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Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq — Transcript

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0:04all right good afternoon and welcome to
0:07this session of the Washington history
0:10seminar historical perspectives on
0:13International and National Affairs I'm
0:15Christian Osterman I direct the Wilson
0:17Center's history and public policy
0:18program and I co-chair this seminar
0:21series usually with Eric arneson of
0:24George Washington's Washington
0:25University representing the American
0:27historical Association Eric is away
0:30today
0:33this afternoon we will speak with
0:35eminent historian Melvin P Lefler about
0:38his new book confronting Saddam Hussein
0:40George W bush and the invasion of Iraq
0:43published in January of this year the
0:46Oxford University press
0:48confronting Saddam Hussein is a
0:50provocative reinterpretation
0:53of what Professor Lefler calls the most
0:55consequential foreign policy decision of
0:58the 21st century is a major new
1:00reassessment of the motivations behind
1:02the 2003 Invasion and of the reasons for
1:06which The Invasion quickly turned into a
1:08foreign policy tobacco
1:10Mel worked on this book during a
1:132011-2010 hi Corey
1:17fellowship at the Wilson Center and so
1:19we're delighted
1:21to welcome him back to welcome you back
1:24Mel to the center I should note that the
1:27center that that
1:29um that that same year at the Wilson
1:31Center
1:322010-2011 the center also hosted French
1:35historian Frederick puzzo who worked on
1:38a major International history of the war
1:39published in 2016 as a history of the
1:42Iraq crisis France United States and
1:45Iraq 1991 to 2003.
1:49and even a few years before that in
1:53[Music]
1:542003 Charles Dover the former deputy
1:57executive chairman of the UN special
1:59Commission on Iraq from 93 to 2000 was
2:03at the Wilson Center working on a
2:05historical subject on the world war one
2:07uh issues of disarmament when he got the
2:11call to lead the Iraq survey group in
2:16search of weapons of mass destruction
2:18stockpiles so the Iraq invasion has been
2:21somewhat of a focal point for the
2:23center's work and it's only fitting that
2:25on the 20th anniversary of the invasion
2:27we're holding this discussion here at
2:29the center
2:31we have the privilege of being joined
2:33today by three leading experts Brookings
2:36institutions Robert Kagan aei's Corey
2:39shaki and virtually that psychologist
2:41Robert Brigham a warm welcome to all of
2:45you as well I will introduce the
2:47speaker's shortly
2:50the Washington history seminar is a
2:52collaborative effort of two
2:53organizations the American historical
2:55Association and the Wilson Center's
2:57history and public policy program
3:00for over well over a decade the seminar
3:03has served as a nonpartisan Forum to
3:05discuss important new historical
3:07findings inside and publications
3:11since the onset of the pandemic we have
3:13met virtually and I believe this is the
3:15first in-person session we're having
3:17since the spring of 2020 I should note
3:20that this session is also co-sponsored
3:22by the center's Middle East program
3:24directed by Marissa corma
3:27behind the scenes to individuals helped
3:29produce this event Rachel Wheatley for
3:31the AHA and Peter bierstecker for the
3:33Wilson Center along with in this case
3:35the centers or the visual team our
3:38thanks to the entire team for making
3:40this event possible
3:42I would like to invite you to join us
3:45next week then again virtually only when
3:48we will be discussing the ends of
3:50modernization Nicaragua and the United
3:52States and the Cold War by David Johnson
3:55Lee with discussing Cynthia arnson and
3:57Elaine van omen
3:59for those of you who are with us in
4:01person you will see a link and can scan
4:04the QR code on the back of the Flyers to
4:06view upcoming Washington history seminar
4:08schedule and register for events if
4:11you're watching us if you're watching
4:12the webcast a link to the schedule is
4:16also available in the chat now
4:19before we begin a brief word on the game
4:21plan for the session I will introduce
4:24our speakers in turn we will start with
4:26Professor Lefler who will provide a
4:28brief overview of his argument he will
4:31be followed by Dr Kagan and Dr Shack and
4:33finally Professor Brigham each of our
4:36commentators will make some brief
4:37remarks in an Engaged Mal with two or
4:40three questions at about 5 PM I hope to
4:43open up the conversation to the audience
4:45in the room and online for those of you
4:48watching the webcast on the Wilson
4:49Center's website please use the chat
4:52below the chat on the website to submit
4:55your question for the Q a and I will
4:58then put it to our panelists
5:01I should note that today's session will
5:03be recorded and will soon appear on our
5:05respective organization's websites
5:08now let me introduce Professor methan
5:10Lefler
5:11one of this country's most distinguished
5:13diplomatic historians that the left
5:15there is Emeritus professor of American
5:17History at the University of Virginia
5:18and the author of several books on the
5:21Cold War and U.S relations with Europe
5:23including for the soul of mankind
5:25published in 2007 which won the George
5:28Lewis bear prize of the American
5:29historical Association and a
5:32preponderance of power published in 1993
5:34which won the Bancroft Hoover and
5:37Pharrell prizes in 2010 he and our
5:39investor co-edited the three volume
5:42Cambridge history of the Cold War in
5:442017 he published safeguarding
5:47Democratic nationalism U.S foreign
5:49policy and National Security 1920 to
5:522015.
5:54he has served as president of the
5:56Society of American Foreign Relations as
5:58harmsworth professors at Oxford
6:00University and Dean of the college and
6:03Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at
6:05the University of Virginia he has been a
6:07fellow at the center on several
6:09occasions and he co-chairs the academic
6:11Advisory Board of the history and public
6:13policy program it's wonderful to launch
6:17this book your book here with you Mel
6:18you have the floor yep
6:24thank you
6:28thanks so much Christian
6:30it's really a pleasure to be back here
6:33at the Wilson Center
6:35this institution
6:37has supported me and my work for so many
6:41decades and I first came here to begin
6:44my work on preponderance of power and
6:47I'm very indebted to the Wilson Center
6:50for for all that it's done to support me
6:52and so many other historians and and
6:55other Scholars
6:58in fact
6:59I recall vividly
7:02that I was here
7:04at the Wilson Center
7:06on the morning of 9 11.
7:09I arrived a little after nine o'clock in
7:12the morning
7:14I saw people standing in the lobby
7:16watching television I think on the fifth
7:18floor level
7:19that was very unusual
7:22and then we were all bewildered
7:24as we saw the replay again and again
7:28of jet planes
7:30flying into the two towers of the World
7:32Trade Center and the buildings
7:34collapsing
7:36we were shocked even more
7:39an hour or so later
7:41to see another jet
7:44crash into the Pentagon
7:48I can recall to this day
7:52walking home that day
7:54the Eerie quietness the streets of
7:58Washington the foreboding
8:01the uncertainty
8:04one could sense I could sense that the
8:07country
8:09and the world
8:10might be entering into a turbulent
8:14portentous New Era
8:17just a few weeks later
8:20I was still here at the Wilson Center
8:23when Anthrax started circulating in the
8:26mail
8:27some postal workers died
8:30the anthrax spores turned up in a Senate
8:32Office Building
8:34closing it down
8:36the Supreme Court moved its
8:38deliberations
8:40mail and internet service
8:42were interrupted at government buildings
8:44including here at the Wilson Center
8:48in the White House
8:50on October 18th just four or five weeks
8:53after 9 11.
8:55sensors went off alerting occupants of a
8:59toxic substance
9:02it was a false alarm
9:04but nobody should forget
9:07the anxiety
9:09that gripped Washington in the aftermath
9:12of 9 11 and I anxiety that attack that
9:16an attack with biological or chemical
9:19weapons could occur an attack that could
9:22even be far more devastating than 9 11.
