Cyberpunk, D&D, and Neuroscience--Jed Todd's Unconventional Journey to Iraq and Return to His Roots — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:00We keep saying we want innovation. We
- 0:02keep saying we want adaptability. We
- 0:04keep saying we want leaders who can
- 0:06think. But the minute someone takes a
- 0:08small risk, we punish them like they
- 0:10committed a war crime. And that's how
- 0:12institutions end up taking the big
- 0:14risks, the ones that get people killed.
- 0:17This is the beaten zone. And I'm John
- 0:19Mark Wilson.
- 0:21Today's guest is Jed Todd, Scot
- 0:24practitioner, Iraq veteran, information
- 0:26warfare junkie, and one of the smartest,
- 0:28most unique, most honest voices I know
- 0:31on what the military gets wrong about
- 0:33culture, command, and information
- 0:35statecraft.
- 0:37Jed doesn't talk about war like it's a
- 0:39PowerPoint or he's some kind of YouTube
- 0:41hero. No, he talks about like a dude who
- 0:44walked into the village, knocked on the
- 0:46door, and tried to keep things from
- 0:48getting worse. He was there in Baghdad
- 0:50in 2004 where he watched the country go
- 0:52from being barely stable to chaotic and
- 0:55seeing how decisions made far away lit
- 0:57the fuse on the ground. He tells stories
- 1:00that don't make the highlight real. How
- 1:02trust gets built, how it gets destroyed
- 1:05over something as small as a family
- 1:07shotgun, and how the nothing burger
- 1:09moments are the ones that echo for
- 1:11years. Then we zoom out. Russia,
- 1:14Ukraine, strategic culture, the
- 1:16information environment, how it gets
- 1:18manipulated, how it collapses, and why
- 1:20people grab on to wrong sources when
- 1:22credibility dies. Jed's argument is
- 1:25simple and brutal. In the information
- 1:27war, you don't win by making fewer
- 1:29mistakes. You win by making the next to
- 1:31last mistake. And after all that, he
- 1:34leaves the military, finds faith, writes
- 1:36poetry and cyberpunk fiction, and goes
- 1:39back to the one path he put on hold when
- 1:41he joined the army. neuroscience
- 1:44because in the end this episode isn't
- 1:46just about scop. It's about people. How
- 1:48systems reward cowardice, how wars get
- 1:51sold, how trust gets broken, and what it
- 1:54takes to rebuild a mind after you've
- 1:55seen too much. So, if you've ever
- 1:58wondered why we keep repeating the same
- 1:59mistakes, why we can't adapt, or why
- 2:02truth feels like it's always losing,
- 2:04you're going to want to hear this one.
- 2:06This is Jed Todd, and this is the beaten
- 2:08zone.
- 2:09>> And awesome. So, uh, Jed, you you're a
- 2:13student of all things Eastern Europe,
- 2:15Russia. You've dedicated your entire
- 2:17professional life really to studying
- 2:19culture, language, history, and then,
- 2:21you know, you've been a practitioner in
- 2:22that part of the world as well uh in
- 2:25national security. It's interesting that
- 2:27your first kind of big operational
- 2:29experience was in Bosnia. Now, what year
- 2:32uh did you get to Bosnia?
- 2:34>> So, I was in Bosnia in '98. the unit
- 2:36that I was in um augmented kind of to to
- 2:39fill the gap between European Union uh
- 2:42units and then there were the mission
- 2:44was being taken over by uh units on
- 2:47rotation from the US.
- 2:49>> Mhm.
- 2:49>> We were the the stock gap measure in
- 2:51between. They they you know put together
- 2:53a a team of folks grabbed from
- 2:56everywhere that that VCORE had access to
- 2:58and and sent them there. It was uh was
- 3:01kind of a weird situation for for me
- 3:05volunteering. I I had no objection to
- 3:08going. Politically, I had objections to
- 3:10the mission as a whole, but you know, I
- 3:11was but you know, on a personal level, I
- 3:14thought it it sounded like a good thing,
- 3:17but I didn't want to be recorded as
- 3:19volunteering. So, I was a real I was a
- 3:21real to my bosses,
- 3:23unfortunately. I I you know, kind of
- 3:25regret it now, but you know, I I kept
- 3:26telling them, "Hey, I have no no problem
- 3:28with going. And I think it makes sense.
- 3:30I don't want anybody to go, you know, as
- 3:31a family here or anything like that. Um,
- 3:34and I think I'm, you know, trained and
- 3:36in the right field and all that, but I I
- 3:38refuse to volunteer. I'm not willing to
- 3:40to say that I volunteer. And
- 3:42>> order me to go.
- 3:44>> Yeah. Yeah. I was I was telling him, you
- 3:46know, order me to go and I'll go. And so
- 3:48the uh the the master, I think, you
- 3:50know, she heard that as as you know, me
- 3:53just kind of making something for the
- 3:54record. And so then in one staff meeting
- 3:57where they they had all the people who
- 3:59were going to go when they were telling
- 4:00us what they were doing, you know, she
- 4:02introduced me as a volunteer and and you
- 4:04know, right in front of of you know,
- 4:06everybody there. I said, "No, no, I'm
- 4:07I'm not volunteering. I have no
- 4:08objection to going, but and I think I'm
- 4:10the right choice, but I refuse to
- 4:12volunteer." And you know, the the whole
- 4:14room is just sitting there. We've got a
- 4:16lot of things to go over. Why are you
- 4:17bringing this up? You know, why are you
- 4:18even making this a fight? And it was uh
- 4:21>> that is such an out of the ordinary
- 4:23move, Jed. Uh, I like that. Now, when
- 4:25you get there and you know the mission's
- 4:27going on and you know you guys are
- 4:30bringing stability to an area that's
- 4:33been fractured by ethnic cleansing and
- 4:36genocide. Did you feel like more
- 4:38personally attached like to the to the
- 4:40mission? Like, wow, this is really where
- 4:42I need to be right now. I'm doing good
- 4:43in the world. Did that ever feeling ever
- 4:45emerge during that time to kind of
- 4:46challenge your political kind of
- 4:48skepticism? It actually did almost as
- 4:51soon it really as soon as we as we got
- 4:54into country. So we came in we rented
- 4:57buses to go into country and literally
- 5:00you know took took uh you know a fleet
- 5:03of of buses with German drivers and they
- 5:07drove down the the highway. when we
- 5:09crossed, you know, the the river,
- 5:11crossed a bridge, and then they said,
- 5:12"Okay, everybody lock and load. You
- 5:13know, you're now in country." [laughter]
- 5:15And and they treated it the whole time I
- 5:19was here, they treated it as as very
- 5:21highstakes situation. Um, everything was
- 5:24was figured as though we were we were
- 5:26always on, we were required to always
- 5:29when we were outdoors have our helmet
- 5:31and have our body armor. But the body
- 5:33armor at that time was a flack vest, so
- 5:35it wouldn't actually do anything. It was
- 5:36just heavier. you know, even if you went
- 5:38up, you know, while you were on base, if
- 5:41if you, you know, got up in the middle
- 5:43of the night, you needed to go pee, you
- 5:44had to put on your your flack vest and
- 5:46and, you know, Kevlar to go do that. Um,
- 5:49and have your weapon with you, even
- 5:51though you couldn't have any rounds with
- 5:53you because you're on base and there's
- 5:55nothing going on. So, you know, you have
- 5:57to have this unloaded weapon with you at
- 5:59all times. It was the most absurd, you
- 6:03know, mission in a lot of ways that, you
- 6:05know, it was a very much performative,
- 6:07you know, it was it was security
- 6:08theater. We were doing a lot of security
- 6:10theater. So, you could tell that the
- 6:11risk wasn't to us when we were there.
- 6:14But as you're as we're driving through
- 6:16these villages, they they were really
- 6:19they were destroyed. And that was my
- 6:21first understanding of what had happened
- 6:24to the country. And I had been doing my
- 6:26my, you know, my research on what life
- 6:30in in Yugoslavia was like before the
- 6:32war.
- 6:33>> Um, I had a pretty good understanding of
- 6:34it. And I kept contrasting the images of
- 6:37what I was seeing with what I understood
- 6:40about uh about the country
- 6:43>> and that contrast to me was was
- 6:45shocking. you know, it was uh it was
- 6:47something very I I knew intellectually
- 6:50that, you know, things had kind of
- 6:52collapsed, but seeing it was very
- 6:55different. And then you're you're
- 6:56talking to, you know, to these people on
- 7:00base who should have a very normal life
- 7:03and in their interactions with each
- 7:04other, um they're having a very normal
- 7:07life. And you know, a year ago, they had
- 7:10their capital where,
- 7:13you know, neighbors were sitting up on
- 7:14the hills, you know, literally shooting
- 7:17each other's children for for no
- 7:19particular reason whatsoever. No reason
- 7:21that any of them could, you know, could
- 7:23articulate. Nobody had a good cause for
- 7:26what was going on. Nobody had anything
- 7:27they were fighting for. You know, the
- 7:29the more you you dug into it, the less
- 7:32and less there was at the heart of what
- 7:35had happened
- 7:36>> Mhm. that big mystery, you know, why did
- 7:39this happen? Over the course of it, I
- 7:40came to realize that there there just
- 7:42wasn't any answer. It was was just a
- 7:46matter of things being allowed to go
- 7:48really wrong because no one tried to
- 7:51stop it.
- 7:51>> No one tried hard enough to stop it at
- 7:53the time.
- 7:54>> And then once it got a certain critical
- 7:56mass, then it was impossible to recover.
- 7:59You know, it was breaking an egg.
- 8:01>> Yeah. What struck me a lot is that, you
- 8:06know, the kind of tensions that were
- 8:08there in Bosnia back in the day, that
- 8:10wasn't all that different from the kind
- 8:12of tensions we had, you know, in in the
- 8:14valley in Texas. You know, it wasn't all
- 8:16that different from the community
- 8:18tensions that I had grown up with all my
- 8:20life. The difference was that that no
- 8:22one had tried to tried to make an issue
- 8:25of it the way they did in Boston. No one
- 8:27had no one had become a a a uh
- 8:30propheteer on polarization and political
- 8:33divides and they they did in Bosnia.
- 8:36That struck me as something that I
- 8:38didn't immediately decide that you know
- 8:41intervention is a good thing or you know
- 8:44US foreign policy is suddenly noble or
- 8:48anything like that. Slowly I came to
- 8:50realize that you know we're we're trying
- 8:52to do the right thing more than we're
- 8:53trying to do the wrong thing. But at the
- 8:55time, what really occurred to me is that
- 8:58whether or not I agree with US policy,
- 9:00it's worth it to keep this from
- 9:03happening in my home.
- 9:05>> Mhm. Yeah.
- 9:06>> You know, keep the war somewhere else.
- 9:08>> Yeah. We'll come back to some of these
- 9:10topics later on when we start talking
- 9:11about inside the United States and the
- 9:13future of the US when we talk about a
- 9:16variety of topics. So, you made the
- 9:18decision after your time was over, you
- 9:22made a decision to reinlist, which is
- 9:24interesting because, you know, your
- 9:27profile like, okay, cool. I'm like this,
- 9:29you know, I'm like this KO Institute
- 9:31poster child, you know, on on
- 9:34intervention and I'm going to I'm going
- 9:36to go in and serve so that no one can
- 9:37call me a coward. You know, I'm not
- 9:39speaking for you is how I interpreting
- 9:41our conversation this far. and and all
- 9:43you wanted it was important to you that
- 9:45you that you had skin in the game that
- 9:47you had that personal perspective as you
- 9:49but you reinlist you reinlisted and I'm
- 9:51going to ask you why
- 9:52>> I didn't do it immediately I um you know
- 9:55when when I transitioned out I was
- 9:58completely in the you know burn my
- 10:00uniform kind of mentality and in fact uh
- 10:02you know one of the meetings of the
- 10:04transition process was you talk to a guy
- 10:06who's recruiting for the National Guard
- 10:08Reserve and uh his argument to me was
- 10:11look you know This was in 1999. And his
- 10:14argument to me is that, you know, you
- 10:16you you're still on you you're still on
- 10:19the line for another four years. You
- 10:21know, you've got IRR uh for that time.
- 10:23And if anything pops up in those four
- 10:25years, you're draft bait and you'll be
- 10:28the first scent. And you know, this was
- 10:30his argument because he knew how I was
- 10:32how I was acting with the military. And
- 10:34I looked at him dead in the face and I
- 10:36said, "Yeah, like something's going to
- 10:37happen in the next four years. I'll take
- 10:38my chances." And I was a complete jerk.
- 10:40you could see like his veins starting to
- 10:42pop. Um, [laughter]
- 10:44you know, and I always think that that
- 10:47that that
- 10:48>> I'm sorry
- 10:49>> that he must have like
- 10:51>> That's such a baller move, Jed. I
- 10:53[laughter]
- 10:54knowing you as long as I've known you, I
- 10:58I'm sorry. I didn't mean to cut you off.
- 11:00Go ahead, man. [laughter]
- 11:02>> So, I know this guy, you know, after 911
- 11:05when when the dust has kind of settled,
- 11:07we start, you know, they start
- 11:08activating folks. I know he was just
- 11:09thinking that jerk finally got what was
- 11:12coming to him. He's he's you know on
- 11:14error. I I wasn't on error out of that
- 11:16time. When I left the army I you know I
- 11:18bummed around. I did some you know crazy
- 11:20stuff. I uh bummed around Europe for for
- 11:23a few months. Uh was in St. Petersburg
- 11:25studying at a school for a couple of
- 11:28months and then I I came back to the US
- 11:30and enrolled in in school again. And as
- 11:34soon as I got into college, it it took a
- 11:36couple of months and I realized I was I
- 11:37didn't fit in there that much anymore.
- 11:40And I um I was missing something. I was
- 11:43lacking something. And so that's when I
- 11:45decided to join the reserves.
- 11:46>> Mhm.
- 11:46>> And it was largely because of of the
- 11:50difficulty I had getting back the life
- 11:53that that that I thought I wanted this
- 11:55whole time.
- 11:56>> Yeah.
- 11:56>> And I found out that I really didn't
- 11:58anymore. You know, I wanted something. I
- 12:00wanted to be something other than the
- 12:01the snot-nosed kids that I that I had
- 12:04been when I left.
- 12:06>> Mhm.
- 12:06>> And I I remember like uh one of my
- 12:08friends held a um they held a Fourth of
- 12:10July party. This was just when I had
- 12:12gotten back, you know, it was a couple
- 12:13of months that that I had been been home
- 12:16and they had a bunch of of plastic flags
- 12:19all around. and some, you know,
- 12:22snot-nosed little little punk just like
- 12:24me a few years ago was picking up the
- 12:26flags and like burning them because he
- 12:28thought it'd be, you know, funny
- 12:29gesture. And I I thought it was a jerk
- 12:32move, you know, when I said so. Um, I
- 12:34didn't try to stop him. I didn't, you
- 12:36know, get in his face or anything, but I
- 12:38said, "Hey, this is, you know, there's
- 12:40no point in this. This is just
- 12:41destruction. You're not making any
- 12:43point. This is a party. These people,
- 12:45you know, what's the what's the
- 12:48political message here?" you know that
- 12:49that all of these drunks should what and
- 12:53my friends uh you know when I was
- 12:55complaining about it one of my friends
- 12:57said you know you've kind of turned into
- 12:59a cryptofascist I thought this is not
- 13:02this is this is not what I signed up for
- 13:04this is and I realized that that by the
- 13:08standards that I had had when I when I
- 13:11left college he was right he was
- 13:13speaking from the same place that that I
- 13:15had been in that time and so I thought
- 13:18all right if if I'm if I'm this changed,
- 13:21I want to at least keep touch with this
- 13:24part of my life. And so I joined the
- 13:26reserves so that I wouldn't lose touch
- 13:28with this thing that that I had that had
- 13:30also become a part of me,
- 13:32>> you know, the the the service.
- 13:35>> So what uh we're going to talk about
- 13:37your That's really cool, man. We're
- 13:39going to talk a little bit about your
- 13:40transition into psychological
- 13:42operations. But before we do that, I
- 13:44want to ask you to just very briefly in
- 13:47plain language, what are psychological
- 13:49operations for the folks who who may be
- 13:51not familiar with it?
- 13:52>> So psychological operations is that
- 13:54field that our whole purpose is to
- 13:57introduce behavioral change on the
- 13:59battlefield using non-lethal means. And
- 14:01that that's all it is. Our purpose is to
- 14:03go there and use whatever measures that
- 14:06we can to get people to do things that
- 14:09will help the commander accomplish the
- 14:10tactical mission that is required with
- 14:13something other than than shooting. And
- 14:15that can mean, you know, doing
- 14:16loudspeaker operations. That can mean
- 14:18putting out leaflets. That can be as
- 14:20simple as, you know, as talking to the
- 14:22local police chief and making sure that
- 14:24that he has an understanding of, you
- 14:26know, who to talk to so that so that
- 14:27there aren't misunderstandings on the
- 14:29ground. It's a wide range of of
- 14:32activities. The only common feature to
- 14:35it is that that we're trying to
- 14:37introduce peace into war. Essentially,
- 14:40we're trying to find a non-lethal
- 14:44solution to the battlefield problems
- 14:45that the commander has.
- 14:47>> Yep. That's a a great, you know, a great
- 14:49job to have
- 14:51>> on the battlefield is, you know, when,
- 14:54you know, you can go in there and by
- 14:58talking to, you know, to somebody there,
- 15:00you can, you know, short circuit the the
- 15:03whole process of of what could be a very
- 15:06messy, unanticipated situation.
- 15:08>> Yeah, Jed, that's a very uh good
- 15:11description. And I think for some of the
- 15:13folks who maybe are looking for some
- 15:15sort of historic example to kind of like
- 15:17provide some some color to that and
- 15:20we'll talk about your time in Iraq later
- 15:21on where you're going to talk to us
- 15:22about the things you did on the
- 15:23battlefield, but I think a lot of people
- 15:25at home maybe are maybe or maybe not
- 15:27familiar with the ghost soldiers of
- 15:28World War II. They're kind of considered
- 15:30to be like the legendary sciopers,
- 15:32right? Can you talk to us just briefly
- 15:35about
- 15:36>> who they were and kind of what they were
- 15:37charged with doing and and particularly
- 15:39their role in Normandy um to enable that
- 15:42whole operation?
- 15:43>> So the the Ghost Army was this uh this
- 15:47operation set up by the military to to
- 15:50create the mistaken impression that
- 15:51there was going to be a landing and
- 15:55major land invasion of Europe coming in
- 15:57a different direction. And it was just
- 15:59it was just the the you know a large
- 16:01scale deception operation where we would
- 16:03put out pull out all the stops and make
- 16:06make the Germans believe that we were
- 16:09going to do something differently than
- 16:11what we were actually doing so that the
- 16:13guys who were going on Normandy would
- 16:15not be facing the the uh uh main force
- 16:18of the German army. Instead they would
- 16:20spread it out and be looking at at other
- 16:22options at the time. And the way they
- 16:24did that is they got a whole bunch of
- 16:27crazy foreigners um at Camp Richie in
- 16:30Pennsylvania and they put them together
- 16:32there and said, "Look, you know, come up
- 16:34with different ways to create the
- 16:36impression that there's, you know, that
- 16:38there's this other army that that really
- 16:39isn't there. Do anything you need to to
- 16:42do that. you know, whether that's that's
- 16:43whether that's, you know, make blowup
- 16:45tanks, uh whether that's um introduce
- 16:48fake intelligence operations that that
- 16:51will um that will be there if it's talk
- 16:54to to the the newspapers and get them to
- 16:57print, you know, personal ads that will
- 16:59say this and this American from this
- 17:01unit is looking for a contact from this
- 17:04unit. Um, it was to craft a whole
- 17:06picture that would ensure that the the
- 17:09Germans, all of their intelligence
- 17:11assets would convince them of something
- 17:13that was manifestly and obviously not
- 17:15true.
- 17:16>> Mhm.
