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Cyberpunk, D&D, and Neuroscience--Jed Todd's Unconventional Journey to Iraq and Return to His Roots — Transcript

by The Beaten Zone · 25,592 words · 3,675 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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  1. 0:00We keep saying we want innovation. We
  2. 0:02keep saying we want adaptability. We
  3. 0:04keep saying we want leaders who can
  4. 0:06think. But the minute someone takes a
  5. 0:08small risk, we punish them like they
  6. 0:10committed a war crime. And that's how
  7. 0:12institutions end up taking the big
  8. 0:14risks, the ones that get people killed.
  9. 0:17This is the beaten zone. And I'm John
  10. 0:19Mark Wilson.
  11. 0:21Today's guest is Jed Todd, Scot
  12. 0:24practitioner, Iraq veteran, information
  13. 0:26warfare junkie, and one of the smartest,
  14. 0:28most unique, most honest voices I know
  15. 0:31on what the military gets wrong about
  16. 0:33culture, command, and information
  17. 0:35statecraft.
  18. 0:37Jed doesn't talk about war like it's a
  19. 0:39PowerPoint or he's some kind of YouTube
  20. 0:41hero. No, he talks about like a dude who
  21. 0:44walked into the village, knocked on the
  22. 0:46door, and tried to keep things from
  23. 0:48getting worse. He was there in Baghdad
  24. 0:50in 2004 where he watched the country go
  25. 0:52from being barely stable to chaotic and
  26. 0:55seeing how decisions made far away lit
  27. 0:57the fuse on the ground. He tells stories
  28. 1:00that don't make the highlight real. How
  29. 1:02trust gets built, how it gets destroyed
  30. 1:05over something as small as a family
  31. 1:07shotgun, and how the nothing burger
  32. 1:09moments are the ones that echo for
  33. 1:11years. Then we zoom out. Russia,
  34. 1:14Ukraine, strategic culture, the
  35. 1:16information environment, how it gets
  36. 1:18manipulated, how it collapses, and why
  37. 1:20people grab on to wrong sources when
  38. 1:22credibility dies. Jed's argument is
  39. 1:25simple and brutal. In the information
  40. 1:27war, you don't win by making fewer
  41. 1:29mistakes. You win by making the next to
  42. 1:31last mistake. And after all that, he
  43. 1:34leaves the military, finds faith, writes
  44. 1:36poetry and cyberpunk fiction, and goes
  45. 1:39back to the one path he put on hold when
  46. 1:41he joined the army. neuroscience
  47. 1:44because in the end this episode isn't
  48. 1:46just about scop. It's about people. How
  49. 1:48systems reward cowardice, how wars get
  50. 1:51sold, how trust gets broken, and what it
  51. 1:54takes to rebuild a mind after you've
  52. 1:55seen too much. So, if you've ever
  53. 1:58wondered why we keep repeating the same
  54. 1:59mistakes, why we can't adapt, or why
  55. 2:02truth feels like it's always losing,
  56. 2:04you're going to want to hear this one.
  57. 2:06This is Jed Todd, and this is the beaten
  58. 2:08zone.
  59. 2:09>> And awesome. So, uh, Jed, you you're a
  60. 2:13student of all things Eastern Europe,
  61. 2:15Russia. You've dedicated your entire
  62. 2:17professional life really to studying
  63. 2:19culture, language, history, and then,
  64. 2:21you know, you've been a practitioner in
  65. 2:22that part of the world as well uh in
  66. 2:25national security. It's interesting that
  67. 2:27your first kind of big operational
  68. 2:29experience was in Bosnia. Now, what year
  69. 2:32uh did you get to Bosnia?
  70. 2:34>> So, I was in Bosnia in '98. the unit
  71. 2:36that I was in um augmented kind of to to
  72. 2:39fill the gap between European Union uh
  73. 2:42units and then there were the mission
  74. 2:44was being taken over by uh units on
  75. 2:47rotation from the US.
  76. 2:49>> Mhm.
  77. 2:49>> We were the the stock gap measure in
  78. 2:51between. They they you know put together
  79. 2:53a a team of folks grabbed from
  80. 2:56everywhere that that VCORE had access to
  81. 2:58and and sent them there. It was uh was
  82. 3:01kind of a weird situation for for me
  83. 3:05volunteering. I I had no objection to
  84. 3:08going. Politically, I had objections to
  85. 3:10the mission as a whole, but you know, I
  86. 3:11was but you know, on a personal level, I
  87. 3:14thought it it sounded like a good thing,
  88. 3:17but I didn't want to be recorded as
  89. 3:19volunteering. So, I was a real I was a
  90. 3:21real to my bosses,
  91. 3:23unfortunately. I I you know, kind of
  92. 3:25regret it now, but you know, I I kept
  93. 3:26telling them, "Hey, I have no no problem
  94. 3:28with going. And I think it makes sense.
  95. 3:30I don't want anybody to go, you know, as
  96. 3:31a family here or anything like that. Um,
  97. 3:34and I think I'm, you know, trained and
  98. 3:36in the right field and all that, but I I
  99. 3:38refuse to volunteer. I'm not willing to
  100. 3:40to say that I volunteer. And
  101. 3:42>> order me to go.
  102. 3:44>> Yeah. Yeah. I was I was telling him, you
  103. 3:46know, order me to go and I'll go. And so
  104. 3:48the uh the the master, I think, you
  105. 3:50know, she heard that as as you know, me
  106. 3:53just kind of making something for the
  107. 3:54record. And so then in one staff meeting
  108. 3:57where they they had all the people who
  109. 3:59were going to go when they were telling
  110. 4:00us what they were doing, you know, she
  111. 4:02introduced me as a volunteer and and you
  112. 4:04know, right in front of of you know,
  113. 4:06everybody there. I said, "No, no, I'm
  114. 4:07I'm not volunteering. I have no
  115. 4:08objection to going, but and I think I'm
  116. 4:10the right choice, but I refuse to
  117. 4:12volunteer." And you know, the the whole
  118. 4:14room is just sitting there. We've got a
  119. 4:16lot of things to go over. Why are you
  120. 4:17bringing this up? You know, why are you
  121. 4:18even making this a fight? And it was uh
  122. 4:21>> that is such an out of the ordinary
  123. 4:23move, Jed. Uh, I like that. Now, when
  124. 4:25you get there and you know the mission's
  125. 4:27going on and you know you guys are
  126. 4:30bringing stability to an area that's
  127. 4:33been fractured by ethnic cleansing and
  128. 4:36genocide. Did you feel like more
  129. 4:38personally attached like to the to the
  130. 4:40mission? Like, wow, this is really where
  131. 4:42I need to be right now. I'm doing good
  132. 4:43in the world. Did that ever feeling ever
  133. 4:45emerge during that time to kind of
  134. 4:46challenge your political kind of
  135. 4:48skepticism? It actually did almost as
  136. 4:51soon it really as soon as we as we got
  137. 4:54into country. So we came in we rented
  138. 4:57buses to go into country and literally
  139. 5:00you know took took uh you know a fleet
  140. 5:03of of buses with German drivers and they
  141. 5:07drove down the the highway. when we
  142. 5:09crossed, you know, the the river,
  143. 5:11crossed a bridge, and then they said,
  144. 5:12"Okay, everybody lock and load. You
  145. 5:13know, you're now in country." [laughter]
  146. 5:15And and they treated it the whole time I
  147. 5:19was here, they treated it as as very
  148. 5:21highstakes situation. Um, everything was
  149. 5:24was figured as though we were we were
  150. 5:26always on, we were required to always
  151. 5:29when we were outdoors have our helmet
  152. 5:31and have our body armor. But the body
  153. 5:33armor at that time was a flack vest, so
  154. 5:35it wouldn't actually do anything. It was
  155. 5:36just heavier. you know, even if you went
  156. 5:38up, you know, while you were on base, if
  157. 5:41if you, you know, got up in the middle
  158. 5:43of the night, you needed to go pee, you
  159. 5:44had to put on your your flack vest and
  160. 5:46and, you know, Kevlar to go do that. Um,
  161. 5:49and have your weapon with you, even
  162. 5:51though you couldn't have any rounds with
  163. 5:53you because you're on base and there's
  164. 5:55nothing going on. So, you know, you have
  165. 5:57to have this unloaded weapon with you at
  166. 5:59all times. It was the most absurd, you
  167. 6:03know, mission in a lot of ways that, you
  168. 6:05know, it was a very much performative,
  169. 6:07you know, it was it was security
  170. 6:08theater. We were doing a lot of security
  171. 6:10theater. So, you could tell that the
  172. 6:11risk wasn't to us when we were there.
  173. 6:14But as you're as we're driving through
  174. 6:16these villages, they they were really
  175. 6:19they were destroyed. And that was my
  176. 6:21first understanding of what had happened
  177. 6:24to the country. And I had been doing my
  178. 6:26my, you know, my research on what life
  179. 6:30in in Yugoslavia was like before the
  180. 6:32war.
  181. 6:33>> Um, I had a pretty good understanding of
  182. 6:34it. And I kept contrasting the images of
  183. 6:37what I was seeing with what I understood
  184. 6:40about uh about the country
  185. 6:43>> and that contrast to me was was
  186. 6:45shocking. you know, it was uh it was
  187. 6:47something very I I knew intellectually
  188. 6:50that, you know, things had kind of
  189. 6:52collapsed, but seeing it was very
  190. 6:55different. And then you're you're
  191. 6:56talking to, you know, to these people on
  192. 7:00base who should have a very normal life
  193. 7:03and in their interactions with each
  194. 7:04other, um they're having a very normal
  195. 7:07life. And you know, a year ago, they had
  196. 7:10their capital where,
  197. 7:13you know, neighbors were sitting up on
  198. 7:14the hills, you know, literally shooting
  199. 7:17each other's children for for no
  200. 7:19particular reason whatsoever. No reason
  201. 7:21that any of them could, you know, could
  202. 7:23articulate. Nobody had a good cause for
  203. 7:26what was going on. Nobody had anything
  204. 7:27they were fighting for. You know, the
  205. 7:29the more you you dug into it, the less
  206. 7:32and less there was at the heart of what
  207. 7:35had happened
  208. 7:36>> Mhm. that big mystery, you know, why did
  209. 7:39this happen? Over the course of it, I
  210. 7:40came to realize that there there just
  211. 7:42wasn't any answer. It was was just a
  212. 7:46matter of things being allowed to go
  213. 7:48really wrong because no one tried to
  214. 7:51stop it.
  215. 7:51>> No one tried hard enough to stop it at
  216. 7:53the time.
  217. 7:54>> And then once it got a certain critical
  218. 7:56mass, then it was impossible to recover.
  219. 7:59You know, it was breaking an egg.
  220. 8:01>> Yeah. What struck me a lot is that, you
  221. 8:06know, the kind of tensions that were
  222. 8:08there in Bosnia back in the day, that
  223. 8:10wasn't all that different from the kind
  224. 8:12of tensions we had, you know, in in the
  225. 8:14valley in Texas. You know, it wasn't all
  226. 8:16that different from the community
  227. 8:18tensions that I had grown up with all my
  228. 8:20life. The difference was that that no
  229. 8:22one had tried to tried to make an issue
  230. 8:25of it the way they did in Boston. No one
  231. 8:27had no one had become a a a uh
  232. 8:30propheteer on polarization and political
  233. 8:33divides and they they did in Bosnia.
  234. 8:36That struck me as something that I
  235. 8:38didn't immediately decide that you know
  236. 8:41intervention is a good thing or you know
  237. 8:44US foreign policy is suddenly noble or
  238. 8:48anything like that. Slowly I came to
  239. 8:50realize that you know we're we're trying
  240. 8:52to do the right thing more than we're
  241. 8:53trying to do the wrong thing. But at the
  242. 8:55time, what really occurred to me is that
  243. 8:58whether or not I agree with US policy,
  244. 9:00it's worth it to keep this from
  245. 9:03happening in my home.
  246. 9:05>> Mhm. Yeah.
  247. 9:06>> You know, keep the war somewhere else.
  248. 9:08>> Yeah. We'll come back to some of these
  249. 9:10topics later on when we start talking
  250. 9:11about inside the United States and the
  251. 9:13future of the US when we talk about a
  252. 9:16variety of topics. So, you made the
  253. 9:18decision after your time was over, you
  254. 9:22made a decision to reinlist, which is
  255. 9:24interesting because, you know, your
  256. 9:27profile like, okay, cool. I'm like this,
  257. 9:29you know, I'm like this KO Institute
  258. 9:31poster child, you know, on on
  259. 9:34intervention and I'm going to I'm going
  260. 9:36to go in and serve so that no one can
  261. 9:37call me a coward. You know, I'm not
  262. 9:39speaking for you is how I interpreting
  263. 9:41our conversation this far. and and all
  264. 9:43you wanted it was important to you that
  265. 9:45you that you had skin in the game that
  266. 9:47you had that personal perspective as you
  267. 9:49but you reinlist you reinlisted and I'm
  268. 9:51going to ask you why
  269. 9:52>> I didn't do it immediately I um you know
  270. 9:55when when I transitioned out I was
  271. 9:58completely in the you know burn my
  272. 10:00uniform kind of mentality and in fact uh
  273. 10:02you know one of the meetings of the
  274. 10:04transition process was you talk to a guy
  275. 10:06who's recruiting for the National Guard
  276. 10:08Reserve and uh his argument to me was
  277. 10:11look you know This was in 1999. And his
  278. 10:14argument to me is that, you know, you
  279. 10:16you you're still on you you're still on
  280. 10:19the line for another four years. You
  281. 10:21know, you've got IRR uh for that time.
  282. 10:23And if anything pops up in those four
  283. 10:25years, you're draft bait and you'll be
  284. 10:28the first scent. And you know, this was
  285. 10:30his argument because he knew how I was
  286. 10:32how I was acting with the military. And
  287. 10:34I looked at him dead in the face and I
  288. 10:36said, "Yeah, like something's going to
  289. 10:37happen in the next four years. I'll take
  290. 10:38my chances." And I was a complete jerk.
  291. 10:40you could see like his veins starting to
  292. 10:42pop. Um, [laughter]
  293. 10:44you know, and I always think that that
  294. 10:47that that
  295. 10:48>> I'm sorry
  296. 10:49>> that he must have like
  297. 10:51>> That's such a baller move, Jed. I
  298. 10:53[laughter]
  299. 10:54knowing you as long as I've known you, I
  300. 10:58I'm sorry. I didn't mean to cut you off.
  301. 11:00Go ahead, man. [laughter]
  302. 11:02>> So, I know this guy, you know, after 911
  303. 11:05when when the dust has kind of settled,
  304. 11:07we start, you know, they start
  305. 11:08activating folks. I know he was just
  306. 11:09thinking that jerk finally got what was
  307. 11:12coming to him. He's he's you know on
  308. 11:14error. I I wasn't on error out of that
  309. 11:16time. When I left the army I you know I
  310. 11:18bummed around. I did some you know crazy
  311. 11:20stuff. I uh bummed around Europe for for
  312. 11:23a few months. Uh was in St. Petersburg
  313. 11:25studying at a school for a couple of
  314. 11:28months and then I I came back to the US
  315. 11:30and enrolled in in school again. And as
  316. 11:34soon as I got into college, it it took a
  317. 11:36couple of months and I realized I was I
  318. 11:37didn't fit in there that much anymore.
  319. 11:40And I um I was missing something. I was
  320. 11:43lacking something. And so that's when I
  321. 11:45decided to join the reserves.
  322. 11:46>> Mhm.
  323. 11:46>> And it was largely because of of the
  324. 11:50difficulty I had getting back the life
  325. 11:53that that that I thought I wanted this
  326. 11:55whole time.
  327. 11:56>> Yeah.
  328. 11:56>> And I found out that I really didn't
  329. 11:58anymore. You know, I wanted something. I
  330. 12:00wanted to be something other than the
  331. 12:01the snot-nosed kids that I that I had
  332. 12:04been when I left.
  333. 12:06>> Mhm.
  334. 12:06>> And I I remember like uh one of my
  335. 12:08friends held a um they held a Fourth of
  336. 12:10July party. This was just when I had
  337. 12:12gotten back, you know, it was a couple
  338. 12:13of months that that I had been been home
  339. 12:16and they had a bunch of of plastic flags
  340. 12:19all around. and some, you know,
  341. 12:22snot-nosed little little punk just like
  342. 12:24me a few years ago was picking up the
  343. 12:26flags and like burning them because he
  344. 12:28thought it'd be, you know, funny
  345. 12:29gesture. And I I thought it was a jerk
  346. 12:32move, you know, when I said so. Um, I
  347. 12:34didn't try to stop him. I didn't, you
  348. 12:36know, get in his face or anything, but I
  349. 12:38said, "Hey, this is, you know, there's
  350. 12:40no point in this. This is just
  351. 12:41destruction. You're not making any
  352. 12:43point. This is a party. These people,
  353. 12:45you know, what's the what's the
  354. 12:48political message here?" you know that
  355. 12:49that all of these drunks should what and
  356. 12:53my friends uh you know when I was
  357. 12:55complaining about it one of my friends
  358. 12:57said you know you've kind of turned into
  359. 12:59a cryptofascist I thought this is not
  360. 13:02this is this is not what I signed up for
  361. 13:04this is and I realized that that by the
  362. 13:08standards that I had had when I when I
  363. 13:11left college he was right he was
  364. 13:13speaking from the same place that that I
  365. 13:15had been in that time and so I thought
  366. 13:18all right if if I'm if I'm this changed,
  367. 13:21I want to at least keep touch with this
  368. 13:24part of my life. And so I joined the
  369. 13:26reserves so that I wouldn't lose touch
  370. 13:28with this thing that that I had that had
  371. 13:30also become a part of me,
  372. 13:32>> you know, the the the service.
  373. 13:35>> So what uh we're going to talk about
  374. 13:37your That's really cool, man. We're
  375. 13:39going to talk a little bit about your
  376. 13:40transition into psychological
  377. 13:42operations. But before we do that, I
  378. 13:44want to ask you to just very briefly in
  379. 13:47plain language, what are psychological
  380. 13:49operations for the folks who who may be
  381. 13:51not familiar with it?
  382. 13:52>> So psychological operations is that
  383. 13:54field that our whole purpose is to
  384. 13:57introduce behavioral change on the
  385. 13:59battlefield using non-lethal means. And
  386. 14:01that that's all it is. Our purpose is to
  387. 14:03go there and use whatever measures that
  388. 14:06we can to get people to do things that
  389. 14:09will help the commander accomplish the
  390. 14:10tactical mission that is required with
  391. 14:13something other than than shooting. And
  392. 14:15that can mean, you know, doing
  393. 14:16loudspeaker operations. That can mean
  394. 14:18putting out leaflets. That can be as
  395. 14:20simple as, you know, as talking to the
  396. 14:22local police chief and making sure that
  397. 14:24that he has an understanding of, you
  398. 14:26know, who to talk to so that so that
  399. 14:27there aren't misunderstandings on the
  400. 14:29ground. It's a wide range of of
  401. 14:32activities. The only common feature to
  402. 14:35it is that that we're trying to
  403. 14:37introduce peace into war. Essentially,
  404. 14:40we're trying to find a non-lethal
  405. 14:44solution to the battlefield problems
  406. 14:45that the commander has.
  407. 14:47>> Yep. That's a a great, you know, a great
  408. 14:49job to have
  409. 14:51>> on the battlefield is, you know, when,
  410. 14:54you know, you can go in there and by
  411. 14:58talking to, you know, to somebody there,
  412. 15:00you can, you know, short circuit the the
  413. 15:03whole process of of what could be a very
  414. 15:06messy, unanticipated situation.
  415. 15:08>> Yeah, Jed, that's a very uh good
  416. 15:11description. And I think for some of the
  417. 15:13folks who maybe are looking for some
  418. 15:15sort of historic example to kind of like
  419. 15:17provide some some color to that and
  420. 15:20we'll talk about your time in Iraq later
  421. 15:21on where you're going to talk to us
  422. 15:22about the things you did on the
  423. 15:23battlefield, but I think a lot of people
  424. 15:25at home maybe are maybe or maybe not
  425. 15:27familiar with the ghost soldiers of
  426. 15:28World War II. They're kind of considered
  427. 15:30to be like the legendary sciopers,
  428. 15:32right? Can you talk to us just briefly
  429. 15:35about
  430. 15:36>> who they were and kind of what they were
  431. 15:37charged with doing and and particularly
  432. 15:39their role in Normandy um to enable that
  433. 15:42whole operation?
  434. 15:43>> So the the Ghost Army was this uh this
  435. 15:47operation set up by the military to to
  436. 15:50create the mistaken impression that
  437. 15:51there was going to be a landing and
  438. 15:55major land invasion of Europe coming in
  439. 15:57a different direction. And it was just
  440. 15:59it was just the the you know a large
  441. 16:01scale deception operation where we would
  442. 16:03put out pull out all the stops and make
  443. 16:06make the Germans believe that we were
  444. 16:09going to do something differently than
  445. 16:11what we were actually doing so that the
  446. 16:13guys who were going on Normandy would
  447. 16:15not be facing the the uh uh main force
  448. 16:18of the German army. Instead they would
  449. 16:20spread it out and be looking at at other
  450. 16:22options at the time. And the way they
  451. 16:24did that is they got a whole bunch of
  452. 16:27crazy foreigners um at Camp Richie in
  453. 16:30Pennsylvania and they put them together
  454. 16:32there and said, "Look, you know, come up
  455. 16:34with different ways to create the
  456. 16:36impression that there's, you know, that
  457. 16:38there's this other army that that really
  458. 16:39isn't there. Do anything you need to to
  459. 16:42do that. you know, whether that's that's
  460. 16:43whether that's, you know, make blowup
  461. 16:45tanks, uh whether that's um introduce
  462. 16:48fake intelligence operations that that
  463. 16:51will um that will be there if it's talk
  464. 16:54to to the the newspapers and get them to
  465. 16:57print, you know, personal ads that will
  466. 16:59say this and this American from this
  467. 17:01unit is looking for a contact from this
  468. 17:04unit. Um, it was to craft a whole
  469. 17:06picture that would ensure that the the
  470. 17:09Germans, all of their intelligence
  471. 17:11assets would convince them of something
  472. 17:13that was manifestly and obviously not
  473. 17:15true.
  474. 17:16>> Mhm.
  475. 17:16>> Um, and the reason it worked is because
  476. 17:19it it it did the main thing that, you
  477. 17:22know, SCUP always does is that you don't
  478. 17:24try to convince someone of of something
  479. 17:26that they they don't believe. you find
  480. 17:28out what they believe that is
  481. 17:30advantageous to you and you reinforce
  482. 17:32that,
  483. 17:33>> you know, as much as you can. And so
  484. 17:36they knew that there were certain ideas
  485. 17:39that the Germans um had about what the
  486. 17:42Americans were doing. And we just made
  487. 17:44sure that there was lots of paperwork
  488. 17:45and observables and and things out there
  489. 17:48to convince them that this was indeed
  490. 17:50what was happening. That there that we
  491. 17:52had um we were going to conduct a a
  492. 17:54large scale landing in in Norway and
  493. 17:57that we were also going to um the main
  494. 18:00force was going to come from I think it
  495. 18:02was uh um Sardinia, you know, and from
  496. 18:05the south rather than Normandy. So that
  497. 18:07the idea was that when Normandy actually
  498. 18:09happened, Hitler would be convinced that
  499. 18:10this was a faint so that he wouldn't put
  500. 18:13his main forces up against those guys
  501. 18:16and they would have, you know, a couple
  502. 18:17of weeks before he figured out that he
  503. 18:18had been fooled.