9:26of course
9:28I didn't know at the time
9:31that the global war on terror that
9:33President Bush
9:35quickly declared
9:37would lead to the invasion of Iraq
9:40in my book as Christian just said
9:44I treat that decision
9:46as probably the most consequential U.S
9:49foreign policy Choice since the end of
9:52the Cold War
9:54I believe
9:55The Invasion and the occupation turned
9:59into a tragedy
10:02the war
10:03and the Insurrection that followed along
10:07with the counter-insurgency and the
10:09sectarian strife and bloodletting inside
10:12Iraq
10:13led to the deaths
10:15of over two hundred thousand Iraqis and
10:18the displacement
10:20of eight or nine million more
10:24the war in invasion
10:26led to the deaths of about nine thousand
10:28American soldiers and contractors
10:32and ultimately it will cost American
10:34taxpayers it payers it's estimated about
10:37two trillion dollars
10:40geopolitically
10:42the war enhanced
10:45Iranian power in the Gulf
10:47it diverted attention and resources from
10:50Afghanistan it divided America's
10:52European allies and it provided
10:55additional opportunities for China's
10:57rise and Russia's revanchism
11:01it fueled the sense of grievance among
11:04Muslims
11:05heightened anti-americanism
11:08and complicated the war on terrorism
11:12at home
11:13it accentuated
11:16partisan Rifts
11:18and even more profoundly
11:21sundered trust in government
11:25so why did the War take place
11:29and why did The Invasion go so badly
11:32that's what my book is all about
11:36the purpose of my book is not to indict
11:39or to quit or to acquit
11:43I try to understand I try to explain I
11:46try to assess I try to extrapolate
11:50lessons
11:53my sources include a unique set of
11:56interviews that I conducted over 10
11:58years with almost all of the highest
12:01officials
12:03in the Bush Administration except for
12:06the president himself who refused to
12:09allow me to interview him
12:12the interviews
12:15were extremely revealing
12:17and I'm grateful for the time busy
12:20former officials spent with me
12:24but I always was aware in conducting the
12:27interviews
12:28that the policy makers I talked to were
12:31far better able to spin than I was to
12:34probe
12:36I did not abandon
12:39my long-held conviction
12:43that documents are vital for writing
12:46good history
12:48interviews cannot substitute
12:51for documents they can complement they
12:54can supplement
12:56but they cannot substitute
12:58to write this book
13:00I relied on as many American
13:03Declassified documents as I could access
13:08even though many of my own submissions
13:11for mandatory declassification and for
13:15Freedom of Information were either
13:16denied or fool in full or largely
13:19redacted
13:21but in addition to the documents that
13:24have been secured by the National
13:25Security archive and other agencies
13:29I also mind the documents emanating from
13:33the chilcott inquiry in Great Britain
13:36as well as employed
13:39the captured Iraqi documents some of
13:42which have been translated into English
13:46for one of the last chapters of my book
13:48that deals with the inspections in 2002
13:51and 2003 in the winter of 2002 and 2003
13:55I used printed un documents
14:00as I researched
14:03I saw
14:04more complexity
14:07as I researched I saw more contingency
14:12the Bush Administration did not come
14:14into office
14:16intent on going to war in Iraq to
14:21produce regime change
14:24there would have been no invasion of
14:26Iraq
14:27without 9 11. no invasion of Iraq
14:31without Saddam Hussein
14:35no invasion of Iraq
14:37without the belief that Iraq possessed
14:40weapons of mass destruction
14:44as I researched
14:46I became more and more empathetic
14:50and also
14:52more and more critical
14:56I came to understand
14:59the fears
15:01And the emotions
15:03that gripped policy makers in the
15:06aftermath of 9 11 the apprehension the
15:09anger the embarrassment the sense of
15:13responsibility
15:15but as I wrestled with the evidence
15:19I was shocked
15:21by the flaws in the policy process
15:24the poor planning
15:26and the unwillingness to re-examine
15:28assumptions and think long and hard
15:31about consequences
15:36when readers
15:37peruse my book
15:39and I hope you will
15:41I hope readers will suspend their
15:45preconceptions
15:47and look at the evidence
15:49carefully
15:51both the evidence evoking empathy
15:55as well as the evidence
15:58provoking criticism
16:02at the end of the story I'm sure readers
16:04will see much that will confirm their
16:06predilections
16:08but I hope they will also see evidence
16:12that will impel a re-examination
16:16a rethinking
16:18of critical assumptions
16:22knowing full well
16:24that this is just the beginning of
16:25serious historical inquiry
16:28I'll succinctly State my most important
16:31conclusions
16:34first
16:35I argue that President Bush
16:38not vice president Cheney not Secretary
16:41of Defense Rumsfeld not neocons like
16:45Paul wolfowitz
16:47made all the key decisions
16:49regarding Iraq
16:52I show
16:54that bush did not rush to war
16:57his War planning
17:00did not mean War
17:02if the general Franks visited Crawford
17:07during Christmas 2001 to pers to present
17:11the first iteration
17:13of the war plan
17:16General Frank subsequently reflected
17:18quote
17:19I never got the sense that bush wanted
17:21to go to war that was never communicated
17:24to me I left the ranch at Crawford
17:27thinking it was not certain that America
17:31would go to war in Iraq
17:33but it was certain
17:35that we would set the conditions that
17:38would allow us to launch a decisive
17:40campaign
17:41should the president order us to do so
17:45end quote
17:47I explain
17:49Bush's motives
17:52which I emphasize
17:54were not the same as his goals
17:59he was not motivated by oil not
18:01motivated by Israel not motivated by a
18:05quest for her Gemini
18:07not even motivated by a missionary ferva
18:11to spread democracy
18:14if Bush went to war
18:17he did hope
18:20to spread freedom and nurture democracy
18:25but that was not why he went to war
18:31Bush's overriding motive
18:35was to prevent another attack
18:38I examined the mix of emotions
18:41interests
18:43ideas and ideals
18:46that shaped the president's thinking and
18:49his calculations
18:51fear
18:53and Power
18:55guilt
18:56and hubris
18:59uncertainty
19:01and credibility
19:03Danger
19:05and opportunity
19:08I argue
19:10that feelings of guilt over 9 11.
19:14fear of political retribution if another
19:17attack occurred
19:19and most of all an overriding sense of
19:23responsibility
19:25heightened President Bush's threat
19:27perception
19:29and shaped his subsequent Behavior
19:34I discuss a great length
19:37why the intelligence Community thought
19:39what they thought
19:41they knew about Hussein's weapons of
19:44mass destruction and what intelligence
19:46analysts thought they knew
19:50about Saddam Hussein's links
19:53to terrorists
19:56I show that the analysts struggled
20:00poorly struggled
20:02to do the best they could
20:05with suspect informers
20:07an inadequate and inept Collective
20:12collection methods
20:14I describe what Michael Morrell
20:17President Bush's daily CIA briefer
20:21told the president
20:24Hussein
20:25Morel informed bush
20:28had nothing to do with 911 quote zero
20:31Zippo nothing end quote
20:34but Morel also told bush
20:37that Iraq was a terrorist state they
20:41conduct their own terrorism quote
20:43unquote their intelligence service
20:45conducts terrorism in places around the
20:47world and they give money training to a
20:50bunch of Palestinian groups end quote
20:54Saddam Hussein Morel said
20:57had few
20:59if any contacts with Al Qaeda terrorists
21:04nonetheless
21:06Morel warned the president that quote
21:09although Hussein and Al-Qaeda had
21:14diametrically opposed interests
21:18and diametrically opposed ideological
21:21orientations
21:24possibility still exists
21:27of limited cooperation against a mutual
21:31enemy
21:33the United States end quote
21:37I claim that the president had a
21:39strategy one that he and his National
21:41Security adviser Kandi rice like to call
21:45coercive diplomacy
21:48I analyze in the book
21:51why coercive diplomacy was flawed
21:55be set
21:56as it was
21:58by contradictory goals
22:01and competing priorities
22:05I examine
22:08how President Bush tried to implement
22:12coercive diplomacy
22:15in conjunction with the British
22:18I outline his very close relations
22:22with Prime Minister Tony Blair
22:25and I also emphasize the importance
22:28of David Manning's relations Bush but
22:31Blair's National Security adviser with
22:33candy rice
22:35and the importance of Pell's relations
22:38with British foreign secretary Jack
22:40straw
22:43I show in the book
22:45that the outcome of coercive diplomacy
22:50was contingent
22:52on Saddam Hussein's response
22:57the end result of coercive diplomacy
23:00might not have been War
23:04Saddam Hussein needs to be an important
23:08character
23:09in any study of the American decision to
23:13go to war
23:15that's why I start my book
23:18with a chapter
23:20that outlines Saddam Hussein's character
23:24and his career
23:27I stress his considerable achievements
23:30inside Iraq in the 1970s
23:33and then his subsequent failures in the
23:371980s and 90s
23:40I stress
23:42his opportunism his brutality his
23:46pragmatism his inconsistency and his
23:49megalomania
23:53I interrogate the flawed implementation
23:56of Bush's strategy of coercive diplomacy
24:00I show
24:02that it was launched without much
24:04consideration
24:06of how it might play out without
24:09weighing costs and benefits without
24:11careful consideration of the end game of
24:14the so-called phase four of the war plan
24:19in the last substantive chapter of my
24:22book
24:23I examined the first months of the
24:25occupation and I highlight
24:27the unpreparedness the dysfunction the
24:31friction
24:32and the acrimony
24:34I look at the strange relations between
24:37the office of reconstruction and
24:40humanitarian assistance orha
24:43and senkam the strained relations
24:47between State Department officials and
24:50defense Department officials
24:52and the strained relations between Paul
24:54Bremer the head of the newly created
24:57Coalition provisional Authority
24:59and Secretary of Defense
25:02Donald runs Donald Rumsfeld
25:06I explain the initial decisions
25:08regarding the Iraqi Army debathification
25:13and the composition of the Iraqi interim
25:16Authority
25:18and I explain why they were so difficult
