Comment l'Europe sabote EDF pour enrichir les traders — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:00The European electricity market is a
- 0:02state scandal. We were told that
- 0:04competition would lower prices.
- 0:06That’s not true. We were told that
- 0:07the market would bring progress and
- 0:09innovation. That failed again. In
- 0:12reality, we paid more. EDF almost went
- 0:15bankrupt and private suppliers lined
- 0:16their pockets without producing
- 0:18anything at all. To fully understand
- 0:20what happened, we have to start from
- 0:22the beginning. If we go back 30 years,
- 0:27electricity in France was produced,
- 0:29transported and sold by a single
- 0:31operator, EDF. The state held a
- 0:34monopoly over the entire value chain
- 0:36and regulated prices itself. And it was
- 0:38like that almost everywhere in Europe.
- 0:40But from the 1990s onwards, people
- 0:42began to doubt the effectiveness of
- 0:44states. We were in the midst of
- 0:51European integration and at that time,
- 0:53people firmly believed that a system
- 0:55had to be created that transcended
- 0:56national borders. Thus arose, in the
- 0:58minds of our leaders, the idea of a
- 1:00European power market. The principle is
- 1:02simple: national markets need to be
- 1:04merged into a single market across the
- 1:06continent. The argument put forward: "
- 1:08The interconnectivity of the grid will
- 1:10help limit supply risks. Thanks to the
- 1:13single market, countries will be able
- 1:14to import electricity from their
- 1:16neighbors much more easily in the event
- 1:18of a shortage." The issue of supply is
- 1:20no small matter, because electricity
- 1:22possesses a feature that is quite
- 1:23specific in nature. It cannot be stored
- 1:26. This means that it must be produced
- 1:28exactly when it is consumed. Because if
- 1:31at any given time demand exceeds supply
- 1:33, even by just one GW, there will be a
- 1:35complete blackout. And since
- 1:37electricity is a basic necessity that
- 1:39is used everywhere in industry,
- 1:41hospitals, and businesses, this is a
- 1:43risk that we absolutely cannot afford.
- 1:45With electricity production based on
- 1:47coal or nuclear power, the risks of
- 1:49power cuts are quite low. The problem
- 1:52is that with the development of
- 1:53renewable energies, security of supply
- 1:55has become much more uncertain. A solar
- 1:58panel needs sun and a wind turbine
- 2:00needs wind to produce electricity. And
- 2:03we don't always have sun and wind. So
- 2:06for a country like Germany, for example
- 2:08, to produce almost 60%of its
- 2:09electricity from renewable sources, it
- 2:11has to be able to easily source it from
- 2:13its neighbors, and in particular from
- 2:15France. It needs French air to ensure
- 2:18security of supply. Thanks to the
- 2:21electricity that France produces with
- 2:23its nuclear power plants, it is the
- 2:24country that ensures a large part of
- 2:26the security of the European market.
- 2:28And that is also why the European Union
- 2:30was so keen for France to play the
- 2:32market game. In short, on paper, we
- 2:34were promised a great deal where we
- 2:36would all be united, we would protect
- 2:38our environment with green energy and
- 2:40where everyone would be a winner. But
- 2:43unfortunately, well, it didn't quite go
- 2:45as planned. We could have stopped there
- 2:50. We could have set up a common market
- 2:52and that's it. But no, we were told
- 2:54that we also had to change the rules of
- 2:56the game because public monopolies went
- 2:58against the founding dogma of the
- 3:00European Union, free competition. So,
- 3:03in 1996, it was decided to break up all
- 3:05public monopolies and entrust the
- 3:07management of electricity to several
- 3:09economic agents in competition with
- 3:11each other. At the time, we were
- 3:13assured that with competition, we would
- 3:15have more innovation and that prices
- 3:17would drop. And here is the result.
- 3:20Quite a success, huh? Now, it's true
- 3:24that at the time, we didn't know these
- 3:25figures, we didn't have much
- 3:27perspective yet, but there were already
- 3:28signs that this idea of a competitive
- 3:30market was flawed. In fact, a problem
- 3:33immediately arose. How could we open up
- 3:35power lines to competition? Because if
- 3:38we look at things in concrete terms,
- 3:40we're dealing with a natural monopoly
- 3:41like roads or trains. It would have
- 3:44been completely absurd for each
- 3:45electricity supplier to build its own
- 3:48cables, its own power lines. So we had
- 3:50to tinker with the system a bit. We had
- 3:52to divide the market into three
- 3:54separate activities: production,
- 3:56transmission and supply. Transmission
- 3:59is the entire network of lines that
- 4:00transports electricity from the power
- 4:02plant to the consumer. Since it was a
- 4:04natural monopoly, we couldn't open it
- 4:06up to competition. So we left its
- 4:08management to the public authorities.