  504. 18:19>> Yeah.
  505. 18:20>> And it it worked like a charm. He he,
  506. 18:23you know, diverted a lot of resources to
  507. 18:25defending Norway and the South when
  508. 18:28really, you know, it was very obvious
  509. 18:30that we had a whole bunch of ships that
  510. 18:32were that were about to come over and
  511. 18:34land on Normandy.
  512. 18:35>> Yeah. I didn't really appreciate it
  513. 18:37until I actually walked the battlefield
  514. 18:39in Normandy. You know, getting on the
  515. 18:41beach, it's widely known how difficult
  516. 18:43that was, particularly at Omaha Beach.
  517. 18:45But I still contend that the real
  518. 18:48deception that was put on ensured that
  519. 18:51we were able to fight through the hedge.
  520. 18:52It wasn't really about establishing a
  521. 18:54hole in the beach
  522. 18:55>> because it took it took a lot of time
  523. 18:57for the Germans to be able to reinforce
  524. 19:00what they would ultimately find out
  525. 19:02would be this was the main thrust of the
  526. 19:04attack. And and that translates not only
  527. 19:06to achieving operational objectives and
  528. 19:07fighting through the hedros. It saved
  529. 19:10untold numbers of lives, civilians,
  530. 19:13allies, access power lives. I mean, in
  531. 19:16in totality, it just saved a lot of
  532. 19:18lives and and and accelerated the
  533. 19:21completion of the war. That gives our
  534. 19:23folks at home kind of an understanding
  535. 19:24of what psychological operations, the
  536. 19:27legacy of psychological operations. I
  537. 19:29wanted to ask
  538. 19:29>> that wasn't called SCUP at the time
  539. 19:31though. That was
  540. 19:32>> that was when it was still it was still
  541. 19:34thought of as intelligence. It became
  542. 19:36understood a during during World War II
  543. 19:40is when an understanding of of sty and
  544. 19:42cy appeared. You know the SF guys would
  545. 19:46hate it when you say this but at the
  546. 19:48time they they decided they would do
  547. 19:49psychological warfare and it was you
  548. 19:51know that was a part of it. You the
  549. 19:53active army component you know doing all
  550. 19:54these these deception operations. There
  551. 19:56was also what the the OSS was doing with
  552. 19:59the Jedberg Jedberg guys and things like
  553. 20:01that. And so they also appeared as
  554. 20:04coming from from psychological warfare.
  555. 20:07And it wasn't until Vietnam really that
  556. 20:11SCOP was cut off from the rest of
  557. 20:14intelligence and special operations was
  558. 20:17kind of divided in into the uh the
  559. 20:20kinetic component
  560. 20:22which is you know SF and the the
  561. 20:26psychological component. And I'm not
  562. 20:27entirely convinced that this has been a
  563. 20:31I don't think anyone, you know, in the
  564. 20:32community thinks that that there is a a
  565. 20:35clean line that that is there or should
  566. 20:37be there. And it's it's it's one that
  567. 20:39we've been squabbbling at, you know,
  568. 20:40ever since.
  569. 20:41>> Not to get too wonky here because this
  570. 20:44conversation can go on for hours and
  571. 20:46it'll bore everyone. However, you bring
  572. 20:49up a really good point. If the
  573. 20:51intelligence community maintains, you
  574. 20:54know, proponency for that kind of thing,
  575. 20:59we'll call it SCOP. There are some
  576. 21:00pretty, I think, some advantages to
  577. 21:03that. The first being that the
  578. 21:06intelligence community, because they own
  579. 21:07it, part of SCOP is actually confirming
  580. 21:11that the things that you're trying to
  581. 21:12do, there's progress towards that. Well,
  582. 21:15that requires intelligence assets,
  583. 21:17right? So if the intelligence community
  584. 21:19has proponency for that, they're going
  585. 21:21to be incentivized and motivated to use
  586. 21:24their trade craft to confirm that the
  587. 21:27deception story is working right now
  588. 21:30that it's been kind of separated from
  589. 21:31the intelligence community. And it goes
  590. 21:33back to when you and I were in the field
  591. 21:34in the Middle East doing this stuff.
  592. 21:36Getting the intel guys to actually
  593. 21:38commit resources to confirming that our
  594. 21:41work is is progressing as it should was
  595. 21:43like pulling teeth, man.
  596. 21:45>> Right. Now you're taking resources away
  597. 21:47from real army stuff. It's something
  598. 21:49that our our viewers should just ponder,
  599. 21:52but you know we we we shouldn't have a
  600. 21:54long conversation about this, but you
  601. 21:56bring up a really interesting point. I
  602. 21:57never really considered that. Um did I
  603. 22:00interpret kind of your you kind of think
  604. 22:02>> yeah there is a part of me that re
  605. 22:04reacts instinctively to the idea of like
  606. 22:06you know scot being pushed under
  607. 22:08intelligence and you know I want to shy
  608. 22:11away from it but but there is some value
  609. 22:15to it. The big problem that there is
  610. 22:18with it is that that this may be a
  611. 22:20result of that kind of divorce is that
  612. 22:22that the intelligence community is
  613. 22:24really bad historically and especially
  614. 22:27today at looking at anything that is is
  615. 22:31beyond you know exquisite sensors and
  616. 22:34it's been it's a real problem for SCAP
  617. 22:37for information operations for anything
  618. 22:39like that.
  619. 22:40>> There's a lot of things that you can
  620. 22:41tell just from from what is open source.
  621. 22:45It is often more significant looking at
  622. 22:48that because you can look at it you can
  623. 22:49look at you know the aggregate of a
  624. 22:51whole lot of sensors that you don't have
  625. 22:53with Intel. Like with Intel you may have
  626. 22:55you know a couple of sensors who are
  627. 22:56telling you exactly where these units or
  628. 22:59these selectors are moving to. With
  629. 23:01academics you have thousands of people
  630. 23:04who are writing about you know what they
  631. 23:06know about what's going on in the world.
  632. 23:08And as you know, their sources of
  633. 23:10information get better and better with
  634. 23:12the internet, with um commercial
  635. 23:14satellite imagery, with things like
  636. 23:16this, all of these sources of
  637. 23:17information are growing exponentially.
  638. 23:20Whereas our ability to you know develop
  639. 23:23exquisite sensors that that you know go
  640. 23:25exactly where we want that does not grow
  641. 23:27the same way. You know, it it grows
  642. 23:29linearly. And so there's been this
  643. 23:30explosion in capabilities, but the intel
  644. 23:33community has more or less looked away
  645. 23:36from from anything that that is not is
  646. 23:40not from a classified source.
  647. 23:42>> Yeah.
  648. 23:42>> You know, if it's if it doesn't have,
  649. 23:44you know, a classification on it, then
  650. 23:46it's not worth looking at. And
  651. 23:47everything that is of value in in uh in
  652. 23:51basic research for SCIA is going to be
  653. 23:54you know unclassified coming from
  654. 23:56academics coming from talking to people
  655. 23:59inherently
  656. 24:00>> from civil society open information from
  657. 24:02civil society media um especially now
  658. 24:05since so much information is out there
  659. 24:07for you guys to potentially chew on
  660. 24:09>> and to you know that feedback loop
  661. 24:12coming from the target audience the the
  662. 24:14things that shape the target audience's
  663. 24:16perspective.
  664. 24:17That to me should be an essential part
  665. 24:19of intelligence collection. [laughter]
  666. 24:21Like not just to collect it, but to but
  667. 24:23to analyze it, process it, and then feed
  668. 24:26it into the operation cycle so that guys
  669. 24:28like you [clears throat]
  670. 24:30>> can then make recommendations to the
  671. 24:32commander about our operations are not
  672. 24:34progressing as well as you think they
  673. 24:35are because this is this is how the the
  674. 24:37population perceives it.
  675. 24:39>> Yeah.
  676. 24:40>> Right.
  677. 24:41>> This is exactly
  678. 24:42>> what you're describing, Jed. And and and
  679. 24:44coming back to you now, this I can see
  680. 24:47the attraction because you're a very
  681. 24:48switched on guy like you you I can see
  682. 24:51the attraction like this is a a scop
  683. 24:53right because this is a thinking
  684. 24:54person's game. Is that that challenge
  685. 24:58that kind of heavy intellectual
  686. 25:00challenge kind of something that
  687. 25:01attracted you to this career field?
  688. 25:03>> It's not what attracted me to the career
  689. 25:04field, but it's why I stayed in the
  690. 25:06career field. It's it's what kept it
  691. 25:08going for me.
  692. 25:09>> [clears throat]
  693. 25:09>> So coming out of out of an intel
  694. 25:11background when I first got into to SCIP
  695. 25:13the first thing I did is you know start
  696. 25:15looking at at what kind of intel
  697. 25:16resources are there for for doing
  698. 25:18planning and target audience analysis
  699. 25:20stuff like that and I figured out real
  700. 25:21quickly that there wasn't any. And so I
  701. 25:23immediately knowing what was actually
  702. 25:25out there I I never put as as my highest
  703. 25:29priority doing research from from the
  704. 25:32intel side of things. I started looking
  705. 25:33at at academic and open- source
  706. 25:35information and the fact that that that
  707. 25:39I prioritized the open source
  708. 25:41information over anything on the
  709. 25:43classified side made sure that that I
  710. 25:45was a lot quicker about, you know,
  711. 25:47getting this information there. I had a
  712. 25:48lot more sources and they were usually
  713. 25:52more accurate than what the folks who
  714. 25:54were, you know, doing the traditional
  715. 25:56MDMP process, what they were saying
  716. 25:58because they were going first to Intel
  717. 26:00and then refining from there. Going
  718. 26:01first to exquisite intel to, you know,
  719. 26:03traditional intelligence disciplines.
  720. 26:06That was a a large part of why I was
  721. 26:08successful in SCAP is because I was
  722. 26:11willing to to court those those types of
  723. 26:14information. I'm not I'm not a great
  724. 26:16salesman, you know. Not I'm not the kind
  725. 26:17of of friendly person who is generally
  726. 26:21successful in SI but my research put me
  727. 26:24over
  728. 26:26you know over a lot of my peers
  729. 26:28>> and that enabled me to see things coming
  730. 26:30that they they didn't and when you were
  731. 26:32in a situation where there was
  732. 26:33absolutely no resources no intel you
  733. 26:36know focus at all had had been looking
  734. 26:38at it I could still produce information
  735. 26:40and analysis and that enabled people you
  736. 26:43know enabled me to succeed despite you
  737. 26:46know my my tactical shortcomings.
  738. 26:48>> So, like with the Ghost Army, reading
  739. 26:50about the type of characters that
  740. 26:53participated and set that whole thing
  741. 26:54up. I'm reading about the Battle of
  742. 26:56Midway now. And what allowed the Battle
  743. 26:58of Midway to be successful was that you
  744. 27:01had this really kind of odd, I'll call
  745. 27:04them odd duck elements of intelligence
  746. 27:07folks and people who thought in terms of
  747. 27:09like deception, etc., that were able to
  748. 27:12kind of do their work and deliver timely
  749. 27:15information to Nimmits that allowed him
  750. 27:18to make the decision about Midway and
  751. 27:21they were able to score that major
  752. 27:23victory that was enabled by people that
  753. 27:25were kind of outsiders and didn't fit
  754. 27:27the the traditional mold. I guess what
  755. 27:29I'm pointing to is what sort of
  756. 27:32characters are the best kind of
  757. 27:34characters for SCOP good SCPers.
  758. 27:36>> So I think there are two different
  759. 27:39components. Mhm.
  760. 27:40>> In SCOP, there's the the folks who are
  761. 27:43really good at uh at integrating with
  762. 27:45the supported unit and you know are good
  763. 27:49instinctive salesmen and then there's
  764. 27:51the people who are really good at the at
  765. 27:53kind of the backend you know the
  766. 27:55research and understanding of of the
  767. 27:57target audience. The front-end guys, the
  768. 28:00folks who are who are good at that are
  769. 28:02those who have a uh they have a
  770. 28:04background that enables them to talk to
  771. 28:06the tactical tactical folks. that they,
  772. 28:09you know, come out of some other kind
  773. 28:11of, you know, combat arms, uh,
  774. 28:13background where they can, they
  775. 28:15understand, you know, what the commander
  776. 28:17wants and they know what what the
  777. 28:19objectives actually are and they're able
  778. 28:21to communicate that effective. Then the
  779. 28:23backend guys, those tend to to be either
  780. 28:26coming from kind of like an Intel
  781. 28:28background or they come out of something
  782. 28:31completely off-the-wall, you know, uh uh
  783. 28:34they're data science guys or the
  784. 28:36computer guys or they're, you know,
  785. 28:37they're artists or they're they're
  786. 28:40missionary kids, something like that
  787. 28:42where they have this this wealth of
  788. 28:44knowledge and you know, it's a bunch of
  789. 28:45weirdos. So, you know, you've got to to
  790. 28:48use Hexus terms, you've got the weirdos
  791. 28:50and the weirdos. And SCAP is the
  792. 28:52combination between that. You know, the
  793. 28:54the guys who can who can uh push forward
  794. 28:58and and you know, talk to talk to the
  795. 29:00guys on the ground and the beardos, and
  796. 29:02then you've got the weirdos who um
  797. 29:04support them providing the information
  798. 29:05that they need. I was definitely one of
  799. 29:07the weirdos. [laughter] I'm trying to
  800. 29:09fake it, but yeah.
  801. 29:10>> You're not fooling anyone, my man. The
  802. 29:13[laughter]
  803. 29:13>> the This is really interesting. We all
  804. 29:16recognize how important this stuff is
  805. 29:18from your example World War II with the
  806. 29:20Ghost Army, my example with Midway, how
  807. 29:22they put out there in the ether that
  808. 29:25like, hey, our freshwater compressor on
  809. 29:26Midway is broken and the the adversary
  810. 29:30took the bait and they were able to get
  811. 29:31that feedback loop and they say, "Aha,
  812. 29:33that's where the fight will take place,
  813. 29:36right?" And allowed Nemits to to stay a
  814. 29:39couple of steps ahead. So for me, the
  815. 29:42question is, we know how important this
  816. 29:43stuff is. we learned in Iraq and
  817. 29:44Afghanistan like how important this
  818. 29:46stuff was and I don't think we did that
  819. 29:47great of a job there. We'll talk more
  820. 29:49about that later. And now looking in the
  821. 29:50future of the battlefield with
  822. 29:52artificial intelligence and all these
  823. 29:54advanced sensors, you know, these sorts
  824. 29:56of things are going to are going to
  825. 29:58determine victory and defeat. They're
  826. 29:59going to determine casualties or not
  827. 30:01casualties, right?
  828. 30:03>> [clears throat]
  829. 30:03>> So, if you were recruiting the ideal
  830. 30:06kind of person for that, we'll call it
  831. 30:08the back-end job, what sort of people
  832. 30:11should we be actually going out and
  833. 30:12recruiting to do these sorts of jobs?
  834. 30:14And do they conveniently fall on that
  835. 30:16beardo weirdor continuum or should we
  836. 30:19really be looking for people with very
  837. 30:21specific skill sets and traits that we
  838. 30:23say we can bring this person on board
  839. 30:26doesn't fit the mold but they have skill
  840. 30:28sets that we can put to use in helping
  841. 30:30us be more creative in terms of how we
  842. 30:32deter conflict and how we when god
  843. 30:35forbid conflict kicks off. So, it is
  844. 30:38hard to recruit weirdos,
  845. 30:40>> but that is exactly what we need right
  846. 30:43now. And the beardos, the beardos you
  847. 30:46can generally recruit pretty easy
  848. 30:47because it's a matter of, you know,
  849. 30:48looking at the rest of the army and
  850. 30:50saying, "Hey, look, this is a better
  851. 30:51deal than what you're doing now. You
  852. 30:53know, you can continue to paint rocks
  853. 30:54for a while or you can go do some more
  854. 30:56fun missions." And, you know, that's a
  855. 30:58pretty easy sell. People will buy that.
  856. 31:00Um, the weirdos, these are people who
  857. 31:03shouldn't be in the army for one reason
  858. 31:04or another. either they shouldn't be in
  859. 31:06the army because because they're, you
  860. 31:08know, they're artsy and, you know, have
  861. 31:11a lot of strong opinions or because they
  862. 31:14they have uh, you know, family or
  863. 31:17emotional ties that that uh give them a
  864. 31:20greater understanding of your your
  865. 31:22adversary and your target audience or
  866. 31:24they are there are people who, you know,
  867. 31:26should be out on Silicon Valley making
  868. 31:28hundreds of thousands of dollars a year
  869. 31:30um because they have that background or
  870. 31:32that that you know they have been doing
  871. 31:34some stuff that may be illegal if it was
  872. 31:36found out. These are the folks who make
  873. 31:38good weirdos and you get a bunch of
  874. 31:39those together and you know you can you
  875. 31:42can craft something that that will
  876. 31:44really effectively you know change
  877. 31:46what's going on on the battlefield. Um
  878. 31:48but they're they're hard to to get into
  879. 31:52the military during peace time.
  880. 31:55>> Yeah. Now, during war, it's it's not so
  881. 31:58hard because, you know, the the weirdos
  882. 32:01are are doing weird things and sooner or
  883. 32:03later they'll end up in a situation
  884. 32:05where the recruiters who were scraping
  885. 32:07the bottom of the barrel are going to
  886. 32:08scoop them up anyways.
  887. 32:09>> Yeah.
  888. 32:09>> But in peace time, they're the folks who
  889. 32:11nobody wants.
  890. 32:12>> So, how do you keep a weirdo during
  891. 32:14peace time where we're supposed to be
  892. 32:16thinking about the future and we're
  893. 32:17supposed to be thinking about the future
  894. 32:19and positioning ourselves so that we can
  895. 32:20be successful in the next war? In peace
  896. 32:22time, how do you keep weirdos happy?
  897. 32:25What sort of things does the army need
  898. 32:27to do to keep weirdos not happy but
  899. 32:30engaged, stimulated, focused on their
  900. 32:33craft?
  901. 32:33>> That's something that I I think CyberCom
  902. 32:36is killing itself over. They have got
  903. 32:39all of these people who they are
  904. 32:40training to be weirdos. You know,
  905. 32:41they're they're collecting people who
  906. 32:43have, you know, an understanding of
  907. 32:45these systems, you know, greater than
  908. 32:47anyone else. They're training them with
  909. 32:48with tools and tradecraft um that enable
  910. 32:51them to understand, you know, what's
  911. 32:54going on in in the operational
  912. 32:55environment. They're and then they're
  913. 32:58putting them and there's they're boxing
  914. 33:00them in with all these rules and
  915. 33:01regulations that completely alienate the
  916. 33:04kind of guys that they actually need to
  917. 33:05be operators. And you know, as soon as
  918. 33:08they finish finish training, they leave.
  919. 33:10>> Yeah.
  920. 33:10>> Because they're they're bored out of
  921. 33:11their heads. And what you need to do is
  922. 33:13you need to give them the opportunity to
  923. 33:16to do something. These guys are not
  924. 33:18motivated by money or status. What
  925. 33:21they're motivated by is the ability to
  926. 33:23do something wild. The more
  927. 33:24opportunities you have, the more likely
  928. 33:27they are to stay. So like Africom, if
  929. 33:29you look at at you know at the
  930. 33:31components of large, there is a a weird
  931. 33:34uh amount of you know old Africa hands
  932. 33:37who are now you know at at at great
  933. 33:40positions across the the information
  934. 33:42warfare you know community just because
  935. 33:45they were given the opportunity to do
  936. 33:47weird stuff you know on the ground you
  937. 33:49know in Africa. They were able to to try
  938. 33:52things that other people weren't doing
  939. 33:54and they were able to interact in ways
  940. 33:56that other, you know, that in other
  941. 33:57places they they wouldn't be allowed to
  942. 33:58do and they had a great time doing it.
  943. 34:01So, they've decided to, you know, take
  944. 34:03that that to the next level. There was
  945. 34:05also things like the asymmetric warfare
  946. 34:07group
  947. 34:07>> where they got guys who uh were
  948. 34:10tactically proficient, who were experts
  949. 34:11in something and then they were told,
  950. 34:13you know, bring this to the rest of the
  951. 34:14army. And that was a kind of mission
  952. 34:17that that kept that that retained, you
  953. 34:20know, those skill sets. Even if there
  954. 34:22was there was great opportunities
  955. 34:23somewhere else, they'd be more than
  956. 34:25happy to to stay in there and continue
  957. 34:29continue doing the impossible, you know,
  958. 34:31just for that chance.
  959. 34:32>> Okay, cool. Um, no, I mean that's um
  960. 34:35I've never walked a day in your boots.
  961. 34:37I'm not a scupper myself and so I can't
  962. 34:40say I agree or disagree, but intuitively
  963. 34:42I kind of do you. But I'll push back on
  964. 34:45one thing and that is you and I both
  965. 34:48served kind of in the information domain
  966. 34:50services during two wars and what I
  967. 34:53found was that there was actually in war
  968. 34:56there was actually quite a stifling
  969. 34:58bureaucracy, right? Lots of comp complex
  970. 35:02authorities and and a lot of
  971. 35:04inefficiencies and uh and so like in in
  972. 35:08that situation I can see how the weirdos
  973. 35:10can be disengaged and unstimulated. And
  974. 35:13I mean, I saw it my own with my my own
  975. 35:15two eyes, the frustration and the
  976. 35:17cynicism. And so, I guess the the
  977. 35:19question is is like, how do we think we
  978. 35:22should like restructure our approach to
  979. 35:24how we do that? What changes do we need
  980. 35:26to make in our strategic culture in
  981. 35:28terms of how we keep our very talented,
  982. 35:30creative people born from this wonderful
  983. 35:33open system that we have, which is
  984. 35:34liberal democracy, where we have this
  985. 35:36great tech and we have Hollywood and we
  986. 35:38have this thriving culture. You would
  987. 35:40think that we'd be able to produce
  988. 35:41people like that. Is there something in
  989. 35:43the army that you think is stifling um
  990. 35:46that kind of creativity?