25:22and why they became the consequences
25:25became so dysfunctional
25:29overall
25:31my book is designed to capture the
25:34texture
25:36of the decision-making process
25:39I illuminate the changes the challenges
25:42that inhered
25:45in the Post 9 11 environment
25:49I highlight contingency
25:53I emphasize the mixture of emotion and
25:56rationality that shape decisions
25:59and I try to assess
26:03the strength and weaknesses of Bush's
26:06own personal leadership
26:10The Invasion and the occupation
26:13were shaped by fear
26:16power
26:18hubris
26:19credibility
26:22and dysfunction
26:24there are lessons to be learned
26:27I'll quickly enumerate them
26:31policy makers need to modulate their
26:33fears
26:35they must calculate carefully
26:38what might constitute
26:40an existential threat
26:43they need to be able to resent
26:45re-examine
26:47assumptions like the one that Iraq
26:50possess weapons of mass destruction
26:53policy makers I show in my book new
26:58that the evidence
27:00for saddam's weapons of mass destruction
27:04was far from conclusive
27:06they knew that
27:08but they also knew other things
27:11they knew that Saddam Hussein
27:13had developed weapons of mass
27:15destruction
27:17had used weapons of mass destruction
27:21had lied about his weapons of mass
27:23destruction
27:25and had concealed his weapons of mass
27:28destruction
27:29that's what proved determinative in
27:32their thinking
27:34what was important
27:36was to step back
27:37and re-examine basic assumptions yes
27:41that's easy to say it's very easy for me
27:44to say
27:45but how many of us how often have I
27:49really re-examine basic assumptions but
27:53the story of Iraq
27:55of decision making in Iraq
27:58suggests that at critical times
28:02when survival
28:04of tens of thousands of people are at
28:07stake
28:08one needs to step back and rethink basic
28:12assumptions
28:14one needs to grasp the limits of
28:17American power the notion that the
28:19United States
28:21could create through military force
28:24democracy
28:26one needs to curb one's hubris
28:30to grasp the sensibilities and
28:32perceptions
28:34of Target populations the idea that
28:37Iraqis would meet Americans
28:40with chocolates and flowers
28:43as Iraqi Exiles told President Bush
28:46should have been examined closely
28:50American officials should have known
28:53that the Kurds in the North and the Shia
28:55in the South deeply deeply distrusted
28:58Americans and American promises
29:02most of all perhaps
29:05policy makers can learn that they need
29:08to analyze the consequences and costs of
29:11prospective actions before initiating
29:14them they need to set priorities
29:16carefully
29:17they need to clarify goals
29:20they also need to insist on better staff
29:23work the most important memo suggesting
29:29uncertainties about the desirability of
29:32invading erupt the memo written in the
29:34office of near Eastern Affairs called
29:36The Perfect Storm the state Department's
29:39office of near Eastern Affairs was a
29:41terrible memo
29:43read it it's available it simply
29:46outlines all the things that could
29:48possibly go wrong pre-invasion during
29:50invasion post-invasion
29:5220 30 40 things for each category
29:55without any effort
29:58whatsoever
30:00to examine closely which were the things
30:03that most likely would go wrong and what
30:06would be the consequences
30:08better staff work
30:10is a real lesson of this story
30:14and of course also the importance of
30:17struggling hard
30:19to link means and ends
30:22when readers finish my book
30:25I hope they will ponder
30:28as I often do
30:31whether the venture
30:33was flawed because of its
30:35conceptualization
30:38or doomed
30:40because of its execution
30:43or both
30:45whatever readers conclude
30:48I'm certain that the invasion of Iraq
30:50will long be regarded as a land market
30:52decision in the history of American
30:54foreign policy and will be subject to
30:57much greater scrutiny in the future as
30:59more and more documents become available
31:03mine
31:05in effort to Grapple with a tragedy
31:08that we are wrestling with next week on
31:10the 20th anniversary
31:12and that we will be pondering for many
31:15years to come thank you
31:18[Applause]
31:24thank you so much Mel
31:27we'll now go to Dr Robert Kagan the
31:30Stephen and Barbara Friedman senior
31:32fellow in foreign policy at the
31:35Brookings Institution
31:37he's also a contributing columnist at
31:40the Washington Post he served in the
31:42state department from 1984 to 1988 as a
31:45member of the policy planning staff as
31:48principal speechwriter for security of
31:50stage State George Schultz and his
31:53Deputy for form for policy in the
31:56borough of the inter-american affairs
31:59he's a graduate of Yale University and
32:01Harvard University's Kennedy School and
32:03holds a doctorate in American history
32:05from American University his latest book
32:08the ghost at the feast America and
32:11collapse of World Order 1900 to 1941 was
32:15released in January one of his previous
32:19books was a New York Times
32:21bestseller the world America made
32:24published in 2012 among his many other
32:27books are the jungle grows back American
32:29our imperiled world
32:312018 the return of history and the end
32:34of Dreams
32:352008
32:37dangerous Nation America's place in the
32:40world from its earliest days to the dawn
32:42of the 20th century 2006.
32:45it's a great pleasure to welcome you to
32:47the Wilson Center Bob the floor is all
32:50yours
32:51well thank you so much Christian and uh
32:53thank you to the Wilson Center for
32:54holding this important event and uh
32:56thank you to Mel for taking the trouble
32:58to write this book I I want to emphasize
33:00at least from my point of view that
33:02Mel's book is not the revision it's not
33:05the it's not the provocative
33:07reassessment Mel's book is closer to
33:09like what happened and what everybody
33:12thinks is the revision
33:14um and I especially if you go through
33:17what Mel did in terms of his you know
33:19his basic lessons
33:21um you know in particular the idea that
33:24the motive behind the Iraq War was not
33:27to promote democracy which is absolutely
33:30right and yet astonishingly not only not
33:34understood but actively insisted upon
33:37including by people who supported the
33:39war originally so most recently we've
33:41seen David from uh and Max boot say that
33:45the purpose the purpose the motive for
33:48the war was to promote democracy in Iraq
33:50and I think I would guess a majority of
33:53Americans have come to believe that
33:55that's the case which is why it's so
33:57important that we go back to uh the the
34:02documents uh the actual historical
34:04research that Mel has put in on any
34:07number of foreign policy topics his book
34:10The preponderance of power is probably
34:13the definitive book at least in my view
34:15on the nature of the Cold War his work
34:18on the 20s is definitive in that period
34:22and all of which marked by an incredibly
34:25professional attention to the documents
34:28to to to the decision-making process and
34:32as he has said with it with an attempt
34:34at least to understand why the policy
34:37makers made the decisions that they made
34:39and now he has brought that level of
34:42professionalism and our addition to the
34:44Iraq War
34:46um and and I and I hope that it can
34:48begin to break through a lot of the
34:52misconceptions or misinformation about
34:55why the United States went to war in
34:57Iraq and what was the nature of the
35:00failure and I think that's important
35:03because of course we are all obsessed
35:06with the question of how do we not get
35:08into another Iraq
35:10um and it's therefore it's important to
35:11know why we got into Iraq in the first
35:13place and not have mythology about why
35:15we got into Iraq because if we say well
35:18we went into Iraq to promote democracy
35:19by force we can solve our problem by
35:22saying well let's never promote
35:23democracy by force again but of course
35:25that's not what we did that's not what
35:28the United States did that was not the
35:29motive and and so we're left with a much
35:32harder set of decisions these really
35:34were security issues first and foremost
35:37I do think it's important there's a very
35:40interesting phenomenon that happens to
35:42people and it's happened to us as a
35:45country again and again and again and
35:46it's precisely what Mel talked about at
35:48the beginning of his talk which is
35:51there is a state of mind that leads to
35:54decision making in in in particular
35:56moments uh and usually that state of
35:59mind is fear when it comes to war
36:02um it's fear of what the consequences of
36:04inaction will be its fear of where
36:07things are headed unless something is
36:08done uh to prevent it and that fear is a
36:13dominant factor in making judgments and
36:16may lead to people to to overestimate
36:19the nature of the threat and maybe even
36:21overestimate what you can do about the
36:23threat but that is the basis of it the
36:26problem is is that once the fear is gone
36:29people forget that there ever was fear
36:31and then they start searching for well
36:33why did we do this and if you remove the
36:36fear as the explanation then you are
36:38left with absurd explanations like well
36:41I guess we must have been trying to
36:42promote democracy
36:44um and and I think it's very important
36:45that we that we dig our way past that
36:48because guess what worrying these situ
36:51today
36:52you know there is a there are nuclear
36:55weapons Ambitions States out there with
36:58the nuclear Ambitions we know about it
37:00and we're going to have to decide again
37:02in the case of Iran in the case of North
37:04Korea where I think we've already made
37:06our decision but we're gonna have to
37:08decide again are we willing to allow
37:10proliferation are we willing to allow a
37:13regime like Iran to have a nuclear
37:15weapon and to be more powerful in the
37:17region or are we going to do something
37:18about it well the answer may be that
37:20we're not going to do anything about it
37:21but we will live to deal with the
37:24consequences of that too and of course
37:26that's also one of the sort of missing
37:29elements of this and it's something Mel
37:31doesn't get into and he doesn't have to
37:33and counterfactual history is not
37:35something that historians are
37:36comfortable with but decision makers
37:39have to think about not counterfactual
37:42history but what are the alternative