- 4:10In France, RTE and Nedis are
- 4:12responsible for it. But as for the
- 4:14other two activities, production and
- 4:16supply, we decided to open them up to
- 4:18competition. Producers were responsible
- 4:21for operating the electrical
- 4:22installations and suppliers for
- 4:24marketing the electricity produced. And
- 4:26here, we need to focus on one point.
- 4:28Suppliers have no obligation to produce
- 4:30electricity. The supply activity
- 4:33consists solely of buying electricity
- 4:35on the market to resell it to consumers
- 4:38. This means that we disconnected
- 4:41supply from production solely to create
- 4:43a market. But this is completely
- 4:46artificial. It is a purely legal
- 4:48construct that does not respond to any
- 4:50economic need. This is pure and simple
- 4:52dogmatism. You might start to realize
- 5:04that it was off to a bad start. Well
- 5:07yes, since EDF was practically the sole
- 5:09owner of the French electricity network
- 5:10, it was impossible for other suppliers
- 5:12to compete with it. So to allow
- 5:15competitors to set up shop, between
- 5:172011 and 2026, what is known as the
- 5:20arena, regulated access to historic
- 5:22nuclear electricity, was applied.
- 5:24Behind this somewhat barbaric acronym
- 5:27lies a huge scandal. For 15 years, the
- 5:30State forced EDF to sell around 25%of
- 5:32its nuclear electricity to its
- 5:34competitors at a fixed and very
- 5:35advantageous price. Only € 42 per MW,
- 5:39while the cost of nuclear production
- 5:41amounts to at least € 60. This is
- 5:44economic suicide for EDF.
- 5:46I have always said no. The queen is a
- 5:48monstrosity. A monstrosity. I've
- 5:50said it for 8 years now. The queen is
- 5:52poison. I’ve
- 5:53always called the queen a failing
- 5:55device.
- 5:56So in theory, there was still a
- 5:57trade-off for all this. The idea was to
- 5:59allow the supplier to invest in
- 6:01production. Thanks to the arena,
- 6:03suppliers were going to be able to make
- 6:06big margins and then use this money to
- 6:08develop their own production,
- 6:09particularly via renewable energies.
- 6:12But since they were not given any
- 6:13obligations, what do you think most
- 6:15suppliers did? Well yes, nothing. It
- 6:18was not in their interest at all.
- 6:20Look, none of those who benefited from
- 6:22the rent invested in nuclear power or
- 6:24even in production.
- 6:26So, we made the fortune of traders, not
- 6:28industrialists. Either they invested
- 6:31colossal costs in means of production,
- 6:33certainly to make a profit, but years
- 6:35later. Or they took maximum advantage
- 6:38of the arena by buying their cheap
- 6:40electricity from EDF and then reselling
- 6:42it at the market price. The choice was
- 6:44easy to make. No need to produce.
- 6:46Buying to resell was very profitable
- 6:49and very profitable immediately. You
- 6:51created this obscure system that goes
- 6:55beyond EDF and requires it to give part
- 6:59of its energy produced by nuclear power
- 7:04(25%) to its direct competitors. There
- 7:08was a contract that was signed and at
- 7:11the end it had to produce. What happens
- 7:1412 years later? They haven't invested a
- 7:17single euro, they tell us that this
- 7:21protects consumers. But no, it's
- 7:24organized plunder.
- 7:26In fact, a large number of suppliers
- 7:28preferred to increase their
- 7:30shareholders 'dividends rather than
- 7:32seriously invest in means of production
- 7:34. In 2021, for example, out of a net
- 7:37profit of more than 5 billion euros, NG
- 7:39paid 65%to its shareholders. Today, we
- 7:42find ourselves with a whole bunch of
- 7:44suppliers who are in fact pure
- 7:45speculators. They don't produce
- 7:48electricity, nor do they transport it,
- 7:50but they make money, a lot of money on
- 7:53DF's UDO, but also on consumers, and
- 7:55not always in a very legal way. To
- 7:57attract their customers, suppliers have
- 7:59gotten into the habit of engaging in
- 8:01ultra-aggressive and sometimes even
- 8:03completely fraudulent canvassing. In
- 8:052018 alone, NGJ was convicted twice for
- 8:07unfair competition and abusive
- 8:09solicitation. For example, salespeople
- 8:13invented a pseudonym to promise bonuses
- 8:15to their customers. Some suppliers even
- 8:18pretended to be EDF salespeople. Ah,
- 8:21for these people, there are no scruples
- 8:22, huh? Any technique is good for taking
- 8:24advantage of customers. Last important
- 8:26point, the big difference between
- 8:28yesterday's model based on DF's public
- 8:31monopoly and today's, a large market
- 8:33with lots of suppliers, is profit. When
- 8:36the activity was managed exclusively by
- 8:38the public, all the money paid by users
- 8:41was reinvested in the activity. No one
- 8:43made money. We provided a service, a
- 8:46public service. Period. With the
- 8:49opening up to competition, the supply
- 8:51of electricity became lucrative. It is
- 8:53a new market for private players, in
- 8:55other words a new source of profit, a
- 8:58new way of doing business. The
- 8:59consequence is that part of the price
- 9:01of electricity that we pay is no longer
- 9:03used to invest in our infrastructure,
- 9:05but goes into the pockets of private
- 9:07shareholders. Does this make the
- 9:08service better? No. EDF has always
- 9:11fulfilled its mission perfectly.