- 17:16>> Um, and the reason it worked is because
- 17:19it it it did the main thing that, you
- 17:22know, SCUP always does is that you don't
- 17:24try to convince someone of of something
- 17:26that they they don't believe. you find
- 17:28out what they believe that is
- 17:30advantageous to you and you reinforce
- 17:32that,
- 17:33>> you know, as much as you can. And so
- 17:36they knew that there were certain ideas
- 17:39that the Germans um had about what the
- 17:42Americans were doing. And we just made
- 17:44sure that there was lots of paperwork
- 17:45and observables and and things out there
- 17:48to convince them that this was indeed
- 17:50what was happening. That there that we
- 17:52had um we were going to conduct a a
- 17:54large scale landing in in Norway and
- 17:57that we were also going to um the main
- 18:00force was going to come from I think it
- 18:02was uh um Sardinia, you know, and from
- 18:05the south rather than Normandy. So that
- 18:07the idea was that when Normandy actually
- 18:09happened, Hitler would be convinced that
- 18:10this was a faint so that he wouldn't put
- 18:13his main forces up against those guys
- 18:16and they would have, you know, a couple
- 18:17of weeks before he figured out that he
- 18:18had been fooled.
- 18:19>> Yeah.
- 18:20>> And it it worked like a charm. He he,
- 18:23you know, diverted a lot of resources to
- 18:25defending Norway and the South when
- 18:28really, you know, it was very obvious
- 18:30that we had a whole bunch of ships that
- 18:32were that were about to come over and
- 18:34land on Normandy.
- 18:35>> Yeah. I didn't really appreciate it
- 18:37until I actually walked the battlefield
- 18:39in Normandy. You know, getting on the
- 18:41beach, it's widely known how difficult
- 18:43that was, particularly at Omaha Beach.
- 18:45But I still contend that the real
- 18:48deception that was put on ensured that
- 18:51we were able to fight through the hedge.
- 18:52It wasn't really about establishing a
- 18:54hole in the beach
- 18:55>> because it took it took a lot of time
- 18:57for the Germans to be able to reinforce
- 19:00what they would ultimately find out
- 19:02would be this was the main thrust of the
- 19:04attack. And and that translates not only
- 19:06to achieving operational objectives and
- 19:07fighting through the hedros. It saved
- 19:10untold numbers of lives, civilians,
- 19:13allies, access power lives. I mean, in
- 19:16in totality, it just saved a lot of
- 19:18lives and and and accelerated the
- 19:21completion of the war. That gives our
- 19:23folks at home kind of an understanding
- 19:24of what psychological operations, the
- 19:27legacy of psychological operations. I
- 19:29wanted to ask
- 19:29>> that wasn't called SCUP at the time
- 19:31though. That was
- 19:32>> that was when it was still it was still
- 19:34thought of as intelligence. It became
- 19:36understood a during during World War II
- 19:40is when an understanding of of sty and
- 19:42cy appeared. You know the SF guys would
- 19:46hate it when you say this but at the
- 19:48time they they decided they would do
- 19:49psychological warfare and it was you
- 19:51know that was a part of it. You the
- 19:53active army component you know doing all
- 19:54these these deception operations. There
- 19:56was also what the the OSS was doing with
- 19:59the Jedberg Jedberg guys and things like
- 20:01that. And so they also appeared as
- 20:04coming from from psychological warfare.
- 20:07And it wasn't until Vietnam really that
- 20:11SCOP was cut off from the rest of
- 20:14intelligence and special operations was
- 20:17kind of divided in into the uh the
- 20:20kinetic component
- 20:22which is you know SF and the the
- 20:26psychological component. And I'm not
- 20:27entirely convinced that this has been a
- 20:31I don't think anyone, you know, in the
- 20:32community thinks that that there is a a
- 20:35clean line that that is there or should
- 20:37be there. And it's it's it's one that
- 20:39we've been squabbbling at, you know,
- 20:40ever since.
- 20:41>> Not to get too wonky here because this
- 20:44conversation can go on for hours and
- 20:46it'll bore everyone. However, you bring
- 20:49up a really good point. If the
- 20:51intelligence community maintains, you
- 20:54know, proponency for that kind of thing,
- 20:59we'll call it SCOP. There are some
- 21:00pretty, I think, some advantages to
- 21:03that. The first being that the
- 21:06intelligence community, because they own
- 21:07it, part of SCOP is actually confirming
- 21:11that the things that you're trying to
- 21:12do, there's progress towards that. Well,
- 21:15that requires intelligence assets,
- 21:17right? So if the intelligence community
- 21:19has proponency for that, they're going
- 21:21to be incentivized and motivated to use
- 21:24their trade craft to confirm that the
- 21:27deception story is working right now
- 21:30that it's been kind of separated from
- 21:31the intelligence community. And it goes
- 21:33back to when you and I were in the field
- 21:34in the Middle East doing this stuff.
- 21:36Getting the intel guys to actually
- 21:38commit resources to confirming that our
- 21:41work is is progressing as it should was
- 21:43like pulling teeth, man.
- 21:45>> Right. Now you're taking resources away
- 21:47from real army stuff. It's something
- 21:49that our our viewers should just ponder,
- 21:52but you know we we we shouldn't have a
- 21:54long conversation about this, but you
- 21:56bring up a really interesting point. I
- 21:57never really considered that. Um did I
- 22:00interpret kind of your you kind of think
- 22:02>> yeah there is a part of me that re
- 22:04reacts instinctively to the idea of like
- 22:06you know scot being pushed under
- 22:08intelligence and you know I want to shy
- 22:11away from it but but there is some value
- 22:15to it. The big problem that there is
- 22:18with it is that that this may be a
- 22:20result of that kind of divorce is that
- 22:22that the intelligence community is
- 22:24really bad historically and especially
- 22:27today at looking at anything that is is
- 22:31beyond you know exquisite sensors and
- 22:34it's been it's a real problem for SCAP
- 22:37for information operations for anything
- 22:39like that.
- 22:40>> There's a lot of things that you can
- 22:41tell just from from what is open source.
- 22:45It is often more significant looking at
- 22:48that because you can look at it you can
- 22:49look at you know the aggregate of a
- 22:51whole lot of sensors that you don't have
- 22:53with Intel. Like with Intel you may have
- 22:55you know a couple of sensors who are
- 22:56telling you exactly where these units or
- 22:59these selectors are moving to. With
- 23:01academics you have thousands of people
- 23:04who are writing about you know what they
- 23:06know about what's going on in the world.
- 23:08And as you know, their sources of
- 23:10information get better and better with
- 23:12the internet, with um commercial
- 23:14satellite imagery, with things like
- 23:16this, all of these sources of
- 23:17information are growing exponentially.
- 23:20Whereas our ability to you know develop
- 23:23exquisite sensors that that you know go
- 23:25exactly where we want that does not grow
- 23:27the same way. You know, it it grows
- 23:29linearly. And so there's been this
- 23:30explosion in capabilities, but the intel
- 23:33community has more or less looked away
- 23:36from from anything that that is not is
- 23:40not from a classified source.
- 23:42>> Yeah.
- 23:42>> You know, if it's if it doesn't have,
- 23:44you know, a classification on it, then
- 23:46it's not worth looking at. And
- 23:47everything that is of value in in uh in
- 23:51basic research for SCIA is going to be
- 23:54you know unclassified coming from
- 23:56academics coming from talking to people
- 23:59inherently
- 24:00>> from civil society open information from
- 24:02civil society media um especially now
- 24:05since so much information is out there
- 24:07for you guys to potentially chew on
- 24:09>> and to you know that feedback loop
- 24:12coming from the target audience the the
- 24:14things that shape the target audience's
- 24:16perspective.
- 24:17That to me should be an essential part
- 24:19of intelligence collection. [laughter]
- 24:21Like not just to collect it, but to but
- 24:23to analyze it, process it, and then feed
- 24:26it into the operation cycle so that guys
- 24:28like you [clears throat]
- 24:30>> can then make recommendations to the
- 24:32commander about our operations are not
- 24:34progressing as well as you think they
- 24:35are because this is this is how the the
- 24:37population perceives it.
- 24:39>> Yeah.
- 24:40>> Right.
- 24:41>> This is exactly
- 24:42>> what you're describing, Jed. And and and
- 24:44coming back to you now, this I can see
- 24:47the attraction because you're a very
- 24:48switched on guy like you you I can see
- 24:51the attraction like this is a a scop
- 24:53right because this is a thinking
- 24:54person's game. Is that that challenge
- 24:58that kind of heavy intellectual
- 25:00challenge kind of something that
- 25:01attracted you to this career field?
- 25:03>> It's not what attracted me to the career
- 25:04field, but it's why I stayed in the
- 25:06career field. It's it's what kept it
- 25:08going for me.
- 25:09>> [clears throat]
- 25:09>> So coming out of out of an intel
- 25:11background when I first got into to SCIP
- 25:13the first thing I did is you know start
- 25:15looking at at what kind of intel
- 25:16resources are there for for doing
- 25:18planning and target audience analysis
- 25:20stuff like that and I figured out real
- 25:21quickly that there wasn't any. And so I
- 25:23immediately knowing what was actually
- 25:25out there I I never put as as my highest
- 25:29priority doing research from from the
- 25:32intel side of things. I started looking
- 25:33at at academic and open- source
- 25:35information and the fact that that that
- 25:39I prioritized the open source
- 25:41information over anything on the
- 25:43classified side made sure that that I
- 25:45was a lot quicker about, you know,
- 25:47getting this information there. I had a
- 25:48lot more sources and they were usually
- 25:52more accurate than what the folks who
- 25:54were, you know, doing the traditional
- 25:56MDMP process, what they were saying
- 25:58because they were going first to Intel
- 26:00and then refining from there. Going
- 26:01first to exquisite intel to, you know,
- 26:03traditional intelligence disciplines.
- 26:06That was a a large part of why I was
- 26:08successful in SCAP is because I was
- 26:11willing to to court those those types of
- 26:14information. I'm not I'm not a great
- 26:16salesman, you know. Not I'm not the kind
- 26:17of of friendly person who is generally
- 26:21successful in SI but my research put me
- 26:24over
- 26:26you know over a lot of my peers
- 26:28>> and that enabled me to see things coming
- 26:30that they they didn't and when you were
- 26:32in a situation where there was
- 26:33absolutely no resources no intel you
- 26:36know focus at all had had been looking
- 26:38at it I could still produce information
- 26:40and analysis and that enabled people you
- 26:43know enabled me to succeed despite you
- 26:46know my my tactical shortcomings.
- 26:48>> So, like with the Ghost Army, reading
- 26:50about the type of characters that
- 26:53participated and set that whole thing
- 26:54up. I'm reading about the Battle of
- 26:56Midway now. And what allowed the Battle
- 26:58of Midway to be successful was that you
- 27:01had this really kind of odd, I'll call
- 27:04them odd duck elements of intelligence
- 27:07folks and people who thought in terms of
- 27:09like deception, etc., that were able to
- 27:12kind of do their work and deliver timely
- 27:15information to Nimmits that allowed him
- 27:18to make the decision about Midway and
- 27:21they were able to score that major
- 27:23victory that was enabled by people that
- 27:25were kind of outsiders and didn't fit
- 27:27the the traditional mold. I guess what
- 27:29I'm pointing to is what sort of
- 27:32characters are the best kind of
- 27:34characters for SCOP good SCPers.
- 27:36>> So I think there are two different
- 27:39components. Mhm.
- 27:40>> In SCOP, there's the the folks who are
- 27:43really good at uh at integrating with
- 27:45the supported unit and you know are good
- 27:49instinctive salesmen and then there's
- 27:51the people who are really good at the at
- 27:53kind of the backend you know the
- 27:55research and understanding of of the
- 27:57target audience. The front-end guys, the
- 28:00folks who are who are good at that are
- 28:02those who have a uh they have a
- 28:04background that enables them to talk to
- 28:06the tactical tactical folks. that they,
- 28:09you know, come out of some other kind
- 28:11of, you know, combat arms, uh,
- 28:13background where they can, they
- 28:15understand, you know, what the commander
- 28:17wants and they know what what the
- 28:19objectives actually are and they're able
- 28:21to communicate that effective. Then the
- 28:23backend guys, those tend to to be either
- 28:26coming from kind of like an Intel
- 28:28background or they come out of something
- 28:31completely off-the-wall, you know, uh uh
- 28:34they're data science guys or the
- 28:36computer guys or they're, you know,
- 28:37they're artists or they're they're
- 28:40missionary kids, something like that
- 28:42where they have this this wealth of
- 28:44knowledge and you know, it's a bunch of
- 28:45weirdos. So, you know, you've got to to
- 28:48use Hexus terms, you've got the weirdos
- 28:50and the weirdos. And SCAP is the
- 28:52combination between that. You know, the
- 28:54the guys who can who can uh push forward
- 28:58and and you know, talk to talk to the
- 29:00guys on the ground and the beardos, and
- 29:02then you've got the weirdos who um
- 29:04support them providing the information
- 29:05that they need. I was definitely one of
- 29:07the weirdos. [laughter] I'm trying to
- 29:09fake it, but yeah.
- 29:10>> You're not fooling anyone, my man. The
- 29:13[laughter]
- 29:13>> the This is really interesting. We all
- 29:16recognize how important this stuff is
- 29:18from your example World War II with the
- 29:20Ghost Army, my example with Midway, how
- 29:22they put out there in the ether that
- 29:25like, hey, our freshwater compressor on
- 29:26Midway is broken and the the adversary
- 29:30took the bait and they were able to get
- 29:31that feedback loop and they say, "Aha,
- 29:33that's where the fight will take place,
- 29:36right?" And allowed Nemits to to stay a
- 29:39couple of steps ahead. So for me, the
- 29:42question is, we know how important this
- 29:43stuff is. we learned in Iraq and
- 29:44Afghanistan like how important this
- 29:46stuff was and I don't think we did that
- 29:47great of a job there. We'll talk more
- 29:49about that later. And now looking in the
- 29:50future of the battlefield with
- 29:52artificial intelligence and all these
- 29:54advanced sensors, you know, these sorts
- 29:56of things are going to are going to
- 29:58determine victory and defeat. They're
- 29:59going to determine casualties or not
- 30:01casualties, right?
- 30:03>> [clears throat]
- 30:03>> So, if you were recruiting the ideal
- 30:06kind of person for that, we'll call it
- 30:08the back-end job, what sort of people
- 30:11should we be actually going out and
- 30:12recruiting to do these sorts of jobs?
- 30:14And do they conveniently fall on that
- 30:16beardo weirdor continuum or should we
- 30:19really be looking for people with very
- 30:21specific skill sets and traits that we
- 30:23say we can bring this person on board
- 30:26doesn't fit the mold but they have skill
- 30:28sets that we can put to use in helping
- 30:30us be more creative in terms of how we
- 30:32deter conflict and how we when god
- 30:35forbid conflict kicks off. So, it is
- 30:38hard to recruit weirdos,
- 30:40>> but that is exactly what we need right
- 30:43now. And the beardos, the beardos you
- 30:46can generally recruit pretty easy
- 30:47because it's a matter of, you know,
- 30:48looking at the rest of the army and
- 30:50saying, "Hey, look, this is a better
- 30:51deal than what you're doing now. You
- 30:53know, you can continue to paint rocks
- 30:54for a while or you can go do some more
- 30:56fun missions." And, you know, that's a
- 30:58pretty easy sell. People will buy that.
- 31:00Um, the weirdos, these are people who
- 31:03shouldn't be in the army for one reason
- 31:04or another. either they shouldn't be in
- 31:06the army because because they're, you
- 31:08know, they're artsy and, you know, have
- 31:11a lot of strong opinions or because they
- 31:14they have uh, you know, family or
- 31:17emotional ties that that uh give them a
- 31:20greater understanding of your your
- 31:22adversary and your target audience or
- 31:24they are there are people who, you know,
- 31:26should be out on Silicon Valley making
- 31:28hundreds of thousands of dollars a year
- 31:30um because they have that background or
- 31:32that that you know they have been doing
- 31:34some stuff that may be illegal if it was
- 31:36found out. These are the folks who make
- 31:38good weirdos and you get a bunch of
- 31:39those together and you know you can you
- 31:42can craft something that that will
- 31:44really effectively you know change
- 31:46what's going on on the battlefield. Um
- 31:48but they're they're hard to to get into
- 31:52the military during peace time.
- 31:55>> Yeah. Now, during war, it's it's not so
- 31:58hard because, you know, the the weirdos
- 32:01are are doing weird things and sooner or
- 32:03later they'll end up in a situation
- 32:05where the recruiters who were scraping
- 32:07the bottom of the barrel are going to
- 32:08scoop them up anyways.
- 32:09>> Yeah.
- 32:09>> But in peace time, they're the folks who
- 32:11nobody wants.
- 32:12>> So, how do you keep a weirdo during
- 32:14peace time where we're supposed to be
- 32:16thinking about the future and we're
- 32:17supposed to be thinking about the future
- 32:19and positioning ourselves so that we can
- 32:20be successful in the next war? In peace
- 32:22time, how do you keep weirdos happy?
- 32:25What sort of things does the army need
- 32:27to do to keep weirdos not happy but
- 32:30engaged, stimulated, focused on their
- 32:33craft?
- 32:33>> That's something that I I think CyberCom
- 32:36is killing itself over. They have got
- 32:39all of these people who they are
- 32:40training to be weirdos. You know,
- 32:41they're they're collecting people who
- 32:43have, you know, an understanding of
- 32:45these systems, you know, greater than
- 32:47anyone else. They're training them with
- 32:48with tools and tradecraft um that enable
- 32:51them to understand, you know, what's
- 32:54going on in in the operational
- 32:55environment. They're and then they're
- 32:58putting them and there's they're boxing
- 33:00them in with all these rules and
- 33:01regulations that completely alienate the
- 33:04kind of guys that they actually need to
- 33:05be operators. And you know, as soon as
- 33:08they finish finish training, they leave.
- 33:10>> Yeah.
- 33:10>> Because they're they're bored out of
- 33:11their heads. And what you need to do is
- 33:13you need to give them the opportunity to
- 33:16to do something. These guys are not
- 33:18motivated by money or status. What
- 33:21they're motivated by is the ability to
- 33:23do something wild. The more
- 33:24opportunities you have, the more likely
- 33:27they are to stay. So like Africom, if
- 33:29you look at at you know at the
- 33:31components of large, there is a a weird
- 33:34uh amount of you know old Africa hands
- 33:37who are now you know at at at great
- 33:40positions across the the information
- 33:42warfare you know community just because
- 33:45they were given the opportunity to do
- 33:47weird stuff you know on the ground you
- 33:49know in Africa. They were able to to try
- 33:52things that other people weren't doing
- 33:54and they were able to interact in ways
- 33:56that other, you know, that in other
- 33:57places they they wouldn't be allowed to
- 33:58do and they had a great time doing it.
- 34:01So, they've decided to, you know, take
- 34:03that that to the next level. There was
- 34:05also things like the asymmetric warfare
- 34:07group
- 34:07>> where they got guys who uh were
- 34:10tactically proficient, who were experts
- 34:11in something and then they were told,
- 34:13you know, bring this to the rest of the
- 34:14army. And that was a kind of mission
- 34:17that that kept that that retained, you
- 34:20know, those skill sets. Even if there
- 34:22was there was great opportunities
- 34:23somewhere else, they'd be more than
- 34:25happy to to stay in there and continue
- 34:29continue doing the impossible, you know,
- 34:31just for that chance.
- 34:32>> Okay, cool. Um, no, I mean that's um
- 34:35I've never walked a day in your boots.