  991. 35:48>> So I don't know if it is possible to
  992. 35:51make these changes, but what I can say
  993. 35:53is that what Ukraine has done in the
  994. 35:56past couple years has shown that there
  995. 35:58are ways to keep people engaged in new
  996. 36:01innovative ideas um and get them working
  997. 36:04on the battlefield. And the way they've
  998. 36:05done this is they have, you know,
  999. 36:08allowed units to do their own recruiting
  1000. 36:11for for folks. So they go out and they
  1001. 36:14instead of you having a one central
  1002. 36:16pipeline that is the you know for the
  1003. 36:19whole army and then you get divided up
  1004. 36:21wherever the hell you know you have you
  1005. 36:23happen to go. Individual units are
  1006. 36:26looking for their own kind of people and
  1007. 36:28they put out their their own ads. you
  1008. 36:30know, they have a a budget and, you
  1009. 36:33know, platforms and outreach just the
  1010. 36:35way that you have for for, you know,
  1011. 36:38retention and recruiting now, but they
  1012. 36:40can actually use it to go outside the
  1013. 36:41force to the to the community. And what
  1014. 36:45they're doing there is, you know,
  1015. 36:46they're finding, all right, we have
  1016. 36:47problems in these specific areas. We
  1017. 36:49need solutions here. And so they go out
  1018. 36:51and they find people who can provide
  1019. 36:53those solutions and they find out what
  1020. 36:55they want there. A lot of times, you
  1021. 36:56know, that may be, hey, we'll make sure
  1022. 36:58that you don't end up, you know, in a a
  1023. 37:01boring menial job. We'll bring you right
  1024. 37:03out to the front line or um these are
  1025. 37:06the other people who you'll be working
  1026. 37:07with. And those kinds of guarantees
  1027. 37:11enable the kind of innovation that they
  1028. 37:13need where um instead of having the army
  1029. 37:17as a whole as you know as the whole
  1030. 37:19institution innovating which can be a
  1031. 37:21very slow process you know there's all
  1032. 37:24these approval changes there's all this
  1033. 37:26contract and all these legalities
  1034. 37:28instead you have you know 50 or 100 um
  1035. 37:31you know you know battalions and even
  1036. 37:34you know companies um that are going out
  1037. 37:36there and they're all innovating on
  1038. 37:38their own. And some of those ideas and
  1039. 37:39and methods are good, some of them are
  1040. 37:41not. But the ones that that work, their
  1041. 37:45ideas spread through the entire, you
  1042. 37:47know, the entire military. And that was
  1043. 37:49very much the same way that that we have
  1044. 37:52we have won in previous wars. You know,
  1045. 37:54in World War II, you had a a bunch of
  1046. 37:57people coming up with with ideas on the
  1047. 37:59battlefield, and those that were, you
  1048. 38:01know, were ended up ended up being used
  1049. 38:04in other places. those that didn't work,
  1050. 38:06you know, were left by the wayside. That
  1051. 38:08is something that we are poorly set up
  1052. 38:12for. And I don't know, you know, I don't
  1053. 38:16know what kind of policy changes you
  1054. 38:18would need to do that, but that would be
  1055. 38:19that would be the way to to spark real
  1056. 38:22innovation. I I I think that Jed, like
  1057. 38:25we can riff on some ideas here, but like
  1058. 38:27one thing that immediately comes to mind
  1059. 38:29is that we just have to evaluate people
  1060. 38:32with those sorts of skill sets
  1061. 38:35differently than what we evaluate like
  1062. 38:38combat arms. Right? Now, that's
  1063. 38:40controversial. I'm probably going to get
  1064. 38:41a ton of push back on that, but like
  1065. 38:44soldiers and this is we're not the
  1066. 38:45Marine Corps. Like we're not a we're
  1067. 38:47army is a large we're talking about the
  1068. 38:48army. The army is a large organization,
  1069. 38:50right? And there's a lot of activities
  1070. 38:52like that smaller organizations don't do
  1071. 38:55and you know having a very robust
  1072. 38:57psychological operations element is part
  1073. 38:59of that right and so shooting well and
  1074. 39:02and and being a stud in physical fitness
  1075. 39:06and having like the institutional
  1076. 39:08training check marks to progress your
  1077. 39:11career that works for a huge mass of the
  1078. 39:14army but for really specialized career
  1079. 39:16fields like this where we're trying to
  1080. 39:19cultivate a different kind of product
  1081. 39:20that's going to help the army. I think
  1082. 39:22you have to evaluate people differently.
  1083. 39:24I think you have to do things like
  1084. 39:26lateral appointments. We're bringing in
  1085. 39:29like for example tech executives now and
  1086. 39:31making them lieutenant colonels. I mean
  1087. 39:32that generate a lot of controversy. For
  1088. 39:34me that's like a really smart move
  1089. 39:37because we're bringing people with skill
  1090. 39:38sets that the army really needs. And we
  1091. 39:40should do the same thing with fields
  1092. 39:41like psychological operations. We should
  1093. 39:44be reaching into places like Silicon
  1094. 39:46Valley, Hollywood, the art community,
  1095. 39:48and finding ways to to to recruit that
  1096. 39:52kind of talent and bring them in in the
  1097. 39:54in the service of the country. In that
  1098. 39:55regard, I guess what I'm getting as a
  1099. 39:57more flexible management of of talent,
  1100. 40:00strategic talent, right? that puts the
  1101. 40:03right type of people. We give them the
  1102. 40:05right kind of incentives maybe higher
  1103. 40:08pay uh to do these ne necessary
  1104. 40:11supporting functions be kind of my
  1105. 40:14thoughts there.
  1106. 40:15>> Yeah. Um give them so you know the tech
  1107. 40:18tech executives coming in that that is a
  1108. 40:20great first step. We don't really need
  1109. 40:22the top of the pyramid so much. We need
  1110. 40:24the folks who are you know more at the
  1111. 40:26bottom of the pyramid who are younger
  1112. 40:28and hungry. And if we can use that same
  1113. 40:31model there, we will have, you know, if
  1114. 40:33we can get board app developers who are
  1115. 40:35tired of producing, you know, new AI for
  1116. 40:39their bottled water company, um, and
  1117. 40:41instead give them the chance to to, you
  1118. 40:44know, do something that that's, um,
  1119. 40:47that's going to to control a fleet of
  1120. 40:50drones that, you know, is is going to be
  1121. 40:52used on the battlefield. You know,
  1122. 40:54they'll leap at the chance. That's
  1123. 40:55that's the kind of problem they love to
  1124. 40:57sink their teeth into. and then give
  1125. 40:58them the chance to do that innovation.
  1126. 41:02So, you know, the the Air Force had this
  1127. 41:03thing called Kessle Run where they
  1128. 41:05essentially, you know, got the the smart
  1129. 41:07guys who were already there and gave
  1130. 41:08them the chance to go off and do weird
  1131. 41:11on their own that that potentially
  1132. 41:12solved problems. And uh they developed,
  1133. 41:15you know, a huge amount of of great
  1134. 41:18innovative ideas that way. And you know,
  1135. 41:21if if we could have, you know, a a 100
  1136. 41:24kessle runs across, you know, the
  1137. 41:27military where each unit um is given the
  1138. 41:29flexibility to send some guides for
  1139. 41:32schools that that can't really be
  1140. 41:34justified to higher commands. You know,
  1141. 41:36why does this guy need a hacking school?
  1142. 41:38Well, because, you know, what we needed
  1143. 41:39to do is we needed to hack hack some
  1144. 41:41systems. But he's not a computer
  1145. 41:43operator. That's okay. We we don't need
  1146. 41:45we don't need somebody to, you know, do
  1147. 41:48this on these computer systems. We need
  1148. 41:49him to be able to to hack our internal
  1149. 41:52hardware so that it so it can function
  1150. 41:54more effectively. There is no way you
  1151. 41:56could possibly sell that. But that guy
  1152. 41:57will come up with a solution that will
  1153. 41:59fix the problems that the big
  1154. 42:02military-industrial complex is having is
  1155. 42:04going to charge you billions to do the
  1156. 42:06same thing. And they will do it far more
  1157. 42:08effectively.
  1158. 42:09>> Yeah. Um 100%. you know, and it's, you
  1159. 42:12know, there's the right to repair that's
  1160. 42:14talking about, you know, that you once
  1161. 42:15you buy it, you have the the the option
  1162. 42:18of doing whatever the hell you want with
  1163. 42:20that technology. The military has always
  1164. 42:22said that we have the right to to repair
  1165. 42:24on our own systems. We don't really um
  1166. 42:26they don't allow people to mess with
  1167. 42:28these, you know, these different bespoke
  1168. 42:30technologies. And the fact of the matter
  1169. 42:31is that that because our approval system
  1170. 42:33is so Byzantine and slow to process, we
  1171. 42:36have all these technologies that
  1172. 42:38everybody knows there are some pretty
  1173. 42:40simple solutions that will make things
  1174. 42:42work better. They could do them very
  1175. 42:44easily by the time it goes through all
  1176. 42:46of the steps necessary to allow that
  1177. 42:48change. You know, it's already 10 years
  1178. 42:50out of date and you don't you don't need
  1179. 42:52that change anymore. If we give people
  1180. 42:54the opportunity to do that, you know, on
  1181. 42:56the battlefield and give them the
  1182. 42:58resources, tools, training to do it and
  1183. 43:01the latitude to accomplish it, they will
  1184. 43:03stay in for the challenge.
  1185. 43:05>> Yeah, man. And there's just as you
  1186. 43:07talking about that, another thing came
  1187. 43:08to mind and that's the idea of risk.
  1188. 43:10Like we have to be willing to make bets
  1189. 43:13in activities like psychological
  1190. 43:15operations, right? And that's tough.
  1191. 43:17It's easy for me to say that now that
  1192. 43:19I'm no longer in uniform and I'm sitting
  1193. 43:20here in the comfort of my studio, right?
  1194. 43:23Risk has to be part of it and I work in
  1195. 43:26tech and you know making bets and
  1196. 43:29breaking things and iterating is like
  1197. 43:32that's how you do it. That's how it gets
  1198. 43:33done. If you don't do that, you're going
  1199. 43:34to be really your your startup is not
  1200. 43:36going to get past stealth mode, right? I
  1201. 43:38view the activities like psychological
  1202. 43:39operations, cyerspace, we have to to get
  1203. 43:43to really get that innovation to emerge
  1204. 43:45from that. You have to you have
  1205. 43:48commanders have to be willing to take
  1206. 43:49risks, right? The acquisition systems
  1207. 43:52that support it have to be built for big
  1208. 43:55bets. And yeah, we may have some
  1209. 43:57expensive misses, but it's going to be a
  1210. 44:00hell of a lot less expensive than
  1211. 44:01casualties or failed military operations
  1212. 44:04further down the road. And this
  1213. 44:06conversation about this stuff can go all
  1214. 44:08all on all day. Congress, you know,
  1215. 44:10operating from continuing resolution to
  1216. 44:12continuing resolution. It makes it
  1217. 44:14really difficult for commanders to make
  1218. 44:15bets, right?
  1219. 44:17>> Um, [clears throat] every mistake being
  1220. 44:19on social media, the the New York Times
  1221. 44:22front page makes it hard to to to make
  1222. 44:25bets. World War II, it was a very
  1223. 44:28different type of environment than the
  1224. 44:29one we're in today. And uh I think that
  1225. 44:32these sorts of reforms that you and I
  1226. 44:33are talking about require very good
  1227. 44:36leadership. Leaders who are willing to
  1228. 44:38put it on the line and and try new
  1229. 44:40things and and to be willing to fail.
  1230. 44:42>> So we were just talking about risk. And
  1231. 44:44it occurred to me that as an institution
  1232. 44:46because we're unwilling to take, you
  1233. 44:48know, the small risk and we're unwilling
  1234. 44:49to, you know, let a company or battalion
  1235. 44:52commander make, you know, stupid
  1236. 44:54decisions that that, you know, might end
  1237. 44:56up on the New York Times and look silly.
  1238. 44:59um we end up taking huge risks that we
  1239. 45:01know we are likely to lose like you know
  1240. 45:03continue bad uh betting on uh platforms
  1241. 45:07and capabilities that we know are way
  1242. 45:09too expensive to sustain over a long
  1243. 45:11fight and that that's an an interesting
  1244. 45:15difference that in some ways is one of
  1245. 45:18the big differences between the Russian
  1246. 45:20military and the Ukrainian military in
  1247. 45:21the current conflict. the Russian
  1248. 45:24military, they are very riskaverse at at
  1249. 45:29low levels at the you know the the
  1250. 45:31junior officer level because you know
  1251. 45:33the junior officer knows that if he does
  1252. 45:35not do exactly what his what he has been
  1253. 45:38ordered he's going to be sent to the
  1254. 45:39front lines in the place of the guys
  1255. 45:41that you know he can direct their on
  1256. 45:42suicide missions. So he has a choice you
  1257. 45:44know he can die or he can let his men
  1258. 45:46die and most of the time they are more
  1259. 45:47than happy to let their men die. that
  1260. 45:49that is a very riskaverse culture you
  1261. 45:51know at the lowest levels but at the
  1262. 45:52highest levels what that means is they
  1263. 45:54will do things like Bakmood well they
  1264. 45:56will they will send you know 20,000
  1265. 45:59people to their death you know literal
  1266. 46:02deaths not you know to potential deaths
  1267. 46:03but they will have 20,000 casualties to
  1268. 46:05take over a parking lot because no one
  1269. 46:08will say that this is a stupid move
  1270. 46:10whereas the Ukrainian military there is
  1271. 46:12a high acceptance of the chance of you
  1272. 46:16know smaller units making risky
  1273. 46:19decisions that may end up coming coming
  1274. 46:20out poorly. And you you've even seen
  1275. 46:22some very large scale examples of this.
  1276. 46:25You've you've had situations like, you
  1277. 46:27know, Marople where the unit stayed in
  1278. 46:30Marople well after it made any strategic
  1279. 46:33sense and they were very publicly you
  1280. 46:35know directed get out. We are not going
  1281. 46:38to this is not sustainable. But they
  1282. 46:40kept fighting and kept fighting and kept
  1283. 46:42fighting despite you know despite or
  1284. 46:44they were allowed to lose that small
  1285. 46:46bet.
  1286. 46:48but uh because they thought it was
  1287. 46:50important. Who knows? You know, maybe
  1288. 46:51maybe their strategic senses were, you
  1289. 46:55know, more correct than than the uh the
  1290. 46:58hierarchy as a whole. It's hard to say
  1291. 47:00from now, but the Ukrainian army has
  1292. 47:03largely accepted that units are allowed
  1293. 47:04to take the risk that they need and they
  1294. 47:08have had some big su successes and some,
  1295. 47:11you know, and some small losses that
  1296. 47:12way. Whereas a Russian army has not been
  1297. 47:15allowed that. So they've had they've had
  1298. 47:17many fewer small losses or at least like
  1299. 47:20unplanned losses. They uh but they have
  1300. 47:23had the whole strategy has has
  1301. 47:27>> [snorts]
  1302. 47:27>> utterly collapsed and they have been
  1303. 47:28unable to you know accomplish these
  1304. 47:31strategic objectives that they thought
  1305. 47:33they could have in three days.
  1306. 47:35>> It's it's fascinating because you
  1307. 47:37described like some really good examples
  1308. 47:39of like taking tactical risk, right? And
  1309. 47:41there are other kinds of risk too,
  1310. 47:43right? Like there are let's a guy or gal
  1311. 47:46who has a background or has a specific
  1312. 47:50technical skill set that could be put to
  1313. 47:52good use in some of these SCOP or cyber
  1314. 47:57who maybe has a criminal record right
  1315. 48:00they can't pass like the basic ascension
  1316. 48:02they can't get a security clearance
  1317. 48:04right we should I mean the question is
  1318. 48:07should we be taking a bet on these
  1319. 48:09people saying hey we'll bring them in
  1320. 48:10we'll give them some discipline we'll
  1321. 48:11give them some structure
  1322. 48:13and we're going to we're going to
  1323. 48:15absolutely tap into that those those
  1324. 48:17skill sets, right? Acquisitions, like
  1325. 48:20you know,
  1326. 48:22I I I get a chuckle every time I say,
  1327. 48:24"Oh, you know, making that small
  1328. 48:26investment, it's a risk because it may
  1329. 48:27not work." It's like, "Well, bro, my
  1330. 48:28guy, like, we've been putting F-35
  1331. 48:31programs [laughter]
  1332. 48:33[gasps]
  1333. 48:34with long, you know, uh, program cycles,
  1334. 48:36right? and we've been dropped all this
  1335. 48:38money for a very, you know, with all
  1336. 48:41this inefficiency. Like, you're you're
  1337. 48:43willing to make that bet, but you're not
  1338. 48:44willing to make a bet on a smaller piece
  1339. 48:47of technology that maybe we have to go
  1340. 48:48through multiple iterations to get
  1341. 48:50right. It I I think it's I think it
  1342. 48:52really comes back, Jed, just to
  1343. 48:53strategic culture in the entire
  1344. 48:55institution.
  1345. 48:56>> And if we're going to try to if we're
  1346. 48:58going to repeat the same mistake, the
  1347. 49:00same things that we've done for years
  1348. 49:01and years and years, we're going to get
  1349. 49:02the same out outcome. We have to try
  1350. 49:04different things. the promotion system.
  1351. 49:08Here's a great example. The the two
  1352. 49:10times and you're out, right? If you
  1353. 49:11don't get promoted in two cycles, they
  1354. 49:13kick you out.
  1355. 49:14>> Like, okay, well, maybe this guy or gal
  1356. 49:17does really good things at this level of
  1357. 49:19their career at this particular rank and
  1358. 49:22they're happy with doing that, but
  1359. 49:25because they don't hit the right army
  1360. 49:26schools, we're going to kick them out.
  1361. 49:28They getting promoted in two years.
  1362. 49:30Let's take a bet.
  1363. 49:31>> Yeah. maybe this person can do really
  1364. 49:33good at this level and they can stay at
  1365. 49:35this level for the rest of their career,
  1366. 49:36right? Those are the sorts of things I I
  1367. 49:39think that like are also related to risk
  1368. 49:41as well.
  1369. 49:42>> It's a a huge systemic problem
  1370. 49:44throughout throughout the military is
  1371. 49:46that that zero tolerance for risk. It it
  1372. 49:50doesn't just mean it's not something you
  1373. 49:52can just just wipe away, you know, with
  1374. 49:54a with a single, you know, a single
  1375. 49:57order. you have to to enable people to
  1376. 50:01know that at the lowest levels they're
  1377. 50:02going to be supported when they make
  1378. 50:03mistakes and when things go wrong. And
  1379. 50:07we
  1380. 50:08>> don't, you know, we not only don't do
  1381. 50:10that, we've gotten worse about doing
  1382. 50:11that lately.
  1383. 50:12>> Yeah.
  1384. 50:13>> Um, you know, people have seen very
  1385. 50:17well- reggarded professionals flipped on
  1386. 50:19their ass for for things that that
  1387. 50:23before wouldn't have even been seen as a
  1388. 50:25risk.
  1389. 50:25>> Yeah. For Yeah. I'll say it
  1390. 50:28for you. [laughter]
  1391. 50:30[gasps]
  1392. 50:30>> Yeah,
  1393. 50:31>> Jed, I I wanna I wanna talk a little bit
  1394. 50:34more about your time because we've
  1395. 50:35talked about like the Ghost Army and
  1396. 50:37we've talked about Midway and we've
  1397. 50:38talked a lot of theory about strategic
  1398. 50:40culture. Let's bring it back to your
  1399. 50:42personal experience because you as a
  1400. 50:44sigh oper you were on the ground in
  1401. 50:48Iraq. You were practicing you were
  1402. 50:51executing these types of operations and
  1403. 50:53we want to take a closer look at that so
  1404. 50:56that we can kind of get a sense of like
  1405. 50:58on the implementation side like what
  1406. 51:00your experiences were. You got to Iraq
  1407. 51:02during a period of time where there was
  1408. 51:04great upheaval in the country. I think
  1409. 51:06you said you were there in ' 04, right?
  1410. 51:08In Baghdad.
  1411. 51:09>> Yeah. So, so we came in um right after,
  1412. 51:13you know, I was in a reserve unit, a
  1413. 51:14scop reserve unit at the time, and we
  1414. 51:17replaced the uh the initial active duty
  1415. 51:20teams, the night battalion teams that
  1416. 51:21that had been on the ground. And so, you
  1417. 51:24know, I've got a t-shirt that says, you
  1418. 51:25know, Iraq, you know, we were winning
  1419. 51:27when I left. And the reason I wear it is
  1420. 51:29because that was what the team before me
  1421. 51:30said. You know, they they said, "Hey,
  1422. 51:32look, this is this is all great now, but
  1423. 51:34in a couple of months, it's going to
  1424. 51:37collapse." And they were right.
  1425. 51:39It it's exactly what happened.
  1426. 51:42>> Yeah. What were the key political
  1427. 51:44security and social forces that were
  1428. 51:45driving that instability that that that
  1429. 51:48came when you got to Baghdad?
  1430. 51:50>> So, and I'm only speaking for for
  1431. 51:53myself, of course, when I say these
  1432. 51:55things, but I I think the big problem
  1433. 51:57was a disconnect at the larger scale
  1434. 52:01from what was happening at the smaller
  1435. 52:03scale. So at the larger scale, you had
  1436. 52:05all these people in in the the green
  1437. 52:07zone and the CPA who were making a lot
  1438. 52:10of decisions that had huge impact on
  1439. 52:12what was going on in the country and
  1440. 52:14they weren't talking to they weren't
  1441. 52:16talking to the folks um on the ground
  1442. 52:19either, you know, either Iraqis or US
  1443. 52:21forces on the ground. you know, the
  1444. 52:23communication was all one way. And what
  1445. 52:25that meant is that you had had a lot of
  1446. 52:26decisions that were being made without
  1447. 52:28feedback and without an understanding of
  1448. 52:30what the consequences, but you had
  1449. 52:31things like the debathification
  1450. 52:33process where they decided that, you
  1451. 52:36know, not only were they going to
  1452. 52:37disband the army, which is crazy in and
  1453. 52:39of itself. You're going to take all of
  1454. 52:40these people with skill at arms and, you
  1455. 52:43know, a facility for for conducting
  1456. 52:45operations, and you're going to turn
  1457. 52:46them loose with no money and source of
  1458. 52:49income. you know, not the uh the the
  1459. 52:51wisest course of action. But then you
  1460. 52:52had the debatification where you took
  1461. 52:54all the people who had been forced to be
  1462. 52:57in the VAT party in order to, you know,
  1463. 53:00to actually administer, you know, the
  1464. 53:02country and he told them that none of
  1465. 53:04you were going to be able to maintain
  1466. 53:05your positions. And so that meant that,
  1467. 53:07you know, the principal of the of, you
  1468. 53:09know, the local, you know, elementary
  1469. 53:11school, he was out on his ass and half
  1470. 53:13the teachers were out on his ass because
  1471. 53:15they had they had been forced to become,
  1472. 53:17you know, party members in order to
  1473. 53:18advance up the hierarchy. Not only did
  1474. 53:20that leave a problem where you had all
  1475. 53:22of this this, you know, the people
  1476. 53:24actually knew how to administer things
  1477. 53:26were suddenly taken out of the picture,
  1478. 53:28but then they had to be replaced from
  1479. 53:29somewhere. And there's there weren't all
  1480. 53:32that many good sources of, you know,
  1481. 53:35institutions, training, and influence
  1482. 53:37that could start populating where all
  1483. 53:39the people are coming from. The one
  1484. 53:41place that really had a good
  1485. 53:43infrastructure and a lot of ready people
  1486. 53:45who they could, you know, organize and
  1487. 53:46get into the right places was Iran. We
  1488. 53:49handed it to. they had the opportunity
  1489. 53:51to ensure that that uh things went their
  1490. 53:54way because we were we were busy, you
  1491. 53:58know, making these very ideological
  1492. 54:00choices
  1493. 54:01>> at the top.