- 9:13Although it was a monopoly despite the
- 9:15huge salaries, pensions and so on, the
- 9:17bills were still among the cheapest, or
- 9:19rather the cheapest in Europe. It
- 9:21worked well. Once again, it was
- 9:23recognized.
- 9:24So today, we have increased consumers'
- 9:26bills for nothing at all except to
- 9:28enrich a few private players. They're
- 9:31sharks; as soon as they can gorge
- 9:33themselves, they do it on each other.
- 9:36That, we owe entirely to the European
- 9:38electricity market. But it's not over
- 9:40because when the European Union decides
- 9:42to do things right, it does so by
- 9:44halves. For electricity suppliers, the
- 9:49European market is based on a strict
- 9:51rule: a single price across the
- 9:53continent. And because of this
- 9:55principle, a real gas factory has been
- 9:57created. But to fully understand this,
- 9:59let's go back for a moment. Back in the
- 10:01monopoly, it was simple. We took all
- 10:03the costs of the national electricity
- 10:05system to determine the selling price.
- 10:07It is an approach based on the full
- 10:08cost of production. There are
- 10:09essentially three types of costs.
- 10:11Capital costs, i.e. the construction
- 10:13and depreciation of infrastructure, the
- 10:15nuclear fleet, hydroelectric dams, and
- 10:17thousands of kilometers of power lines.
- 10:20Operating costs, i.e. maintenance,
- 10:22network management, salaries for DF
- 10:24employees, and fuel costs, such as the
- 10:26purchase of uranium, coal, or fuel oil.
- 10:29We added all of this up and divided it
- 10:31by the total volume of electricity
- 10:32consumed in the country. In the end,
- 10:34the selling price of electricity
- 10:36reflected the average cost of the
- 10:37French energy mix. To put it more
- 10:40simply, we paid what was needed to
- 10:41produce enough to meet the country's
- 10:43needs, no more and no less. With the
- 10:45European market, we made everything
- 10:47more complex. We created a large market
- 10:49bringing together all European
- 10:51electricity players. On this market,
- 10:53producers sell the energy they have
- 10:55just generated. Suppliers buy the
- 10:57electricity there to then resell it to
- 10:59consumers. And traders trade. They buy
- 11:02and resell to provide liquidity to the
- 11:04market. It is on this wholesale market
- 11:07that the single price rule applies.
- 11:09This price varies from one hour to the
- 11:11next depending on supply and demand,
- 11:13but according to a very specific system
- 11:14, marginal cost pricing. Now, it may
- 11:17seem a bit technical when put like that
- 11:19, but as you will see, it is not that
- 11:20complicated to understand. Explanation.
- 11:23Since electricity cannot be stored, the
- 11:25quantity of electricity produced must
- 11:27correspond exactly to the demand at the
- 11:29time it is consumed. However, demand
- 11:32varies greatly depending on the season
- 11:34or the time of day. You will consume
- 11:36more during the day than at night, for
- 11:38example. That's why not all the power
- 11:40plants are on all the time, especially
- 11:43when demand is low. So what we do is we
- 11:45call the power plants one by one, from
- 11:47the cheapest to the most expensive,
- 11:49until we reach the amount of
- 11:50electricity requested. An important
- 11:52point to make sure you understand: the
- 11:54calculation only takes into account
- 11:56variable costs, i.e. the price of fuel
- 11:58or carbon taxes. We completely ignore
- 12:00the fixed cost. This means that we set
- 12:03aside all the expenses related to the
- 12:04construction of the power plant and its
- 12:06maintenance. In practice, we end up
- 12:08with this order. First, we call on
- 12:10renewable energies. Since they do not
- 12:12use any fuel, their production cost is
- 12:14very low. Then, we call on nuclear
- 12:17power plants, the fuel they use,
- 12:18uranium, which is quite cheap. Finally,
- 12:21gas, coal and fuel oil are used as a
- 12:24last resort because their production
- 12:26cost depends on the price of fuels and
- 12:28is therefore generally much higher.