- 34:37I'm not a scupper myself and so I can't
- 34:40say I agree or disagree, but intuitively
- 34:42I kind of do you. But I'll push back on
- 34:45one thing and that is you and I both
- 34:48served kind of in the information domain
- 34:50services during two wars and what I
- 34:53found was that there was actually in war
- 34:56there was actually quite a stifling
- 34:58bureaucracy, right? Lots of comp complex
- 35:02authorities and and a lot of
- 35:04inefficiencies and uh and so like in in
- 35:08that situation I can see how the weirdos
- 35:10can be disengaged and unstimulated. And
- 35:13I mean, I saw it my own with my my own
- 35:15two eyes, the frustration and the
- 35:17cynicism. And so, I guess the the
- 35:19question is is like, how do we think we
- 35:22should like restructure our approach to
- 35:24how we do that? What changes do we need
- 35:26to make in our strategic culture in
- 35:28terms of how we keep our very talented,
- 35:30creative people born from this wonderful
- 35:33open system that we have, which is
- 35:34liberal democracy, where we have this
- 35:36great tech and we have Hollywood and we
- 35:38have this thriving culture. You would
- 35:40think that we'd be able to produce
- 35:41people like that. Is there something in
- 35:43the army that you think is stifling um
- 35:46that kind of creativity?
- 35:48>> So I don't know if it is possible to
- 35:51make these changes, but what I can say
- 35:53is that what Ukraine has done in the
- 35:56past couple years has shown that there
- 35:58are ways to keep people engaged in new
- 36:01innovative ideas um and get them working
- 36:04on the battlefield. And the way they've
- 36:05done this is they have, you know,
- 36:08allowed units to do their own recruiting
- 36:11for for folks. So they go out and they
- 36:14instead of you having a one central
- 36:16pipeline that is the you know for the
- 36:19whole army and then you get divided up
- 36:21wherever the hell you know you have you
- 36:23happen to go. Individual units are
- 36:26looking for their own kind of people and
- 36:28they put out their their own ads. you
- 36:30know, they have a a budget and, you
- 36:33know, platforms and outreach just the
- 36:35way that you have for for, you know,
- 36:38retention and recruiting now, but they
- 36:40can actually use it to go outside the
- 36:41force to the to the community. And what
- 36:45they're doing there is, you know,
- 36:46they're finding, all right, we have
- 36:47problems in these specific areas. We
- 36:49need solutions here. And so they go out
- 36:51and they find people who can provide
- 36:53those solutions and they find out what
- 36:55they want there. A lot of times, you
- 36:56know, that may be, hey, we'll make sure
- 36:58that you don't end up, you know, in a a
- 37:01boring menial job. We'll bring you right
- 37:03out to the front line or um these are
- 37:06the other people who you'll be working
- 37:07with. And those kinds of guarantees
- 37:11enable the kind of innovation that they
- 37:13need where um instead of having the army
- 37:17as a whole as you know as the whole
- 37:19institution innovating which can be a
- 37:21very slow process you know there's all
- 37:24these approval changes there's all this
- 37:26contract and all these legalities
- 37:28instead you have you know 50 or 100 um
- 37:31you know you know battalions and even
- 37:34you know companies um that are going out
- 37:36there and they're all innovating on
- 37:38their own. And some of those ideas and
- 37:39and methods are good, some of them are
- 37:41not. But the ones that that work, their
- 37:45ideas spread through the entire, you
- 37:47know, the entire military. And that was
- 37:49very much the same way that that we have
- 37:52we have won in previous wars. You know,
- 37:54in World War II, you had a a bunch of
- 37:57people coming up with with ideas on the
- 37:59battlefield, and those that were, you
- 38:01know, were ended up ended up being used
- 38:04in other places. those that didn't work,
- 38:06you know, were left by the wayside. That
- 38:08is something that we are poorly set up
- 38:12for. And I don't know, you know, I don't
- 38:16know what kind of policy changes you
- 38:18would need to do that, but that would be
- 38:19that would be the way to to spark real
- 38:22innovation. I I I think that Jed, like
- 38:25we can riff on some ideas here, but like
- 38:27one thing that immediately comes to mind
- 38:29is that we just have to evaluate people
- 38:32with those sorts of skill sets
- 38:35differently than what we evaluate like
- 38:38combat arms. Right? Now, that's
- 38:40controversial. I'm probably going to get
- 38:41a ton of push back on that, but like
- 38:44soldiers and this is we're not the
- 38:45Marine Corps. Like we're not a we're
- 38:47army is a large we're talking about the
- 38:48army. The army is a large organization,
- 38:50right? And there's a lot of activities
- 38:52like that smaller organizations don't do
- 38:55and you know having a very robust
- 38:57psychological operations element is part
- 38:59of that right and so shooting well and
- 39:02and and being a stud in physical fitness
- 39:06and having like the institutional
- 39:08training check marks to progress your
- 39:11career that works for a huge mass of the
- 39:14army but for really specialized career
- 39:16fields like this where we're trying to
- 39:19cultivate a different kind of product
- 39:20that's going to help the army. I think
- 39:22you have to evaluate people differently.
- 39:24I think you have to do things like
- 39:26lateral appointments. We're bringing in
- 39:29like for example tech executives now and
- 39:31making them lieutenant colonels. I mean
- 39:32that generate a lot of controversy. For
- 39:34me that's like a really smart move
- 39:37because we're bringing people with skill
- 39:38sets that the army really needs. And we
- 39:40should do the same thing with fields
- 39:41like psychological operations. We should
- 39:44be reaching into places like Silicon
- 39:46Valley, Hollywood, the art community,
- 39:48and finding ways to to to recruit that
- 39:52kind of talent and bring them in in the
- 39:54in the service of the country. In that
- 39:55regard, I guess what I'm getting as a
- 39:57more flexible management of of talent,
- 40:00strategic talent, right? that puts the
- 40:03right type of people. We give them the
- 40:05right kind of incentives maybe higher
- 40:08pay uh to do these ne necessary
- 40:11supporting functions be kind of my
- 40:14thoughts there.
- 40:15>> Yeah. Um give them so you know the tech
- 40:18tech executives coming in that that is a
- 40:20great first step. We don't really need
- 40:22the top of the pyramid so much. We need
- 40:24the folks who are you know more at the
- 40:26bottom of the pyramid who are younger
- 40:28and hungry. And if we can use that same
- 40:31model there, we will have, you know, if
- 40:33we can get board app developers who are
- 40:35tired of producing, you know, new AI for
- 40:39their bottled water company, um, and
- 40:41instead give them the chance to to, you
- 40:44know, do something that that's, um,
- 40:47that's going to to control a fleet of
- 40:50drones that, you know, is is going to be
- 40:52used on the battlefield. You know,
- 40:54they'll leap at the chance. That's
- 40:55that's the kind of problem they love to
- 40:57sink their teeth into. and then give
- 40:58them the chance to do that innovation.
- 41:02So, you know, the the Air Force had this
- 41:03thing called Kessle Run where they
- 41:05essentially, you know, got the the smart
- 41:07guys who were already there and gave
- 41:08them the chance to go off and do weird
- 41:11on their own that that potentially
- 41:12solved problems. And uh they developed,
- 41:15you know, a huge amount of of great
- 41:18innovative ideas that way. And you know,
- 41:21if if we could have, you know, a a 100
- 41:24kessle runs across, you know, the
- 41:27military where each unit um is given the
- 41:29flexibility to send some guides for
- 41:32schools that that can't really be
- 41:34justified to higher commands. You know,
- 41:36why does this guy need a hacking school?
- 41:38Well, because, you know, what we needed
- 41:39to do is we needed to hack hack some
- 41:41systems. But he's not a computer
- 41:43operator. That's okay. We we don't need
- 41:45we don't need somebody to, you know, do
- 41:48this on these computer systems. We need
- 41:49him to be able to to hack our internal
- 41:52hardware so that it so it can function
- 41:54more effectively. There is no way you
- 41:56could possibly sell that. But that guy
- 41:57will come up with a solution that will
- 41:59fix the problems that the big
- 42:02military-industrial complex is having is
- 42:04going to charge you billions to do the
- 42:06same thing. And they will do it far more
- 42:08effectively.
- 42:09>> Yeah. Um 100%. you know, and it's, you
- 42:12know, there's the right to repair that's
- 42:14talking about, you know, that you once
- 42:15you buy it, you have the the the option
- 42:18of doing whatever the hell you want with
- 42:20that technology. The military has always
- 42:22said that we have the right to to repair
- 42:24on our own systems. We don't really um
- 42:26they don't allow people to mess with
- 42:28these, you know, these different bespoke
- 42:30technologies. And the fact of the matter
- 42:31is that that because our approval system
- 42:33is so Byzantine and slow to process, we
- 42:36have all these technologies that
- 42:38everybody knows there are some pretty
- 42:40simple solutions that will make things
- 42:42work better. They could do them very
- 42:44easily by the time it goes through all
- 42:46of the steps necessary to allow that
- 42:48change. You know, it's already 10 years
- 42:50out of date and you don't you don't need
- 42:52that change anymore. If we give people
- 42:54the opportunity to do that, you know, on
- 42:56the battlefield and give them the
- 42:58resources, tools, training to do it and
- 43:01the latitude to accomplish it, they will
- 43:03stay in for the challenge.
- 43:05>> Yeah, man. And there's just as you
- 43:07talking about that, another thing came
- 43:08to mind and that's the idea of risk.
- 43:10Like we have to be willing to make bets
- 43:13in activities like psychological
- 43:15operations, right? And that's tough.
- 43:17It's easy for me to say that now that
- 43:19I'm no longer in uniform and I'm sitting
- 43:20here in the comfort of my studio, right?
- 43:23Risk has to be part of it and I work in
- 43:26tech and you know making bets and
- 43:29breaking things and iterating is like
- 43:32that's how you do it. That's how it gets
- 43:33done. If you don't do that, you're going
- 43:34to be really your your startup is not
- 43:36going to get past stealth mode, right? I
- 43:38view the activities like psychological
- 43:39operations, cyerspace, we have to to get
- 43:43to really get that innovation to emerge
- 43:45from that. You have to you have
- 43:48commanders have to be willing to take
- 43:49risks, right? The acquisition systems
- 43:52that support it have to be built for big
- 43:55bets. And yeah, we may have some
- 43:57expensive misses, but it's going to be a
- 44:00hell of a lot less expensive than
- 44:01casualties or failed military operations
- 44:04further down the road. And this
- 44:06conversation about this stuff can go all
- 44:08all on all day. Congress, you know,
- 44:10operating from continuing resolution to
- 44:12continuing resolution. It makes it
- 44:14really difficult for commanders to make
- 44:15bets, right?
- 44:17>> Um, [clears throat] every mistake being
- 44:19on social media, the the New York Times
- 44:22front page makes it hard to to to make
- 44:25bets. World War II, it was a very
- 44:28different type of environment than the
- 44:29one we're in today. And uh I think that
- 44:32these sorts of reforms that you and I
- 44:33are talking about require very good
- 44:36leadership. Leaders who are willing to
- 44:38put it on the line and and try new
- 44:40things and and to be willing to fail.
- 44:42>> So we were just talking about risk. And
- 44:44it occurred to me that as an institution
- 44:46because we're unwilling to take, you
- 44:48know, the small risk and we're unwilling
- 44:49to, you know, let a company or battalion
- 44:52commander make, you know, stupid
- 44:54decisions that that, you know, might end
- 44:56up on the New York Times and look silly.
- 44:59um we end up taking huge risks that we
- 45:01know we are likely to lose like you know
- 45:03continue bad uh betting on uh platforms
- 45:07and capabilities that we know are way
- 45:09too expensive to sustain over a long
- 45:11fight and that that's an an interesting
- 45:15difference that in some ways is one of
- 45:18the big differences between the Russian
- 45:20military and the Ukrainian military in
- 45:21the current conflict. the Russian
- 45:24military, they are very riskaverse at at
- 45:29low levels at the you know the the
- 45:31junior officer level because you know
- 45:33the junior officer knows that if he does
- 45:35not do exactly what his what he has been
- 45:38ordered he's going to be sent to the
- 45:39front lines in the place of the guys
- 45:41that you know he can direct their on
- 45:42suicide missions. So he has a choice you
- 45:44know he can die or he can let his men
- 45:46die and most of the time they are more
- 45:47than happy to let their men die. that
- 45:49that is a very riskaverse culture you
- 45:51know at the lowest levels but at the
- 45:52highest levels what that means is they
- 45:54will do things like Bakmood well they
- 45:56will they will send you know 20,000
- 45:59people to their death you know literal
- 46:02deaths not you know to potential deaths
- 46:03but they will have 20,000 casualties to
- 46:05take over a parking lot because no one
- 46:08will say that this is a stupid move
- 46:10whereas the Ukrainian military there is
- 46:12a high acceptance of the chance of you
- 46:16know smaller units making risky
- 46:19decisions that may end up coming coming
- 46:20out poorly. And you you've even seen
- 46:22some very large scale examples of this.
- 46:25You've you've had situations like, you
- 46:27know, Marople where the unit stayed in
- 46:30Marople well after it made any strategic
- 46:33sense and they were very publicly you
- 46:35know directed get out. We are not going
- 46:38to this is not sustainable. But they
- 46:40kept fighting and kept fighting and kept
- 46:42fighting despite you know despite or
- 46:44they were allowed to lose that small
- 46:46bet.
- 46:48but uh because they thought it was
- 46:50important. Who knows? You know, maybe
- 46:51maybe their strategic senses were, you
- 46:55know, more correct than than the uh the
- 46:58hierarchy as a whole. It's hard to say
- 47:00from now, but the Ukrainian army has
- 47:03largely accepted that units are allowed
- 47:04to take the risk that they need and they
- 47:08have had some big su successes and some,
- 47:11you know, and some small losses that
- 47:12way. Whereas a Russian army has not been
- 47:15allowed that. So they've had they've had
- 47:17many fewer small losses or at least like
- 47:20unplanned losses. They uh but they have
- 47:23had the whole strategy has has
- 47:27>> [snorts]
- 47:27>> utterly collapsed and they have been
- 47:28unable to you know accomplish these
- 47:31strategic objectives that they thought
- 47:33they could have in three days.
- 47:35>> It's it's fascinating because you
- 47:37described like some really good examples
- 47:39of like taking tactical risk, right? And
- 47:41there are other kinds of risk too,
- 47:43right? Like there are let's a guy or gal
- 47:46who has a background or has a specific
- 47:50technical skill set that could be put to
- 47:52good use in some of these SCOP or cyber
- 47:57who maybe has a criminal record right
- 48:00they can't pass like the basic ascension
- 48:02they can't get a security clearance
- 48:04right we should I mean the question is
- 48:07should we be taking a bet on these
- 48:09people saying hey we'll bring them in
- 48:10we'll give them some discipline we'll
- 48:11give them some structure
- 48:13and we're going to we're going to
- 48:15absolutely tap into that those those
- 48:17skill sets, right? Acquisitions, like
- 48:20you know,
- 48:22I I I get a chuckle every time I say,
- 48:24"Oh, you know, making that small
- 48:26investment, it's a risk because it may
- 48:27not work." It's like, "Well, bro, my
- 48:28guy, like, we've been putting F-35
- 48:31programs [laughter]
- 48:33[gasps]
- 48:34with long, you know, uh, program cycles,
- 48:36right? and we've been dropped all this
- 48:38money for a very, you know, with all
- 48:41this inefficiency. Like, you're you're
- 48:43willing to make that bet, but you're not
- 48:44willing to make a bet on a smaller piece
- 48:47of technology that maybe we have to go
- 48:48through multiple iterations to get
- 48:50right. It I I think it's I think it
- 48:52really comes back, Jed, just to
- 48:53strategic culture in the entire
- 48:55institution.
- 48:56>> And if we're going to try to if we're
- 48:58going to repeat the same mistake, the
- 49:00same things that we've done for years
- 49:01and years and years, we're going to get
- 49:02the same out outcome. We have to try
- 49:04different things. the promotion system.
- 49:08Here's a great example. The the two
- 49:10times and you're out, right? If you
- 49:11don't get promoted in two cycles, they
- 49:13kick you out.
- 49:14>> Like, okay, well, maybe this guy or gal
- 49:17does really good things at this level of
- 49:19their career at this particular rank and
- 49:22they're happy with doing that, but
- 49:25because they don't hit the right army
- 49:26schools, we're going to kick them out.
- 49:28They getting promoted in two years.
- 49:30Let's take a bet.
- 49:31>> Yeah. maybe this person can do really
- 49:33good at this level and they can stay at
- 49:35this level for the rest of their career,
- 49:36right? Those are the sorts of things I I
- 49:39think that like are also related to risk
- 49:41as well.
- 49:42>> It's a a huge systemic problem
- 49:44throughout throughout the military is
- 49:46that that zero tolerance for risk. It it
- 49:50doesn't just mean it's not something you
- 49:52can just just wipe away, you know, with
- 49:54a with a single, you know, a single
- 49:57order. you have to to enable people to
- 50:01know that at the lowest levels they're
- 50:02going to be supported when they make
- 50:03mistakes and when things go wrong. And
- 50:07we
- 50:08>> don't, you know, we not only don't do
- 50:10that, we've gotten worse about doing
- 50:11that lately.
- 50:12>> Yeah.
- 50:13>> Um, you know, people have seen very
- 50:17well- reggarded professionals flipped on
- 50:19their ass for for things that that
- 50:23before wouldn't have even been seen as a
- 50:25risk.
- 50:25>> Yeah. For Yeah. I'll say it
- 50:28for you. [laughter]
- 50:30[gasps]
- 50:30>> Yeah,
- 50:31>> Jed, I I wanna I wanna talk a little bit
- 50:34more about your time because we've
- 50:35talked about like the Ghost Army and
- 50:37we've talked about Midway and we've
- 50:38talked a lot of theory about strategic
- 50:40culture. Let's bring it back to your
- 50:42personal experience because you as a
- 50:44sigh oper you were on the ground in
- 50:48Iraq. You were practicing you were
- 50:51executing these types of operations and
- 50:53we want to take a closer look at that so
- 50:56that we can kind of get a sense of like
- 50:58on the implementation side like what
- 51:00your experiences were. You got to Iraq
- 51:02during a period of time where there was
- 51:04great upheaval in the country. I think
- 51:06you said you were there in ' 04, right?
- 51:08In Baghdad.
- 51:09>> Yeah. So, so we came in um right after,
- 51:13you know, I was in a reserve unit, a
- 51:14scop reserve unit at the time, and we
- 51:17replaced the uh the initial active duty
- 51:20teams, the night battalion teams that
- 51:21that had been on the ground. And so, you
- 51:24know, I've got a t-shirt that says, you
- 51:25know, Iraq, you know, we were winning
- 51:27when I left. And the reason I wear it is
- 51:29because that was what the team before me
- 51:30said. You know, they they said, "Hey,
- 51:32look, this is this is all great now, but
- 51:34in a couple of months, it's going to
- 51:37collapse." And they were right.
- 51:39It it's exactly what happened.
- 51:42>> Yeah. What were the key political
- 51:44security and social forces that were
- 51:45driving that instability that that that
- 51:48came when you got to Baghdad?
- 51:50>> So, and I'm only speaking for for
- 51:53myself, of course, when I say these
- 51:55things, but I I think the big problem
- 51:57was a disconnect at the larger scale
- 52:01from what was happening at the smaller
- 52:03scale. So at the larger scale, you had
- 52:05all these people in in the the green
- 52:07zone and the CPA who were making a lot
- 52:10of decisions that had huge impact on
- 52:12what was going on in the country and
- 52:14they weren't talking to they weren't
- 52:16talking to the folks um on the ground
- 52:19either, you know, either Iraqis or US
- 52:21forces on the ground. you know, the
- 52:23communication was all one way. And what
- 52:25that meant is that you had had a lot of
- 52:26decisions that were being made without
- 52:28feedback and without an understanding of
- 52:30what the consequences, but you had
- 52:31things like the debathification
- 52:33process where they decided that, you
- 52:36know, not only were they going to
- 52:37disband the army, which is crazy in and
- 52:39of itself. You're going to take all of
- 52:40these people with skill at arms and, you
- 52:43know, a facility for for conducting
- 52:45operations, and you're going to turn
- 52:46them loose with no money and source of
- 52:49income. you know, not the uh the the
- 52:51wisest course of action. But then you
- 52:52had the debatification where you took
- 52:54all the people who had been forced to be
- 52:57in the VAT party in order to, you know,
- 53:00to actually administer, you know, the
- 53:02country and he told them that none of
- 53:04you were going to be able to maintain
- 53:05your positions. And so that meant that,
- 53:07you know, the principal of the of, you
- 53:09know, the local, you know, elementary
- 53:11school, he was out on his ass and half
- 53:13the teachers were out on his ass because
- 53:15they had they had been forced to become,
- 53:17you know, party members in order to
- 53:18advance up the hierarchy. Not only did
- 53:20that leave a problem where you had all
- 53:22of this this, you know, the people
- 53:24actually knew how to administer things
- 53:26were suddenly taken out of the picture,
- 53:28but then they had to be replaced from
- 53:29somewhere. And there's there weren't all
- 53:32that many good sources of, you know,
- 53:35institutions, training, and influence
- 53:37that could start populating where all
- 53:39the people are coming from. The one
- 53:41place that really had a good
- 53:43infrastructure and a lot of ready people
- 53:45who they could, you know, organize and
- 53:46get into the right places was Iran. We
- 53:49handed it to. they had the opportunity
- 53:51to ensure that that uh things went their
- 53:54way because we were we were busy, you
- 53:58know, making these very ideological
- 54:00choices
- 54:01>> at the top.