  1494. 54:03>> And the guys on the ground knew this the
  1495. 54:05whole time. They were saying, "Hey,
  1496. 54:06look, these cops are corrupt, but they
  1497. 54:09can be they can be managed, you know,
  1498. 54:12with with this people. These are the
  1499. 54:13specific individuals who are, you know,
  1500. 54:15going to be a problem." That information
  1501. 54:16does not go up to hire. Instead they say
  1502. 54:18look you got to keep those people
  1503. 54:19because they have connections through
  1504. 54:21this chain. The folks who were connected
  1505. 54:25in you know in and a organized system
  1506. 54:29were able to to maintain their influence
  1507. 54:31and grow that influence. While the folks
  1508. 54:34who were you know basically honest um
  1509. 54:36just trying to get you know you know get
  1510. 54:38through the day. they were the ones who
  1511. 54:40were the the the greatest victims of all
  1512. 54:42these purges and political political
  1513. 54:44purges, firings and scandals and
  1514. 54:48opportunities. So you had you had the
  1515. 54:50honest cop who was kicked out because he
  1516. 54:53had you know um because somebody else
  1517. 54:55wanted his apartment and you had the the
  1518. 54:58cop who was you know behold him to Iran
  1519. 55:01and everybody knew it who could advance
  1520. 55:03up the hierarchy step by step. What we
  1521. 55:06did there was a lot of the reverse of
  1522. 55:10what we did in after World War II. It
  1523. 55:13was a situation where we had no show
  1524. 55:16trials. We had no trials where we we
  1525. 55:19gave people the sense of we're going to
  1526. 55:21punish the the the criminals because
  1527. 55:24nobody was actually punished. They just
  1528. 55:25lost their influence and job. But of
  1529. 55:27course, to somebody in power, that's
  1530. 55:29enough of a that's enough of a a uh of
  1531. 55:32an offense. And at the same time you had
  1532. 55:35the the potential for for corrupt
  1533. 55:39structures infiltrating you know that
  1534. 55:41government because all the administrator
  1535. 55:43administrators had to be replaced.
  1536. 55:45>> So we we took the worst of both worlds.
  1537. 55:48>> Yeah.
  1538. 55:49>> Um
  1539. 55:49>> and that really became a it became a
  1540. 55:51witch's brew man uh for for violence.
  1541. 55:55You know the violence that you and your
  1542. 55:58teammates saw on the streets of Baghdad.
  1543. 56:00I mean it has its roots in what you just
  1544. 56:02described. I mean there would have been
  1545. 56:04violence anyway, right? Because we
  1546. 56:07invaded another country and people were
  1547. 56:09going to push back on that. You know,
  1548. 56:11they did during the first phase and of
  1549. 56:13course as we all know during the latter,
  1550. 56:16you know, the the bulk of the conflict,
  1551. 56:18we had an insurgency. But the things
  1552. 56:20you're describing, I think just put fuel
  1553. 56:22to the fire. You know, it just made the
  1554. 56:25problem 10 times harder. What what part
  1555. 56:28of Baghdad did you and your teammates
  1556. 56:32operate in?
  1557. 56:33>> So when I started out, I was operating
  1558. 56:36in in the green zone. We were the
  1559. 56:38smallest team. We had, you know, two
  1560. 56:39people. I was the uh you know, in the uh
  1561. 56:42in the detachment. They looked at all
  1562. 56:44the guys who had experience and they
  1563. 56:45decided, you know, these guys are
  1564. 56:47technically and tactically proficient
  1565. 56:48and then we still have, you know, we
  1566. 56:51still need one more. Well, you can do
  1567. 56:54the least damage here. And so they they
  1568. 56:57put me and another guy, you know,
  1569. 56:58another weirdo who um who they none of
  1570. 57:01the other teams wanted and they gave us
  1571. 57:03the the AO that included the green zone
  1572. 57:06and the couple of neighborhoods right
  1573. 57:07around it and a couple of neighborhoods
  1574. 57:08that were actually inside it, you know,
  1575. 57:10where there were Iraqis living in the
  1576. 57:11green zone. Um that was an an
  1577. 57:14interesting an interesting zone to work
  1578. 57:16through. Spent the uh the the first
  1579. 57:19couple months doing that and it was it
  1580. 57:21was it was interesting, but there wasn't
  1581. 57:23a whole lot happening because of course
  1582. 57:24screens. Then after that, uh, once other
  1583. 57:27units started requesting SCAP teams,
  1584. 57:30that's when they they farmed farmed me
  1585. 57:32out. They put together a threeperson
  1586. 57:34team with, uh, with a couple of guys who
  1587. 57:36were, you know, they hoped would would
  1588. 57:38make up for the for the, you know, the
  1589. 57:40the failings that I had there. We had an
  1590. 57:44area that that included actually um, you
  1591. 57:46know, Yusf, Madia, um, those areas. And
  1592. 57:50we were we were kind of the the the the
  1593. 57:53leftover team that was given the
  1594. 57:55assignments, you know, for to to make up
  1595. 57:59the request that they couldn't they
  1596. 58:01couldn't ignore, but they didn't want to
  1597. 58:02devote one of the better teams to
  1598. 58:06>> I mean you talk about Yusf Mahammudia,
  1599. 58:09those are very dangerous areas and and
  1600. 58:12so during that time uh what I would see,
  1601. 58:16you know, in the Shia political
  1602. 58:19arena, we started to see, you know, the
  1603. 58:21rise of of Mktad al-Assad's, you know,
  1604. 58:25influence and some of the things that he
  1605. 58:27did and said led to a lot of violence
  1606. 58:30from some of the um Shia groups. And
  1607. 58:34then you had like this Sunni population
  1608. 58:37that coexisted there and, you know, a
  1609. 58:39couple years later like that area would
  1610. 58:41be like ground zero for the civil war.
  1611. 58:43Some horrible sectarian violence. So
  1612. 58:46they had you knocking around in a pretty
  1613. 58:48damn dangerous area and you and of
  1614. 58:50course being a sci-fer you're not the
  1615. 58:51kind you're you're not going to be
  1616. 58:52spending all your time like on the FOB.
  1617. 58:54You're going to be out in the populace
  1618. 58:55doing your work. Could you kind of give
  1619. 58:57us a sense of like the dayto-day for
  1620. 58:59your team when you were kind of
  1621. 59:01operating and kind of what were sort of
  1622. 59:02things were you responsible for and what
  1623. 59:04you were doing in those areas?
  1624. 59:06>> So and this would apply to you know both
  1625. 59:08of of my my deployments as a cyber in
  1626. 59:11Iraq. you know, the the one in in you
  1627. 59:14know, 2004 when I was with the reserve
  1628. 59:16unit and then the active one where we
  1629. 59:18were, you know, a part of ninth
  1630. 59:20battalion um later on. Um and what our
  1631. 59:24daytoday, you know, both of those
  1632. 59:26situations was, you know, the the first
  1633. 59:28thing we we do, we'd come into a new
  1634. 59:30team, um supporting a new unit, we'd
  1635. 59:32have to sell ourselves to to the
  1636. 59:35commander. And then we would usually be
  1637. 59:37given, you know, the opportunity to kind
  1638. 59:39of set our own missions so that that we
  1639. 59:42could enable we could enable the
  1640. 59:43functions that they have been
  1641. 59:44accomplishing with a you know, with
  1642. 59:46greater resistance. What that would
  1643. 59:47usually mean is we would get on the
  1644. 59:51ground um usually with, you know, they'd
  1645. 59:54already planned the mission and the
  1646. 59:56operation. We would go out with with the
  1647. 59:58folks to accomplish that. We'd have we
  1648. 1:00:01would not necessarily have sources that
  1649. 1:00:03we needed tailored for for that
  1650. 1:00:06operation, whatever it was. Sometimes we
  1651. 1:00:07didn't have interpreters with us. We'd
  1652. 1:00:09have to borrow somebody. There's there's
  1653. 1:00:11missions that we went on where um
  1654. 1:00:13literally, you know, we were getting our
  1655. 1:00:15interpreter, you know, interpreters
  1656. 1:00:17through talking to the kids there and
  1657. 1:00:19finding the kid who spoke English and
  1658. 1:00:20and you know, using him to get things
  1659. 1:00:22done. You know, if we had, you know,
  1660. 1:00:23interpreter resources, we would record
  1661. 1:00:26messages on a loudspeaker. But most of
  1662. 1:00:29what we were doing was face to face
  1663. 1:00:32where we were going out and talking to
  1664. 1:00:35the locals, breaking the ice and and
  1665. 1:00:38getting a sense of what was happening in
  1666. 1:00:40that community. And sometimes that would
  1667. 1:00:42uh very directly enable operations. One
  1668. 1:00:45of the first first operations I did when
  1669. 1:00:48they when they started farming us out
  1670. 1:00:50was a cordon and search operation. And
  1671. 1:00:52we rolled up on this village. They had a
  1672. 1:00:54planned cordon and search. We recorded
  1673. 1:00:57some messages and started going out and
  1674. 1:00:59talking, knocking on doors saying, "Hey,
  1675. 1:01:00these are the rules that that we've been
  1676. 1:01:02given. You know, you can have one rifle,
  1677. 1:01:04but we're looking for for military
  1678. 1:01:06weapons. We're not, you know, we're just
  1679. 1:01:08we're not looking for the the one rifle
  1680. 1:01:11that every household is allowed to have.
  1681. 1:01:13You know, exactly the rules that that
  1682. 1:01:14were given by the uh you know, by the
  1683. 1:01:17commander before this operation, who I
  1684. 1:01:18hadn't built a whole lot of of trust and
  1685. 1:01:21communication with before. and going
  1686. 1:01:23knocking on these knocking on all these
  1687. 1:01:25doors, talking to the people face to
  1688. 1:01:26face. Slowly they're getting an an an
  1689. 1:01:30understanding of why all these Americans
  1690. 1:01:32have suddenly descended on their
  1691. 1:01:33village. It's not because there's a bad
  1692. 1:01:35guy in the middle and they're just going
  1693. 1:01:36to start shooting things up. They're
  1694. 1:01:38they're doing a standard search and
  1695. 1:01:41they're being, you know, straightforward
  1696. 1:01:43and they're talking to us. And so
  1697. 1:01:45there's a a greater comfort of that.
  1698. 1:01:47Sometimes too comfortable. One of the
  1699. 1:01:49the things that happened on that
  1700. 1:01:51particular operation is I was talking to
  1701. 1:01:53a bunch of farmers on the outskirts of
  1702. 1:01:55the village. They had, you know, the the
  1703. 1:01:57fields behind him and, you know, talking
  1704. 1:02:00to this guy and, you know, we're going
  1705. 1:02:02through, we're just looking for military
  1706. 1:02:03weapons. We're not looking for the the
  1707. 1:02:05average family weapons. And you can have
  1708. 1:02:06one one weapon per household. And so
  1709. 1:02:08this farmer says, "One weapon per
  1710. 1:02:09household? That, you know, that's not
  1711. 1:02:11really a problem." And he lights up and
  1712. 1:02:12you see the other farmers looking
  1713. 1:02:14around, they're going like, "Oh shit."
  1714. 1:02:15You know, their eyes widen a little bit.
  1715. 1:02:17And the guy and the guy says, "Hey,
  1716. 1:02:19great." And he walks out into the fields
  1717. 1:02:21and goes out about, you know, halfway,
  1718. 1:02:25you know, into, you know, unmarked
  1719. 1:02:27portion of the fields. And he reaches
  1720. 1:02:28down and he and he does something and
  1721. 1:02:30then he comes back up and he's got, you
  1722. 1:02:32know, his one rifle with him. Hey, you
  1723. 1:02:34know, our our household has just one
  1724. 1:02:35weapon. And the security guy that I was
  1725. 1:02:38with, he just looked at me and I looked
  1726. 1:02:40at him and he walked right out after
  1727. 1:02:43where that farmer was and opened up this
  1728. 1:02:47this cache where the other local
  1729. 1:02:49households there had put their AKs.
  1730. 1:02:52>> Mhm.
  1731. 1:02:52>> And um at that point, you know, we
  1732. 1:02:55talked to the commander say, "Hey, this
  1733. 1:02:56is what we found." And they're going,
  1734. 1:02:58"So, who's whose rifles are these?"
  1735. 1:03:00Well, there's, you know, five rifles.
  1736. 1:03:02There's probably six houses right there,
  1737. 1:03:04but nobody wants to claim them. And so
  1738. 1:03:06they say, "Okay, well this is this is
  1739. 1:03:07the cache and they take all of those
  1740. 1:03:09weapons." That same operation, some some
  1741. 1:03:12of the the people came up to me after
  1742. 1:03:14and said, "Look, one of the the
  1743. 1:03:16commanders here, he took a a rifle that
  1744. 1:03:18is not military. It's just an old he he
  1745. 1:03:22said it was a uh a gun for birds." And
  1746. 1:03:24he kept saying it was Turkish and
  1747. 1:03:25eventually figured out it was like a
  1748. 1:03:26Turkish shotgun, you know, expensive
  1749. 1:03:28Turkish shotgun. Um, and we would like
  1750. 1:03:31to trade that for, you know, for for one
  1751. 1:03:34of the AKs that we were allowed to keep
  1752. 1:03:35because, you know, the Turkish shotgun
  1753. 1:03:37is is uh, you know, vamp of valued
  1754. 1:03:40family heirloom. And they wanted to talk
  1755. 1:03:42to the uh to the commander about that.
  1756. 1:03:45So went with this whole troop of these
  1757. 1:03:47guys, you know, these Iraqis behind me,
  1758. 1:03:49went to talk to the commander and and
  1759. 1:03:51explained the situation and the the
  1760. 1:03:52commander, you know, I I started to say
  1761. 1:03:55what I was going to say and then, you
  1762. 1:03:57know, he gets mad and kind of leaves and
  1763. 1:03:58the first ar going and
  1764. 1:04:02explain the situation to the first
  1765. 1:04:03sergeant saying, "Look, they don't want
  1766. 1:04:05they're not asking for more weapons.
  1767. 1:04:08They're not asking for for military
  1768. 1:04:10grade weapons, sir. they just want the
  1769. 1:04:11shotgun back, you know, or at least they
  1770. 1:04:13want um an acknowledgement of it or a
  1771. 1:04:15seat, something, anything. And the first
  1772. 1:04:17sergeant is looking at me, asking him to
  1773. 1:04:20tell his commander that, you know, he's
  1774. 1:04:22grabbing a souvenir um rather than
  1775. 1:04:25actually conducting an operation. And
  1776. 1:04:28you know, he's getting he's caught in
  1777. 1:04:29the middle. Um it was a really bad
  1778. 1:04:31situation for that first sergeant. It
  1779. 1:04:33was a, you know, a bad situation for the
  1780. 1:04:36local populace and it created a lot of
  1781. 1:04:39distrust with that that unit with with
  1782. 1:04:42me. And at that point, you know, when I
  1783. 1:04:45started that operation, I was the the
  1784. 1:04:47team leader for the threeperson team. I
  1785. 1:04:49was demoted on the radio to assistant
  1786. 1:04:51team leader right after that because
  1787. 1:04:53they called back to the they called back
  1788. 1:04:55to our detachment commander and he
  1789. 1:04:57called us on, you know, separate radio
  1790. 1:04:58frequency and told me to step down. And
  1791. 1:05:01uh
  1792. 1:05:02>> I mean I'm I'm sorry Jedhas. I'm I'm
  1793. 1:05:05reacting to this. It's like
  1794. 1:05:08that is such a in the big scheme of
  1795. 1:05:10things that is such a nothing burger. I
  1796. 1:05:13mean it's just a I mean
  1797. 1:05:16it's it's incionable to me that such a
  1798. 1:05:19drastic action would be taken over
  1799. 1:05:21something that is a com is is I don't
  1800. 1:05:24know. It was like it's like it was like
  1801. 1:05:25a common thing that was asked of us when
  1802. 1:05:27we were on the ground during those days
  1803. 1:05:28about the the ability to keep one weapon
  1804. 1:05:30and uh it was almost like a common
  1805. 1:05:33courtesy. Can I keep this because it's a
  1806. 1:05:34family heirloom. It's a shotgun.
  1807. 1:05:37>> Mhm.
  1808. 1:05:38>> It's crazy.
  1809. 1:05:38>> It's not Yeah. It's not anything.
  1810. 1:05:41>> Yeah.
  1811. 1:05:41>> But it uh it was a small thing and you
  1812. 1:05:45know the picture for us it was you know
  1813. 1:05:47that that one that one shotgun isn't
  1814. 1:05:50going to do anything um to the overall
  1815. 1:05:53operation.
  1816. 1:05:54you know, that village was way off in
  1817. 1:05:57the boonies and, you know, that was
  1818. 1:05:59probably the first time they had been
  1819. 1:06:01visited in in months and, you know, they
  1820. 1:06:03probably weren't visited again for, you
  1821. 1:06:05know, six more months, you know, until
  1822. 1:06:06the next rotation had had already come
  1823. 1:06:08in. But what a difference that made to
  1824. 1:06:11the families there. They had an example
  1825. 1:06:14of, you know, what the US was all about
  1826. 1:06:16right there. And I like now to think
  1827. 1:06:20that what they saw was not the same kind
  1828. 1:06:23of corruption that they saw with the
  1829. 1:06:25with the army before with Saddam's army.
  1830. 1:06:27that they saw that, you know, they could
  1831. 1:06:30raise concerns and people would listen
  1832. 1:06:32and that, you know, NCOs's could
  1833. 1:06:35challenge the commanders. Um, and that
  1834. 1:06:38moreover, you know, when the people came
  1835. 1:06:40up in a in a huge mob and challenged the
  1836. 1:06:43the commander of the operation instead
  1837. 1:06:44of opening fire, arresting anyone or
  1838. 1:06:46something like that, he stormed off back
  1839. 1:06:48into his, you know, his Bradley in a
  1840. 1:06:51huff looking embarrassed and we left
  1841. 1:06:54shortly there afterfter. They didn't get
  1842. 1:06:55what they wanted, but what they also saw
  1843. 1:06:57is that that, you know, we weren't the
  1844. 1:06:59same kind of people that they had been
  1845. 1:07:00told we were. I like to think that.
  1846. 1:07:03>> Yeah.
  1847. 1:07:03>> But what I also know is what they they
  1848. 1:07:05saw is that that even if we weren't the
  1849. 1:07:09people that they had been told we were,
  1850. 1:07:12we weren't necessarily heroes either.
  1851. 1:07:14>> Yeah.
  1852. 1:07:15>> And we weren't we weren't necessarily
  1853. 1:07:17going to do things, you know, as much by
  1854. 1:07:19the book as we said.
  1855. 1:07:21>> Yeah.
  1856. 1:07:22>> So,
  1857. 1:07:22>> interesting. Interesting. I think one of
  1858. 1:07:24the things I wanted to ask you was, you
  1859. 1:07:26know, obviously media up until the
  1860. 1:07:30invasion was state controlled, right?
  1861. 1:07:32The the central the central the central
  1862. 1:07:34governing the regime controlled media.
  1863. 1:07:37But then when you know the invasion took
  1864. 1:07:39place and uh we started to see kind of
  1865. 1:07:43an emergence of a of a new media
  1866. 1:07:46ecosystem and you were probably there
  1867. 1:07:50starting engagements with with people at
  1868. 1:07:53radio stations, TV stations, like what
  1869. 1:07:56was that like as these folks were
  1870. 1:08:00starting to exercise probably a lot more
  1871. 1:08:03freedom than they had in the past? What
  1872. 1:08:05was that like to be part of that whole
  1873. 1:08:07process? Like were these folks excited
  1874. 1:08:09about that or I suspect it was probably
  1875. 1:08:11dangerous too?
  1876. 1:08:13>> There was a um there was a lot of
  1877. 1:08:16feeling each other out in both
  1878. 1:08:17directions. So the Iraqis had to know
  1879. 1:08:21what we really wanted. You know, we
  1880. 1:08:23would go in there and tell them, "Hey,
  1881. 1:08:24look, you know, you can broadcast
  1882. 1:08:25whatever you want. Um you're free now.
  1883. 1:08:28we would like to buy you some airtime or
  1884. 1:08:30we're going to fix this radio station up
  1885. 1:08:32for you and you know in return we'd like
  1886. 1:08:34you to to you know broadcast some
  1887. 1:08:36messages of support but we're not going
  1888. 1:08:37to you know force you to do that. And at
  1889. 1:08:41the same time you know what they were
  1890. 1:08:43anticipating and planning upon uh a
  1891. 1:08:46level of of support that was not
  1892. 1:08:49necessarily forthcoming. So they were
  1893. 1:08:51expecting that they would get you know
  1894. 1:08:53handouts for for good stories and we
  1895. 1:08:57were unwilling to provide that you know
  1896. 1:08:58and so their journalists are going wait
  1897. 1:09:00a minute you know I can't make it just
  1898. 1:09:02on the salary as a journalist somebody
  1899. 1:09:04has to pay me to you know write the
  1900. 1:09:07stories that they want and that ended up
  1901. 1:09:10with some some complications and some
  1902. 1:09:12confusions. There was a a situation
  1903. 1:09:14where there was a New York Times story
  1904. 1:09:16that ended up in a big scandal. There
  1905. 1:09:18was a and this was after I left. It was,
  1906. 1:09:21you know, I suspect that that particular
  1907. 1:09:24company was probably contracting with
  1908. 1:09:26with our company headquarters back in
  1909. 1:09:28the rear. You know, I just wasn't aware
  1910. 1:09:30of it because I was, you know, uh on a
  1911. 1:09:32um on a tactical team. But anyways, that
  1912. 1:09:35company, they were found to be paying
  1913. 1:09:37stories, paying journalists for good
  1914. 1:09:39stories. And that made a lot of
  1915. 1:09:41headlines in the US. You know, big
  1916. 1:09:43scandal. The the Americans are producing
  1917. 1:09:45propaganda, all this kind of stuff. For
  1918. 1:09:46the Iraqis, that was an absolute nothing
  1919. 1:09:49burger. Um because that was how things
  1920. 1:09:51were done. You know, journalists would
  1921. 1:09:53be would be bribed a little bit. They'd
  1922. 1:09:55get a little bit of a gift to provide,
  1923. 1:09:58you know, a a story the same way that an
  1924. 1:10:00American uh journalist might be given a
  1925. 1:10:03press release and a a junket where he
  1926. 1:10:05gets to go to this this conference that
  1927. 1:10:07has really nice rooms, you know, and
  1928. 1:10:10gets gets paid there. It wasn't any
  1929. 1:10:12different to them. Um this was not a
  1930. 1:10:14situation where we were buying
  1931. 1:10:16journalists or threatening journalists
  1932. 1:10:17or anything like that. We were just just
  1933. 1:10:19making we were just accommodating
  1934. 1:10:20ourselves to local customs. Do you think
  1935. 1:10:23that the Iraqi Iraqis with whom you
  1936. 1:10:26engaged, not the members of the emerging
  1937. 1:10:29media space, but like the people who
  1938. 1:10:31lived in the communities, I mean, people
  1939. 1:10:33naturally are thirst for information?