- 12:31This system is called merit order. It
- 12:33allows the cheapest and least polluting
- 12:35power plants to be used first. This way
- 12:38, production costs are reduced and
- 12:40carbon-free energy sources are
- 12:41prioritized. The problem is that the
- 12:43European Union has decided to set the
- 12:45price on the last power plant to be
- 12:47used. So the most expensive power plant
- 12:49sets the price for the whole market,
- 12:51which often corresponds to the cost of
- 12:53gas. And it is on the basis of this
- 12:55price that suppliers obtain their
- 12:57electricity and then resell it to
- 12:59consumers. Are you starting to
- 13:01understand the problem? In France, we
- 13:03produce more than 60%of our electricity
- 13:05with our nuclear power plants. Gas, on
- 13:07the other hand, represents less than 10
- 13:09%of our production. So, the French are
- 13:12dependent on fluctuations in the price
- 13:14of gas, while their production, mainly
- 13:16from nuclear power, is a much cheaper
- 13:18energy. This means that French
- 13:20consumers may end up paying much more
- 13:22for their electricity than the true
- 13:24cost of production in France. It's
- 13:26completely absurd. Drink some water to
- 13:29stay calm. Given what's coming next,
- 13:31we're going to need it. Let's get to
- 13:34the question of regulated tariffs. The
- 13:36State, via EDF, can set its own price
- 13:38for electricity sold to consumers.
- 13:40What is a regulated tariff? Wherever
- 13:43you live in the country, you will have
- 13:45access to energy at the same price and
- 13:47everyone will have access to a price
- 13:49that will be set by the State with an
- 13:51independent commission and which will
- 13:54therefore be regulated. On paper, we
- 13:58think, "Oh, that's great, we'll be able
- 14:00to free ourselves from the European
- 14:01price and base it on our true cost of
- 14:03production and therefore lower our
- 14:04bills." Yes, but no, that's too good.
- 14:09No, the European Union forbids EDF from
- 14:12setting low prices. And do you know why
- 14:15? Well, so as not to sink alternative
- 14:17suppliers. And yes, them again. In fact
- 14:21, the European Union does not want DF
- 14:22to take advantage of its historical
- 14:24dominant position to lower electricity
- 14:26bills, otherwise it would risk stifling
- 14:28competition. Do you understand? DF
- 14:31should not be able to sell its cheap
- 14:33electricity to consumers, otherwise the
- 14:35poor alternative suppliers will lose
- 14:37their customers and will no longer be
- 14:39able to make a profit. And for Europe,
- 14:41this is very, very serious. It is an
- 14:43illegal restriction on competition. Yes
- 14:46, the European market protects
- 14:48alternative suppliers, even those who
- 14:50are only speculating rather than
- 14:52consumers. This is crazy.
- 14:54We have a regulated tariff that is
- 14:57based on market prices. It is
- 14:58completely ridiculous. Even the
- 14:59competition authority said, we have
- 15:01never seen anything like this. So if
- 15:03you want competition now, it's more
- 15:04competition that will lower prices; you
- 15:06have to set prices high enough to allow
- 15:08competition.
- 15:09So even with DF's regulated tariffs,
- 15:11the European market poses a huge
- 15:13problem for French consumers. The last
- 15:16point to know about regulated tariffs
- 15:18is that they are reserved for
- 15:19individuals and small businesses anyway
- 15:20. Only companies employing fewer than
- 15:2310 people and whose turnover or total
- 15:25balance sheet is less than 2 million
- 15:28euros can benefit from them. All other
- 15:30professionals, from small restaurateurs
- 15:32to large companies, are excluded.
- 15:34French businesses are therefore largely
- 15:36dependent on the price of gas, while
- 15:38our country produces energy at low cost
- 15:40thanks to nuclear power. The French
- 15:42industry is already not doing very well
- 15:43, and now we're driving the point home.
- 15:45And that's why in 2022 all this led to
- 15:48a historic crisis. By the summer of
- 15:542021, the Covid epidemic was behind us.
- 15:56The global economy was slowly returning
- 15:58to normal, and consumption was picking
- 16:00up again. In short, we were able to
- 16:03breathe a little easier, but in the end
- 16:05, 2022 was a real nightmare for French
- 16:07electricity production. It was as if
- 16:09all the circumstances had come together
- 16:11at the same time to sink the ship. In
- 16:14February 2022, the war in Ukraine began
- 16:16. Russia cut off part of its gas
- 16:18exports, which sent prices soaring to
- 16:21stratospheric levels. On the market,
- 16:23the MGAW of electricity, which had
- 16:25historically traded at around € 50,
- 16:27crossed the crazy € 1,000 mark.