- 54:03>> And the guys on the ground knew this the
- 54:05whole time. They were saying, "Hey,
- 54:06look, these cops are corrupt, but they
- 54:09can be they can be managed, you know,
- 54:12with with this people. These are the
- 54:13specific individuals who are, you know,
- 54:15going to be a problem." That information
- 54:16does not go up to hire. Instead they say
- 54:18look you got to keep those people
- 54:19because they have connections through
- 54:21this chain. The folks who were connected
- 54:25in you know in and a organized system
- 54:29were able to to maintain their influence
- 54:31and grow that influence. While the folks
- 54:34who were you know basically honest um
- 54:36just trying to get you know you know get
- 54:38through the day. they were the ones who
- 54:40were the the the greatest victims of all
- 54:42these purges and political political
- 54:44purges, firings and scandals and
- 54:48opportunities. So you had you had the
- 54:50honest cop who was kicked out because he
- 54:53had you know um because somebody else
- 54:55wanted his apartment and you had the the
- 54:58cop who was you know behold him to Iran
- 55:01and everybody knew it who could advance
- 55:03up the hierarchy step by step. What we
- 55:06did there was a lot of the reverse of
- 55:10what we did in after World War II. It
- 55:13was a situation where we had no show
- 55:16trials. We had no trials where we we
- 55:19gave people the sense of we're going to
- 55:21punish the the the criminals because
- 55:24nobody was actually punished. They just
- 55:25lost their influence and job. But of
- 55:27course, to somebody in power, that's
- 55:29enough of a that's enough of a a uh of
- 55:32an offense. And at the same time you had
- 55:35the the potential for for corrupt
- 55:39structures infiltrating you know that
- 55:41government because all the administrator
- 55:43administrators had to be replaced.
- 55:45>> So we we took the worst of both worlds.
- 55:48>> Yeah.
- 55:49>> Um
- 55:49>> and that really became a it became a
- 55:51witch's brew man uh for for violence.
- 55:55You know the violence that you and your
- 55:58teammates saw on the streets of Baghdad.
- 56:00I mean it has its roots in what you just
- 56:02described. I mean there would have been
- 56:04violence anyway, right? Because we
- 56:07invaded another country and people were
- 56:09going to push back on that. You know,
- 56:11they did during the first phase and of
- 56:13course as we all know during the latter,
- 56:16you know, the the bulk of the conflict,
- 56:18we had an insurgency. But the things
- 56:20you're describing, I think just put fuel
- 56:22to the fire. You know, it just made the
- 56:25problem 10 times harder. What what part
- 56:28of Baghdad did you and your teammates
- 56:32operate in?
- 56:33>> So when I started out, I was operating
- 56:36in in the green zone. We were the
- 56:38smallest team. We had, you know, two
- 56:39people. I was the uh you know, in the uh
- 56:42in the detachment. They looked at all
- 56:44the guys who had experience and they
- 56:45decided, you know, these guys are
- 56:47technically and tactically proficient
- 56:48and then we still have, you know, we
- 56:51still need one more. Well, you can do
- 56:54the least damage here. And so they they
- 56:57put me and another guy, you know,
- 56:58another weirdo who um who they none of
- 57:01the other teams wanted and they gave us
- 57:03the the AO that included the green zone
- 57:06and the couple of neighborhoods right
- 57:07around it and a couple of neighborhoods
- 57:08that were actually inside it, you know,
- 57:10where there were Iraqis living in the
- 57:11green zone. Um that was an an
- 57:14interesting an interesting zone to work
- 57:16through. Spent the uh the the first
- 57:19couple months doing that and it was it
- 57:21was it was interesting, but there wasn't
- 57:23a whole lot happening because of course
- 57:24screens. Then after that, uh, once other
- 57:27units started requesting SCAP teams,
- 57:30that's when they they farmed farmed me
- 57:32out. They put together a threeperson
- 57:34team with, uh, with a couple of guys who
- 57:36were, you know, they hoped would would
- 57:38make up for the for the, you know, the
- 57:40the failings that I had there. We had an
- 57:44area that that included actually um, you
- 57:46know, Yusf, Madia, um, those areas. And
- 57:50we were we were kind of the the the the
- 57:53leftover team that was given the
- 57:55assignments, you know, for to to make up
- 57:59the request that they couldn't they
- 58:01couldn't ignore, but they didn't want to
- 58:02devote one of the better teams to
- 58:06>> I mean you talk about Yusf Mahammudia,
- 58:09those are very dangerous areas and and
- 58:12so during that time uh what I would see,
- 58:16you know, in the Shia political
- 58:19arena, we started to see, you know, the
- 58:21rise of of Mktad al-Assad's, you know,
- 58:25influence and some of the things that he
- 58:27did and said led to a lot of violence
- 58:30from some of the um Shia groups. And
- 58:34then you had like this Sunni population
- 58:37that coexisted there and, you know, a
- 58:39couple years later like that area would
- 58:41be like ground zero for the civil war.
- 58:43Some horrible sectarian violence. So
- 58:46they had you knocking around in a pretty
- 58:48damn dangerous area and you and of
- 58:50course being a sci-fer you're not the
- 58:51kind you're you're not going to be
- 58:52spending all your time like on the FOB.
- 58:54You're going to be out in the populace
- 58:55doing your work. Could you kind of give
- 58:57us a sense of like the dayto-day for
- 58:59your team when you were kind of
- 59:01operating and kind of what were sort of
- 59:02things were you responsible for and what
- 59:04you were doing in those areas?
- 59:06>> So and this would apply to you know both
- 59:08of of my my deployments as a cyber in
- 59:11Iraq. you know, the the one in in you
- 59:14know, 2004 when I was with the reserve
- 59:16unit and then the active one where we
- 59:18were, you know, a part of ninth
- 59:20battalion um later on. Um and what our
- 59:24daytoday, you know, both of those
- 59:26situations was, you know, the the first
- 59:28thing we we do, we'd come into a new
- 59:30team, um supporting a new unit, we'd
- 59:32have to sell ourselves to to the
- 59:35commander. And then we would usually be
- 59:37given, you know, the opportunity to kind
- 59:39of set our own missions so that that we
- 59:42could enable we could enable the
- 59:43functions that they have been
- 59:44accomplishing with a you know, with
- 59:46greater resistance. What that would
- 59:47usually mean is we would get on the
- 59:51ground um usually with, you know, they'd
- 59:54already planned the mission and the
- 59:56operation. We would go out with with the
- 59:58folks to accomplish that. We'd have we
- 1:00:01would not necessarily have sources that
- 1:00:03we needed tailored for for that
- 1:00:06operation, whatever it was. Sometimes we
- 1:00:07didn't have interpreters with us. We'd
- 1:00:09have to borrow somebody. There's there's
- 1:00:11missions that we went on where um
- 1:00:13literally, you know, we were getting our
- 1:00:15interpreter, you know, interpreters
- 1:00:17through talking to the kids there and
- 1:00:19finding the kid who spoke English and
- 1:00:20and you know, using him to get things
- 1:00:22done. You know, if we had, you know,
- 1:00:23interpreter resources, we would record
- 1:00:26messages on a loudspeaker. But most of
- 1:00:29what we were doing was face to face
- 1:00:32where we were going out and talking to
- 1:00:35the locals, breaking the ice and and
- 1:00:38getting a sense of what was happening in
- 1:00:40that community. And sometimes that would
- 1:00:42uh very directly enable operations. One
- 1:00:45of the first first operations I did when
- 1:00:48they when they started farming us out
- 1:00:50was a cordon and search operation. And
- 1:00:52we rolled up on this village. They had a
- 1:00:54planned cordon and search. We recorded
- 1:00:57some messages and started going out and
- 1:00:59talking, knocking on doors saying, "Hey,
- 1:01:00these are the rules that that we've been
- 1:01:02given. You know, you can have one rifle,
- 1:01:04but we're looking for for military
- 1:01:06weapons. We're not, you know, we're just
- 1:01:08we're not looking for the the one rifle
- 1:01:11that every household is allowed to have.
- 1:01:13You know, exactly the rules that that
- 1:01:14were given by the uh you know, by the
- 1:01:17commander before this operation, who I
- 1:01:18hadn't built a whole lot of of trust and
- 1:01:21communication with before. and going
- 1:01:23knocking on these knocking on all these
- 1:01:25doors, talking to the people face to
- 1:01:26face. Slowly they're getting an an an
- 1:01:30understanding of why all these Americans
- 1:01:32have suddenly descended on their
- 1:01:33village. It's not because there's a bad
- 1:01:35guy in the middle and they're just going
- 1:01:36to start shooting things up. They're
- 1:01:38they're doing a standard search and
- 1:01:41they're being, you know, straightforward
- 1:01:43and they're talking to us. And so
- 1:01:45there's a a greater comfort of that.
- 1:01:47Sometimes too comfortable. One of the
- 1:01:49the things that happened on that
- 1:01:51particular operation is I was talking to
- 1:01:53a bunch of farmers on the outskirts of
- 1:01:55the village. They had, you know, the the
- 1:01:57fields behind him and, you know, talking
- 1:02:00to this guy and, you know, we're going
- 1:02:02through, we're just looking for military
- 1:02:03weapons. We're not looking for the the
- 1:02:05average family weapons. And you can have
- 1:02:06one one weapon per household. And so
- 1:02:08this farmer says, "One weapon per
- 1:02:09household? That, you know, that's not
- 1:02:11really a problem." And he lights up and
- 1:02:12you see the other farmers looking
- 1:02:14around, they're going like, "Oh shit."
- 1:02:15You know, their eyes widen a little bit.
- 1:02:17And the guy and the guy says, "Hey,
- 1:02:19great." And he walks out into the fields
- 1:02:21and goes out about, you know, halfway,
- 1:02:25you know, into, you know, unmarked
- 1:02:27portion of the fields. And he reaches
- 1:02:28down and he and he does something and
- 1:02:30then he comes back up and he's got, you
- 1:02:32know, his one rifle with him. Hey, you
- 1:02:34know, our our household has just one
- 1:02:35weapon. And the security guy that I was
- 1:02:38with, he just looked at me and I looked
- 1:02:40at him and he walked right out after
- 1:02:43where that farmer was and opened up this
- 1:02:47this cache where the other local
- 1:02:49households there had put their AKs.
- 1:02:52>> Mhm.
- 1:02:52>> And um at that point, you know, we
- 1:02:55talked to the commander say, "Hey, this
- 1:02:56is what we found." And they're going,
- 1:02:58"So, who's whose rifles are these?"
- 1:03:00Well, there's, you know, five rifles.
- 1:03:02There's probably six houses right there,
- 1:03:04but nobody wants to claim them. And so
- 1:03:06they say, "Okay, well this is this is
- 1:03:07the cache and they take all of those
- 1:03:09weapons." That same operation, some some
- 1:03:12of the the people came up to me after
- 1:03:14and said, "Look, one of the the
- 1:03:16commanders here, he took a a rifle that
- 1:03:18is not military. It's just an old he he
- 1:03:22said it was a uh a gun for birds." And
- 1:03:24he kept saying it was Turkish and
- 1:03:25eventually figured out it was like a
- 1:03:26Turkish shotgun, you know, expensive
- 1:03:28Turkish shotgun. Um, and we would like
- 1:03:31to trade that for, you know, for for one
- 1:03:34of the AKs that we were allowed to keep
- 1:03:35because, you know, the Turkish shotgun
- 1:03:37is is uh, you know, vamp of valued
- 1:03:40family heirloom. And they wanted to talk
- 1:03:42to the uh to the commander about that.
- 1:03:45So went with this whole troop of these
- 1:03:47guys, you know, these Iraqis behind me,
- 1:03:49went to talk to the commander and and
- 1:03:51explained the situation and the the
- 1:03:52commander, you know, I I started to say
- 1:03:55what I was going to say and then, you
- 1:03:57know, he gets mad and kind of leaves and
- 1:03:58the first ar going and
- 1:04:02explain the situation to the first
- 1:04:03sergeant saying, "Look, they don't want
- 1:04:05they're not asking for more weapons.
- 1:04:08They're not asking for for military
- 1:04:10grade weapons, sir. they just want the
- 1:04:11shotgun back, you know, or at least they
- 1:04:13want um an acknowledgement of it or a
- 1:04:15seat, something, anything. And the first
- 1:04:17sergeant is looking at me, asking him to
- 1:04:20tell his commander that, you know, he's
- 1:04:22grabbing a souvenir um rather than
- 1:04:25actually conducting an operation. And
- 1:04:28you know, he's getting he's caught in
- 1:04:29the middle. Um it was a really bad
- 1:04:31situation for that first sergeant. It
- 1:04:33was a, you know, a bad situation for the
- 1:04:36local populace and it created a lot of
- 1:04:39distrust with that that unit with with
- 1:04:42me. And at that point, you know, when I
- 1:04:45started that operation, I was the the
- 1:04:47team leader for the threeperson team. I
- 1:04:49was demoted on the radio to assistant
- 1:04:51team leader right after that because
- 1:04:53they called back to the they called back
- 1:04:55to our detachment commander and he
- 1:04:57called us on, you know, separate radio
- 1:04:58frequency and told me to step down. And
- 1:05:01uh
- 1:05:02>> I mean I'm I'm sorry Jedhas. I'm I'm
- 1:05:05reacting to this. It's like
- 1:05:08that is such a in the big scheme of
- 1:05:10things that is such a nothing burger. I
- 1:05:13mean it's just a I mean
- 1:05:16it's it's incionable to me that such a
- 1:05:19drastic action would be taken over
- 1:05:21something that is a com is is I don't
- 1:05:24know. It was like it's like it was like
- 1:05:25a common thing that was asked of us when
- 1:05:27we were on the ground during those days
- 1:05:28about the the ability to keep one weapon
- 1:05:30and uh it was almost like a common
- 1:05:33courtesy. Can I keep this because it's a
- 1:05:34family heirloom. It's a shotgun.
- 1:05:37>> Mhm.
- 1:05:38>> It's crazy.
- 1:05:38>> It's not Yeah. It's not anything.
- 1:05:41>> Yeah.
- 1:05:41>> But it uh it was a small thing and you
- 1:05:45know the picture for us it was you know
- 1:05:47that that one that one shotgun isn't
- 1:05:50going to do anything um to the overall
- 1:05:53operation.
- 1:05:54you know, that village was way off in
- 1:05:57the boonies and, you know, that was
- 1:05:59probably the first time they had been
- 1:06:01visited in in months and, you know, they
- 1:06:03probably weren't visited again for, you
- 1:06:05know, six more months, you know, until
- 1:06:06the next rotation had had already come
- 1:06:08in. But what a difference that made to
- 1:06:11the families there. They had an example
- 1:06:14of, you know, what the US was all about
- 1:06:16right there. And I like now to think
- 1:06:20that what they saw was not the same kind
- 1:06:23of corruption that they saw with the
- 1:06:25with the army before with Saddam's army.
- 1:06:27that they saw that, you know, they could
- 1:06:30raise concerns and people would listen
- 1:06:32and that, you know, NCOs's could
- 1:06:35challenge the commanders. Um, and that
- 1:06:38moreover, you know, when the people came
- 1:06:40up in a in a huge mob and challenged the
- 1:06:43the commander of the operation instead
- 1:06:44of opening fire, arresting anyone or
- 1:06:46something like that, he stormed off back
- 1:06:48into his, you know, his Bradley in a
- 1:06:51huff looking embarrassed and we left
- 1:06:54shortly there afterfter. They didn't get
- 1:06:55what they wanted, but what they also saw
- 1:06:57is that that, you know, we weren't the
- 1:06:59same kind of people that they had been
- 1:07:00told we were. I like to think that.
- 1:07:03>> Yeah.
- 1:07:03>> But what I also know is what they they
- 1:07:05saw is that that even if we weren't the
- 1:07:09people that they had been told we were,
- 1:07:12we weren't necessarily heroes either.
- 1:07:14>> Yeah.
- 1:07:15>> And we weren't we weren't necessarily
- 1:07:17going to do things, you know, as much by
- 1:07:19the book as we said.
- 1:07:21>> Yeah.
- 1:07:22>> So,
- 1:07:22>> interesting. Interesting. I think one of
- 1:07:24the things I wanted to ask you was, you
- 1:07:26know, obviously media up until the
- 1:07:30invasion was state controlled, right?
- 1:07:32The the central the central the central
- 1:07:34governing the regime controlled media.
- 1:07:37But then when you know the invasion took
- 1:07:39place and uh we started to see kind of
- 1:07:43an emergence of a of a new media
- 1:07:46ecosystem and you were probably there
- 1:07:50starting engagements with with people at
- 1:07:53radio stations, TV stations, like what
- 1:07:56was that like as these folks were
- 1:08:00starting to exercise probably a lot more
- 1:08:03freedom than they had in the past? What
- 1:08:05was that like to be part of that whole
- 1:08:07process? Like were these folks excited
- 1:08:09about that or I suspect it was probably
- 1:08:11dangerous too?
- 1:08:13>> There was a um there was a lot of
- 1:08:16feeling each other out in both
- 1:08:17directions. So the Iraqis had to know
- 1:08:21what we really wanted. You know, we
- 1:08:23would go in there and tell them, "Hey,
- 1:08:24look, you know, you can broadcast
- 1:08:25whatever you want. Um you're free now.
- 1:08:28we would like to buy you some airtime or
- 1:08:30we're going to fix this radio station up
- 1:08:32for you and you know in return we'd like
- 1:08:34you to to you know broadcast some
- 1:08:36messages of support but we're not going
- 1:08:37to you know force you to do that. And at
- 1:08:41the same time you know what they were
- 1:08:43anticipating and planning upon uh a
- 1:08:46level of of support that was not
- 1:08:49necessarily forthcoming. So they were
- 1:08:51expecting that they would get you know
- 1:08:53handouts for for good stories and we
- 1:08:57were unwilling to provide that you know
- 1:08:58and so their journalists are going wait
- 1:09:00a minute you know I can't make it just
- 1:09:02on the salary as a journalist somebody
- 1:09:04has to pay me to you know write the
- 1:09:07stories that they want and that ended up
- 1:09:10with some some complications and some
- 1:09:12confusions. There was a a situation
- 1:09:14where there was a New York Times story
- 1:09:16that ended up in a big scandal. There
- 1:09:18was a and this was after I left. It was,
- 1:09:21you know, I suspect that that particular
- 1:09:24company was probably contracting with
- 1:09:26with our company headquarters back in
- 1:09:28the rear. You know, I just wasn't aware
- 1:09:30of it because I was, you know, uh on a
- 1:09:32um on a tactical team. But anyways, that
- 1:09:35company, they were found to be paying
- 1:09:37stories, paying journalists for good
- 1:09:39stories. And that made a lot of
- 1:09:41headlines in the US. You know, big
- 1:09:43scandal. The the Americans are producing
- 1:09:45propaganda, all this kind of stuff. For
- 1:09:46the Iraqis, that was an absolute nothing
- 1:09:49burger. Um because that was how things
- 1:09:51were done. You know, journalists would
- 1:09:53be would be bribed a little bit. They'd
- 1:09:55get a little bit of a gift to provide,
- 1:09:58you know, a a story the same way that an
- 1:10:00American uh journalist might be given a
- 1:10:03press release and a a junket where he
- 1:10:05gets to go to this this conference that
- 1:10:07has really nice rooms, you know, and
- 1:10:10gets gets paid there. It wasn't any
- 1:10:12different to them. Um this was not a
- 1:10:14situation where we were buying
- 1:10:16journalists or threatening journalists
- 1:10:17or anything like that. We were just just
- 1:10:19making we were just accommodating
- 1:10:20ourselves to local customs. Do you think
- 1:10:23that the Iraqi Iraqis with whom you
- 1:10:26engaged, not the members of the emerging
- 1:10:29media space, but like the people who
- 1:10:31lived in the communities, I mean, people
- 1:10:33naturally are thirst for information?