  1940. 1:10:36Like especially when you're living in a
  1941. 1:10:37time of violence, right? Like what's
  1942. 1:10:39going on? Like I mean, were there were
  1943. 1:10:41the were the people that were in the
  1944. 1:10:43target audience, were they craving more
  1945. 1:10:45information? Were they were they
  1946. 1:10:46listening to these radio stations?
  1947. 1:10:48>> Absolutely.
  1948. 1:10:48>> And TV stations you guys were pouring
  1949. 1:10:50money into? So they were they were
  1950. 1:10:52looking for any source of information
  1951. 1:10:54that that they could get because you
  1952. 1:10:56know information in a war zone means the
  1953. 1:10:59difference between um you you know
  1954. 1:11:02playing in enough time or being right in
  1955. 1:11:05the middle of you know of a major
  1956. 1:11:06operation that you can't get out of it.
  1957. 1:11:08It's the difference between having a
  1958. 1:11:10business that works because you're
  1959. 1:11:11bringing products, you know, up to the
  1960. 1:11:14Syrian border and that border is open
  1961. 1:11:15versus it being closed and you've got a
  1962. 1:11:18truck full of of something that gets
  1963. 1:11:20stolen by the by the militia groups on
  1964. 1:11:22the way back. You know, it's
  1965. 1:11:24>> it's critically important. And so they
  1966. 1:11:26would go to whatever information source
  1967. 1:11:28they had. And there were there were some
  1968. 1:11:30real disasters there for us because we
  1969. 1:11:33did not have a good understanding or
  1970. 1:11:36ability to influence the media space
  1971. 1:11:38that they were operating in. One of the
  1972. 1:11:40examples is Abu Grae. You know, when the
  1973. 1:11:42investigation happened for Abu Grae, you
  1974. 1:11:44know, the report came out of what was
  1975. 1:11:46going on. The report came out internal
  1976. 1:11:48to the, you know, to the army channels
  1977. 1:11:50in somewhere like January. And by, you
  1978. 1:11:53know, April or May, that still had not
  1979. 1:11:56become public to anyone. um they were
  1980. 1:11:58still dragging their feet. They had you
  1981. 1:12:00know everybody knew that something was
  1982. 1:12:02happening inside you know the military
  1983. 1:12:04and eventually you know the western
  1984. 1:12:08journalist went with the story um and it
  1985. 1:12:11broke. When that broke the army you know
  1986. 1:12:14then uh took some more time to figure
  1987. 1:12:17out exactly what they were going to say
  1988. 1:12:18and how they were going to say it. And
  1989. 1:12:20um by the time that they finally made
  1990. 1:12:23their statements, the Iraqis had already
  1991. 1:12:25learned exactly what was happening at
  1992. 1:12:27Abra. What had happened is there was a a
  1993. 1:12:30TV station that had a Moroccan porn
  1994. 1:12:33movie that showed American leaders going
  1995. 1:12:37into a prison that was purported to be
  1996. 1:12:38Abu Grae and um raping women. Mhm.
  1997. 1:12:43>> It probably in that movie probably never
  1998. 1:12:46said that this was Abber Gray, but
  1999. 1:12:48probably I presume never never purported
  2000. 1:12:50to be news, but everybody took it as it
  2001. 1:12:53came out at about the same time. Some
  2002. 1:12:55programmer must have, you know, as the
  2003. 1:12:57Western papers were saying this was what
  2004. 1:12:58was happening. He said, "Hey, I've got a
  2005. 1:13:00I've got a movie that that will settle
  2006. 1:13:01this. We don't have anything else." And
  2007. 1:13:03so they put it on TV. The Iraqis all saw
  2008. 1:13:05that. And every time you tell the Iraqis
  2009. 1:13:07that, you know, no, this that's not what
  2010. 1:13:09was happening. This is what was really
  2011. 1:13:11going on. they don't believe you because
  2012. 1:13:13they saw it with their own eyes. The
  2013. 1:13:15only way that that was was actually
  2014. 1:13:17resolved is that what was going on with
  2015. 1:13:20that grave is you had a way overcrowded
  2016. 1:13:22prison because we were arresting a bunch
  2017. 1:13:23of people waiting for the Iraqi system
  2018. 1:13:25to release that.
  2019. 1:13:26>> Y
  2020. 1:13:26>> uh we were waiting for the Iraqi court
  2021. 1:13:28system to be set up so we could release
  2022. 1:13:30all these people who we had we had
  2023. 1:13:31brought in and most of them, you know,
  2024. 1:13:33didn't have anything that they had done
  2025. 1:13:34in particular. They were just being held
  2026. 1:13:36there warehoused until we could have the
  2027. 1:13:39courts go through the process. And so
  2028. 1:13:41you had an way overcrowded prison and
  2029. 1:13:42you had some abuses that happened in a
  2030. 1:13:44disciplined way. What happened was that
  2031. 1:13:47that uh when this made a scandal that
  2032. 1:13:52the leadership looked at it and decided
  2033. 1:13:54we have to solve this problem one way or
  2034. 1:13:56the other. The first thing they figured
  2035. 1:13:57out is that this is way overcrowded. We
  2036. 1:13:59have a lot of people who don't need to
  2037. 1:14:00be there. And they started releasing
  2038. 1:14:02them. They released you know about a
  2039. 1:14:03third of the population of Abu Grae.
  2040. 1:14:06Just you know got got them on buses, got
  2041. 1:14:08them out to the villages. As soon as
  2042. 1:14:09they did that, everything died down
  2043. 1:14:12because the Iraqis then were being told
  2044. 1:14:15exactly what had really happened in Abu
  2045. 1:14:17Grae. They were told, you know, these
  2046. 1:14:20are the things that were occurring here.
  2047. 1:14:22The Americans took me for no good reason
  2048. 1:14:24for my home and they kept me there for,
  2049. 1:14:27you know, for four or five months. But
  2050. 1:14:30what that also was is that that was not,
  2051. 1:14:33you know, there was no systematic
  2052. 1:14:35torture. There was no, you know, they
  2053. 1:14:37they weren't going out and and raping
  2054. 1:14:39women. There there were, you know,
  2055. 1:14:41almost no women, you know, who were in
  2056. 1:14:44Abu Grave. They dispelled the rumors
  2057. 1:14:46because there were trusted source of
  2058. 1:14:48information that came out and told the
  2059. 1:14:50people. It is ridiculous that that that
  2060. 1:14:54had to be that had to be the way that
  2061. 1:14:56that the situation resolved. you know,
  2062. 1:14:58one we we could have, you know, we could
  2063. 1:15:00have prevented the whole problem had we
  2064. 1:15:03just allowed these people who were being
  2065. 1:15:05held for no good reason to
  2066. 1:15:09to leave in the first place. Had the
  2067. 1:15:12commanders, you know, who were saying
  2068. 1:15:15there, you know, most of these people
  2069. 1:15:17are are not security risk and we've got
  2070. 1:15:19too many people. We need to do
  2071. 1:15:20something. Had they been allowed to to
  2072. 1:15:23release them originally, never would
  2073. 1:15:25have happened. Had uh the court system
  2074. 1:15:28been set up faster, never would have
  2075. 1:15:29happened. Had uh the report come out
  2076. 1:15:33through a thoroughly anodine method that
  2077. 1:15:35you know in January or February when the
  2078. 1:15:38hurricane had a chance to look at it,
  2079. 1:15:39said, "Okay, this is what actually
  2080. 1:15:41happened." And they released it
  2081. 1:15:42themselves. It never would have made a
  2082. 1:15:43big news story. It would have been the
  2083. 1:15:44Americans just saying something.
  2084. 1:15:46>> It would not have have made the kind of
  2085. 1:15:48impact that it had. But because we we
  2086. 1:15:52let events develop on their own, things
  2087. 1:15:54happen very very badly for the you know
  2088. 1:15:57the worst case scenario for the Iraqis,
  2089. 1:15:59for the Americans, for stability of the
  2090. 1:16:02country as a whole.
  2091. 1:16:03>> Yeah. I mean, this is fascinating, Jed,
  2092. 1:16:05because like the things you're
  2093. 1:16:06describing in terms of your dayto-day.
  2094. 1:16:08Let's go back to the Ghost Army. Let's
  2095. 1:16:10go back to to what you described there.
  2096. 1:16:12Those sorts of operations were very much
  2097. 1:16:14focused on an enemy army, getting the
  2098. 1:16:17enemy commander to do things with his
  2099. 1:16:19his military assets to create an
  2100. 1:16:22advantage that we would be able to
  2101. 1:16:24exploit, right? Military to military.
  2102. 1:16:27What you're describing is a completely
  2103. 1:16:29different type of psychological
  2104. 1:16:30operations. Now you're you're you guys
  2105. 1:16:32are certainly doing things to get after
  2106. 1:16:36an insurgency, which is not like you
  2107. 1:16:38can't see an insurgency from like
  2108. 1:16:39overhead shots, you know, from, you
  2109. 1:16:42know, insurgencies, they they they
  2110. 1:16:44operate in the dark, right? But you're
  2111. 1:16:47trying to influence them. You're also
  2112. 1:16:49dealing with the local populace. I mean
  2113. 1:16:52this is a completely different type of
  2114. 1:16:54thing than what you described in your
  2115. 1:16:56historical the historical context you
  2116. 1:16:59provide with the ghost army. These are
  2117. 1:17:01different types of like skill sets.
  2118. 1:17:03These is you have to like be there's no
  2119. 1:17:06like solid measurement that says like
  2120. 1:17:08this is how we're affecting the
  2121. 1:17:10population. And even if you could
  2122. 1:17:12measure it, it probably would take
  2123. 1:17:13freaking decades to do the things you
  2124. 1:17:15were trying to do in terms of
  2125. 1:17:17establishing trust in the Iraqi
  2126. 1:17:18government, establishing trust in the
  2127. 1:17:20Iraqi security forces, establishing
  2128. 1:17:22trust in American occupying forces.
  2129. 1:17:25Probably takes decades to do that stuff
  2130. 1:17:26with a very robust information program.
  2131. 1:17:30Sounds like to me that your threeperson
  2132. 1:17:32SCOP team almost had an impossible task
  2133. 1:17:35to pull off. the tactical, you know, a
  2134. 1:17:37threeperson SAP team did not have the
  2135. 1:17:39objective of stabilizing the country as
  2136. 1:17:42a whole. All they're doing is helping
  2137. 1:17:44that captain or that team leader to
  2138. 1:17:46control the battle space that he's
  2139. 1:17:48working in. Those those objectives, what
  2140. 1:17:51we're doing is is we've got a situation
  2141. 1:17:53where we have a whole bunch of of
  2142. 1:17:55tactical resources that are assuming
  2143. 1:17:58that there is a larger
  2144. 1:18:00um strategic picture in place at the
  2145. 1:18:02higher level. And there isn't, you know,
  2146. 1:18:05and it isn't communicated. And that that
  2147. 1:18:08is is one of the the big problems that
  2148. 1:18:12we have. You know, the whole army, the
  2149. 1:18:14whole army is trained for conventional
  2150. 1:18:17stuff and then they're doing an, you
  2151. 1:18:18know, counterinsurgency and that's a
  2152. 1:18:20different ballgame. We're all in the
  2153. 1:18:22same boat on that one. But for the army
  2154. 1:18:24as a whole, there was an understanding
  2155. 1:18:27of, you know, these are the these are
  2156. 1:18:29the ways that that we can, you know,
  2157. 1:18:31hold ground and ensure the bad guys
  2158. 1:18:35aren't here. Whereas on an information
  2159. 1:18:37level that not only is there not an
  2160. 1:18:40understanding, but there are actual
  2161. 1:18:42there are actual roadblocks to any kind
  2162. 1:18:45of understanding of this or any kind of
  2163. 1:18:47real effective action on this. You would
  2164. 1:18:50have folks at the strategic level who
  2165. 1:18:52would actively be against anything that
  2166. 1:18:54that smacked of, you know, an
  2167. 1:18:57information or deception pitcher. They
  2168. 1:18:59could often sabotage the operation. So
  2169. 1:19:02there was a um there was one operation
  2170. 1:19:05um that we did and this was in my second
  2171. 1:19:07tour where the ODB
  2172. 1:19:10had they were going to do a battalion
  2173. 1:19:13you know wide um operation that was
  2174. 1:19:15coordinated with national assets and had
  2175. 1:19:18you know teams from law enforcement
  2176. 1:19:20agents in the US. They were going to
  2177. 1:19:21conduct this this big operation in an
  2178. 1:19:24area. They wanted a good way to ensure
  2179. 1:19:26that, you know, when they were doing
  2180. 1:19:28this, they did not cause any more
  2181. 1:19:31problems than they had to. Um, they
  2182. 1:19:34couldn't they couldn't announce exactly
  2183. 1:19:36what they were going to to do on the
  2184. 1:19:38ground in advance. Um, but they wanted a
  2185. 1:19:41way that they would not be going in
  2186. 1:19:44against local authorities who they
  2187. 1:19:46really wanted to support and, you know,
  2188. 1:19:48getting into uh to accidental um green
  2189. 1:19:51on blue conflict. So we helped write up
  2190. 1:19:56a plan for these are the folks you need
  2191. 1:19:58to talk to. This is how you you can run
  2192. 1:20:00it. This is this is the kind of press
  2193. 1:20:01release you can give and these are the
  2194. 1:20:03folks who you need to give that to who
  2195. 1:20:06can enable enable you to make sure that
  2196. 1:20:09you are coordinated with the local
  2197. 1:20:10community in exactly the right time and
  2198. 1:20:12there's no green on blue. a PA officer
  2199. 1:20:16who, you know, it's an ODB. They don't
  2200. 1:20:18they didn't have their own PA, but at
  2201. 1:20:21the the higher headquarters, he he got a
  2202. 1:20:23hold of, you know, being told that some
  2203. 1:20:25SCer come up with a press release. Well,
  2204. 1:20:27of course, there nobody else to to write
  2205. 1:20:30this at that level and he absolutely,
  2206. 1:20:33you know, stomped on it. No, there's no
  2207. 1:20:35way you can do this. the commander, you
  2208. 1:20:38know, they they were able to to
  2209. 1:20:42improvise something that made sure that
  2210. 1:20:45they didn't they didn't have the the
  2211. 1:20:47kind of of risks that could have been a
  2212. 1:20:50worst case scenario, but they sure
  2213. 1:20:51didn't get the best case scenario
  2214. 1:20:52either. They they they scared a lot of
  2215. 1:20:54people. They had some some serious risk
  2216. 1:20:57of loss of lives. And it was all simply
  2217. 1:21:00because some guy didn't like to hear
  2218. 1:21:02that that a scipper was doing PA work
  2219. 1:21:06when he didn't have any PA people who
  2220. 1:21:08>> Yeah.
  2221. 1:21:09>> you know could do it or would do it.
  2222. 1:21:11>> Yeah. That's one of those classic we
  2223. 1:21:14found the enemy and it's us scenarios.
  2224. 1:21:17>> I mean you and that's the kind of thing
  2225. 1:21:19you know I mean we still haven't figured
  2226. 1:21:21it out. you know, the public affairs
  2227. 1:21:24folks, they have their responsibilities
  2228. 1:21:25and that's I respect that because
  2229. 1:21:27they're there to represent the
  2230. 1:21:28institution, to preserve the reputation
  2231. 1:21:31of the institution to inform the
  2232. 1:21:33American people, but man, they've got in
  2233. 1:21:36my opinion, they have neither the
  2234. 1:21:40culture, cultural training, the language
  2235. 1:21:42training, the expertise to be able to
  2236. 1:21:45target uh the local population. That is
  2237. 1:21:48a psychological operations function. And
  2238. 1:21:51so writing press press releases that
  2239. 1:21:53that are intended for distribution
  2240. 1:21:56via Iraqi uh media is completely
  2241. 1:21:59appropriate. That's the kind of crap
  2242. 1:22:01that that you just described. These just
  2243. 1:22:04makes my head spin. Ched, I I wanted to
  2244. 1:22:07ask you, we spend a lot of time on this
  2245. 1:22:09channel being critical because a we're
  2246. 1:22:11crusty old veterans. That's what we do.
  2247. 1:22:13Um but I do want to take a moment to
  2248. 1:22:15talk about like what were some of the
  2249. 1:22:16things that you thought were successful
  2250. 1:22:17during your tour? things you thought you
  2251. 1:22:19did that that made you feel good about
  2252. 1:22:21your mission and things that you know
  2253. 1:22:23like cool we kicked ass in that.
  2254. 1:22:25>> In my first tour in Iraq I I kind of
  2255. 1:22:28towards the end of of that tour I ended
  2256. 1:22:31up like kind of making a list to myself
  2257. 1:22:33of things that I had accomplished while
  2258. 1:22:36I was there because it had been a pretty
  2259. 1:22:38hard tour and uh things had gone you
  2260. 1:22:42know very wrong in a lot of ways. We
  2261. 1:22:44we'd literally watched, you know, the
  2262. 1:22:46entire country go from, you know, point
  2263. 1:22:49of stability to chaos and seen it happen
  2264. 1:22:52because of us. So, I kept a a list of
  2265. 1:22:55things that accomplished and it was it
  2266. 1:22:56was all pretty minor stuff. There was
  2267. 1:22:59there was one situation where there was
  2268. 1:23:01a um there was an apartment for a uh a
  2269. 1:23:05Turkman many cop you know inside the
  2270. 1:23:07grain zone and we heard a call on the
  2271. 1:23:10radio that there was this you know this
  2272. 1:23:12platoon leader you know this this uh you
  2273. 1:23:14know first lieutenant or captain who was
  2274. 1:23:17on the ground and he was saying he was
  2275. 1:23:19really tired cuz he had been there all
  2276. 1:23:20night literally sitting in this
  2277. 1:23:22apartment trying to keep it from being
  2278. 1:23:24stolen while they took this this Iraqi
  2279. 1:23:28policeman for interrogation. And so I
  2280. 1:23:31went to to this captain and found out
  2281. 1:23:33what the backstory was and what the
  2282. 1:23:34situation was is that that the the intel
  2283. 1:23:38shop above his level, you know, up at
  2284. 1:23:40the at the BCT level, um they had an
  2285. 1:23:43asset who wanted that apartment. And so
  2286. 1:23:46they decided that they were going to
  2287. 1:23:48briefly detain this uh police officer
  2288. 1:23:51and steal his apartment and, you know,
  2289. 1:23:55make it so that he was unemployable. And
  2290. 1:23:57then, you know, the asset would would
  2291. 1:23:58get what he wanted. And that platoon
  2292. 1:24:01leader did not want that to happen. But
  2293. 1:24:04the only way he could do anything about
  2294. 1:24:05it was to actually stand there and hope
  2295. 1:24:07that, you know, hire would would uh
  2296. 1:24:09change their mind, would be shamed into
  2297. 1:24:11doing the right thing. You know, I
  2298. 1:24:13talked to the guy and I I said, "Look,
  2299. 1:24:15this is what I'm going to do. You know,
  2300. 1:24:17you just got to be here for a little
  2301. 1:24:18while. I'm going to go talk to the three
  2302. 1:24:23shop and the two shop and say that, you
  2303. 1:24:25know, is this
  2304. 1:24:26Turkman many police officer, you're
  2305. 1:24:29right, you're creating a potential
  2306. 1:24:30political rift um or a potential ethnic
  2307. 1:24:33crisis in this area if they see that you
  2308. 1:24:36know the Turk mens are being pushed out
  2309. 1:24:38um while a Sunni Iraqi a Sunni Arab is
  2310. 1:24:42is you know given this instead and also
  2311. 1:24:45what I need you to do is to write up a
  2312. 1:24:47receipt and you know put all the right
  2313. 1:24:49signatures and everything on it and I
  2314. 1:24:51will take this to them as well. What
  2315. 1:24:52ended up up actually happening is that
  2316. 1:24:54he's the one who went to to talk to to
  2317. 1:24:57them. You know, I I'm the one who stayed
  2318. 1:24:59on, you know, on the scene, but he took
  2319. 1:25:02that receipt and and an explanation of
  2320. 1:25:04what the situation was. And between the
  2321. 1:25:07receipt and, you know, the uh um two
  2322. 1:25:11shop, you know, hearing the potential
  2323. 1:25:13downside of it, they decided not to to
  2324. 1:25:16actually steal the apartment. They let
  2325. 1:25:18the family come back and the, you know,
  2326. 1:25:19the Turkman officer, police officer was
  2327. 1:25:22was allowed to, you know, return to his
  2328. 1:25:25home.
  2329. 1:25:26>> Yeah.
  2330. 1:25:26>> That I felt was a huge victory. But it
  2331. 1:25:28was just one apart.
  2332. 1:25:30>> Yeah. But I mean, that's how we sustain
  2333. 1:25:32ourselves though, man. While we're while
  2334. 1:25:33we're downrange, you know, it's those
  2335. 1:25:35small things that that, you know, it's
  2336. 1:25:37like, oh, because I did X, you know, we
  2337. 1:25:39were able to achieve Y. And it's usually
  2338. 1:25:42the small things, right? And it keeps
  2339. 1:25:43you sane. It keeps you motivated. I
  2340. 1:25:46think I I have several stories like that
  2341. 1:25:48too where small conversations where you
  2342. 1:25:51think you moved the needle just a little
  2343. 1:25:54bit or you you staved off a disaster or
  2344. 1:25:56you kept someone from making a really
  2345. 1:25:57bad decision. Those are those are
  2346. 1:26:00important moments for me uh because they
  2347. 1:26:03help me like come to grips with like my
  2348. 1:26:06my legacy of service, you know, things
  2349. 1:26:09that I have plenty of regrets, things
  2350. 1:26:11that I did and things that I failed to
  2351. 1:26:13do, but I of it's important to reflect
  2352. 1:26:15on those. So, that's really good, man. I
  2353. 1:26:18I do want to talk a little a little bit
  2354. 1:26:20about you, a little bit to you about
  2355. 1:26:23taking a step back now and given what
  2356. 1:26:27you've learned as a practitioner in
  2357. 1:26:28these kind of like dark arts of psy
  2358. 1:26:30psychological operations and take a step
  2359. 1:26:33back now and take a a broader view of
  2360. 1:26:35the country the United States
  2361. 1:26:38>> and you know it's become very
  2362. 1:26:40fashionable to talk about this thing
  2363. 1:26:41called information statecraftraft right
  2364. 1:26:43where the United States you know we need
  2365. 1:26:45to have like you know we need to be we
  2366. 1:26:48need to the United States government
  2367. 1:26:50needs to be able to communicate clearly
  2368. 1:26:52to the world and to you know with to the
  2369. 1:26:55world I'm primarily talking about
  2370. 1:26:56external about like who we are what
  2371. 1:26:59we're doing and by doing so that we can
  2372. 1:27:02you know create peace we can create
  2373. 1:27:04stability we can open markets we can
  2374. 1:27:06have all these great outcomes it's been
  2375. 1:27:08posited that we need to bring back like
  2376. 1:27:12the US information agency right uh which
  2377. 1:27:16Ronald Reagan and disbanded in the uh in
  2378. 1:27:18the early in his first administration, I
  2379. 1:27:20believe. Do you think that like
  2380. 1:27:22something like that is would be helpful
  2381. 1:27:26and for the United States government to
  2382. 1:27:27have to kind of communicate to the world
  2383. 1:27:30or help clarify policy positions uh that
  2384. 1:27:34helps the world maybe have a a better
  2385. 1:27:36understanding or dare I say a more a
  2386. 1:27:39more advantageous uh understanding of of
  2387. 1:27:41our foreign policy? or is something like
  2388. 1:27:44a USIA kind of something that would just
  2389. 1:27:47add another layer of bureaucracy that
  2390. 1:27:49would just gum things up even worse.