- 16:30Throughout Europe, electricity was sold
- 16:32on the market at the exorbitant price
- 16:34of gas, while the production costs of
- 16:35other power plants had not increased
- 16:37one iota. In France, we mainly produce
- 16:39our electricity using nuclear power, so
- 16:41there was no reason for us to be
- 16:43affected by the explosion in gas prices
- 16:45. At least, that's what we thought. But
- 16:48no luck. At the same time, EDF had to
- 16:50shut down some of its nuclear reactors
- 16:53due to corrosion defects. And as if
- 16:55that wasn't enough, the historic
- 16:57drought of 2022 reduced the production
- 16:59of hydroelectric dams.
- 17:00And more than half of the nuclear power
- 17:02plants are shut down for maintenance.
- 17:04Hydroelectric power plants are also
- 17:05running at low speed due to the lack of
- 17:07water. -25%of production compared to
- 17:09last year in Alsace, for example. As a
- 17:12result, French electricity production
- 17:14has fallen to its lowest level in 30
- 17:16years. For the first time, France has
- 17:18had to import electricity, even though
- 17:20it was historically one of the largest
- 17:22exporters in Europe. And in this story,
- 17:25you will see that the European market
- 17:27has not only been useless, it has
- 17:29simply worsened France's debt. At that
- 17:31time, EDF was still subject to the
- 17:33arena. Do you remember? EDF has to sell
- 17:36part of its electricity to the
- 17:37alternative supplier for € 42 per MWh
- 17:39. Even in normal times, the amount was
- 17:42completely absurd. But imagine what
- 17:44happened during the crisis. EDF was no
- 17:46longer producing enough to meet its
- 17:48consumers 'demand. It therefore had to
- 17:50buy electricity on the European market
- 17:53at crazy prices and then resell this
- 17:55electricity to the alternative supplier
- 17:58for the modest sum of € 42 per MWh.
- 18:01DF bought at € 300, € 400 or even
- 18:03€ 600 per MW to resell it at € 42.
- 18:06You can see the scale of the problem.
- 18:09And while DF was literally ruining
- 18:11itself, what rushed some alternative
- 18:14suppliers to do? They forced their
- 18:17customers to terminate their contracts
- 18:18in order to immediately sell all this
- 18:19electricity at a high price on the
- 18:20wholesale market. As a
- 18:22customer of alternative supplier Planè
- 18:24Oui, Romain had a nasty surprise when
- 18:26he received his bill in March.
- 18:28€ 1,887 for a period of 4 months. So
- 18:30from the beginning of November 2021 to
- 18:32the end of February 2022, I was
- 18:34flabbergasted, I thought there was a
- 18:35mistake somewhere and that they must
- 18:37have made a mistake. 50%gas price hike
- 18:40per kWh in 4 months. In fact, the
- 18:42supplier charged the market price and
- 18:44no longer the regulated price blocked
- 18:46by the government. Rome set up a
- 18:47collective. Hundreds of people are in
- 18:49the same situation. Well yes, they were
- 18:51not going to let the opportunity to
- 18:53take advantage of the crisis and make
- 18:54historic profits pass them by. Thanks
- 18:57to these arrangements, Home Energy made
- 19:00a gross margin of 44 million euros and
- 19:02Mint made a profit of 20 million in
- 19:042022 alone. The European Union is
- 19:06pretty cool, right? But that's not all.
- 19:08While these alternative suppliers were
- 19:10fattening up, the State had to get out
- 19:12its checkbook. To protect households,
- 19:14small businesses and communities, the
- 19:16government set up the famous price
- 19:18shield. He has frozen the increase in
- 19:21energy prices.
- 19:22We are going to block it. There will be
- 19:25no more increases in gas prices. That
- 19:27is to say, those that are planned. I
- 19:29have the power to not implement the
- 19:31texts, and the important thing is that
- 19:33for gas consumers, there will not be
- 19:35this extremely sharp increase that is
- 19:37planned.
- 19:39Today, without government action, gas
- 19:42and electricity prices for households
- 19:44would be multiplied by 2.2 at the
- 19:46beginning of next year. To avoid these
- 19:52increases, which would be unsustainable
- 19:55, we are going to extend the price
- 19:57shield mechanism for all households,
- 20:00condominiums, social housing, small
- 20:02businesses and the smallest
- 20:04municipalities until 2023.