- 1:10:36Like especially when you're living in a
- 1:10:37time of violence, right? Like what's
- 1:10:39going on? Like I mean, were there were
- 1:10:41the were the people that were in the
- 1:10:43target audience, were they craving more
- 1:10:45information? Were they were they
- 1:10:46listening to these radio stations?
- 1:10:48>> Absolutely.
- 1:10:48>> And TV stations you guys were pouring
- 1:10:50money into? So they were they were
- 1:10:52looking for any source of information
- 1:10:54that that they could get because you
- 1:10:56know information in a war zone means the
- 1:10:59difference between um you you know
- 1:11:02playing in enough time or being right in
- 1:11:05the middle of you know of a major
- 1:11:06operation that you can't get out of it.
- 1:11:08It's the difference between having a
- 1:11:10business that works because you're
- 1:11:11bringing products, you know, up to the
- 1:11:14Syrian border and that border is open
- 1:11:15versus it being closed and you've got a
- 1:11:18truck full of of something that gets
- 1:11:20stolen by the by the militia groups on
- 1:11:22the way back. You know, it's
- 1:11:24>> it's critically important. And so they
- 1:11:26would go to whatever information source
- 1:11:28they had. And there were there were some
- 1:11:30real disasters there for us because we
- 1:11:33did not have a good understanding or
- 1:11:36ability to influence the media space
- 1:11:38that they were operating in. One of the
- 1:11:40examples is Abu Grae. You know, when the
- 1:11:42investigation happened for Abu Grae, you
- 1:11:44know, the report came out of what was
- 1:11:46going on. The report came out internal
- 1:11:48to the, you know, to the army channels
- 1:11:50in somewhere like January. And by, you
- 1:11:53know, April or May, that still had not
- 1:11:56become public to anyone. um they were
- 1:11:58still dragging their feet. They had you
- 1:12:00know everybody knew that something was
- 1:12:02happening inside you know the military
- 1:12:04and eventually you know the western
- 1:12:08journalist went with the story um and it
- 1:12:11broke. When that broke the army you know
- 1:12:14then uh took some more time to figure
- 1:12:17out exactly what they were going to say
- 1:12:18and how they were going to say it. And
- 1:12:20um by the time that they finally made
- 1:12:23their statements, the Iraqis had already
- 1:12:25learned exactly what was happening at
- 1:12:27Abra. What had happened is there was a a
- 1:12:30TV station that had a Moroccan porn
- 1:12:33movie that showed American leaders going
- 1:12:37into a prison that was purported to be
- 1:12:38Abu Grae and um raping women. Mhm.
- 1:12:43>> It probably in that movie probably never
- 1:12:46said that this was Abber Gray, but
- 1:12:48probably I presume never never purported
- 1:12:50to be news, but everybody took it as it
- 1:12:53came out at about the same time. Some
- 1:12:55programmer must have, you know, as the
- 1:12:57Western papers were saying this was what
- 1:12:58was happening. He said, "Hey, I've got a
- 1:13:00I've got a movie that that will settle
- 1:13:01this. We don't have anything else." And
- 1:13:03so they put it on TV. The Iraqis all saw
- 1:13:05that. And every time you tell the Iraqis
- 1:13:07that, you know, no, this that's not what
- 1:13:09was happening. This is what was really
- 1:13:11going on. they don't believe you because
- 1:13:13they saw it with their own eyes. The
- 1:13:15only way that that was was actually
- 1:13:17resolved is that what was going on with
- 1:13:20that grave is you had a way overcrowded
- 1:13:22prison because we were arresting a bunch
- 1:13:23of people waiting for the Iraqi system
- 1:13:25to release that.
- 1:13:26>> Y
- 1:13:26>> uh we were waiting for the Iraqi court
- 1:13:28system to be set up so we could release
- 1:13:30all these people who we had we had
- 1:13:31brought in and most of them, you know,
- 1:13:33didn't have anything that they had done
- 1:13:34in particular. They were just being held
- 1:13:36there warehoused until we could have the
- 1:13:39courts go through the process. And so
- 1:13:41you had an way overcrowded prison and
- 1:13:42you had some abuses that happened in a
- 1:13:44disciplined way. What happened was that
- 1:13:47that uh when this made a scandal that
- 1:13:52the leadership looked at it and decided
- 1:13:54we have to solve this problem one way or
- 1:13:56the other. The first thing they figured
- 1:13:57out is that this is way overcrowded. We
- 1:13:59have a lot of people who don't need to
- 1:14:00be there. And they started releasing
- 1:14:02them. They released you know about a
- 1:14:03third of the population of Abu Grae.
- 1:14:06Just you know got got them on buses, got
- 1:14:08them out to the villages. As soon as
- 1:14:09they did that, everything died down
- 1:14:12because the Iraqis then were being told
- 1:14:15exactly what had really happened in Abu
- 1:14:17Grae. They were told, you know, these
- 1:14:20are the things that were occurring here.
- 1:14:22The Americans took me for no good reason
- 1:14:24for my home and they kept me there for,
- 1:14:27you know, for four or five months. But
- 1:14:30what that also was is that that was not,
- 1:14:33you know, there was no systematic
- 1:14:35torture. There was no, you know, they
- 1:14:37they weren't going out and and raping
- 1:14:39women. There there were, you know,
- 1:14:41almost no women, you know, who were in
- 1:14:44Abu Grave. They dispelled the rumors
- 1:14:46because there were trusted source of
- 1:14:48information that came out and told the
- 1:14:50people. It is ridiculous that that that
- 1:14:54had to be that had to be the way that
- 1:14:56that the situation resolved. you know,
- 1:14:58one we we could have, you know, we could
- 1:15:00have prevented the whole problem had we
- 1:15:03just allowed these people who were being
- 1:15:05held for no good reason to
- 1:15:09to leave in the first place. Had the
- 1:15:12commanders, you know, who were saying
- 1:15:15there, you know, most of these people
- 1:15:17are are not security risk and we've got
- 1:15:19too many people. We need to do
- 1:15:20something. Had they been allowed to to
- 1:15:23release them originally, never would
- 1:15:25have happened. Had uh the court system
- 1:15:28been set up faster, never would have
- 1:15:29happened. Had uh the report come out
- 1:15:33through a thoroughly anodine method that
- 1:15:35you know in January or February when the
- 1:15:38hurricane had a chance to look at it,
- 1:15:39said, "Okay, this is what actually
- 1:15:41happened." And they released it
- 1:15:42themselves. It never would have made a
- 1:15:43big news story. It would have been the
- 1:15:44Americans just saying something.
- 1:15:46>> It would not have have made the kind of
- 1:15:48impact that it had. But because we we
- 1:15:52let events develop on their own, things
- 1:15:54happen very very badly for the you know
- 1:15:57the worst case scenario for the Iraqis,
- 1:15:59for the Americans, for stability of the
- 1:16:02country as a whole.
- 1:16:03>> Yeah. I mean, this is fascinating, Jed,
- 1:16:05because like the things you're
- 1:16:06describing in terms of your dayto-day.
- 1:16:08Let's go back to the Ghost Army. Let's
- 1:16:10go back to to what you described there.
- 1:16:12Those sorts of operations were very much
- 1:16:14focused on an enemy army, getting the
- 1:16:17enemy commander to do things with his
- 1:16:19his military assets to create an
- 1:16:22advantage that we would be able to
- 1:16:24exploit, right? Military to military.
- 1:16:27What you're describing is a completely
- 1:16:29different type of psychological
- 1:16:30operations. Now you're you're you guys
- 1:16:32are certainly doing things to get after
- 1:16:36an insurgency, which is not like you
- 1:16:38can't see an insurgency from like
- 1:16:39overhead shots, you know, from, you
- 1:16:42know, insurgencies, they they they
- 1:16:44operate in the dark, right? But you're
- 1:16:47trying to influence them. You're also
- 1:16:49dealing with the local populace. I mean
- 1:16:52this is a completely different type of
- 1:16:54thing than what you described in your
- 1:16:56historical the historical context you
- 1:16:59provide with the ghost army. These are
- 1:17:01different types of like skill sets.
- 1:17:03These is you have to like be there's no
- 1:17:06like solid measurement that says like
- 1:17:08this is how we're affecting the
- 1:17:10population. And even if you could
- 1:17:12measure it, it probably would take
- 1:17:13freaking decades to do the things you
- 1:17:15were trying to do in terms of
- 1:17:17establishing trust in the Iraqi
- 1:17:18government, establishing trust in the
- 1:17:20Iraqi security forces, establishing
- 1:17:22trust in American occupying forces.
- 1:17:25Probably takes decades to do that stuff
- 1:17:26with a very robust information program.
- 1:17:30Sounds like to me that your threeperson
- 1:17:32SCOP team almost had an impossible task
- 1:17:35to pull off. the tactical, you know, a
- 1:17:37threeperson SAP team did not have the
- 1:17:39objective of stabilizing the country as
- 1:17:42a whole. All they're doing is helping
- 1:17:44that captain or that team leader to
- 1:17:46control the battle space that he's
- 1:17:48working in. Those those objectives, what
- 1:17:51we're doing is is we've got a situation
- 1:17:53where we have a whole bunch of of
- 1:17:55tactical resources that are assuming
- 1:17:58that there is a larger
- 1:18:00um strategic picture in place at the
- 1:18:02higher level. And there isn't, you know,
- 1:18:05and it isn't communicated. And that that
- 1:18:08is is one of the the big problems that
- 1:18:12we have. You know, the whole army, the
- 1:18:14whole army is trained for conventional
- 1:18:17stuff and then they're doing an, you
- 1:18:18know, counterinsurgency and that's a
- 1:18:20different ballgame. We're all in the
- 1:18:22same boat on that one. But for the army
- 1:18:24as a whole, there was an understanding
- 1:18:27of, you know, these are the these are
- 1:18:29the ways that that we can, you know,
- 1:18:31hold ground and ensure the bad guys
- 1:18:35aren't here. Whereas on an information
- 1:18:37level that not only is there not an
- 1:18:40understanding, but there are actual
- 1:18:42there are actual roadblocks to any kind
- 1:18:45of understanding of this or any kind of
- 1:18:47real effective action on this. You would
- 1:18:50have folks at the strategic level who
- 1:18:52would actively be against anything that
- 1:18:54that smacked of, you know, an
- 1:18:57information or deception pitcher. They
- 1:18:59could often sabotage the operation. So
- 1:19:02there was a um there was one operation
- 1:19:05um that we did and this was in my second
- 1:19:07tour where the ODB
- 1:19:10had they were going to do a battalion
- 1:19:13you know wide um operation that was
- 1:19:15coordinated with national assets and had
- 1:19:18you know teams from law enforcement
- 1:19:20agents in the US. They were going to
- 1:19:21conduct this this big operation in an
- 1:19:24area. They wanted a good way to ensure
- 1:19:26that, you know, when they were doing
- 1:19:28this, they did not cause any more
- 1:19:31problems than they had to. Um, they
- 1:19:34couldn't they couldn't announce exactly
- 1:19:36what they were going to to do on the
- 1:19:38ground in advance. Um, but they wanted a
- 1:19:41way that they would not be going in
- 1:19:44against local authorities who they
- 1:19:46really wanted to support and, you know,
- 1:19:48getting into uh to accidental um green
- 1:19:51on blue conflict. So we helped write up
- 1:19:56a plan for these are the folks you need
- 1:19:58to talk to. This is how you you can run
- 1:20:00it. This is this is the kind of press
- 1:20:01release you can give and these are the
- 1:20:03folks who you need to give that to who
- 1:20:06can enable enable you to make sure that
- 1:20:09you are coordinated with the local
- 1:20:10community in exactly the right time and
- 1:20:12there's no green on blue. a PA officer
- 1:20:16who, you know, it's an ODB. They don't
- 1:20:18they didn't have their own PA, but at
- 1:20:21the the higher headquarters, he he got a
- 1:20:23hold of, you know, being told that some
- 1:20:25SCer come up with a press release. Well,
- 1:20:27of course, there nobody else to to write
- 1:20:30this at that level and he absolutely,
- 1:20:33you know, stomped on it. No, there's no
- 1:20:35way you can do this. the commander, you
- 1:20:38know, they they were able to to
- 1:20:42improvise something that made sure that
- 1:20:45they didn't they didn't have the the
- 1:20:47kind of of risks that could have been a
- 1:20:50worst case scenario, but they sure
- 1:20:51didn't get the best case scenario
- 1:20:52either. They they they scared a lot of
- 1:20:54people. They had some some serious risk
- 1:20:57of loss of lives. And it was all simply
- 1:21:00because some guy didn't like to hear
- 1:21:02that that a scipper was doing PA work
- 1:21:06when he didn't have any PA people who
- 1:21:08>> Yeah.
- 1:21:09>> you know could do it or would do it.
- 1:21:11>> Yeah. That's one of those classic we
- 1:21:14found the enemy and it's us scenarios.
- 1:21:17>> I mean you and that's the kind of thing
- 1:21:19you know I mean we still haven't figured
- 1:21:21it out. you know, the public affairs
- 1:21:24folks, they have their responsibilities
- 1:21:25and that's I respect that because
- 1:21:27they're there to represent the
- 1:21:28institution, to preserve the reputation
- 1:21:31of the institution to inform the
- 1:21:33American people, but man, they've got in
- 1:21:36my opinion, they have neither the
- 1:21:40culture, cultural training, the language
- 1:21:42training, the expertise to be able to
- 1:21:45target uh the local population. That is
- 1:21:48a psychological operations function. And
- 1:21:51so writing press press releases that
- 1:21:53that are intended for distribution
- 1:21:56via Iraqi uh media is completely
- 1:21:59appropriate. That's the kind of crap
- 1:22:01that that you just described. These just
- 1:22:04makes my head spin. Ched, I I wanted to
- 1:22:07ask you, we spend a lot of time on this
- 1:22:09channel being critical because a we're
- 1:22:11crusty old veterans. That's what we do.
- 1:22:13Um but I do want to take a moment to
- 1:22:15talk about like what were some of the
- 1:22:16things that you thought were successful
- 1:22:17during your tour? things you thought you
- 1:22:19did that that made you feel good about
- 1:22:21your mission and things that you know
- 1:22:23like cool we kicked ass in that.
- 1:22:25>> In my first tour in Iraq I I kind of
- 1:22:28towards the end of of that tour I ended
- 1:22:31up like kind of making a list to myself
- 1:22:33of things that I had accomplished while
- 1:22:36I was there because it had been a pretty
- 1:22:38hard tour and uh things had gone you
- 1:22:42know very wrong in a lot of ways. We
- 1:22:44we'd literally watched, you know, the
- 1:22:46entire country go from, you know, point
- 1:22:49of stability to chaos and seen it happen
- 1:22:52because of us. So, I kept a a list of
- 1:22:55things that accomplished and it was it
- 1:22:56was all pretty minor stuff. There was
- 1:22:59there was one situation where there was
- 1:23:01a um there was an apartment for a uh a
- 1:23:05Turkman many cop you know inside the
- 1:23:07grain zone and we heard a call on the
- 1:23:10radio that there was this you know this
- 1:23:12platoon leader you know this this uh you
- 1:23:14know first lieutenant or captain who was
- 1:23:17on the ground and he was saying he was
- 1:23:19really tired cuz he had been there all
- 1:23:20night literally sitting in this
- 1:23:22apartment trying to keep it from being
- 1:23:24stolen while they took this this Iraqi
- 1:23:28policeman for interrogation. And so I
- 1:23:31went to to this captain and found out
- 1:23:33what the backstory was and what the
- 1:23:34situation was is that that the the intel
- 1:23:38shop above his level, you know, up at
- 1:23:40the at the BCT level, um they had an
- 1:23:43asset who wanted that apartment. And so
- 1:23:46they decided that they were going to
- 1:23:48briefly detain this uh police officer
- 1:23:51and steal his apartment and, you know,
- 1:23:55make it so that he was unemployable. And
- 1:23:57then, you know, the asset would would
- 1:23:58get what he wanted. And that platoon
- 1:24:01leader did not want that to happen. But
- 1:24:04the only way he could do anything about
- 1:24:05it was to actually stand there and hope
- 1:24:07that, you know, hire would would uh
- 1:24:09change their mind, would be shamed into
- 1:24:11doing the right thing. You know, I
- 1:24:13talked to the guy and I I said, "Look,
- 1:24:15this is what I'm going to do. You know,
- 1:24:17you just got to be here for a little
- 1:24:18while. I'm going to go talk to the three
- 1:24:23shop and the two shop and say that, you
- 1:24:25know, is this
- 1:24:26Turkman many police officer, you're
- 1:24:29right, you're creating a potential
- 1:24:30political rift um or a potential ethnic
- 1:24:33crisis in this area if they see that you
- 1:24:36know the Turk mens are being pushed out
- 1:24:38um while a Sunni Iraqi a Sunni Arab is
- 1:24:42is you know given this instead and also
- 1:24:45what I need you to do is to write up a
- 1:24:47receipt and you know put all the right
- 1:24:49signatures and everything on it and I
- 1:24:51will take this to them as well. What
- 1:24:52ended up up actually happening is that
- 1:24:54he's the one who went to to talk to to
- 1:24:57them. You know, I I'm the one who stayed
- 1:24:59on, you know, on the scene, but he took
- 1:25:02that receipt and and an explanation of
- 1:25:04what the situation was. And between the
- 1:25:07receipt and, you know, the uh um two
- 1:25:11shop, you know, hearing the potential
- 1:25:13downside of it, they decided not to to
- 1:25:16actually steal the apartment. They let
- 1:25:18the family come back and the, you know,
- 1:25:19the Turkman officer, police officer was
- 1:25:22was allowed to, you know, return to his
- 1:25:25home.
- 1:25:26>> Yeah.
- 1:25:26>> That I felt was a huge victory. But it
- 1:25:28was just one apart.
- 1:25:30>> Yeah. But I mean, that's how we sustain
- 1:25:32ourselves though, man. While we're while
- 1:25:33we're downrange, you know, it's those
- 1:25:35small things that that, you know, it's
- 1:25:37like, oh, because I did X, you know, we
- 1:25:39were able to achieve Y. And it's usually
- 1:25:42the small things, right? And it keeps
- 1:25:43you sane. It keeps you motivated. I
- 1:25:46think I I have several stories like that
- 1:25:48too where small conversations where you
- 1:25:51think you moved the needle just a little
- 1:25:54bit or you you staved off a disaster or
- 1:25:56you kept someone from making a really
- 1:25:57bad decision. Those are those are
- 1:26:00important moments for me uh because they
- 1:26:03help me like come to grips with like my
- 1:26:06my legacy of service, you know, things
- 1:26:09that I have plenty of regrets, things
- 1:26:11that I did and things that I failed to
- 1:26:13do, but I of it's important to reflect
- 1:26:15on those. So, that's really good, man. I
- 1:26:18I do want to talk a little a little bit
- 1:26:20about you, a little bit to you about
- 1:26:23taking a step back now and given what
- 1:26:27you've learned as a practitioner in
- 1:26:28these kind of like dark arts of psy
- 1:26:30psychological operations and take a step
- 1:26:33back now and take a a broader view of
- 1:26:35the country the United States
- 1:26:38>> and you know it's become very
- 1:26:40fashionable to talk about this thing
- 1:26:41called information statecraftraft right
- 1:26:43where the United States you know we need
- 1:26:45to have like you know we need to be we
- 1:26:48need to the United States government
- 1:26:50needs to be able to communicate clearly
- 1:26:52to the world and to you know with to the
- 1:26:55world I'm primarily talking about
- 1:26:56external about like who we are what
- 1:26:59we're doing and by doing so that we can
- 1:27:02you know create peace we can create
- 1:27:04stability we can open markets we can
- 1:27:06have all these great outcomes it's been
- 1:27:08posited that we need to bring back like
- 1:27:12the US information agency right uh which
- 1:27:16Ronald Reagan and disbanded in the uh in
- 1:27:18the early in his first administration, I
- 1:27:20believe. Do you think that like
- 1:27:22something like that is would be helpful
- 1:27:26and for the United States government to
- 1:27:27have to kind of communicate to the world
- 1:27:30or help clarify policy positions uh that
- 1:27:34helps the world maybe have a a better
- 1:27:36understanding or dare I say a more a
- 1:27:39more advantageous uh understanding of of
- 1:27:41our foreign policy? or is something like
- 1:27:44a USIA kind of something that would just
- 1:27:47add another layer of bureaucracy that
- 1:27:49would just gum things up even worse.