37:45routes before us
37:46and it was not simply the case in Iraq
37:49that well we could just launch this
37:51crazy Invasion
37:52um other or we could just do nothing
37:54that was not the perception like right
37:57at the time people thought that Saddam
37:59was in fact in the process of breaking
38:01out uh of his containment and I think he
38:04the Mel demonstrates that that was true
38:07um and so it wasn't a status quo it was
38:09an evolving situation which was going to
38:11lead to uh trouble down the road now
38:14it's impossible for us to sit here and
38:16say would we be better off if Saddam
38:18Hussein was still in power today I could
38:20come up with a lot of reasons why that
38:22would not be of benefit to the world
38:24today nor am I sure that we would have
38:26avoided going to war with Iraq sometime
38:28between the end of 2003 and today even
38:31if we hadn't gone to war in 2003 because
38:35the the problem posed by Iraq uh was a
38:38real problem
38:41let me just uh I'll pose a few questions
38:43from Mel because uh that's who we're
38:45here to hear from and so let me let me
38:47just try to do that the the first
38:49question I have is
38:52is there a Doctrine
38:55that keeps us out of the next Iraq
38:59and what would that Doctrine look like
39:01because it seems to me and I'll I'll
39:04throw out my side of this and then and
39:06then you can respond Mel and Corey too
39:08and Christian and Bob and anybody else
39:10who wants to uh you know if we take as a
39:14as a starting position
39:16that now I've lost my track oh right is
39:20there a doctrine that keeps us out of of
39:22a war like that because we could say
39:24well we're not going to promote
39:25democracy but are we also going to say
39:27that we're not going to maintain
39:28Security in the Middle East
39:30we can say that we're not going to
39:32maintain the security in the Middle East
39:33but if we are then I don't know exactly
39:36how you distinguish between which Wars
39:38you want to get into and which Wars you
39:40don't and I take very seriously what you
39:43say Mel about thinking ahead and and
39:45questioning your assumptions but let's
39:47look at where we are right now for
39:49instance we have a policy toward Ukraine
39:52and a policy toward China do we know
39:55where those policies are leading do we
39:57know what the end consequence is going
39:59to be of our of our current position in
40:02Ukraine is this the time when we should
40:04be examining that assumption as well
40:06since we don't really know where all
40:09that ends it seems to me that you're
40:11always in a position of not knowing
40:13where things end so the question is one
40:16question is what are the set of
40:18principles that tell you yes here but
40:21know there and is there and is there
40:23such a thing
40:26I also want to ask what do you mean by
40:28hubris exactly the word gets thrown
40:30around a lot uh hubris sounds like
40:33something you tried to do and failed so
40:34you were you know it was Hubris to think
40:37that you could succeed but but that
40:40could is that just a function of whether
40:42you succeeded or not I mean where is the
40:44Hubris in it you could say is it that
40:46Americans thought they could succeed and
40:49were they wrong to think that they could
40:50succeed and this is that gets to the
40:52question that you uh have also posed and
40:55I think I think is a hard question to
40:57answer which was
40:58was the failure inherent in the decision
41:02or were their strategic and tactical
41:05errors made in the execution that if
41:08they had not been made if the wrong
41:10decisions had not been made on that
41:12would we have had an outcome in in Iraq
41:14that was more acceptable
41:16and more tolerable and less costly
41:19ultimately so was that was it was it the
41:22policy was it the decision or was it the
41:24way the decision was executed I don't
41:26think that that is an easy question to
41:28answer but again if the answer is the
41:31way it was executed then again how do
41:33you sit here where we are today and say
41:36this is the right route if we execute it
41:39correctly right because often we do not
41:41execute it correctly
41:44um
41:44and I'll just let me just end on this uh
41:47I know the Iraq War was a was a failure
41:51in many respects
41:52and I agree with you that it has turned
41:55out to be the most consequential foreign
41:57polic decision of the post-cold War era
42:00but I think the degree of consequential
42:02is cannot be traced simply to the cost
42:05involved
42:07if you think about the wars that the
42:09United States has fought the Korean war
42:11in which we lost I think over 36 000
42:13soldiers in about three years of
42:15fighting the Vietnam War where we lost
42:17about 54 000 soldiers in about 10 years
42:21of fighting
42:22um I I sometimes look at the first four
42:26weeks of World War II as being the
42:28greatest catastrophe in the history of
42:30American foreign policy we lost
42:31thousands and thousands of soldiers our
42:34base in the Philippines was overrun
42:35immediately Etc you know
42:38why the question I have then and it is
42:41not true by the way that America's
42:43standing in the world was irreparably
42:44harmed by Iraq all we have to do is look
42:47at the way the world looks is looking to
42:48the United States today for protection
42:51so I I'm just not sure exactly what it
42:55is even though I I agree that this is
42:57the way Americans view it but why do
43:00they view what is it about the Iraq war
43:02that has made it such a a huge issue as
43:06opposed to being one of several
43:09relatively minor over in historical
43:12terms conflicts that the United States
43:14has gotten into over the past 100 years
43:16I I know I've gone on for too long but
43:18I'll end it there oh thanks Bob that was
43:20brilliant Mel
43:22um over to you
43:24well Bob yeah you're afraid of you've
43:28raised some really profound issues here
43:29that we could probably be discussing for
43:31hours and hours and I'm sure Corey and
43:34Bob Brigham have some strong views about
43:37this uh as well but I'll try to answer
43:39uh succinctly these are really
43:42terrifically provocative stimulating
43:44question is there a doctrine that keeps
43:47us out of the next Iraq and I would say
43:49no Bob there is no Doctrine and there
43:53shouldn't be a Doctrine doctrines
43:55simplify things too much what I've
43:59learned about policy making and what I
44:02try to underscore really in all my books
44:04is that decision making is an agonizing
44:09difficult challenging process
44:12what I would like people to take away
44:15from my book is not that there's an
44:18alternative Doctrine
44:20but that policy making needs to be done
44:23carefully systematically thoughtfully
44:27and I I think a lot of those qualities
44:30were absent
44:32um in in the situation and that relates
44:35very much to to the question that you
44:37say what's the problem really inherent
44:39in basically in the conceptualization in
44:42the desire to go to war or whether it
44:46was uh the execution I purposefully
44:49raised that at the end of my talk
44:52and I did it purposely because I think
44:54it's an incredibly difficult uh question
44:58and
45:00um I I
45:02I don't think that the flaws were
45:06absolutely inherent in the
45:07conceptualization I really came to
45:11understand the motives uh for for
45:14intervening but I also came to feel that
45:18if one had thought through the
45:21consequences more systematically and the
45:25prospective costs more systematically
45:29you probably would have decided and
45:32should have decided that there were
45:35other things that should have been done
45:37so I I agree with you saying that it
45:40wasn't a question of going to war or not
45:42going to war Iraq was a profound problem
45:46and there were there was reason for fear
45:49the simple reason that and and one that
45:52George Bush really did believe in my
45:54opinion was that weapons of mass
45:56destruction might be handed off to
45:59terrorists maybe even Al Qaeda
46:01terrorists but as you suggested there
46:04was also a great fear
46:08that the sanctions would end which
46:10everyone thought they were Saddam would
46:13break out of containment which seemed
46:15pretty imminent and that he would Embark
46:18as everyone thought at the time and as
46:22most people believe in retrospect he
46:24would have embarked on developing
46:26weapons of mass destruction and the
46:28perception was the explicit perception
46:31that policy talks makers talked about
46:33all the time was that if Saddam develops
46:37or any dick to North Korea Iran develops
46:40weapons of mass destruction it will
46:44enable him to quote blackmail us that
46:48was the term used again and again which
46:51meant that should somebody like Saddam
46:54get weapons of mass destruction it would
46:57force us to self-deter in a crisis that
47:01would impel us not to do the things we
47:04otherwise would have would have done so
47:08um that that fear was
47:12um pervasive and what I say in the book
47:15is that when fear is mixed with a great
47:18sense of power it's a dangerous
47:22combination
47:24I think I'll I'll stop there because
47:26there are a lot of other comments I know
47:27great thank you
47:29our next speaker is Dr Corey shaki a
47:32senior fellow and director of foreign
47:34defense policy studies at the American
47:36Enterprise Institute before joining AEI
47:40Dr shaki was the deputy director general
47:44of The International Institute for
47:46strategic studies in London she has had
47:48a distinguished career in government
47:50working at the U.S state Department U.S
47:52Department of Defense and the National
47:54Security Council at the White House
47:56she's also taught at Stanford West Point
47:58Johns Hopkins size National Defense
48:02University and the University of
48:04Maryland
48:05she's the author of Five Books among
48:07them America versus the West can the
48:10liberal World Order be preserved
48:11published in 2018 and safe passage to
48:15transition from British to American
48:16hegemony 2017. she holds a PhD and M.A
48:21in government and politics from
48:23University of Maryland as well as an mpm
48:25from the University of Maryland school
48:27of public policy it's wonderful to
48:30welcome you to the Washington history
48:31seminar Corey thank you so much
48:34um so Mel lefler's book is the first one
48:38I have read about Iraq and I think I've
48:41read most all of the books written about
48:44Iraq that feels like what it felt like
48:48to me being on the bush NSC in 2002 and
48:532003.