- 20:07And that has cost him dearly, so dearly
- 20:09that we are still paying the price
- 20:11today. In total, this small operation
- 20:13cost the State 72 billion euros, and to
- 20:15this must be added another 9 billion
- 20:17euros that the State had to pay to buy
- 20:19back the shares of DF shareholders who
- 20:22were literally on the verge of
- 20:23asphyxiation. The group is in debt for
- 20:25nearly 50 billion euros. In the end, we
- 20:28were told that consumers had been
- 20:30spared during the crisis. Yes, because
- 20:32it was the taxpayer who paid for it on
- 20:34credit through public debt. All these
- 20:37dysfunctions of the European market
- 20:39were so obvious during the 2022 crisis
- 20:41that even Ursula Van Derleyen, Bruno
- 20:42Lemire and Emmanuel Macron acknowledged
- 20:44that it was absurd and that it needed
- 20:46to be reformed.
- 20:48My diagnosis is that the current design
- 20:52of the electricity market is obsolete.
- 20:59The French must pay the price of
- 21:01decarbonized electricity at its
- 21:03production cost and not have the cost
- 21:06of the MWh of decarbonized electricity
- 21:09produced by our nuclear power plants
- 21:11based
- 21:13on the price of gas. This is absurd
- 21:15from an economic point of view. It is
- 21:16absurd from an ecological point of view
- 21:18. Today, the price of electricity on
- 21:21the European market is far too
- 21:23dependent on marginal contributions,
- 21:25and in particular that of gas,
- 21:26especially at peak times. This is
- 21:29absurd for countries like ours and some
- 21:31others and means that you have an
- 21:33electricity price that is disconnected
- 21:35from the prices and the reality of
- 21:36production costs. This is also what
- 21:39means that some operators are making
- 21:41excessive profits, which I hope the
- 21:42European Commission is preparing to
- 21:44correct in the short term. But with the
- 21:46European Union, the best is often the
- 21:48enemy of the good. After the disaster
- 21:54of 2022, our leaders finally decided
- 21:55that the electricity market needed to
- 21:57be reformed. Bruno Lemer, who was then
- 22:00Minister of the Economy, was more
- 22:01determined than ever and fully intended
- 22:04to make his point. We refuse, he said
- 22:06on June 12, 2023, to allow the price of
- 22:08electricity to be dictated by the price
- 22:10of gas. We will put all our political
- 22:12weight behind it. That was his speech
- 22:15and the government did not fail to
- 22:16congratulate itself on the agreement it
- 22:18had wrested from Europe.
- 22:20We have been engaged in this battle
- 22:22with the President of the Republic for
- 22:24months and, with Agnies Pagier Renacher
- 22:26, we do not go a week, or even a day,
- 22:29without discussing with our European
- 22:31partners to obtain exactly what you
- 22:33want and which is fair: that the price
- 22:35of energy in France be paid at the cost
- 22:37of production and not at the marginal
- 22:39cost of opening the last gas-fired
- 22:41power station. Because we have kept our
- 22:45promises. We disconnected the price of
- 22:48electricity from that of gas. We have
- 22:52obtained recognition for nuclear power
- 22:54and we are regaining control of
- 22:57electricity prices. This agreement
- 23:00therefore marks a turning point for
- 23:01France. It is the result of the
- 23:03determination of the President of the
- 23:05Republic and all the teams that
- 23:07negotiated it. It is the best response
- 23:09to the far right and the far left, who
- 23:12have continued to withdraw into
- 23:14themselves following the exit from the
- 23:17European market.
- 23:18But when you know our French leaders
- 23:20and their ability to say what suits
- 23:22them, there is reason to be wary. In
- 23:24fact, there has been no questioning of
- 23:26the European market or the principle of
- 23:28marginal cost pricing. Likewise, the
- 23:31existence of alternative suppliers has
- 23:32not been questioned at all. All this
- 23:34gave rise to the VNU, the universal
- 23:37nuclear payment. Applicable since
- 23:39January 1, 2026, the VNU replaces the
- 23:42arena. On paper, the VNU should allow
- 23:45EDF to regain margins to finance its
- 23:47investments and reduce consumer bills.
- 23:49In concrete terms, EDF's obligation to
- 23:52resell part of its production at € 42
- 23:54per MW to other suppliers is over. Okay
- 23:57, that's something. From now on, EDF
- 23:59will be able to sell all of its
- 24:00production at the market price. OK, but
- 24:02now brace yourself for what's coming
- 24:04next. When the price exceeds € 78 per
- 24:08MWh, the State will tax excess revenues
- 24:11at a rate of 50%and even 90%above €
- 24:13110. The stated objective? To allow the
- 24:17State to redistribute the proceeds of
- 24:19this tax to all consumers. Let's be
- 24:21clear, for most players in the sector,
- 24:23we have essentially created a gas plant
- 24:25within a gas plant. For now, there
- 24:27remains a lot of uncertainty regarding
- 24:29the system's application. So it's hard
- 24:31to get a clear idea.
- 24:34The system is so complicated,
- 24:36especially with a reimbursement
- 24:38mechanism that can be set up, that
- 24:40consumers won't understand anything
- 24:42about it and so they will probably go
- 24:45to the mediator and we can indeed
- 24:47expect difficulties in setting up this
- 24:50system.