- 1:27:51>> I think we do need something like that,
- 1:27:54but that doesn't mean we need to
- 1:27:55reinstate, you know, a new bureaucracy.
- 1:27:58Um the fact of the matter is is that all
- 1:28:00across you know the government across
- 1:28:03the you know the whole of government
- 1:28:04there are a lot of of agencies or
- 1:28:07organizations that have this mandate but
- 1:28:11each time they're created they get
- 1:28:14hemmed in and boxed in in order to
- 1:28:17prevent them you know having
- 1:28:20institutional power over over larger
- 1:28:23organizations. And so like like there's
- 1:28:25the um I forget what the initials stand
- 1:28:28for but it's the AGM which is
- 1:28:30responsible for for controlling all the
- 1:28:32Voice of America stations and you know
- 1:28:34our radio free Europe radio liberty and
- 1:28:36stuff. That was was their mandate but
- 1:28:39they were hemmed in because you know
- 1:28:42because people did not want them to to
- 1:28:46end up you know dictating to other folks
- 1:28:48what you know Americans should be. And
- 1:28:50then in this administration there's been
- 1:28:52a lot of anger at VA because they they
- 1:28:56maintained an independent editorial
- 1:28:57posture and so they've been you know
- 1:28:59almost destroyed. They could act in that
- 1:29:03role of coordinating a unified message
- 1:29:06if they were allowed to do it. You've
- 1:29:08also got like the in state department
- 1:29:09you've got the bureau of conflict and
- 1:29:10stability operations and this is an
- 1:29:12organization that instead of like where
- 1:29:15you know all of the state department
- 1:29:16folks they have one nation missions you
- 1:29:19know they have you know let's improve
- 1:29:21bilateral relations with Nair or Mali
- 1:29:25and you don't have anyone who has
- 1:29:26responsibility for you know the the
- 1:29:28problem of you know transnational uh
- 1:29:31terrorism across the Sahel as a whole
- 1:29:33their job and and you know conflict
- 1:29:36disability operation ations was to go in
- 1:29:38into these different these different
- 1:29:40embassies and work with all of the
- 1:29:42partners and ensure that there was some
- 1:29:43kind of consensus and stability or idea
- 1:29:46about that. they they took as a problem
- 1:29:48set a transnational problem rather than
- 1:29:50a any anything specific to one country.
- 1:29:55And so they coordinated um the same
- 1:29:57thing. But um out of institutional you
- 1:30:00know jealousies and rivalries within
- 1:30:03State Department, they you know had
- 1:30:04their mandate cut as as you know as
- 1:30:07tight as they could and all of their
- 1:30:10their operations were hamstrung by you
- 1:30:12know the usual players. You've got, you
- 1:30:15know, you've had the the GEK, the global
- 1:30:17engagement center that was created by
- 1:30:19state department to coordinate, you
- 1:30:21know, information outreach on digital
- 1:30:22level. They could have done it, but um
- 1:30:25for the same reason as as you know the
- 1:30:28other agencies, they were not allowed to
- 1:30:30actually function and so they spent you
- 1:30:32know millions of dollars um
- 1:30:34accomplishing nothing.
- 1:30:36>> Yeah.
- 1:30:36>> And eventually their funding was allowed
- 1:30:37to lapse. There is a need for a
- 1:30:39coordinated information policy at some
- 1:30:42level. It has to it has to have the
- 1:30:44ability to reach out to other folks and
- 1:30:47you know if not tell them what to do at
- 1:30:50least to be you know at their table
- 1:30:52saying we object you know even if they
- 1:30:54they can't force them to do what they
- 1:30:56say at least to be able to raise
- 1:30:57objections. It doesn't have to be a new
- 1:30:59layer of bureaucracy. It just needs to
- 1:31:01be someone, you know, pin the tail on
- 1:31:04someone. And it can be a defense
- 1:31:06department are the the guys who who end
- 1:31:09up with all the money and, you know,
- 1:31:11authorities that that every no
- 1:31:13administration likes to to you know, cut
- 1:31:16into the authorities of the defense
- 1:31:18department. So that is possibly a
- 1:31:20logical place to put it. It should be
- 1:31:23realistically it should be somewhere
- 1:31:25between state and uh and something else.
- 1:31:29>> Yeah. But in practice, you know, sooner
- 1:31:32or later, if we get into a real
- 1:31:35situation, if we end up, you know, in a
- 1:31:38in a conventional conflict, we're going
- 1:31:40to end up developing this anyways just
- 1:31:43to coordinate the information picture
- 1:31:45that we need.
- 1:31:45>> Yeah, I I think that I think that's you
- 1:31:47bring up a really good point because
- 1:31:48it's it's not as simple as saying we
- 1:31:50need a USIA, right? Because really and
- 1:31:53truly those different agencies that you
- 1:31:55just described, they have different
- 1:31:57mandates. Voice of America, Radio Free
- 1:32:00Europe, Radio Free Asia, those were
- 1:32:03designed to have independent editorial
- 1:32:06control. Why? Because it's part, it's
- 1:32:10not about controlling the information
- 1:32:12that goes out through all these global
- 1:32:13bureaus and people around the world
- 1:32:15listening to them. It's about attraction
- 1:32:17to America. Here is a country with this
- 1:32:20great culture, this rich culture, strong
- 1:32:23markets, and a press that can hold its
- 1:32:26government accountable. To me, that's
- 1:32:28what VA was always about. It was never
- 1:32:31about a conduit for passing propaganda,
- 1:32:33right? It's about the attraction of
- 1:32:35American culture, right? The global the
- 1:32:37GEC, that's about public diplomacy,
- 1:32:40right? That's about clarifying for the
- 1:32:42world and providing context and
- 1:32:44providing you knowledge about foreign
- 1:32:48American foreign policy right and then
- 1:32:50the department of defense like it I'll
- 1:32:52just express my own personal opinion I
- 1:32:53don't think has any business in those
- 1:32:55areas right like department of defense
- 1:32:57should be focused on I'm sorry
- 1:32:59department of war apologies should be
- 1:33:01focused on should be focused on you know
- 1:33:05military things and to your point maybe
- 1:33:08we don't need necessarily a coord
- 1:33:10coordinating body because that seems
- 1:33:11kind of ridiculous, but maybe some kind
- 1:33:13of like policy body that establishes
- 1:33:17that puts out like a strategic
- 1:33:19communications strategy for the US
- 1:33:21government and then the different
- 1:33:22departments agencies fall under that.
- 1:33:26Now, not to get political because that's
- 1:33:27not what this thing is about, but it's a
- 1:33:29part of the information environment. To
- 1:33:32even have this conversation between you
- 1:33:35and me about a policy body,
- 1:33:38different agencies or different mandates
- 1:33:40seems utterly ridiculous because the
- 1:33:42most influential voice in the United
- 1:33:45States government, maybe even in the
- 1:33:46entire world right now, is the president
- 1:33:48of the United States because of how the
- 1:33:50president is is is is chooses to
- 1:33:52communicate to the world. the world is
- 1:33:54really focused on his uh you know his
- 1:33:57his overwhelming access to the media,
- 1:33:59his social media game. When you think
- 1:34:02about that, this very unconventional
- 1:34:04approach to how you communicate, the
- 1:34:06whole idea of a government agency just
- 1:34:08seems like it's out the window. It'll be
- 1:34:09a complete waste of money, right? Do you
- 1:34:11think that we're looking at a point now
- 1:34:13where the president bull bully pullpit
- 1:34:16is on steroids and that becomes our
- 1:34:18deacto way for the United States
- 1:34:21government to communicate to the world?
- 1:34:22Now, is that role in your mind changing
- 1:34:25given what we've seen over the past few
- 1:34:27years?
- 1:34:28>> I would say that there is there is still
- 1:34:30a government role for messaging and
- 1:34:34understanding the implications and all
- 1:34:35that, but it is stepped on by the
- 1:34:38president continually and this this is a
- 1:34:43a it is an absolute contradiction. So,
- 1:34:46you know, we have ended up with with a,
- 1:34:49you know, an imperial presidency that
- 1:34:51that, you know, has gone into the crazy
- 1:34:53emperor uh stage where, you know, we're
- 1:34:57we're turning horses into into senators
- 1:35:00because
- 1:35:02no one, you know, at a staff level can
- 1:35:05can really
- 1:35:07have a voice at the table where it needs
- 1:35:09to be listened to. And we can have very
- 1:35:12coherent sensible you know responses
- 1:35:17that will be ignored or counteracted
- 1:35:20because of decisions that are at at the
- 1:35:22highest the absolute highest level. The
- 1:35:24co situation is the perfect example. So
- 1:35:27with and I know that that this is
- 1:35:29something that's very near and dear to
- 1:35:31your heart. So most of the US political
- 1:35:34and military response to CO was very
- 1:35:38sensible and very well put together.
- 1:35:40Every military command had a plan for
- 1:35:43how to deal with pandemics that was very
- 1:35:45sensible. We had, you know, a a um
- 1:35:49creation of of a vaccine with Operation
- 1:35:51Warp Speed that was incredibly rapid. We
- 1:35:54had, you know, uh good CDC. It was
- 1:35:58slower CDC response than than ideal, but
- 1:36:01but but it definitely did great things.
- 1:36:04All of that was completely undercut
- 1:36:08because of statements at the very top of
- 1:36:10the chain that that went against
- 1:36:12everything else that the government was
- 1:36:14doing.
- 1:36:14>> Mhm.
- 1:36:15>> And that kind of of schizophrenia in our
- 1:36:17in our public image that creates discord
- 1:36:20and distrust, you know, in the community
- 1:36:22as a whole. Our allies can't trust us
- 1:36:25because all of the people they're
- 1:36:26talking to, they're not talking to the
- 1:36:28president on a daily basis. You know,
- 1:36:30our allies are talking to the staff
- 1:36:32inside of, you know, and inside of NATO
- 1:36:36headquarters. And all the staff inside
- 1:36:38of NATO headquarters has this plan, and
- 1:36:40it's a pretty good one for how they're
- 1:36:42going to, you know, uh, develop NATO as
- 1:36:44an institution further. But then you
- 1:36:46come out with a national security
- 1:36:47strategy that completely undercuts
- 1:36:49everything that they've said and puts
- 1:36:51out things that are fundamentally
- 1:36:54unsustainable. And that's,
- 1:36:56you know, you can work for years to
- 1:36:59stabilize a situation and a single
- 1:37:02executive order or statement at the
- 1:37:04highest level can completely destroy it.
- 1:37:06Yeah, you bring up a really good point
- 1:37:09and I I want to I want you bring up a
- 1:37:12very fair point, but I I also think it's
- 1:37:15a good point and it it is that
- 1:37:19embassies, consulates, military units
- 1:37:23out in the world, right? Government
- 1:37:25agencies out in the world who speak to
- 1:37:28our allies on a day-to-day basis, who
- 1:37:31exchange lots of information. when there
- 1:37:34is that disconnect at the very top,
- 1:37:37right, to you know, versus what they're
- 1:37:40putting out, it does create an image of
- 1:37:44just utter chaos, complete incoherence,
- 1:37:47right? And it makes um it makes it
- 1:37:50difficult for us to be able to
- 1:37:51accomplish what we need to accomplish,
- 1:37:52right? I encourage my guests to speak
- 1:37:54freely. I'm going to steer clear of
- 1:37:56making political judgments, but I think
- 1:37:57that everyone can recognize that if you
- 1:38:00know at the if at the top, right, says
- 1:38:03something and they say it at a very
- 1:38:05rapid rate and it seems to change a lot
- 1:38:08at the execution level where you know it
- 1:38:11it it can undercut it could it can
- 1:38:13disempower it makes you less likely to
- 1:38:16be able to do your job. I you and I both
- 1:38:18have suffered from that while we were in
- 1:38:20the military, right? And so that's a
- 1:38:22very fair point that you that that I
- 1:38:24think that you bring up, a very valid
- 1:38:27point. I think too like when you start
- 1:38:28talking about pandemics, one of the
- 1:38:30things I learned um during the pandemic,
- 1:38:32public health communications
- 1:38:35very rapidly becomes political
- 1:38:37communications. Science becomes at some
- 1:38:40point less important than politics and
- 1:38:43at different points it becomes more
- 1:38:44important than politics. Right. But
- 1:38:46going back to your experiences in
- 1:38:48Baghdad, when you're in a crisis
- 1:38:49situation, people thirst for
- 1:38:51information. They thirst for credible
- 1:38:54information because it affects their
- 1:38:55business. It can affects their
- 1:38:56livelihoods, affects their very lives.
- 1:38:59Well, if there's a vacuum, there's all
- 1:39:01kinds of people in particularly in our
- 1:39:02country where there's an open ecosystem
- 1:39:04where people can post whatever the hell
- 1:39:05they want. There's all sorts of people
- 1:39:07willing to fill vacuum with all kinds of
- 1:39:09And that can be very
- 1:39:11dangerous, right? I will always say an
- 1:39:14open system is the the best, good
- 1:39:16markets, you know, creativity, but
- 1:39:19there's a cost to it when you're dealing
- 1:39:21with a public health crisis of having
- 1:39:24that, right? And I'm not going to
- 1:39:26litigate like, you know, censorship and
- 1:39:29all that kind of stuff. That's that's
- 1:39:30outside the purview of this podcast. But
- 1:39:33I think one of the things that's really
- 1:39:34interesting is you've spent your time
- 1:39:37doing this stuff in the army, working in
- 1:39:40information programs, working in the
- 1:39:42world and seeing what happens when our
- 1:39:44public image is distorted.
- 1:39:46And the United States government would
- 1:39:48be well advised in my opinion to listen
- 1:39:52to guys like you who understand the the
- 1:39:55the bad that happens when we are
- 1:39:58not cor we're not communicating in a
- 1:40:01coherent manage
- 1:40:04a a coherent way to the world. it can
- 1:40:06cause a lot of problems not just for the
- 1:40:08world but here like our markets can
- 1:40:10suffer our national defense posture
- 1:40:12suffers and so all of your experience
- 1:40:15that you had I think is very valuable to
- 1:40:18hopefully people in government today
- 1:40:19that are thinking about this I'll stop
- 1:40:22short of rendering an opinion whether I
- 1:40:23think they're really thinking about it
- 1:40:25hey listen man for me it's like I've
- 1:40:26always felt that the the great
- 1:40:28attraction of of this country is its
- 1:40:33government its fairness
- 1:40:35our open markets,
- 1:40:38you know, our commerce,
- 1:40:40culture, technology, backed up by this
- 1:40:43really capable military. I've always
- 1:40:46felt even when I first joined the
- 1:40:49military that, you know, this altogether
- 1:40:51was our greatest source of influence and
- 1:40:54frankly it was a is part of our
- 1:40:57contribution to the stability of the
- 1:40:59world. But to be honest with you, man,
- 1:41:01like I look at culture, I look at
- 1:41:04markets and yes, even military power
- 1:41:07because in the wake of these two
- 1:41:09disastrous wars that we came out with,
- 1:41:11the failure of our deterrence in
- 1:41:13Ukraine, right? The failure to to to
- 1:41:17deter Russia. I'm seeing all these
- 1:41:19things, man, markets, military, culture
- 1:41:23moving in the wrong direction. They're
- 1:41:24trending in the in the wrong direction.
- 1:41:27So, you know, in that regard, I think
- 1:41:29that we have a major that that's always
- 1:41:31been our strength and I think we have a
- 1:41:34major challenge with how the United
- 1:41:37States is positioned in the world moving
- 1:41:38forward. And I don't think it's just
- 1:41:40about rotten American government
- 1:41:43institutions. I think it's a it's a much
- 1:41:44broader thing. And I think what the
- 1:41:46world if our if our trends continue to
- 1:41:48go down in these key areas, I think the
- 1:41:51attraction of America in the world is
- 1:41:54going to go down. And I think it's going
- 1:41:56to have devastating impact not just here
- 1:41:59in this this country but also in the
- 1:42:00world. That's that's kind of my my take
- 1:42:02on that. I kind of want to see how you
- 1:42:04react. Or do you think I'm going full
- 1:42:05crank mode here? Man,
- 1:42:06>> I don't think you're being a crank. I
- 1:42:08think that uh we have been in an in an
- 1:42:12information war um since the end of the
- 1:42:15cold war,
- 1:42:16>> you know, [clears throat] when or at the
- 1:42:19very least since 2000 when Putin came
- 1:42:21into power. And the thing about a war,
- 1:42:25you know, or any strategic situation is
- 1:42:28that, you know, the the person the
- 1:42:31person who wins a battle is not the guy
- 1:42:33who makes the most mistakes or the least
- 1:42:35mistakes. It's the guy who makes the
- 1:42:37next to last mistake.
- 1:42:39>> Mhm.
- 1:42:40>> In this information war, it's the same
- 1:42:41thing. The enemy is making all kinds of
- 1:42:43mistakes, too. Up and down across the
- 1:42:46board. We aren't taking good advantage
- 1:42:48of them, but we could. when it comes to
- 1:42:52COVID um inside of Russia, they
- 1:42:55developed a vaccine very early on before
- 1:42:57we did. It, you know, had a little bit
- 1:42:59less effectiveness, but it was still a
- 1:43:01pretty good one. But they had almost no
- 1:43:03uptake of the vaccine inside the
- 1:43:05country. And so and so much less than
- 1:43:08than even the US. And it was remarkable
- 1:43:11because, you know, the Russian
- 1:43:13government has the ability to push out
- 1:43:14to hospitals, make this mandatory, and
- 1:43:16get every get everybody a shot. and they
- 1:43:18still couldn't do it um because they had
- 1:43:20built up so much distrust in their
- 1:43:22internal media infrastructure. They had
- 1:43:26destroyed the the credibility of every
- 1:43:28institution that was able to push
- 1:43:30something. And so when it actually came
- 1:43:32down to it, they didn't have the levers
- 1:43:34of power that they thought they did.
- 1:43:35We've seen that in the Russ and you know
- 1:43:37the Russian war in Ukraine. It has gone
- 1:43:40disastrously for Russian society as a
- 1:43:42whole. And there is a very good chance
- 1:43:44that Russia is going to fragment.
- 1:43:45Whenever Russia right now cannot stop
- 1:43:48fighting in Ukraine because as soon as
- 1:43:50they do situation inside the country is
- 1:43:52going to collapse. Right now Russian
- 1:43:54society is only being held up by the
- 1:43:57fact that they are that that all of that
- 1:44:00their army is in Ukraine. When that's
- 1:44:03over, when all these troops can go home,
- 1:44:05you're going to have situation where you
- 1:44:06have a 100,000 very rich elite uh
- 1:44:10Russians who fled the country when the
- 1:44:12fighting started, they're all going to
- 1:44:13be able to come back home and they're
- 1:44:15going to have money and resources and
- 1:44:16they're going to take all the elite jobs
- 1:44:18and all these troops who were
- 1:44:20sacrificed, you know, in in the meat
- 1:44:22grinder of the war are also going to
- 1:44:23come back and that is not a good
- 1:44:26situation. There will be a lot of
- 1:44:28conflict and fragmentation
- 1:44:30and it will be an ugly situation and I
- 1:44:35suspect that at the highest levels you
- 1:44:37know of the power vertical that they are
- 1:44:39aware of this risk and that's why there
- 1:44:42is all this weird dithering from the
- 1:44:44Russian side you know about what's going
- 1:44:47on because they know that that right now
- 1:44:49once they stop fighting they're going to
- 1:44:52continue fighting inside of Russia.