48:54and I want to say six quick points that
48:58Mel makes that felt really true to me
49:02and that I haven't
49:03seen in other accounts the first is that
49:07so I was hired after September 11th to
49:11be the director for a defense strategy
49:12on the NSC I wasn't important enough to
49:15be a decision maker on Iraq I was the
49:19third oarsman on the left of the galley
49:21trying to make the government work to
49:24carry out decisions
49:26uh and the thing that struck me most
49:30was how fearful everybody was the
49:34president uh the Secretary of State the
49:37National Security adviser the long
49:40shadow of the September 11th attacks
49:43colored all of these decisions in ways
49:47that a lot of accounts aren't fair to
49:50the profound sense of having failed the
49:54American public about September 11th
49:58colored these decisions in really
50:00powerful ways so much so that I think if
50:03the sanctions regime had been collapsing
50:05even two years later you would have had
50:08a different decision
50:10second thing
50:11um the the
50:14paucity of evidence that there was an
50:17Al-Qaeda connection
50:18also feels very true the the way I heard
50:22the connection discussed in policy
50:25circles
50:26the the only actual link was that
50:30because of Saddam Hussein's 1990
50:33invasion of Kuwait America's friends in
50:36the region Saudi Arabia the GCC states
50:39were so insecure that it necessitated
50:43the retention of American troops in
50:46Saudi Arabia and that was clearly
50:48driving Al Qaeda as a as a political
50:53force in the region and as an effective
50:56terrorist Force searching is
51:00that the sanctions regime really was
51:03collapsing it wasn't
51:06a sense of we can handle this now or we
51:08can handle this in three years time the
51:11moral case for sanctions had collapsed
51:14the political case for sanctions had
51:16collapsed the effectiveness of sanctions
51:19was collapsing and you give a great
51:23sense of the sense of urgency that this
51:26is about to break out into a much bigger
51:29problem
51:30fourth uh you know what the U.N weapons
51:36inspectors had not known about the
51:39Iranian excuse me the Iraqi nuclear
51:43programs in 1990 and what was revealed
51:47after the 1991 Iraq War
51:51what again it fueled this fear it was a
51:55belief that we can't know what's
51:57happening inside Iraq and the game
52:01Saddam Hussein was playing with U.N
52:03weapons inspectors
52:05accentuated that fear hugely
52:10fifth I I did feel the Resonance of the
52:15discussion Mel has about hubris that did
52:19actually feel true to me that you know
52:23the swaggering confidence of General
52:26Franks that we didn't need a phase four
52:29plan the unwillingness to intervene as
52:33the Insurgency started spinning up
52:37but but even the the example that
52:40returns to me is DoD was so anxious
52:42about the inadequacy of the political
52:45planning that had been done for the war
52:48that they got together an interagency
52:51working group to kind of red team what
52:53could go wrong and what should we be
52:55doing to Shield ourselves against the
52:58emergence of those conditions and we
53:01could not get anyone senior to me
53:05from the state department from
53:08the NSC from any place else to
53:10participate in the process because they
53:13were so busy getting ready for the for
53:15the war
53:16um
53:18fifthly or I guess lastly uh
53:23the point about the contingency
53:26also really resonated for me the moment
53:29when I realized the war was inevitable
53:33wasn't until late January of 2003 when
53:39that when the French hosted a un
53:44U.N meeting on terrorism and used that
53:48opportunity to attack the American case
53:52for of concern about Iraq's
53:56choices I happened to see secretary
53:59Powell when he came back from that
54:01meeting and that's the moment it seemed
54:05to him it was inevitable to and and we
54:09had a conversation about that the last
54:12thing I will say is that strategic
54:14failures are failures of imagination and
54:17that comes through so beautifully in the
54:20book all of the things all of the paths
54:23that might have been explored that were
54:26in event for reasons of fear for reasons
54:29of hubris for reasons
54:32and and
54:33also for reasons of Saddam Hussein's
54:36fear right like the reason he was
54:38playing all these games projecting that
54:41he had a program was about domestic
54:43political control and the failure of
54:46imagination on our part to think about
54:49that you know that somebody else might
54:52have domestic politics that drive their
54:54National Security choices really was
54:57striking okay two quick questions one
55:00about the role of personalities in the
55:04American
55:05you know there's the the famous anecdote
55:08about Richard Armitage being interviewed
55:10to be the deputy secretary of defense
55:12and at the end of the interview
55:13secretary Rumsfeld says listen I don't
55:15think you're going to be the deputy
55:17secretary and Richard Armitage is a
55:19sensible response was oh I can assure
55:22you I'm not going to be the deputy
55:24secretary of defense
55:25that the outsized personality in
55:29particular of secretary rumsell but the
55:31way that interplayed with the
55:33president's relationship with vice
55:36president Cheney and and Condi Rice's
55:39view of her job as a national security
55:41advisor as not the peer of the cat I
55:44mean the Bush Administration felt so
55:47dysfunctional
55:48to me in 2002 and 2003
55:51largely because processes got overrun by
55:55personalities and I wonder whether that
55:57feels true to you and then the second
55:59question is about
56:01the role of Britain
56:03because Tony Blair has been so
56:05castigated and future British foreign
56:08policy choices have been so constrained
56:11by the British conclusion that that they
56:16made a choice to side with us in order
56:19to influence our policy choices and the
56:22British conclusion is they had no
56:24influence over those choices
56:26my recollection was Blair had a lot of
56:29influence until that January U.N meeting
56:35that the French derailed and I wonder
56:38whether that feels true to you he
56:39convinced Bush to ask for a second vote
56:41at the U.N which may have been a
56:43diplomatic disaster
56:45it's a great point
56:48well Corey thanks so much for those
56:51those comments you were there so it's
56:53nice to know that that you you think
56:56that I ca I captured the the texture of
57:00of what was going what was going on I
57:03worked very hard to do that and one
57:06thing that I'd like to to underscore
57:09that both you and Bob said was the role
57:12of fear every book
57:15says there was fear but most books say
57:18it in a sentence or a paragraph and then
57:21they go on to dwell on all these other
57:24factors and it's fine to talk about the
57:28other factors I do talk about the other
57:31factors but I try to really illuminate
57:34the compelling
57:36importance of fear and and when you talk
57:41to the policy makers and actually when
57:43you read their memos carefully you see
57:46they were incredibly fearful of another
57:50attack and no and no one should should
57:54underestimate that the role of
57:57personalities Corey I think
57:59um is critical you say personalities
58:02trumped processes I think and I try to
58:07illuminate in the book Donald Rumsfeld
58:10was an incredibly difficult person to
58:13deal with everyone who was interacting
58:17or almost everyone who was interacting
58:19with him felt that felt that way and as
58:23a historian
58:25one of the most striking things I've
58:27ever seen
58:28was the contemptuous
58:32snowflakes
58:34that
58:35Rumsfeld sent
58:37directly to Candy rice
58:40and really they were the types of things
58:44that policy makers might say about their
58:47colleagues in private but to write
58:50to another colleague in the way in the
58:53condescending way that Donald Rumsfeld
58:56wrote to Candy rice is amazing I mean
58:59one one snowflake said something like if
59:03you continue to do this
59:05I'm going to tell the president it was
59:08like it was like you know something
59:11going on in a classroom with a kid that
59:13if you do this again I'm going to tell
59:15the principal and
59:17um the I think that had a tremendously
59:22corrosive effect plus the fact that
59:25Rumsfeld was inconsistent as well as
59:29irascible and sometimes he would argue
59:32points really thoughtfully
59:34systematically
59:36and then maybe a week later he would be
59:39presenting an alternative view that also
59:43was well well supported and often when
59:46people would say to him something like
59:47what what do you really think this is a
59:49real hard problem we need to get an
59:52answer but he didn't provide an answer
59:55one of the most I think important things
59:59of my book that's that's truly new is
1:00:03the relationship between Blair
1:00:06and and Bush and what I tried to show