- 24:51Furthermore, things are unlikely to be
- 24:53much clearer in 2026 since, according
- 24:56to current forecasts, the price will
- 24:58not exceed the threshold of € 78.
- 25:00Therefore, the redistribution tax
- 25:02mechanism should not be triggered. No
- 25:04reduction in consumer bills is in sight
- 25:06. Another key point is that the VNU
- 25:09fails to exit market logic, which is by
- 25:11definition both short-term and volatile
- 25:13. Since EDF is obliged to align itself
- 25:16with the competition's prices, it
- 25:17cannot anticipate its income in the
- 25:19medium to long term. Furthermore, in a
- 25:21report from September 2025, the Court
- 25:23of Auditors stated the following: The
- 25:25regulatory mechanism due to take over
- 25:27from the arena in 2026 does not provide
- 25:29any predictability regarding the levels
- 25:31of income that DF will attract from its
- 25:34existing nuclear fleet and, more
- 25:35generally, from its non-RE generation
- 25:37fleet over the next 15 years. Clearly,
- 25:40and contrary to government
- 25:42communication, the VNU does not secure
- 25:44DF's investment capacity. Ultimately,
- 25:47French leaders are twisting themselves
- 25:49in all directions to try to stay within
- 25:51the European framework, with an outcome
- 25:53that is at best uncertain and at worst
- 25:55catastrophic. But the best part is that
- 25:57while all this is being done, the
- 25:59European Union is also putting
- 26:00obstacles in France's way when it comes
- 26:02to building the new EPR2 reactors. To
- 26:05give manufacturers visibility, France
- 26:07wants to be able to sell 30%of the
- 26:09production of future EPR2s via
- 26:10long-term contracts, in other words, to
- 26:12deviate from the single European market
- 26:15price. Well, just for that, the
- 26:16European Union is showing its teeth
- 26:18because that would undermine its famous
- 26:20ideological logic of pure and perfect
- 26:22competition. Ah, the famous free
- 26:25competition of the European Union. It's
- 26:27a bit of an à la carte thing, you know
- 26:28. On the one hand, when it comes to
- 26:29electricity and France, prices should
- 26:31not be too low because that would
- 26:33distort competition. But when some
- 26:35countries, like Ireland or the
- 26:36Netherlands, propose unfair taxation to
- 26:38steal investments from their neighbors,
- 26:40strangely enough, it doesn't seem to
- 26:41bother them. And that's the problem
- 26:44with the European Union: you always
- 26:45have to fight for everything, and in
- 26:47the end, it's still France that loses.
- 26:52So that's where we are. Yes, the
- 26:55European market has generalized the
- 26:56merit system across the continent,
- 26:58which allows us to prioritize using
- 27:00cheaper, carbon-intensive power plants.
- 27:02We can't deny that. But in France, has
- 27:05it reduced our electricity bill? No.
- 27:08Has it encouraged innovation as we were
- 27:10promised? No, not either. In reality,
- 27:13competition mostly brought about
- 27:15alternative suppliers who ruined EDF
- 27:17and the State in the process. As a
- 27:19result, we pay for electricity at a
- 27:21price totally disconnected from
- 27:22production costs. We end up with an
- 27:24over-indebted producer and we have
- 27:26created a gas factory that we can no
- 27:28longer control. And to top it all off,
- 27:30as soon as the State tries to regulate
- 27:33and plan its energy policy, it finds
- 27:35itself having to battle with the
- 27:36European Union. However, as long as we
- 27:39remain stuck with gas prices that yo-yo
- 27:41in a completely unpredictable way,
- 27:43planning anything in the long term is
- 27:46impossible. So, now that we know all
- 27:48this, what do we do? One thing is
- 27:50certain, we absolutely do not need all
- 27:52these alternative suppliers. By
- 27:54artificially opening up electricity to
- 27:55competition, our leaders have clearly
- 27:57been blinded by their ideology. They
- 27:59wanted to apply it to all sectors of
- 28:01the economy. However, electricity is
- 28:03not a commodity like any other. It is
- 28:05what is called a natural monopoly and
- 28:07should not be opened up to competition.
- 28:09The second certainty is that the price
- 28:11of our electricity must correspond to
- 28:13the real and full cost of production.
- 28:14No more, no less. Even Bruno Lemè
- 28:17agrees with that, which says it all. So
- 28:19what we are proposing at Praxis is two
- 28:21measures. First, restoring DF's
- 28:23monopoly. Second, getting out of the
- 28:26marginal cost pricing system. This
- 28:29means that in France we would have a
- 28:31public system that would own all the
- 28:32means of production and that would bill
- 28:34all consumers based on the real and
- 28:36complete costs of production. But be
- 28:38careful, this does not mean that we
- 28:39isolate ourselves and stop trading with
- 28:41our European neighbors. Contrary to
- 28:44what some people try to make us believe
- 28:45, we do not have to completely leave
- 28:46the European market to do this.