- 1:44:54>> Mhm. These kinds of mistakes are present
- 1:44:56with every with every organization with
- 1:44:59every element of power about the world.
- 1:45:02They all are making huge mistakes and
- 1:45:05taking huge risks. And it's a matter of
- 1:45:07of whether we get our act together in
- 1:45:10time to make sure that that you know the
- 1:45:12the that we make the next the last
- 1:45:15mistake and that it's our adversaries
- 1:45:16who make the last one.
- 1:45:18>> Yeah. Yeah. I mean that's that's that's
- 1:45:22an interesting perspective, man. And you
- 1:45:24know, I think another area where I feel
- 1:45:26like
- 1:45:28our press,
- 1:45:30I I you know, for so long,
- 1:45:34I've seen the press in this town
- 1:45:39become more chummy with government. Now,
- 1:45:42you don't see that on TV, right? But
- 1:45:46what I So, I'm I'm a huge supporter of
- 1:45:49an o open press. I am a supporter of an
- 1:45:52act of an adversarial press to the US
- 1:45:54government holding the government to
- 1:45:56account and the government and the press
- 1:45:57being having and the press being given
- 1:45:59the access to be able to do that job. I
- 1:46:02am a I will defend that with my last
- 1:46:04drop of blood.
- 1:46:06>> Okay.
- 1:46:07But I actually
- 1:46:09in my I actually am observing the way
- 1:46:12things work in this town is that members
- 1:46:16of the press feel that to maintain their
- 1:46:18access they have to be a little chummier
- 1:46:20than they probably have to be.
- 1:46:23And I feel that like as an institution
- 1:46:25it's not all the press's fault. The
- 1:46:29government has a social contract to
- 1:46:31basically keep itself open and to accept
- 1:46:34an adversarial relationship with the
- 1:46:36press. right to make this whole
- 1:46:39democracy thing work.
- 1:46:41And what I see is like that's actually
- 1:46:44it's actually not happening. Like the
- 1:46:46the government is actually kind of
- 1:46:48turning is making that access more
- 1:46:51difficult. And as a natural response to
- 1:46:54that, I think the media, a lot of the
- 1:46:55media, they are trying to be chummy with
- 1:46:58the current government.
- 1:47:01It's just it's come off the rails, man.
- 1:47:04And uh so you can sit there in the press
- 1:47:07room and hear like reporters, you know,
- 1:47:09yelling at the the press secretary and
- 1:47:12back and forth and we can hear the the
- 1:47:14conversations that, you know,
- 1:47:17>> yeah, you can hear all that stuff,
- 1:47:18right? You can watch all that stuff on
- 1:47:20TV, right? But at the end of the day,
- 1:47:22like it's just really difficult for me
- 1:47:24to see like the days of the of the long
- 1:47:26form breaking big stories about
- 1:47:28something in government that's just
- 1:47:30wrong. And it scares the hell out of me,
- 1:47:33man. It's it scares the hell out of me.
- 1:47:35And uh the it's another part of this
- 1:47:38institution where it's not just the
- 1:47:40government communicating to the world.
- 1:47:42It's also the government being open so
- 1:47:43that a adversarial press corps can do
- 1:47:46their jobs. That's what makes it work
- 1:47:48work. When I worked with the press here
- 1:47:50in DC, I never had an expectation of
- 1:47:52hanging out with them and having drinks
- 1:47:54with them and, you know, leaking to
- 1:47:57them. That's not the way this works.
- 1:47:58We're we have an adversarial
- 1:48:00relationship, right? And it works. They
- 1:48:02ask me a hard question, I'm gonna
- 1:48:04freaking answer it. Anyway, I I don't
- 1:48:07see that anymore. And I'm my fear is not
- 1:48:09just the government's going to do things
- 1:48:10that the American people can't see, but
- 1:48:12the American people are going to lose
- 1:48:13confidence in the press. And again, in
- 1:48:16that vacuum,
- 1:48:17>> they are.
- 1:48:18>> And in that vacuum, you're going to run
- 1:48:20to other sources of information. And it
- 1:48:23can be really bad. Low editorial, you
- 1:48:27know, uh, standards, straight up lies.
- 1:48:30disinformation that can be filled by
- 1:48:34adversaries. Like I don't think that
- 1:48:36people really understand some of the
- 1:48:38things that you're teasing out and I
- 1:48:39just wanted to help provide some color
- 1:48:40there. But am I off base in that
- 1:48:43assessment?
- 1:48:44>> No, you're you're completely correct and
- 1:48:46it's but it isn't it is a matter of of
- 1:48:50you know that that increase in
- 1:48:52Trumpiness is not just you know this
- 1:48:54current administration. It's been going
- 1:48:56on for a while and there are structural
- 1:48:58reasons for why that's happening. One of
- 1:49:00the big ones is the consolidation of
- 1:49:03journalistic power in just a a few
- 1:49:05organizations. So when you have hundreds
- 1:49:09of independent newsrooms across the
- 1:49:11country who are all competing for, you
- 1:49:13know, getting the information out,
- 1:49:15they're competing with each other, they
- 1:49:17are trying to get scoops. And you have
- 1:49:18that adversarial situation because all
- 1:49:20of these reporters are competing with
- 1:49:24other reporters to get that information.
- 1:49:27they're they're hungry for status within
- 1:49:29the field. On the other hand, if you
- 1:49:31have two or three institutions that
- 1:49:34control all of the the newsrooms across
- 1:49:38the country and all of the papers across
- 1:49:40the country, or even worse, if you have
- 1:49:42a a technical monopoly like Facebook or
- 1:49:46Google or something like that that can
- 1:49:47control uh who sees those stories, you
- 1:49:51know, you have you have the people that
- 1:49:53you could put into into, you know, a
- 1:49:56single fundraiser event who have control
- 1:49:59over those levers of power and those
- 1:50:01people you can influence and you can you
- 1:50:04can get them to kill the stories you
- 1:50:06don't want or promote the stories that
- 1:50:08you do want. And moreover, all of those
- 1:50:10guys have a financial incentive to not
- 1:50:13rock the boat.
- 1:50:14>> Whereas an individual reporter,
- 1:50:17their incentive is to rock the boat,
- 1:50:20>> right?
- 1:50:21>> Because that's how they get their their
- 1:50:23that's how they get uh you know greater
- 1:50:26status within the field. And we don't I
- 1:50:30don't know how that can be resolved. And
- 1:50:33I don't think I don't think anyone does.
- 1:50:35But there are organizations that are
- 1:50:37trying. There's things like ProPublica,
- 1:50:39things like that that are are trying to
- 1:50:42maintain some kind of independent
- 1:50:45journalist um community, you know, in a
- 1:50:48way. And and this is back to that D&D
- 1:50:51basis. I I didn't come into the army as,
- 1:50:54you know, you know, a jock. I came into
- 1:50:56the kid as I came into the army as a D
- 1:50:58and D kid. And so what I grew up on was,
- 1:51:02you know, cyberpunk literature and then
- 1:51:03the cyberpunk game. And we are building
- 1:51:06ourselves a a cyberpunk world every day.
- 1:51:11We're building, you know, a handful of
- 1:51:13news corps, but we're also building the
- 1:51:16capabilities for, you know, independent
- 1:51:18journalists to try to try to rise up in
- 1:51:21there. What's going to end up happening
- 1:51:22is these journalists are going to be if
- 1:51:25it goes the way it's going, those
- 1:51:27journalists are going to be getting
- 1:51:29their information not from uh sources
- 1:51:32within government who they are um trying
- 1:51:35to embarrass in a press room, but
- 1:51:36instead they're going to be going to
- 1:51:38hackers who are going to hack into our
- 1:51:39systems and steal the information. That
- 1:51:42is why Assange is better trusted as a
- 1:51:46journalist than you know CNN by a lot of
- 1:51:50people in America. when Assange is, you
- 1:51:52know, is fully um compromised
- 1:51:57by, you know, by Russian forces.
- 1:52:01>> Yeah,
- 1:52:01>> that's that is is a uh we have we have
- 1:52:06leaned into the risk factor there. We
- 1:52:08have created an ecosystem in which we
- 1:52:11are potentially um easily compromised by
- 1:52:15malicious foreign actors um just because
- 1:52:18we're losing the credibility of those
- 1:52:21who could oppose them within the
- 1:52:24institutions here.
- 1:52:25>> Yeah, Jed, that's a very smart and I
- 1:52:28know nothing about cyber punk, so I have
- 1:52:29to look that up and we're done. Just
- 1:52:31just joking. Um the
- 1:52:35So people who are listening and have
- 1:52:37have have stuck with us,
- 1:52:40you may be asking yourself like, "Dude,
- 1:52:42why the hell is the beaten zone talking
- 1:52:44about this?" Well, I'll tell you why.
- 1:52:46Decisions to go to war are big
- 1:52:47decisions, right? They cost the country
- 1:52:51untold amounts of money. They require
- 1:52:54enormous sacrifices for soldiers, right?
- 1:52:58and and sailors, airman's, marine,
- 1:53:00guardians, all of them. Enormous
- 1:53:03sacrifice. It affects the service
- 1:53:04members. It affects their families. It
- 1:53:07creates a a pipeline of of of veterans
- 1:53:10who have to be cared for by the Veterans
- 1:53:12Administration uh burden on them because
- 1:53:15you have injuries, you have, you know,
- 1:53:17that that come as a result of that. And
- 1:53:19these are very important decisions. And
- 1:53:22people have to understand like how the
- 1:53:24information that makes its way to them
- 1:53:26can be manipulated to sway uh people
- 1:53:31their opinions, tap into their emotions.
- 1:53:34And you have to understand how
- 1:53:35adversaries can actually lead us through
- 1:53:38these critical vulnerabilities in our
- 1:53:40information environment can lead us to
- 1:53:44make very disastrous
- 1:53:46decisions to take us to war needlessly.
- 1:53:50Right. And and so that's why we talk
- 1:53:54about this in the beaten zone is because
- 1:53:56as we're just there's a potential war
- 1:53:58that can be potentially going on in the
- 1:53:59Caribbean, okay? You're getting a lot of
- 1:54:02the information from that from the big
- 1:54:06networks, right? Or on social media and
- 1:54:09it's shaping your view and it's it's
- 1:54:12it's it's hitting your hitting you in
- 1:54:15the fields. It's it's tapping into your
- 1:54:17emotions and you're forming judgments
- 1:54:18and you're throwing support behind this
- 1:54:20or you're throwing it against this. The
- 1:54:23quality of that information must always
- 1:54:26be challenged. Everything that comes out
- 1:54:29of the government about its foreign
- 1:54:32policy should absolutely be taken with a
- 1:54:35healthy dose of skepticism and we should
- 1:54:38always be challenging. And that's why
- 1:54:41having an adversarial relationship
- 1:54:43between the press and the government is
- 1:54:45so important. But if the government is
- 1:54:48shutting down press rooms,
- 1:54:51kicking kicking outlets out, I'm sorry.
- 1:54:55I'll I'll express my opinion here.
- 1:54:56That's a problem, man. And it
- 1:54:59makes me wonder what the heck is going
- 1:55:01on. Especially when there's a potential
- 1:55:03wars getting cooked up over here. So
- 1:55:05people can say I'm a crank. I don't
- 1:55:07really give a That's kind of where
- 1:55:09I am on that. It the type of we have to
- 1:55:12challenge every single piece of
- 1:55:13information that comes out of the
- 1:55:14government, but also the media
- 1:55:16understanding
- 1:55:18and and let me tell you something, man.
- 1:55:19I work with some damn good reporters,
- 1:55:22some really good ones who worked for
- 1:55:24really shitty editors and work for
- 1:55:26really shitty media companies. And I
- 1:55:30>> Yeah,
- 1:55:30>> I I I I salute those people. Uh, I've
- 1:55:33never walked a mile in their boots, but
- 1:55:36it's it it I think we're living in
- 1:55:38dangerous times, man. And I think a lot
- 1:55:40of it's because of the information that
- 1:55:41we're being fed on a day-to-day basis.
- 1:55:43So, so much of it is just absolute
- 1:55:44Uh, sorry, I'm emotional about
- 1:55:47this topic, particularly when we start
- 1:55:49talking about going to war. [laughter]
- 1:55:52So, um, it just terrifies me that we
- 1:55:55have a Pentagon press room that's been
- 1:55:56almost handpicked because of the quality
- 1:55:58of the reporting, because of the
- 1:56:00favorability of the reporting that comes
- 1:56:01out. I find that to be a real problem.
- 1:56:06Okay. Sorry, you had to allow me to get
- 1:56:09on myself a little bit.
- 1:56:10>> [laughter]
- 1:56:11>> If you have a situation in the
- 1:56:13information environment in which um
- 1:56:15there aren't a whole lot of people who
- 1:56:17have who have the incentive to get at
- 1:56:20what's really going on, then people like
- 1:56:23me who have an incentive to put out the
- 1:56:26image that we want to put out to achieve
- 1:56:29the advantage that we want, we're going
- 1:56:32to we're going to be all over that.
- 1:56:34You're making an open field for us.
- 1:56:36>> Yeah. Yeah.
- 1:56:37>> And you know most of us are not working
- 1:56:40for tactical commanders on a tactical
- 1:56:43field. Most of us are working um
- 1:56:45somewhere else. You know China has
- 1:56:48millions of people like me. Russia has
- 1:56:50millions of people like me and Meta and
- 1:56:54Google is empowering
- 1:56:57millions of people like me. But what
- 1:57:00they are all undercutting are the only
- 1:57:03people who are trying to
- 1:57:06to present an accurate image.
- 1:57:09>> Yeah. Yeah. 100%. Man, we're going to p
- 1:57:12pivot now to our to our final part here,
- 1:57:14Jed. And I want to talk a little bit
- 1:57:16about you. And so now, you know, you're
- 1:57:18no longer like me. You're no longer in
- 1:57:20the military. You got facial hair. You
- 1:57:22haven't put on too many pounds. I've put
- 1:57:23on far more than you, but we've put on a
- 1:57:25couple of pounds. And we're no longer
- 1:57:27serving.
- 1:57:27>> Put on a peep out. Yeah.
- 1:57:30[laughter and gasps] Hey, don't let Jed
- 1:57:31fool you, dude. Dude, you used to run
- 1:57:33marathons, right? You're quite you're a
- 1:57:36hell of a lot more accomplished runner
- 1:57:37than me, man. Um, when did you know it
- 1:57:41was time to retire?
- 1:57:42>> For me, it was it was because of deals
- 1:57:45that that were made within the, you
- 1:57:47know, within the military community. So,
- 1:57:49I had a a kind of a handshake deal, a
- 1:57:51drug deal with the ranch manager that
- 1:57:53would allow me to stay in the DC area
- 1:57:55because that was better for my
- 1:57:57daughter's health.
- 1:57:57>> Mhm. [clears throat]
- 1:57:58>> Um because she needed medical care that
- 1:57:59you couldn't get at Brack. Um but the
- 1:58:02other side of that deal was that as soon
- 1:58:04as as I had the chance to hang it up, I
- 1:58:08would hang it up. And you know, that's
- 1:58:10what I did.
- 1:58:11>> Yep.
- 1:58:12>> It was S Major Billot. He he took some
- 1:58:16some risk and and did some work to, you
- 1:58:19know, to to keep me there. But that's
- 1:58:21probably why my daughter still alive
- 1:58:24today.
- 1:58:24>> And it's funny because Star Major
- 1:58:27Millian and I, the first time we met, we
- 1:58:30actually almost got into a fist fight.
- 1:58:32>> We uh he was training us up for um
- 1:58:37before we went up to Iraq. And uh you
- 1:58:40know, he was kind of trying to be a hard
- 1:58:41ass. was in in charge of the uh the SCUP
- 1:58:44teams that were sporting the Rangers.
- 1:58:46And so he was trying to be a hard ass
- 1:58:48about, you know, our uh shooting. I'm
- 1:58:50not very good shot. And he was making a
- 1:58:53lot of uh a lot of uh uh you know,
- 1:58:56putting a lot of pressure on us. And one
- 1:58:58of the things he was saying is is you
- 1:59:00know, he was he was saying something. He
- 1:59:02was saying how, you know, he wanted our
- 1:59:04shot our shot groups like, you know,
- 1:59:06tight like our wife and stuff like that.
- 1:59:07Eventually, I made this this nary
- 1:59:09comment about his wife. It was really
- 1:59:11inappropriate and I should not have made
- 1:59:13and man he almost beat my ass and he
- 1:59:15would have won. You know it uh he
- 1:59:17restrained himself with
- 1:59:18>> I think the Dungeons and Dragons
- 1:59:20probably guys would have been proud of
- 1:59:21your performance man.
- 1:59:23>> He really came came through for me in
- 1:59:25the end. He uh he made sure that that my
- 1:59:28daughter had a chance at life.
- 1:59:29>> Mhm.
- 1:59:30>> Yeah. So,
- 1:59:32>> speaking of your family, um, and we're
- 1:59:34not going to use names here to protect
- 1:59:36our family members, um, but how did your
- 1:59:39career of service, you mentioned a
- 1:59:41positive aspect was your daughter's, you
- 1:59:43know, was able to get her because of the
- 1:59:45stability that you were able to stay
- 1:59:47here in the DC area and you were able to
- 1:59:49take advantage of the good medical
- 1:59:51system here, was able to have a very
- 1:59:53positive impact on your on on your for
- 1:59:55your daughter. But, you know, throughout
- 1:59:57your entire career, you spent a lot of
- 1:59:59time away from home. Um, how what kind
- 2:00:01of can you give our listeners kind of a
- 2:00:03some an idea of like what kind of
- 2:00:06pressure and what the impact that
- 2:00:08military family members face when
- 2:00:11they're on that journey with their
- 2:00:13service member.
- 2:00:14>> It can be really rough. We depend upon,
- 2:00:16you know, our our family members to to
- 2:00:19take up the slap when when we're not
- 2:00:21there. And it also means that when we
- 2:00:24when we are home um they have to kind of
- 2:00:27they have to to maintain control of all
- 2:00:30these things you know just as though we
- 2:00:32could go away at any time because it
- 2:00:34takes a lot of effort to switch back
- 2:00:36every time that goes through. For a lot
- 2:00:38of years uh my wife was was was doing
- 2:00:42everything for the family and uh and it
- 2:00:46took a lot out of her. Um there was a
- 2:00:48lot of hard decisions with my daughter's
- 2:00:49healthcare that I wasn't there for and
- 2:00:51that was that was very very hard on her.
- 2:00:54>> Yeah.
- 2:00:54>> As it happens, she was incredibly
- 2:00:58um capable and she she did her research
- 2:01:02and she made the right decisions, but
- 2:01:05but it wasn't easy on her.
- 2:01:06>> Yeah. Yeah. You have a very great family
- 2:01:10unit, man. I love every single member of
- 2:01:13of your family and uh you have a great
- 2:01:15one. You're very blessed in that regard.
- 2:01:18How do you care for your mind, body, and
- 2:01:21spirit in the wake of everything that
- 2:01:23you've been through in your career?
- 2:01:25>> I guess what I've done is is try to try
- 2:01:29to remove the worst influences on me
- 2:01:34over time. I I had to give up drinking.
- 2:01:37Um had to, you know, go to a and and get
- 2:01:40that out of my life because it was
- 2:01:42leading me into making some bad
- 2:01:43decisions. I just wasn't sustainable.