1:00:10Blair had a significant influence I show
1:00:13that in Late July in early August of
1:00:162002
1:00:18Blair really did convince bush
1:00:22that he should go to the U.N for a
1:00:25resolution but more importantly than
1:00:28that
1:00:29Blair said to Bush This is in the
1:00:31British records Blair said to Bush quote
1:00:34repeatedly
1:00:36if Saddam
1:00:38should accept the resolution and really
1:00:40comply with it which I don't expect said
1:00:43Blair but if he does
1:00:46we need to accept yes for an answer we
1:00:51need to be prepared to live with this
1:00:55regime
1:00:56regardless of how repugnant it is if we
1:00:59can gain
1:01:01conviction that there are no weapons of
1:01:04man of mass destruction and I think that
1:01:08was incredibly important my book
1:01:10suggests that bush really was willing to
1:01:15pursue that possibility
1:01:17I think it's a controversial conclusion
1:01:19but there's a lot of evidence for that
1:01:21and Blair I think actually deserves a
1:01:25lot of credit for that he has said I
1:01:28just heard an interview today he he said
1:01:31he's he said to an interrogate it I
1:01:35didn't really want to go to war I was
1:01:37trying to find a way out of the war and
1:01:39I was trying to get the Americans to
1:01:42find a way out of the war and going
1:01:44first for a resolution
1:01:47was a prospective means of doing that
1:01:51but it depended a lot on Saddam Hussein
1:01:55thank you thank you Corey for for your
1:01:58thoughtful questions and and for for the
1:02:00conversation well now actually before we
1:02:02turn to our final panelist
1:02:05um Professor Robert Brigham let me
1:02:07remind our audience uh uh uh our sizable
1:02:11Zoom audience that you can
1:02:13um post your question in the chat
1:02:15function and the questions and will be
1:02:17relied to me
1:02:18uh but we'll also go to questions uh
1:02:21from the audience here after our next
1:02:23speaker
1:02:26Dr Robert K Brigham is the surely Ecker
1:02:29Bosque professor of history and
1:02:32international relations at Vassar
1:02:34College
1:02:35he's the author or editor of nine books
1:02:38on the history of U.S foreign policy
1:02:40among them Reckless Henry Kissinger and
1:02:44the tragedy of Vietnam published in 2018
1:02:47the United States and Iraq since 1990 a
1:02:51brief history
1:02:52and also relevant for our discussion
1:02:54here today is Iraq another Vietnam
1:02:56published in 2006. Bob it's wonderful to
1:03:01have you with us virtually
1:03:04um you joined at fairly short notice
1:03:07um so we're I'm particularly
1:03:09appreciative that you're that you're
1:03:11here and the zoom room is yours
1:03:18thank you Christian and uh thank you uh
1:03:21Corey and and Bob for allowing me to
1:03:24join uh your panel
1:03:26um Mel it's uh always good to read your
1:03:29work you came to Vassar about 12 years
1:03:31ago and delivered a talk
1:03:34uh on this very topic and uh it was as
1:03:38insightful as the book is now and I
1:03:41appreciate you coming uh to us and
1:03:43sharing your ideas I also appreciate you
1:03:45taking such good care of many of my
1:03:47students who went to earn their PHD with
1:03:49you appreciate that I found I'm not
1:03:52going to re rehearse what Corey and Bob
1:03:55have already said I found Mel's argument
1:03:58compelling and convincing that Bush was
1:04:02in fact the decider that he did not
1:04:04believe in democracy promotion as the
1:04:07first principle
1:04:08that he wanted Saddam go on but how he
1:04:10got Saddam gone was not as part of a
1:04:14larger project that he wasn't just a
1:04:16cipher for the neoconservatives and the
1:04:18administration
1:04:19and I think you make very clear that
1:04:21every time that wolfowitz tried to push
1:04:24that agenda Bush pushed him aside
1:04:26whether it was in Washington or Camp
1:04:28David
1:04:29uh so I I think that you've really done
1:04:32what you set out to do here which is
1:04:34write a deliberative thoughtful uh
1:04:38informative book that looks at the
1:04:41decision-making process uh inside the
1:04:43Bush Administration in these key years
1:04:47um I think you're you're especially uh
1:04:49sound on the infighting between the
1:04:52various groups and that will lead me to
1:04:55some some comments uh that are somewhat
1:04:58related and then a question coming out
1:05:00of that
1:05:02I wonder if Rumsfeld uh was winning at
1:05:06the politics in DC at the expense of
1:05:08sound planning I think you hint at that
1:05:11but I I wonder what you would say about
1:05:13that I also like Corey and Bob I think
1:05:16that you do a masterful job explaining
1:05:19the fear this has been a theme of our
1:05:20discussion already
1:05:22but to me uh the the element of fear
1:05:27doesn't always manifest itself in in the
1:05:31actual strategic planning or even at the
1:05:33Tactical level
1:05:35um and I would like you to comment on
1:05:37that is that the president's
1:05:39responsibility to make sure he has you
1:05:42know President Bush has fear that others
1:05:45don't he has uh fear not only of another
1:05:47attack but he has fear about the
1:05:50domestic political climate he is the
1:05:52elected official he's the the person
1:05:54responsible
1:05:56um so did he in any way uh show that
1:06:00fear to his National Security Associates
1:06:05um it doesn't seem to me that rumsfeld's
1:06:07desire to get the Army below 10
1:06:09divisions
1:06:10before and during
1:06:13really is in line with Bush's thinking
1:06:16for Iraq planning Rumsfeld required the
1:06:18Army to project all forces for the
1:06:20entire campaign and then he required RFS
1:06:25the request for forces on an individual
1:06:28level the total opposite of what
1:06:30happened of course at D-Day this allowed
1:06:33you know
1:06:35several decisions in the process and
1:06:37seems to me that the politics that
1:06:39you're describing in the book could have
1:06:41gummed up the works very easily and did
1:06:43facts uh have an impact on on phase four
1:06:48um I also wonder if uh if Bush ever
1:06:52thought about the relationship between
1:06:55the people uh on his National Security
1:06:58force uh and and the idea of employing
1:07:02forces uh you know they they employed
1:07:05the guard and the reserves only when
1:07:07they deployed them but not before as an
1:07:09effort to build up what were the
1:07:11internal politics like uh inside the
1:07:13administration about those discussions
1:07:15or did did Rumsfeld keep everyone uh at
1:07:18arm's distance
1:07:20um I think you've set yourself up nicely
1:07:23Mel for a second volume because uh you
1:07:26know when things start to unravel in the
1:07:29summer of 2003 is it's kind of where
1:07:32this book leaves off the decapitation
1:07:35went well but phase three and four were
1:07:37a disaster as you said
1:07:39um and I I'd like to see a next book uh
1:07:42come out of this but uh for the sake of
1:07:44getting the audience involved I'll stop
1:07:46my comments and my questions there thank
1:07:48you thanks so much Bob
1:07:51thanks Bob
1:07:52um
1:07:53you are an expert on Iraq I I was hoping
1:07:56you'd write that volume
1:07:59tag you're it Bob
1:08:04um I I think
1:08:06um
1:08:07if I understand what what you're asking
1:08:09it seems like a very
1:08:11um
1:08:11Salient question if there was fear
1:08:15how was that fear exhibited in the in
1:08:19the war planning itself and in and in
1:08:22the uh in the preparations
1:08:26um for deployments it's Etc
1:08:29well I don't think it was fear
1:08:34that actually
1:08:36shaped
1:08:37the way the plans were executed
1:08:41what shaped the way the plans were
1:08:44executed was power and hubris
1:08:48um and that's why you know I talk about
1:08:51fear and power and hubris
1:08:55the policymakers fears including those
1:08:58of rumsfels were really about
1:09:02short-term fear of another attack inside
1:09:04the United States that had nothing to do
1:09:06with Iraqi military capabilities or
1:09:10long-term medium-term and long-term
1:09:12fears about Iraqi developments of
1:09:15weapons of mass destruction that might
1:09:18paralyze American action in some future
1:09:21crisis
1:09:23those were the fears but there was great
1:09:27confidence that if the president went to
1:09:31war
1:09:33Victory would come very quickly and in
1:09:38truth
1:09:39phases two and three you might say of
1:09:42the war were effectively constructed I
1:09:45mean
1:09:46um the you know the sense of American
1:09:50power
1:09:52in traditional combat you might say
1:09:56was demonstrated
1:09:59but what also was demonstrated
1:10:03immediately was the failure
1:10:06to Think Through what would happen
1:10:08immediately afterwards and I think that
1:10:13had a lot that had a lot to do with
1:10:15hubris
1:10:17that Iraqis would welcome us it also had
1:10:21to do with the compelling analogy no one
1:10:25should underestimate how important was
1:10:29the analogy to the end of the Cold War