- 28:49We are a global market, a single market
- 28:51, and there must be free movement
- 28:53because it does indeed benefit
- 28:55producers. France is a net producer of
- 28:57electricity, particularly thanks to
- 28:58nuclear power.
- 28:59France is neither Spain nor Portugal.
- 29:00It is not a penultimate country. It is
- 29:02connected to other nations that supply
- 29:04it with energy when, unfortunately,
- 29:06what happened, our nuclear power plants
- 29:07are not working. 12 of them had to be
- 29:10closed due to accidents that were
- 29:12corrected thanks to EDF. I am simply
- 29:14saying that if we had left the European
- 29:16energy market today, European
- 29:18solidarity would not have come into
- 29:19play and there would have been no
- 29:21electricity in bakers' ovens. We'd be
- 29:23well ahead, the same big shots as
- 29:25before.
- 29:25It is important to know that in France,
- 29:28we import electricity 40 days a year.
- 29:31So that is nothing new. And that is why
- 29:34we have a European market and that is
- 29:36why we have interconnections. And that
- 29:38is why the people who tell you that we
- 29:40need to leave the European energy
- 29:42market are big and reponsible. The
- 29:45electricity market is essential so that
- 29:47bakers can heat their ovens.
- 29:49That is a total lie. We began importing
- 29:53and exporting electricity well before
- 29:55the European market existed,
- 29:58and the first interconnections, the one
- 30:01that saw France, Germany and
- 30:03Switzerland create interconnections,
- 30:06were in 1967. I therefore propose that
- 30:12we stop repeating and announcing this
- 30:14untruth and that we leave it to the
- 30:16experts on the BFM Business television
- 30:18sets and focus on the facts. Just as we
- 30:23can trade without discussing
- 30:25climate-killing exchanges since we have
- 30:27been trading since ancient times, we
- 30:30can maintain interconnections and
- 30:32solidarity-based exchanges rather than
- 30:34letting traders make profits. The only
- 30:38difference is that before, we only
- 30:40imported electricity when there was a
- 30:42shortage. Today, we buy our electricity
- 30:44where the production cost is lowest.
- 30:47And we can absolutely continue to do
- 30:49that with a public monopoly and
- 30:51regulated prices. All that's needed is
- 30:53for the European market to become
- 30:55solely an import-export market, and for
- 30:56the rest, well, we can manage things as
- 30:58we wish. This architecture is supported
- 31:00in particular by Anne de Brejas, a
- 31:02research engineer at EDF and
- 31:04spokesperson for the Sudénergie
- 31:05Federation. Ultimately, the main
- 31:08problem with this solution is the
- 31:10European Union.
- 31:11And what's really crazy is that there
- 31:13is a simple solution. We're going back
- 31:16to a public system in France and in all
- 31:18the countries that want it.
- 31:20So a public system that would, well, I
- 31:24think, gradually own all the means of
- 31:27production.
- 31:27Okay.
- 31:29And that would bill all consumers based
- 31:32on the average cost of French
- 31:33production. Okay?
- 31:36By including the cost or revenue from
- 31:38export taxes
- 31:39on a purely legal level, of course, we
- 31:41would be forced to disobey the European
- 31:44treaties or to modify them. But beyond
- 31:46the law, do we risk harming our
- 31:48neighbors? Could he impose reprisals on
- 31:51us if France were to remain its public
- 31:53monopoly and apply its own prices? Well
- 31:55, that's not obvious. At worst, it
- 31:57would be open to negotiation. We're
- 32:00used to that with Europe, but for once,
- 32:02our leaders would truly defend France's
- 32:04interests. So starting today, it's up
- 32:06to you to decide. Do you agree to
- 32:08entrust the operation of the French
- 32:09electricity system to a centralized
- 32:11public player? And next week, you'll be
- 32:14able to vote in favor of ending the
- 32:16marginal pricing system. To vote, go to
- 32:19our platform praxismedia.fr. The link
- 32:21is in the comments and in the
- 32:23description. I remind you that Praxis
- 32:25is an independent media outlet that
- 32:26depends entirely on your financial
- 32:28contributions. If you think that our
- 32:30work is useful and that we should give
- 32:32power back to citizens, subscribe to
- 32:33our site to keep the project alive. And
- 32:35of course, you can like, share this
- 32:37video and subscribe to the channel.
- 32:40Take care of yourself and remember, now
- 32:42we're taking control. Ah.
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