Part 1) by UMD Policy Watch, generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 4,445 words across 624 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.

What you can do with it

Use the transcript to take notes, quote the speaker, build a study guide, generate a summary with ChatGPT or Claude via the YouTube Summary tool, or export it as a timed subtitle file with YouTube to SRT. You can also re-open it in the transcriber to translate the transcript into 100+ languages.

Free YouTube transcript tool

YouTube2Text is a free YouTube transcript generator — no signup, no daily limit. Paste any YouTube link and get the full transcript instantly, with timestamps, click-to-jump, translation to 100+ languages, AI prompts for ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, and exports to TXT, SRT, VTT, or Markdown.