  2391. 1:27:51>> I think we do need something like that,
  2392. 1:27:54but that doesn't mean we need to
  2393. 1:27:55reinstate, you know, a new bureaucracy.
  2394. 1:27:58Um the fact of the matter is is that all
  2395. 1:28:00across you know the government across
  2396. 1:28:03the you know the whole of government
  2397. 1:28:04there are a lot of of agencies or
  2398. 1:28:07organizations that have this mandate but
  2399. 1:28:11each time they're created they get
  2400. 1:28:14hemmed in and boxed in in order to
  2401. 1:28:17prevent them you know having
  2402. 1:28:20institutional power over over larger
  2403. 1:28:23organizations. And so like like there's
  2404. 1:28:25the um I forget what the initials stand
  2405. 1:28:28for but it's the AGM which is
  2406. 1:28:30responsible for for controlling all the
  2407. 1:28:32Voice of America stations and you know
  2408. 1:28:34our radio free Europe radio liberty and
  2409. 1:28:36stuff. That was was their mandate but
  2410. 1:28:39they were hemmed in because you know
  2411. 1:28:42because people did not want them to to
  2412. 1:28:46end up you know dictating to other folks
  2413. 1:28:48what you know Americans should be. And
  2414. 1:28:50then in this administration there's been
  2415. 1:28:52a lot of anger at VA because they they
  2416. 1:28:56maintained an independent editorial
  2417. 1:28:57posture and so they've been you know
  2418. 1:28:59almost destroyed. They could act in that
  2419. 1:29:03role of coordinating a unified message
  2420. 1:29:06if they were allowed to do it. You've
  2421. 1:29:08also got like the in state department
  2422. 1:29:09you've got the bureau of conflict and
  2423. 1:29:10stability operations and this is an
  2424. 1:29:12organization that instead of like where
  2425. 1:29:15you know all of the state department
  2426. 1:29:16folks they have one nation missions you
  2427. 1:29:19know they have you know let's improve
  2428. 1:29:21bilateral relations with Nair or Mali
  2429. 1:29:25and you don't have anyone who has
  2430. 1:29:26responsibility for you know the the
  2431. 1:29:28problem of you know transnational uh
  2432. 1:29:31terrorism across the Sahel as a whole
  2433. 1:29:33their job and and you know conflict
  2434. 1:29:36disability operation ations was to go in
  2435. 1:29:38into these different these different
  2436. 1:29:40embassies and work with all of the
  2437. 1:29:42partners and ensure that there was some
  2438. 1:29:43kind of consensus and stability or idea
  2439. 1:29:46about that. they they took as a problem
  2440. 1:29:48set a transnational problem rather than
  2441. 1:29:50a any anything specific to one country.
  2442. 1:29:55And so they coordinated um the same
  2443. 1:29:57thing. But um out of institutional you
  2444. 1:30:00know jealousies and rivalries within
  2445. 1:30:03State Department, they you know had
  2446. 1:30:04their mandate cut as as you know as
  2447. 1:30:07tight as they could and all of their
  2448. 1:30:10their operations were hamstrung by you
  2449. 1:30:12know the usual players. You've got, you
  2450. 1:30:15know, you've had the the GEK, the global
  2451. 1:30:17engagement center that was created by
  2452. 1:30:19state department to coordinate, you
  2453. 1:30:21know, information outreach on digital
  2454. 1:30:22level. They could have done it, but um
  2455. 1:30:25for the same reason as as you know the
  2456. 1:30:28other agencies, they were not allowed to
  2457. 1:30:30actually function and so they spent you
  2458. 1:30:32know millions of dollars um
  2459. 1:30:34accomplishing nothing.
  2460. 1:30:36>> Yeah.
  2461. 1:30:36>> And eventually their funding was allowed
  2462. 1:30:37to lapse. There is a need for a
  2463. 1:30:39coordinated information policy at some
  2464. 1:30:42level. It has to it has to have the
  2465. 1:30:44ability to reach out to other folks and
  2466. 1:30:47you know if not tell them what to do at
  2467. 1:30:50least to be you know at their table
  2468. 1:30:52saying we object you know even if they
  2469. 1:30:54they can't force them to do what they
  2470. 1:30:56say at least to be able to raise
  2471. 1:30:57objections. It doesn't have to be a new
  2472. 1:30:59layer of bureaucracy. It just needs to
  2473. 1:31:01be someone, you know, pin the tail on
  2474. 1:31:04someone. And it can be a defense
  2475. 1:31:06department are the the guys who who end
  2476. 1:31:09up with all the money and, you know,
  2477. 1:31:11authorities that that every no
  2478. 1:31:13administration likes to to you know, cut
  2479. 1:31:16into the authorities of the defense
  2480. 1:31:18department. So that is possibly a
  2481. 1:31:20logical place to put it. It should be
  2482. 1:31:23realistically it should be somewhere
  2483. 1:31:25between state and uh and something else.
  2484. 1:31:29>> Yeah. But in practice, you know, sooner
  2485. 1:31:32or later, if we get into a real
  2486. 1:31:35situation, if we end up, you know, in a
  2487. 1:31:38in a conventional conflict, we're going
  2488. 1:31:40to end up developing this anyways just
  2489. 1:31:43to coordinate the information picture
  2490. 1:31:45that we need.
  2491. 1:31:45>> Yeah, I I think that I think that's you
  2492. 1:31:47bring up a really good point because
  2493. 1:31:48it's it's not as simple as saying we
  2494. 1:31:50need a USIA, right? Because really and
  2495. 1:31:53truly those different agencies that you
  2496. 1:31:55just described, they have different
  2497. 1:31:57mandates. Voice of America, Radio Free
  2498. 1:32:00Europe, Radio Free Asia, those were
  2499. 1:32:03designed to have independent editorial
  2500. 1:32:06control. Why? Because it's part, it's
  2501. 1:32:10not about controlling the information
  2502. 1:32:12that goes out through all these global
  2503. 1:32:13bureaus and people around the world
  2504. 1:32:15listening to them. It's about attraction
  2505. 1:32:17to America. Here is a country with this
  2506. 1:32:20great culture, this rich culture, strong
  2507. 1:32:23markets, and a press that can hold its
  2508. 1:32:26government accountable. To me, that's
  2509. 1:32:28what VA was always about. It was never
  2510. 1:32:31about a conduit for passing propaganda,
  2511. 1:32:33right? It's about the attraction of
  2512. 1:32:35American culture, right? The global the
  2513. 1:32:37GEC, that's about public diplomacy,
  2514. 1:32:40right? That's about clarifying for the
  2515. 1:32:42world and providing context and
  2516. 1:32:44providing you knowledge about foreign
  2517. 1:32:48American foreign policy right and then
  2518. 1:32:50the department of defense like it I'll
  2519. 1:32:52just express my own personal opinion I
  2520. 1:32:53don't think has any business in those
  2521. 1:32:55areas right like department of defense
  2522. 1:32:57should be focused on I'm sorry
  2523. 1:32:59department of war apologies should be
  2524. 1:33:01focused on should be focused on you know
  2525. 1:33:05military things and to your point maybe
  2526. 1:33:08we don't need necessarily a coord
  2527. 1:33:10coordinating body because that seems
  2528. 1:33:11kind of ridiculous, but maybe some kind
  2529. 1:33:13of like policy body that establishes
  2530. 1:33:17that puts out like a strategic
  2531. 1:33:19communications strategy for the US
  2532. 1:33:21government and then the different
  2533. 1:33:22departments agencies fall under that.
  2534. 1:33:26Now, not to get political because that's
  2535. 1:33:27not what this thing is about, but it's a
  2536. 1:33:29part of the information environment. To
  2537. 1:33:32even have this conversation between you
  2538. 1:33:35and me about a policy body,
  2539. 1:33:38different agencies or different mandates
  2540. 1:33:40seems utterly ridiculous because the
  2541. 1:33:42most influential voice in the United
  2542. 1:33:45States government, maybe even in the
  2543. 1:33:46entire world right now, is the president
  2544. 1:33:48of the United States because of how the
  2545. 1:33:50president is is is is chooses to
  2546. 1:33:52communicate to the world. the world is
  2547. 1:33:54really focused on his uh you know his
  2548. 1:33:57his overwhelming access to the media,
  2549. 1:33:59his social media game. When you think
  2550. 1:34:02about that, this very unconventional
  2551. 1:34:04approach to how you communicate, the
  2552. 1:34:06whole idea of a government agency just
  2553. 1:34:08seems like it's out the window. It'll be
  2554. 1:34:09a complete waste of money, right? Do you
  2555. 1:34:11think that we're looking at a point now
  2556. 1:34:13where the president bull bully pullpit
  2557. 1:34:16is on steroids and that becomes our
  2558. 1:34:18deacto way for the United States
  2559. 1:34:21government to communicate to the world?
  2560. 1:34:22Now, is that role in your mind changing
  2561. 1:34:25given what we've seen over the past few
  2562. 1:34:27years?
  2563. 1:34:28>> I would say that there is there is still
  2564. 1:34:30a government role for messaging and
  2565. 1:34:34understanding the implications and all
  2566. 1:34:35that, but it is stepped on by the
  2567. 1:34:38president continually and this this is a
  2568. 1:34:43a it is an absolute contradiction. So,
  2569. 1:34:46you know, we have ended up with with a,
  2570. 1:34:49you know, an imperial presidency that
  2571. 1:34:51that, you know, has gone into the crazy
  2572. 1:34:53emperor uh stage where, you know, we're
  2573. 1:34:57we're turning horses into into senators
  2574. 1:35:00because
  2575. 1:35:02no one, you know, at a staff level can
  2576. 1:35:05can really
  2577. 1:35:07have a voice at the table where it needs
  2578. 1:35:09to be listened to. And we can have very
  2579. 1:35:12coherent sensible you know responses
  2580. 1:35:17that will be ignored or counteracted
  2581. 1:35:20because of decisions that are at at the
  2582. 1:35:22highest the absolute highest level. The
  2583. 1:35:24co situation is the perfect example. So
  2584. 1:35:27with and I know that that this is
  2585. 1:35:29something that's very near and dear to
  2586. 1:35:31your heart. So most of the US political
  2587. 1:35:34and military response to CO was very
  2588. 1:35:38sensible and very well put together.
  2589. 1:35:40Every military command had a plan for
  2590. 1:35:43how to deal with pandemics that was very
  2591. 1:35:45sensible. We had, you know, a a um
  2592. 1:35:49creation of of a vaccine with Operation
  2593. 1:35:51Warp Speed that was incredibly rapid. We
  2594. 1:35:54had, you know, uh good CDC. It was
  2595. 1:35:58slower CDC response than than ideal, but
  2596. 1:36:01but but it definitely did great things.
  2597. 1:36:04All of that was completely undercut
  2598. 1:36:08because of statements at the very top of
  2599. 1:36:10the chain that that went against
  2600. 1:36:12everything else that the government was
  2601. 1:36:14doing.
  2602. 1:36:14>> Mhm.
  2603. 1:36:15>> And that kind of of schizophrenia in our
  2604. 1:36:17in our public image that creates discord
  2605. 1:36:20and distrust, you know, in the community
  2606. 1:36:22as a whole. Our allies can't trust us
  2607. 1:36:25because all of the people they're
  2608. 1:36:26talking to, they're not talking to the
  2609. 1:36:28president on a daily basis. You know,
  2610. 1:36:30our allies are talking to the staff
  2611. 1:36:32inside of, you know, and inside of NATO
  2612. 1:36:36headquarters. And all the staff inside
  2613. 1:36:38of NATO headquarters has this plan, and
  2614. 1:36:40it's a pretty good one for how they're
  2615. 1:36:42going to, you know, uh, develop NATO as
  2616. 1:36:44an institution further. But then you
  2617. 1:36:46come out with a national security
  2618. 1:36:47strategy that completely undercuts
  2619. 1:36:49everything that they've said and puts
  2620. 1:36:51out things that are fundamentally
  2621. 1:36:54unsustainable. And that's,
  2622. 1:36:56you know, you can work for years to
  2623. 1:36:59stabilize a situation and a single
  2624. 1:37:02executive order or statement at the
  2625. 1:37:04highest level can completely destroy it.
  2626. 1:37:06Yeah, you bring up a really good point
  2627. 1:37:09and I I want to I want you bring up a
  2628. 1:37:12very fair point, but I I also think it's
  2629. 1:37:15a good point and it it is that
  2630. 1:37:19embassies, consulates, military units
  2631. 1:37:23out in the world, right? Government
  2632. 1:37:25agencies out in the world who speak to
  2633. 1:37:28our allies on a day-to-day basis, who
  2634. 1:37:31exchange lots of information. when there
  2635. 1:37:34is that disconnect at the very top,
  2636. 1:37:37right, to you know, versus what they're
  2637. 1:37:40putting out, it does create an image of
  2638. 1:37:44just utter chaos, complete incoherence,
  2639. 1:37:47right? And it makes um it makes it
  2640. 1:37:50difficult for us to be able to
  2641. 1:37:51accomplish what we need to accomplish,
  2642. 1:37:52right? I encourage my guests to speak
  2643. 1:37:54freely. I'm going to steer clear of
  2644. 1:37:56making political judgments, but I think
  2645. 1:37:57that everyone can recognize that if you
  2646. 1:38:00know at the if at the top, right, says
  2647. 1:38:03something and they say it at a very
  2648. 1:38:05rapid rate and it seems to change a lot
  2649. 1:38:08at the execution level where you know it
  2650. 1:38:11it it can undercut it could it can
  2651. 1:38:13disempower it makes you less likely to
  2652. 1:38:16be able to do your job. I you and I both
  2653. 1:38:18have suffered from that while we were in
  2654. 1:38:20the military, right? And so that's a
  2655. 1:38:22very fair point that you that that I
  2656. 1:38:24think that you bring up, a very valid
  2657. 1:38:27point. I think too like when you start
  2658. 1:38:28talking about pandemics, one of the
  2659. 1:38:30things I learned um during the pandemic,
  2660. 1:38:32public health communications
  2661. 1:38:35very rapidly becomes political
  2662. 1:38:37communications. Science becomes at some
  2663. 1:38:40point less important than politics and
  2664. 1:38:43at different points it becomes more
  2665. 1:38:44important than politics. Right. But
  2666. 1:38:46going back to your experiences in
  2667. 1:38:48Baghdad, when you're in a crisis
  2668. 1:38:49situation, people thirst for
  2669. 1:38:51information. They thirst for credible
  2670. 1:38:54information because it affects their
  2671. 1:38:55business. It can affects their
  2672. 1:38:56livelihoods, affects their very lives.
  2673. 1:38:59Well, if there's a vacuum, there's all
  2674. 1:39:01kinds of people in particularly in our
  2675. 1:39:02country where there's an open ecosystem
  2676. 1:39:04where people can post whatever the hell
  2677. 1:39:05they want. There's all sorts of people
  2678. 1:39:07willing to fill vacuum with all kinds of
  2679. 1:39:09And that can be very
  2680. 1:39:11dangerous, right? I will always say an
  2681. 1:39:14open system is the the best, good
  2682. 1:39:16markets, you know, creativity, but
  2683. 1:39:19there's a cost to it when you're dealing
  2684. 1:39:21with a public health crisis of having
  2685. 1:39:24that, right? And I'm not going to
  2686. 1:39:26litigate like, you know, censorship and
  2687. 1:39:29all that kind of stuff. That's that's
  2688. 1:39:30outside the purview of this podcast. But
  2689. 1:39:33I think one of the things that's really
  2690. 1:39:34interesting is you've spent your time
  2691. 1:39:37doing this stuff in the army, working in
  2692. 1:39:40information programs, working in the
  2693. 1:39:42world and seeing what happens when our
  2694. 1:39:44public image is distorted.
  2695. 1:39:46And the United States government would
  2696. 1:39:48be well advised in my opinion to listen
  2697. 1:39:52to guys like you who understand the the
  2698. 1:39:55the bad that happens when we are
  2699. 1:39:58not cor we're not communicating in a
  2700. 1:40:01coherent manage
  2701. 1:40:04a a coherent way to the world. it can
  2702. 1:40:06cause a lot of problems not just for the
  2703. 1:40:08world but here like our markets can
  2704. 1:40:10suffer our national defense posture
  2705. 1:40:12suffers and so all of your experience
  2706. 1:40:15that you had I think is very valuable to
  2707. 1:40:18hopefully people in government today
  2708. 1:40:19that are thinking about this I'll stop
  2709. 1:40:22short of rendering an opinion whether I
  2710. 1:40:23think they're really thinking about it
  2711. 1:40:25hey listen man for me it's like I've
  2712. 1:40:26always felt that the the great
  2713. 1:40:28attraction of of this country is its
  2714. 1:40:33government its fairness
  2715. 1:40:35our open markets,
  2716. 1:40:38you know, our commerce,
  2717. 1:40:40culture, technology, backed up by this
  2718. 1:40:43really capable military. I've always
  2719. 1:40:46felt even when I first joined the
  2720. 1:40:49military that, you know, this altogether
  2721. 1:40:51was our greatest source of influence and
  2722. 1:40:54frankly it was a is part of our
  2723. 1:40:57contribution to the stability of the
  2724. 1:40:59world. But to be honest with you, man,
  2725. 1:41:01like I look at culture, I look at
  2726. 1:41:04markets and yes, even military power
  2727. 1:41:07because in the wake of these two
  2728. 1:41:09disastrous wars that we came out with,
  2729. 1:41:11the failure of our deterrence in
  2730. 1:41:13Ukraine, right? The failure to to to
  2731. 1:41:17deter Russia. I'm seeing all these
  2732. 1:41:19things, man, markets, military, culture
  2733. 1:41:23moving in the wrong direction. They're
  2734. 1:41:24trending in the in the wrong direction.
  2735. 1:41:27So, you know, in that regard, I think
  2736. 1:41:29that we have a major that that's always
  2737. 1:41:31been our strength and I think we have a
  2738. 1:41:34major challenge with how the United
  2739. 1:41:37States is positioned in the world moving
  2740. 1:41:38forward. And I don't think it's just
  2741. 1:41:40about rotten American government
  2742. 1:41:43institutions. I think it's a it's a much
  2743. 1:41:44broader thing. And I think what the
  2744. 1:41:46world if our if our trends continue to
  2745. 1:41:48go down in these key areas, I think the
  2746. 1:41:51attraction of America in the world is
  2747. 1:41:54going to go down. And I think it's going
  2748. 1:41:56to have devastating impact not just here
  2749. 1:41:59in this this country but also in the
  2750. 1:42:00world. That's that's kind of my my take
  2751. 1:42:02on that. I kind of want to see how you
  2752. 1:42:04react. Or do you think I'm going full
  2753. 1:42:05crank mode here? Man,
  2754. 1:42:06>> I don't think you're being a crank. I
  2755. 1:42:08think that uh we have been in an in an
  2756. 1:42:12information war um since the end of the
  2757. 1:42:15cold war,
  2758. 1:42:16>> you know, [clears throat] when or at the
  2759. 1:42:19very least since 2000 when Putin came
  2760. 1:42:21into power. And the thing about a war,
  2761. 1:42:25you know, or any strategic situation is
  2762. 1:42:28that, you know, the the person the
  2763. 1:42:31person who wins a battle is not the guy
  2764. 1:42:33who makes the most mistakes or the least
  2765. 1:42:35mistakes. It's the guy who makes the
  2766. 1:42:37next to last mistake.
  2767. 1:42:39>> Mhm.
  2768. 1:42:40>> In this information war, it's the same
  2769. 1:42:41thing. The enemy is making all kinds of
  2770. 1:42:43mistakes, too. Up and down across the
  2771. 1:42:46board. We aren't taking good advantage
  2772. 1:42:48of them, but we could. when it comes to
  2773. 1:42:52COVID um inside of Russia, they
  2774. 1:42:55developed a vaccine very early on before
  2775. 1:42:57we did. It, you know, had a little bit
  2776. 1:42:59less effectiveness, but it was still a
  2777. 1:43:01pretty good one. But they had almost no
  2778. 1:43:03uptake of the vaccine inside the
  2779. 1:43:05country. And so and so much less than
  2780. 1:43:08than even the US. And it was remarkable
  2781. 1:43:11because, you know, the Russian
  2782. 1:43:13government has the ability to push out
  2783. 1:43:14to hospitals, make this mandatory, and
  2784. 1:43:16get every get everybody a shot. and they
  2785. 1:43:18still couldn't do it um because they had
  2786. 1:43:20built up so much distrust in their
  2787. 1:43:22internal media infrastructure. They had
  2788. 1:43:26destroyed the the credibility of every
  2789. 1:43:28institution that was able to push
  2790. 1:43:30something. And so when it actually came
  2791. 1:43:32down to it, they didn't have the levers
  2792. 1:43:34of power that they thought they did.
  2793. 1:43:35We've seen that in the Russ and you know
  2794. 1:43:37the Russian war in Ukraine. It has gone
  2795. 1:43:40disastrously for Russian society as a
  2796. 1:43:42whole. And there is a very good chance
  2797. 1:43:44that Russia is going to fragment.