1:10:31and to the fact that people like
1:10:35um like candy rice and President Bush
1:10:38himself really you know believe that you
1:10:41know 40 Years of American policy had led
1:10:47to the collapse of the Berlin wall and
1:10:50Eastern Europeans you know were
1:10:53exhilarated and welcomed us and there
1:10:56was some legitimacy to to the to those
1:10:59perceptions and they analogized that
1:11:02this is what's going to happen in Iraq
1:11:04we're going to be you know
1:11:06enthusiastically welcome because
1:11:08Iraqis Love Freedom all people love
1:11:13freedom and as I suggested in my final
1:11:16come comments while I was in the initial
1:11:19presentation I don't think there was
1:11:22really deep thinking at the top levels
1:11:25this certainly was awareness of this in
1:11:27in the middle levels
1:11:29um that there was deep distrust inside
1:11:32Iraq about about the United States in
1:11:35fact George Tennant did tell George Bush
1:11:38on several occasions I really can't
1:11:42succeed in orchestrating a covert action
1:11:45against
1:11:47Saddam Hussein because the Kurds whom we
1:11:52might rely upon simply don't believe
1:11:55that we would carry through or would
1:11:59sustain our commitment and of course the
1:12:01curse had reason to be distrustful they
1:12:04had been sold out again and again and
1:12:07again so I think there was you know so
1:12:09when we talk about the the the elements
1:12:13here it's not just fear fear is the a
1:12:15compelling motive
1:12:17but to understand
1:12:20the failure why things went awry as they
1:12:25did you need to combine it with the
1:12:28sense of Power by the way inspired
1:12:30tremendously by the quick Victory quote
1:12:33end quote in Afghanistan what was
1:12:35perceived as the quick quick victory
1:12:38the sense of power
1:12:40the sense of hubris and superiority and
1:12:43the massive dysfunction in the planning
1:12:47what Corey alluded to and I dwell on it
1:12:50uh in in the book is that there were a
1:12:54lot of middle level planners who were
1:12:55saying not enough planning not enough
1:12:58planning we need to focus we need to
1:13:00focus on this George Casey on the joint
1:13:03staff in the Pentagon was saying that
1:13:05all the time
1:13:07but it never really reached up now one a
1:13:12really good question is why didn't it
1:13:14reach up I once said to Elliot Abrams
1:13:17and others who worked on the National
1:13:20Security Council staff I said who told
1:13:22me we saw this dysfunction I said did
1:13:26you
1:13:26ever really talk about this to Steve
1:13:29Hadley and Candy rice
1:13:31and he said sort of shrugged his
1:13:33shoulders and said no just like the
1:13:37generals inside Iraq in April and May
1:13:412003 except for Frank's most of them
1:13:45knew
1:13:46that American forces were short-handed
1:13:50and if you read General Sanchez's Memoir
1:13:53you know that he was incredibly angry
1:13:56about insufficient forces but then if
1:13:58you ask did you
1:14:00communicate that as a secretary Rumsfeld
1:14:04the answer is no and there's no
1:14:07indication that they did
1:14:09Bob well just on that point
1:14:14everybody was screaming at the Pentagon
1:14:16that there were not enough troops at the
1:14:17time it was a public debate I mean you
1:14:20know those of us who had supported the
1:14:21Iraq War and were now horrified to
1:14:23discover that they were not in fact
1:14:25ready to to keep order which is what the
1:14:28Iraqi people needed and the Shia in
1:14:31particular who by the way didn't trust
1:14:33us because we completely abandoned them
1:14:35at the end of the first Gulf War and
1:14:37allowed Saddam free reign with his
1:14:39helicopters to wipe out hundreds of
1:14:42thousands of them but
1:14:43um
1:14:45I just want to bring another element to
1:14:48this though Mal which is the world view
1:14:50and the strategy that Rumsfeld was
1:14:53bringing to the United States overall in
1:14:56which Iraq was part of the test case in
1:15:00a way uh Rumsfeld this is also very much
1:15:04in keeping with the post-cold war period
1:15:06Rumsfeld had determined along with
1:15:09Richard Pearl and others that the United
1:15:11States needed fewer troops deployed
1:15:13overseas more long-range missiles and
1:15:16that this would be the new model and so
1:15:19cutting back on the forces was a big
1:15:21part of what Rumsfeld was trying to do
1:15:23and one thing he was bound and
1:15:26determined not to do was to take the
1:15:27military that he was trying to cut down
1:15:29and now send it into Iraq to occupy it
1:15:31in the numbers that would have been
1:15:32necessary so he relied on the idea that
1:15:35you had a turnkey operation you handed
1:15:37over to the Iraqis you set up these
1:15:39Fighters and and then you just lie about
1:15:41how many fighters that you're taking
1:15:43care of in the first few months but that
1:15:45that angle I think was a critical part
1:15:47of why you couldn't argue with Rumsfeld
1:15:51about this because he had already had a
1:15:53top-line theory about all of Americans
1:15:56strategy and all this subordinates knew
1:15:59that right they absolutely knew so
1:16:01nobody was coming to him and saying hey
1:16:02we really need more troops Mr secretary
1:16:04but another interesting aspect of this
1:16:07that people should keep in mind and that
1:16:10goes along with what you're saying is
1:16:11that secretary Rumsfeld didn't really
1:16:14care at all about democracy promotion
1:16:16well or any anything or even order in
1:16:19Iraq
1:16:20that that is why people who may argument
1:16:24about democracy promotion completely
1:16:27misconstrue you know the second most
1:16:30important decision maker the most
1:16:32important one was President Bush who did
1:16:34care about democracy the second one was
1:16:37Rumsfeld who was in charge of the forces
1:16:39who did not care about democracy you
1:16:42want to know why there was dysfunction
1:16:44just think about Rumsfeld and Bush in
1:16:46their different predilections yeah and
1:16:49it's the Secretary of defense's job to
1:16:52translate the president's political
1:16:54objectives into military plans and a
1:16:58fast-moving short-handed city-skipping
1:17:01strategy
1:17:04knew how much smarter he was than the
1:17:06president indeed and but but one needs
1:17:09also to to fault and I do in the book
1:17:12President Bush absolutely for not for
1:17:15not making it clear to Rumsfeld what he
1:17:18wanted and demanding what he wanted
1:17:22thank you we have time for a few
1:17:24questions if you could be succinct and
1:17:27also in the response is succinct we'll
1:17:28go over here and then over here
1:17:32thank you very much Benjamin to a
1:17:35retired civil servant uh
1:17:38did the administration understand
1:17:41that a one person one vote regime in
1:17:45Iraq which was a possibility uh
1:17:48following the overthrow of Saddam uh
1:17:51would mean the empowerment of the shias
1:17:53and the strengthening of Iran's position
1:17:57in the region thank you
1:18:02when you say did the administration know
1:18:05different different
1:18:07analysts different policy makers had
1:18:11diff very different views of what to do
1:18:14in terms of configuring a new government
1:18:18inside Iraq so during this period of
1:18:21time that that I'm focused focused on
1:18:25um let's say from March to September of
1:18:28of 2003 the focus is is is not really
1:18:33during that period of time on creating a
1:18:37constitution or working out the issues
1:18:40that you're alluding to that would
1:18:42subsequently become very important but
1:18:46the focus during these first few months
1:18:49of occupation in Iraq was
1:18:52who should constitute an interim
1:18:55government and how to put that interim
1:18:58government together and who should be
1:19:01relied upon
1:19:03in trying to Grapple with those issues
1:19:06yes there was recognition and Paul
1:19:09Bremer did recognize the importance of
1:19:12trying to find some sort of balance
1:19:14between the many different factional and
1:19:16sectarian groups but it was difficult he
1:19:20was trying to do that but at the same
1:19:22time his own attitude toward Iraqis was
1:19:25perceived by Iraqis as being
1:19:28extraordinarily condescending indeed I
1:19:31would say even toxic and that was a real
1:19:34problem
1:19:35thank you over here
1:19:37all right Tom Parker George Washington
1:19:39University
1:19:40would the panelists agree that there
1:19:44were three major uh achievements uh
1:19:47coming out of the invasion in the wmd
1:19:50area first The Invasion Force caused
1:19:54Saddam to destroy his wmd even though he
1:19:58didn't tell the International Community
1:20:00Charles delpher told me several weeks
1:20:02ago of an AEI conference that he was
1:20:05pretty close to having a a rudimentary
1:20:07nuclear weapon secondly removing him
1:20:10means he's not going to reconstitute his
1:20:12program sir box not a wmd state for the