- 2:01:45that led me to a a relationship with God
- 2:01:49that that the teenage me would have been
- 2:01:52um a gas at, you know, it made me
- 2:01:55rethink all of my ideas about, you know,
- 2:01:59what God really was. And and I became I
- 2:02:02became a religious person in ways that
- 2:02:05that, you know, that I would have fought
- 2:02:09tooth and nail against when I was, you
- 2:02:12know, when I was a kid. The other thing
- 2:02:13is that I've uh ended up writing a lot.
- 2:02:16I've written a lot of poetry and this
- 2:02:18t-shirt is actually the uh you know the
- 2:02:20uh newsletter I guess of like military
- 2:02:23poetry
- 2:02:25>> where I get a lot of
- 2:02:27>> it's the aiming circle. It's a guy um
- 2:02:29Randy Sherper Brown who's actually a PA
- 2:02:32guy um uh who you know uh now does does
- 2:02:36poetry and uh you know runs a small
- 2:02:39poetry press. And this is the the
- 2:02:43news, you know, the uh newsletter, you
- 2:02:46know, Patreon group, whatever that, you
- 2:02:48know, that finds all the opportunities
- 2:02:51for veteran fiction, uh, short stories,
- 2:02:55poetry, and consolidates and make sure
- 2:02:57that, you know, that, you know, the
- 2:02:58community knows about these. that has
- 2:03:01helped tremendously the ability to kind
- 2:03:02of get out there some of that that vital
- 2:03:05and and uh things that have built up
- 2:03:07over the years and put that onto paper
- 2:03:10and to try to see it from a different
- 2:03:12perspective.
- 2:03:13>> Um I'm also, you know, writing some some
- 2:03:16science fiction, you know, cyberpunky
- 2:03:18D&D uh kind of stuff. And you know, in
- 2:03:22the spring, we're going to be me and a
- 2:03:25bunch of of uh u you know, buddies from
- 2:03:28from uh high school and college. We're
- 2:03:31you know, putting together an anthology,
- 2:03:33Limal Horizons. We're going to put that
- 2:03:35out, you know, where I'm going to you
- 2:03:37know, I'm able to get out some of those
- 2:03:39those stories in a fictional context.
- 2:03:42Things that that, you know,
- 2:03:44>> can't talk about. That's a lot of the
- 2:03:47>> that's what's really helped for me. No,
- 2:03:49that's awesome, man. I mean, you're
- 2:03:51you're
- 2:03:53I' Now you're I guess you're This is
- 2:03:56episode I think it's 11 or 12 and
- 2:04:01four of you guys have been writers,
- 2:04:05written books, written poetry, you know,
- 2:04:08uh I guess a lot more have written
- 2:04:10profession professional journals and uh
- 2:04:14they all talk say the same thing, man.
- 2:04:16Like writing is therapy. it is. There's
- 2:04:19something about it that just really
- 2:04:21helps you kind of I guess interpret your
- 2:04:24life's events and then you're able to
- 2:04:26share that with future generations.
- 2:04:28>> Um, and yes, science fiction is a
- 2:04:31contribution to future generations. I've
- 2:04:33never read much science fiction because
- 2:04:36I was a jock and I thought that stuff
- 2:04:38was for dorks. So, I guess I'll have to
- 2:04:40read your I have to read your stuff,
- 2:04:42Jaden. I can't wait for it to come out.
- 2:04:44[laughter]
- 2:04:45>> I can't even pron I I think Starship
- 2:04:48Trooper. Starship Trooper science
- 2:04:50fiction. Do you consider that science
- 2:04:51fiction?
- 2:04:52>> Yes, it's absolutely science fiction.
- 2:04:54And it's it's had a huge influence in
- 2:04:57all kinds of ways. Some good, some bad.
- 2:04:59>> Okay. I got some credit. Uh what was the
- 2:05:01one? What was the one about the zombie
- 2:05:03apocalypse? The AER that was written
- 2:05:06>> World War Z.
- 2:05:07>> That was a damn good book. Um I thought
- 2:05:09that was
- 2:05:10>> Max Brooks. Excellent. Yeah. [laughter]
- 2:05:13>> So that's awesome, brother. Um now
- 2:05:16something that uh I think is really
- 2:05:18fascinating I want to kind of touch on
- 2:05:19with you is um you're now embarking on
- 2:05:22another journey and that is to get your
- 2:05:23PhD in neuroscience.
- 2:05:26Okay. First off tell them tell me what's
- 2:05:28neuroscience because I don't think I
- 2:05:29know what that is and then kind of like
- 2:05:31what inspired you to go down that route.
- 2:05:32>> So neuroscience was the the the career
- 2:05:35that I kind of gave up when I joined the
- 2:05:37military. I was um you know in the in
- 2:05:40the mid 90s when I was you know
- 2:05:42finishing my undergrad. um you know it
- 2:05:45was the field called psychobiology or
- 2:05:47biocsychology depending on what school
- 2:05:48you were going to and it was just uh
- 2:05:51looking at at the brain and behavior and
- 2:05:54figuring out how those work together and
- 2:05:56you know over over the time that I was
- 2:05:59in the war that has developed you know
- 2:06:01leaps and bounds and is now a a field
- 2:06:04that has a huge amount of uh you know
- 2:06:08it's it's gone from where we were just
- 2:06:10kind of throwing ideas out against the
- 2:06:13all and coming up with crazy theories
- 2:06:16that couldn't be backed. And now we're
- 2:06:17doing, you know, real impactful
- 2:06:20interventions. So the the particular lab
- 2:06:22that I'm in, we're going to be working
- 2:06:24on, you know, neuro stimulation, um,
- 2:06:26which is where we're, you know, putting
- 2:06:28electrical currents into, you know,
- 2:06:30different nerves to see how that that
- 2:06:32impacts behavior. My project will
- 2:06:35probably be on trust in AI systems with
- 2:06:38veagal nerve stimulation. And you know
- 2:06:41the way we're able to do this is we've
- 2:06:42got a little device puts electrical
- 2:06:44stimulations on the vagus nerve here and
- 2:06:47uh that influences a lot of behavior.
- 2:06:52There's a lot of interventions that are
- 2:06:54now possible of non-invasive or mediumly
- 2:06:58invasive
- 2:06:59you know uh ways that we can directly
- 2:07:02impact the nervous system in all kinds
- 2:07:04of crazy ways. There was just a study
- 2:07:06that came out where they used some some
- 2:07:08mice and they were able to put a small
- 2:07:12surgically implant a small device in the
- 2:07:14scalp over the skull that shined light
- 2:07:17into into the the genetically engineered
- 2:07:20brains of of rats and then able to turn
- 2:07:24on lights on the scalp above the skull
- 2:07:28and that changed the the behavior that
- 2:07:31these rats were doing on the inside. Um,
- 2:07:33China is going leaps and bounds on this
- 2:07:37stuff with brain computer interfaces.
- 2:07:39they are going crazy for for different
- 2:07:41ways that they can they can in practice
- 2:07:44really engage with with the person at a
- 2:07:47neural level and we are we have a lot of
- 2:07:52good scientists but but uh the process
- 2:07:54is much more difficult
- 2:07:56>> for us to do because of you know FDA and
- 2:07:59ethics and all these kinds of things and
- 2:08:02uh so there's it's an interesting time
- 2:08:05to be in it.
- 2:08:06>> Yeah. I mean, when you talk about that
- 2:08:07stuff, Jed, I mean, immediately my mind
- 2:08:10starts to drift towards, oh boy, some
- 2:08:13stuff that's very untoward, like, oh,
- 2:08:14you know, this is human control and, you
- 2:08:17know, we're going to we're going to live
- 2:08:19in this, well, again, I've never read
- 2:08:21any science fiction, so I can't say this
- 2:08:23weird science fiction world where humans
- 2:08:24are are able to think things and they
- 2:08:28actually happen and we're able to have
- 2:08:30our minds controlled. That's where my
- 2:08:31mind goes. But neuroscience is
- 2:08:34neuroscience there's a lot of positive
- 2:08:35benefits to that sort of research and
- 2:08:38innovation like in terms of treating
- 2:08:40people with um
- 2:08:42>> is so could you talk a little bit about
- 2:08:44like the positive sides of that?
- 2:08:46>> Sure. So it's really hard to do
- 2:08:50something like like uh like do something
- 2:08:53like a mind control issue. that is
- 2:08:55extremely challenging and even if you
- 2:08:57can get you know an implanted electrode
- 2:09:00um the brain has a trauma response that
- 2:09:02means that that you know most electrodes
- 2:09:04are are going to become useless after
- 2:09:07just a couple years and you've got you
- 2:09:08know then massive trauma in the brain
- 2:09:10what is very uh uh easy to do is
- 2:09:14influence the systems that are already
- 2:09:16designed to influence the nervous system
- 2:09:17so I talked about so I mentioned like uh
- 2:09:19the vagus nerve you've got you know
- 2:09:20cranial nerves that are designed to
- 2:09:22bring information from the body into the
- 2:09:25mind and that is a kind of of
- 2:09:29therapeutic input that has had uh huge
- 2:09:32success. There are other kinds of of
- 2:09:35minimally invasive methods including
- 2:09:37things as simple as like uh like having
- 2:09:40an EEG system which are now commercially
- 2:09:42available for you know very very low
- 2:09:45cost and you're you're simply listening
- 2:09:48to audio stimulation that tell you how
- 2:09:50calm you are and you're able to do much
- 2:09:52better meditation
- 2:09:54>> um just because you can hear how calm
- 2:09:56you are uh and put yourself into the
- 2:09:59right kind of mental states. almost all
- 2:10:01of the the minimally of invasive stuff.
- 2:10:04Uh the interventions that are done, you
- 2:10:08know, with the body and with the
- 2:10:10information systems that the body is
- 2:10:12designed to to use can have huge
- 2:10:15therapeutic effects. Large invasive
- 2:10:17procedures, things like putting
- 2:10:18electrodes into a brain, those are are
- 2:10:22generally pretty challenging to do
- 2:10:25anything good with because the brain
- 2:10:27does not expect to get information that
- 2:10:29way. Okay. And so there's a pretty good
- 2:10:31chance that you're going to provide
- 2:10:32you're going to provide [clears throat]
- 2:10:33information. You're going to provide
- 2:10:34something that doesn't come in the right
- 2:10:36direction and it's going to it's going
- 2:10:38going to degrade the performance of the
- 2:10:40brain as a whole. It's like uh like most
- 2:10:43most drugs the way they operate is
- 2:10:45essentially like taking a sledgehammer
- 2:10:46to the brain. They're they're uh putting
- 2:10:49they're flooding the system with uh a
- 2:10:52bunch of chemicals that are going to
- 2:10:54have effect on some of these receptors
- 2:10:56that you want and then a lot of
- 2:10:57receptors that you don't. And it's it's
- 2:10:59all happening all at the same time. And
- 2:11:02you know, even the the best new designs,
- 2:11:05you know, serotonin, selective re
- 2:11:07reuptake um inhibitors like uh like you
- 2:11:11know, standard anti-depressants, Prozac,
- 2:11:13stuff like that. Those are are
- 2:11:16sledgehammers in the brain. They have
- 2:11:17all these these um unexpected side
- 2:11:20effects and they're affecting systems
- 2:11:22that you don't want to impact the way
- 2:11:24that you are. And to a large degree, we
- 2:11:26don't really understand how they
- 2:11:28operate. There's huge mysteries in why
- 2:11:31SSRIs, why they work the way they do,
- 2:11:34and um why there is this huge lag before
- 2:11:38they can actually start taking taking
- 2:11:40effect. And we know that there is a
- 2:11:42system that we don't understand that we
- 2:11:44are somehow impacting. We know that
- 2:11:46there there are things that we shouldn't
- 2:11:48be doing, but you know, it's the tool
- 2:11:51that we've got, and so we just keep
- 2:11:52hammering away at the brain. um until we
- 2:11:55get a better understanding.
- 2:11:56>> That's very interesting. So um that's
- 2:11:59very interesting. I mean, yeah, when you
- 2:12:00when you say it that way, it becomes
- 2:12:02more obvious to me like what the I mean,
- 2:12:04you can really greatly improve the
- 2:12:06quality of of of lives, um, with some of
- 2:12:09those sorts of therapies that you're
- 2:12:10talking about. Um, make us less
- 2:12:12dependent upon what comes out of big
- 2:12:14pharma, which I'm, you know, I'm not a
- 2:12:18I'm not an expert and but like I'm I I I
- 2:12:21I welcome that sort of research. I think
- 2:12:24it's there's all sorts of great
- 2:12:27possibilities. I mean, the other day
- 2:12:29someone was talking to me about the the
- 2:12:31VA should this is just another veteran.
- 2:12:34Uh, and I haven't done any research on
- 2:12:36this, so I I but we were just talking
- 2:12:38about and he's like, "Man, the VA should
- 2:12:39have dispensary for psychedelics, man.
- 2:12:41This the the psychedelics can actually
- 2:12:44have great great great um benefits for
- 2:12:47people suffering from post-traumatic
- 2:12:49stress." And my initial reaction was,
- 2:12:52well, yeah, that'll never happen,
- 2:12:54[laughter]
- 2:12:54you know, because there's a stigma with
- 2:12:56psychedelics and that kind of thing. But
- 2:12:59when you think about it, it's actually
- 2:13:01quite rational. If it helps to make
- 2:13:02someone's life better, it helps them be
- 2:13:04able to to deal with post-traumatic
- 2:13:07stress, why not? That's the charter of
- 2:13:11the organization, right? So, anyway, I
- 2:13:13don't want to bash on the VA. It's not
- 2:13:15it's not what we're here to do, but like
- 2:13:16the stuff that you're talking about to
- 2:13:18me, like that's the really interesting
- 2:13:20Um, there's some really interesting
- 2:13:22things that can come out of that that
- 2:13:24can greatly improve the lives of of
- 2:13:26everyone, but also for our veteran
- 2:13:28community. It's it's pretty obvious
- 2:13:30based on what you're telling me. What
- 2:13:32kind of a program is that like a
- 2:13:33five-year program or what's what's
- 2:13:35what's that? What's that going to what
- 2:13:37kind of work? I guess mine I was how
- 2:13:39much work is that going to be for me,
- 2:13:40man? Like what's what's kind of involved
- 2:13:42with that?
- 2:13:43>> The the program as a as a whole is
- 2:13:45standard PhD program, you know, you
- 2:13:46know, four or five years. Um the way I
- 2:13:48got it is the first couple years I
- 2:13:50essentially had to had to get my masters
- 2:13:53um you know I have a masters that's in
- 2:13:55unconventional warfare. It's not really
- 2:13:57useful for neuroscience. It's not really
- 2:14:00useful in the civilian world at all. Um
- 2:14:02but yeah and I had to learn all the
- 2:14:04things that had happened in 20 years um
- 2:14:06that I hadn't been you know when I when
- 2:14:09I left you know undergraduate school
- 2:14:11that we didn't know about cannabonoids
- 2:14:14you know in the brain. We didn't we had
- 2:14:15no idea how THC worked and all of that
- 2:14:18came up you know after I I spent two
- 2:14:20years getting that essentially getting
- 2:14:23that masters but the VA wouldn't pay for
- 2:14:26me to get a masters cuz I already had
- 2:14:27one and so I had to get a graduate
- 2:14:29certificate which was a a um an 18month
- 2:14:33program that ended up stretching to two
- 2:14:35years to get almost the same thing as a
- 2:14:39as a master's and then after that I was
- 2:14:42able to get into the PhD program and
- 2:14:44it'll another couple years.
- 2:14:45>> Okay.
- 2:14:46>> Um before I before I uh finally get out,
- 2:14:49I should in the summer hopefully. Knock
- 2:14:51on wood. Um
- 2:14:54>> I should be advancing to candidacy and
- 2:14:56then I'm just doing research instead of
- 2:14:58going through, you know, the classes.
- 2:14:59I'm just taking the last of the the
- 2:15:01mandatory classes now.
- 2:15:03>> That's awesome, man. Well,
- 2:15:04congratulations, Jed. I mean, it's a
- 2:15:07nice book into your career. started off
- 2:15:09as, you know, a scioper, which is like,
- 2:15:12you know, now you're turning to be a
- 2:15:15neuroscientist. So, you're like have
- 2:15:17this obsession with the brain, man. I I
- 2:15:19kind of like that. Uh, didn't know that.
- 2:15:22Didn't know about that about you until
- 2:15:23we've chatted. Just want to wrap it up
- 2:15:25by basically saying, you know, um, one
- 2:15:28of the things I really enjoyed about
- 2:15:29this conversation reminded me of
- 2:15:31something very important. The military
- 2:15:34has a very uh is a we're a mly crew,
- 2:15:38right? Like we have a lot of people from
- 2:15:40a lot of different backgrounds and like
- 2:15:42a guy like you and a guy like me were
- 2:15:45probably probably hung in different
- 2:15:46circles when we're in high school,
- 2:15:48right?
- 2:15:49>> Yeah.
- 2:15:50>> You know, but we ended up serving
- 2:15:52together. We were in the same unit
- 2:15:54together and we came together because it
- 2:15:57was the military that kind of made that.
- 2:15:59And that's one of the beautiful things
- 2:16:00about the military. You have people from
- 2:16:02all kinds of different backgrounds and
- 2:16:04we come together and we serve on a team
- 2:16:07and towards a common goal and and here
- 2:16:10we are today. You and I are like close
- 2:16:13family friends. I mean ain't life if
- 2:16:16there's any there if there's anything
- 2:16:18positive I can say about military
- 2:16:19service it's that there's a lot I can
- 2:16:21say positive about military service but
- 2:16:22that's my favorite thing. We It's just
- 2:16:24It's It's a great way to meet people
- 2:16:26from all across the country with
- 2:16:28different backgrounds. And in some
- 2:16:31respects, that's kind of how America
- 2:16:32should be, man. Like,
- 2:16:34>> yeah,
- 2:16:35>> we should not be fighting each other
- 2:16:36over stupid We should be working
- 2:16:38together to try to make a better life
- 2:16:40for our families and for our country.
- 2:16:42>> The military is the one organization
- 2:16:43that has to be a melting pot all the
- 2:16:46time because it has to represent the
- 2:16:47whole country or else there's a big
- 2:16:49risk.
- 2:16:50>> That's right. And uh and in the end, you
- 2:16:52know, that melting pot has to produce
- 2:16:55something that is worth eating. Amen.
- 2:16:57Brother, there is a message at the end.
- 2:16:59>> Yes, sir. Well, Jed, I I appreciate you
- 2:17:02spent a lot of time with me. I
- 2:17:04appreciate very much you joining us and
- 2:17:07uh you did a great job and I look
- 2:17:09forward to uh well, our f we're family
- 2:17:12friends, so I'll probably see you like
- 2:17:13really soon. So,
- 2:17:15>> yeah, [laughter]
- 2:17:17>> it's great chatting you here, man. I
- 2:17:19actually got to learn a lot about you I
- 2:17:21didn't know. So, it was great and thank
- 2:17:22you for joining us. Appreciate it.
- 2:17:24>> Had a great conversation. So, uh
- 2:17:26>> yeah, man.
- 2:17:27>> Uh and hopefully all of the the uh the
- 2:17:30backlash will be directed against you
- 2:17:32and not me. So, [laughter]
- 2:17:34>> you can count on it.
- 2:17:38>> All right, brother.
- 2:17:39>> Just misspell my name on the uh on the
- 2:17:41YouTube notification.
- 2:17:43>> I've already had my first like encounter
- 2:17:45with a troll. I'll tell you about that
- 2:17:46later.
- 2:17:49All right, brother. Thank you so much.
- 2:17:51Have a good weekend.
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Use the transcript to take notes, quote the speaker, build a study guide, generate a summary with ChatGPT or Claude via the YouTube Summary tool, or export it as a timed subtitle file with YouTube to SRT. You can also re-open it in the transcriber to choose a caption track available on the video.
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YouTube2Text is a free YouTube transcript generator — no signup, no daily limit. Paste any YouTube link and get the full transcript instantly, with timestamps, click-to-jump, caption language selection, AI prompts for ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, and exports to TXT, SRT, VTT, or Markdown.