  2798. 1:43:45Whenever Russia right now cannot stop
  2799. 1:43:48fighting in Ukraine because as soon as
  2800. 1:43:50they do situation inside the country is
  2801. 1:43:52going to collapse. Right now Russian
  2802. 1:43:54society is only being held up by the
  2803. 1:43:57fact that they are that that all of that
  2804. 1:44:00their army is in Ukraine. When that's
  2805. 1:44:03over, when all these troops can go home,
  2806. 1:44:05you're going to have situation where you
  2807. 1:44:06have a 100,000 very rich elite uh
  2808. 1:44:10Russians who fled the country when the
  2809. 1:44:12fighting started, they're all going to
  2810. 1:44:13be able to come back home and they're
  2811. 1:44:15going to have money and resources and
  2812. 1:44:16they're going to take all the elite jobs
  2813. 1:44:18and all these troops who were
  2814. 1:44:20sacrificed, you know, in in the meat
  2815. 1:44:22grinder of the war are also going to
  2816. 1:44:23come back and that is not a good
  2817. 1:44:26situation. There will be a lot of
  2818. 1:44:28conflict and fragmentation
  2819. 1:44:30and it will be an ugly situation and I
  2820. 1:44:35suspect that at the highest levels you
  2821. 1:44:37know of the power vertical that they are
  2822. 1:44:39aware of this risk and that's why there
  2823. 1:44:42is all this weird dithering from the
  2824. 1:44:44Russian side you know about what's going
  2825. 1:44:47on because they know that that right now
  2826. 1:44:49once they stop fighting they're going to
  2827. 1:44:52continue fighting inside of Russia.
  2828. 1:44:54>> Mhm. These kinds of mistakes are present
  2829. 1:44:56with every with every organization with
  2830. 1:44:59every element of power about the world.
  2831. 1:45:02They all are making huge mistakes and
  2832. 1:45:05taking huge risks. And it's a matter of
  2833. 1:45:07of whether we get our act together in
  2834. 1:45:10time to make sure that that you know the
  2835. 1:45:12the that we make the next the last
  2836. 1:45:15mistake and that it's our adversaries
  2837. 1:45:16who make the last one.
  2838. 1:45:18>> Yeah. Yeah. I mean that's that's that's
  2839. 1:45:22an interesting perspective, man. And you
  2840. 1:45:24know, I think another area where I feel
  2841. 1:45:26like
  2842. 1:45:28our press,
  2843. 1:45:30I I you know, for so long,
  2844. 1:45:34I've seen the press in this town
  2845. 1:45:39become more chummy with government. Now,
  2846. 1:45:42you don't see that on TV, right? But
  2847. 1:45:46what I So, I'm I'm a huge supporter of
  2848. 1:45:49an o open press. I am a supporter of an
  2849. 1:45:52act of an adversarial press to the US
  2850. 1:45:54government holding the government to
  2851. 1:45:56account and the government and the press
  2852. 1:45:57being having and the press being given
  2853. 1:45:59the access to be able to do that job. I
  2854. 1:46:02am a I will defend that with my last
  2855. 1:46:04drop of blood.
  2856. 1:46:06>> Okay.
  2857. 1:46:07But I actually
  2858. 1:46:09in my I actually am observing the way
  2859. 1:46:12things work in this town is that members
  2860. 1:46:16of the press feel that to maintain their
  2861. 1:46:18access they have to be a little chummier
  2862. 1:46:20than they probably have to be.
  2863. 1:46:23And I feel that like as an institution
  2864. 1:46:25it's not all the press's fault. The
  2865. 1:46:29government has a social contract to
  2866. 1:46:31basically keep itself open and to accept
  2867. 1:46:34an adversarial relationship with the
  2868. 1:46:36press. right to make this whole
  2869. 1:46:39democracy thing work.
  2870. 1:46:41And what I see is like that's actually
  2871. 1:46:44it's actually not happening. Like the
  2872. 1:46:46the government is actually kind of
  2873. 1:46:48turning is making that access more
  2874. 1:46:51difficult. And as a natural response to
  2875. 1:46:54that, I think the media, a lot of the
  2876. 1:46:55media, they are trying to be chummy with
  2877. 1:46:58the current government.
  2878. 1:47:01It's just it's come off the rails, man.
  2879. 1:47:04And uh so you can sit there in the press
  2880. 1:47:07room and hear like reporters, you know,
  2881. 1:47:09yelling at the the press secretary and
  2882. 1:47:12back and forth and we can hear the the
  2883. 1:47:14conversations that, you know,
  2884. 1:47:17>> yeah, you can hear all that stuff,
  2885. 1:47:18right? You can watch all that stuff on
  2886. 1:47:20TV, right? But at the end of the day,
  2887. 1:47:22like it's just really difficult for me
  2888. 1:47:24to see like the days of the of the long
  2889. 1:47:26form breaking big stories about
  2890. 1:47:28something in government that's just
  2891. 1:47:30wrong. And it scares the hell out of me,
  2892. 1:47:33man. It's it scares the hell out of me.
  2893. 1:47:35And uh the it's another part of this
  2894. 1:47:38institution where it's not just the
  2895. 1:47:40government communicating to the world.
  2896. 1:47:42It's also the government being open so
  2897. 1:47:43that a adversarial press corps can do
  2898. 1:47:46their jobs. That's what makes it work
  2899. 1:47:48work. When I worked with the press here
  2900. 1:47:50in DC, I never had an expectation of
  2901. 1:47:52hanging out with them and having drinks
  2902. 1:47:54with them and, you know, leaking to
  2903. 1:47:57them. That's not the way this works.
  2904. 1:47:58We're we have an adversarial
  2905. 1:48:00relationship, right? And it works. They
  2906. 1:48:02ask me a hard question, I'm gonna
  2907. 1:48:04freaking answer it. Anyway, I I don't
  2908. 1:48:07see that anymore. And I'm my fear is not
  2909. 1:48:09just the government's going to do things
  2910. 1:48:10that the American people can't see, but
  2911. 1:48:12the American people are going to lose
  2912. 1:48:13confidence in the press. And again, in
  2913. 1:48:16that vacuum,
  2914. 1:48:17>> they are.
  2915. 1:48:18>> And in that vacuum, you're going to run
  2916. 1:48:20to other sources of information. And it
  2917. 1:48:23can be really bad. Low editorial, you
  2918. 1:48:27know, uh, standards, straight up lies.
  2919. 1:48:30disinformation that can be filled by
  2920. 1:48:34adversaries. Like I don't think that
  2921. 1:48:36people really understand some of the
  2922. 1:48:38things that you're teasing out and I
  2923. 1:48:39just wanted to help provide some color
  2924. 1:48:40there. But am I off base in that
  2925. 1:48:43assessment?
  2926. 1:48:44>> No, you're you're completely correct and
  2927. 1:48:46it's but it isn't it is a matter of of
  2928. 1:48:50you know that that increase in
  2929. 1:48:52Trumpiness is not just you know this
  2930. 1:48:54current administration. It's been going
  2931. 1:48:56on for a while and there are structural
  2932. 1:48:58reasons for why that's happening. One of
  2933. 1:49:00the big ones is the consolidation of
  2934. 1:49:03journalistic power in just a a few
  2935. 1:49:05organizations. So when you have hundreds
  2936. 1:49:09of independent newsrooms across the
  2937. 1:49:11country who are all competing for, you
  2938. 1:49:13know, getting the information out,
  2939. 1:49:15they're competing with each other, they
  2940. 1:49:17are trying to get scoops. And you have
  2941. 1:49:18that adversarial situation because all
  2942. 1:49:20of these reporters are competing with
  2943. 1:49:24other reporters to get that information.
  2944. 1:49:27they're they're hungry for status within
  2945. 1:49:29the field. On the other hand, if you
  2946. 1:49:31have two or three institutions that
  2947. 1:49:34control all of the the newsrooms across
  2948. 1:49:38the country and all of the papers across
  2949. 1:49:40the country, or even worse, if you have
  2950. 1:49:42a a technical monopoly like Facebook or
  2951. 1:49:46Google or something like that that can
  2952. 1:49:47control uh who sees those stories, you
  2953. 1:49:51know, you have you have the people that
  2954. 1:49:53you could put into into, you know, a
  2955. 1:49:56single fundraiser event who have control
  2956. 1:49:59over those levers of power and those
  2957. 1:50:01people you can influence and you can you
  2958. 1:50:04can get them to kill the stories you
  2959. 1:50:06don't want or promote the stories that
  2960. 1:50:08you do want. And moreover, all of those
  2961. 1:50:10guys have a financial incentive to not
  2962. 1:50:13rock the boat.
  2963. 1:50:14>> Whereas an individual reporter,
  2964. 1:50:17their incentive is to rock the boat,
  2965. 1:50:20>> right?
  2966. 1:50:21>> Because that's how they get their their
  2967. 1:50:23that's how they get uh you know greater
  2968. 1:50:26status within the field. And we don't I
  2969. 1:50:30don't know how that can be resolved. And
  2970. 1:50:33I don't think I don't think anyone does.
  2971. 1:50:35But there are organizations that are
  2972. 1:50:37trying. There's things like ProPublica,
  2973. 1:50:39things like that that are are trying to
  2974. 1:50:42maintain some kind of independent
  2975. 1:50:45journalist um community, you know, in a
  2976. 1:50:48way. And and this is back to that D&D
  2977. 1:50:51basis. I I didn't come into the army as,
  2978. 1:50:54you know, you know, a jock. I came into
  2979. 1:50:56the kid as I came into the army as a D
  2980. 1:50:58and D kid. And so what I grew up on was,
  2981. 1:51:02you know, cyberpunk literature and then
  2982. 1:51:03the cyberpunk game. And we are building
  2983. 1:51:06ourselves a a cyberpunk world every day.
  2984. 1:51:11We're building, you know, a handful of
  2985. 1:51:13news corps, but we're also building the
  2986. 1:51:16capabilities for, you know, independent
  2987. 1:51:18journalists to try to try to rise up in
  2988. 1:51:21there. What's going to end up happening
  2989. 1:51:22is these journalists are going to be if
  2990. 1:51:25it goes the way it's going, those
  2991. 1:51:27journalists are going to be getting
  2992. 1:51:29their information not from uh sources
  2993. 1:51:32within government who they are um trying
  2994. 1:51:35to embarrass in a press room, but
  2995. 1:51:36instead they're going to be going to
  2996. 1:51:38hackers who are going to hack into our
  2997. 1:51:39systems and steal the information. That
  2998. 1:51:42is why Assange is better trusted as a
  2999. 1:51:46journalist than you know CNN by a lot of
  3000. 1:51:50people in America. when Assange is, you
  3001. 1:51:52know, is fully um compromised
  3002. 1:51:57by, you know, by Russian forces.
  3003. 1:52:01>> Yeah,
  3004. 1:52:01>> that's that is is a uh we have we have
  3005. 1:52:06leaned into the risk factor there. We
  3006. 1:52:08have created an ecosystem in which we
  3007. 1:52:11are potentially um easily compromised by
  3008. 1:52:15malicious foreign actors um just because
  3009. 1:52:18we're losing the credibility of those
  3010. 1:52:21who could oppose them within the
  3011. 1:52:24institutions here.
  3012. 1:52:25>> Yeah, Jed, that's a very smart and I
  3013. 1:52:28know nothing about cyber punk, so I have
  3014. 1:52:29to look that up and we're done. Just
  3015. 1:52:31just joking. Um the
  3016. 1:52:35So people who are listening and have
  3017. 1:52:37have have stuck with us,
  3018. 1:52:40you may be asking yourself like, "Dude,
  3019. 1:52:42why the hell is the beaten zone talking
  3020. 1:52:44about this?" Well, I'll tell you why.
  3021. 1:52:46Decisions to go to war are big
  3022. 1:52:47decisions, right? They cost the country
  3023. 1:52:51untold amounts of money. They require
  3024. 1:52:54enormous sacrifices for soldiers, right?
  3025. 1:52:58and and sailors, airman's, marine,
  3026. 1:53:00guardians, all of them. Enormous
  3027. 1:53:03sacrifice. It affects the service
  3028. 1:53:04members. It affects their families. It
  3029. 1:53:07creates a a pipeline of of of veterans
  3030. 1:53:10who have to be cared for by the Veterans
  3031. 1:53:12Administration uh burden on them because
  3032. 1:53:15you have injuries, you have, you know,
  3033. 1:53:17that that come as a result of that. And
  3034. 1:53:19these are very important decisions. And
  3035. 1:53:22people have to understand like how the
  3036. 1:53:24information that makes its way to them
  3037. 1:53:26can be manipulated to sway uh people
  3038. 1:53:31their opinions, tap into their emotions.
  3039. 1:53:34And you have to understand how
  3040. 1:53:35adversaries can actually lead us through
  3041. 1:53:38these critical vulnerabilities in our
  3042. 1:53:40information environment can lead us to
  3043. 1:53:44make very disastrous
  3044. 1:53:46decisions to take us to war needlessly.
  3045. 1:53:50Right. And and so that's why we talk
  3046. 1:53:54about this in the beaten zone is because
  3047. 1:53:56as we're just there's a potential war
  3048. 1:53:58that can be potentially going on in the
  3049. 1:53:59Caribbean, okay? You're getting a lot of
  3050. 1:54:02the information from that from the big
  3051. 1:54:06networks, right? Or on social media and
  3052. 1:54:09it's shaping your view and it's it's
  3053. 1:54:12it's it's hitting your hitting you in
  3054. 1:54:15the fields. It's it's tapping into your
  3055. 1:54:17emotions and you're forming judgments
  3056. 1:54:18and you're throwing support behind this
  3057. 1:54:20or you're throwing it against this. The
  3058. 1:54:23quality of that information must always
  3059. 1:54:26be challenged. Everything that comes out
  3060. 1:54:29of the government about its foreign
  3061. 1:54:32policy should absolutely be taken with a
  3062. 1:54:35healthy dose of skepticism and we should
  3063. 1:54:38always be challenging. And that's why
  3064. 1:54:41having an adversarial relationship
  3065. 1:54:43between the press and the government is
  3066. 1:54:45so important. But if the government is
  3067. 1:54:48shutting down press rooms,
  3068. 1:54:51kicking kicking outlets out, I'm sorry.
  3069. 1:54:55I'll I'll express my opinion here.
  3070. 1:54:56That's a problem, man. And it
  3071. 1:54:59makes me wonder what the heck is going
  3072. 1:55:01on. Especially when there's a potential
  3073. 1:55:03wars getting cooked up over here. So
  3074. 1:55:05people can say I'm a crank. I don't
  3075. 1:55:07really give a That's kind of where
  3076. 1:55:09I am on that. It the type of we have to
  3077. 1:55:12challenge every single piece of
  3078. 1:55:13information that comes out of the
  3079. 1:55:14government, but also the media
  3080. 1:55:16understanding
  3081. 1:55:18and and let me tell you something, man.
  3082. 1:55:19I work with some damn good reporters,
  3083. 1:55:22some really good ones who worked for
  3084. 1:55:24really shitty editors and work for
  3085. 1:55:26really shitty media companies. And I
  3086. 1:55:30>> Yeah,
  3087. 1:55:30>> I I I I salute those people. Uh, I've
  3088. 1:55:33never walked a mile in their boots, but
  3089. 1:55:36it's it it I think we're living in
  3090. 1:55:38dangerous times, man. And I think a lot
  3091. 1:55:40of it's because of the information that
  3092. 1:55:41we're being fed on a day-to-day basis.
  3093. 1:55:43So, so much of it is just absolute
  3094. 1:55:44Uh, sorry, I'm emotional about
  3095. 1:55:47this topic, particularly when we start
  3096. 1:55:49talking about going to war. [laughter]
  3097. 1:55:52So, um, it just terrifies me that we
  3098. 1:55:55have a Pentagon press room that's been
  3099. 1:55:56almost handpicked because of the quality
  3100. 1:55:58of the reporting, because of the
  3101. 1:56:00favorability of the reporting that comes
  3102. 1:56:01out. I find that to be a real problem.
  3103. 1:56:06Okay. Sorry, you had to allow me to get
  3104. 1:56:09on myself a little bit.
  3105. 1:56:10>> [laughter]
  3106. 1:56:11>> If you have a situation in the
  3107. 1:56:13information environment in which um
  3108. 1:56:15there aren't a whole lot of people who
  3109. 1:56:17have who have the incentive to get at
  3110. 1:56:20what's really going on, then people like
  3111. 1:56:23me who have an incentive to put out the
  3112. 1:56:26image that we want to put out to achieve
  3113. 1:56:29the advantage that we want, we're going
  3114. 1:56:32to we're going to be all over that.
  3115. 1:56:34You're making an open field for us.
  3116. 1:56:36>> Yeah. Yeah.
  3117. 1:56:37>> And you know most of us are not working
  3118. 1:56:40for tactical commanders on a tactical
  3119. 1:56:43field. Most of us are working um
  3120. 1:56:45somewhere else. You know China has
  3121. 1:56:48millions of people like me. Russia has
  3122. 1:56:50millions of people like me and Meta and
  3123. 1:56:54Google is empowering
  3124. 1:56:57millions of people like me. But what
  3125. 1:57:00they are all undercutting are the only
  3126. 1:57:03people who are trying to
  3127. 1:57:06to present an accurate image.
  3128. 1:57:09>> Yeah. Yeah. 100%. Man, we're going to p
  3129. 1:57:12pivot now to our to our final part here,
  3130. 1:57:14Jed. And I want to talk a little bit
  3131. 1:57:16about you. And so now, you know, you're
  3132. 1:57:18no longer like me. You're no longer in
  3133. 1:57:20the military. You got facial hair. You
  3134. 1:57:22haven't put on too many pounds. I've put
  3135. 1:57:23on far more than you, but we've put on a
  3136. 1:57:25couple of pounds. And we're no longer
  3137. 1:57:27serving.
  3138. 1:57:27>> Put on a peep out. Yeah.
  3139. 1:57:30[laughter and gasps] Hey, don't let Jed
  3140. 1:57:31fool you, dude. Dude, you used to run
  3141. 1:57:33marathons, right? You're quite you're a
  3142. 1:57:36hell of a lot more accomplished runner
  3143. 1:57:37than me, man. Um, when did you know it
  3144. 1:57:41was time to retire?
  3145. 1:57:42>> For me, it was it was because of deals
  3146. 1:57:45that that were made within the, you
  3147. 1:57:47know, within the military community. So,
  3148. 1:57:49I had a a kind of a handshake deal, a
  3149. 1:57:51drug deal with the ranch manager that
  3150. 1:57:53would allow me to stay in the DC area
  3151. 1:57:55because that was better for my
  3152. 1:57:57daughter's health.
  3153. 1:57:57>> Mhm. [clears throat]
  3154. 1:57:58>> Um because she needed medical care that
  3155. 1:57:59you couldn't get at Brack. Um but the
  3156. 1:58:02other side of that deal was that as soon
  3157. 1:58:04as as I had the chance to hang it up, I
  3158. 1:58:08would hang it up. And you know, that's
  3159. 1:58:10what I did.
  3160. 1:58:11>> Yep.
  3161. 1:58:12>> It was S Major Billot. He he took some
  3162. 1:58:16some risk and and did some work to, you
  3163. 1:58:19know, to to keep me there. But that's
  3164. 1:58:21probably why my daughter still alive
  3165. 1:58:24today.
  3166. 1:58:24>> And it's funny because Star Major
  3167. 1:58:27Millian and I, the first time we met, we
  3168. 1:58:30actually almost got into a fist fight.
  3169. 1:58:32>> We uh he was training us up for um
  3170. 1:58:37before we went up to Iraq. And uh you
  3171. 1:58:40know, he was kind of trying to be a hard
  3172. 1:58:41ass. was in in charge of the uh the SCUP
  3173. 1:58:44teams that were sporting the Rangers.
  3174. 1:58:46And so he was trying to be a hard ass
  3175. 1:58:48about, you know, our uh shooting. I'm
  3176. 1:58:50not very good shot. And he was making a
  3177. 1:58:53lot of uh a lot of uh uh you know,
  3178. 1:58:56putting a lot of pressure on us. And one
  3179. 1:58:58of the things he was saying is is you
  3180. 1:59:00know, he was he was saying something. He
  3181. 1:59:02was saying how, you know, he wanted our
  3182. 1:59:04shot our shot groups like, you know,
  3183. 1:59:06tight like our wife and stuff like that.
  3184. 1:59:07Eventually, I made this this nary
  3185. 1:59:09comment about his wife. It was really
  3186. 1:59:11inappropriate and I should not have made
  3187. 1:59:13and man he almost beat my ass and he
  3188. 1:59:15would have won. You know it uh he
  3189. 1:59:17restrained himself with
  3190. 1:59:18>> I think the Dungeons and Dragons
  3191. 1:59:20probably guys would have been proud of
  3192. 1:59:21your performance man.
  3193. 1:59:23>> He really came came through for me in
  3194. 1:59:25the end. He uh he made sure that that my
  3195. 1:59:28daughter had a chance at life.
  3196. 1:59:29>> Mhm.
  3197. 1:59:30>> Yeah. So,
  3198. 1:59:32>> speaking of your family, um, and we're
  3199. 1:59:34not going to use names here to protect
  3200. 1:59:36our family members, um, but how did your
  3201. 1:59:39career of service, you mentioned a
  3202. 1:59:41positive aspect was your daughter's, you
  3203. 1:59:43know, was able to get her because of the
  3204. 1:59:45stability that you were able to stay
  3205. 1:59:47here in the DC area and you were able to
  3206. 1:59:49take advantage of the good medical
  3207. 1:59:51system here, was able to have a very
  3208. 1:59:53positive impact on your on on your for
  3209. 1:59:55your daughter. But, you know, throughout
  3210. 1:59:57your entire career, you spent a lot of
  3211. 1:59:59time away from home. Um, how what kind
  3212. 2:00:01of can you give our listeners kind of a
  3213. 2:00:03some an idea of like what kind of
  3214. 2:00:06pressure and what the impact that
  3215. 2:00:08military family members face when
  3216. 2:00:11they're on that journey with their
  3217. 2:00:13service member.
  3218. 2:00:14>> It can be really rough. We depend upon,
  3219. 2:00:16you know, our our family members to to
  3220. 2:00:19take up the slap when when we're not
  3221. 2:00:21there. And it also means that when we
  3222. 2:00:24when we are home um they have to kind of
  3223. 2:00:27they have to to maintain control of all
  3224. 2:00:30these things you know just as though we
  3225. 2:00:32could go away at any time because it
  3226. 2:00:34takes a lot of effort to switch back
  3227. 2:00:36every time that goes through. For a lot
  3228. 2:00:38of years uh my wife was was was doing
  3229. 2:00:42everything for the family and uh and it
  3230. 2:00:46took a lot out of her. Um there was a
  3231. 2:00:48lot of hard decisions with my daughter's
  3232. 2:00:49healthcare that I wasn't there for and
  3233. 2:00:51that was that was very very hard on her.
  3234. 2:00:54>> Yeah.
  3235. 2:00:54>> As it happens, she was incredibly
  3236. 2:00:58um capable and she she did her research
  3237. 2:01:02and she made the right decisions, but
  3238. 2:01:05but it wasn't easy on her.
  3239. 2:01:06>> Yeah. Yeah. You have a very great family
  3240. 2:01:10unit, man. I love every single member of
  3241. 2:01:13of your family and uh you have a great
  3242. 2:01:15one. You're very blessed in that regard.
  3243. 2:01:18How do you care for your mind, body, and
  3244. 2:01:21spirit in the wake of everything that
  3245. 2:01:23you've been through in your career?