1:20:15foreseeable future and then third and
1:20:17finally one does read periodically in
1:20:19the papers that the Iranians suspended
1:20:22their weaponization program not the uh
1:20:25the creation of the fuels but the
1:20:27weaponization program in the wake of the
1:20:29invasion so that despite all the
1:20:31incredible problems there were arguably
1:20:34some significant achievements is the
1:20:37question thank you we'd like to respond
1:20:39sorry yes I think those are all all
1:20:42three of those are true and there's also
1:20:45the fact that you know for all of the
1:20:49suffering and death that Iraqis have
1:20:53been through they do have just about the
1:20:56best functional representative
1:20:58government in the Middle East
1:21:01let me just hyper it as we know but in
1:21:03nevertheless it's important it's
1:21:05important to remember because that isn't
1:21:06and can I just say a word about the Shia
1:21:08briefly yes yeah it's not true that the
1:21:11Shia because they're Shia are
1:21:12subservient to Iran the the Shia are
1:21:15very independent of Iran and didn't want
1:21:18to be influenced by Iran and even today
1:21:20I would say Iran's influence in Iraq is
1:21:23not that great ultimately so just
1:21:26because they're Shia doesn't mean that
1:21:27they're ready to serve Tehran and in
1:21:29fact quite the contrary there's actually
1:21:31a great description in a book called The
1:21:34Rose Garden of the Martyrs about Iran
1:21:38about this hostility between Shia in
1:21:43Iran and Shia in Iraq thank you let's
1:21:47take a question from the web Doyle
1:21:48McManus asked did any senior official in
1:21:51the Bush Administration question the
1:21:53notion that it would be easy to pacify
1:21:56and demarketize a post Saddam Iraq other
1:22:00than uh
1:22:01and why so little diversity of views on
1:22:04that score
1:22:13that he talks to the president about
1:22:16you know yeah I would say secretary uh
1:22:20State pal uh raised these issues clearly
1:22:24people in the near East Division of the
1:22:27state department like like Bill Burns
1:22:30and Ryan Crocker
1:22:32um were were knowledgeable about the
1:22:37problematic aspects of this but at least
1:22:42for Secretary of State pal Corey I once
1:22:44asked him directly I said
1:22:46in that Pottery Barn conversation on
1:22:50August 5th
1:22:51should the president have interpreted
1:22:54your comments I explicitly asked pal I
1:22:57said should the president have
1:23:00interpreted your comments to mean that
1:23:03you were opposed to The Invasion it
1:23:05wasn't opposed to that yeah and and he
1:23:07said right and he said no that's not
1:23:10what I thought that's not what I wanted
1:23:12President Bush to be aware of I wanted
1:23:15him to be aware of the dangers that
1:23:18might emerge
1:23:19exactly thank you
1:23:22Robert work all the way in the back
1:23:23Robert thank you really excellent this
1:23:26conversation I think you sort of
1:23:27answered my question at the end Mel I
1:23:29was interested in the role that Powell
1:23:31played I mean in that summer when he had
1:23:33that meeting I think uh uh Brent
1:23:35Schoolcraft had written That Wall Street
1:23:37Journal op-ed don't attack which was
1:23:40really laying out the case for a
1:23:41continued containment Pollard referred
1:23:43to Saddam Hussein as a toothache at one
1:23:45point and then Powell went along I was
1:23:47just wondering when he got to the going
1:23:49out to Langley and reviewing everything
1:23:51and then coming back and then seeing how
1:23:53thin everything was did Powell consider
1:23:56did he have second thoughts at that
1:23:57point or was he all in and I think the
1:24:00other person who really brought I mean
1:24:01if you look at 90 1991 where you had the
1:24:05UN was unified again in favor of
1:24:08reversing aggression in Kuwait because
1:24:11Saddam had done the one thing all states
1:24:13can agree on don't murder another state
1:24:14it was it was the reverse in 2003
1:24:18contentious in the U.N consensus in
1:24:21America and when I look at what could
1:24:23have changed the political discourse
1:24:25here about Iraq Iraq I think Blair Blair
1:24:29and Powell brought everybody along who
1:24:31might not have otherwise
1:24:33of you
1:24:35I'm not sure I'm not sure Rob that I
1:24:39that I grasp this the specific question
1:24:41there uh uh other than the usual
1:24:45question do you agree with me no it's
1:24:46it's uh no I was just really saying that
1:24:48that you know did Powell
1:24:51have as you know after after the uh
1:24:54going out to the CIA did that change his
1:24:56mind at all uh because the presentation
1:24:58he made to America was now viewed in
1:25:01retrospective has dramatized it and
1:25:03galvanized support for the war that in
1:25:06addition to Blair I think brought a lot
1:25:07of people along to support an invasion
1:25:10decision you know well I I know
1:25:13Secretary of Pell uh like like to say
1:25:17that he was
1:25:19um misled in in designing that speech
1:25:23that he gave to the UN a speech that
1:25:27um you know uh hugely embarrassed him
1:25:30subsequently
1:25:32but I think that it's also true that
1:25:37Secretary of State pal had ample reason
1:25:40to put had ample opportunity to put in
1:25:44that speech whatever he wanted to put
1:25:46into it he himself went to the CIA
1:25:50headquarters and seemingly spent several
1:25:53days there with a couple of his closest
1:25:55aides looking over the information
1:26:00and so ultimately you know I think that
1:26:04Secretary of State pal must be held
1:26:07responsible you may rest in peace
1:26:11for the uh for the information
1:26:14that was in that that was in the in that
1:26:18speech I know he blames it on scooter
1:26:22Libby and other people who misled him
1:26:24but I don't I don't think those claims
1:26:28are terribly well founded given the
1:26:32opportunity that he himself had and his
1:26:36aides to assess the contents of what
1:26:39should be in that speech I asked
1:26:42Secretary of State pal and Richard
1:26:44Armitage numerous times did you believe
1:26:47that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
1:26:50destruction especially biological and
1:26:52chemical weapons and they said of course
1:26:53we don't of course we believe that of
1:26:56course we believe that and I would just
1:26:57point out he was not an inexperienced
1:27:00assessor of intelligence
1:27:02right like this he'd been chairman of
1:27:06the Joint Chiefs of Staff he made
1:27:08decisions about what he was advancing in
1:27:11the U.N speech you could also add I'm
1:27:13sorry I know that every intelligence
1:27:16service in the world thought that Saddam
1:27:18had weapons of mass destruction that the
1:27:20Senate intelligence Chiefs who had the
1:27:22ability and did go talk to the CIA about
1:27:24these things never came up and said hey
1:27:26this looks like pretty specious evidence
1:27:28I mean it's very very 2020 hindsight to
1:27:32to talk about how speechless it all was
1:27:34that that's that's true but but you know
1:27:38in my book I present this once
1:27:41um uh assessment where Donald rumsfelder
1:27:45actually asked
1:27:46the head of Intel Intelligence on the
1:27:51joint staff General Shafer and said
1:27:53would you please evaluate the
1:27:55credibility of the evidence that we have
1:27:57about weapons of mass destruction and
1:27:59Schaefer's sent him about a 10-page
1:28:02memorandum which you also can access in
1:28:05the Rumsfeld papers
1:28:07on the internet and Schaefer said well
1:28:10we're about 30 percent sure of chemical
1:28:12weapons this aspect of it and 20 sure of
1:28:15that and 50 sure of this on biological
1:28:18weapons etc etc etc and the last
1:28:21statement of it says he said in other
1:28:24words Mr secretary we don't really know
1:28:28what we don't know and uh what's so
1:28:32interesting about that just in
1:28:33conclusion is Rumsfeld
1:28:36sent a snowflake with that memorandum
1:28:39that said quote and he wrote on it this
1:28:42is big quote end quote he sent it to the
1:28:45chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1:28:47General Myers
1:28:48but he did not send that snowflake to
1:28:51Condi rice Shaney
1:28:54and um and pal which he often did but he
1:28:58didn't send that one interestingly
1:29:02thank you I'm afraid we're past our time
1:29:05we clearly could have gone on for much
1:29:08longer there are tons more questions
1:29:11um I'm sure there are more questions
1:29:12here in the audience as well
1:29:15um thanks uh Mel Corey Bob and Bob for
1:29:21terrific conversation those of you here
1:29:24you have the opportunity to ask Mel uh
1:29:27additional questions or if you didn't
1:29:28get to your question at the reception
1:29:30across the hall we invite you to that
1:29:33please join us please join us in a round
1:29:36of applause thanking our panelists thank
1:29:38you
1:29:38[Music]

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