  3246. 2:01:25>> I guess what I've done is is try to try
  3247. 2:01:29to remove the worst influences on me
  3248. 2:01:34over time. I I had to give up drinking.
  3249. 2:01:37Um had to, you know, go to a and and get
  3250. 2:01:40that out of my life because it was
  3251. 2:01:42leading me into making some bad
  3252. 2:01:43decisions. I just wasn't sustainable.
  3253. 2:01:45that led me to a a relationship with God
  3254. 2:01:49that that the teenage me would have been
  3255. 2:01:52um a gas at, you know, it made me
  3256. 2:01:55rethink all of my ideas about, you know,
  3257. 2:01:59what God really was. And and I became I
  3258. 2:02:02became a religious person in ways that
  3259. 2:02:05that, you know, that I would have fought
  3260. 2:02:09tooth and nail against when I was, you
  3261. 2:02:12know, when I was a kid. The other thing
  3262. 2:02:13is that I've uh ended up writing a lot.
  3263. 2:02:16I've written a lot of poetry and this
  3264. 2:02:18t-shirt is actually the uh you know the
  3265. 2:02:20uh newsletter I guess of like military
  3266. 2:02:23poetry
  3267. 2:02:25>> where I get a lot of
  3268. 2:02:27>> it's the aiming circle. It's a guy um
  3269. 2:02:29Randy Sherper Brown who's actually a PA
  3270. 2:02:32guy um uh who you know uh now does does
  3271. 2:02:36poetry and uh you know runs a small
  3272. 2:02:39poetry press. And this is the the
  3273. 2:02:43news, you know, the uh newsletter, you
  3274. 2:02:46know, Patreon group, whatever that, you
  3275. 2:02:48know, that finds all the opportunities
  3276. 2:02:51for veteran fiction, uh, short stories,
  3277. 2:02:55poetry, and consolidates and make sure
  3278. 2:02:57that, you know, that, you know, the
  3279. 2:02:58community knows about these. that has
  3280. 2:03:01helped tremendously the ability to kind
  3281. 2:03:02of get out there some of that that vital
  3282. 2:03:05and and uh things that have built up
  3283. 2:03:07over the years and put that onto paper
  3284. 2:03:10and to try to see it from a different
  3285. 2:03:12perspective.
  3286. 2:03:13>> Um I'm also, you know, writing some some
  3287. 2:03:16science fiction, you know, cyberpunky
  3288. 2:03:18D&D uh kind of stuff. And you know, in
  3289. 2:03:22the spring, we're going to be me and a
  3290. 2:03:25bunch of of uh u you know, buddies from
  3291. 2:03:28from uh high school and college. We're
  3292. 2:03:31you know, putting together an anthology,
  3293. 2:03:33Limal Horizons. We're going to put that
  3294. 2:03:35out, you know, where I'm going to you
  3295. 2:03:37know, I'm able to get out some of those
  3296. 2:03:39those stories in a fictional context.
  3297. 2:03:42Things that that, you know,
  3298. 2:03:44>> can't talk about. That's a lot of the
  3299. 2:03:47>> that's what's really helped for me. No,
  3300. 2:03:49that's awesome, man. I mean, you're
  3301. 2:03:51you're
  3302. 2:03:53I' Now you're I guess you're This is
  3303. 2:03:56episode I think it's 11 or 12 and
  3304. 2:04:01four of you guys have been writers,
  3305. 2:04:05written books, written poetry, you know,
  3306. 2:04:08uh I guess a lot more have written
  3307. 2:04:10profession professional journals and uh
  3308. 2:04:14they all talk say the same thing, man.
  3309. 2:04:16Like writing is therapy. it is. There's
  3310. 2:04:19something about it that just really
  3311. 2:04:21helps you kind of I guess interpret your
  3312. 2:04:24life's events and then you're able to
  3313. 2:04:26share that with future generations.
  3314. 2:04:28>> Um, and yes, science fiction is a
  3315. 2:04:31contribution to future generations. I've
  3316. 2:04:33never read much science fiction because
  3317. 2:04:36I was a jock and I thought that stuff
  3318. 2:04:38was for dorks. So, I guess I'll have to
  3319. 2:04:40read your I have to read your stuff,
  3320. 2:04:42Jaden. I can't wait for it to come out.
  3321. 2:04:44[laughter]
  3322. 2:04:45>> I can't even pron I I think Starship
  3323. 2:04:48Trooper. Starship Trooper science
  3324. 2:04:50fiction. Do you consider that science
  3325. 2:04:51fiction?
  3326. 2:04:52>> Yes, it's absolutely science fiction.
  3327. 2:04:54And it's it's had a huge influence in
  3328. 2:04:57all kinds of ways. Some good, some bad.
  3329. 2:04:59>> Okay. I got some credit. Uh what was the
  3330. 2:05:01one? What was the one about the zombie
  3331. 2:05:03apocalypse? The AER that was written
  3332. 2:05:06>> World War Z.
  3333. 2:05:07>> That was a damn good book. Um I thought
  3334. 2:05:09that was
  3335. 2:05:10>> Max Brooks. Excellent. Yeah. [laughter]
  3336. 2:05:13>> So that's awesome, brother. Um now
  3337. 2:05:16something that uh I think is really
  3338. 2:05:18fascinating I want to kind of touch on
  3339. 2:05:19with you is um you're now embarking on
  3340. 2:05:22another journey and that is to get your
  3341. 2:05:23PhD in neuroscience.
  3342. 2:05:26Okay. First off tell them tell me what's
  3343. 2:05:28neuroscience because I don't think I
  3344. 2:05:29know what that is and then kind of like
  3345. 2:05:31what inspired you to go down that route.
  3346. 2:05:32>> So neuroscience was the the the career
  3347. 2:05:35that I kind of gave up when I joined the
  3348. 2:05:37military. I was um you know in the in
  3349. 2:05:40the mid 90s when I was you know
  3350. 2:05:42finishing my undergrad. um you know it
  3351. 2:05:45was the field called psychobiology or
  3352. 2:05:47biocsychology depending on what school
  3353. 2:05:48you were going to and it was just uh
  3354. 2:05:51looking at at the brain and behavior and
  3355. 2:05:54figuring out how those work together and
  3356. 2:05:56you know over over the time that I was
  3357. 2:05:59in the war that has developed you know
  3358. 2:06:01leaps and bounds and is now a a field
  3359. 2:06:04that has a huge amount of uh you know
  3360. 2:06:08it's it's gone from where we were just
  3361. 2:06:10kind of throwing ideas out against the
  3362. 2:06:13all and coming up with crazy theories
  3363. 2:06:16that couldn't be backed. And now we're
  3364. 2:06:17doing, you know, real impactful
  3365. 2:06:20interventions. So the the particular lab
  3366. 2:06:22that I'm in, we're going to be working
  3367. 2:06:24on, you know, neuro stimulation, um,
  3368. 2:06:26which is where we're, you know, putting
  3369. 2:06:28electrical currents into, you know,
  3370. 2:06:30different nerves to see how that that
  3371. 2:06:32impacts behavior. My project will
  3372. 2:06:35probably be on trust in AI systems with
  3373. 2:06:38veagal nerve stimulation. And you know
  3374. 2:06:41the way we're able to do this is we've
  3375. 2:06:42got a little device puts electrical
  3376. 2:06:44stimulations on the vagus nerve here and
  3377. 2:06:47uh that influences a lot of behavior.
  3378. 2:06:52There's a lot of interventions that are
  3379. 2:06:54now possible of non-invasive or mediumly
  3380. 2:06:58invasive
  3381. 2:06:59you know uh ways that we can directly
  3382. 2:07:02impact the nervous system in all kinds
  3383. 2:07:04of crazy ways. There was just a study
  3384. 2:07:06that came out where they used some some
  3385. 2:07:08mice and they were able to put a small
  3386. 2:07:12surgically implant a small device in the
  3387. 2:07:14scalp over the skull that shined light
  3388. 2:07:17into into the the genetically engineered
  3389. 2:07:20brains of of rats and then able to turn
  3390. 2:07:24on lights on the scalp above the skull
  3391. 2:07:28and that changed the the behavior that
  3392. 2:07:31these rats were doing on the inside. Um,
  3393. 2:07:33China is going leaps and bounds on this
  3394. 2:07:37stuff with brain computer interfaces.
  3395. 2:07:39they are going crazy for for different
  3396. 2:07:41ways that they can they can in practice
  3397. 2:07:44really engage with with the person at a
  3398. 2:07:47neural level and we are we have a lot of
  3399. 2:07:52good scientists but but uh the process
  3400. 2:07:54is much more difficult
  3401. 2:07:56>> for us to do because of you know FDA and
  3402. 2:07:59ethics and all these kinds of things and
  3403. 2:08:02uh so there's it's an interesting time
  3404. 2:08:05to be in it.
  3405. 2:08:06>> Yeah. I mean, when you talk about that
  3406. 2:08:07stuff, Jed, I mean, immediately my mind
  3407. 2:08:10starts to drift towards, oh boy, some
  3408. 2:08:13stuff that's very untoward, like, oh,
  3409. 2:08:14you know, this is human control and, you
  3410. 2:08:17know, we're going to we're going to live
  3411. 2:08:19in this, well, again, I've never read
  3412. 2:08:21any science fiction, so I can't say this
  3413. 2:08:23weird science fiction world where humans
  3414. 2:08:24are are able to think things and they
  3415. 2:08:28actually happen and we're able to have
  3416. 2:08:30our minds controlled. That's where my
  3417. 2:08:31mind goes. But neuroscience is
  3418. 2:08:34neuroscience there's a lot of positive
  3419. 2:08:35benefits to that sort of research and
  3420. 2:08:38innovation like in terms of treating
  3421. 2:08:40people with um
  3422. 2:08:42>> is so could you talk a little bit about
  3423. 2:08:44like the positive sides of that?
  3424. 2:08:46>> Sure. So it's really hard to do
  3425. 2:08:50something like like uh like do something
  3426. 2:08:53like a mind control issue. that is
  3427. 2:08:55extremely challenging and even if you
  3428. 2:08:57can get you know an implanted electrode
  3429. 2:09:00um the brain has a trauma response that
  3430. 2:09:02means that that you know most electrodes
  3431. 2:09:04are are going to become useless after
  3432. 2:09:07just a couple years and you've got you
  3433. 2:09:08know then massive trauma in the brain
  3434. 2:09:10what is very uh uh easy to do is
  3435. 2:09:14influence the systems that are already
  3436. 2:09:16designed to influence the nervous system
  3437. 2:09:17so I talked about so I mentioned like uh
  3438. 2:09:19the vagus nerve you've got you know
  3439. 2:09:20cranial nerves that are designed to
  3440. 2:09:22bring information from the body into the
  3441. 2:09:25mind and that is a kind of of
  3442. 2:09:29therapeutic input that has had uh huge
  3443. 2:09:32success. There are other kinds of of
  3444. 2:09:35minimally invasive methods including
  3445. 2:09:37things as simple as like uh like having
  3446. 2:09:40an EEG system which are now commercially
  3447. 2:09:42available for you know very very low
  3448. 2:09:45cost and you're you're simply listening
  3449. 2:09:48to audio stimulation that tell you how
  3450. 2:09:50calm you are and you're able to do much
  3451. 2:09:52better meditation
  3452. 2:09:54>> um just because you can hear how calm
  3453. 2:09:56you are uh and put yourself into the
  3454. 2:09:59right kind of mental states. almost all
  3455. 2:10:01of the the minimally of invasive stuff.
  3456. 2:10:04Uh the interventions that are done, you
  3457. 2:10:08know, with the body and with the
  3458. 2:10:10information systems that the body is
  3459. 2:10:12designed to to use can have huge
  3460. 2:10:15therapeutic effects. Large invasive
  3461. 2:10:17procedures, things like putting
  3462. 2:10:18electrodes into a brain, those are are
  3463. 2:10:22generally pretty challenging to do
  3464. 2:10:25anything good with because the brain
  3465. 2:10:27does not expect to get information that
  3466. 2:10:29way. Okay. And so there's a pretty good
  3467. 2:10:31chance that you're going to provide
  3468. 2:10:32you're going to provide [clears throat]
  3469. 2:10:33information. You're going to provide
  3470. 2:10:34something that doesn't come in the right
  3471. 2:10:36direction and it's going to it's going
  3472. 2:10:38going to degrade the performance of the
  3473. 2:10:40brain as a whole. It's like uh like most
  3474. 2:10:43most drugs the way they operate is
  3475. 2:10:45essentially like taking a sledgehammer
  3476. 2:10:46to the brain. They're they're uh putting
  3477. 2:10:49they're flooding the system with uh a
  3478. 2:10:52bunch of chemicals that are going to
  3479. 2:10:54have effect on some of these receptors
  3480. 2:10:56that you want and then a lot of
  3481. 2:10:57receptors that you don't. And it's it's
  3482. 2:10:59all happening all at the same time. And
  3483. 2:11:02you know, even the the best new designs,
  3484. 2:11:05you know, serotonin, selective re
  3485. 2:11:07reuptake um inhibitors like uh like you
  3486. 2:11:11know, standard anti-depressants, Prozac,
  3487. 2:11:13stuff like that. Those are are
  3488. 2:11:16sledgehammers in the brain. They have
  3489. 2:11:17all these these um unexpected side
  3490. 2:11:20effects and they're affecting systems
  3491. 2:11:22that you don't want to impact the way
  3492. 2:11:24that you are. And to a large degree, we
  3493. 2:11:26don't really understand how they
  3494. 2:11:28operate. There's huge mysteries in why
  3495. 2:11:31SSRIs, why they work the way they do,
  3496. 2:11:34and um why there is this huge lag before
  3497. 2:11:38they can actually start taking taking
  3498. 2:11:40effect. And we know that there is a
  3499. 2:11:42system that we don't understand that we
  3500. 2:11:44are somehow impacting. We know that
  3501. 2:11:46there there are things that we shouldn't
  3502. 2:11:48be doing, but you know, it's the tool
  3503. 2:11:51that we've got, and so we just keep
  3504. 2:11:52hammering away at the brain. um until we
  3505. 2:11:55get a better understanding.
  3506. 2:11:56>> That's very interesting. So um that's
  3507. 2:11:59very interesting. I mean, yeah, when you
  3508. 2:12:00when you say it that way, it becomes
  3509. 2:12:02more obvious to me like what the I mean,
  3510. 2:12:04you can really greatly improve the
  3511. 2:12:06quality of of of lives, um, with some of
  3512. 2:12:09those sorts of therapies that you're
  3513. 2:12:10talking about. Um, make us less
  3514. 2:12:12dependent upon what comes out of big
  3515. 2:12:14pharma, which I'm, you know, I'm not a
  3516. 2:12:18I'm not an expert and but like I'm I I I
  3517. 2:12:21I welcome that sort of research. I think
  3518. 2:12:24it's there's all sorts of great
  3519. 2:12:27possibilities. I mean, the other day
  3520. 2:12:29someone was talking to me about the the
  3521. 2:12:31VA should this is just another veteran.
  3522. 2:12:34Uh, and I haven't done any research on
  3523. 2:12:36this, so I I but we were just talking
  3524. 2:12:38about and he's like, "Man, the VA should
  3525. 2:12:39have dispensary for psychedelics, man.
  3526. 2:12:41This the the psychedelics can actually
  3527. 2:12:44have great great great um benefits for
  3528. 2:12:47people suffering from post-traumatic
  3529. 2:12:49stress." And my initial reaction was,
  3530. 2:12:52well, yeah, that'll never happen,
  3531. 2:12:54[laughter]
  3532. 2:12:54you know, because there's a stigma with
  3533. 2:12:56psychedelics and that kind of thing. But
  3534. 2:12:59when you think about it, it's actually
  3535. 2:13:01quite rational. If it helps to make
  3536. 2:13:02someone's life better, it helps them be
  3537. 2:13:04able to to deal with post-traumatic
  3538. 2:13:07stress, why not? That's the charter of
  3539. 2:13:11the organization, right? So, anyway, I
  3540. 2:13:13don't want to bash on the VA. It's not
  3541. 2:13:15it's not what we're here to do, but like
  3542. 2:13:16the stuff that you're talking about to
  3543. 2:13:18me, like that's the really interesting
  3544. 2:13:20Um, there's some really interesting
  3545. 2:13:22things that can come out of that that
  3546. 2:13:24can greatly improve the lives of of
  3547. 2:13:26everyone, but also for our veteran
  3548. 2:13:28community. It's it's pretty obvious
  3549. 2:13:30based on what you're telling me. What
  3550. 2:13:32kind of a program is that like a
  3551. 2:13:33five-year program or what's what's
  3552. 2:13:35what's that? What's that going to what
  3553. 2:13:37kind of work? I guess mine I was how
  3554. 2:13:39much work is that going to be for me,
  3555. 2:13:40man? Like what's what's kind of involved
  3556. 2:13:42with that?
  3557. 2:13:43>> The the program as a as a whole is
  3558. 2:13:45standard PhD program, you know, you
  3559. 2:13:46know, four or five years. Um the way I
  3560. 2:13:48got it is the first couple years I
  3561. 2:13:50essentially had to had to get my masters
  3562. 2:13:53um you know I have a masters that's in
  3563. 2:13:55unconventional warfare. It's not really
  3564. 2:13:57useful for neuroscience. It's not really
  3565. 2:14:00useful in the civilian world at all. Um
  3566. 2:14:02but yeah and I had to learn all the
  3567. 2:14:04things that had happened in 20 years um
  3568. 2:14:06that I hadn't been you know when I when
  3569. 2:14:09I left you know undergraduate school
  3570. 2:14:11that we didn't know about cannabonoids
  3571. 2:14:14you know in the brain. We didn't we had
  3572. 2:14:15no idea how THC worked and all of that
  3573. 2:14:18came up you know after I I spent two
  3574. 2:14:20years getting that essentially getting
  3575. 2:14:23that masters but the VA wouldn't pay for
  3576. 2:14:26me to get a masters cuz I already had
  3577. 2:14:27one and so I had to get a graduate
  3578. 2:14:29certificate which was a a um an 18month
  3579. 2:14:33program that ended up stretching to two
  3580. 2:14:35years to get almost the same thing as a
  3581. 2:14:39as a master's and then after that I was
  3582. 2:14:42able to get into the PhD program and
  3583. 2:14:44it'll another couple years.
  3584. 2:14:45>> Okay.
  3585. 2:14:46>> Um before I before I uh finally get out,
  3586. 2:14:49I should in the summer hopefully. Knock
  3587. 2:14:51on wood. Um
  3588. 2:14:54>> I should be advancing to candidacy and
  3589. 2:14:56then I'm just doing research instead of
  3590. 2:14:58going through, you know, the classes.
  3591. 2:14:59I'm just taking the last of the the
  3592. 2:15:01mandatory classes now.
  3593. 2:15:03>> That's awesome, man. Well,
  3594. 2:15:04congratulations, Jed. I mean, it's a
  3595. 2:15:07nice book into your career. started off
  3596. 2:15:09as, you know, a scioper, which is like,
  3597. 2:15:12you know, now you're turning to be a
  3598. 2:15:15neuroscientist. So, you're like have
  3599. 2:15:17this obsession with the brain, man. I I
  3600. 2:15:19kind of like that. Uh, didn't know that.
  3601. 2:15:22Didn't know about that about you until
  3602. 2:15:23we've chatted. Just want to wrap it up
  3603. 2:15:25by basically saying, you know, um, one
  3604. 2:15:28of the things I really enjoyed about
  3605. 2:15:29this conversation reminded me of
  3606. 2:15:31something very important. The military
  3607. 2:15:34has a very uh is a we're a mly crew,
  3608. 2:15:38right? Like we have a lot of people from
  3609. 2:15:40a lot of different backgrounds and like
  3610. 2:15:42a guy like you and a guy like me were
  3611. 2:15:45probably probably hung in different
  3612. 2:15:46circles when we're in high school,
  3613. 2:15:48right?
  3614. 2:15:49>> Yeah.
  3615. 2:15:50>> You know, but we ended up serving
  3616. 2:15:52together. We were in the same unit
  3617. 2:15:54together and we came together because it
  3618. 2:15:57was the military that kind of made that.
  3619. 2:15:59And that's one of the beautiful things
  3620. 2:16:00about the military. You have people from
  3621. 2:16:02all kinds of different backgrounds and
  3622. 2:16:04we come together and we serve on a team
  3623. 2:16:07and towards a common goal and and here
  3624. 2:16:10we are today. You and I are like close
  3625. 2:16:13family friends. I mean ain't life if
  3626. 2:16:16there's any there if there's anything
  3627. 2:16:18positive I can say about military
  3628. 2:16:19service it's that there's a lot I can
  3629. 2:16:21say positive about military service but
  3630. 2:16:22that's my favorite thing. We It's just
  3631. 2:16:24It's It's a great way to meet people
  3632. 2:16:26from all across the country with
  3633. 2:16:28different backgrounds. And in some
  3634. 2:16:31respects, that's kind of how America
  3635. 2:16:32should be, man. Like,
  3636. 2:16:34>> yeah,
  3637. 2:16:35>> we should not be fighting each other
  3638. 2:16:36over stupid We should be working
  3639. 2:16:38together to try to make a better life
  3640. 2:16:40for our families and for our country.
  3641. 2:16:42>> The military is the one organization
  3642. 2:16:43that has to be a melting pot all the
  3643. 2:16:46time because it has to represent the
  3644. 2:16:47whole country or else there's a big
  3645. 2:16:49risk.
  3646. 2:16:50>> That's right. And uh and in the end, you
  3647. 2:16:52know, that melting pot has to produce
  3648. 2:16:55something that is worth eating. Amen.
  3649. 2:16:57Brother, there is a message at the end.
  3650. 2:16:59>> Yes, sir. Well, Jed, I I appreciate you
  3651. 2:17:02spent a lot of time with me. I
  3652. 2:17:04appreciate very much you joining us and
  3653. 2:17:07uh you did a great job and I look
  3654. 2:17:09forward to uh well, our f we're family
  3655. 2:17:12friends, so I'll probably see you like
  3656. 2:17:13really soon. So,
  3657. 2:17:15>> yeah, [laughter]
  3658. 2:17:17>> it's great chatting you here, man. I
  3659. 2:17:19actually got to learn a lot about you I
  3660. 2:17:21didn't know. So, it was great and thank
  3661. 2:17:22you for joining us. Appreciate it.
  3662. 2:17:24>> Had a great conversation. So, uh
  3663. 2:17:26>> yeah, man.
  3664. 2:17:27>> Uh and hopefully all of the the uh the
  3665. 2:17:30backlash will be directed against you
  3666. 2:17:32and not me. So, [laughter]
  3667. 2:17:34>> you can count on it.
  3668. 2:17:38>> All right, brother.
  3669. 2:17:39>> Just misspell my name on the uh on the
  3670. 2:17:41YouTube notification.
  3671. 2:17:43>> I've already had my first like encounter
  3672. 2:17:45with a troll. I'll tell you about that
  3673. 2:17:46later.
  3674. 2:17:49All right, brother. Thank you so much.
  3675. 2:17:51Have a good weekend.

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